Abstract
Professor James R. Holmes is a former US Naval officer who holds the J.C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College, Newport. Rhode Island. He seems a good choice therefore to write a brief guide to his subject. He intends it to act as a primer to allow newcomers to the field, both service and civilian, to acquire the rudiments of maritime strategy
This is a laudable aim, but this reviewer is far from sure that the book succeeds in it. Two of the three chapters are spent summarising the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan on the generation and maintenance of sea power, with surprisingly little commentary on how the world has changed since the publication of his classic works. Sir Julian Corbett then puts in an appearance and his work, along with Mahan's, plays an important role in the final chapter ‘What Navies Do’.
Given the centrality of Mahan to this work it is a concern that there are serious errors that the book perpetuates. First is the claim on page 1 that Mahan defined 'command of the sea' as 'the possession of that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive'. This not the case. The term 'command of the sea' does not appear on p. 138 of The Influence of Sea Power on History, from where the rest of the quotation comes.
In fact, the term ‘command of the sea' rarely appears in Mahan's classic work. It does so towards the end of the book when Mahan argues in reference to attack on maritime trade that: 'Only by military command of the sea by prolonged control of the strategic centres of commerce can such an attack be fatal, and that could only be achieved by fleet action.' This rather goes against the book's claim that Mahan is ambivalent about guerre de course, only mentioning it in a final footnote in 'Influence' . The true quotation quoted reads: Commerce destroying by independent cruisers depends on wide dissemination of force. Commerce destroying through control of a strategic centre by a great fleet depends on concentration of force. Regarded as a primary, not as a secondary operation the former is condemned, the latter justified by the experience of centuries.
That seems pretty clear.
The chapter on ‘What Navies Do' begins using Professor Ken Booth’s useful triangular analysis. For some reason the author thinks Ken is an Australian, which would greatly surprise him. Perhaps Professor Wylie has got him mixed up with the Australian politician of the same name. I developed the Booth triangle in my Future of Sea Power, but the author has chosen not to use this. Neither does he mention the key work of Sir James Cable on naval diplomacy.
The book’s grasp of historical knowledge is also tenuous at times. The Japanese did not use 'Long Lance' torpedoes at Pearl Harbor. The 'Long Calm Lee of Trafalgar', one of Andrew Gordon's less wise statements, not least because it is so easily remembered, is used to make a remarkable statement about how the Royal Navy stagnated during the Nineteenth Century into a service run by 'control freaks', which was not prepared to confront the 'enterprising' German Navy in World War One.
Given the nineteenth-century Royal Navy's positive record of technological progress, continued high level action (albeit largely in a shore bombardment role) and positive tactical evolution, this is hardly an accurate comment. Any weaknesses in the early twentieth century were more due to an over emphasis on technological management than character defects. Indeed, the author's comments about German attitudes rather goes against his approving comments on Wilfgang Wegemer's criticisms of his native naval culture. One suspects that Professor Holmes' criticism of the contemporary US Navy being in the lee of the Cold Way has more to do with similar reasons of technological preoccupation than just complacency.
The book is very US-orientated, which makes it all the more surprising that there is no mention of Stansfield Turner's work that popularised the key terms sea control, power projection and sea denial. Any 'brief guide to maritime strategy' ought to make a point of paying attention to and analysing these key concepts.
A Brief Guide is more an interesting and stimulating commentary on classical maritime strategic thinkers than a true primer for beginners. It has some interesting things to say, for example developing Mahan's 'Fortress Fleet' idea to describe modern long-range shore based ‘anti-access/ area denial' forces covering naval operations. It is worth attention but is to be hoped that beginners develop their reading quickly to make important additions to its analysis and contradict its errors.