Abstract
This book presents a sobering and compelling account of the challenges facing the U.S. in its efforts to constrain China’s increasing control over the East Asian seas. Its main contention is that Beijing has been highly effective in changing the status quo in the East Asian seas without resorting to armed conflict or war despite opposition from several coastal states and the U.S. and China is gaining substantial influence over what it views as its historic rights and interests through grey zone operations, a comprehensive, long-term strategy that emphasizes the use of paramilitary forces – especially the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) – ‘on the frontlines of China’s seaward expansion’. They have been able to occupy natural and artificially-created islands, develop military facilities, and pressure and intimidate rivals, while carefully avoiding any serious reaction from its main maritime rival, the U.S. It is a strategy of ‘Push, push, but don’t break’.
Originating in a 2017 international conference of experts at the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, this book contains 18 well-edited and highly complementary chapters examining China’s maritime grey zone operations. The term ‘grey zone’ refers to maritime activities that are not clearly peace-time or war-time but are intentionally ambiguous to minimize the risk of precipitating an armed conflict. NB: grey zone is not the same as grey hull, the colour of PLA Navy vessels. CCG vessel hulls are white, while PAFMM vessel hulls are blue.
Grey zone operations seek to alter the status quo incrementally and gradually by employing unconventional elements of state power; e.g., fishermen militias. PAFMM personnel are mostly civilian fishermen. But they can also be used to assert China’s sovereignty claims and resource control. Some are trained and paid to do so, under a direct military chain of command of the PAFMM, a state-organized and controlled maritime force.
The CCG and the PAFMM carry out most of Chinese maritime grey zone operations. Most CCG cutters and PAFMM vessels are minimally armed, but they can bump, ram and obstruct other vessels. They can also employ powerful water cannons to damage sensitive equipment aboard other ships. They can maintain a Chinese presence in contested waters, thereby ‘declaring sovereignty’. They can provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. They can intimidate and harass foreign vessels who are found fishing or pursuing oil and gas development activities in disputed maritime space. They can protect Chinese civilians operating in Chinese-claimed maritime space; for example, in their defence of the Chinese drilling rig HYSY-981 in 2014. Chinese coast guard and militia forces have upheld Chinese control over Scarborough Reef, after a 2012 confrontation with Philippine forces there. Today, Filipino fishermen can only operate there with China’s permission. The PLA Navy also plays a role in disputed waters, by hovering nearby to discourage foreign countries from any forceful resistance to Chinese activities.
The core of the book provides extensive data and details on the development, structure, strategies and tactics, capabilities and limitations of China’s maritime grey zone forces, with frequent use of tables, graphs, figures and case studies, many from Chinese language primary and secondary sources. Various chapters examine how each maritime force fits into China’s overall national defence strategy; these are combined with an analysis of China’s maritime intentions, capabilities and recent experiences.
The well-documented results of this ‘great leap outward’ are impressive. The PLA Navy, the CCG, and the PAFMM are the largest of their type in the world, in terms of number of vessels. China now has by far the world’s largest coast guard, operating more maritime law enforcement vessels than the coast guards of all its regional neighbours combined. The CCG owns more than 220 ships over 500 tons, far surpassing Japan (with around 80 coast guard hulls over 500 tons), the United States (with around 50), and South Korea (with around 45). The size of the PAFMM is difficult to determine. However, it recruits from the world’s largest fishing industry, with nearly two million fishermen operating about 187,000 marine fishing vessels. The text provides more accurate data about militia boats and crews in China’s two major maritime provinces: Hainan and Zhejiang.
Several chapters analyse the diverse responses of regional states to Chinese encroachments. Japan has taken the most vigorous actions by strengthening its naval and coast guard forces along its southern islands. Vietnam has resisted Chinese claims and activities in contested fishing and oil exploration areas, but with only mixed results. The Philippines is apparently acquiescing to Beijing control over Scarborough Shoal, despite a 2016 arbitration ruling clearly placing it under Philippine jurisdiction.
How China’s grey zone operations affect U.S. interests directly and indirectly are considered carefully in this book. U.S. efforts to defend its own interests of maritime freedom in the East Asian seas are seen here as having been fairly successful. Nevertheless, several U.S. Navy special mission ships – the USNS Bowditch, USNS Impeccable, USNS Effective, USNS Victorious and USNS Howard O. Lorenzen – have all been shadowed and harassed by various Chinese maritime forces demonstrating their opposition to foreign naval activities within its claimed EEZ.
When it comes to indirect effects, the United States has a mixed record of helping its allies and partners protect themselves against Chinese intrusion. Despite the robust presence of American sea power in contested areas of maritime East Asia, and despite the periodic Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), the United States has largely failed to halt China’s bullying behaviour against its smaller neighbours. The former (presence) cannot deter Beijing from taking tactical actions in the grey zone. The latter (FONOPs) do little to defend the interests of allies and partners. China’s grey zone activities cannot be easily deterred, because each individual act is calculated to fall below the U.S. escalation threshold to a more forceful retaliation.
Several authors here suggest how the U.S. could pursue more effective ways to constrain China’s maritime intrusions and to manage confrontations when they do occur. With its allies and partners, the U.S. could increase surface and satellite surveillance of maritime hot spots. It could expand the Shiprider Program and other forms of joint or coordinated patrols and exercises. It could publicize and protest all acts of Chinese encroachment and militarization swiftly and widely. It could escort allied vessels through contested waters or help allies protect their own EEZs from Chinese intrusions. All these options imply a lower threshold for U.S. retaliation along with acceptance of a higher risk of escalation. China does not want war, the authors contend, but will continue pursuing maritime expansion opportunistically until it encounters stiffer resistance. Perhaps the U.S. and its allies and partners should deploy their own grey zone forces. The co-editors conclude that ‘ultimately, the goal is for China to recognize that its interests would be better served by a more cooperative approach’. This reviewer concludes that this is a definitive and essential work for maritime historians.