Abstract
In January 2019, Koreans controlled 1,647 vessels and 76,701,517 deadweight, placing Korea as the world’s seventh largest shipowning country. In this article, the author reviews the contribution of the education of upper-class marine officers to the development of Korean shipping industry during the period 1948–1982. This study is organized into four main parts. In the first section, the role of human capital in economic development is reviewed, while Section 2 focuses on change in the education for merchant marine officers from 1948 to 1982. Section 3 analyzes the role of marine officers in the development of Korea’s shipping industry, while the final part considers the wider implications of the education of marine officers in the development of shipping.
Introduction: The role of human capital in economic development
In January 2019, Koreans controlled 1,647 vessels and 76,701,517 deadweight (DWT), placing Korea as the world’s seventh largest shipowning country. 1 The shipping industry is defined as a service industry that transports passengers and cargoes by combining ships (physical capital) and seafarers (labour force). 2 The individual labourer could develop his skill, knowledge and experience during his education and training, and on-the-job-training or learning-by-doing. In this process, workers acquire human capital and improve their working condition and welfare by making use of them. Finally, the society the workers live in could accumulate the human capital and could expect economic growth and improvement of living conditions. The positive correlation between human capital and economic growth is widely recognized among scholars. 3
Generally speaking, a merchant marine officer has expertise and experience in ship operation and management, cargo management and crew management. In those respects, a marine officer could be regarded as one who has the human capital of an international standard through schooling, on-board training, and, finally, the acquisition of a license. However, a marine officer cannot have any chance to invest his human capital to earn a living and improve his living condition if there is no ship for him to board. This is the very case of Korea during the 1950s and early 1960s.
In this article, the author reviews the interrelationship between the education of upper-class marine officers and the development of shipping industry in Korea during the period 1948–1982. The study is organized into four main parts. In the first section, the role of human capital in the economic development is reviewed, while Section 2 focuses on change in the education for the merchant marine officers in Korea from 1948 to 1982. Section 3 analyzes the correlation between the supply of marine officers and the development of the shipping industry in Korea. The final part considers the wider implications of the education of marine officers in the development of the shipping industry.
Change in the education of merchant marine officers in Korea, 1948–1982
Korea was set free from the colonial rule of Imperial Japan in August 1945. The Japanese ruling class including colonial government officials and civilians returned to their home islands from the Korean Peninsula. In this situation, Koreans had to rebuild everything literally with their own bare hands, along with the education and training of marine officers. This section will describe and review the provision of education for upper-class marine officers in Korea in three phases that were characterized by: excess supply (1948–1964); creating overseas employment (1965–1971); and excess demand (1972–1982).
Excess supply, 1948–1964
Just after Independence, Jinhae Nautical College was established by Mr. Sihyung Lee, with permission from the USA Military Government in Korea (hereafter, USAMGIK) on 5 November 1948. Acquiring permission to take over the Jinhae Higher Seafarers’ Training Center, Lee began recruiting cadets and when the opening ceremony was held on 5 January 1946, there were 40 new cadets for navigation and engineering. Of course, there were many cadets in shore or onboard training in the colonial Jinhae Higher Seafarers’ Training Center, but he did not allow the transfer of the cadets to the newly opened Jinhae Nautical College. 4 The main reasons why he refused to transfer the cadets were differences of opinon regarding the purposes of education and educational institution. The mission of the newly opened Jinhae Nautical College was to educate and train marine officers to serve their newly born independent home country, but the Jinhae Higher Seafarers’ Training Centre supported the efforts of Japanese colonial shipping to colonize the Korean people. Eventually, some of the cadets at the Center were allowed to re-enter as part of the bottom class in January 1946. 5
All the vessels in Korean waters at the Independence had to be transferred to the USAMGIK according to Ordinance No. 33 of the Military Governor Concerning Property Transfers on 25 September 1945. The tonnage of ocean-going vessels in Korean waters was equivalent to six ships and 9,866 gross tons (GTs) in 1946. However, the SS Busan sank in the southern Sea of Korea in 1947 and the SS Aengdo was seized by North Korea in 1948. There were several first-class Korean marine officers who were educated in Japan, China and colonial Korea. 6 This small cohort of marine officers, however, was considered sufficient to operate the ocean-going merchant vessels. Thus, the Department of Transport under the USAMGIK established a special short course on 20 December 1945 at the newly opened the Korea Maritime University (hereafter, KMU), which produced 12 second-class deck officers (eight second-class chief officers and four second officers) and six second-class engineers (three second-class first engineers and three second engineers) on 20 June 1946. 7 These marine officers had no problem in operating a small number of ocean-going vessels in 1945 and 1946.
However, as the US ‘Gratis Support Ships’ were provided to the USAMGIK from 1946 to 1948, the number of ocean-going vessels surged. Upon introducing the USS Elisa Whitney in June 1946, USAMGIK deployed eight Baltic type vessels (average 1,870 GTs per ship), 12 LSTs (2,700 GTs per ship), and 11 FS (freight and supply) type vessels (560 GTs per ship) in the Korean waters in 1947-1948. Of of these vessels, the USS Kimball Smith was handed over to North Korea by her captain in September 1949, and USS Elen H. Linell was returned to the US government due to engine trouble in 1949. The US ‘Gratis Support Ships’ helped to transport coal, fertilizer, salt and US aid grain under the control of the USAMGIK until May 1947. The ‘Gratis Support Ships’ did not belong to Korea, but to the United States, although some were handed over to the Republic of Korea after 1948. 8 In response to the rapid increase of ocean-going tonnage, the Interim Government (June 1947–July 1948) decided to graduate second-year cadets to embark on merchant ships after a short onboard training course in 1947. KMU’s first graduate received his qualification in December 1948 after a mere two-year training course, including half-year onboard training. As shown in Table 1, the employment rate of KMU was 50 per cent on average from 1948 to 1954, but only 5 per cent from 1955 to 1964 (except for 1962 and 1963).
Number of graduates of the Korea Maritime University, 1948–1964.
Source: KOMARES, Hyundai Hankuk Haewoon Baljeon 40-nyeon Sa, 971. [A 40 Year History of the Development of Korean Shipping Industry, (Seoul, 1984)]
Note: *The number of admission was increased to 60 cadets for navigation and engineering, respectively, since 1953.
According to the enforcement of Decree of Naval Reserve Force, 17 October 1958, it had conducted ROTC (Reserve Officers’ Training Corps) training for KMU cadets from 1959 to 1993
The boarding employment rate of KMU graduates was quite low because the number of ocean-going vessels owned by Korean shipping companies was inadequate. 9 The national Korea Shipping Corporation (hereafter, KSC), established on 20 December 1949, was the sole employer of KMU graduates from 1948 to 1964. There were idle upper-class marine officers, including 39 masters, 20 chief engineers, 14 chief officers, 31 second officers and 28 second engineers in Korea in 1965. 10 In this situation, many KMU graduates had to find non-boarding jobs. As shown in Table 2, in April 1955, half of KMU graduates managed to find jobs aboard, while half managed to find non-boarding jobs, for instance as soldiers, teachers and public officials.
Employment of KMU graduates as of April 1955.
Source: The Bureau of Shipping, Haewoon 10-nyeon Yaksa, 220–1 [A 10 Year History of Korean Shipping, (Seoul, 1955)].
Overseas employment, 1965–1971
The employment situation for KMU graduates changed totally from 1965, with all KMU graduates finding work aboard merchant vessels and the navy, as shown in Table 3. Even though Korean ocean-going tonnage increased steadily (See Tables 7, 8, and 12) there were not enough marine officers. The main reason of this full employment was that foreign shipowners began to hire Korean seafarers. For example, in 1964, Hyopsung Shipping Corporation signed a contract to supply Korean seafarers to work on three vessels owned by Fong Shing Shipping Co. in Hong Kong.
Graduates of Korea Maritime University, 1965–1971.
Source: KOMARES, Hyundai Hankuk Haewoon Baljeon 40-nyeon Sa, 971.
Note: *Includes those who joined the navy.
Two of four master mariners boarding foreign vessels in late 1963 and early 1964 were ex-professors of KMU, who resigned their professorial posts to earn higher wages in shipping (refer to Table 4). The wage of Captain Ki-hyun Kim, ex-professor of KMU and captain of MV Loong Hwa in 1964, was US$280 per month, which was around four times that (19,000 Won = US$74.0) of captains of Korean ships. 11 In foreign vessels, they had to work diligently to satisfy shipowners who had a large supply of jobless KMU graduates to draw upon. 12 In 1964, when overseas employment had taken off in earnest, Korean seafarers boarded 21 foreign ships. 13 This enabled foreign shipowners to employ Korean seafarers, which led to the full employment of KMU graduates from 1965 (see Table 3 and 5).
Comparison of monthly salary by nation, 1966 (US$, 1 US$ = 270 Korean Won).
Source: Daehan Haekiwon Hyophoi (ex-Korea Marine Officers’ Association), Haeki Hoibo [Bulletin of KMOA], No. 1 (Busan, 1966), f.2.
Note: *The wage for overseas employment is an average wage of over/under 10,000 GTs ships, and the wage for Korean employment is an average wage of two Korean ocean-going shipping companies.
Number and employment rate of graduates of the Korea Maritime University, 1972–1982.
Source: 1972–1981= KOMARES, Hyundai Hankuk Haewoon Baljeon 40-nyeon Sa, 1.
Note: *Includes the number of enlisted in the navy.
As KMU graduates began to embark on foreign vessels, the supply of marine officers became insufficient. To solve this problem, on 24 November 1964, a one-year short course was established to train marine officers affiliated to KMU, while Mokpo Maritime High School was promoted to Mokpo Higher Maritime Academy on 31 December 1964. This Academy ran a five-year training course comprising a three-year high school and a two-year vocational college course in divisions of navigation, engineering and communication, with places for 40 cadets in each division. 14 The military government also amended the ‘Enforcement Decree of Ship Personnel Act’ on 26 November 1965 to exempt naval officers of commander or higher rank, with experience of working in naval ships. In 1968, the number of admissions for KMU was increased to 100 for both navigation and engineering. In addition, the Mokpo Higher Maritime Academy established a nine-month short course for navigation and engineering in February 1968, along with a short course for radio officers in June 1970. The second-class marine officer (now the fourth-class marine officer) cohort of 140 deck officers and 105 engineers graduated from 1968 to 1971, while 182 second-class radio officers graduated from 1970 to 1975. 15 All of these measures were designed to increase the supply of marine officers to satisfy market demand.
From 1964, the overseas employment of Korean marine officers increased, with Korean flagged tonnage also increased. The Korean flagged tonnage reached 116 ships and 827,000 GTs, while the number of foreign ships operated by Korean seafarers was 217 ships in 1971 (see Table 8 & 13). This resulted in high demand for marine officers, but they preferred overseas employment because wages were four times higher than those paid by Korean shipping companies. As a result, national ocean carriers had difficulty in securing marine officers. Therefore, according to Article 26 of the 1970 ‘Decree of Establishment of the Maritime College’, the government did not allow KMU graduates to work on foreign vessels for three years after graduation. Even with this restriction, the popularity of KMU soared and competition for admission increased. The admission rate for the navigation department of KMU during the period 1970–72 was 8.04 per place on average, and that of engineering department was 3.05. 16
Excess demand, 1972–1982
The 100 per cent employment rate of KMU graduates from 1965, and the excess demand for marine officers, continued until the 1972–1982 period (Refer to Table 5). In addition to KMU, the Mokpo Higher Maritime Academy began to produce upper-class 2nd marine officers from 1976. The Busan Maritime High School also produced lower-class 2nd marine officers. Nevertheless, the demand for marine officers in Korea was not be sated by this supply, mainly due to the rapid growth of national flagged tonnage and overseas employment. The fleet controlled by Korean shipowners increased from 116 ships in 1971 to 147 ships in 1972 and 169 ships in 1973. Additionally, the foreign ships crewed by Korean seafarers increased from 217 to 249 to 264 in the three years from 1971 (see Tables 9 and 14). Accordingly, the number of ocean-going vessels manned by Korean seafarers expanded from 1971 to 1972 by 63 ships (31 Korean-owned + 32 foreign-owned ships), which entailed the employment of an additional 630 marine officers of all ranks, together with at least 63 third officers and engineers.
The government had to take measures to mitigate the lack of marine officers. First, it increased the number of cadets in maritime education institutions. KMU increased its intake for the short course from 50 trainees to 100 for deck officers and engineers in 1972, when there were two courses for upper-class (one year) and lower-class (nine months). In March 1973, the Maritime Technical College was affiliated to KMU, where 100 deck and engineer trainees were educated for two years (1.5 years on-shore education + 0.5 onboarding training). The college produced 361 deck officers and 376 engineers before it was closed in February 1978. 17 Furthermore, KMU increased the admission of cadets to 150 for both deck and engine in 1975, and then to 175 in 1976 and 200 in 1977. As the number of cadets increased from 1972 to 1977, classroom and dormitory facilities became insufficient. KMU therefore relocated its campus from Dongsam-dong to the current Achi Campus in June 1974, which was costly and six years (1969–1974). In addition, the government expanded and reorganized the Mokpo Higher Maritime Academy, which was promoted to two-year National Mokpo Maritime College (hereafter, MMC) in 1974, to 2.5-year MMC in 1979, and then to three-year MMC for deck and engineer officers in 1985. Admissions also increased from 40 deck officers and engineers in 1964 to 100 in 1974, 150 in 1975, and 200 in 1977. 18
The second measure was to restrict the overseas employment of marine officers. As Korean marine officers preferred to enlist aboard foreign-owned ships, which paid higher salaries, Korean shipowners had difficulty in recruiting marine officers and proposed various methods to solve the shortage. The government (Ministry of Transportation) accepted the proposals of the Korean Shipowners’ Association and made the following decision (Notice no. 36 – Ways of Managing Supply and Demand of Marine Officers) on 19 July 1972: (1) new graduates of KMU should board Korean flagged vessels for six years; (2) upper-class marine officers of overseas employment should board Korean owned vessels for a certain period of time; (3) Korean shipowners should employ at least 10 per cent of reserve marine officers. Contrary to expectation, these measures resulted in the massive overseas employment of lower-class marine officers. In response, the government repealed the above measures within five months of their implementation, and issued the following guideline (Notice no. 70 – Basic Guideline for Managing Demand of Marine Officers) on 1 January 1 1973: The supply of marine officers is in the following order: (1) Korean flagged ships; (2) vessels of Bare Boat Charter with Purchase Option (hereafter, BBCHP); (3) BBC vessels; (4) vessels of BBCPO chartered out with time charter; (5) vessels of BBC chartered out with time charter. 19 This measure, however, resulted in a shortage of upper-class marine officers and an overabundance of lower-class marine officers. The government had to revise the notice once again. The Ministry of Transportation implemented Notice no. 20 – Guideline for Managing Supply and Demand of Marine Officer on 27 March 1974. The main point of this notice was to induce upper-class marine officers employed by foreign shipowners to enlist in Korean vessels and to persuade lower-class marine officers to board foreign-owned vessels.
Changing the rules three times in one year and eight months suggests that the imbalance of supply and demand for marine officers was severe. Fortunately, as the overseas employment of southeast Asian seafarers had increased and the first oil crisis shocked the world economy, the rate of growth in the overseas employment of Korean seafarers began to slow down. Accordingly, the short courses at KMU were closed in 1978 and 1983, as shown in Table 6, and admissions to KMU and MMC reached their apexes of 200 for deck and engineering in 1977 and 1978, respectively.
Increasing trend of number of admissions by Maritime Educational Institutes, 1948–1985.
Source: Collected by the author from KMU, KMU 50-nyeon Sa and MMU, MMU 60–nyeon Sa [A 60–Year History of Mokpo Maritime University] (Mokpo, 2010).
Note: Dk = deck officer; Eng = engineer; RO = radio officer.
Human capital and the development of the shipping industry
In this section, the process by which marine officers stimulated the Korean shipping industry is described. In first phase, from 1948 to 1964, was marked by traditional shipping, when Korean ocean-going shipping was operated by KSC and a few private shipping companies. The second phase was the stage of pre-condition for take-off during 1965–1971, when capital was accumulated through the wage income and service commission. The third phase was the take-off from 1972 to 1982, when the Korean shipping industry experienced a rapid increase in national tonnage through the BBCPO arrangement. The author demonstrates the process through two cases of Chunkyung Line (hereafter, CK Line) and the Korea Line Corporation (hereafter, KLC).
Traditional shipping, 1948–1964
After Independence in 1945, Korea finally established its own government in 1948, but had to struggle against communists of North Korea from 1950 to 1953. Even with these severe national circumstances and its several movements from Jinhae to Busan via Incheon and Kunsan, KMU never stopped educating and training merchant marine cadets. On the contrary, the tonnage owned by Koreans stagnated or grew sluggishly as shown in Table 7. The ocean-going tonnages in 1950, when national KSC was just founded, were 25 ships owned by KSC and 5 more owned by a private shipping company. By 1960, when KSA was founded, the tonnage had increased to 39 ships owned by 11 members of the Korean Shipowners’ Association (hereafter, KSA). As a result, the employment rate for KMU graduates averaged 50 per cent from 1948 to 1954 and only 5 per cent from 1955 to 1964, except for two years. The graduates who could not find ship-boarding jobs had to work outside of the maritime industry.
Ocean-going ships controlled by Koreans and the number of seafarers, 1949–1963.
Source: 1949–1959: Tae-hyun Sohn, Hankook Haewoon Sa, 352; 1960-1963: Korea Shipowners’ Association, KSA 30-nyeon Sa [A 30-Year History of the Korea Shipowners’ Association] (Seoul, 1990), 174–8 and KOMARES, Hyundai Hankuk Haewoon Baljeon 40-nyeon Sa, 976.
Note: *The figure in (+) indicates the tonnage owned by private shipping companies. Tae-hyun Sohn, Hankook Haewoon Sa, 372.
There are no data on the number of Korean seafarers during this period and the figure is estimated by the number of Korean controlled ships x 30 crews.
CK Line
During this period, a few private shipping companies were founded, with CK Line established in 1962. This firm secured a ship of 513 GTs with a Government Shipbuilding Loan Program in 1964 and purchased a second-handed ship of 1,048 GTs in 1966. CK Line returned successful results by deploying the newly built ship MV Chunkyung on the Korea-Japan route in October 1964. However, in the mid-1960s, 10 shipping companies were competing mainly on Korea-Japan route. As a result, freight competition became fierce due to the surplus tonnages, while CK Line faced its first crisis. CK Line was able to overcome this crisis by supplying Korean seafarers on Japanese merchant ships belongingthe Sanko Steamship Company since 1968. 20
According to W.W. Rostow, the traditional society is characterized by a subsistent, agriculture-based economy, with intensive labour and low levels of trading. 21 Applying the above to shipping industry, the Korean ocean-going industry experienced the stage of traditional shipping during the period of 1948–1964, characterized by a subsistent, short sea-based, ocean-going shipping, with excess supply of marine officers and shortage of national tonnage.
Preconditions for take-off, 1965–1971
The situation changed due to the creation of overseas employment from 1965. The overseas employment of the Korean seafarers was accomplished by the Hyopsung Shipping Corporation in 1964, which was an agency for Fong Shing Shipping Co. in Hong Kong. The first foreign ship boarded by Korean seafarers was MV Loong Hwa (2,700 GTs) owned by Fong Shing Shipping in February 1964; the second was MV Loong Kang (5,140 GTs) in June 1964; and the third was MV Loong An (2,800 GTs) in July 1964. In August 1964, the Tehhu Steam Shipping Company in Hong Kong also asked the Korean Seafarers’ Association to recruit Korean seafarers to embark on MV Billy (13,500 GTs). 22 In this way, the number of foreign merchant vessels boarded by the Korean seafarers increased to six in 1964, 54 in 1968, and 217 in 1971, as shown in Table 8.
Korean-controlled vessels and seafarers in overseas employment, 1964–1971.
Source: Korean controlled vessels: KSA, KSA 30-nyeon Sa, 179–188; KOMARES, Hyundai Hankuk Haewoon Baljeon 40-nyeon Sa, 976; seafarers of overseas employment (merchant ships only) = KMOA, KMOA 30-nyeon Sa, 370 [A 30 Year History of Korea Maritime Officers’ Association. (Busan, 1985)].
Note. *There is no data on the number of Korean seafarers during this period and the figure is estimated by the number of Korean-owned ship x 30 persons.
In August 1967, CK Line prepared a contract with Sanko Steamship Co. in Japan for recruiting Korean seafarers on its vessels. In mid-1967, the Union Shipping Agency was established by Su-keum Kim to supply Korean seafarers on the vessels of China Union Lines in Taiwan and he was also employed in 1970 by the Maritime Overseas Corporation of America as a port captain for recruiting and supervising Korean seafarers. In 1968, the Lasco Shipping Company of America established the Korea branch office for recruiting and managing Korean seafarers. In 1969, KLC, just established in December 1968, entered into a contract with Japan Line for recruiting and managing Korean seafarers. As the demand for Korean marine officers and ratings soared, the number of newly educated marine officers also increased. As shown in Table 9, the number of marine officers, which were 95, including 42 deck officers and 53 engineers, in 1971 doubled to 182, including 89 deck officers and 93 engineers in 1971. As the demand increased, the number of graduates from two regular higher marine officers’ training institutes doubled between 1965 and 1971, as shown in Table 9.
Number of newly graduated marine officers, 1965–1971.
Source: KOMARES, Hyundai Hankuk Haewoon Baljeon 40-nyeon Sa, 978; KMU, KMU 50-nyeon Sa (1995), 202; MMU, MMU 60-nyeon Sa, Vol. 2 (2010), 633.
CK Line
During the 1965–1971 period, CK Line had laid the foundation for future growth by supplying Korean seafarers to the Sanko Steamship in addition to competing for survival with about 20 Korean shipping companies on its main service route of Korea-Japan. The fleet owned by the CK Line stagnated from 1965 to 1969, increasing to four ships and 3,806 GTs in 1971 as shown in Table 10. However, MV No. 1 Chunkyung, the first ship to be built with a government loan in 1964, sank near Nakadosima in Setonaikai Strait in May 1968, leading to a severe dispute among the co-founders on the benefit of her hull insurance. After all, Mr. Yun-seok Kim, the representative of CK Line, submitted the explanatory statement of the discontinuance of business in June 1968 to the government. After reviewing the explanatory statement, the government (Ministry of Transportation and Ministry of Commerce and Industry) allowed CK Line to secure alternative ship while two of the four co-shareholders left the company.
Owned fleet and overseas employment of CK Line, 1965–1971.
Source: Collected by the author from CK Line, CKS 50-nyeon Sa, 93, 98–99 [A 50 Year History of CK Line, (Seoul, 2012)].
Note: *MV No. 1 Chunkyung (513 GTs) sank in May 1968 and MV No. 2 Chunkyung (1,241 GTs) was secured in August 1969.
**Total number of ships and seafarers of Korean seafarers’ overseas employment is from Table 9.
It was a contract for the supply of Korean seafarers with the Eastern Shipping Company, the crew-supplying company for Sanko Steamship, in 1967 that provided a way for the survival and future growth of the CK Line during this period. Sanko Steamship owned 28 vessels of 658,000 GTs in 1969, growing rapidly to 33 vessels of 849,000 GTs in 1970. As shown in Table 10, the number of Sanko merchant ships operated by Korean seafarers tripled from 12 in 1967 to 34 in 1971. CK Line accounted for 20 per cent of ships and 18.8% of seafarers working overseas during the 1967–1971 period.
There is no data available to confirm the company’s business performance, but it is evident that one or two small vessels and low freight rates would not have been beneficial during this period. According to A 50-year History of CK Line, the structure of CK Line’s business revenue accounted for 67.3% of the ship’s revenue, 27.7% of commission for seafarers’ overseas employment and 5 per cent of agency fees. 23
KLC
Mr. Maeg-ki Lee, founder of KLC, established KLC (capital asset 5 million Won = US$17,762) with seven co-partners in December 1968, but secured a 16-year-old ship (MT Gloria) through the BBCHP arrangement and charter back condition from Japan Line by loan from Sumitomo Bank in March 1969. However, the management performance was worse than expected due to the low tanker market and high operating costs, including repayment of loan. The debt for the first three fiscal years from 1969–1971 amounted to 35 million yen (US$113,636, with the exchange rate of dollar to yen being 308 in 1971). 24
As shown in Table 11, the company’s balance of payments had been steadily in surplus after the first year’s deficit. The ships’ revenue income accounted for an annual average of 22.3% of total sales during the 1968–1972 period, while the service commission for overseas employment averaged 77.7%. 25 Similar to CK Line’s case, the recruitment service for Japan Line became the main business of KLC, 26 and the commission income from this sector was the foundation for KLC’s initial survival and future growth.
Owned fleet and overseas employment of KLC, 1969–1971.
Source : KLC, KLC 20-nyeon Sa [A 20 Year History of KLC] (Seoul, 1989), 71, 82, 108–113, 402.
Note: The fiscal year was from April 1 to March 31. The exchange rate of US dollar to Won was 281.50 in 1968, 304.45 in 1969, 316.65 in 1970, 373.30 in 1971, 398.90 in 1972 as of the end of each year from The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook 1975 (Seoul, 1976), 219.
According to Rostow, a society in the stage of preconditions to take-off begins to develop manufacturing, and a more national/international, as opposed to regional, outlook. 27 Applying this hypothesis to shipping, the Korean ocean-going industry exhibited preconditions to take-off from 1965 to 1971, when it began to develop oceangoing in a real sense, and a more international, outlook with the help of the seafarers recruiting for foreign shipowners.
Take-off, 1972–1982
The demand for Korean seafarers soared at home and abroad, resulting in a shortage of marine officers in the early 1970s. Korean-flagged ships increased numerically by 54.7% from 95 vessels in 1970 to 147 in 1972, and by 168.4% to 255 vessels in 1974. The number of foreign ships crewed by Korean seafarers also increased, by 72.9% from 144 vessels in 1970 to 249 in 1972, and by 116 per cent to 311 in 1974 (see Tables 12 and 13). The increase in national tonnage resulted from the rapid growth of the Korean economy due to government-driven economic development policies. Korean ocean-going shipping companies expanded their fleets through the BBCPO arrangement rather than building new ships or purchasing the second-hand vessels due to lack of capital. As shown in Table 15, the Korea Marine Transport Company chartered one vessel under the condition of the BBCPO in 1971, and since 1972, Korean shipping companies had begun to expand their tonnage by the acquisition of ships through the BBCPO arrangement with Japan. According to T.W. Lee, ‘there were a number of economic factors behind the creation of the BBCPO arrangements, but the first of these lay in low Korean crew costs and high operating costs under a Japanese flag’. 28 As a result, the expansion of national tonnage through the BBCPO arrangement peaked at 42 per cent of Korea’s ocean-going tonnage in 1974 and 1975, which led to the shortage of Korean seafarers.
Korean-controlled vessels and Korean seafarers on foreign vessels, 1972–1982.
Sources. Korean-controlled vessels: for 1972–1981, KOMARES, Hyundai Hankuk Haewoon Baljeon 40-nyeon Sa, 976 and KSA, KSA 30-nyeon Sa, 189–210. Seafarers on foreign ships: collected by the author from KMOA, KMOA 30-nyeon Sa, 370, 373, and from ‘Ships from Korea Seafarers’ Welfare & Employment Center’, Korean Statistics Annals of Seafarers and Ships, Vol. 2 (Busan, 1985), 37, 39, 99, 102.
Note: *There are no data on the number of Korean seafarers during this period and the figure is estimated by the number of Korean-owned ship x 25 seafarers. According to the statistics of the Korea Maritime and Port Administration, the number of Korean seafarers in 1978 was 12,978, comprising 4,542 officers and 8,436 ratings. The estimated figures in this table might be slightly larger than the actual number.
Composition of the Korean ocean-going fleets, 1970–1982.
Sources: Collected and calculated by the author from KSA, KSA 30-nyeon Sa, chapter 2; S. June Kim, ‘The Expansion of Private Shipping and Entrepreneurship in Korea, 1960-1981’, International Journal of Maritime History, 32 (2018), 108.
Estimate Increase of national tonnage and ships of overseas employment, 1972–1976.
Source: KMOA, Haeki Haibo, No. 62 (Busan, 1972), f.1.
Increasing trends of upper-class marine officers, 1972–1982.
Source: KOMARES, Hyundai Hankuk Haewoon Baljeon 40-nyeon Sa, 978; KMU, KMU 50 nyeon-Sa, 202, 219; MMU, MMU 60 nyeon-Sa, Vol. 2, 633.
Note: *Mokpo Maritime College provided a two-year course to 1980, and a 2.5 year course from 1981, and a three-year course from 1985.
The government also recognized that there was a lack of marine officers. In February 1972, the Bureau of Shipping under the Ministry of Transportation anticipated a large shortage of marine officers due to the surge in national tonnage (see Table 14) and the increase in Korean seafarers’ overseas employment during the 3rd Five-Year Economic Development Plan from 1972 to 1976, and prepared measures to train marine officers. According to A Plan for the Supply of Marine Officers and the Short and Long Term Measure for Training them, the lower-class marine officers and ratings were oversupplied, while a shortfall of 542 upper-class marine officers and 481 radio officers was anticipated over the next five years. 29 As countermeasures, the Bureau of Shipping determined to close the short courses for training lower-class marine officers, to allow the graduation of 4th grade cadets of KMU in December 1972, earlier than originally scheduled in February 1973, and to consider increasing enrolments for KMU and MMC. As a result, the number of admissions for KMU and MMC had gradually increased, as shown in Table 6, while the number of graduates from KMU and MMC doubled from 267 in 1972 to 526 in 1974, peaking at 744 in 1983, as shown in Table 15.
CK Line
CK Line made a leap from short-sea operator focusing on the Korea-Japan route to ocean-going shipping company during between 1972 and 1982. Its fleet consisted of four vessels and 3,806 GTs in 1971, but it increased to 10 and 25,443 GTs in 1972, fluctuating between seven and 13 ships until 1982 (see Table 16). The tonnage was secured by the purchase of second-hand ships and the acquisition of ships through the BBCPO arrangement in the first quarter of this period, but the vessels were newly built in the fourth quarter of this period. As the size of the fleet increased, the service routes also expanded. CK Line deployed two log carriers to southeast Asia in 1973, and one vessel to the American continent by way of chartering out the ship to Sanko Steamship in 1975. As a result, the freight income increased to 3.57 billion Won in 1973, 9.51 billion Won in 1975, and 15.87 billion Won in 1980. However, in terms of the balance of payment of ship operation, it was not satisfactory. The increase of gross sales of ship operation was attributed to an increase in the number of deployed vessels, and the balance of payment per vessel did not meet expectations. 30
CK Line ships owned and seafarers employed overseas, 1972–1982 (units for income and profit: 1,000).
Source: Owned fleet = KSA, KSA 30-nyeon Sa, 188–212; Gross profit & overseas employment = CKS, CKS 50-nyeon Sa, 94, 137–8, 437.
Note: The Korean Shipping Industry Rationalization Plan was in place from 1983 to 1988.
The reason why the CK Line was able to survive and make up for poor operational performance was due to the income generated by the crew supply service. CK Line was responsible for the overseas employment of Korean seafarers on between 40 and 60 Japanese vessels, which was four to five times the number of ships the company owned. As a result, its commission income soared by 523.7% from 62.36 million Won in 1972 to 389 million Won in 1977. The service income accounted for an annual average of 35 per cent of gross profit during the 1972–1982 period, peaking at 72 per cent in 1976.
CK Line recorded deficits of 272 million Won in 1976, 59 million Won in 1978, and 841 million Won in 1982, and achieved profits ranging from 29 million Won in 1974 to 315 million Won in 1979 (see Table 16). 31 If there had been no service income from the recruitment of Korean seafarers, the surplus would have been smaller than it actually was, and the deficit would have been larger. As the proportion of overseas employment expanded, CK Line split part of the Korean seafarers’ recruitment business for Japan’s Eastern Shipping with Dongji Maritime Company in July 1978.
The title of Chapter 2 of A 50-year History of CK Line was ‘a leap as one of the main shipping companies on the Korea-Japan route’ during 1972–1982, which suggests that the company regarded these years as the take-off period. Since 1979, however, the global shipping recession and the structural problems of the Korean shipping industry, which had purchased second-hand tonnage at high prices, led to a new crisis in the Korean Shipping Rationalization Plan from 1983 to 1988. 32
KLC
As the fleet increased year by year, and expanding overseas employment businesses were hived off into specialized crew supplying companies, KLC developed into one of the leading ocean-going shipping companies in Korea during the 1972–1982 period. The number of vessels, which was only one of 18,000 DWTs in 1971, grew rapidly to 13 ships and 142,564 GTs in 1975–1976 (see Table 17). KLC was able to increase its fleet in the first quarter of this period due to the signing of a freight contract for transporting iron ore and coal with POSCO in July 1976. Most of KLC’s newly acquired vessels were secured through the BBCPO arrangement, which was the most common way of securing vessels for Korean shipowners, who lacked capital, in the 1970s. Another reason for the rapid increase in tonnage was the merger of the Hanil Shipping Corporation in 1978 and the acquisition of four ships and 24,298 DWTs. 33 Unlike the CK Line, which focused on the liner service between Korea and Japan, KLC had initially chosen the tramp market, with its service routes covering all areas of the world, including the southeast Asia, the Middle East, Australia and the Americas.
KLC ships owned and seafarers employed overseas, 1972–1982 (units for income & profit: 1,000).
Source: Collected by the author from KSA, KSA 30-nyeon Sa, 187–213; and KLC, KLC 20-nyeon Sa, 113–31, 402–4.
Note: The fiscal year was from 1 April to 31 March until March 1975, and then from 1 October to 30 September from April 1975. The Korean Shipping Industry Rationalization Plan was in place from 1983 to 1988.
Korea Marine Agency was founded and separated for specializing overseas employment on 31 March 1977.
The service business for manning Korean seafarers on foreign vessels also grew with 19 ships in 1972–1973, 29 in 1973–1974, and 41 in 1978–1979. As the business of overseas employment increased rapidly, KLC split and established the Korea Marine Agency Ltd on 31 March 1977 to take charge of overseas employment. The Korea Marine Agency, which had been in charge of overseas employment on behalf of KLC, grew steadily, as shown in Table 18, and achieved an annual average profit of 10.7% from its foundation in 1978. In 1980, the Korea Marine Agency supplied Korean seafarers for 66 foreign vessels, making it difficult to handle with a limited number of onshore personnel. In response, the Korea Marine Limited (re-named on 29 February 1980) split and established the Overseas Shipping Corporation on 13 March 1980 to manage the larger tankers operated by the Maritime Overseas Corporation (MOC) and Ogden Marine Inc. (OMI). 34 The Overseas Shipping Corporation began its business by providing Korean seafarers for 20 tankers of MOC and OMI in 1980, gathering an average annual profit of 19.3% until 1985, as shown in Table 19. The Korea Marine Limited and Overseas Shipping Corporation, subsidiaries of KLC, contributed to the growth of KLC by continuously profiting, while the overseas employment business was absolutely essential for KLC’s initial business to settle.
The performance of Korea Marine Agency, 1977–1985.
Source: KLC, KLC 20-nyeon Sa, 342.
The performance of Overseas Shipping Corporation, 1980–1985.
Source: KLC, KLC 20-nyeon Sa, 344.
Comparison of indices.
Source: Collected and calculated by the author from tables 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13.
KLC recorded a surplus every year until the global shipping market entered a real recession in 1981. It was evident that the service commission income of overseas employment played a crucial role for KLC’s profits. As shown in Table 19, the share of service commission in gross profit reached its peak at 68.4% in 1972–1973, with an annual average of 27.7% during 1972–1978. KLC, which had continued to grow, could not avoid the global shipping recession in the early 1980s and recorded a series of deficits from 1982 to 1985. KLC, however, laid the foundation for survival and future growth by absorbing the Korea Marine Corporation, which owned five ships and 65,191 DWTs, and one tug, in June 1984 under the Korean Shipping Industry Rationalization Policy. 35
Rostow describes the take-off as a short period of intensive growth, in which industrialization begins to occur, and workers and institutions become concentrated around a new industry. 36 This characteristic might be redrafted to read: the Korean shipping industry experienced a short period of intensive growth between 1972 and 1981, in which ocean-going carriers progressed, and seafarers and carriers became concentrated around the ocean-going shipping industry, domestically and abroad.
Concluding remark
The education of marine officers in Korea was initiated almost simultaneously with its independence from Japan in 1945, when there were only three ocean-going vessels in Korean waters. Koreans, therefore, had tried to train and cultivate the human capital of merchant marine officers first without securing the physical capital of vessels. As a result, the annual employment rate of KMU graduates was only 50 per cent per year from 1948 to 1954, and 5 per cent per year from 1955 to 1961. This meant that the human capital of marine officers trained at the national expense was not properly invested and was socially wasted.
It was abroad where Korean marine officers found a workplace to invest their human capital. The overseas employment of Korean seafarers, which began in 1964, expanded rapidly, while the number of Korean enlisting aboard foreign vessels doubled compared to national tonnage in 1971. The number of overseas ships manned by Korean seafarers continued to grow rapidly from 1972 to 1982, but the national fleet increased at a faster rate. As a result, the demand for marine officers increased significantly at home and abroad, which created a shortfall during the third Economic Development Plan (1972–1976). The government had to increase the number of places at maritime educational institutions to solve this problem. Nevertheless, as the lack of marine officers persisted, the government was forced to take measures to limit the overseas employment of KMU’s and MMC’s graduates.
Applying Rostow’s five-stage theory of economic development to the Korean shipping industry, it could be said that it was the stage of traditional shipping, focused on the Korea-Japan tramp market, during the 1948–1964 period. From 1965 to 1971, overseas employment began in earnest. This was the precondition for take-off stage, when some Korean shipping companies stabilized their management performance through the crew supplying service for foreign shipowners, gradually expanding their tonnages and service routes to southeast Asia. Lastly, from 1972 to 1982, the period when overseas employment increased and the expansion of national tonnages through the BBCPO arrangement became rapid, was the take-off stage for the Korean shipping industry. The cases of CK Line and KLC prove the author’s opinion.
The education and overseas employment of marine officers had a positive effect on the development of the Korean economy and ocean-going shipping industry in five main ways, as follows: (1) the education of merchant marine officers was crucial to the increase in Korean national tonnage. The surge in Korean national tonnage in the 1970s was achieved by acquiring Japanese second-hand ships through the BBCPO arrangement, which was possible, owing to low Korean crew costs and competent marine officers; 37 (2) in addition, the crew supply service for foreign shipowners was absolutely crucial for the initial survival and stabilization of business of ocean-going shipping companies that started only with one merchant vessel, which was confirmed in the cases of CK Line and KLC; (3) in particular, the wage income of overseas employed seafarers reached an average of 13 per cent of the freight revenue of shipping companies (see Appendix 1). If it might be estimated the net profit of freight income to around 10 per cent, it can be said that the wage income of overseas employed crews was comparable to the net profit of ship operation earned by all national carriers; 38 (4) Korean seafarers’ overseas employment contributed to the national economy by activating the overseas employment agency business. As shown in Table 21, there was only one agency for overseas employment in 1964, but it increased to 24 in 1974 and 64 in 1984.
Number of agencies and merchant ships engaged in the overseas employment of Korean seafarers, 1964–1984.
Sources: Collected by the author from: 1973 = KMOA, KMOA 30-nyeon Sa, 177; 1974 = Monthly Haeki, Vol. 102 (1975), 108; 1982 = KMOA, KMOA 30-nyeon Sa, 371; 1983 = Seafarers Demand and Supply Council, Status of Agencies, Shipowners, Seafarers, Ships of Overseas Employment (Busan, 1984 and 1985).
(5) Korean seafarers were able to acquire the operating skills of new types of ships and automated vessels through overseas employment. Beginning in the mid-1960s with large bulk carriers, log carriers and VLCCs, the vessels operated by Korean seafarers expanded to car carriers, LPG carriers, container ships, chemical tankers and refined oil tankers in the 1970s and 1980s; (6) the overseas employment of Korean crews contributed to the development of Korea’s shipbuilding industry. Foreign shipowners such as MOC and Lasco, which hired Korean seafarers, built 34 ships and repaired 90 ships at Korean shipyards during the late 1970s and 1980s; 39 (7) the wages of overseas seafarers were generally three to four times higher than those of Korean shipping companies, thus contributing to the increase in national income. The Korean ocean-going shipping industry entered into the stage of maturity after undergoing Korean Shipping Rationalization from 1983 to 1988, due to the global shipping recession and structural problems.
Merchant marine officers are internationally certified human capital. However, without the physical capital of vessels, the marine officer is merely a manual worker. Korean marine officers were able to find the physical capital of vessels overseas and some of them grew up as founders and managers of shipping and shipping-related companies, thereby contributing to the development of Korea’s national economy, as well as the ocean-going shipping industry. 40 Seafarers from the Philippines and Myanmar have succeeded in overseas employment and are contributing to the economic growth of their countries. For example, while there were 442,820 seafarers deployed in 2016, Filipino seafarers contributed $5.87 billion in remittances in 2017. 41 The case of Myanmar is very similar to that of the Philippines. Some 21,856 Myanmar seafarers, including 10,085 officers and 11,771 ratings, embarked on foreign shipowners’ vessels in 2014 and earned $766 million in 2014. In consideration of $1,244 for Myanmar GDP per capita in 2014, Myanmar seafarers earned about 24 times than an average income. The onboard seafarers’ income and GDP ratio of Myanmar in 2014 was 1.2%. 42
Nevertheless, these countries have not been able to develop their ocean-going shipping industries like Korea. These countries can likewise develop their ocean-going shipping industries through active economic development and shipping support policy considering that the government-led economic development policy played an important role in the rapid growth of the Korean ocean-going shipping industry. 43
Footnotes
Appendix
Revenue earned by Korean fleets and wage earned by Korean overseas employed seafarers.
| Year | Freight revenue |
Wage |
B/A (%) | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US dollar (A) | Year-on-year growth rate (%) | US dollar (B) | Year-on-year growth rate (%) | ||
|
|
10,473,786 | – | 556,935 | – | 5.3 |
|
|
12,727,214 | 21.5 | 1,497,394 | 168.9 | 11.8 |
|
|
19,909,763 | 56.4 | 1,936,135 | 22.7 | 9.7 |
|
|
28,654,773 | 43.9 | 3,369,481 | 74.0 | 11.8 |
|
|
42,783,233 | 33.0 | 4,610,097 | 36.8 | 10.8 |
|
|
59,326,559 | 38.7 | 5,976,900 | 29.6 | 10.1 |
|
|
73,344,383 | 28.7 | 7,364,575 | 23.2 | 9.6 |
|
|
85,037,744 | 11.4 | 10,723,130 | 45.6 | 12.6 |
|
|
103,753,654 | 22.0 | 25,915,000 | 141.7 | 25.0 |
|
|
163,888,653 | 58.0 | 27,915,000 | 7.7 | 17.0 |
|
|
300,978,082 | 83.6 | 31,214,164 | 11.8 | 10.4 |
|
|
317,068,990 | 5.3 | 48,366,003 | 54.9 | 15.3 |
|
|
420,436,070 | 32.6 | 70,911,232 | 46.6 | 16.9 |
|
|
629,296,016 | 9.7 | 88,327,969 | 24.6 | 14.0 |
|
|
875,822,297 | 39.2 | 115,884,339 | 31.2 | 13.2 |
|
|
1,263,886,645 | 44.3 | 137,350,432 | 18.5 | 10.9 |
|
|
1,884,735,060 | 49.1 | 166,705,302 | 21.4 | 8.0 |
|
|
2,398,773,000 | 27.2 | 254,831,990 | 52.9 | 10.6 |
|
|
2,392,759,000 | -0.2 | 298,469,549 | 17.1 | 12.5 |
Source: Il-young Jung, ‘A Study on the Activation Projects for the Overseas Employment of Korea Seamen’. Unpublished Masters Thesis (Sung Kyun Kwan University, May 1987), 54–5.
Note: Appendix 1 includes the wage earned by seafarers on foreign-owned merchant and fishing vessels.
1.
UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2019 (Geneva, 2020), 31.
2.
Hyun–kyu Park and Won-cheol Ee, Haewoonron (On Shipping) (Seoul, 1991), 2; Svein Kristiansen, Maritime Transportation (Amsterdam, 2005), 3–4.
3.
Robert E. Lucas, ‘On the Mechanics of Economic Development’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 22 (1988), 3–42; Edward L. Glaeser, Jose A. Scheinkman & Adrei Shleifer, ‘Economic Growth in a Cross–Section of Cities’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 36 (1995), 117–43; Robert J. Barro, Human Capital and Economic Growth: Policies for Long-run Economic Growth (Kansas City, MO, 1992; Curtis Simon & Clark Nardinelli, ‘Human Capital and the rise of American Cities, 1900–1990’, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 32 (2002), 59–96; Eric Hanushek & Ludger Woessmann, ‘The Role of Cognitive Skills in Economic Development’, Journal of Economic Literature, 46 (2008), 607–68; Jonghwa Lee, ‘Human Capital and Economic Growth’ [Korean], Korean Economic Journal, 55, No. 2 (2007), 269–76.
4.
Jae-seung Kim, History of Colonial Jinhae Higher Seafarers’ Training Center (Seoul, 2001), 94.
5.
Eight navigation cadets and 11 engineering cadets of third class and second class in Jinhae Higher Seafarers’ Training Center were allowed to re-enter Jinhae Nautical College. Kim, History of Colonial, 178; Tae-hyun Sohn, Hankuk Haeyang Daehak Ron (Busan, 2015), 12.
6.
There were five first-class masters, two chief officers, 47 second officers, no lower class chief engineers, 13 first engineers, and 32 second engineers in Korea in December 1944. See 
, in Sung-June Kim, et al., ‘Retrospect on the Development of the Shipping Industry in Korea’, Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics, 27 (2011), 130.
7.
The Bureau of Shipping, Haewoon 10–nyeon Yaksa [A 10-Year History of the Korean Shipping Industry] (Seoul, 1955, reprinted in 2001), 222.
8.
Cited from Sung-june Kim et al., ‘Retrospect’, 113–42.
9.
It established one private shipping company in 1948, one in 1952, four in 1953, three in 1954, one in 1955, one in 1957 and one in 1958. The private shipping companies owned 1.1 ships of 1,250 GTs on average. Tae-hyun Sohn, Hankook Haewoon Sa [A History of the Korean Shipping Industry] (Busan,1997), 372.
10.
Tae-kwon. Hankuk Haegisa Hyeophoe 60–nyeon Sa [A 60-Year History of Korea Marine Officers’ Association], Vol. 1 (Korea Maritime Officers’ Association, Busan, 2014), 98.
11.
12.
See S. June Kim, ed., Heeyang Hanghae-rok [Su-keum Kim’s Memoirs] (Seoul, 2019), 162.
13.
Hyundai Haewoon Baljeon 40–nyeon Sa, 976 [A 40 Year History of the Development of Korean Shipping Industry, (Seoul, 1984)].
14.
MMU, MMU 60–nyeon Sa [A 60–Year History of Mokpo Maritime University], Vol. 1 (Mokpo, 2010), 287, 290.
15.
MMU, MMU 60–nyeon Sa, Vol. 1, 504–5.
16.
KMOA, Haeki Hoibo, No. 37 (February 2, 1970), f. 2; No. 49 (February 1, 1971), f.3; No. 61 (February 1, 1972), f.3.
17.
KMU, KMU 50–nyeon Sa [A 50-Year History of Korea Maritime University] (Busan, 1995), 217–9.
18.
MMU, MMU 60–nyeon Sa, Vol. 1, 621–2, 643; Vol. II, 23, 38.
19.
KMOA, Hankuk Haegisa Hyeophoe 60–nyeon Sa, 126–7.
20.
K Line, CKS 50–nyeon Sa [A 50 Year History of CK Line, (Seoul, 2012)].
21.
22.
KMOA, KMOA 60–nyeon Sa I, 90–1.
23.
CK Line, CKS 50–nyeon Sa, 94.
24.
KLC, KLC 20–nyeon Sa [A 20-Year History of Korea Line Corporation] (Seoul, 1989), 75.
25.
KLC, KLC 20–nyeon Sa, 402.
26.
KLC, KLC 20–nyeon Sa, 110.
27.
Jacobs, ‘Rostow’s Stages of Growth Development Model’; Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, 6–7 & chapter 3.
28.
Tae-Woo Lee, Shipping Developments in Far East Asia: The Korean Experience (Avebury, 1996), 75.
29.
KMOA, Haeki Haibo, No. 62, March 1 (Busan,1972), f.1.
30.
CK Line, CKS 50–nyeon Sa, 130–1.
31.
CK Line, CKS 50–nyeon Sa, 437.
32.
S. June Kim, ‘Government Policy and the Rise of a National Shipping Industry: Korea’s Experience, 1967–1999’, International Journal of Maritime History, 31 (2019), 293–7.
33.
KLC, KLC 20–nyeon Sa, 125.
34.
KLC, KLC 20–nyeon Sa, 341–4.
35.
KLC, KLC 20–nyeon Sa, 132.
36.
Jacobs, ‘Rostow’s Stages of Growth Development Model’; Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, 7–9, chapter 4.
37.
Sohn, Hankuk Haewoon Sa, 398–9.
38.
Korea Seafarers’ Management Companies’ Association, Hyuphoi 10–nyeon Sa [A 10–year History of KSMCA] (Busan, 1992), 24–8.
39.
Korea Seafarers’ Management Companies’ Association, Hyuphoi 10–nyeon Sa, 34–6.
40.
S. June Kim, ‘The Expansion of Private Shipping and Entrepreneurship in Korea, 1960–1981’, International Journal of Maritime History, 32 (2020), 101–23.
41.
42.
Enrico D’agostini, ‘A Study of Myanmar Seafarers’ Impact on National Economy,’ Journal of Navigation and Port Research, 41 (2017), 252–3.
43.
For the correlation of government policy and the growth of shipping industry, refer to S. June Kim, ‘Government Policy and the Rise of a National Shipping Industry: Korea’s Experience, 1967–1999’, International Journal of Maritime History, 31 (2019), 285–307.