Abstract
At the beginning of this short work the authors acknowledge that amphibious warfare involves some of the most complex of all military undertakings. Thus, they have set themselves a challenge – to encapsulate a history of these operations in a book of 160 pages. How successful they have been largely depends on what their objectives are. It appears as a Casemate Short History, but neither the publisher nor the authors precisely define their purpose and audience. The book consists of short narratives (up to three pages) of selected operations with a two- or three-sentence assessment at the end of each. It is safe to assume that it is not book intended for the readers of the IJMH. Rather, it is probably best seen as a primer aimed at appealing to the public, principally in the United States, to wake up to the importance of amphibious warfare.
In the opening section, the authors provide a useful typology of operations, ranging from amphibious assault to administrative landings, but, curiously, they do not use it thereafter to inform their narrative or assessments. The early sections (from antiquity to 1918) cover the usual operations (Marathon, Roman, Viking, Norman invasions of Britain, Mongol invasion attempt on Japan, raids and landing in the colonial, revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, Crimea, US Civil War). These narratives do not add anything new and contain some of the old canards. Abercrombie’s meticulous approach to an opposed amphibious landing at Aboukir Bay in 1801 is said to have been neglected after his death by ‘hidebound military and naval bureaucracy’ (p.39). However, the British went on to develop their expertise in landing operations to the end of the Napoleonic War, maintaining the advantage of sea mobility to avoid opposed landings. The first use of steam vessels in amphibious warfare is claimed to have been employed by the United States at La Vera Cruz in 1847 – but the French had used them at Algiers in the 1830. The disaster at Gallipoli is supposed to have resulted in the wilful abandonment of amphibious doctrine by most armies. This is not entirely accurate so far as Britain was concerned. There was a lack of clarity over the future purpose of amphibious landings, but doctrine, techniques, and equipment continued to be developed throughout the 1920s and 1930s (albeit with limited budgets).
The book really gets into its stride post-1918 with a focus primarily on the US Marine Corps (USMC). The section on inter-war years, the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations (1934) and the beginning of the Fleet Exercises (FLEX) in 1935 provides a good, short, introduction to the subject. Once war broke out in 1939, the use of short cases, chronologically presented, continues. It is in the Pacific theatre that the narrative shows the clearest evidence of an evolving doctrine. The sections on the European theatre are unexceptional and while most still get their short ‘assessment’, the operations in the Scheldt in October-November1944 are included by without comment.
The Cold War and post-Cold War section is brief, but illustrates the continuing strategic importance of amphibious operations. Inchon (1950) and Cyprus (1974) provide examples of inspired operations. Suez (1956) and the Falklands (1982) are two examples of operational success with very different geopolitical outcomes. The two Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003) are mentioned but not used as case studies.
The authors end with the warning that amphibious capability rapidly decays and that decay can be hidden by apparent success (for example Grenada in 1983). The US hegemony in amphibious capability continues, but is under threat from Russia and, more importantly, China. The clarion call of the final paragraph is clear enough but the warning examples that the ‘first thoroughly modern’ Yuzhao-class LPD was launched in January 2018, and the Yuting II-class tank landing ships are under construction confused this reader. The former has been in service since 2007 and the improved variants of latter since 2016. Perhaps something went adrift in final editing.