Abstract
The simple version of the story of the Spanish-American War typically goes like this: The battleship Maine blows up in Havana harbor; the US goes to war with Spain; Spain is defeated; the US gains a colonial empire. Yet the story is much more complex, and this rich collection of documents provides insights into that complexity.
This book, presumably, has a target audience of college classes. The volume begins with a foreword by Kalman Goldstein that is an extended rant against all of American foreign policy since the Spanish-American War. Fortunately, that very politicized tone fades once we reach the main section of the book – a series of primary documents, each about a page in length, and each with a useful introduction that provides the background and context. These readings form the best and most valuable part of the book – and of course the main purpose of the book.
The documents are organized in eight logical groupings: Background to War (1895–1898); Failed Diplomacy (1896–1898); The War at Home; The War in Cuba; The War in the Philippines; The War in Puerto Rico; Negotiating the Peace; Post-War Developments. Throughout, some of the documents are the standard sort, but others are unusual and fascinating – providing a nuanced picture of a complicated story.
This short review can provide just a glimpse of some of the documents and so will touch on some of those illustrating the naval and maritime dimensions of the story. For example, the book includes Admiral Pascual Cervera’s clearheaded assessment of a possible Spanish conflict with the United States, forecasting a Spanish defeat. On the other hand, Admiral José Beranger optimistically predicted Spanish victory. The chapter on ‘Failed Diplomacy’ includes an extensive series of documents on the turning point: the explosion and sinking of the USS Maine – the first American battleship to be launched (although not the first to be commissioned). Excerpts include Navy Secretary John Davis Long’s comments in his journal; the 1898 court of inquiry; the Spanish report; the New York World report; and various other newspaper reports and comments. There is a reference to Admiral Rickover’s 1976 investigation, but unfortunately no excerpt from the report.
The excerpts provide a clear picture of Spain as a weak and declining former imperial power that was hampered by fantasies of its old glory. Spain was bankrupt and her navy was unprepared for war, which caused a crisis within the military establishment. Commanders of Admiral Cervera’s fleet, as one of the readings illustrates, insisted that the squadron should not be sent to the West Indies. Another reading reveals that captains in Cervera’s squadron believed that going to the West Indies would be folly. Of course they were correct in their assessment. Spain’s inability to conduct an offensive war against a rising industrial United States is evident in the documents that Berner includes in this anthology.
The naval war, then, was central to the outcome. The book provides interesting insights into the US naval blockade of Cuba, the decision to sink the collier Merrimac in Santiago harbor to block Cervera’s fleet from leaving, and the role of US marines at Guantanamo. The famous naval battle of Santiago on 3 July 1898 is particularly well-covered. The selections illustrate the political interference in military decision-making: for example, Cortes member Romero Robledo’s demands that Admiral Cervera’s squadron be sent into action as a matter of Spanish honor. Numerous eyewitness accounts capture the action: from the Spanish flagship (‘poor Spain’ says Capt. Víctor María Concas, commander of the Spanish flagship Infanta María Teresa); by Capt. Henry C. Taylor, commanding battleship Indiana; and by the commander of the Cristobal Colon (missing her 10” guns, which had not been installed). And the captain of the Battleship Texas provides a fascinating perspective on what has come to be known as ‘Schley’s Loop’, Commodore Winfield Scott Schley’s turn to starboard which almost caused a collision between Schley’s Brooklyn and the Texas.
Similarly, the book includes Commodore George Dewey’s iconic victory at Manila Bay through several reports by Admiral Patricio Montojo, and several cables from Dewey. The cables remind us that changes in communication technology were inexorably leading to changes in military tactics and the practice of day-to-day diplomacy. ‘You must exercise discretion’, Navy Secretary Long warns Dewey in response to Dewey’s reports about the German presence in the Philippines.
Of course, the book provides insights into many other issues. For example, there was other action in the Caribbean – in Puerto Rico, where the governor general had declared martial law and Admiral William Sampson engaged in a brief bombardment of San Juan. In addition, various selections provide insights into the situation of African Americans in the United States at the time. The book also, of course, provides good coverage of army engagements, of the peace talks in Paris, and decisions made afterwards about what to do with the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba; decisions that, ultimately, shaped the American approach to the world for the next half-century.
All in all, this collection for undergraduates provides history the way it should be – directly from the sources – and will be of interest to anyone intrigued by the course of the Spanish-American War. The selections are wide-ranging and appropriately introduced. There is a reasonable table of contents and a brief bibliography. My main reservations are the politicized introductory essay and the book’s lack of illustrations, maps, or chronology.