Abstract
This excellent new book examines the other theatres of the ‘Crimean War’, leaving aside the siege of Sevastopol, so familiar to students of British military disasters, in favour of operations in the Baltic, the White Sea, and the North Pacific. The author demonstrates an exemplary grasp of the extant literature of the Crimean War, in many languages, and of the various regional debates which he uses to develop the argument that this was a far wider conflict than is implied by the label ‘Crimean’. The book is consistently effective at addressing the limitations of and gaps in the extant literature. It is based on the widest use of extant primary and secondary materials. The analysis of evidence is equally sound, and together these analytical elements are a key strength. Criticisms of existing scholarship are well made, ably sustained, and essential to the development of academic enquiry in this field. The resulting work is original, both in the questions posed and the resources employed.
By moving around the immense subject of the siege operations before Sevastopol, it has been possible to make very effective use of the French archives, hitherto only consulted on the ‘Crimean’ aspect of the conflict. Research on the French side of the war has long been hampered by an enduring distaste for the Second Empire among French scholars. This situation has begun to change, with some important works appearing in the last decade. In view of historic and current problems of access to primary sources in Russia, the author has displayed exemplary dedication in securing published Russian language material, and the assistance of Russian scholars. The skilful integration of Russian evidence, both contemporary and more recent, into manuscript is a highlight of the work. The maps and charts are unduly small, lacking some of the detail needed to follow events in a war that took place in little known regions of the world.
Critically the text demonstrates that British strategists planned to attack Russian naval bases and resources in all theatres. This was not accidental, it reflected long term planning to assault fortified arsenals, initially developed to neutralize the French naval base of Cherbourg, but easily shifted to Cronstadt, Sevastopol, Archangel and Petropavlovsk. The blundering application of these ideas at Petropavlovsk should not mislead: the attack on Sweaborg in 1855 was entirely consistent with pre-war planning, which had been largely conducted at the Gunnery Training ship HMS Excellent under the direction of Captain Henry Chads, who commanded the coast attack squadron in the Baltic in 1854. They were demonstrated on St. George’s day 1856, in the great Fleet Review at Spithead, celebrating British victory with a parade of the Baltic Fleet.
While the chapters on the Baltic theatre are excellent, this field has already been addressed in detail, and it is the chapters dealing with the White Sea and the Pacific that make the most significant contribution to scholarship. They amply sustain the core argument and advance the integration of Crimean War scholarship with the very different bodies of work that focus on the longer term issues of these distinct regions. The discussion of the attack on Petropavlovsk and Admiral David Price’s suicide is ably handled, and highly original. These chapters replace all extant treatments of both theatres, introducing the full range of scholarly resources and intelligent analysis into a field that has hitherto remained on the peripheries of academic research. These chapters also address post-war developments are addressed, although more as suggestion than conclusion. Having established that the war was far wider than hitherto assumed, and far more significant in the more distant theatres than has been hitherto allowed, any attempt to address those issues in detail would have distorted the text. It is the task for another book. The war still has legacies, as the recent Russian military occupation of the Crimea demonstrated. The Russian seizure of the Amur River basin from China in 1856 has never been reversed, and in an age when China insists on recovering lost provinces this begs a very big question about Sino-Russian relations.
The war that Rath presents was profoundly maritime: at no point were any British or French formations more than one day’s march from the sea. The allies had learnt the lesson in 1812, they attacked Russia’s weak maritime peripheries, not her internal fastnesses, and relied on blockade, for strategic effect. As Rath observes, when Russia decided to make peace, in January 1856, the fall off Sevastopol was not even mentioned, it was a broken economy, shortage of critical weapons, and gunpowder, and looming disasters in the Baltic, with Poland and Finland using the war to break away from Russian rule that drove the decision. The Czar recognized that Russia had been defeated, and that defeat could become catastrophic if Russia fought on. The peace left her international status greatly diminished she would have to undertake fundamental structural reforms before it could return to a prominent position in international relations. The impact of what was, for Britain at least, a very limited war, had been hugely disproportionate. The next time Russia attacked Turkey in the Black Sea, in 1877–1878, the Royal Navy was deployed and the Czar backed down. Yet the war that is remembered in the Anglophone world is dominated by the Crimea, soldiers and nurses. Little wonder historians consistently fail to comprehend the reality of British power, money and fleets deployed on a global scale, not the tiny army that got bogged down outside Sevastopol.
This is the most important and original contribution to scholarship on the Crimean War for many years, it rescues the war from the vice like grip of British soldiers and Florence Nightingale, restoring it to its rightful place as a major event in world history. The quality of research and analysis amply sustain an ambitious argument. It should reshape the debate about this controversial conflict, and add significantly to our understanding of mid-nineteenth century international relations.