Abstract
This study presents selective moral disengagement as a paradigm for analyzing extremist marketing messages and developing effective countermessages. Selective moral disengagement explicates eight mechanisms common to extremist media content that can influence seemingly ordinary people to support and commit atrocities. Through a qualitative content analysis, the author investigates the use of moral disengagement mechanisms in an online propaganda magazine (Rumiyah) of the so-called Islamic State (IS) terrorist organization. This article demonstrates the extensive use of the eight moral disengagement mechanisms throughout a variety of genres of IS propaganda articles. In addition, a ninth moral disengagement strategy—humanization of perpetrators—emerged. The analysis reveals internal inconsistencies in IS’s approach to moral disengagement. The author argues that careful consideration of the use of these mechanisms in IS propaganda clarifies the understanding of IS’s marketing strategy and informs countermessaging efforts. Specific countermessaging approaches are proposed for combatting IS given these findings. Further, a roadmap is given for extending the selective moral disengagement analysis paradigm into other extremist marketing contexts, including U.S. domestic terrorism.
How are seemingly ordinary people persuaded to commit atrocities? And what interventions can disrupt this process? These two questions form the foundation of Bandura's social psychological work on selective moral disengagement (SMD). Rather than framing violent, radical actors as possessing fundamentally different psyches than ordinary humans, Bandura's SMD perspective argues that all humans have internalized moral codes that inhibit harmful behavior. But media messages and social systems can encourage the selective disengagement of these codes (Bandura 1986, 2002, 2015). Such disengagement empowers people to support and commit atrocities with minimal self-condemnation. Eight factors—including moral justification, displacement of responsibility, and dehumanization of victims—are hypothesized to enable SMD.
In the decades since Bandura first introduced SMD, many researchers have applied the perspective in contexts as varied as military campaigns, video games, and corporate workspaces (Bandura 2015). Researchers in the context of political extremism and terrorism also apply SMD and theorize about its role in the efforts of variousorganizations, states, or media to widely manipulate audiences, which are referred to as propaganda efforts (see Lakomy 2020). Many organizations perpetrating terrorism—defined as the “premeditated use or threat to use violence … against non-combatants to obtain a political objective through the intimidation of a large audience” (Sandler 2018, p. 1)—use propaganda strategies. The messaging efforts of influential terrorist and extremist groups are strategic and coordinated, drawing on fundamental principles of psychological manipulation and rationalization. But despite the clear recognition that SMD is relevant to the context of terrorism, little research has systematically identified and analyzed the SMD strategies embedded in terrorist propaganda texts (for a rare exception, see Frissen and D’Haenens [2017]). Yet analyzing SMD strategies in terrorist texts can elucidate the effectiveness of propaganda and inform governmental and paragovernmental efforts at creating effective countermessaging that aim to disrupt the radicalization process.
This study thus proposes SMD as a crucial text analysis tool for (1) analyzing terrorist propaganda and (2) formulating effective countermessaging. Although I argue that SMD can and should be applied to a variety of extremist and terrorist texts, this study specifically applies SMD to written propaganda of the so-called Islamic State (IS; referred to alternatively as ISIS, ISIL, and Daesh) terrorist organization. Wielding a highly strategized propaganda network, IS recruited over 40,000 fighters from 120 countries outside of Iraq and Syria from 2014 to 2017 (The Wilson Center 2017). Further, the unprecedented deadliness of the IS caliphate and the ongoing threat of IS in its current decentralized format (Reed and Aryaeinejad 2021) make IS a crucial context for continued investigation and counterstrategizing. Highly publicized IS attacks at the Kabul, Afghanistan airport in August 2021 and at a prison holding IS fighters near Hasaka, Syria in January 2022 left hundreds of civilians and military personnel dead, reminding the world of the continuing threat of the organization (Hubbard 2022). In addition, the failure of the U.S. government's previous countermessaging efforts to effectively combat IS's powerful propaganda machine highlights the need for improved strategies in countermessaging formation. Thus, this research aims to demonstrate how the SMD framework can provide much needed strategic enhancement for countermessaging strategies against extremist ideologies and actors.
This study combines literature review and content analysis to demonstrate the importance of the SMD framework in analyzing terrorist propaganda and forming countermessaging strategies. The article first presents an in-depth review of the SMD framework and its current application in terrorist contexts. It then presents a qualitative content analysis of a portion of Rumiyah, a flagship propaganda magazine of IS that was published in 12 languages and distributed through IS's vast social media network (Samouris 2018). Consistent with a directed qualitative content analysis approach as defined by Hsieh and Shannon (2005; see also Krippendorff 2004), the analysis aims both to apply existing theorizing (SMD) in an underresearched context and to extend the theoretical paradigm. To this end, the qualitative content analysis explores three key research questions (RQs). First, how does IS incorporate cues of the eight mechanisms presented by SMD (Bandura 1986, 2002, 2015) into its propaganda (RQ1)? To answer this question, the analysis probes which mechanisms are most prevalent, how they interrelate with one another, and which themes commonly appear in the presentation of different mechanisms. Second, what other strategies used by IS may facilitate SMD beyond the eight mechanisms presented by Bandura (RQ2)? Finally, given the specific strategies used by IS to promote SMD, how can countermessaging strategies best encourage moral engagement (RQ3)?
In analyzing these research questions, I discuss the emergence of an additional SMD strategy beyond the original eight outlined by Bandura, and I demonstrate the significance of observed inconsistencies in IS's propaganda strategy. Finally, I provide practical policy recommendations for applying SMD to the creation of countermessaging. I discuss not only how the current analysis could inform IS countermessaging specifically but also how further research could extend this framework to other extremist contexts, including domestic terrorism.
Selective Moral Disengagement
Overview
To explain the relevance of SMD to this endeavor, I first present a summary of the general approach, followed by a discussion of the nuances of SMD in a terrorism context, a review of applications of SMD to terroristic text analysis, and, finally, an overview of the relevance of SMD for countermessaging strategies. SMD (Bandura 1986, 2002, 2015) begins with the premise that humans generally operate off a set of moral convictions that drive them to be decent to their fellow humans. According to Bandura (2002), “Individuals adopt standards of right and wrong that serve as guides and deterrents for conduct … and regulate their actions by the consequences they apply to themselves” (p. 102). However, when prompted, humans can disengage from these typical moral convictions and support or even commit morally reprehensible acts. This process—labeled by Badura as SMD—is thought to occur through eight distinct psychosocial mechanisms, which are situated in four categories (Bandura 1986, 2002, 2015; see Table 1).
Categories and Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement as Defined by Bandura (1986, 2002, 2015).
Each category focuses on a specific element of the process of committing a harmful act. The first category focuses on rationalizations of the behavior itself. The second category focuses on the denial of agency for committing the harmful behavior. The third category focuses on minimization of the outcomes of harmful behavior. Finally, the fourth category focuses on portrayals of victims of harmful behavior.
Importantly, Bandura (2015) conceptualizes SMD as a universal process in which all humans engage from time to time, which is dependent on context and motivation. By selectively disengaging from our own moral values, humans can escape the internal self-censure and cognitive dissonance (see Festinger 1957) that would otherwise result from committing or approving of behaviors we typically believe to be immoral. In this sense, SMD is a self-protective process empowered by several psychosocial mechanisms that have been observed across cultures and contexts. Although explicit applications of SMD to marketing contexts have been limited (for notable exceptions, see Finnel, Reed, and Aquino [2011] and Lim, Cho, and Bedford [2019]), I contend that SMD provides a crucial perspective for marketing practitioners, particularly in the context of understanding extremist propaganda and crafting effective countermessaging.
Applying SMD in Terrorism-Related Contexts
Because terrorism intentionally targets innocent adults and children going about their daily lives in an effort to bring a people or nation to its knees, Bandura (2015) argues that SMD must be particularly well-practiced for terrorists to live with themselves. Further, Bandura emphasizes that the common conception that there must be a “distinctive ‘terrorist personality’” (2015, p. 313) is faulty. Bandura notes that terrorists cannot be accurately stereotyped as possessing a consistent life circumstance, religion, ethnicity, or socioeconomic background (see also Sandler 2018). Instead, many different types of individuals—particularly with the right circumstances and mechanisms at play—could become terrorists.
Bandura (2015) further notes that three of the eight mechanisms may be used quite differently by terrorists than by others. First, Bandura notes that because terrorists aim to emphasize the brutality of their actions to maximize the terror experienced by the population they are targeting, terrorists are unlikely to intentionally use euphemistic labeling to describe their actions, and they may go out of their way to share the gory details of their violence instead. However, terrorists may strategically frame the way they describe themselves by distorting “how they construe their mission and view themselves in carrying it out” (Bandura 2015, p. 317). For example, terrorists may refer to themselves as “freedom fighters.”
Bandura's fifth and sixth mechanisms—diffusion of responsibility and disregard or distortion of consequences—also function differently for terrorists. Diffusion of responsibility is typically characterized by rationalizing away individual responsibility for playing a part in evil actions; however, many terrorists actually seek glory from their personal responsibility for committing a terrorist act. In the context of radical Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, terrorists see acts of religious violence (jihad) as obedience to and worship of Allah, which increases their chances at eternal reward. Relatedly, terrorists are unlikely to downplay the painful outcomes of their acts (distortion of consequences) because “terrorists usually magnify the harm they cause” (Bandura 2015, p. 320). Overall, although most of the mechanisms of SMD apply similarly to both terrorists and others, nuances exist in applying the perspective to terrorism.
Bandura's SMD theorizing has prompted numerous terrorism-related research endeavors. However, these efforts largely focus on studying SMD as a tendency for an individual (e.g., Blanco et al. 2022; Mafimisebi and Thorne 2017; Ozer and Bertelson 2020), not as a set of mechanisms that fuel behavioral choices and are exacerbated by external cues (e.g., propaganda). For example, Lieber, Efreom-Lieber, and Rate (2010) analyze the presence of moral disengagement psychological traits in young Egyptian Muslim males who are at risk for radicalization. The authors discover that SMD tendencies are prevalent in the population and that younger males are more likely to possess SMD tendencies than their older counterparts.
But although better understanding contextual and individual variation in SMD is helpful, the power of Bandura's theorizing lies in his predictions regarding the universality of SMD and the broad effectiveness of extremist propaganda that taps into SMD's eight psychosocial mechanisms. Bandura (2015, p. 99) notes that SMD is often prompted and enabled by external forces, rather than predicted by individuals’ internal proclivities: “It requires conducive social conditions rather than monstrous people to produce atrocious deeds” (see also Sarma 2010). Thus, researchers should investigate not only individual human differences but also the content of terroristic messaging from an SMD perspective.
Applying SMD to Terroristic Marketing Content
Few researchers have used the framework of SMD to systematically analyze terrorist propaganda (for an informal application, see Sarma [2007]). However, one major exception must be discussed. Frissen and D’Haneans (2017) use the eight mechanisms of SMD as the basis for a quantitative content analysis in which sentence-by-sentence coding is used to count the total incidences of each mechanism in 14 issues of IS's Dabiq magazine. The authors’ analysis features calculations of the comparative frequencies of the eight mechanisms and tracks changes over time. The analysis shows that IS relied heavily on SMD mechanisms in Dabiq and documents 4,683 instances of SMD arguments or wording across the 14 issues.
Although this analysis is truly impressive in its scope and longitudinal nature, the use of SMD mechanisms as quantitative coding categories with the goal of drawing numerical comparisons between categories poses some limitations. Some of Bandura's mechanisms are typically identified in individual words/phrases, but other mechanisms rely largely on multisentence arguments, resulting in comparatively lower counts in a sentence-by-sentence quantitative coding approach. For example, a reader of IS propaganda will note that Bandura's seventh mechanism—dehumanization—typically manifests in single words or phrases (e.g., “filthy ones,” “kuffar”). Similarly, Bandura's second mechanism—euphemistic labeling—is typically identified through the use of a single word or phrase (e.g., “eliminate” instead of “kill”). In contrast, mechanisms such as advantageous comparison and moral justification are often represented by extended, implicit narratives spanning several sentences or even paragraphs (see Table 3). Thus, it is not surprising that Frissen and D’Haneans’s (2017) results show that dehumanization and euphemistic labeling are far more prevalent than other mechanisms. The authors conclude there is a need for particular focus on combatting these two mechanisms (rather than the other six).
Summary of Coding Rules and Key Examples.
Before such a conclusion is firmly established, however, I propose that diverse, complementary methods are needed to promote an understanding of the relative impact of all eight mechanisms in their varying forms. Indeed, a qualitative analysis that can examine the exposition strategies involved in the use of each mechanism may be particularly well-suited for drawing conclusions regarding which mechanisms are most central to IS's propaganda strategy. Further, a qualitative approach empowers a more meaningful analysis of Bandura's key outcome–focused mechanism: disregard or distortion of consequences. This mechanism often manifests in the absence rather than presence of information (e.g., a lack of discussion of victims’ suffering). Absence of information is difficult, if not impossible, to objectively quantify (see Hopf 2004).
SMD's Practicality for Countermessaging
SMD not only provides a powerful analytical tool for assessing terrorist propaganda, but it can also inform the creation of effective countermessages. SMD research repeatedly shows that although moral standards can be disengaged through psychosocial mechanisms, they can also be engaged (see Bandura 2002; McAlister 2001). Thus, applications of SMD to the creation of effective countermessages are explored in the “Discussion” section of this article.
Careful strategy in message creation is sorely needed. Many past governmental efforts at creating counterpropaganda messages against terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and IS lacked evidence-based strategy (Carthy et al. 2020). For example, the U.S. Department of State launched the “Think Again, Turn Away” program in 2013, which was originally designed to combat al-Qaeda propaganda but shifted to combatting IS propaganda by 2014. The campaign was broadly criticized by analysts. Text and videos gave legitimacy to jihadists, demonstrated a poor understanding of Islamic cultural values, and risked polarizing the very audiences they tried to persuade (Bilazarian 2020; Braddock and Morrison 2020; Speckhard and Ellenberg 2020). With little to no evidence of success, the “Think Again, Turn Away” program is no longer active.
A careful analysis of the SMD strategies in an enemy's messaging can inform the creation of moral engagement strategies that use the enemy's own tactics against them. With this ultimate goal in mind, I next provide a brief overview of IS's goals and propaganda efforts, followed by a discussion of previous analytical strategies and the current study's methods and results.
The Current Context: Islamic State Propaganda
IS originated as a branch of al-Qaeda in 2006 and separated from al-Qaeda in early 2014—the same year that IS began to amass significant territory. IS established itself as unique from other radical Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, by prioritizing the creation and governance of a territorial caliphate. By the fall of 2014, IS subdued large swaths of Iraq and Syria and controlled 41,000 square miles of territory (The Wilson Center 2017)—an area similar in size to Ohio.
As a modern terrorist group, IS’s deadliness is unmatched. By early 2018, IS had enacted 143 terrorist attacks in 29 countries, killing over 2,000 people outside of Iraq and Syria (Lister et al. 2018). Though Syrian casualty numbers have been difficult to estimate, a 2016 United Nations report states that 18,000 civilians were killed and 36,000 civilians were wounded in the first two years of the IS conflict in Iraq alone (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2016). Further, IS has demonstrated not only its violent global power but also its ability to attract recruits from around the world with incredible speed. Through its highly strategized social media propaganda efforts, IS drew over 40,000 fighters from 120 countries outside of Iraq and Syria from 2014–2017 (The Wilson Center 2017), including nearly every member of the European Union, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.
IS Marketing and Propaganda Strategies
Compared with other terrorist groups, IS has created unprecedented amounts of textual and visual propaganda materials. Western audiences are often familiar with gruesome videos of IS executions that receive sanitized coverage by mainstream media outlets (see Grizzard et al. 2017). However, experts note that such videos are only a small part of IS’s marketing efforts and that IS has created and distributed thousands of high-quality video propaganda pieces (Robinson and Dauber 2019). Further, IS created and published 15 high-quality online issues of a magazine called Dabiq from 2014–2016, which featured a total of 159 different articles, forwards, and other unique informational items (Simons 2018). These magazines were remarkable in their well-framed images, skillful design, and powerful writing, showing clear professional creation. After Dabiq, IS launched a second series of propaganda magazines entitled Rumiyah, which is the focus of this research analysis. Similar to Dabiq in its design, Rumiyah was a key feature of IS text propaganda efforts from 2016–2017. As Samouris (2018) describes, “Monthly RUMIYAH, the flagship IS magazine addressing audiences in eleven languages other than Arabic, is by its nature one of the core instruments of IS propaganda” (p. 20).
IS's expansive propaganda dissemination efforts on social media empowered IS to reach an incredibly broad audience with its high-quality materials. An analysis of Twitter data in a ten-month period from July 2014 through April 2015 shows that IS possessed a network of nearly 76,000 supporter accounts (Bodine-Baron et al. 2016) averaging 60 tweets daily for each account. Even as Twitter continued to suspend IS accounts in 2016 and future years, IS began to focus its social media efforts more heavily on Telegram (Samouris 2018), which features encryption and minimal censorship. Though experts note some signs of success in combatting IS distribution channels, the idea that online propaganda distribution will ever be fully stopped is utopian. Thus, experts also advocate for the distribution of countermessages (Bilazarian 2020).
IS as an Active Threat
Although coalition forces succeeded in ousting IS from the last of its territorial claims in Iraq and Syria in 2017, IS continues to pose a substantial threat. Though IS no longer controls its own territorial caliphate, it continues to thrive as a decentralized global sleeper-cell organization. As of February 2020, the Prime Minister of Iraqi Kurdistan estimated that 20,000 IS fighters were active in sleeper cells in Iraq and Syria alone and were actively recruiting (Giglio and Gilsinan 2020). In Iraq there were 556 IS attacks in the first three months of 2020, and an additional 100 attacks were reported in August 2020 (Dent 2020). Overall, IS continues to greatly concern the intelligence community, and experts warn of potential of continued attacks and resurgence. An attack in Baghdad, Iraq, on January 21, 2021, demonstrated the validity of these warning, as at least 32 people were killed and 110 were injured (Diaz and Fordham 2021). Repeated IS attacks in Afghanistan, Syria, Nigeria, and other countries have killed many hundreds more in late 2021 and into 2022 (see Hubbard 2022).
Experts warn that two trends indicate a concerning potential for global resurgence of IS threats in the coming months and years. First, although IS lost its territorial caliphate, it has expanded globally to include affiliates in Europe, Russia, Asia, and Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa has become a particular hotbed for IS affiliation and attacks (Reed and Aryaeinejad 2021). Second, experts warn of a burgeoning radicalization crisis in prisons and camps hosting alleged IS fighters and their families. As of 2020, approximately 10,000 alleged IS fighters from approximately 50 different nations were being held in prisons in northeast Syria that were guarded by Kurdish forces with little international assistance (Schmitt 2020). In addition, 70,000 family members of IS fighters are being held at al-Hol camp in northern Syria, which has proved to be a hotbed for radicalization and violence (Jeffrey 2020). Expert James Jeffrey (2020) notes of al-Hol and related camps, “ISIS is engaged in indoctrination and presumably preliminary recruitment in the camps. The goal is to form a new generation of ISIS leaders and fighters.” Recognizing IS’s capabilities of recruiting inordinate numbers of followers from across the globe, I next review past efforts at assessing IS's propaganda efforts and identify the need for further analysis.
Past Analyses and Need for SMD Approach
Thus far, this article has presented SMD as a valuable theoretical framework for analyzing propaganda and noted that little research has systematically applied SMD to terrorism texts. However, significant research has applied alternative theoretical paradigms to the analysis of terrorism texts, including the analysis of IS propaganda. Such efforts are worthy of a brief review to understand both the current state of IS propaganda research and what an analysis based on SMD can contribute that prior research has not.
Current research on IS's propaganda magazines includes general thematic categorization, narrative analyses, and observations of language shifts across time. Several scholars use thematic categorization (see Musial 2016) to investigate the breadth of IS propaganda magazines (Dabiq and Rumiyah) and assess the broad types of content that emerge in these writings (for a thorough review of the trends in IS magazine propaganda content from 2014–2017, see Ingram [2018]). For example, Colas (2017) sorts Dabiq's content into genres and themes to theorize which types of content may be intended for which audiences. Lakomy (2020) uses a seven-part framework from the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, which originated during World War II, to identify general themes in IS magazine propaganda. This classic propaganda analysis tool is used across various extremist contexts (see Sarma 2007) and focuses on seven language strategies common in propaganda, three of which emerge as significantly prevalent in IS content (name-calling, glittering generalities, and transfer). Other analyses examine general thematic differences between Dabiq and Rumiyah. For example, Welch (2018) categorizes the content of Dabiq and Rumiyah into a five-part typology and finds that the later magazine (Rumiyah) focuses more on Islamic teaching than its predecessor. Other scholars note that Rumiyah focuses more heavily on apocalyptic religious content and the need for lone-wolf attacks in the face of territorial losses than Dabiq (Wignell et al. 2017; see also Ingram 2018).
In the realm of narrative framing analysis, Andersen and Sandberg (2020) apply social movement theory and subcultural theory to IS propaganda analysis. The authors note an inherent tension in IS's strategy, as it aims to appeal to a broad global audience by presenting itself as a legitimate social movement while also using graphic violence to attract the interest and allegiance of a radically violent subculture. Alternatively, Ingram (2016) examines identity frames in Dabiq and notes that one of the most prevalent strategies in IS propaganda is dichotomizing the in-group (IS adherents) and the out-group (nonadherents) to emphasize the crisis/threat posed by the out-group. Using a black-and-white portrayal of good and evil, IS demands complete adherence and implores followers to assist in implementing violent solutions to the threats posed by the out-group. Finally, some recent work uses automated linguistic analysis tools to examine changes in IS word usage over time (see Vergani and Bliuc 2018).
The approaches summarized offer helpful lenses into understanding the content and strategy of IS propaganda. Yet SMD serves as a lens that can provide unique insight that reaches beyond prior analyses. First, SMD is particularly well-suited for analyzing IS propaganda because it is a universal theory of human psychology and behavior, unbounded by a specific cultural context. As previously discussed, IS recruited fighters from more than 120 countries, which suggests that a universal theory of human psychology is appropriate to inform countermessaging strategies that, by necessity, must reach people across the globe. Second, SMD is an inherently practical theory, formulated with the purpose of not only observing and explaining harmful behavior but also effectively disrupting it (see Bandura 1986, 2002). Finally, and relatedly, SMD is ultimately a theory of human behavior, rooted in decades of social psychological research on the observed nature, motivations, and behaviors of humans (see Bandura 1986). Although identifying genres and narrative themes is an important first step in propaganda analysis, such approaches only become practical for counterterrorism when the psychological processes that are cued are also considered. SMD empowers observations of text that can be directly tied to processes in the human psyche, and those processes must be directly targeted in countermessaging efforts. Next, I present the method and results of an analysis based in SMD to empower such direct targeting.
Method
Sampling
The data analyzed were the entire article contents of the second issue of Rumiyah, which was published in October of 2016. This issue was chosen through purposive sampling (Palinkas et al. 2015). A full issue was chosen, rather than a selection of articles from various issues, to collect the full breadth of genres contained in a single issue and to capture IS's propaganda strategy at a single snapshot in time. Further, careful readers will note that although initial Rumiyah issues were extremely high-quality, the quality declined somewhat as the issues progressed, possibly as a result of the assassination of key IS leaders and the loss of IS territory that was ongoing during Rumiyah’s publication. An early issue of Rumiyah was thus chosen to prioritize the “selection of information-rich cases for the most effective use of limited resources” (Palinkas et al. 2015, p. 534; see also Krippendorf 2004).
In addition, the sampling procedure prioritized maximum variation and inclusion of a critical case (Palinkas et al. 2015). The first issue of Rumiyah—though perhaps the most logical starting place at first glance—includes a significant amount of introductory content, so it does not have the maximum variation of genre desired. The second issue includes a wide breadth of genres and it additionally featured a critical case, which proved useful for analysis. Specifically, a terrorism instructional article in issue 2 (“Just Terror Tactics”) was the first of its kind in an IS propaganda magazine (Ingram 2018). This article includes step-by-step instructions for lone-wolf knife attacks, and it gained global attention after it sparked a number of such attacks around the world (see Engel 2016). Thus, this issue captures a high-quality example of IS print publications, including maximum variation in genre and a critical case.
Summary of Data
The issue being analyzed is 38 pages long and written in English, but many English transliterations of Arabic words are incorporated throughout. Although it primarily comprises text-based articles, the issue also includes several infographics and many large photographs. The artistic design and writing quality of the magazine is remarkable, denoting professional creation (see Figure 1). The issue contains ten distinct articles, which range widely in genre. Several articles are devoted to the Islamic history of jihad, citing examples and quotations from the Prophet Muhammed and other ancient Islamic leaders. One article provides step-by-step instructions for purchasing a quality knife and using knives to kill various individuals. Another article contains a series of reports of “operations” detailing the circumstances and number of casualties of select IS attacks around the world. Other articles contain official directions and memorandums from IS leadership that clarify policies and rebut accusations from international media and governments. Although two articles contain a byline identifying a specific author, the rest do not. Table 2 provides a brief overview of the genre and content of the ten core articles of the magazine issue (as observed and categorized by this article's author). Further, Figure 1 offers examples of magazine pages.
Cover and pages 2, 8, and 12 of Rumiyah, issue 2.
Article Genres and Summaries of Rumiyah, Issue 2.
Analysis Procedure
The current study applies the method of qualitative content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Krippendorff 2004; see also Altheide and Schnider 2013). Specifically, the analysis followed a directed approach (Hsieh and Shannon 2005) in which a preexisting theoretical framework (Bandura's SMD, in this context) is used as the initial basis for developing operational definitions for coding (see Blanco et al. 2022).
The analysis dissected several elements of Rumiyah, issue 2. First, the articles within the issue were categorized into genres (e.g., history of Islam, terrorism instructions, attack reports), noting key differences and areas of overlap among article types. As part of contextualizing the articles, I categorized each article into up to two of six distinct genres that I observed in the coding process (see Table 2). Second, the tactics used to encourage SMD were identified throughout the issue, and potential SMD techniques that did not fit neatly within any of Bandura's eight mechanisms were also observed and analyzed, which is the focus of the study's second research question (RQ2). Third, the intersections of genre and SMD cues were inspected. Fourth, the analysis explored how SMD cues were used in connection with one another, analyzing the development of multiple cues in extended arguments and narratives.
Consistent with directed qualitative content analysis methodology (Hsieh and Shannon 2005; see also Krippendorff 2004), I first reviewed relevant literature that discusses SMD content cues in relevant contexts (e.g., Bandura 2002, 2015; Frissen and D’Haenens 2017 [including coding materials provided by the authors]). Definitional refinement was performed collaboratively with two undergraduate research assistants. After reading and discussing literature relevant to the theoretical approach (SMD), I adapted operationalizations from prior work (i.e., Frissen and D’Haenens 2017) to formulate initial operational definitions. Then, the assistants and I coded and discussed several portions of past IS propaganda magazines (Dabiq) to develop familiarity with applications of SMD in this context. These discussions led me to substantially revise the operational definitions. The team then completed exploratory coding of Rumiyah, issue 2. Again, group discussions enabled me to refine the operational definitions of the mechanisms represented in the text.
During the process of preliminary coding and group discussions for operational refinement, an apparent SMD strategy emerged in the reading of the text that did not fit neatly into any of Bandura's eight mechanisms. This strategy is referred to in this analysis as “humanization of perpetrators.” Upon observing this strategy several times, I added it to the final research protocol in accordance with RQ3, which asks what elements of IS propaganda may encourage SMD beyond the eight mechanisms classically presented by Bandura. After developing and refining the protocol, I conducted the final rounds of coding (reported next) alone. The full operational definitions, including coding rules, clarification points, and anchor examples, are available in the Web Appendix, and a summary of coding rules is included alongside key results in Table 3.
Results
The first research question (RQ1) asks how IS incorporated cues of the eight original SMD mechanisms (Bandura 1986, 2002, 2015) into its propaganda, and the second (RQ2) asks what other strategies used by IS may facilitate SMD beyond the eight mechanisms presented by Bandura. Results of the qualitative content analysis indicate that all eight of Bandura's mechanisms, as well as the additional humanization of perpetrators strategy, were used by IS throughout Rumiyah, issue 2. Table 3 presents a breakdown of this analysis that summarizes how IS operationalized each mechanism and gives key examples in each category. Beyond Table 3, further detail is presented regarding which mechanisms are most emphasized and how mechanisms were observed to interrelate with one another.
Emphasized Mechanisms and Strategic Combinations
Although IS utilized all eight of Bandura's proposed mechanisms in its propaganda, four mechanisms are emphasized more than the others. Moral justification and displacement of responsibility are prevalent throughout, and they are heavily tied to religious appeals to holy scriptures, Allah, and the Prophet Muhammed. Moreover, the victim-focused strategies of dehumanization and attribution of blame are highly dominant across the issue. In addition to these four mechanisms, the exploratory mechanism of humanization of perpetrators is also heavily emphasized throughout, manifesting in eulogies for recently deceased IS fighters, descriptions of the daily struggles of IS adherents, and stories about historical violent jihadists.
Not only are these five strategies (moral justification, displacement of responsibility, dehumanization of victims, attribution of blame, and humanization of perpetrators) heavily emphasized throughout the issue, but they are also strategically used in combination with one another. Moral justification and displacement of responsibility are carefully intertwined in many passages to make the argument that violence is commanded by Allah (displacement) for the greater good of the world (justification). The two mechanisms combine to reinforce one another: Allah's credibility as a supreme authority is boosted by his care for the world, and IS's claim that violent jihad benefits the world is supported by Allah's divine wisdom. The issue’s opening paragraph provides a prime example of this two-pronged approach, which repeats throughout: When mentioning the obligation of jihad for His cause, Allah indicated that some people would have reservations toward this noble commandment…. He then reminded the believers to place their trust in Him, by deferring to His infinite wisdom instead of relying upon their limited knowledge…. He further taught them that if it were not for jihad, the world would be filled with corruption. “And if it were not for Allah curbing people by means of others, the earth would become corrupt, but Allah has much bounty for the creation” (Al-Baqarah 251). (p. 2)
Further, the two victim-related mechanisms (dehumanization and attribution of blame) are often applied together. Many of the dehumanizing group labels used to deindividuate victims also include accusations of immorality or disloyalty to Islam/Allah. Such disloyalty is frequently discussed as deserving of punishment by death. These dehumanizing and blame-inducing labels include “kuffar/kafir [infidel],” “disbelievers,” “taghut [idol/demon/opposer of Allah],” “enemies of Allah,” “murtadd [apostate],” “pagans,” “apostates,” “mushrikin [worshipers of one(s) other than Allah],” and “fasiq [evildoer].” A clear example of mixing dehumanizing language and moral blame is further seen in the praising of violent jihadists who “struck the necks of the kuffar [apostates] with their swords, severing limbs and piercing the fleshy meat of those who opposed Islam” (p. 12).
Dehumanization of victims is further accentuated by its frequent proximity to humanization of perpetrators, emphasizing the purported difference in human value between IS fighters and their victims. Though this contrast is apparent throughout the issue, it is most clearly observed in “The Shuhada of the Gulshan Attack,” which details a deadly IS attack by five suicide fighters on a bakery in Bangladesh. The first half of the article details the attack and describes the dozens of civilian victims solely in collective and dehumanized terms, such as “Crusaders, pagans, and apostates” (p. 10). In sharp contrast, the second half of the article features individual eulogies for the five IS terrorists who died during the attack, including detailed narratives of their childhoods, emotions, struggles, dedication, and ultimate perseverance in so-called martyrdom. In a typical example, one passage describes terrorist Abu Muharib al-Bengali as follows: If he ever upset a brother, he would rush to apologize and ask for forgiveness…. He learned to cook and would help in the kitchen even when it was not his turn. During training, he got diarrhea, stomach cramps, and emesis, this lasting for a week, until he lost much weight and it appeared in his face and body, yet he did not complain, manifested patience, and said that this illness would purify him of any past sins. (p. 11)
Less-Emphasized Mechanisms
Euphemistic labeling, advantageous comparison, diffusion of responsibility, and disregard/distortion of consequences are not emphasized as heavily as the previously discussed mechanisms, but they are still present in the text. Euphemistic labeling appears sporadically across the different genres of articles, but it is most notable in the terrorism instructions article. In addition to the frequent use of “operation” and “just terror operation” to describe terrorist murders, the article repeatedly refers to victims as “targets” and refers to a knife as an active force. Further, it uses many sanitized terms for killing/murdering, including “job at hand,” “detach the head,” “achieving kills,” and “attain a reasonable kill count.” Consider the following example from the article “Just Terror Tactics,” which contains several sanitizing words and phrases: As for choosing a target, then this is just like hunting prey. When carrying out a knife operation, it is not advised to target very large gatherings or overly crowded areas, as this presents a disadvantage and only increases the likelihood of being prevented from achieving kills. (p. 13)
By contrast, however, other passages use language that is far from sanitized but is instead gratuitously brutal. Articles recounting historical examples of violent jihad often describe these actions in extreme and gory detail. For example, an article notes that when revered jihadist Khalid Ibn al-Walid was destroying apostates, “Some of them he burned with fire; others he smashed with stone; others he threw from atop the highest mountains” (p. 24). The article later describes how Khalid's men individually murdered 70,000 Persians on the bank of a river until “the river flowed as if it were pure blood” (p. 25). Similar examples are given for other historical jihadists and include continuous urgings for current IS adherents to follow in their footsteps.
Advantageous comparison and diffusion of responsibility generally only appear implicitly. Some content focuses on past brutality by “apostates” against so-called true Muslims (see Table 3), although an explicit comparison is not drawn between those actions and current IS actions. Diffusion of responsibility is observed in frequent emphases on group action and the importance of all so-called true Muslims devoting themselves to violence (see Table 3); however, these appeals are not explicitly tied to the moral responsibility of the actors.
Finally, disregard or distortion of consequences appears to play a role in the framing observed in the text. Disregard or distortion of consequences is difficult to identify in text because it often presents as the absence of the discussion of certain consequences. However—despite the subjective nature of parsing out disregard or distortion of consequences—this analysis aimed to identify what consequences were discussed, how they were discussed, and what could plausibly be considered missing. Overall, two themes emerged. First, IS focuses on brutal physical consequences of its violence (or similar historical violence) in passages, such as describing its attacks as “turning those present there into a heap of torn limbs” (p. 33). But in contrast to such brutal physical descriptions, negative consequences of an emotional, personal, communal, or familial nature are not discussed (beyond broad mentions of inflicting horror and misery). The sole focus on bodily functions and not on the personal suffering, emotions, and trauma experienced by victims, their loved ones, and communities can be plausibly interpreted as a strategic distortion of consequences, reinforcing the dehumanization of victims. Second, child victims of IS violence are not mentioned, although children are casualties of many IS attacks. This can reasonably be interpreted as an intentional effort by IS to save face, particularly because text on page 9 notes that certain “adults” should be targeted as most deserving of punishment.
Discussion
The results of the analysis raise three important discussion points. First, the most emphasized mechanisms are applied nearly exclusively in the context of religious arguments or narratives, highlighting IS's unique melding of psychosocial disengagement strategies with religious argumentation. Second, the use of euphemistic language and disregard/distortion of consequences challenges Bandura's (2015) supposition that terrorists do not typically apply such mechanisms. Consideration of the complex target audience of IS propaganda can shed light on this apparent inconsistency and provide guidance for improving and applying Bandura's theory in other extremist contexts. Finally, the emergence of humanization of perpetrators as an additional mechanism is a theoretical advancement that highlights intersections of cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) and SMD, emphasizing the complexities of IS's messaging given its complex target audience. Next, I address these observations and advancements.
Selective Focus: Intersections with Religion
IS's focus on four of Bandura's mechanisms and humanization of perpetrators coincides with its radical religious orientation. Moral justification and displacement of responsibility are applied nearly exclusively in the context of appeals to the tenets of radical fundamentalist Islam, which—in IS's worldview—is the highest moral standard. The frequent use of these two mechanisms in conjunction with one another demonstrates IS's emphasis of the claim that its adherents are merely vessels of Allah who enact his good will on the earth. Dehumanization of victims and attribution of blame are likewise frequently intertwined with religious claims. By far the most common accusation leveled against victims is a lack of allegiance to Allah and so-called true Islam. This accusation is also incorporated in the many dehumanizing group terms used to castigate victims, which emphasize apostasy or infidelity. Finally, even the use of humanization of perpetrators is often laced with religious emphasis, to include detailed descriptions of the soft hearts of the fighters toward Allah, prayer, and the Quran. Overall, the most common applications of SMD in IS's propaganda content demonstrate its radical religious emphasis. As is discussed further, this religious emphasis must be considered in countermessaging strategies.
Challenges to Bandura's Predictions: The Complexity of Target Audiences
Although the five most-emphasized strategies appear across all of the genres of propaganda articles, others are more selectively applied to certain types of content. Most strikingly, euphemistic labeling is used heavily in terrorism instructions (“Just Terror Tactics”) and moderately in attack reports (“The Shuhada of the Gulshan Attack,” “Operations”), but it is rarely featured in articles about religious charges and histories of jihad.
Even moderate use of euphemistic labeling poses a contradiction to Bandura's predictions regarding terrorists’ use of the mechanism. Further, IS's apparent reticence to discuss certain features or types of victims, particularly children (see Table 3), indicates its unwillingness to be fully honest about the consequences of its actions. Yet Bandura (2015) argues that terrorists typically do not use euphemistic labeling and disregard/distortion of consequences in their messaging because such strategies undermine their express purpose of psychologically terrorizing broad enemy populations beyond their physical targets (see Sandler 2018). Striking terror through the gruesome reality of their violence is exactly their goal. Similarly, terrorists are not expected to disregard the consequences of their actions because “terrorists usually magnify the harm they cause” (Bandura 2015, p. 320). Yet this analysis suggests that terrorists may utilize both euphemistic language and disregard/distortion of consequences.
An initial explanation for this apparent inconsistency may be that magazines such as Rumiyah are not intended to be read by the populations targeted by terrorists but rather are aimed solely at potential IS recruits or current adherents. Yet this assumption is at odds with analyses indicating that English-language IS propaganda magazines aim to simultaneously (1) terrify target populations, including individuals and entire nations, and (2) recruit and/or reenergize IS adherents. Ingram (2018) argues that much of Rumiyah’s content, though on the face addressed to potential recruits, is clearly aimed at drawing Western media attention and thus terrorizing entire nations and civilian populations. Colas (2017) argues that Dabiq, the series of propaganda magazines that preceded Rumiyah and contained many content similarities, was written for three distinct audiences: (1) English-speaking Muslims, (2) Western policy makers, and (3) current or soon-to-be IS recruits who needed to better integrate with the organization. Colas contends that audiences “can be distinguished on an article-to-article basis” (2017, p. 178). Andersen and Sandberg (2020) interpret Dabiq’s target audiences as both (1) Muslim-majority families whose loyalty IS desires and (2) extremist warriors. The authors argue that although Dabiq’s common “graphic description of excessive violent actions” (Andersen and Sandberg 2020, p. 1520) aims to attract the latter audience, such graphic content also undermines IS's attempts to appear mainstream in pursuit of state-building, thwarting its aim of persuading large swaths of the Muslim population to join its cause.
In short, although different scholars propose nuanced interpretations of the target audience of IS magazine propaganda, scholars agree that the texts target multiple audiences at once. And, as Andersen and Sandberg (2020) point out, such a multitargeting approach can lead to internal inconsistencies. Therefore, an amendment must be made to Bandura's supposition that euphemistic labeling and disregard/distortion of consequences are typically not used in terrorist propaganda. Terrorists may indeed use these mechanisms, particularly when they are targeting potential supporters or fighters who are experiencing moral discomfort when considering the graphic violence advocated by the organization. In fact, this discomfort is explicitly discussed by IS in the magazine analyzed here, as it notes how potential recruits may be “squeamish of the thought of plunging a sharp object into another person's flesh” (p. 12) and offers strategies to help people overcome this squeamishness. The opening sentence of the magazine reads, “When mentioning the obligation of jihad for his cause, Allah indicated that some people would have reservations toward this noble commandment” (p. 2). The downplaying of brutality in some passages, even while violence is described in graphic detail elsewhere, may be evidence of IS's struggle to communicate simultaneously to (1) targets it wants to terrorize, (2) potential recruits who feel moral discomfort in the face of brutality, and (3) hardened fighters who are inspired by graphic descriptions (Andersen and Sandberg 2020). I propose that the struggles and inconsistencies evident in the attempt to target multiple audiences simultaneously can be exploited in countermessaging strategies, discussed subsequently.
Emergent Mechanism: Humanization of Perpetrators
The emergence of humanization of perpetrators as an additional SMD mechanism advances theory and raises practical considerations for countermessaging strategies. Although one might argue that humanizing perpetrators is a form of advantageous comparison, the observed humanization was agent-focused, not behavior-focused. Instead, humanization of perpetrators appears in the text in three ways: (1) the description of normalizing details of terrorists’ personal lives, (2) the description of terrorists’ “soft” emotions and personality traits, and (3) the description of terrorists’ human vulnerability and weakness.
Humanization of perpetrators can be a particularly powerful mechanism for enhancing a potential perpetrator's view of their own morality and enabling them to rationalize immorality. Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) posits that when humans experience conflicting cognitions simultaneously, they try to relieve the uncomfortable experience of dissonance through one of several internal mechanisms. A potential IS recruit may experience dissonant cognitions such as “I am a good, compassionate person” and “I need to kill innocent victims.” Cognitive dissonance theory presents bolstering as a potential strategy to relieve dissonance. In bolstering, a person thinks of many consonant cognitions to increase the ratio of consonant cognitions to dissonant cognitions, thus deemphasizing the dissonant cognitions. A potential IS recruit may use many humanizing attributes and details about themselves as a bolstering technique to reinforce their own goodness and sense of human compassion when faced with the dissonant cognition that they are going to kill innocent people. This may be especially important in IS's context because adherents are deeply religious and must rationalize that their radical religious views call them to both devout goodness in daily life and to murder.
The willingness of IS propagandists to repeatedly emphasize the weaknesses and soft emotions of their fighters may surprise readers because the organization generally emphasizes brutality and world domination. Emphasizing fighters’ cooking skills, debilitating diarrhea, and pliable hearts (see Table 3) seems counterintuitive to the common terrorist goal of striking fear in the hearts of their enemies. Yet again—as with the use of euphemistic labeling previously discussed—the inclusion of these elements in propaganda texts highlights the struggle of communicating to multiple audiences simultaneously. The apparent need to emphasize softness and vulnerability in recruitment efforts affirms Andersen and Sandberg's (2020) contention that IS is not simply trying to recruit hardened extremist fighters. Rather, it is targeting a wide swath of mainstream families and individuals (see Colas 2017), hoping to convince some that they need not lay their humanity aside to fulfill their moral/religious duty for IS’s cause. Overall, this approach is consistent with Bandura's (2015, p. 99) contention that “it requires conducive social conditions rather than monstrous people to produce atrocious deeds.”
Public Policy Implications for Countermessaging Strategies
IS's effectiveness in recruiting terrorists is unquestionable and unmatched in the modern age. As such, effective counterterrorism messaging must actually counter IS’s strategies. The SMD perspective provides insight into the psychosocial mechanisms that are triggered by content cues in propaganda, which can make certain propaganda approaches uniquely powerful. Such analysis also provides insight into which countermessaging strategies will likely work and which may be ineffective or even counterproductive.
A body of literature has emerged regarding extremism countermessaging strategies and best practices. Yet Carthy et al.’s (2020) systematic review notes discouraging evidence regarding the effectiveness of commonly recommended countermessaging approaches. The authors emphasize that though “several counternarrative guidelines have been published by varying counterterrorism actors” (p. 29), many of the recommended strategies lack supporting evidence and fail to produce results in experimental tests. For example, past policy recommendations to incorporate heavy emotional appeals, use satire, or rely on theological argumentation are not supported in experimental work reviewed.
Yet some tactics show more promising results. Recent tests of inoculation theory in extremist contexts, wherein participants are made aware of their vulnerability to extremist persuasion and are presented with weakened versions of propaganda messages that are then refuted, have shown some success (see Braddock 2022; Saleh et al. 2021). Further, Ingram's (2017) linkage-based approach details unique strategies for target audiences based on their current motivations regarding extremism and employs strategic combinations of positive and negative messaging based on pragmatic and identity frames. This approach incorporates much-needed nuance into countermessaging strategizing. In a content analysis, Whittaker and Elsayed (2019) note that numerous countermessaging campaigns appear to incorporate parts of Ingram's strategic logic. However, the authors also note that current messaging emphasizes the brutal atrocities of terrorist groups, which may prove less than strategic.
Consider, for example, the U.S. Department of State's “Think Again Turn Away” program, discussed previously. The now infamous and heavily viewed “Welcome to ISIS Land” counterpropaganda video relies heavily on extremely gory and graphic footage of explosions, heads severed from bodies, and crucifixions. Similar to IS propaganda itself, however, the video does not feature humanized victim testimonies or recognition of the emotional, personal, and familial suffering of victims. Although video producers ostensibly hoped that potential IS recruits would be disgusted and deterred by such gore, IS uses such gore intentionally. From an SMD perspective, extensive gore that is featured without the emotional or otherwise humanized attributes of victims may feed into the dehumanization of victims by presenting them as depersonalized, bestial recipients of massive butchering. Featuring humanized portrayals of victims—such as their school photos, their grieving children, or their own words and voices—may be more likely to trigger the desired aversion to violent terrorism.
Overall, such examples demonstrate that when governments and paragovernmental organizations choose to employ countermessaging strategies against extremists, officials working for these organizations have numerous strategic choices to make. The rationales used in making those choices range widely from practitioner to practitioner and, at times, appear based on intuition rather than sound psychological research and evidence-based practice. With such examples in mind, I propose that officials designing counterterrorism messaging strategies incorporate SMD theorizing as a crucial part of their countermessaging toolbox. An improved approach to extremist countermessaging would include (1) analyzing the unique SMD cues used by the target terrorist/extremist group in its media and (2) developing content that directly counters those strategies. The case for directly countering a terrorist/extremist group's SMD strategies with moral engagement strategies relies on the recognition that effective terrorist/extremist groups, such as IS, are uniquely familiar with the moral vulnerabilities of potential recruits. By observing the ways in which terrorist groups focus their moral cases and by strategically responding to these efforts, countermessage creators can reduce the effectiveness of terrorists’ strategies by using terrorists’ own knowledge against them. These strategies should not exclude other evidence-based strategies (e.g., inoculation) but can build on existing strides to meaningfully improve future efforts. Next, I present five specific recommendations and examples from the IS context for the use of SMD analysis to fight moral disengagement with moral engagement (see Figure 2). These recommendations focus on the five mechanisms that are most predominately used by IS: moral justification, displacement of responsibility, dehumanization, attribution of blame, and humanization of perpetrators.
Summary of Countermessaging Recommendations.
Engaging Moral Convictions Against Harm
As noted in the “Results” section, moral justification is primarily utilized by IS in two key ways: (1) through framing the pleasure of Allah and heavenly rewards as greater goods to be achieved through harmful actions and (2) through framing harmful actions as preserving or cleansing the earth from corruption. Thus, simply telling a potential IS recruit that IS commits harmful actions is unlikely to counteract these much broader claims of a greater good. To be effective, countermarketers should aim to engage a higher view of the “greater good.” Such a strategy should ideally rely on the help of religious scholars and former members of similar terrorist groups who are well-versed in the religious texts and histories to which IS appeals.
Although expertise in religious texts and histories is important for effective message development, caution should be taken in using religious scholars and former adherents as direct sources in messaging. Many scholars agree that secular or governmental sources (e.g., the U.S. State Department) cannot make an effective religious case for maintaining a moral ethic that opposes harm, and they may even be counterproductive as persuasive sources (Bilazarian 2020; Braddock and Horgan 2016; Speckhard and Ellenberg 2020). But the ideal alternate source has been a topic of much debate among scholars. Evidence regarding the effectiveness of theological arguments from religious scholars and testimonies of former adherents is mixed (see Carthy et al. 2020; Gansewig and Walsh 2021). Experts caution that it may be more difficult to use religious-based refutations of radical ideology with target audiences that are already radicalized, as opposed to broader audiences that have not fully succumbed to extremist ideologies. For narrower, already-radicalized audiences, the voices of former violent extremists who may “have a degree of ideological commonality with extremists but reject violence” (Bilazarian 2020, p. 55) are likely to prove the most effective in countering moral justifications of radicalism (see also Braddock and Horgan 2016). Yet more evidence is needed to justify the expansion of these sources to broader, not-yet-radicalized audiences (see concerns raised by Gansewig and Walsh [2021]).
Engaging Moral Responsibility
Similar to moral justification, displacement of responsibility is inextricably tied to commands that IS claims stem from holy scriptures, Allah, or the Prophet Muhammed. The voices of community leaders can play a crucial role in engaging a sense of personal moral responsibility for harmful actions in an IS-vulnerable audience (Braddock and Horgan 2016) by strengthening the positive social in-group ties that extremists aim to weaken (see Saleh et al. 2021). Further, interviews with former IS fighters who now express guilt, regret, and a sense of direct responsibility for their actions are available through various media outlets and may provide powerful testimonies of moral responsibility that challenge IS’s narrative. The words of former IS fighter Abu Taha in an interview produced by a U.S. Department of Defense counterterrorism project are a poignant example of such testimony: We were drowning in hatred and rancor that we enveloped in a religious framework … we did things that neither God nor Islam commanded us to do, but that we falsely attributed to Islam. The word shame does not fully express how I feel. (al-Obeidi 2019)
Engaging Humanization and Blamelessness of Victims
Dehumanization and attribution of blame—the two mechanisms of the victim-focused locus (Bandura 1986, 2015)—are dominant across all genres of IS propaganda. Dehumanization of victims can be directly countered with humanization of victims. Importantly, however, effective humanization goes beyond mere bodily presentations of victims. IS does not hesitate to show pictures of victim corpses, but IS rarely discusses the emotional, personal, or familial aspects of victims’ lives. Portraying victims in the fullness of their humanity can powerfully combat radicalization. Effective humanization portrays people as unique individuals rather than depersonalized others, showing their unique feelings, thoughts, and experiences. For example, one audiovisual narrative produced by the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (see Speckhard and Ellenberg 2020) features a former IS recruit discussing how he fell ill while in IS (see https://youtu.be/tkUTg9WshFQ). He was cared for in a local hospital by an “enemy” nurse and doctor whom he was supposed to want to kill. He discusses the nurse and doctor by name, describes their tenderness, and confesses he realized that “if I had come to target people like these, I’m wrong.” Bandura (2002, pp. 109–10) notes how powerful humanization is: Psychological research tends to emphasise how easy it is to bring out the worst in people through dehumanisation and other self-exonerating means…. What is rarely noted is the equally striking evidence that most people refuse to behave cruelly, even with strong authoritarian commands, toward humanised others.
Further, IS’s focus on the supposed blameworthiness of victims can be countered by emphasizing the innocence of victims. For example, IS routinely targets children, despite the fact that potential child victims receive high moral priority among humans compared with potential adult victims (Bleske-Rechek et al. 2010). As discussed in the “Results” section, however, IS appears reticent to emphasize the reality of its child victims. Emphasizing the innocence of victims and particularly noting the child victims of IS—who are more likely to be widely perceived as blameless—could aid in promoting moral engagement.
In addition, highlighting the similarities between victims and potential perpetrators may increase moral engagement. IS is popularly known for its claim of allegiance to radical fundamentalist Islam and its hatred of other religions and the West. But in truth, most of IS’s victims are Muslim, including some victims featured in IS’s own propaganda footage (Grizzard et al. 2017). Another International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism counternarrative (see https://youtu.be/XoYzcnyqtuo) features a former IS fighter discussing how he left IS after realizing that IS fighters were taking Muslim women as sex slaves, abusing them, and selling them in markets. The former fighter expresses that he was greatly troubled to see his own people—Muslim women—victimized by so-called Muslim fighters. Messages that emphasize the Muslim identities of IS victims and highlight the similarities between perpetrators and victims (e.g., family status, occupation, personal history) may engage moral perceptions of victims as people who do not deserve to brutalized.
Countering Humanization of Perpetrators
I propose that the best way to counter humanization of perpetrators—the additional mechanism that emerged—is through the humanization of victims (as previously described) rather than through the dehumanization of perpetrators. Although some intentionally use dehumanization of perpetrators in characterizing atrocities (see discussions by McIntosh and Mendoza-Denton [2020]), I am reticent to recommend this strategy for two reasons. First, dehumanization in any form is based on the false premise that some people do not possess human value or dignity. This is a dangerous position that underlies many historic atrocities (see Bandura 2015). Thus, ethically, I cannot condone basing a marketing strategy on a view of human nature that—if accepted—could be used to justify atrocities against humans. Second, trying to dehumanize perpetrators risks triggering psychological reactance (see Brehm and Sensenig 1966), particularly if the audience believes they share traits or sympathies with the perpetrators. Psychological reactance is triggered when a person feels threatened by a message and can result in the person polarizing their view to an even more extreme view than they originally held. In contrast, humanizing victims can promote aversion to harmful actions without risking an increase in polarization.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
I envision two primary avenues for future research that build on the paradigm presented in this article. First, as previously discussed, IS remains a significant threat with a risk of resurgence. As such, further analysis that identifies SMD strategies in IS propaganda is highly encouraged to aid in the ongoing effort against IS sleeper cell terrorists and to prepare for future threats. Researchers should particularly aim to observe how IS's SMD strategies may be changing as IS adjusts to its identity as a decentralized sleeper cell network rather than a centralized territorial caliphate. Further, how has the content shared been affected by the migration from Twitter to encrypted platforms like Telegraph for message dissemination?
To this end, future researchers should use both quantitative and qualitative methods to analyze themes and trends in IS's use of SMD. Although I make the case for the value of an in-depth, qualitative approach in this article, the narrow range of propaganda material that can be covered in such an analysis presents a significant limitation. Extensions of qualitative analysis to broader swaths of IS propaganda are thus encouraged. Beyond qualitative work, I also suggest using automated content analysis to provide quantitative estimates of themes and strategies across large swaths of content (see Sanfilippo, McGrath and Whitney 2011; Vergani and Bliuc 2018). Although automated software cannot replace the depth of qualitative content analysis, it can provide important thematic information across a broad selection of content. Further, automated analyses can partially relieve the mental burden on researchers tasked with perusing large amounts of extremely disturbing content, a task which carries a psychological risk (see Redmond et al. 2019). Automated analysis is particularly well-suited to study certain SMD mechanisms that rely heavily on a relatively small set of specific phrases, such as euphemistic labeling and dehumanization of victims.
Finally, in the previous section of this work, I proposed potential countermessaging strategies to morally engage audiences that are vulnerable to IS radicalization and recruitment. Although my recommendations are based in theory and observations of best practices in other contexts, the effectiveness of these strategies remains in question until they are further tested, limiting their usefulness. Promisingly, Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky (2013) report some success and positive feedback from students in a pilot secondary school antiradicalization program that aimed to engage moral self-sanctions. However, it appears that the approach has not been widely applied or studied since. Thus, future research must use experimental methods to examine the efficacy of these types of proposed moral engagement messages. Further, this research should elucidate whether some strategies are more or less effective for specific audiences.
I also contend that the theoretical framework of SMD should be used more broadly in analyses of online propaganda and development of extremism countermessaging strategies beyond IS. However, it is important to note that although the psychological processes that underlie SMD are fundamental to human nature (Bandura 1986) and have been observed across cultures and contexts over decades of research (see Bandura 2015), some views about what constitutes moral/immoral behavior vary across cultures. Thus, when analyzing texts, SMD should be considered in conjunction with cultural mores. As a theoretical approach, SMD should be viewed as a complement to, rather than a replacement for, more culture-specific approaches to analysis (e.g., Andersen and Sandberg 2020). Although the SMD approach is rare in marketing research, the SMD framework could powerfully inform marketing strategies to combat extremism in various contexts, including the most recent threats to the United States and the international community.
Anecdotally, SMD mechanisms are superfluously displayed in rationalizations for harmful actions related to recent domestic extremism. For example, perpetrators of the attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, framed the attack as a defense of democracy against an evil deep state—a clear attempt at moral justification of a harmful action by claiming it promotes a greater good. In an obvious display of displacement of responsibility, Jacob Chansley—a Capitol attacker known as the QAnon Shaman—and his lawyer tried to defend his violent actions by categorizing them as obedience to President Donald Trump’s commands (Blest 2021). President Trump engaged in attribution of blame by faulting targeted victims (lawmakers supporting the electoral college's legitimate vote for President Biden) for the deadly attack. During the attack, he tweeted, “These are the things and events that happen when a sacred landslide election victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped away from great patriots who have been badly & unfairly treated for so long” (Booker 2021).
In short, SMD is as relevant today as when it was first theorized decades ago. The approach is not bound to a specific extremist context. In fact, a major strength of SMD is its universal applicability across contexts because of its basis in the fundamental processes of human self-regulation. The same approach applied here in the context of IS propaganda can be applied to other extremist movements threatening people today—including radicalization and recruitment efforts of QAnon adherents, antigovernment extremists, and white supremacists (whom the Department of Homeland Security [2020, p. 18] categorized as the “most persistent and lethal threat in the Homeland”). Thus, as a practical recommendation, I urge counterextremism marketers to follow the two-step approach proposed in this article: (1) systematically identify the use of SMD cues in the marketing of the extremist movement and (2) craft messages that intentionally engage moral thinking where extremists are the most encouraged to disengage.
Supplemental Material
sj-pdf-1-ppo-10.1177_07439156221096394 - Supplemental material for Marketing Against Extremism: Identifying and Responding to Moral Disengagement Cues in Islamic State Terrorist Propaganda
Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-ppo-10.1177_07439156221096394 for Marketing Against Extremism: Identifying and Responding to Moral Disengagement Cues in Islamic State Terrorist Propaganda by Rebecca Frazer in Journal of Public Policy & Marketing
Footnotes
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Dr. Matthew Grizzard, Dr. Teresa Lynch, Dr. James Alex Bonus, Dr. Nicholas Matthews, and Dr. Bill Lafayette for their insights and support throughout various stages of this project. Further, the author gratefully acknowledges Joel Erickson and Alexander Kidd for their work as research assistants. Finally, the author thanks the JPP&M review team for their constructive feedback that substantially improved this work.
Joint Editor in Chief
Kelly Martin
Special Issue Editors
Yany Grégoire and Marie Louise Radanielina Hita
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
References
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