Abstract
The Napoleonic years in Holland, 1806–1813, were a time of trouble and turmoil. The Dutch republican polity was ended when Napoleon proclaimed his younger brother Louis King of Holland in June 1806. In 1810, Holland even ceased to exist as an independent state, when it was incorporated in the French Empire. The Dutch also suffered a severe economic crisis after 1806, as a result of the Continental Blockade. Notwithstanding a series of regulations and a variety of offices charged with implementing them, the enforcement of the Blockade remained imperfect. Smuggling flourished, with Dutch North Sea fishermen, facilitated by the relatively mild stance of the British Navy, playing an important role. Police files, some recently rediscovered, demonstrate that their role was even more substantial when it came to the illegal transport of passengers and mail. Dutch North Sea fishermen, who dominated the illicit conveyance of travellers and correspondence, mainly lived near Rotterdam and the Meuse estuary. As well as goods and raw materials, they conveyed information and served as mediators in commercial networks. The proximity of these fishermen boosted the strategic advantage of local merchants and thereby contributed to the resilience of Rotterdam in this time of crisis.
It is striking, from a historical and a symbolic perspective, that fishermen played a very prominent role at both the beginning and the end of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era in the Netherlands. The period began in Holland with the ‘Batavian Revolution’, which was ignited by regime change in Amsterdam and the flight of the last Stadtholder, William V; events that took place almost simultaneously on 18 February 1795. On this occasion, William V and his family fled to England from Scheveningen in a fishing boat. The era ended in November 1813, when the Stadtholder’s son, William Frederic of Orange (his father had died in exile in 1806), returned to Holland from England on the English warship The Warrior. He did so upon hearing news of the Dutch uprising against the French, which was communicated to him by Dutch delegates who had travelled to England – again, by way of a fishing boat. The Warrior sailed to Scheveningen, where it arrived in the afternoon of 30 November 1813. The Prince of Orange disembarked almost immediately, aided by fishermen from this fishing village near The Hague. 1 After nearly two decades of exile, William Frederic stepped ashore on almost exactly the same spot whence he and his father had fled to England. Two days later, William Frederic was sworn in as the sovereign of liberated Holland, and he became King William I of the Kingdom of the United Netherlands in 1815. The Revolution and the Napoleonic domination had a deep impact on Dutch history. During this period, Holland even ceased to exist geographically and politically as an independent state, when it was incorporated into the French Empire in 1810. The Dutch also suffered a severe economic crisis, especially after 1806, as a result of the Continental Blockade.
In this article, I examine the role played by Dutch fishermen in this era of turmoil and crisis. Fishing was an important economic activity in Holland with a long history, but the role played by Dutch fishermen in the Napoleonic Period has hardly been studied to date. Research into recently rediscovered police files dating from the Napoleonic era reveals that fishermen were significant players in the maintenance of (illegal) commodity and information networks. This was particularly the case for Rotterdam, given the city’s proximity to fishing communities and strong historical ties with the fisheries; as we shall see, Rotterdam seems to have been more resilient to the Blockade crisis than Amsterdam. Before examining the Dutch fishery in the Napoleonic period and its contribution to the local resilience of Rotterdam, I shall first provide a short overview of the revolutionary and Napoleonic Period and of the Dutch fishing sector.
The Netherlands in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era
The return of William Frederic with help of a fishing boat is the stuff of Dutch folklore and has long formed part of the national collective memory. Although the return was certainly of historic significance, from a historical point of view, the flight of William Frederic’s father and his abandonment of government in 1795 was crucial for the founding of the state. The flight of the Stadholder precipitated the Batavian Revolution, bringing an immediate end to the old Dutch Republic and heralding a period of fundamental reorganisation. In Dutch historiography, the period between 1795 and 1813 is known as the Batavian French Period. Within this, the years 1806–1813 form a special sub-period, the Napoleonic Period, during which the country was first a kingdom under Louis Bonaparte, Napoleon’s younger brother, and later, after July 1810, part of the French Empire. In this second phase of annexation or ‘incorporation’, Holland lost its independence altogether. The two successive authoritarian Napoleonic regimes after 1806 resumed and extended the process of unification and centralisation, that the Batavian Revolution of 1795 had set in motion. Although many of the reforms remained incomplete, it was in the Batavian French Period and, above all, in the Napoleonic years, that the foundations of the modern Dutch nation state were laid.
The Batavian French Period was also important from a economic point of view. Influenced by the ‘New Institutional Economics’, Dutch economic historians have described the institutional reforms of these years as a critical precondition for later economic growth in the Netherlands. 2 Paradoxically, the economic developments during the Batavian French Period itself were less impressive. In fact, agriculture was the only healthy sector, with increasing exports of Dutch dairy products and rising agricultural prices. However, overseas trade, which had been the mainstay of the economy of the Dutch Republic, suffered, especially after 1806, when the Continental System came into force. 3 Amsterdam, which had dominated the Dutch Republic politically and economically in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was hit particularly hard by the Blockade. The number of incoming ships in Amsterdam decreased rapidly to almost none during the years of Incorporation. Migration from Amsterdam increased, which contributed to a dramatic fall in the population, from more than 220,000 in 1795 to a little more than 180,000 in 1815. 4
The downfall of Amsterdam was of political and economic significance for the Netherlands. Politically, it unblocked the further growth of the nation state; and economically, a national market formed, with the relocation of economic activities to new areas of economic importance. In general, Dutch industry, which was tightly bound to seaborne commerce, also suffered in the Napoleonic years because of the Blockade, as did the Dutch North Sea fishery, which had once been a pillar of the Dutch Republic.
Dutch fisheries: Herring, cod and fresh fish
The foundations for the rise of the Dutch Republic were laid in the fifteenth century, especially in the western part of Holland and Zealand. It was at the beginning of that century that the Hollanders first developed full-rigged seagoing ships, which formed the basis of the bulk-carrying traffic. It was also in the early fifteenth century that the Dutch full-rigged herring buss evolved. The first records of this ship in Holland date back to the year 1417. 5 Aside from the new, efficient seagoing ships, another key element of the Dutch herring fishery was the technique of gutting, which was also introduced in Holland at the beginning of the fifteenth century. The herring was gutted and salted on board, creating a high-quality, non-perishable product that was efficiently packed in barrels. 6 The well-organised planning and efficient production methods made the Dutch herring fishery the ‘first modern fishery’ in the world. 7
The regulated salted herring fishery was the most significant sector of Holland’s fisheries, but it was certainly not the only one. Two other economically important branches were the cod fishery and the ‘fresh fishery’, which, like most of the regulated salted herring fishery, were both concentrated in the southern part of Holland. The cod fishery was initially based in Zealand, but from the sixteenth century onwards most cod fishers operated from ports in the Meuse estuary, in Holland. In the first half of the seventeenth century, the cod fishery was professionalised through the introduction of a new type of ship known as a hoeker. This name was derived from the Dutch word for hook, haak, and referred to the tackle that was used. Whereas herring live on a diet of plankton and can be caught in nets, cod is carnivorous and had to be caught with bait and a line. 8 From the first half of the seventeenth century, the cod fishery was almost entirely based in Vlaardingen and Maassluis, two fishing ports on the Meuse estuary in today’s Province of South Holland. In contrast to the herring fishery, which was temporarily brought to a halt in 1803, the cod fishery continued to operate under Louis Napoleon. In 1807, Louis decreed that fishing vessels operating in the cod fishery would be allowed to take extra fishing nets on board, in addition to stipulations in the ancient Fishery Law, which permitted cod fishermen to fish for herring to be used as bait. In effect, Louis’ decree sanctioned a backdoor method that was already being used by some fishermen to catch herring after the fishery had been suspended. 9
In addition to the herring and cod fisheries, the third branch was the so-called ‘fresh fishery’ or coast fishery. Here, fishermen used small, flat-bottomed fishing vessels and were mainly based in fishing villages in the western coastal area of Holland known in Dutch as de Zijde or ‘the Side’, particularly the coastal strip running from the Meuse estuary to north of The Hague. The main fishing villages were Noordwijk, Katwijk and Scheveningen. The flat-bottomed fishing boat, or bomschuiten, did not need harbour facilities, but could land anywhere on the beach. Fishermen from the Side specialised in catching haddock, flounders and sole, which they sold fresh at market. They also fished for herring, but the body that supervised the herring fishery strictly forbade them from gutting the herring and selling the product as salted herring. Instead, they smoked their fish and sold it as red herring (bokking). 10 Many of these fishermen specialised in red herring, which they caught on more extended sea voyages to the banks off Yarmouth on the English coast. These men would become the most active in illicit trade during the Napoleonic Period.
The Dutch fisheries in the Napoleonic Period
The Napoleonic Period was a time of turmoil for the Dutch fishery. Contrary to the image that is usually presented in the historiography, Louis Napoleon made a serious attempt to enforce the Blockade. Numerous decrees were issued, whose enforcement fell to a wide range of military and civilian authorities, including a newly introduced police organisation. In his decrees, Louis repeatedly closed Dutch harbours to all navigation. Fishermen were not permitted to communicate with crews of ships from England, the enemy. Despite his efforts, Louis failed. 11 The Dutch estuaries in the southwest and the north meant that it was impossible to close the harbours and the coast completely. Moreover, an effective enforcement of the Blockade was seriously hindered by rivalry between the different departments and offices charged with controlling navigation. Officially, the Ministry of Finance was responsible for the control of cargo, and the Ministry of Justice and Police for passengers and correspondence. In practice, their tasks and competencies overlapped, which resulted in frequent conflicts and friction at all operational levels. The French regime during the Incorporation was unquestionably more repressive than that of Louis Napoleon. In addition, the reins were tightened to enforce the Blockade. Ordinary sea trade, already almost non-existent after a total prohibition of neutral trade in 1809, came to a complete standstill. Smuggling was now repressed more systematically by the deployment of armed customs officials, who were provided with observation yachts and even small gunboats.
Following provisional regulations in 1810, a general regulation for the fishery in Holland was proclaimed in a decree of 25 April 1812. 12 In short, all fishermen needed a permit from the office of the ‘sea prefect’, Holland’s chief naval officer. As a result of the decree, the Navy administration replaced the police – which had been in charge since 1811 – as the leading authority for the inspection of the fishery. The police retained some powers with regard to the interrogation of fishermen suspected of illegal communication, but its authority in this field, too, was seriously reduced; much to the chagrin of the commissioner-general of police of Rotterdam, De Marivault, who was second in rank in the French police organisation in Holland and supervised the area formed by today’s Province of South Holland, including the Meuse estuary and the North Sea coast. 13 To a substantial degree, De Marivault’s reluctance to accept the dominance of the Navy was inspired by his doubts about the naval officials’ dedication to the cause. Indeed, many naval officials were Dutch, including the chief of the district of Rotterdam, Admiral Kikkert. Moreover, extensive powers of supervision were also given to locals, especially to boards of so-called ‘wise men’ and the maires, who were inclined to exculpate local fishermen. 14
In addition to the impediment of the Blockade, Dutch fishermen also had to cope with privateers and the English Navy. It is telling that the danger of the former exceeded that of the latter during most of the Napoleonic Period. In fact, the English Navy was remarkably generous towards Dutch fishermen, especially the fresh herring fishermen of the Side. In May 1810, the English Government officially stated that the order to the British Navy to confiscate all fishing ships belonging to France and her allies at sea did not apply to fresh fishery ships, which were chiefly Dutch. 15 According to some historians, the mildness of the English was due to the intervention of the Stadtholder William V, who had escaped to England with the help of a fisherman in 1795. 16 Whereas this aspect of the relations between the House of Orange and the fishermen of Scheveningen is interesting in itself, considerations of a practical and strategic nature seem to have been of greater importance in shaping English policy on this point. Dutch fishermen provided the English market with herring, and continuity in the supply of this staple food was welcomed during times of war. In addition, other products could also be traded relatively easily in this way. Fishermen were an important strategic source for military intelligence and could be used as intermediaries in the exchange of prisoners of war. Moreover, they were respected for the role they played in information networks.
The smuggling boom
Considering the imperfections of the Blockade and the mild stance of the English Navy towards the Dutch in practice, it will come as no surprise that illegal trade in English commodities and colonial products flourished during the Napoleonic Period. Although a systematic study of the Continental System in the Netherlands is still lacking, a wide range of records show that smuggling was extensive in this era. According to a memo by the Minister of Finance, Gogel, on smuggled goods intercepted in the Northern Netherlands in the autumn of 1809, more than six million pounds of coffee, four million pounds of sugar and 160,000 pounds of cotton were illegally imported through this part of the country in a timespan of just six weeks (between 15 October and 30 November). 17
Aside from the northern part of the Netherlands, where the shallow Wadden Sea provided a highway for smugglers, the southwest of what is today the Province of South Holland, particularly the North Sea coast and the Meuse estuary, and the Province of Zealand were major smuggling hubs. At the end of 1809, the police official Couilliboeuf was sent on a special mission to observe the practice of smuggling on the coast of South Holland, especially in the area around the Side. In his reports, Couilliboeuf complained about the total lack of control, and he emphasised that if he were in charge, he would easily be able to intercept smuggling goods to a value of one million guilders or even more within a mere three weeks’ time. 18 Other records confirm that smugglers could indeed earn dazzling sums of money. A merchant from the city of Groningen complained to the government about the unfair competition he suffered from less honest and obedient merchants, whose smuggling allowed them easily to earn half a million guilders within two or three weeks. 19 Another telling example is the attempt by Cornelis Cats, a merchant of Zealand, to bribe a customs official. Cats offered the functionary a one-off sum of 40,000 guilders and a share in future profits. 20 Much to Cats’ surprise, the official did not accept his offer, which was rather unusual. The French commander of the garrison in the port of Flushing, General Monnet, was less scrupulous. In September 1806, he was bribed with the sum of 200,000–300,000 guilders to let shipments of contraband pass in Zealand. 21
In general, the illegal trade operated in four ways: first, by the use of neutral flags or neutral ships; second, by national or ‘Frenchified’ trading vessels; third, by English ships, including English warships; fourth, by Dutch fishing vessels. The first method, the use of neutral flags or ships, was already a well-known practice during times of war. Many Dutch ships were instantly reflagged after Holland became involved in the war in 1795. Initially, Prussia, Denmark and some small independent territories in Northwest Germany, such as Papenburg, were important providers of neutral flags. After 1807, as a result of the outbreak of the War of the Fourth Coalition, the United States took the lead in neutral shipping. The neutral ships (or so-called neutral ships) were provided with false papers to prove the neutral origin of the cargo. There are many examples of smuggling by neutrals, such as the illegal import of large quantities of English manufactures in American ships, as reported to King Louis in March 1808. According to these reports, shops in Leiden and other cities in the west of Holland were flooded with contraband. 22
Compared to the contribution made by neutral ships, the role played by national Dutch merchant vessels, or Frenchified vessels after 1810, was probably of limited importance, although there are reports of Dutch merchants being involved in illegal trading activities. 23 Unlike the first method, which ceased to be operational after a complete ban on neutral shipping in 1809, the importance of this second method grew at the time of the Incorporation, as a result of the expansion of Napoleon’s licence system. In 1812 and 1813, the police made various reports about merchants who had requested licences and who were, according to the police, notorious smugglers. 24
Smuggling by English ships, the third method, was often conducted in combination with the fourth method, smuggling by Dutch fishermen. English warships cruised the North Sea in substantial numbers and were almost permanently close to the Dutch coast, meaning that they could often be seen clearly from the beach. We know of various reports, including a report by King Louis’ wife, Queen Hortense, who wrote in a letter to a friend that she dreamed about being taken hostage by a British naval commander to liberate her from her unhappy marriage and her life in Holland, which she detested. 25 English ships sometimes secretly anchored in hidden creeks of the Meuse estuary. There, they could put out their boats at night and row to land to unload their goods, or wait to be visited by local Dutch smugglers, who were often tipped off beforehand. The English ships used for smuggling included fishing vessels. In June 1812, the appearance of English fishing vessels off the coast near The Hague distressed the special police commissioner of that town. However, according to the above-mentioned commissioner-general of police, De Marivault, their coming was quite normal, because English fishermen traditionally crossed the sea to Holland once a year to catch halibut, a fish that was popular among the English. 26 Nevertheless, he recommended a tightening of the checks on smuggling. Smuggling was also carried out in old Dutch fishing ships – probably seized and confiscated – which were converted into special smuggling vessels. These ships were known as ‘smugglers’ or even ‘Dutch smugglers’, as they were named in police reports in October 1812. 27
The preferred English method of smuggling, however, was to cruise the North Sea with ships more or less randomly off the coast of Holland, in search of Dutch fishing vessels. Both sides could take the initiative for an encounter. In November 1808, a Dutch fisherman sailed to an English cutter, which he had spotted at sea, while hoisting a basket to the top of his mast as a sign that he wanted to make contact. The English captain tied a red flag to the gaff of his cutter in response. 28 Other reports mention the pursuit of Dutch fishing vessels by English warships at sea to force communication or to transfer passengers or goods to the fishermen. 29 Although the English policy was generally friendly towards the fishermen, with most encounters mutual and planned, fishermen still risked arrest and imprisonment in England and the confiscation of their ships.
Police files from the reign of Louis Napoleon and the Incorporation contain dozens of memos about this fourth method of smuggling, the illegal import of commodities and goods by Dutch fishermen. One of the earliest reports about smuggling in the Napoleonic Period concerns the landing of three fishing boats loaded with colonial products on the coast of South Holland in July 1806. 30 Two years later, in December 1808, the Minister of Justice and Police received a series of anonymous letters informing him of increasing smuggling activities among the fishermen of Katwijk, Noordwijk and Scheveningen. 31 Moreover, the extensive smuggling reported by the police officer Coulliboeuf, which was easily worth a million guilders, was certainly conducted by fishermen, most likely from the Side. Although the commissioner-general of police, De Marivault, was more focused on the illicit conveyance of passengers and correspondence, memos about the smuggling of colonial goods by fishermen continued to appear in the police records of 1811–1813. For example, the fishing crew of the fishing boat le Lièvre was sentenced to prison for illegally importing sugar in July 1813. 32
Smuggling took place more or less openly in broad daylight, as part of normal daily routine, with the forbidden goods concealed in fish baskets or herring barrels, or stowed in secret compartments in ships. 33 Smuggling also frequently took place on a more specialised basis, at night. The fishermen were assisted by helpers on land, such as the farmers in the surroundings of Maassluis in March 1809. 34 Further north, in Wijk aan Zee, a small fishing village in today’s Province of North Holland, local carters assisted the crew of the fishing boat Nooitgedagt after the fishermen had landed their vessel on the beach, late in the evening of 24 April 1809. 35
Unlike the practice of smuggling by neutral vessels, smuggling by fishing boats continued during the Incorporation, although it was not as considerable as it had been under Louis’ reign. Considering the absence of neutral shipping after 1809 and the limited significance of the regulated Napoleonic licence system, the role played by fishermen in the illegal transport of forbidden goods must have been extensive during the Napoleonic Period, in both an absolute and a relative sense.
The illegal transport of passengers, journals and mail
If the role played by Dutch fishermen in the smuggling of English manufactures and colonial goods was substantial, it was overwhelming when it came to the illegal transport of passengers and mail. The archive of the Minister of Justice and Police under Louis Napoleon contains a series of records in which numerous apprehensions of incoming ships and arrests of illegal passengers are registered. 36 Although the accompanying files have been lost, the extensive lists in the registers show that a huge number of passengers, letters, journals and other papers were transported by fishermen. Again, the police files of the commissioner general of police, De Marivault, demonstrate that the fishermen did not cease these activities after the annexation in 1810.
All of these records clearly demonstrate that the illegal transport of persons and correspondence from Holland to England and vice versa was immense during the Napoleonic Period. Voyagers from all over Europe – French, Russians, Italians, Austrians, Germans, etc – came to Holland to search for an opportunity to cross the North Sea to England, including many whose final destination was in the colonies or America. Holland was even the preferred travelling route for diplomats. In July 1809, in the midst of international political tensions, the Austrian diplomat Von Stahremberg travelled to England through Holland for an emergency meeting with the English Government. Napoleon was unpleasantly surprised, and the incident further worsened the relations between the brothers Bonaparte, which were already seriously under pressure at that time. 37
Fishermen dominated the illicit conveyance of travellers and correspondence. The transport of passengers and mail by neutral merchant vessels is only incidentally reported, and licensed ships started to provide a modest alternative only at the end of 1812. Illegal transport facilities for passengers were offered in the north of the Netherlands, in the Province of Friesland, but by far the most important location for travelling to England was the Side, especially the west coast of South Holland and the area of the Meuse estuary. It was not a coincidence that this was home to most of the Dutch fishermen who caught herring, cod and fresh fish. In his reports about smuggling, the notorious police official Coulliboeuf described, half-irritated and half-triumphant, the existence of a regular schedule of almost daily departures and arrivals of passengers to and from England, provided by fishermen. According to Coulliboeuf, the shore in this part of the Side was ‘as free as in times of peace’. 38
Other records contain detailed practical information about the voyage itself. If a traveller wanted to cross to England, he or she could try to make direct contact with a fisherman from Katwijk or Scheveningen, or another fishing village from the Side or the Meuse estuary. If they came to an agreement, the voyager could be hidden in the cabin during the night, while the ship was on the beach. 39 Direct contact could be difficult and risky for foreigners, however, and many preferred a more organised approach. The records reveal the existence of a remarkable, highly professional travelling system. Specialised travel agents organised collective trips and ran internationally known offices at inns and coffee houses, such as the Klein Schippershuis and Le Marechal de Turenne in Rotterdam. In March 1808, there was a raid on an illegal travel office in Rotterdam led by a merchant broker from that city, Jean Levasseur, and an Irish merchant, John Sleaven. Levasseur and Sleaven had offered their services to a group of seven travellers and a family with two children and a maid. All, with one exception, were foreigners. Some voyagers had paid their tickets in guineas, with an average of 85 guineas. Others had paid in guilders, with prices ranging from 100 to 500 guilders. A fishing ship belonging to a shipowner from Rotterdam had been rented for 1,600 guilders. The ship would be sailed from Rotterdam to England by a steersman from the same city, who would receive 400 guilders for his services. 40 This was rather good compensation compared to that received by the fishermen of Scheveningen, who were paid an average of 70 guilders by their employer, Faasen de Heer, for each trip to transport passengers to England. 41 The shipowner Faasen de Heer was also a clergyman and a notorious smuggler. Only scarce records of the prices of tickets and fares are available for the years of the Incorporation, but all indicate a sharp increase in the travelling costs. In September 1811, two English men were willing to pay 4,000 guilders for their crossing to England from the fishing port of Maassluis. 42 In comparison, the average annual wage earned by a craftsman in Holland was 230 guilders at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 43
Passengers travelling in the opposite direction, from England to Holland, could likewise be transported in secret compartments in ships or disguised as extra members of the crew. The transport of passengers, however, was done mostly at night, in secret. If the landing spot was safe – as established by the sailors on the ships, who exchanged whistle signals with helpers on land – the passengers were put in small rowing boats and dropped off in groups on the beach or in the dunes. 44 Besides sound signals such as whistling, visual signals such as smoke during the day and fire and light during the night, were also used to guide the boats to a safe landing place. 45 Locals, especially relatives, supported the illegal transport of passengers by fishermen. In October 1812, the mother of Arie van der Sluys even continued to give light signals to incoming boats on the Isle of Goeree after her son, suspected of smuggling, had to go into hiding for a while. 46 It is unclear whether travel agencies offered return trips from England to Holland in an equally organised way. However, records indicate the existence of official printed announcements to voyagers to Holland, with the departure times and places of Dutch vessels, in London in July 1811. 47
The illicit traffic of passengers was frequently combined with the illegal transport of papers, mainly journals and mail. The amount of correspondence was sometimes surprisingly large. Several thousand letters were discovered on board a fishing vessel from Katwijk in February 1809. 48 Other records report the discovery of official letters addressed to the Swedish ambassador in London, and even to the King of England, on a boat that was about to depart from Amsterdam in June 1808. 49 A regular service to transport journals and official mail, running from Katwijk to Harwich, was even operated by nine fishing vessels at the beginning of Louis’ reign. Louis secretly tolerated this service, but withdrew his support when his relationship with Napoleon rapidly deteriorated in October 1807. 50 The illegal transport of correspondence, however, continued to flourish. Much of the private correspondence concerned commercial affairs and was sent by or addressed to foreign bankers, merchants and trading houses. In July 1809, King Louis, then inclined to obedience, expressed his great disappointment to the Minister of Internal Affairs at the merchants of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Dordrecht, who were undermining the Blockade with their illegal commercial correspondence, the content of which he considered overly political. 51
The mail, papers, journals and, occasionally, political caricatures were concealed in all kinds of secret compartments in the ships: under the cabin floor, in double-bottomed compass boxes and in hollow spaces within the leeboards. 52 In August 1811, the commissioner of police in Scheveningen reported that the fishermen in his village were hiding letters for England in the folds of their hats. 53 His colleague in Vlaardingen reported similar findings in May 1813. He had discovered that some fishermen were wearing shoes with double soles, an innovative, although very limited, instrument for smuggling letters to England, it seems. In his letter, the police commissioner from Vlaardingen also mentioned that each letter was subject to a postage fee of 12 francs. 54
Transport and information hubs: The key role played by Rotterdam
Amsterdam, The Hague and, above all, Rotterdam were the main hubs in the networks for the illicit traffic of passengers and illegal transfer of correspondence. Rotterdam was explicitly described as a major town and the hub of all illegal correspondence in an anonymous report presented to the director general of police, Devilliers Duterrage, Holland’s most senior police official, in July 1811. 55 Rotterdam’s reputation as the centre of illegal trade, linchpin of the Napoleonic dark web of information and pivot in illicit international passenger traffic is confirmed by various records throughout the whole Napoleonic Period. The discovery of the travel agency run by Jean Levasseur and John Sleaven in 1808, mentioned above, is a case in point.
Rotterdam’s prominence in these networks was largely the result of its advantageous geographical position, which had impressed foreign visitors as early as the 1720s. 56 The city enjoyed an open connection with England by way of the North Sea, and possessed excellent harbour facilities. The isles and creeks of the Meuse estuary, not far from the city, offered great opportunities for secret ship arrivals and departures, and therefore for smuggling. In addition, Rotterdam was an important market and service centre, with a relatively large group of English merchants and merchant houses that had traditionally enjoyed strong ties with England, especially with London. Because of its relatively large English community, Rotterdam was nicknamed ‘Little London’ even before the eighteenth century. 57 Finally, Rotterdam still retained close ties with the fishing industry. The fisheries, especially the herring fishery, had been the major economic activity in Rotterdam down to the early seventeenth century, and Rotterdam had been the leading city (of five) within the ‘College van de Grote Visserij’ or College of the Great Fishery, the supervisory body of the herring fishery founded in the late sixteenth century. 58 Rotterdam had retained its strong position in the College until the end of the eighteenth century, notwithstanding the herring fishery’s replacement by trade as the primary local economic activity and the rise of the neighbouring towns of Vlaardingen and Maassluis as the most important centres for herring fishery in the early seventeenth century. The Batavian Revolution brought a formal and de facto end to Rotterdam’s position in the College of the Great Fishery, but many owners of fishing vessels, sailors and even fishermen still lived in the town during the time of the Kingdom of Holland and the Incorporation. 59
The active role played by Rotterdam’s merchants in illegal trade conducted by fishermen, especially in the illicit traffic of passengers and correspondence in the Napoleonic years, was evident on several occasions. Levasseur, who is repeatedly mentioned in the sources, was connected to the well-known Rotterdam merchants, Thomas Browne, Hudig, Blokhuyzen and Smeer. 60 In this respect, it is also telling that the latter intervened when a French privateer captured some English fishermen, who were subsequently detained in Rotterdam, in April 1810. Smeer feared English reprisals and asked the College to intervene for their liberty. 61 Various examples of the involvement of Rotterdam merchants in the illegal transfer of passengers and correspondence to and from England are also found in De Marivault’s records during the years of the Incorporation. In July 1812, a converted fishing vessel was found that seems to have been used for illegal communication by Roodbol and other merchants from Rotterdam. 62 Other suspected merchants named in De Marivault’s registers included Hudig, Blokhuyzen and Van der Eb; Kuyper, Van Dam and Smeer; and, less prominently, Haeton, Jager and Groenewoud. 63 Meanwhile, one of Rotterdam’s leading merchants, Anthony van Hoboken, worked closely with Varkevisser and Dorrepaal, two fishing vessel owners and notorious smugglers from Katwijk, when he commissioned his licensed ship the Courier at the beginning of 1812. 64 The commissioner-general of police was diligent in his handling of illegal communication until the end. One of his last police investigations concerned the skipper of a fishing vessel from Rotterdam, who had frequently sailed to England in the time of Louis Napoleon. 65 Finally, his last letter, dated 16 November 1813, ended with a call to the special commissioners of police in Middelharnis and Hellevoetsluis to be alert to all incidents in their districts, especially to ‘movements’ at sea. 66
The fishermen’s contribution to the local resilience of Rotterdam
Although trade and industry in Rotterdam generally suffered, as they did in Amsterdam, due to the Blockade in the Napoleonic years, the city remained remarkably resilient. Notwithstanding the impediments of the Blockade, several important industries, especially the sugar refineries, managed to stay in business. 67
The relocation of economic activity prompted by the erosion of Amsterdam’s dominance and a long-term structural change in European trade may explain the relatively good performance of Rotterdam. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the North-South orientated bulk trade, with the downward trade in Baltic grain and timber and the upward trade in herring, salt, wine and colonial goods, was increasingly replaced by an West-East orientated trade in a variety of goods, with a major role for English manufactures and a growing German market. This rotation of the European trade axis and the rise of England as the leading global power in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were especially beneficial to Rotterdam.
If these two causes formed part of long-term structural processes, the activities of fishermen in Rotterdam and its surroundings must have contributed substantially to the resilience of the city in the short period between 1806 and 1813. Fishermen were important carriers of goods and raw materials, such as sugar for the refineries. Even more importantly, they were the dominant suppliers of information and the leading mediators between the merchants of Rotterdam and their clients and associates beyond the Continent. The close presence of fishermen in the leading fishing centres of Vlaardingen and Maassluis, and in the area of the Side, must have been particularly important during the Incorporation, when the Blockade ultimately strangled Amsterdam. Amsterdam’s relations with the fisheries had traditionally been limited, and her position vis-à-vis the most important fishing centres was remote. Geographically, it was more closely related to the Zuiderzee, where illegal encounters between fishing boats and English vessels were practically impossible during the Napoleonic years. At that time of trouble and turmoil, the North Sea herring and cod fishermen of Vlaardingen, Maassluis and, above all, the fresh-fish fishermen of the Side, notably Scheveningen, Noordwijk and Katwijk, succeeded in keeping Rotterdam connected with England and the world market; accordingly, they boosted the strategic advantage and survival capacity of Rotterdam’s merchants.
Footnotes
1.
J. C. Vermaas, Geschiedenis van Scheveningen (2 vols, ‘s-Gravenhage, 1926), I, 304–20.
2.
Jan Luiten van Zanden and Arthur van Riel, The Strictures of Inheritance: The Dutch Economy in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, NJ, 2004), 5–6, 52–84.
3.
Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815 (Cambridge, 1997), 412, 685, 687; Kevin H. O’Rourke, ‘The Worldwide Economic Impact of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars’, NBR Working Paper Series, No. 11344 (2005), 17–8, 22–5, 36–7.
4.
Johan Joor, ‘Significance and Consequences of the Continental System for Napoleonic Holland, Especially for Amsterdam’, in Katherine B. Aaslestad and Johan Joor, eds., Revisiting Napoleon’s Continental System: Local, Regional and European Experiences (Basingstoke, 2015), 259–76.
5.
H. A. H. Kranenburg, De zeevisscherij van Holland in den tijd der Republiek (Amsterdam, 1946), 16.
6.
Christiaan van Bochove, ‘The “Golden Mountain”: An Economic Analysis of Holland’s Early Modern Herring Fisheries’, in Louis Sicking and Darlene Abreu-Feneira, eds., Beyond the Catch: Fisheries of the North Atlantic, the North Sea and the Baltic, 900–1850 (Leiden, 2009), 211–2.
7.
Bo Poulsen, Dutch Herring: An Environmental History, c.1600–1860 (Amsterdam, 2008), 112.
8.
J. P. van der Voort, Vissers van de Noordzee: het Nederlandse vissersbedrijf in geschiedenis en volksleven (‘s-Gravenhage, 1975), 12, 24.
9.
J. C. Vermaas, De haringvisscherij van 1795 tot 1813 (Vlaardingen, 1922), 69–71, 104.
10.
Van der Voort, Vissers, 22, 35.
11.
Johan Joor, ‘Le système continental et sa signification pour le Royaume de Hollande’, in Annie Jourdan, ed., Louis Bonaparte: Roi de Hollande (Paris, 2010), 131–44.
12.
‘Décret concernant les pêches de la morue, du hareng et du poisson frais dans les arrondissemens maritimes de Hollande et d’Anvers’, J. B. Duvergier, Collection Complète des Lois, Décrets, Ordonnances, Réglemens, et Avis du Conseil–d’État [. . . .] (158 vols, Paris, 1827), 18, 226–9.
13.
See, for example, the letter from De Marivault to Savary, Minister of General Police, 28 July 1812, Stadsarchief Rotterdam, Rotterdam (hereafter SAR), 386.1 [Register with copies of sent letters (to superior officials)], 1812 (Jan–Nov), no. 1614.
14.
See SAR, 386.1, no. 1530, De Marivault to Savary, 8 July 1812.
15.
Order in Council of 2 May 1810, cited in Vermaas, De haringvisscherij, 116–7.
16.
Vermaas, De haringvisscherij, 96–9.
17.
H. T. Colenbrander, Gedenkstukken der Algemeene Geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840 (10 vols, ‘s-Gravenhage, 1910), 5, xxxix, digitally available at Huygens ING, Resources Huygens ING, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/retroboeken/gedenkstukken/#page=36&accessor=toc&source=7 (accessed 21 March 2019).
18.
Nationaal Archief, Den Haag (hereafter NADH), 2.01.10.04 (Minister of Justice and Police), inv. no. 276 (secret-confidential report), 30 December 1809.
19.
Groninger Archieven, Groningen, 3 (Departemental Administrations, landdrost), 771 (incoming confidential letters), 20 December 1809.
20.
NADH, 2.01.10.04, inv. no. 272 (secret-confidential report), 1 April 1809.
21.
NADH, 2.01.10.04, inv. no. 259 (secret report), 22 September 1806.
22.
Letter from Johan Valckenaer to King Louis, 27 March 1808, in Colenbrander, Gedenkstukken 5, 404.
23.
See SAR, 386.1, no. 924, De Marivault to Réal, head of the First Police Arrondissement in Paris, 13 February 1812.
24.
SAR, 386.1, no. 1212, De Marivault to Savary, 14 April 1812; SAR, 386.1, no. 1797, De Marivault to De Stassart, prefect of Bouches-de-la-Meuse, 18 September 1812.
25.
T. Spaans-van der Bijl, Lodewijk Napoleon 1778–1846 (Zaltbommel, 1967), 145; Françoise Wagener, La reine Hortense (1992), 241.
26.
SAR, 386.4 [Register with copies of sent letters (to subordinates)], 1812 (Feb–Oct), no. 2477, De Marivault to Eymard, special commissioner of police in The Hague, 13 June 1812.
27.
SAR, 386.4, no. 3237, Circular of De Marivault to the special commissioners of police in The Hague, Hellevoetsluis and Middelharnis, 23 October 1812.
28.
Intercepted private letter of 19 November 1808, in NADH, 2.01.10.04, 366 (index secret–confidential report), 13 December 1808 and 272 (secret-confidential report), 13 December 1808 (43).
29.
See, for example, SAR, 386.1, no. 1314, De Marivault to Savary, 12 May 1812.
30.
NADH, 2.01.10.04, 351 (index report), 1 August 1806.
31.
Anonymous letter to Van Maanen, Minister of Justice and Police, 3 December 1808, NADH, 2.01.10.04, 366, 6 December 1808 and 262 (secret-confidential report), no. 39.
32.
SAR, 386.5 [Register with copies of sent letters (to subordinates)], 1812 (Oct)– 1813, no. 4917, De Marivault to Marcandier, special commissioner of police in Middelharnis, 13 August 1813.
33.
SAR, 386.1, no. 1585, De Marivault to Savary, 18 July 1812; SAR, 386.3 [Register with copies of sent letters (to subordinates)], 1811 (May)–1812 (Jan), no. 922 (converted fishing ship), De Marivault to Pasquier, Navy commissioner in Rotterdam, 16 November 1811.
34.
NADH, 2.01.10.04, 364 (index secret report), no. 5, Notification of the head of the Police Division of the Department of Justice and Police, 13 March 1809.
35.
Noord-Hollands Archief, Haarlem, 13 (Departemental Administrations, landdrost), 341 (index report), 6 May 1809 and 256 (report), no. 3, Letter from the bailiff of Brederode to the landdrost of the Department Amstelland, 6 May 1809.
36.
See NADH, 2.01.10.04, especially 351–355 (indexes on the reports), 1806–1810. These registers contain extended lists of incidents in categories such as ‘Apprehensions of ships and passengers’, ‘Illegal trade’, etc.
37.
NADH, 2.01.10.04, 366, 4 and 6 August 1809. Another name mentioned was that of Von Sternberg, a German envoy (Wurttemberg). See also F. Rocquain, Napoléon 1er et le Roi Louis: d’après les documents conserves aux archives nationales (Paris, 1875), 204.
38.
NADH, 2.01.10.04, 276, 22 December 1809, 280.
39.
SAR, 386.5, no. 1811, De Marivault to the commissioner of police in Katwijk, 14 October 1811.
40.
See the judicial files of this case in NADH, 3.03.01.01 (Court of Justice), 5639, (criminal files), especially interrogations with attachments of various persons suspected of the illicit transport of passengers to England, 1808, nos. 4–7.
41.
Haags Gemeentearchief, Den Haag, 0351–01 (judicial archives), 878 (criminal files), Interrogatory of Maarten Kol, 30 June 1808.
42.
SAR, 386.3, no. 571, De Marivault to Coulliboeuf, commissioner of police in Maassluis, 19 September 1811.
43.
See Marco H. D. van Leeuwen, Bijstand in Amsterdam, ca. 1800–1850: Armenzorg als beheersings- en overlevingsstrategie (Zwolle, 1992), 200.
44.
SAR, 386.4, no. 26, De Marivault to the special commissioners of police, 22 July 1812, 96.
45.
SAR, 386.4, no. 2839 (smoke signal), De Marivault to Eymard, 17 August 1812; SAR, 386.5, no. 4787 (light signals) De Martivault to Eymard, 20 July 1813.
46.
SAR, 386.4, no. 3146, De Marivault to Marcandier, 7 October 1812.
47.
SAR, 386.3, no. 279, De Marivault to the special commissioners, 25 July 1811; see also SAR, 386.1, no. 1530 (‘Les entrepreneurs de transport de passagers de Londres en Hollande reprennent leurs opérations’), De Marivault to Savary, 8 July 1812.
48.
NADH, 2.01.10.04, 272, 23 February 1809, no. 65.
49.
Elisabeth Kluit, Cornelis Felix van Maanen: tot het herstel der onafhankelijkheid, 9 september 1769–6 december 1813 (Groningen, 1954), 251.
50.
For information about this service, which was operational from September 1806 until October 1807, see NADH, 2.01.10.04, 361 (index secret report), geheime correspondentie, 29 July, 6, 8, 16 and 23 August 1808 etc, and additional files in 259–265 (secret reports).
51.
NADH, 2.01.12 (Interior Affairs), 839 (Minutes of secret records), 18 July 1809.
52.
SAR, 386.3, no. 798, De Marivault to commissioners of police in coast villages (warning about double-bottomed compass boxes); SAR, 386.3, no. 862, De Marivault to the commissioner of police in Middelharnis, 8 November 1811 (secret compartments); SAR, 386.4, no. 3222 (‘caricatures anglaises’), De Marivault to Buys ‘t Hooft, commissioner of police Dordrecht, 21 October 1812; see also Vermaas, Scheveningen, 300 (leeboard).
53.
SAR, 386.3, no. 403, De Marivault to Van Alphen, commissioner of police Scheveningen, 18 August 1811.
54.
SAR, 386.5, no. 4532, De Marivault to the commissioner of police Vlaardingen, 29 May 1813.
55.
NADH, 2.21.114 (personal archive C.F. van Maanen), 54 (reports to the director-general of police [. . .]) Anonymous report to Devillier Duterage, undated (11 July 1811).
56.
Arie van der Schoor, Stad in aanwas: Geschiedenis van Rotterdam tot 1813 (Zwolle, 1999), 315.
57.
P. W. Klein, ‘Little London: British merchants in Rotterdam during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’, in D. C. Coleman and P. Mathias, eds., Enterprise and History: Essays in Honour of Charles Wilson (Cambridge, 1984), 116.
58.
H. A. H. Kranenburg, De zeevisscherij van Holland in den tijd der Republiek (Amsterdam, 1946), 75–80; J.G. van Dillen, Van Rijkdom en Regenten: handboek tot de economische en sociale geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens de Republiek (‘s-Gravenhage, 1970), 239–43; and Van der Schoor, Stad in aanwas, 196.
59.
For the College, see Vermaas, De haringvisscherij, 5, 51; and Poulsen, Dutch herring, 44.
60.
NADH, 3.03.01.01, 5639, nos. 4 and 6.
61.
Vermaas, De haringvisscherij, 116.
62.
SAR, 386.4, no. 2708, De Marivault to Lançon commissioner of police (of the harbour) Rotterdam, 23 July 1812.
63.
In various places, but see SAR, 386.1 21 January (845), 13, 14 and 18 February (923, 930 and 955) and 1 May (1264) 1812; and 386.2 [Register with copies of sent letters (to superior officials)], 1812 (Nov)–1813 (Nov), 5 December (2167) 1812.
64.
SAR, 386.1, 4 April 1812 (1172), De Marivault to Eymard (sic!),. Varkevisser and Dorrepaal had run the above-mentioned regular service from Katwijk to Harwich in the days of King Louis.
65.
SAR, 386.5, no. 5163, De Marivault to the commissioners of police Rotterdam, 24 October 1813.
66.
SAR, 386.5, no. 5274.
67.
M.C. ‘t Hart, Hilde Greefs, ‘Sweet and Sour: Economic Turmoil and Resilience of the Sugar Sector in Antwerp and Rotterdam, 1795–1815’, BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review, 133 (2018), 3–26.
