Abstract
This article presents a long-term explanation of port evolution in Africa. It focuses on the economic, political and social characteristics that influenced the development of maritime infrastructures and their interaction with inland transport systems. This article demonstrates how seaport evolution in Africa has been heavily affected by path-dependence patterns. In addition, this study provides evidence of the insertion of the African economy into the waves of globalization through the modernization of seaports and the necessary institutional and technological flexibility.
Seaports and development
Seaports are organic entities whose growth or decline derive from various factors: natural forces (earthquakes/tsunamis and silting), geographical conditions (site and situation, accessibility), foreland influences (liner shipping, global trade and business cycles, war and blockades), political developments (conflict or warfare, trade wars, boundary delimitation, secession and political reforms), institutional (port governance system, regulatory regime) and market forces. 1 For example, the dissolution of the Mali Federation in the 1960s favoured Abidjan as an alternative to Dakar, while crisis in Cote-d’Ivoire in 2002 diverted traffic meant for Abidjan to Ghana, Togo and Benin; 2 the secession of Eritrea turned Ethiopia into a landlocked country, making it more dependent on Djibouti. Apartheid policy in South Africa forced neighbouring African countries to seek alternative but more distant and costlier outlets. Conversely, the tide turned with the end of Apartheid, which made South African ports accessible to neighbouring countries. Civil wars in Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia and Sierra Leone at different times from the 1960s to the 1990s adversely affected the national ports and landlocked countries that depended on them. With peace restored and white minority rule abolished in Southern Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe now have options for their overseas trade as indicated later in this article.
Seaports are dynamic, multi-dimensional phenomena. They are complex institutions that, though defined by location, interface with multiple institutions, agencies and actors beyond local and national boundaries. In effect, ports not only bestride the land-sea divide, but they also interface with institutions and interests. As Malcolm Tull aptly noted, those actors and organizations often have ‘overlapping and sometimes conflicting interests’. 3 Ports are, therefore, susceptible to the vagaries of political, economic, social and geographical dynamics. Indeed, forces beyond the locale or control of ports (economic crises, conflicts, natural disasters, closure of mines, 4 depletion of hydrocarbon deposits, relocation of capital cities, etc.) have often been decisive in determining their fortunes. 5
Except in single-port countries, such as Singapore, ports are grouped hierarchically within a country and across a region. Human and natural forces impinge on and affect the character, function and fortunes of ports. Intermodalism is the lifeblood of seaports, without which they atrophy into irrelevance.
The developmental impact of ports has often been taken for granted, but that assumption has been challenged by various experts. At the centre of the debate is the usefulness or otherwise of Port Impact Studies (PIS), which port managers and other stakeholders employ to validate the competitiveness and socio-economic impact of ports and to justify plans for port expansion. Implicit in the exercise is the admission that ports exert both positive and negative impacts, the latter being trade-offs for economic growth induced by the port. However, the contentious issue is how to measure the developmental impact of ports in the local and wider settings. Difficulties have been encountered in using PIS to ascertain a port’s contribution to economic development in its region and beyond. For example, it is not easy to determine the degree of the dependence of a firm or an industry on a port. PIS have also been criticised for being ‘static’, being relevant only for the year of data collection. Defenders of PIS, however, contend that such studies provide understanding of the structure of the port and its immediate economic effects; they inform both port planning and regional economic planning; highlight costs and benefits of port development or expansion; provide options and set priorities for the economic, social and territorial development of a port’s region. 6 In all, ports register different types of impact: direct, indirect, induced and catalytic. 7
Opinion is divided on the connection between seaports and the development of their hinterlands. A dominant view presents seaports as ‘growth poles and enablers of economies of scale for production and trade. . . [thereby providing] comparative advantages to regions and cities where they are located’. However, for seaports to be engines of local, regional or even national economic growth, they have to be efficient and competitive, for ‘port efficiency creates more economic benefits because it will allow more cargo throughputs’. 8 Microstudies have indeed established the local and regional multiplier effects of seaports in developing countries. 9 It may be noted that the port-hinterland nexus is symbiotic: it has been described as ‘a two-way process, and a function of varied economic, technical, political, and social forces’. The relationship is also stated to be ‘dynamic, with periods of equilibrium and possibly more extended periods characterised by adjustment and change’. 10 In sum, it may be stated that ports could serve strategic interests in the context of national or sub-national development policy. Thus, at the local level, seaports could generate jobs, taxes and duties, and add value; increase economic activity and lower trading costs at the national level, and exert positive influence beyond national borders, such as through transit traffic to landlocked countries.
The developmental impact of seaports is epitomised by the phenomenon of ‘developer ports’. 11 This is illustrated in West Africa by an artificial port at Port Harcourt in eastern Nigeria, developed between 1913 and 1926. The port was designed as the outlet for the forest product and minerals (coal and tin) of the proximate and distant hinterlands in eastern and north-central Nigeria. With the concurrent construction of a railway line, the port-rail project did (and continues to) serve the purpose of engendering local or regional economic growth in Nigeria. 12 Hoyle noted likewise that ports at Tema (Ghana), Abidjan and San Pedro (Cote d’Ivoire) and Richards Bay (South Africa) were developed over time ‘often in the context of a major regional development programme’. 13 The port of San Pedro, opened in 1971, was targeted at fostering the development of south-western Cote d’Ivoire. The region had been neglected during the colonial period because of ‘difficult socio-political conditions in the area’ and the concentration of resources on the Abidjan-Bouake region. The nationalist government responded to criticism of the neglect of the area by instituting a regional development programme for the prosecution of multiple projects, including developing a new cityport and its hinterland. 14
However, the developer port project at San Pedro did not attain the heights of Port Harcourt for two reasons. First, Abidjan was too strong to be undermined by an upstart; it even became stronger. Second, the new port was dependent on timber (tropical hardwoods), which suffered declining demand from overseas markets. 15 Tema in Ghana had better prospects as a developer port in south-eastern Ghana. First, it did not have a rival in the capital port-city (Accra), but in Takoradi in south-western Ghana. Second, its alignment with aluminium smelting and hydro-electric power generation made it a viable growth pole of south-eastern Ghana.
Hoyle described the African developer ports as ‘specialized facilities . . . [designed] to enhance competiveness within an international economic context but sometimes also . . . to promote the diffusion of development within the national space economy’. 16 The growth pole function of African seaports can also be seen in the context of boosting local industries or providing outlets for bulk cargoes. This is exemplified by Buchanan in Liberia and Saldanha Bay in South Africa (iron ore), San Pedro in Cote-d’Ivoire (timber), Tema in Ghana (aluminium), Lome and Kpeme in Togo (phosphates), Onne in Nigeria (crude oil) and Richards Bay in South Africa (coal), which were developed in association with industrial projects, with consequences for the local and national economies. 17
In contrast to the foregoing, there is a less optimistic view of the presumed developmental impact of seaports. First, it is argued that seaports actually respond to, rather than catalyse, development, and that they act as nothing more than mere gateways or conveyor belts. In short, infrastructure in general and ports in particular can either facilitate or follow development. 18 It can, therefore, be asserted that ports can be, but do not always function, as growth poles. As noted by Ethan Chorin: ‘While the benefits of a well-functioning port are at times difficult to quantify, the harm done by inefficient, low-capacity or poorly run ports can be glaringly obvious, and include delays/demurrage, lack of capacity, congestion, and higher prices for staple goods.’ 19 In other words, ‘inefficient ports’ could be anti-developmental by placing a country or region ‘farther away from sources of cheaper inputs or markets for goods produced’. 20 Second, by the same token, concentration of traffic at a few ports in a country or region has the unintended effect of promoting lopsided allocation of resources. A feature of this in developing countries is that resources are unduly concentrated in a narrow belt of the country at the expense of an underdeveloped hinterland. Third, in the local setting of port-cities, seaports as magnets tend to aggravate congestion in port cities, 21 fuelling rural-urban migrations. Such massive migrations aggravate living conditions in the urban centres and induce high rates of unemployment, crime and cost of living. 22
The divergent views of seaports as drivers of growth or development can be sustained in different contexts. In some cases, the role of ports has been more proactive than reactive. From the foregoing, we can state that seaports cannot be considered in isolation but in the context of port-logistics synergy. Moreover, the role and impact of seaports extend beyond acting as gateways or conduits between the hinterlands and forelands. Whatever position one takes on the port-development nexus, it can be argued that the contribution of ports must be coordinated with that of hinterland transport, especially railways. This has been established in the case of French West Africa, 23 and the conclusion can be generalized for the Atlantic ports of Africa and their hinterlands. For example, port throughput at Dakar and Lagos rose dramatically in the 1880s and post-1912, as railway development induced significant peanut/groundnut production in the Thies and Kano regions, respectively.
However, the central role of seaports in developing the hinterlands is best appreciated in the context of a wide network comprising ocean shipping and the forelands, on the one hand, and the port city and the wider hinterlands, on the other. Foreland dynamics, especially ocean shipping and globalization, need to be taken together with hinterland logistics and political economy. From the colonial period, African economies have been dominated by foreign shipping, especially those originating from the colonial powers. In West and Central Africa, for example, British, French, German and Dutch lines – Elder Dempster, Chargéurs Reunis, Woemann Linie and the Dutch West Afrika Lijn, respectively, handled the maritime trade between the region and Europe. The shipping trade was dominated by shipping conferences, which survived into the post-independence era in spite of the establishment of national shipping lines by Ghana and Nigeria. From the late 1960s, a new dynamic was the rapid growth of containerisation, which required the development of facilities at old ports or the creation of dedicated ports to handle container traffic. 24 Table 1 shows the share of container traffic by West Africa’s leading ports. A visual representation of this is provided in Figure 1.
Container throughput (in TEUs) at five West African Ports, 2008–2013.
Source: Adapted from Evans A. Tetteh, Yang Hualong and Gomina Mama Fousseni, ‘Container Ports Throughput Analysis: A Comparative Evaluation of China and Five West African Countries Seaport Efficiencies’, International Journal of Engineering Research in Africa, 22 (2016), 167, Table 1.
Note: TEU = twenty-foot equivalent units.
Leading container ports of West Africa.
It is important to emphasize the complexity of the hinterlands of African ports. Often these overlap, or are difficult to delineate precisely. Hinterlands often traverse national boundaries, leaving the seaport vulnerable to dynamics beyond its control, such as political or security challenges of the neighbouring country, or hostile bilateral relations, including trade and tariff wars. In a striking instance of the impact of borders on seaports, the port of Calabar in Nigeria has remained under-utilized because its natural hinterland in Cameroun is cut off by a colonial boundary frozen by fraught bilateral relations. This is paralleled by the case of north-western Tanzania, whose natural outlet is the port of Mombasa in Kenya, which, however, manages to get a proportion of the region’s traffic. 25 That said, critical to port-hinterland relationship is the adequacy and efficiency or otherwise of logistics infrastructure. Accordingly, Ducruet noted that ‘[h]interlands have reached beyond port regions mostly due to improvements in transport systems’ connectivity’. 26 He added, however, that improvements in hinterland connectivity could produce a tunnel effect, characterized, on the one hand, by lower local benefits, and, on the other, the channelling of greater throughputs to distant destinations. In all, seaports do not operate in isolation. They exist in a symbiotic relationship with local, national and supranational economies. Local and national economies are particularly vulnerable to the performance of their ports, while the health of such economies affect the fortunes of the seaports. It has been suggested that ‘industrial specialization constitutes a weakness for port performance in an age of globalisation. Conversely, service specialization and the concentration of economic wealth foster traffic.’ 27
Profile of African Atlantic ports
The entire Atlantic coastline up to Cape Town in South Africa is characterized by lack of indentation, 28 with only a handful of natural harbours at Dakar, Freetown, Lagos, Lobito and Walvis Bay. However, the disadvantage of site and situation often conferred some dubious benefits. For example, Badagry (and Lagos before 1914) in Nigeria and Cotonou in Benin, were lagoon ports, sheltered from the open sea by sand bars. This locational disadvantage was exploited by slave traders to carry on their nefarious activities right up to the late nineteenth century. Until the advent of European colonial rule, African Atlantic ports had limited hinterland connections. In the absence of railways, they relied on inland waterways, most of which were seasonal.
The onset of European imperialism, especially from the nineteenth century, dramatically changed the fortunes of West Coast of Africa (WCA) ports. First, the coastal port towns were made administrative capitals of the European colonies that abutted the coast. This later became a disadvantage when such ports could not expand beyond the boundaries of the city. Port functions have consequently been relocated beyond the city itself by way of new constructions and inland container ports. Second, the natural harbours were developed through extensive dredging and harbour works. 29 Third, a network of railway lines and roads was developed from the coastal settlements towards the hinterland. On the eve of the First World War, the basic transport infrastructure linking seaports with the hinterlands via railways and roads had been established, and this was maintained almost intact till the 1980s, when another phase of port and rail development took place.
Modern seaports on the Atlantic coast of Africa may be classified into two: natural and artificial ports. Natural harbours were dredged and expanded to accommodate larger ships, while, as indicated earlier, artificial ports were constructed for strategic reasons. Moreover, port development was aligned with railway and road construction. Opened in 1866, Dakar was the chief port of French West Africa. Its annual throughput in 2006 amounted to 9.9 million tonnes. The port was served by a major railway line opened in 1885, running northwards to the port of Saint Louis and eastwards towards Bamako in Mali. Upon completion of the Vridi Canal in 1951, the Port of Abidjan became Cote d’Ivoire’s major seaport, leading to the closure of wharves at Port-Bouët and Grand-Bassam. A one-metre narrow gauge railway line from Abidjan to Azaguié, a distance of some 70km, was opened in 1905.
Takoradi, the first major seaport of the Gold Coast (modern Ghana), was opened in 1928. It was preceded, however, by an eastern railway line constructed in 1923 to harness the minerals and cocoa of the hinterland. In post-independence Ghana, a new port was constructed at Tema, as the outlet for the country’s aluminium smelting plant. In Benin Republic to the east, the modern port of Cotonou was opened in 1965. This had been operational since the era of French colonial rule. A railway line was opened in 1906 to connect Cotonou with Ouidah, the capital of the pre-colonial kingdom of Dahomey.
In Nigeria, both seaport development and railway construction commenced in the 1890s. The Lagos railway had reached Ibadan by 1901 and Minna in 1911. Meanwhile, the Baro–Kano Railway was constructed by the government of Northern Nigeria between 1907 and 1911. Both lines were integrated as Northern and Southern Nigeria were formally amalgamated in 1914.
The port of Douala has served as the outlet for Cameroon as well as Chad and other landlocked countries to the north since the nineteenth century. As in other colonial territories, railway construction proceeded alongside port development during the era of German colonial rule up to 1914.
In the Portuguese colony of Angola, Luanda port was opened in 1844 but railway construction only commenced in 1887. The line from Luanda was opened in 1889, the Moçâmedes line in 1910, and the Benguela line in 1912. By 1961, the Moçâmedes railway had been extended to Menongue in the hinterland.
Walvis Bay, Namibia’s largest port, was established in 1840. Originally developed by the Germans, it came under South African control as a League of Nations Mandated Territory, which South Africa annexed, before Namibia attained independence. The Germans commenced railway construction in 1897 from Swakopmund to Windhoek. The Walvis Bay railway was completed in 1899.
The evolution of African Atlantic seaports may be summarised as follows. 30 Up to the mid-nineteenth century, they had limited draught and capacity though a few had natural harbours. Many of them were engaged in the trans-Atlantic slave trade though primary produce, including foodstuff, indigenous textiles and exotic products, featured in their external trade. The ports were orientated towards Europe and the Americas and served by foreign shipping. With the onset of European rule in the nineteenth century, extensive engineering works improved access and capacity at these ports. The favoured ports (such as Lagos and Dakar) became dominant and some of their erstwhile competitors (Badagry, Saint Louis, Forcados, Burutu) declined. Indeed, some of the disadvantaged ports went into irreversible decline via lock-in. Port concentration was accentuated by economic depression or global conflict. In West Africa, Lagos, dubbed the ‘Liverpool of West Africa’, 31 Dakar and Freetown were the most important ports for most of the twentieth century.
Local or regional conflict and official policy have influenced the fortunes of these ports. Ports that had railway links to the hinterland developed at the expense of those with limited hinterland access by the river or lagoon system. During the twentieth century, three major dynamics shaped the hierarchy of African ports: independence from colonial rule, globalization of shipping, epitomised by containerisation, and the concession of major ports.
Nationalist governments invested in port development, leading to diffusion and inter-port competition. Paradoxically, schemes of regional integration were undertaken in all the sub-regions of SSA (East, Central, Southern and West) to manage joint projects and complex multilateral issues (political, security and economic) in pursuit of regional development. This may be seen as a countervailing force against counter-productive competition. For example, civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and political crises in Cote d’Ivoire and The Gambia were resolved on the regional platform of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Such exigencies expanded ECOWAS’ mandate beyond its primary focus on economic integration.
As well, containerisation and port concessions have led to concentration within and across national boundaries. 32 The two mutually reinforcing dynamics also bred competition for the hinterlands, which became more accessible by competing transport corridors, a subject discussed later in this essay. Apart from inducing the construction of dedicated ports, containerization has also generated the rise of inland container terminals or dry ports, further extending the operational reach of ports into an ever-widening hinterland. Between 2004 and 2011, nine terminal concessions were implemented in West Africa, as shown below in Table 2. In retrospect, it is arguable that the concessions were negotiated by the African governments from a position of weakness. This may be countered by the argument that the African countries had limited options.
Port concessions in West Africa, 2004–2011.
Source: Adapted from Jean Debrie, ‘The West African’, Figure 2.
As Hoyle has demonstrated for East Africa, with broad relevance for WCA, it is the ‘interplay of local circumstances and global forces,’ especially since the 1980s, which has driven port development in Africa. 33 The continent has absorbed massive investment, especially by global players, in port development and management. Yet, notwithstanding the new dynamics of globalization, containerization, port reforms and regional integration, little has changed in the structure and processes governing port-hinterland-foreland relationships in WCA. Indeed, the transport corridors discussed in the next section as lynchpins of this complex relationship had their roots in the colonial period.
Transport corridors as development corridors?
Transport corridors have been veritable bridges between Sub-Saharan African (SSA) ports and their hinterlands. They have been defined as ‘a collection of routes that link the region’s seaports to major inland markets as well as offer connections to its many landlocked countries’. 34 There are 15 landlocked countries (LLCs) out of SSA’s 48 countries. The LLCs are key players in the six major transport corridors between Dakar (Senegal) and Walvis Bay (Namibia) shown in Table 3.
Transport corridors on the Atlantic Coast of Africa.
Source: Adapted from Economic Commission for Africa, ‘The Development of Trade Transit Corridors in Africa’s Landlocked Countries’, in Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA IV) (2014), 248, Table 7.1.
These corridors serve not only the national hinterlands of the seaports indicated above, but also handle the transit traffic of LLCs in the distant hinterlands. The following features of the corridors are worth noting. 35 First, each corridor contains feeder transport routes. Second, they are largely unconnected for now, a defect that the trans-African highway is expected to correct. The trans-African transport network, comprising 10,000km of additional railways and 7,000km of additional roads, is estimated to cost $32 billion. Figure 2 shows the network of highways across Africa.
Trans-African highways.
A report on transport corridors in West Africa identified nine transit corridors, two intra-regional corridors (Bamako, Mali-Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; and Ouagadougou-Niamey, Niger) and two major East-West corridors (Dakar-Niamey) and (Abidjan-Lagos). 36 The most important corridors from the seaport-hinterland developmental perspective are the Lagos-Kano-Jibiya; Cotonou-Niamey; Lome-Ouagadougou; Tema- Ouagadougou; Abidjan-Ouagadougou; Abidjan-Bamako; and Dakar-Bamako. These transit corridors are distinguished by certain features. First, two of them (Dakar-Bamako and Abidjan-Ouagadougou) have dual rail and road links. Others are based on road transport services. Second, Dakar and Abidjan service multiple corridors, with Bamako and Ouagadougou being hinterland termini of those links. Third, Dakar, Abidjan and Lome, unlike Lagos and Tema, profit from common membership of the defunct French empire in West Africa, and rail links across their modern borders.
The transit corridor between Cotonou and Niamey, handling a total of 2.2 million metric tonnes, in 2015, is the busiest in West Africa. A proportion of this traffic goes to Northern Nigeria, thus implying that Lagos, Nigeria’s major seaport, does not enjoy an overwhelmingly advantage as outlet for its national hinterland. Cotonou’s competitiveness vis-a-vis Lagos is attributable to two factors. First, it is the least costly corridor in West Africa at $3,938 compared to $4,552 for Lagos-Jibiya or $5,095 for the Abidjan-Ouagadougou corridor. Second, delays at the border crossings and checkpoints, totalling an average of 98 minutes, were the shortest in the region. Third, road harassment for transit import traffic within Benin national boundaries has been reduced to the barest minimum by the official policy of attaching military escorts to transit trucks up to the border with Niger. 37 A similar policy of reducing harassment and delays on the road was adopted in Togo by the abolition of gendarmerie checkpoints. Next to the Cotonou-Niamey Corridor, the one from Dakar to Bamako is the second busiest in West Africa, carrying 1.7 million tonnes. It is served by road and rail services though the latter is inefficient because of its dilapidation. Delays at border crossings and checkpoints along this corridor (316 minutes) are the highest in West Africa.
Unlike the transit corridors that link ports with their hinterlands across ecological zones, the Abidjan-Lagos Economic Corridor cuts across the countries of Cote-d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria, which are all on the Atlantic seaboard. It connects major urban centres with a combined population of nearly 40 million. The Ghana/Togo border crossing is the busiest in the corridor, taking advantage of the proximity of a cement factory in Ghana close to the border. An indication of the magnitude of transactions across coastal West Africa is provided by seaport and logistics features of the corridor detailed in Table 4.
Features of the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor.
Source: Adapted from Danish International Development Agency, ‘Accelerating Trade’, 11, Table 2.
The optimal performance of these corridors, however, has been undermined by high transport costs; competition between transit countries or hubs and the LLCs; corruption and inefficiency, epitomised by bottlenecks at customs checkpoints; and poor rail and road networks. As late as 2009, 80 per cent of roads in the entire SSA were unpaved. 38
From a maritime perspective, transport corridors are crucial to the future development of African economies. This is exemplified by the Walvis Bay Corridor (WBC), which appears to have had the greatest impact of Africa’s Atlantic seaports. 39 The WBC consists of the Walvis Bay port, the Trans Kalahari Corridor, the Trans Caprivi Corridor, the Trans Kunene Corridor and the trans Oranje Corridor, serving six countries (Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Angola and South Africa) directly and one (DRC) indirectly. Established in 2000 as a public-private enterprise, the WBC aims to facilitate trade and transport in the corridor that spans several countries. It runs on a network of roads, railways and shipping services. So far, the initiative has attracted trade to the port and provided incentives of competitive tariffs for importers and exporters, thereby reducing the cost of doing business in the region. Only time will tell whether these optimistic prospects are sustainable and the experience transferable to other corridors.
Conclusion
Some inferences can be drawn from the foregoing discussion. First, African seaports have not optimized their potential as growth poles, though it must be conceded that seaports cannot be treated in isolation in a setting of systemic under-achievement. To be fair, the seaports exerted varying degrees of localized growth impact on the adjoining hinterlands, which has also been a double-edged sword in terms of countervailing costs. The potential of the port-hinterland nexus has been affected by local and external dynamics, including the limited number of natural harbours and the underdevelopment of national economies.
Second, the application of technology and capital since the nineteenth century has transformed old ports and led to the emergence of new ports across the coastline. Bigger ports are being constructed and an increasing number of ports are being run by concessions signed with foreign operators, with generally optimistic outcomes. But there are also concerns that the entry of expatriate cartels in the shipping and ports sectors is a form of neo-colonialism. This is captured in Debrie’s apt comment: ‘We still need to see through future research whether this recent rationalization of the port system, which provides international operators with very large productivity increases and returns on investment, also benefits the economies of West Africa . . ., or if merely benefits the networks of the companies involved.’ 40
Third, the integration of port development with railway/road construction has conferred unassailable advantage on a few ports and accentuated port concentration. This synergy underscores the imperative of efficient intermodal transport for the competitiveness of Africa’s Atlantic ports. The ability to retain or increase levels of port traffic will largely depend on a combination of factors, including the competitiveness of intermodal hinterland logistics, endowment, economic development and population of hinterlands, the efficiency of port management (including tariffs, length of dwell and turnaround times, security in the ports), reduction of bottlenecks along its corridors and changing policies. 41 It is likely that heightened competition among seaports along transport corridors will benefit landlocked countries, such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, which have wider options of coastal outlets.
Fourth, containerization has been an important dynamic, which latched African seaports and economies to the juggernaut of globalization. Containerisation has been helped along by hinterland logistics, especially railways and roads, and has duly rewarded adaptable ports.
Fifth, the quest for hub port status by WCA seaports in alliance with national governments and foreign investors has bred multiple port projects. This practically forecloses the possibility that any single port could achieve unassailable hub status. The most likely outcome is the concentration of port traffic at a few large ports (Lagos, Abidjan and Tema are leading candidates), which draw substantial hinterland traffic, operate efficiently and accommodate increasingly large container ships. 42 This reflects the interplay of two competing dynamics – local pressure for port diffusion and global shipping demand for concentration.
Sixth, the prospect of overcapacity in the ports sector looms large. The inevitable depletion of hydrocarbon reserves will doom oil platforms and purpose-built ports to obsolescence, while the optimism and economic nationalism behind the quest for hub status cannot mask the threat of economic vicissitudes to the huge investments in the multiple ports projects in WCA.
Finally, seaports are not isolated actors: SSA ports operate at the local-global interface. They must, therefore, manage a complex relationship among multiple factors and actors and harness the domestic and external dynamics to thrive. As noted for East Africa, ‘the increasing scale of activity and the increasing degree to which local networks and systems, rooted in maritime transport, reflect global technological and economic trends while remaining conditioned particularly by national-scale political conditions’. 43
No seaport can develop above the capacity of its domestic economy. Consequently, for African seaports to fulfil their developmental potential, national and regional actors should adopt a holistic and collaborative approach to planning and development. In all, the pivotal role of seaports in Africa’s economic development validates the assertion that the seaport is ‘both a cause and a result of development’. 44
Footnotes
1.
Darren Fraser and Theo Notteboom, ‘Gateway and Hinterland Dynamics: The Case of the Southern African Container Seaport System’, African Journal of Business Management, 6, No. 44 (2012), 10807–10.
2.
Alan Harding, Gylfi Palson and Gael Raballand, Port and Maritime Challenges in West and Central Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program, Working Paper 84, (2007), 24.
3.
Malcolm Tull, ‘Port History in the International Journal of Maritime History (1989–2012)’, International Journal of Maritime History, 26, No. 1 (2012), 124.
4.
Pepel, Sierra Leone’s iron ore-exporting port, was closed between 1975 and 1983, when mining ceased at Marampa. Both the port and mine were reopened in 1983. David Hilling and Brian S. Hoyle, ‘Spatial Approaches to Port Development’, in Brian S. Hoyle and David Hilling (eds), Seaport Systems and Spatial Change (Chichester, 1984), 7.
5.
Brian S. Hoyle, ‘Global and Local Forces in Developing Countries’, Journal for Maritime Research, 2, No. 1 (2000), 10.
6.
Enrico Musso, Marco Benacchio, Claudio Ferrari and Hercules E. Haralambides, ‘On the Economic Impact of Ports: Local Vs. National Costs and Benefits’, World Conference on Transport Research (Seoul, 2001).
7.
Claudio Ferrari, Marco Percoco and Andrea Tedeschi, ‘Ports and Local Development: Evidence from Italy’, International Journal of Transport Economics, 27, No. 1 (2010), 11.
8.
César Ducruet, ‘Port Regions and Globalization’, in Theo Notteboom, César Ducruet and Pieter De Langen (eds), Ports in Proximity: Competition and Coordination Among Adjacent Seaports (Aldershot, 2009), 46.
9.
F.G.I. Omiunu, ‘The Port Factor in the Growth and Decline of Warri and Sapele Townships in the Western Delta Region in Nigeria’, Applied Geography, 9 (1989), 57–69.
10.
Hilling and Hoyle, ‘Spatial Approaches’, 14.
11.
Ayodeji Olukoju, ‘Port as Growth Poles: The Japanese “Developer Port” Concept in Comparative Perspective’, International Journal of Maritime History, 16, No. 1 (2004), 43–57.
12.
Ayodeji Olukoju, ‘Playing the Second Fiddle: The Development of Port Harcourt and its Role in the Nigerian Economy, 1917–1950’, International Journal of Maritime History, 8, No. 1 (1996), 105–31.
13.
Hoyle, ‘Global and Local Forces’, 18.
14.
Brian S. Hoyle, ‘Cityport Industrialization and Regional Development in Less-Developed Countries: The Tropical African Experience’, in Brian S. Hoyle and David A. Pinder (eds), Cityport Industrialization and Regional Development: Spatial Analysis and Planning Strategies (Oxford, 1981), 283.
15.
Hoyle, ‘Cityport Industrialization’, 295
16.
Hoyle, ‘Global and Local Forces’, 18.
17.
Hoyle, ‘Global and Local Forces’, 19.
18.
Piet Rietveld, ‘Infrastructure and Regional Development’, Annals of Regional Science, 23, No. 4 (1989), 255–74.
19.
Ethan Chorin, Articulating a ‘Dubai Model’ of Development: The Case of Djibouti (Dubai, 2010), 21.
20.
César Ducruet, citing Eduardo Amaral Haddad, Geoffrey J. D. Hewings and Raul Antonio dos Santos, Port Efficiency and Regional Development (2005), unpublished paper.
21.
Robert J. McCalla, ‘Global Change, Local Pain: Intermodal Seaport Terminals and Their Service Areas’, Journal of Transport Geography, 7, No. 4 (1999), 247–54.
22.
Ayodeji Olukoju, The ‘Liverpool’ of West Africa: The Dynamics and Impact of Maritime Trade in Lagos, 1900–1950 (Trenton, 2004).
23.
Benjamin E. Thomas, ‘Railways and Ports in French West Africa’, Economic Geography, 33, No. 1 (1957), 1–15.
24.
The Nigerian experience is examined in M. O. Filani and C. O. Ikporupko, ‘Containerisation in Nigeria: Trends and Patterns’, Maritime Policy and Management, 14, No. 3 (1987), 185–95.
25.
Hoyle, ‘Global and Local Forces’, 20.
26.
Ducruet, ‘Port Regions and Globalization’, 44.
27.
Ducruet, ‘Port Regions and Globalization’, 44–5.
28.
White stated that the 2,400-mile coastline between Cape Verde and Mount Cameroun ‘is for the most part fault-guided and generally lacks major indentations’. H. P. White, ‘The Morphological Development of West African Seaports’, in Brian S. Hoyle and David Hilling (eds), Seaports and Development in Tropical Africa (London, 1970), 12.
29.
Ayodeji Olukoju, ‘The Development of the Port of Lagos, c.1892–1946’, Journal of Transport History, 13, No. 1 (1992), 59–78.
30.
Hoyle has proposed a five-stage model for East Africa that is not replicated in WCA, which has a more diffuse port structure, unlike East Africa, which has two dominant ports, Dar es Salaam and Mombasa. Hoyle, ‘Global and Local Forces’, 23. A good overview of the evolution of West African ports is provided by Debrie (2012).
31.
Olukoju, The ‘Liverpool’ of West Africa.
32.
By 2005, West Africa, with a 41 per cent share, was the leading sub-region in Africa, followed closely by Southern Africa with 40 per cent. Fraser and Notteboom, ‘Gateway and Hinterland’, 10807. Debrie has also noted ‘the beginnings of port concentration (Abidjan, Lagos) and redistribution to secondary ports’. Debrie, ‘The West African’.
33.
Hoyle, ‘Global and Local Forces’, 23.
34.
35.
Peterson, ‘Transport Corridors’.
36.
Danish International Development Agency, ‘Accelerating Trade in West Africa’, Stage 1 Final Report (2015).
37.
Danish International Development Agency, ‘Accelerating Trade’, 12.
38.
Peterson, ‘Transport Corridors’.
39.
Gadzeni Mulenga, ‘Developing Economic Corridors in Africa: Rationale for the Participation of the African Development Bank’, African Development Bank, Regional Integration Brief 1 (2013).
40.
Debrie, ‘The West African’.
41.
Harding, Palson and Raballand, ‘Port and Maritime’, 11, note 14.
42.
Harding, Palson and Raballand, ‘Port and Maritime’, 27.
43.
Hoyle, ‘Global and Local Forces’, 23.
44.
Hilling and Hoyle, ‘Spatial Approaches’, 4.