Abstract
Following the traditions of the preceding feudal dynasties, efforts were made by the Nguyen Dynasty (Vietnam) to prevent piracy and ensure security and marine safety in the South China Sea during the first half of the nineteenth century. The Nguyen Dynasty directed its energies towards national interests and showed an elevated level of international awareness and responsibility, especially at the beginning of the successful cooperation with Qing Dynasty (China) to resolve this widespread problem. This article examines the attempt of the Nguyen Dynasty to suppress the raiding and looting of pirates in the South China Sea, and its important achievements in this difficult and dangerous work. Addressing this non-traditional security problem also helped confirm the Nguyen Dynasty’s possession of islands within the South China Sea, including the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands.
Introduction
Maritime security is an important component of national, regional and global security, and has a significant impact on land security. Vietnam has been no exception. Pirates became a significant and concerning security risk for the feudal dynasties of Vietnam, including the Nguyen Dynasty. Increasing piracy seriously threatened the survival of boats and foreigners. In the first half of the nineteenth century, before 1858 when the French colonialists officially invaded Vietnam, the Nguyen Dynasty was autonomous in responding to and resolving the problem. This article explores what the Nguyen Dynasty did to ensure the security and safety of the South China Sea. Its actions in ensuring the security and safety of navigation for vessels travelling there (including the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands) is one of the most vivid illustrations of an international spirit, and of a dynasty exercising its real sovereignty in the South China Sea. These are the key issues on which this article focuses.
Based on original sources, especially the materials left by the National Historian Office of the Nguyen Dynasty, this article offers a comprehensive reappraisal of naval aggression and plundering in the South China Sea of Vietnam during the first half of the nineteenth century. It also records the responses to the marine invaders by the Nguyen Dynasty. From there, the article draws on the coping strategies that the Nguyen Dynasty applied to counter the piracy problem, and assesses the results. Finally, it compares the Nguyen Dynasty’s behaviour in dealing with piracy with the principles of territorial possession in international law, and offers conclusions regarding Vietnam’s possession of the vast South China Sea, including the Paracel and Spratly Islands.
The South China Sea and the risks from the sea
The ‘South China Sea’ refers simply to the sea bordering the eastern coast of Vietnam. The Nguyen Dynasty was officially established in 1802, governing a unified territorial sea originating from the first three ancient nations (Van Lang – Au Lac in the North, Lam Ap – Champa in the centre, and Phu Nam in the South). Thus, the concept of the South China Sea in Vietnam encompasses the sea running along the entire eastern face of the country, extending from Mong Cai at the northernmost end to Ca Mau cape at the southernmost, and encompassing all of the coastal islands, including the Paracel and Spratly Islands. This concept remains common currency.
The South China Sea refers to one of the largest seas in the world, a bridge connecting the Southeast Asian mainland to the Southeast Asian islands, and the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. 1 The South China Sea is surrounded by 10 countries and territories, including Vietnam, China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Singapore, and Taiwan. Geo-politician Nicolas Spykman dubbed the South China Sea the ‘Mediterranean of Asia’. 2 From an early stage it attracted foreign ships for trade, and the development of ports within the area attracted foreign merchants. Initially, they were Malaysian, Persian, and Arab merchants. These were followed by Japanese merchants, European merchants such as the Portuguese (during the sixteenth century), British (from the eighteenth century), Swedish, Dutch, French, German; and merchants from the USA. 3 Increasing mercantile activity attracted predators. The Paracel Islands, or the Paracels, a group of small islands west of the mainland, 4 constituted an ideal hiding place for pirates, seriously threatening the security and safety of both seafarers and coastal peoples, and adversely affecting the political security and the social order of the dynasties.
The pirates were very diverse, including Vietnamese, Europeans, Wokou (Japanese pirates), Do Ba pirates (also called Cha Va, originating from India, Malaysia, and Indonesia today), Tau O pirates (from China), and others. The most common were the Tau O pirates, the pirates from China also known as the Qing pirates or Te Ngoi pirates. 5
The pirates had diverse origins. Some were fishermen in coastal regions and islands, whilst others were down-and-out traders or sailors, criminals wanted on land, or refugees. When the Qing Dynasty in China took over the government, many people who wanted to recover the Ming Dynasty had no land on which to live, because the Qing government pursued them vigorously. They had to leave their homeland, and many of them gathered into pirate groups operating in multiple locations around the maritime borders of China and some neighbouring countries, including Vietnam. In addition, the oppression and exploitation of the Qing Dynasty drove some poor Chinese to become bandits and pirates, or to go to the South, including Vietnam, and loot to earn a living. 6 From here, the pirate alliance formed a large group, numbering hundreds under the command of the pirate leaders. 7
When the Nguyen Dynasty took power, although its policies towards foreign merchants became more restrictive, they remained preferable to Chinese merchants. On the one hand, the Nguyen Dynasty used Chinese trading as a tool to offset the difficulties accessing goods from China embargoed by the Qing Dynasty. On the other, it also encouraged Chinese traders to come to new lands, reclaiming the markets and towns. Therefore, the Tau O pirates had more opportunities than pirates form other countries. The frequent danger from the Tau O pirates was clearly reflected by Tsuboi, who wrote:
Tau O invaders often attacked Vietnamese boats carrying rice, especially from May to July, before the harvest or docked in Vietnam to rob food, kidnap women and children. In the end, the Vietnamese-Chinese frontiers were full of Chinese bandits who took money from boats travelling down the Red River or looted money and food from the people.
8
Piracy was thus a real threat to the security, political stability and economic security of Vietnam and the other countries concerned. Pirates not only plundered belongings but also kidnapped women and children, collected money from passing vessels in the manner of highwaymen, and directly threatened the lives of seafarers. It is worth mentioning that many Vietnamese merchants and fishermen were also involved in these Chinese pirate teams.
9
The fear of pirates was always in the mind of the Nguyen rulers at that time, as profoundly described by the officer of the Nguyen Dynasty, Nguyen Truong To:
‘Sea invasion is a common threat to the whole country, this is a long-term problem, we do not know when it comes to an end; of course, it is a persistent enemy. Other kinds of invaders also have the time of death, but these sea aggressors are hereditary. Our country is disturbed; we can gradually get out if it only lasts a few years, if just a few times, we can find a way to catch them. But they come and go not in one or two years, robbing and killing not just once or twice. The losses of public and private belongings every year are tens of thousands, trade is stalled, goods are stagnant; this is really a great harm to the people. Is the damage great over the years? People in the coastal area… have been robbed by them for many years and became extremely poor’
10
Facing this problem, what policies did the Nguyen government apply to prevent and combat piracy forces in the South China Sea to protect the security and safety of the sea?
Anti-piracy activities of the Nguyen Dynasty, 1802–1858
To carry out anti-piracy activities, the Nguyen Dynasty realised that it needed much more detailed knowledge of the region. Without understanding the geography of the sea and the islands, the dynasty could not effectively patrol or hunt marine invaders. Thus, beginning in September 1806, King Gia Long finished the book Unified Geographical Gazetteer of Vietnam, which carefully recorded the status and characteristics of rivers and estuaries. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the Nguyen Dynasty also continuously sent explorers to survey the seaports and seaways under the command of the officers in charge of the estuaries. In January 1813, King Gia Long commanded the officials to survey the estuaries to discern the depth and breadth of each. In addition, each year in spring and winter, they drew maps and submitted them to the Ministry-in-charge, who brought the maps to the navy. The navy crews then indicated which areas were dangerous and which were not. 11 In February 1815, King Minh Menh commanded that Pham Quang Anh lead a team to the Paracel Islands for sea exploration. In March 1816, Minh Menh again ordered the officials of townships to measure the sea distances and draw maps for submission, and commanded a Marine Corps and Paracel Islands team to continue to explore waterways. In January 1836, the king ordered Pham Huu Nhat to bring the Marine Corps to cross Quang Ngai, directly to the Paracel Islands, ‘no islands, no dunes, no reefs, no shoals, and no rocky cliffs are omitted; The shape of the place is dangerous or not, the distance from it to the water way; it is near the coast of which district and village; search, plug markers, draw maps to submit to the King’. 12 Obviously, the Nguyen Dynasty particularly focused on the need for a thorough understanding of the sea areas.
The early kings of the Nguyen Dynasty were interested in maritime controls and patrols, through which soldiers could practice boat-handling skills and gain familiarity with the waters, thus being ready to respond when the pirates attacked. This was also a way to strengthen their reputation, and thus act as a deterrent.
Marine patrol activities were closely specified by the Nguyen Dynasty. There were regulations on sea patrol, which stated that, ‘every summer, upon the transport period … the boats with soldiers are dispatched every year, starting in March, ending in July. This is recorded.’
13
There were regulations on the rotation of people and boats, to patrol every three months, as ‘soldiers sent for long days must be tired, now the guards in the locations must be changed every three months to make sure that every soldier has time to rest.’
14
Although closely specified, the regulations were not inflexible; the Nguyen Dynasty gave appropriate directions for the patrols, depending on the specific situation, thus achieving the highest possible efficiency. In the 1838 edition, Minh Menh commanded that:
In the past, I have told that every year the military boats go out for patrolling in February. It is January now; the road is convenient; that is the time for the boats to leave, the time to patrol the sea area.
15
In addition, the king emphasised, ‘Particularly, the sea areas with many pirates, regardless of the season, officials of these areas are responsible for patrolling…’ 16 Patrols were held daily, except when stormy conditions prevented it. According to Minh Menh, ‘in the months of spring to autumn, when the public and merchant boats travel, in those months there must be additional daily patrols from the local marine posts. 17
To cope with the pirates, the patrolling ships had to be armed with cannons, rifles, firecrackers, and magnifying glasses. The decree of King Minh Menh in 1835 said:
‘Boats of enemies are very agile, when fighting with them, if it is a long distance, we must use the cannons to aim at the paddles, the rudders of the enemy boats to shoot, if it is near, use the hooks to cut the ropes in steering levers, make their boats fall down so that we can catch them… Therefore, the coastal areas in inside and outside areas, if there are soldiers that patrol the sea to fight the enemy, you have to do that.’
18
In addition, food was carefully prepared for long days at sea. The soldiers were given an advance of food, along these lines: ‘The capital officials are entitled to receive food of 3–4 months; provincial officials are entitled to food of 1–2 months, based on actual situation.’ 19
Building the boats to suit the patrols against pirates was also of special interest. In May 1838, King Minh Menh commanded the boat building:
‘…the boats sent by the government, as boats covered with copper with many wires, the enemy will be afraid and escape, the boats with the words Binh, Dinh are too large and cannot go quickly to catch them, O boats, Le boats are too small and cannot stand sea waves and winds, not convenient to expel the enemy, sea enemy is not defeated because of that reason… approve the Ministry in-charge to discuss, build boats to patrol, the boats are not too big, not too small like O boats, Le boats, the boats must be moderate, light and fast, convenient, then submit the model to me, wait for decree to start building… approve the idea of the Ministry in-charge in the capital, make the boats covered with copper to patrol. The coastal provinces make the boats, two boats for each province, maybe three or four boats for large provinces, called cruisers.’
20
Although the programme for combatting piracy was clear and suitable boats were made available, provincial officials did not have sufficient knowledge of how to prepare the boats, soldiers, or weapons. Accordingly, the patrols often failed, and the officials were blamed. Moreover, cowardice among the naval units was a persistent problem. For this the Nguyen Dynasty punished them according to the law, with no relief. 21
The Nguyen Dynasty knew how to mobilise people into anti-pirate activity. Although patrolling the sea was generally assigned to the regular military, the coastal areas were also given authority to act against the pirates. The state equipped the people in these areas with telescopes,
22
provided them with weapons, and supported boat repairs. It was ordered that:
Patrolling is carried out regularly and continuously on the sea, regardless of the court boats or the local boats, the civilians who are healthy, courageous, good at shooting can be added to the patrolling teams.
23
In September 1832, King Minh Menh ordered the coastal villages to be ready with boats and weapons, because if the enemy ships came near the shore, they must join forces to fight and arrest them.
24
In 1834, he continued to ask
the Governors, Province Chiefs, Provincial Treasurers, and Provincial Judges in the coastal areas, to consider the islands in the territorial waters with the population, commanded the people in the provinces to quickly bring existing fishing boats to repair to be quick; two or three boats for places with dense population. Each boat can transport about 20 people. The state paid for repair costs. Materials such as long spears, rifles, bullets were delivered to the people to use for patrols.
25
The Nguyen Dynasty promulgated the reward and punishment rules for sea patrol and catching the pirate boats, as follows:
If the boats that patrol the territorial waters of sea post with the negligence, immediately report to the provinces to seriously punish. The patrol boats of the capital consist of two groups of the South and the North. Each group sent four to five boats divided into two trips, each trip is from three, five days apart, the first one went to the middle of the territorial waters, then the second one departed from the territorial waters, the second one went to the middle of the territorial waters, the first one departed from the end of the territorial waters. Passing through a province without seeing the patrol boats of the province, immediately report to the province for punitive action … If a boat arrests the big enemy ships, it will be rewarded 1,000 coins. If the arrested ship is small, then it will be rewarded 500 coins showing encouragement. If the patrol boats annoy merchant ships full of goods to trade, it is a serious crime and subject to severe punishment.
26
Especially, if the enemy continues to harass the sea, sneakily fighting and robbing, this is very serious offence and subject to severe punishment.
27
Thus, the Nguyen Dynasty attempted to elaborate and detail the necessary preparations to confront the pirates. These actions showed the sense of initiative and responsibility of the Nguyen Dynasty to ensure marine security and the safety of traders and ships.
Anti-piracy activities in the South China Sea of the Nguyen Dynasty in the first half of the nineteenth century
Based on the records left by the National Historian’s Office of the Nguyen Dynasty, the authors have recorded the times that pirates appeared in the South China Sea and how the Nguyen Dynasty countered them (Table 1).
Anti-piracy activities in the South China Sea of the Nguyen Dynasty in the first half of the nineteenth century.
According to the above statistics, sometimes, the National Historian Office of the Nguyen Dynasty only reflected that the sea invasions included looting and harassing ships in the South China Sea and leaving, without giving a detailed view of whether the Nguyen Dynasty captured the invaders (for example, the sea invaders came to loot in March 1838 147 , in April 1838 148 , in June 1838 149 and in June 1839 150 ). Most of the other times when mentioning a sea invasion, the National Historian Office recorded that the military soldiers, and even civil soldiers, of the Nguyen Dynasty captured the enemy.
The Nguyen Dynasty had very serious punishment for the pirates. The killing of the enemy or the use of cannons to destroy marine invaders occurred regularly, including in December 1804 151 , May 1808 152 , June 1822 153 , July 1823 154 , February 1827 155 , June 1830 156 , July 1833 157 , August 1833 158 , January 1835 159 , June 1836 160 , June 1837 161 , June 1838 162 , September 1838 163 , March 1839 164 , April 1838 165 , December 1841 166 , September 1842 167 , November 1851 168 , April 1855 169 , and September 1857 170 .
More than once, the captured invaders were also executed by the Nguyen kings, and their heads were hung in coastal places to deter the enemy (such as in June 1838 171 and June 1837 172 ). If the invaders were under 18 years old, ‘they had their five fingers on the right hand cut, [and were] given to the merchant ships to take them to trading locations to release with long-lasting fear’ (June 1837). 173
The people who captured the sea invaders were rewarded very handsomely by the Nguyen Dynasty. For example: the Nguyen Dynasty offered promotion and reward money to the army to capture the enemy in February 1806 174 , July 1823 175 , September 1826 176 , February 1827 177 , September 1832 178 , August 1833 179 , April 1835 180 , June 1837 181 , June 1838 182 , December 1841 183 , February 1847 184 , July 1847 185 , September 1849 186 , September 1851 187 , June 1852 188 , August 1853 189 , April 1855 190 , June 1855 191 , January 1857 192 , September 1857 193 , and October 1858 194 . For those who were lost in combat with the invaders, or through stress of weather, the Nguyen emperors gave survivorship, showing the court’s gratitude. For example, in June 1836, Binh Dinh’s soldiers marched on the sea and met Chinese invaders in the waters of the Phan Thiet province. Captain Do Quyet Suu urged soldiers to shoot the enemy; unfortunately, he was killed. King Minh Menh sent more people to chase the enemy and granted double survivorship to Do Viet Suu 195 . In October 1840, 180 people sailing the Thanh Hai boat to Tran Son Tay to fight the enemy drifted and went missing. Shortly thereafter, King Ming Menh gave double survivorship to the families of the victims, making an altar for sacrifice. 196 These actions of the Nguyen Dynasty expressed the court’s gratitude to the people who were sacrificed and was a major source of encouragement to the Vietnam army’s and the people’s morale in fighting the pirates.
However, there were also harsh penalties for failure. The Nguyen Dynasty rewarded the people for meritorious services but very strictly punished those who erred. Among the more common mistakes were not strictly checking and monitoring, and thereby providing the pirates with an opportunity, as in June 1830 197 January 1835 198 , October 1835 199 , May 1838 200 , and May 1857 201 . Among the other issues which cropped up were failures of command and control, which could cause several deaths, as in April 1832 202 , whilst simple cowardice – running away and hiding in the face of a sea invasion – also occurred, such as in January 1837 203 . Conversely, there were also problems of over eagerness, with captains arresting innocent merchant boats on the pretext that they were pirates, as in March 1836. 204 All were punished by the Nguyen Dynasty as a strong deterrence to others. The penalty was usually demotion, with 80 lashes. The Nguyen court severely punished cowardly officers, who saw the enemy and neglected to fight. For example, in January 1837, the Quang Ngai provincial governor went to sea and encountered three enemy ships. Encountering strong resistance from the enemy, the combatant captain Tran Van Thuc and his soldiers jumped into the water. The soldiers were rescued by civilians, and then these boats, with the soldiers and civilians on board, were then stolen by the pirates. Upon being reported, Minh Menh ordered the beheading of Tran Van Thuc, displaying his head to deter people, and the soldiers were subjected to 100 lashes and had to wear a heavy shackle for a month, whilst other officers were detained or demoted. 205 These serious actions of the Nguyen Dynasty were needed to deter such actions; reinforcing the responsibility and morale of the imperial and local military.
Pirates were strictly punished via the heavy penalties mentioned above, but when the enemy surrendered they were often forgiven. For example, the Nguyen Dynasty forgave the sins of, and even returned the wealth and provided food for, the Te Ngoi sea invaders (Chinese invaders) in April 1806 206 and May 1808 207 when they surrendered. As in the decree in 1806 of King Gia Long, when the enemy surrendered, the court was tolerant, for the Nguyen Dynasty’s ‘method of treatment is based on faithfulness … they have turned their hearts against the evils. Boats and weapons should be submitted to the government. The wealth in the boats are all returned and granted with food, chose land to stay so that they lure the gangs to surrender, if they do not want to, then let them go.’ 208
It is noteworthy that during this period there was collaboration between the Nguyen and Qing dynasties in maritime anti-piracy operations. Among the pirates in the South China Sea, the Tau O (Chinese) were the most common invaders in the seventeenth century, when the Qing Dynasty destroyed the Ming Dynasty. Many Ming officials escaped into the woods or fled to the sea, gradually degenerating and joining the coastal pirates in southern China and northern Vietnam. If they attacked in the South China Sea, they could run to the northeast of Vietnam and vice versa. Facing this widespread activity, the Nguyen court actively cooperated with the Manchu government to solve the problem. Border officials along the Vietnam-China border kept each other informed of the security situation throughout the nineteenth century. 209 The Nguyen Dynasty sent troops to arrest marine enemies who escaped the Qing army. For example, in March 1807, Chinese invaders led by Thai Khien and Chu Phan were chased by the Qing government into the sea. The governor of Liang Guang (Guangdong, Guangxi) sent a letter to the governor of Bac Thanh (Vietnam) saying that the enemy ships had green prows and red masts, asking for assistance in arresting them if they ran to Vietnamese waters. Upon receipt of this letter, King Gia Long of the Nguyen Dynasty ordered the coastal provinces from Quang Duc (an old province on the plateau of Mo Nong in the Central Highlands of Vietnam) to its Northern provinces to send boats to patrol. 210
In March 1808, more than 80 enemy boats arrested by the Chinese army fled to Yen Quang (the Quang Ninh province, Vietnam). The Nguyen Dynasty received the news, brought their boats, beheaded more than 10 invaders, and captured more than 60 people. 211
It was not only the Chinese court asking the Nguyen Dynasty to coordinate and cope with the naval invasion. In some cases, the Nguyen Dynasty also took the lead in coordinating with the Qing Dynasty. For example, in August 1842, in the waters of Nam Dinh and Quang Yen (the Quang Ninh province) in Vietnam, pirates cause obstacles and difficulties for merchant ships. Provincial officials were unable to defend themselves against these pirates. King Thieu Tri of the Nguyen Dynasty sent soldiers from Hue, the imperial city, to the south and from Hue to the north to neautralise the threat. King Thieu Tri also asked Guangdong (China) to protect them from harrassment by invaders. 212
According to the National Historian Office of the Nguyen Dynasty, after capturing Chinese invaders in the waters of Vietnam, the Nguyen Dynasty frequently assigned captives to Qinzhou (China). This happened, among other times, in September 1842 213 , April 1844 214 , May 1846 215 , and September 1849. 216
When the Chinese military was tasked with expelling the enemy, they were wrecked in the sea off Vietnam. They were assisted by the Nguyen Dynasty, who brought them back to China. In 1860, General Governor Qiongzhou (China) sent people to the sea to patrol, but they were blown off course and into the Kim Bong sea in the Binh Dinh province (Vietnam). King Tu Duc (the Nguyen Dynasty) ordered Binh Dinh province to give them rice and money, and repair the damaged boats. 217 Similarly, in April 1843, when the Vietnamese army was sent to fight the pirates, they drifted to the sea area of Qinzhou (China), and the Qing dynasty returned them to the Quang Yen province (Vietnam). 218
Clearly, the cooperation between the Qing Dynasty (China) and the Nguyen Dynasty in the nineteenth-century greatly contributed to the fight against piracy in the South China Sea, ensuring maritime security and safety for ships travelling there.
Conclusion
Anti-piracy activities in the South China Sea of Vietnam continued throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, demonstrating a proactive and positive attitude on the part of the Nguyen Dynasty in protecting maritime safety and security, and enforcing sovereignty over the South China Sea.
To prevent piracy, a widespread problem for not only Vietnam, the Nguyen Dynasty applied many different methods, from necessary preventive measures to extremely strict punishments against the pirates, and yet there were also acts of tolerance towards enemies who surrendered and repented. The cooperation of the Nguyen court with the Qing court for the prevention of piracy in the first half of the nineteenth century brought considerable success in protecting maritime safety and security, thus showing the spirit and the high international responsibility of the Nguyen Dynasty before the problems in the South China Sea.
Relying on the principles of territorial appropriation in international law (which real possession of the territory must: 1. Be carried out by the State; 2. Be carried out in a derelict territory (Res Nullius), or on a territory abandoned by a previously derelict country; 3. Exercise its sovereignty to the necessary extent; and 4. Territorial rights must be continuous and peaceful 219 and, if based on the method of ‘consolidating sovereignty by historical titular’, means that the nation has long used the territory without the opposition of any other country, 220 clearly, the preventive actions and actions against pirates in the South China Sea during the first half of the nineteenth century of the Nguyen Dynasty are a vivid illustration of the real possession of this dynasty of the islands and waters. The obligations of states in matters of maritime safety and security have not been addressed in international legal instruments until now. 221 The active and continuous activities against piracy on the sea, thus ensuring the security and safety of ships and boats travelling in and out of the South China Sea, of the Nguyen Dynasty are honourable. This international responsibility is also a taciturn statement about the real entitlement of the Nguyen Dynasty to the South China Sea, including the Spratly and Paracel Islands.
Footnotes
1.
Department of Defence, United of States of America, Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of People’s Republic of China, Office of the Secretary of Defense (2009), 4; Bronson Percival, America ‘Returns’ to Asia: The South China Sea, Hanoi, International Conference ‘South China Sea: Security and Development Cooperation in the Region’ (September 2011), 3; Hoang Viet, ‘A Look at China’s Policy on the South China Sea Dispute’, New Age Magazine, 22 (2011), 14–15.
2.
Tetsuo Kotani, ‘Why China Wants South China Sea’, The Diplomat, 18 July 2011.
3.
Dian Murray, trans. Liu Ping, Pirates in South China Sea 1790– 1810 (Beijing, 1997), 12.
4.
John Crawfurd, Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China; Exhibiting a View of the Actual State of Those Kingdoms, Second Edition (London, 1830), 243–4; Von Carl Ritter, Die Erdkunde von Asien, Band III (Berlin, 1834), 922; Jean-Louis Taberd, ‘Note on the Geography of Cochin China’, Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 6 (1837), 737–45; M. A. Dubois de Jancigny, L’Univers Pittoresque. Histoire et Description De Tous Les Peuples. Japon, Indo–Chine, Empire Birman (Ou Ava), Siam, Annam (Ou Cochinchine), Peninsule Malaise, Etc., Ceylan (Paris, 1850), 555.
5.
National Historian Office of the Nguyen Dynasty (hereafter NHO ND), Chronicle of Greater Vietnam, Vol. 1, Translation of the Institute of History (Hanoi, 2002), 787; Pham Hoang Quan, ‘Records of the Waters of Guangdong (China) and South China Sea (Vietnam) in Annals of Qing compared with Chronicle of Greater Vietnam’, Journal of Research and Development 2, No. 85 (2011), 59.
6.
Tran Ngoc Duong, Studying the Problem of Pirates in the Guangdong Sea, Qing Dynasty with Vietnam (1810–1885) (Unpublished MA Dissertation, Tunghai University (Taiwan, 2005).
7.
Murray, Pirates in South China Sea 1790– 1810, 79.
8.
Yoshiharu Tsuboi, Dai Nam Faced France and China 1847–1885 (Aurangabad, 2011), 151.
9.
Yunnan History Research Institute, Annals of Qing: Vietnam, Burma, Thailand, Laos Through Historical Documents and Extracts (Kunming, 1985), 290.
10.
Truong Ba Can, Nguyen Truong To, Human and Diaspora, Diaspora No. 38: Extermination of the Sea Invaders (Ho Chi Minh City, 1988), 310.
11.
NHO ND, Summary of the Primary Compilation of the Present Dynasty (Hue, 1998), 110.
12.
NHO ND, Summary, 274.
13.
Cabinet of the Nguyen Dynasty, History of Cabinet System in the Nguyen Dynasty, Vol. 5, (translation) (Hue, 2005), 427.
14.
Center for Vietnamese National Studies, Official Documents of Tu Duc Dynasty (1848–1883) (Hanoi, 2005), 310.
15.
Center for Vietnamese National Studies, Official, 266.
16.
Cabinet of the Nguyen Dynasty, History, 435.
17.
Cabinet of the Nguyen Dynasty, History, 428.
18.
Cabinet of the Nguyen Dynasty, History, 427.
19.
Cabinet of the Nguyen Dynasty, History, 432.
20.
NHO ND, Chronicle of Greater Vietnam, Vol. 5, Translation of the Institute of History (Hanoi, 2004), 340–1.
21.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 340–1.
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Cabinet of the Nguyen Dynasty, History, 425.
23.
Cabinet of the Nguyen Dynasty, History, 435.
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Cabinet of the Nguyen Dynasty, History, 426.
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Cabinet of the Nguyen Dynasty, History, 432.
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Cabinet of the Nguyen Dynasty, History, 432.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 496.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 499.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 509.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 571.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 590–3.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 620–1.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 634.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 639
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 649.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 654.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 662.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 696.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 723.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 728.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 730.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 971.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 971.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 2, 297.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 2, 298.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 2, 541.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 2, 563.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 2, 575.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 2, 587.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 2, 632.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 51–2.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 86–7.
54.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 95–6.
55.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 136–7.
56.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 304.
57.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 306–12.
58.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 367–8.
59.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 383.
60.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 384–5.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 404.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 433–4.
63.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 606.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 669.
65.
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66.
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67.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 4, 512.
68.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 4, 568–9.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 4, 622.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 4, 779.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 4, 883.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 4, 911–2
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 4, 957.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 4, 1076.
75.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 12–3.
76.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 49.
77.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 49.
78.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 75.
79.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 89.
80.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 106.
81.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 158–9.
82.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 270.
83.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 277.
84.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 289.
85.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 310–1.
86.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, p323–4.
87.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 337–8.
88.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 343–4.
89.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 344.
90.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 355–6.
91.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 380–1.
92.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 413.
93.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 475.
94.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 482.
95.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 482.
96.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 495.
97.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 504.
98.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 520.
99.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 528.
100.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 848.
101.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 166.
102.
NHO ND, Chronicle of Greater Vietnam, Vol. 6, Translation of the Institute of History (Hanoi, 2007), 262
103.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 279.
104.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 369.
105.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 395.
106.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 414–5.
107.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 488.
108.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 491–2.
109.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 572.
110.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 598.
111.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 874.
112.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 975.
113.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 981.
114.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 1011.
115.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 1052.
116.
NHO ND, Chronicle of Greater Vietnam, Vol. 7, Translation of the Institute of History (Hanoi, 2007), 74.
117.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 140
118.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 196.
119.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 199.
120.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 199.
121.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 201.
122.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 228.
123.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 247–8.
124.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 283.
125.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 307.
126.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 370.
127.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 371.
128.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 371.
129.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 371–2.
130.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 377.
131.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 381.
132.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 382.
133.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 440.
134.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 443.
135.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 453.
136.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 484.
137.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 486.
138.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 494.
139.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 499.
140.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 500.
141.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 501.
142.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 503.
143.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 518.
144.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 520.
145.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 525.
146.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 532.
147.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 289.
148.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 310–11.
149.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 344.
150.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 528.
151.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 620–1.
152.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 730.
153.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 2, 216.
154.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 669.
155.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 2, 575.
156.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 87.
157.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 669.
158.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 705–6.
159.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 4, 512.
160.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 4, 957.
161.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 106.
162.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 343–4.
163.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 380–1.
164.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 475, 482.
165.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 495.
166.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 262.
167.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 414–5.
168.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 228.
169.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 371–2.
170.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 525.
171.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 343–4.
172.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 106.
173.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 106.
174.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 654.
175.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 2, 298.
176.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 2, 541.
177.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 2, 575.
178.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 384–5.
179.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 705–6.
180.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 4, 622.
181.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 106.
182.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 343–4.
183.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 262.
184.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 981.
185.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 1052.
186.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 149.
187.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 228.
188.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 247–8.
189.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 283.
190.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 371–2.
191.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 381.
192.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 486.
193.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 525.
194.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 579–80.
195.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 4, 957.
196.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 848.
197.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 3, 86–7.
198.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 4, 512.
199.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 4, 779.
200.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 337–8.
201.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 503.
202.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 2, 304.
203.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 12–3.
204.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 4, 911–2.
205.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 5, 12–3.
206.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 662.
207.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 730.
208.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 662.
209.
Vu Duong Luan, ‘The Nguyen Dynasty with Trade Security Situation in the North-East Coast of the Nineteenth Century’, in the proceedings of the workshop: Van Don Trade Port, History, Economic Potentials and Cultural Exchanges (Quang Ninh, July 2008), 167.
210.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 696.
211.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 1, 723.
212.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 395.
213.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 414–5.
214.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 598.
215.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 874.
216.
NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 140.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 7, 664.
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NHO ND, Chronicle, Vol. 6, 491–2.
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