The French fleet and the Italian occupation of France,1940–1942

The scuttling of the French fleet on 27 November 1942 represented the final act in a political tug of war that had influenced Franco–Italian relations since the beginning of the Italian occupation in 1940. ¹ Following the overrunning of Allied forces in France in May and June 1940, and Mussolini’s declaration of war on 10 June, the French government formally requested an armistice with the Axis powers. The two armistice agreements – with Germany at Compiègne and with Italy at the Villa Incisa outside Rome – represented the foundations upon which Franco–Axis relations were constructed in the years of occupation to come. As French forces had been defeated in what was almost entirely a battle on land, many French officials and military personnel were anxious to ascertain the position of the French fleet, which remained both undefeated and a potent naval power. As a result, French negotiators sought to enshrine the position of the fleet in the armistice agreements themselves. Article VII of the Franco–German armistice, and Article XII of the Franco–Italian armistice, clearly stated that the French fleet remained the legal property and under the guardianship of France, and that neither Axis power would seek the requisition of the French fleet following the war. ² This research note seeks to explore the position of the French fleet as a bargaining chip in France’s negotiations with the Axis nations, particularly between France and Italy, where French officials could hope to win greater concessions.

The changing dynamics of the war, particularly the vicissitudes of the conflict in the Mediterranean and the failure of the Axis powers to break the British fortresses in Malta, made the idea of the French high seas fleet joining the conflict a tantalising prospect for both Berlin and Rome. At its zenith, the French fleet stationed at Toulon was made up of over 60 ships and represented a potentially crucial addition to the Axis arsenal. ³ If the French fleet joined the war on the side of the Axis powers, it could provide vital protection for ships supplying German and Italian forces in North Africa. When Italian and German officials began to exert pressure upon the French government for the participation of the French fleet, however, the French government protested, stating that the armistice agreements had clearly stipulated that the French fleet would remain the property of the French state and could not be coerced into military action. ⁴ One Italian official informed the Italian Comando Supremo that the only way to acquire forcibly the French fleet would be to declare the Italo–French armistice null and void and to construct a new political and diplomatic settlement giving the Italian government more extensive powers. ⁵

In reality, the abolition of the Italo–French armistice was what many within the French government had been hoping for and working towards since the early months of Italy’s occupation of the south-eastern corner of the country. The armistice had been signed at a time when France had been militarily beaten and had had little in the way of political capital to resist such an agreement. Furthermore, the French decision to sign the armistice had been made under the duress of German conditions, which stated that the French armistice with Germany was conditional upon the signing of a similar arrangement between Paris and Rome. ⁶ To many within the French government, therefore, the armistice represented an agreement based upon a temporary and artificially created balance of power. An awareness of this ill-balanced agreement existed on both sides of the negotiating table, and many Italian officials feared that any re-negotiation of the agreement would be politically unfavourable to Italy. Accordingly, for many within the Italian government, and for those Italian officials involved in negotiations with France, the rigid insistence upon sticking to the terms of the Italo–French armistice made the agreement itself the sine qua non of all diplomatic transactions between the two sides.

The nature of the Italo–French armistice made its potential overhaul a diplomatic disaster for Italy. The Commissione Italiana di Armistizio con la Francia (Italo–French Armistice Commission – CIAF), the body responsible for the execution of the armistice, and for ensuring the French adhered to its terms, was the prism through which all political, economic and military agreements were conducted. This organisation had been founded in the halcyon days of French military collapse, when many in the Italian government believed that the Axis powers might win the war. As a result, its initial structure was simplistic and betrayed the belief amongst many that it would be a short-term solution to be superseded by a much-anticipated and more-encompassing permanent peace treaty. By contrast, many German ministries and government departments represented their interests directly with French individuals, government bodies and companies, giving a far more inclusive and broad approach to negotiations. ⁷ As it became clear that a rapid conclusion to the war would not follow the fall of France, and as Italian officials saw their German counterparts gain far more financially from France than Italian bodies were doing, many within the Italian government, and particularly in the CIAF, saw the armistice increasingly as a hindrance to more comprehensive and beneficial settlements between the two sides. Nonetheless, these same Italian officials recognised that any agreement that might supersede the armistice would be made with a France that held a far stronger political position than the one she had held in 1940. As a result, it was likely that any future agreement would be to the benefit of France far more than to Italy.

It was under these circumstances that the French fleet became a pawn in political negotiations between the two sides. ⁸ Any attempts made by Italian officials to requisition materials belonging to the French navy, or any suggestion that the French fleet itself could be utilised in the war effort, were met with the sharp reminder that the fleet remained the property of the French state. ⁹ Whilst the French fleet was still important to the French government, both for its military value and the inherent political capital that it represented, it is possible to argue that many within the French government were prepared to relinquish some control over its use if Rome paid an appropriate political price. Even after the scuttling of the fleet in November 1942, the French government attempted to gain permission to re-construct French naval strength in the Mediterranean in exchange for ever-deeper collaboration. ¹⁰ Although the Italian surrender in September 1943 rendered this project premature, it is interesting to note that Italian officials did see potential merit in its implementation. Italian interest in French naval participation in the conflict therefore continued into the months following the destruction of the fleet.

The scuttling of the French fleet abruptly ended this strategy. Although French officials saw the fleet as a way of prising political concessions from the Italian government, they were not prepared to allow it to fall into the hands of the Axis powers. The scuttling was undoubtedly a political and military loss to both Berlin and Rome, but arguably had a greater impact on Franco–Italian relations than it did upon Franco–German. In his article discussing the scuttling of the French fleet, Emanuele Sica has argued that, ‘Internally, [the scuttling] demonstrated the irrelevance of the Vichy regime’. ¹¹ The reality, however, is more complex. The scuttling of the fleet represented the Vichy government’s determination to maintain their position as the legal government of France, a position upheld by the armistice and subsequent agreements. Nonetheless, this determination to maintain control over one of the Vichy government’s most prized pieces of political capital represented a Pyrrhic victory. By refusing to allow the two Axis powers to commit acts explicitly prohibited by the armistice agreements, the French government ensured that she would never again wield a tool of such political influence. Emanuele Sica has described the Axis attempts to take control of the French fleet in 1942 as ‘a serious tactical blunder’. ¹² Sica is perhaps correct from a strictly operational point of view. In reality, however, it was extremely unlikely that the Vichy government would ever allow the fleet to fall into the hands of the Axis powers. Within the context of Italo–French relations, such an act would have instantly negated the Vichy government’s entire strategy of strict adherence to the armistice agreement as the cornerstone of relations with Rome.

In the end, the scuttling of the French fleet, coupled with the arrival of Axis troops in hitherto unoccupied France, did signal the demise, and ultimately the lessening in political relevance, of the Italo–French armistice. Both sides, in effect, achieved something they desired, that is a fundamental shift in the parameters of Italo–French dialogue. Nonetheless, the manner in which this change came about satisfied neither party. For the Vichy government, the fleet at Toulon had represented a political carrot which could be and was used to tempt the Italian government into making a more favourable political settlement. For Italian officials and the CIAF, the French fleet represented a military and political prize that could be obtained at a more opportune date or at an over-arching and long-term peace conference. Moreover, the inability of the Italian armed forces to seize the French fleet further dented their prestige amongst both the French population and the wider international sphere. ¹³ As we have seen, both French and Italian officials hoped that a re-created French fleet would prove useful to both sides; however, the Italian surrender in September 1943 rendered such hopes obsolete.