Abstract
Materials that were born digital, and printed materials that have been digitized, have aided an updated examination of nineteenth-century US whaling voyages’ financial returns. Items included the American Offshore Whaling Voyages dataset from whalinghistory.org, The Whalemen’s Shipping List and Merchant’s Transcript, a congressman’s speech and a state’s census reports. These works and others, with analysis, showed that for the 11,257 analysable voyages ending in the 1800s, the mean return was 4.7% and 4.6% for whaling and US government bonds, respectively. Ideally, this work will place the nineteenth-century US whaling industry returns in context of other investments.
Introduction
Great profits and tragic losses are recounted in the whaling literature. Of the great profits, the stately homes of the owners and captains of these ships continue to provide the evidence. The stories of losses are legendary. For one whaling harbour and for part of the 1800s, the financial returns have been analysed. The born digital and digitized versions of many primary materials allowed for an examination of the financial returns of the 1800s for more harbours and for more years.
In 2018, the American Offshore Whaling Voyages (AOWV) dataset was released on whalinghistory.org. This rich data source detailed the vessels, harbours, voyages, catch, whaling grounds and skippers. The full dataset from the AOWV comprises 13,677 voyage records. The dataset used for this article represents that for which there was enough data for analysis, which ultimately extended to 11,257 voyages undertaken by 1,982 vessels across 59 harbours from 1800 to 1899. In 2019 dollars, the median vessel going to sea in 1850 would cost $992,226. Generally, vessels were owned by a syndicate of individual investors. As the vessel values and related costs data were not as complete or exhaustive as the voyages and catch data, these costs were estimated based on information collected from many sources.
For the nineteenth century, US government bonds, a risk-free asset, returned 4.6%; whaling, a risky asset, returned a mean of 4.7%. This implied 0.1% as the risk premium for whaling over US government bonds. Risk premiums are the additional return to compensate investors for tolerating risk greater than a risk-free asset. The additional compensation of 0.1% for investing in whaling over US government bonds seemed slight given the risk profile of whaling.
Survey of the literature
There were several of types of literature on the nineteenth-century whaling industry. While some works detailed the whaling voyages, others discussed the industry. The primary source of whaling voyage data was the AOWV from the whalinghistory.org website. 1 The AOWV pulled together 739 sources of voyage data. Whalinghistory.org is a partnership between Mystic Seaport and the New Bedford Whaling Museum, and this dataset was first released in 2018. The print and digitized sources were essential. For instance, in the AOWV dataset there were 11 different vessels named Franklin, eight vessels named Minerva, and many other vessels had the same name. Having the print and digitized sources allowed for tracking each unique vessel.
One resource that discussed the industry was a pamphlet of a congressional speech and presentation given by Congressman Joseph Grinnell, the representative from the section of Massachusetts that included New Bedford, on 1 May 1844. 2 This speech and presentation provided vital information on the costs of vessels and outfitting for different types of whaling voyages. Starbuck’s seminal work catalogued thousands of voyages from the inception of the American whaling industry until 1876, 3 which was continued by Hegarty. 4 Dias only catalogued New Bedford voyages, but his study was valuable for the data on the individual voyages and even more so for the commentary about each vessel. 5 Decker detailed New London-based voyages not found elsewhere. 6 The weekly Whalemen’s Shipping List and Merchant’s Transcript (WSL) was key as it was a contemporaneous work and allowed for checking on the data reported for specific vessels and had valuable content on valuation. Unfortunately, the WSL started in 1843 and not earlier. 7
In whaling parlance, returns refers to the catch that was returned to harbour. Starbuck pointed out several factors that resulted in the underestimation of return data: 8
before about 1844–1845, whalebone imports were only occasionally recorded;
as oil and bone were often sold in foreign ports to pay for repairs, records of these sales/barrels were not reported;
as oil and bone often returned to harbour via freight, these imports were not part of the record.
Due to the returns being underestimated, the financial returns are likewise underestimated. The dataset used was not a complete set of all whaling voyages, just those that had data for analysis.
In contrast to the level of detail on the individual voyages, there were only a few sources that delved into the costs and financial returns. Davis et al offered the most detailed financial discussion, with each chapter useful in creating a better understanding of the financial dynamics of whaling. 9
Focusing on the financial analysis of those vessels returning to New Bedford from 1817 to 1892, 2,757 analysable voyages were found for that period. 10 Davis et al wrote about handling the issue of lost vessels and incorporating these financial losses in a couple ways: first, ‘the costs associated with lost vessels were taken into account in the estimates of insurance costs’; 11 second, ‘the total value of vessels lost within each period was divided among vessels returning to New Bedford, and expressed as a value per ton of vessels that returned safely to port’. 12 It was unclear which of these methods were deployed in the different analyses.
Davis et al included cost estimates for agent fees, insurance, depreciation and implicit interest. 13 In contrast, this analysis included insurance and depreciation, but not agent fees or implicit interest. As many agents were also owners and investors, it was unclear, with current data, how to assess agent fees. With all investments, there are trade-offs among different opportunities. Implicit interest is an assessment of the value of the opportunity cost of making one investment instead of another. The formula for annualized returns does not include opportunity costs, so an implicit interest estimate was not included. Although In Pursuit of Leviathan provided the most financially detailed work of all the sources, the dataset used by Davis et al work was not discoverable, and the formulas used and details of how formula items were estimated were also elusive. Hence, the results could not be replicated.
Enderby’s 1847 study was very detailed and included the author’s calculations. 14 He was a member of a prominent sealing and whaling family business in England, and his publication was a part of an investment proposal regarding establishing a whaling enterprise in New Zealand. Accordingly, his work was based on generalizations and not based on specific voyages. Enderby summarized the expected return of a fully financed four-year sperm whale voyage, which showed an annualized return of 1.3%, while a fully financed two-year right whale voyage had an annualized return of 6.5%. 15 He assumed the cost of the vessel and outfit were financed at five per cent. While there were differences between the American and English models, Enderby’s work clearly supported the assumptions behind the estimated values and formulas used. His work was useful in placing results in context and working through the pricing and cost structures. It also confirmed that while British voyages were financed, American voyages were not.
Nicholas supplemented these analyses. 16 Nicholas used the financial summary tables of In Pursuit of Leviathan for his analysis of the American whaling industry. He made clear that, while American whaling voyages were not financed, there were close ties between the banks and whaling to the point where some whaling agents were also bank presidents. 17 The financing question was also addressed by Hilt: ‘The agent often extended credit to the other investors for some or all of their stake in the vessel and outfits, permitting them to pay for their share over time with interest.’ 18 Clearly, there were financial transactions in the shape of loans or other kinds of transactions by individuals funding their investment. However, as the voyages were not financed, but rather some investors financed their stake, finance charges were not included in this analysis.
Starbuck not only detailed the voyages but also discussed outcomes for some years for some harbours and for a handful of specific voyages. These positive and negative accounts were widely quoted in other works. Holman quoted Starbuck’s positive numbers, but also discussed Enderby’s more conservative return estimates. 19 Nicholas quoted Starbuck’s assertion about the 1858 fleet: ‘Of 68 whalers expected to arrive in New Bedford and Fairhaven, in 1858, 44 were calculated as making a losing voyage. . .’. 20 This would amount to about 65 per cent of voyages making losses. The AOWV list shows that in 1858, 90 whalers from New Bedford and Fairhaven either returned to harbour or were lost or condemned. Of those for which there was enough data to analyse and that returned to harbour, there were 80 voyages, of which 24, or 30 per cent, generated negative returns. Adding more voyages enhanced the work previously done. Moment’s article discussed the finances of a particular voyage, identifying the purchasing of provisions in foreign harbours, one of the lesser expenses not considered in other works. 21
Historically, whaling was presented as a prosperous industry and one that the country (Americans) should support. For instance, Daniel Webster, on 3 May 1828, gave a Senate speech supporting the construction of a breakwater at Nantucket: ‘There is a population of eight or nine thousand persons living here on the sea, adding largely every year to the amount of national wealth by the boldest and most preserving industry.’
22
Whaling was also presented positively in the business magazines of the time: The importance of this traffic, not only in its profits, which have, perhaps, been greater than those of any other single object of our national enterprise, the capital which is invested in its expeditions, embracing nearly one tenth part of the tonnage of the country, the importance of the moral interests which it involves, comprising the conditions of that large and valuable class of seamen who are its active agents, and the circumstances bordering on the sublime which attend its hazardous expeditions, all render it an interesting subject to our commercial and mercantile population.
23
In its importance as augmenting the wealth of the country, it is not equaled by any other species of traffic, and presents a marked example of productive labor.
24
. . . and the luxurious edifices which adorn many of the cities, attest the enterprise of those who are engaged in the traffic and the success of their labors.
25
In his speech to Congress on 1 May 1844, Grinnell stated: ‘Commercial History furnishes no account of any parallel; our ships now outnumber those of all other nations combined, and the proceeds of its enterprise are in proportion, and diffused to every part of our country.’ 26
This was followed a year later by Charles Wilkes, an American naval officer, who wrote: The profits of the whaling fishery have been great, and show what industry and perseverance can yield when well directed. The small number of accidents in this large fleet is surprising; for the total losses, for which underwriters have to pay, seldom exceed one per cent, and those from other accidents are not more than one half per cent. The insurance seldom exceeds two and half per cent by the year, and at this low premium the underwriters have derived good dividends.
27
It is estimated about ten per cent of the ships make losing voyages, as well from the incompetency of the masters as from accident and ill luck.
28
The above statements did not align with the results of the current analysis. Similarly, this analysis did not support Starbuck’s presentation of data from 1837: ‘Thus, of the 81 whalers expected to arrive in 1837, 53 made paying voyages, 8 made saving ones, 11 lost money, and 9 involved their owners in severe losses.’ 29 Starbuck’s data showed 65.4% of voyages were paying, 9.8% were saving, and 24.7% were losses. Using the AOWV data set, there were 245 whalers that completed a voyage in 1837, 79 voyages had returns greater than the bond yield (assumed to have been a paying voyage), 62 had voyages greater than zero but under the bond yield (a saving voyage) and 104 were negative. These results show 32.2% had paying voyages, 25.3% made saving voyages and 42.4% of voyages involved losses. Investing in whaling was mentioned in Moby Dick: ‘People in Nantucket invest their money in whaling vessels, the same way that you do yours in approved state stocks bringing in good interest.’ 30 The literature of the time spoke to whaling investing having outcomes that were more positive than indicated in the results of this analysis.
The born digital AOWV dataset, together with digitized primary sources generated by whaling, have rendered available a range of diverse sources of information. Among the many whaling primary materials recently digitized, Mystic Seaport completed the WSL in 2009 and Harvard’s Baker Library filmed the Dias manuscript in 2013. The digitization of these materials facilitated a far more efficient research process than was possible hitherto. The new wealth of electronically available information has facilitated the revision of nineteenth-century whaling financial returns presented in this article.
Methods and data
The formula for calculating annualized return is
As the actual cash flows for each voyage was unknowable, for this analysis the components of the formula were simplified. For the crew and the owners:
crew members were paid as a portion of the total catch, called a lay. From the lay, the owners reduced this by the crew member’s cash advances and ship store purchases. For this analysis, the crew took 30 per cent of the catch;
owners had a multitude of costs, including fees for the agent, dockage, pilotage and cargo handling, as well as advances to crew and income from on-board purchases. For this analysis, the owners took 70 per cent of the catch.
For each voyage, the Annualized Return to Owners was calculated based on the formulas below:
The oil barrels were assumed to hold 31.5 gallons. The starting value was calculated to be the value of the vessel and cost of the outfit and food. As insurance was optional, this analysis was done with and without insurance. The ending value was calculated as catch value to owner plus the value of the vessel post voyage. The value vessel post voyage was calculated as the vessel value less depreciation and maintenance.
it included only voyages that ended between 1800 and 1899;
it excluded vessels with unknown names or voyages from unnamed harbours;
it excluded voyages with foreign home ports;
voyages with zeros or blanks in the catch were reviewed. If the information was zero in another resource, it was updated and kept. If the catch was not recorded, the voyage was excluded. If the voyage was recorded as returning ‘clean’, it was kept at zero. ‘Clean’ meant no catch;
‘days at sea’ was calculated from the dates of leaving and returning to the harbour. If the voyage date data was incomplete, the voyage’s dates were reviewed. If the information was found in another source, it was updated and kept. If the day was not specified, the 15th of the month was selected. If the month of leaving was not specified, July was selected and if the month returning was not specified, June was selected; this one month offset was to account for vessels that returned to harbour and left again without months recorded, it was assumed that it took a month to outfit a vessel to go to sea again;
the catch was augmented with the addition of ambergris.
These changes reduced the list to 11,257 voyages, which were completed by 1,982 vessels from 59 harbours. The fleet comprised 18 vessels on 1 January 1800 and concluded with 42 vessels in the fleet on 31 December 1899, with a maximum fleet size of 718 reached in 1845. Figure 1 shows the fleet size over time.
Size of the American whaling fleet, 1800–1899.
Analysis of how the 1,982 vessels left the fleet over the century reveals that 1,031 were withdrawn, 59 were abandoned, 29 were burned, 270 were condemned, 478 were lost, 73 were seized and 42 remained. ‘Withdrawn’ meant the owners decided to use the vessel for other commercial pursuits, while ‘condemned’ meant the vessel was deemed unseaworthy and could not proceed with its voyage. Figure 2 shows where the 909 vessels were lost, abandoned, condemned, seized or burned.
Vessel demise estimated locations.
This analysis used the annual prices for whale oil, sperm oil, and bone. 32 As Tower’s data starts in 1804, data from Cole completed the series for whale oil prices from 1800–1803. 33 The prices for sperm oil and bone were estimated for that period. The value of the ambergris was taken from the WSL accounts of the sales.
This analysis used a valuation for ships and barks of $20,000, brigs and schooners of $6,000, sloops of $4,000 and $65,000 for the steamers. A mosaic approach was used to establish the value of the vessels. The vessel valuation data showed no trends so these set values were used for the entire time analysed.
The Massachusetts industry censuses from 1835 to 1875 were used for valuation. These censuses detailed the capital involved and number of vessels engaged in whaling by town. Table 1 shows the summary data by county. Assuming that outfits accounted for half of the value of the total capital committed, this suggested a range of vessel values from $4,333 to $17,027.
Summary of Industrial Census Data on whaling vessels by county.
The congressional speech on whaling by Congressman Grinnell on 1 May 1844 was invaluable. Grinnell served in the House of Representatives from the New Bedford district. He had been the head of the First National Bank of New Bedford. Grinnell’s speech included a presentation of data on the American whaling industry. His data showed that a new whaling vessel cost $31,224.90. He further detailed that the estimated value at sailing was $38,000 per vessel for a 44-month voyage, $28,000 for a 27-month voyage and $14,000 for a 15-month Atlantic voyage. The cost of outfitting was estimated to have been: $19,905.75 for a 44-month voyage; $17,127.45 for a 27-month voyage; and $6,557.00 for a 15-month voyage. 34 This implied an underlying vessel value of about $7,000 to $19,000.
The whaling industry’s newspaper, the WSL, was also a source of valuation data in several ways. In an article published in 1859, it was asserted that in 1858, 65 whaleships sailed at an average cost of $30,000 with the estimated voyage length of three to three and a half years. 35 Additionally, the WSL often accounted for vessels lost and sold. When vessels were lost, sometimes the WSL cited how much the vessel was valued at the time it sailed. The median of the 136 mentions of value when sailed was $34,500. The median value of the 628 vessels sold was $5,200. Figures 3 and 4 show the values. The WSL was first published in March 1843, so the data is available for 1843–1899.
Records of sales.
Value of vessel when it sailed.
The number of whaling vessels decreased during the American Civil War. The British were aligned with the Confederacy. British ships captured and burned 43 whalers, captured and bonded two, and captured another two that were taken to New Orleans and repurposed. A further 34 vessels were purchased by the US Navy and became part of Stone Fleet One and Two. These vessels were sunk in southern harbours. The United States sued the United Kingdom over the capture and burning of the whalers and other losses from the American Civil War in cases known as the ‘Alabama Claims’. The details of the ‘Alabama Claims’ were available and reviewed. As each claimant summarized their losses differently, some in great detail and others in a summary fashion, this was not a solid valuation data source. The prices paid for the 34 vessels that were integrated into the Stone Fleets were also reviewed. As these vessels were likely stripped of all but the materials needed to go south, this too was not a solid source for valuation. These historic US Government documents were available online.
The food costs from Grinnell showed $4,617 for a 44-month voyage and $3,326 for the 27-month voyage. Grinnell showed 28 crew members on each of these types of whaling voyages. This resulted in a range of $3.50 to $4.11 per man per month. Grinnell’s speech and presentation was about tariffs, and the purpose seemed to be to show the domestic products used by whalers and how the whaling industry was supporting other domestic industries. This speech and presentation went so far as to distinguish which products on a departing whaling vessel were of domestic, as against foreign, origin.
In a business magazine of the time, it showed $1,200 a year for foreign provisioning in 1859 without mentioning the size of the crew. 36 Moment provided detail from a specific voyage that indicated a $1,900 cost for provisions during a 50-month voyage ending in 1875. 37 Adjusting this data for inflation created a range of $1.07 to $3.70 a month per man for food in 1844. This analysis used the mid points of the Grinnell data and fresh food estimates, which resulted in a cost per month of $6.19 a month per man in 1844, or $74.28 a year per man for food.
Food costs differ in the current analysis from Davis et al, who used the summary of the Grinnell tables as presented by Holman in respect of the cost of food. 38 Davis et al wrote: ‘There is a question about Grinnell’s intentions in preparing these lists. Was he compiling only the items in the original outfitting of the vessels, or did he intend to indicate the requirements of their entire voyages? . . . there is strong suggestion that Grinnell intended his tables of allowances to show the total subsistence for a voyage.’ 39
Grinnell’s speech and related tables were published in a pamphlet, in which he stated: ‘The annual consumption by this fleet is $3,845,500; only $400,000 is of foreign articles.’ He further claimed: I invite the attention of the gentlemen from the South and West to this table of articles consumed by the whaling fleet; they will find that it consumes largely of their products. I will mention some of the most important, to wit: 43,868 barrels of beef and pork, of the value of $372,878; 40,692 barrels of flour.
40
Holman’s reformatted tables did not explain why there was a speech on whaling in Congress or the details behind the data presented. As tariffs were the issue, the demarcation of foreign and domestic items on a whaling ship leaving the harbour was the reason for the tables. The original tables, without reformatting, differentiated domestic and foreign items, with molasses, black tea, hyson tea (a green tea), raisins, sugar and coffee being the only foreign items on a whaling vessel going to sea. The digitization of the Grinnell pamphlet allowed for reviewing the previous analysis from a new perspective. While this analysis used $74.28 a year as the food cost per man, Davis et al estimated $35.00. 41 Food costs were adjusted for inflation, with 1844 as the base year.
Most of the whaling vessels were wooden hulled. To ward off barnacles and other sea life, vessel bottoms were covered in copper. Every few years the bottoms would need to have the copper replaced. Sails only lasted a couple of years. These vessels went all over the world from the northern Alaska to Tahiti to Antarctica and were out at sea for years. Accordingly, each vessel would need different levels of maintenance. Without having maintenance records, a six per cent annual charge for upkeep was assumed.
With insurance, the return for vessels that did not return to harbour was:
If the vessel did not have insurance and was lost, abandoned, burned, seized or condemned, the value of the catch sent home was kept, and the value of any other catch and the vessel was zeroed. The owner’s share of the catch that was sent home was used as it was assumed that the owners would still need to pay the crew or the crew person’s estate if they did not survive.
Without insurance, the return for vessels that did not return to harbour was calculated thus:
Analysis and results
The voyage data was aggregated by the year the voyages concluded. For each year, the maximum, median and mean returns were calculated. The year-by-year results are presented in Appendix 1. To calculate the returns for the century and decade, the annual maximum, median and mean were used and it was assumed that $100 was invested in each category and that the results from one year was the start of the second and so on. Then the final number, after 100 or 10 years, was annualized. The same century and decade methodology was followed for the US government bond. As in 1813, the median return for the uninsured was -100%, the 1814 return was calculated off the 1812 return.
The mean was 4.7% and 4.3% insured to uninsured respectively, while the bond yield was 4.6% (see Table 2).
Overall and by decade returns.
Source. Author’s tabulations.
Assuming no insurance, 6,408, or 57 per cent, of the 11,257 voyages returned with positive returns. This decreases to 6,005, or 53.4%, of the 11,257 voyages returned with positive returns if insurance costs were added. Only 45.7% of the assumed uninsured voyages returned with a return rate that was greater than the bond yield of the time. This decreases to 41.5% if insurance was included. The US government bond was used as the comparator.
Whaling returns increased after petroleum was discovered in Pennsylvania in 1859. One might have expected that the founding of the petroleum industry would have been the death knell for whaling. Over time, whalebone became a greater share of the returns as sperm and whale oil declined. In 1899, whalebone accounted for 81.7% of the whaling returns (see Figure 5).
Percentage of return by catch.
The following distribution charts clarify the range of returns generated by the whaling industry. The 10 per cent number on the axis represents the number of voyages that were at 10 per cent or below, and above zero per cent. This shows that four per cent of voyages were total losses and 3.4% of uninsured voyage’s returns were greater than 100 per cent (see Figure 6). The cumulative chart details the outcomes, showing that 43 per cent of voyages were negative, 64.7% were below 10 per cent, and 80.3% were less than 20 per cent (see Figure 7).
Distribution of returns.
Cumulative distribution of returns.
The charts of the mean and maximum whaling returns and the bond returns show the variability of whaling returns and the trend to more positive outcomes over time (see Figures 8 and 9).
Bond and mean whaling return by year.
Bond and maximum whaling return by year.
Some noteworthy voyage results included: the Nile had the longest voyage at 11 or 12 years, depending on the source. However, as the specifics of the Nile were not consistent across sources, the details are not presented here. Assuming these vessels were uninsured, the Era had the voyage with the highest return, and the Mary Hume had the voyage with the largest catch value, as follows.
Era
This schooner from New London made the voyage with the highest return. The voyage lasted 78 days, with the Era embarking in July 1890 and entering port in October 1890. The vessel returned with 263 barrels of whale oil and 4,131 pounds of whalebone. The two and a half month voyage generated a catch value of $20,912, of which 70 per cent, or $14,639, went to the owners. The cost assumptions included a vessel value of $6,000, outfit of $2,021, food of $904 and $106 in depreciation and maintenance. 43
The results of the Era highlight the time value of money. The size of the Era’s catch was not extraordinary, but the financial return was exceptionally high due to the short time spent at sea.
Mary Hume
This steamer from San Francisco returned the largest catch value. The voyage lasted 894 days, with the Mary Hume departing in April 1890 and arriving home in September 1892 with 70,000 pounds of bone in the hold after two years and five months at sea. This catch was valued at $374,500, of which 70 per cent, or $262,150, went to the owners. The cost assumptions included a vessel value of $65,000, outfit of $14,028, food of $8,976 and depreciation and maintenance of $12,007. 44
Again, the return numbers indicate that for the sake of financial returns, both the length of time at sea and the size of the catch were critical. While the catch was clearly large, due to the length of time at sea, the results on a return basis were not the highest.
Conclusions
The nineteenth-century American whaling industry is steeped in tales of great wealth, tragic losses and considerable fortitude. While rich in stories of voyages good and bad, the whaling lore is poor in the accounting of the financial stakes and returns of the thousands of voyages that took place. The goal of this article was to establish the financial facts behind the legends. To accomplish this, the financial returns of the owners of nineteenth-century whaling vessels were reviewed using materials that have been born digital, sources that have been digitized and those still only in print. While the sources that have been digitized have been always available to researchers, the digitized format allowed them to be revisited and reused as the research evolved. In deploying these new and more accessible materials, this article complements Davis et al’s In Pursuit of Leviathan, which was comprehensive in its coverage of many elements of whaling, including technology, labour, agents, productivity, end markets and captains. Capital and profits were also considered, both in qualitative evidence of the gains and losses of single voyages, certain years or particular harbours, and in quantitative analyses of the financial returns of 2,757 whaling voyages, with breakdowns by agent and hunting ground.
The current article takes the financial appraisals of Davis et al a step further by expanding the number of voyages analysed, and by reviewing more years and more harbours. Its main finding relates to risk premiums, which may be defined as the additional return to compensate investors for tolerating risk greater than a risk-free asset. During the nineteenth century, US government bonds, a risk-free asset, returned an average of 4.6%; whaling, a risky asset, returned a mean of 4.7%. This shows 0.1% as the risk premium for whaling over US government bonds. Perhaps an analysis of letters and business documents would reveal how whaling investors assessed these investments in terms of the potential and expected returns and the associated risks. Moreover, being in an annualized format, these results will facilitate comparison with investments in the private equity, venture capital, energy and other markets.
Footnotes
Appendix
Financial returns in detail by year.
|
Source. Author’s tabulations.
Acknowledgements
My work on this project was encouraged by my employers. Specifically, my direct supervisor at the time I started this project, Patricia Gaspari-Bridges, was very supportive.
1.
New Bedford Whaling Museum and Mystic Seaport Museum, Whallinghistory.org, 
(accessed 30 March 2018).
2.
Joseph Grinnell, Speech of Mr. Grinnell, of Massachusetts on the tariff: with statistical tables of the whale fishery of the United States (Washington, 1844).
3.
Alexander Starbuck, History of the American Whale Fishery: From its Earliest Inception to the Year 1876 (New York, 1964).
4.
Reginald B. Hegarty, Returns of Whaling Vessels Sailing from American Ports: A Continuation of Alexander Starbuck’s “History of the American Whale Fishery”, 1876-1928 (New Bedford, MA, 1959).
5.
6.
Robert O. Decker, Whaling Industry of New London (York, PA, 1974).
7.
8.
Starbuck, History, 166.
9.
Lance E. Davis, Robert E Gallman and Karin Gleiter, In Pursuit of Leviathan: Technology, Institutions, Productivity, and Profits In American Whaling, 1816-1906 (Chicago, IL, 1997).
10.
Davis et al, Leviathan, 437–8.
11.
Davis et al, Leviathan, 433.
12.
Davis et al, Leviathan, 488.
13.
Davis et al, Leviathan, 436.
14.
Charles Enderby, Proposal for Re-establishing the British Southern Whale Fishery: Through the Medium of a Chartered Company, and in Combination with the Colonisation of the Auckland Islands, as the Site of the Company’s Whaling Station (London, 1847).
15.
Enderby, British Southern Whale Fishery, 38.
16.
Tom Nicholas, VC: An American History (Cambridge, MA, 2019).
17.
Nicholas, VC, 23.
18.
Eric Hilt, ‘Investment and Diversification in the American Whaling Industry’, Journal of Economic History, 67 (2007), 298.
19.
Elmo Paul Hohman, The American Whaleman: A Study of Life and Labor In the Whaling Industry (New York, NY, 1928).
20.
Nicholas, VC, 17, quoting Starbuck, History, 149.
21.
David Moment, ‘The Business of Whaling in America in the 1850s’, Business History Review, 31 (1957), 261–91.
22.
Daniel Webster, The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster (Boston, MA, 1903), 18 volume 14, 131. March 2019.
23.
James H. Lanman, ‘The American Whale Fishery’, Hunt’s Merchant Magazine and Commercial Review, 3 (1840), 361.
24.
Lanman, ‘American Whale Fishery’, 394.
25.
Lanman, ‘American Whale Fishery’, 394.
26.
Grinnell, Speech, 6.
27.
Charles Wilkes, Narrative of US Exploring Expedition During Years 1838–1842, in 5 Volumes and Atlas, volume V (Philadelphia, PA, 1845), 497.
28.
Wilkes, Narrative, 497.
29.
Starbuck, History, 149.
30.
Herman Melville, Moby Dick: Or the Whale (New York, NY, 1902), 63.
31.
Ronald W. Melicher and Edgar Norton, Finance: Introduction to Institutions, Investments, and Management (12th edition, Hoboken, NJ, 2005), 212.
32.
Walter Sheldon Tower, A History of the American Whale Fishery (Philadelphia, PA, 1907), 128.
33.
Arthur H. Cole, Wholesale Commodity Prices in the United States, 1700–1861 (Cambridge, MA, 1938).
34.
Grinnell, Speech.
35.
‘The Importance of the Whale Fishery’, Whalemen’s Shipping List and Merchants’ Transcript, 2 August 1859.
36.
‘Whaling Interests of the United States’, Debow’s, May 1859, 590.
37.
Moment, ‘Business of Whaling’, 272.
38.
Holman, American Whaleman, 325.
39.
Davis et al, Leviathan, 211–2.
40.
Grinnell, Tariff, 5–6.
41.
Davis et al, Leviathan, 213.
42.
Davis et al, Leviathan, 231, 488. It was unclear if a life expectancy of 34 years was the rate used throughout the work, or if the specific figure of 30.6 years was used for ships, with and 37.7 was used for barks.
43.
Decker, New London, 162; Hegarty, Returns, 25; WSL, 28 October 1890, stated that 300 barrels of whale oil and 4,000 pounds of whalebone were landed.
44.
Hegarty, Returns, 26. A contemporary newspaper article stated that the catch was worth $400,000. ‘Remarkable Whaling Voyage’, New York Times, 1 October 1892, 1. The catch value of $374,500 was used in this analysis.