No dockers,no empire. The labour question at Dakar during World War I

The port of Dakar: An infrastructure for a colonial empire

The port of Dakar was conceived as a colonization bridgehead for the French Empire on the African continent. Senegal was the oldest French colony in West Africa and had developed an economic role as a privileged slave export centre with major slave markets at Saint-Louis and Gorée. ¹¹ Construction work in the Bay of Dakar began in the late 1850s when the slave trade ended and the first regional transatlantic steamship lines were established. ¹² At the same time, the conquest of the Senegalese hinterland started under the leadership of General Faidherbe. ¹³ By 1880, Dakar emerged as the main maritime centre in Senegal, with key political, economic and military institutions established there. The port was intended specifically to be an imperial gateway for building the colonial state and developing an integrated economic structure dependent on metropolitan interests. ¹⁴ Located on the Cape Verde Peninsula, the Bay of Dakar was in an outstanding position to dominate both foreland and hinterland. It is important to note that the ideological underpinning of French imperialism proposed by Paul Leroy-Beaulieu was an elaboration of the ‘Ricardian’ thesis of trade specialization, which served to consolidate the economic model developed at Senegal and the entire FWA. ¹⁵

In addition, some authors argue that the French chose Dakar as a capital port-city to escape from the African powers (merchant princes, sérignes and métis) that were firmly embedded in the historical trading centres of Saint-Louis and Rufisque. ¹⁶ Although Rufisque continued to be the main export centre until the 1930s, Dakar emerged as the leading regional seaport in the late 1880s. The hierarchical status of Dakar was mainly based on its outstanding navigational qualities and its land expansion potential. The port was designed to serve the inland transport infrastructures developed in Senegal. Thus, imports in hardware, construction materials, coal, firearms and powder, machinery and foodstuffs, rapidly increased Dakar’s cargo throughput. However, exports were limited to coal delivery until the interwar period when the French decided to concentrate the region’s seaborne trade at the FWA capital.

Likewise, the early establishment of major coaling companies, and the expansion of regional coaling depots, which provided bunkers for the main international steamship lines, increased the strategic importance of Dakar in an Atlantic context. ¹⁷ As Daniel Headrick noted, steamship companies, coal bunkering and related stopover services were the main tools of the maritime empires in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. ¹⁸ Political, economic and military hegemony in Senegal was also supported by the opening of the first railway line in 1885, which joined Dakar and Saint-Louis through the groundnut fields located in the Cayor Region. Rail transport definitively transformed Dakar’s economic role and its regional predominance. The seaborne import trade focused on the new seaport. Coal traffic, for instance, rose notably: in 1889, a total of 28,703 tons of coal were handled and in 1900 the equivalent figure was 50,796 tons. ¹⁹ In 1904, the Welsh-Brazilian Wilson and Sons coaling company was established in Dakar under the name of ‘Compagnie Française des Charbonnages de Dakar’. This fostered port activity, which grew rapidly until the eve of the Great War. Another important coaling company – Le Sénégal (most of the shareholders were Italian) – was established in 1913 to bunker Italian transatlantic companies. The construction of the Naval Base in 1898, where an arsenal and a dry dock were built, was a significant development. The agglomeration process included a political choice: in 1902, the FWA capital was moved from Saint-Louis (it remained the capital of the colony of Senegal) to Dakar, which now led an immense Federation. ²⁰

The increasing economic and political importance of Dakar as the nerve centre of the colonial state required an abundant and cheap workforce. Local populations (lébous) were hired early on by the colonists as labourers for public works, such as the construction of the first port infrastructures. ²¹ As the port expanded, an increasing number of workers arrived in the city in search of job opportunities. These workers came from the inner regions of the Cayor (oulofs), Fatick (sérere), the French Soudan, nowadays Mali (bambara), where the most productive cash-crop areas were concentrated. During these first stages of building the colonial state, urban activity required low-skilled and unskilled workers for basic tasks such as stevedoring, cargo handling, road building and other public and private work. At the port level, most of those unskilled workers were hired by the day, depending on the state of the labour market.

However, as will later be explained, worker availability was irregular as it was related to the agricultural cycles and native household economic strategies. ²² Compulsory work (corvées) was virtually non-existent for natives born in the Cercle of Dakar, as it was for the rest of Senegal outside the four historic communes (Saint-Louis, Gorée, Rufisque and Dakar). It meant that French citizens of the four communes were not competent to carry out corvée work. However, other coercion labour regimes existed in the FWA as forced migration, requisition, penal labour or the compulsory conscription to the seconde portion du contingent. ²³

Hence, urban workers had to be ‘attracted’ by private companies and the public sector, and engaged on a fairly regular basis. Low wages were not a sufficient incentive for them; however, in comparative terms, urban wages (even for those engaged in casual jobs) were higher than the economic benefits obtained in the countryside. In addition, the colonial policies of domination and the tax revenue imperative forced native people to obtain cash and it could be earned by selling cash-crop products or by working in the formal economy. ²⁴ Thus, urban workers in Dakar also engaged in rural household activity that required mobility throughout the year. This mobility strategy, which was an economic choice made by natives, was misunderstood by colonial rulers, who aimed to fix the workforce in the urban context as a way of reducing labour and transaction costs, and thus increasing returns. For the maritime and shipping sectors, it was a key issue due to the strategic role played by Dakar in the operations of the French Navy and merchant fleet. During the steamship age, gangs of workers needed to be ready to bunker vessels or handle cargoes. In those times, dock workers around the world were an irregular labour force, and instability and an indefinite status gave them specific features as labourers. ²⁵ The legal status of African and metropolitan differed, especially in terms of general rights like unionism or striking, which were forbidden in FWA until 1936. Thus, the existence of a permanent staff force at the docks was crucial for the port to expand and the colonial economy to be sustained.

This was true during the long nineteenth century, and even more dramatically so throughout the First World War. If no native workers were available at the appropriate time to attend vessels, bunker coal and handle cargoes, then the port would be unable to serve the economic interests of the colonial state. Without port activity, the imperial economy would simply collapse. The Great War increased this problematic situation at the port. The workforce evacuated the berths because of the war. In addition, the shipbrokers and the handling companies increased the wages earned by these labourers in relative terms as a way of attracting workers on a regular or semi-permanent basis. ²⁶ Senegalese dockers also developed collective defensive strategies in order to improve their labour conditions, challenging the basic functioning of the colonial structure. However, to oppose them, the port companies demanded a significant auxiliary contingent from the colonial state (second portion du contingent), a militarized workforce composed of natives formally established in 1926. Thus, colonial rulers faced a key question: should they hire by coercion or hire by providing potential prospective benefits, including fidelity, specialization and stable incomes.

The war state in Senegal: Dakar as a safe place for the Allied Navy

The First World War represented a milestone in the consolidation of the colonial state in Senegal. The main transport infrastructure (seaport and Sudan’s railway system) was almost completed and colonial rule extended its influence into the hinterland. The extensive enlistment of black African colonial troops (tirailleurs sénégalais) in the French territories was another key influence on the configuration of the workforce, both in rural and urban areas. In addition, in 1914, the first anti-colonial actions, such as boycotts against the main European companies, were carried out in Dakar as an organized and structured response to Blaise Diagne’s election to the French National Assembly. ²⁷ Thus, although the major battlefields were far from Senegal, the colony was a key tool for French and British maritime defensive policies in the mid-Atlantic theatre. ²⁸ Like all the West African colonies, the FWA territories were suppliers of commodities such as groundnuts, coffee, gum, oil and other items that were required by European economies. However, the outbreak of war transformed the nature of maritime freights in West Africa, so that key commodities, decided by the French and British admiralties, were given priority. ²⁹ The official trade records (Annuaires Statistiques) show that, until 1916, port activity at Dakar and the main export seaports was relatively normal in terms of cargo mix (volume and value). At Dakar, in that year, the imports of hardware, foodstuffs and other cargo significantly declined. The same goes for the main commodities exported, such as groundnuts, timber and oil commodities. War negatively impacted groundnut exports at Rufisque, the second port of FWA and leading outlet for groundnuts. The small steamships and sailing vessels that transhipped groundnuts from there to Dakar ceased to operate, and port warehouses were filled with local cash-crop products.

Hence, the economic consequences of the war soon affected the regional productive structure in two ways. First, thousands of young men were recruited from the four corners of FWA to serve mainly as a defensive force on the African continent and as an expendable contingent in European battlefields. In an economy based on intensive labour, agricultural production declined rapidly, which led to a dearth of basic foodstuffs for the civilian population. ³⁰ Second, the restrictions on maritime freights (inbound and outbound routes) massively affected the trade price structure, while limitations on cargo space reduced cash-crop exports, which had been buoyant during 1914 and 1915.

On the other hand, warfare increased the value of imports and the market price of basic products in high demand, such as imported rice. The cumulative effects of declining prices paid to the African producers of cash-crop productions, the drop in agrarian productivity and the increasing price of basic imports deeply affected the welfare of local populations. As Lakroum has argued, it was the first time that Senegalese rural households were dramatically and massively affected by colonial economic dependenc. ³¹ Westland recently found quantitative evidence of the economic difficulties for urban workers in Dakar. ³² In addition, as Young suggested, the consolidation of the colonial state in Africa on the eve of the Great War, represented the beginning of its decline and the rise of several forms of native resistance.

In terms of maritime military strategy, the role played by Senegal and its main harbour was essential from 1916 and remained so until the end of 1918. Dakar was transformed into the main regional coaling station for the British and French navies, after major regulations were introduced on the movement of vessels in response to the menace of German vessels. Similarly, these preventive policies, such as the interdiction of navigation at night or the establishment of a visual flag code, were introduced at Freetown (Sierra Leone), which also shared strategic functions for the Allies in terms of bunkering and ammunition supply. The first coaling agreements between France and Britain on West Africa were signed in June 1916 in which the tax-free distribution of coal was assured for both countries at Dakar and Freetown. Later, on 21 November 1916, the main regional coaling companies (Wilson and Sons, Cory Brothers, Miller & Cory, The Atlantic Coaling Company and Elder Dempster) signed an agreement with the French and British admiralties to regulate and coordinate the distribution of coal supplies at Dakar and Freetown. ³³ These agreements reinforced the logistical capacity of Dakar, where important installations were developed under the authority of the colonial government to meet the demands for the increased number of war vessels. For example, coal imports rose from 184,410 tons in 1914 to 544,261 tons in 1917. ³⁴ Figures notably decreased during 1918 because of the shipping restrictions imposed by Germany along the West African coast from the Canary Islands to Sierra Leone.

The question arises as to how the port community of Dakar was able to provide an efficient service during the war to fulfil the agreements signed with the British. How did native workers and colonial institutions devise acceptable measures that enabled them to provide substantial coal supplies into Dakar? Bearing in mind that most of the labour depended on the skills and strength of native workers due to the very limited number of mechanical devices at the docks, it was crucial to manage the workforce to achieve the economic and military goals of the colonial rulers. The continuity of a low-wage structure for these workers was not enough to attract them to hard, physical jobs. Furthermore, African workers knew that the imperial port companies and the entire colonial economic structure depended on them . . . and they did not want to waste this opportunity window.

No men to work: The Great War and the Senegalese dockers

Up to 1931, port equipment was relatively undeveloped in technological terms, as the Port Administration remarked in its annual report. Most of stevedoring tasks were achieved through the intensive use of the workforce. In terms of coal bunkering, the Compagnie Française des Charbonnages de Dakar (Wilson and Sons subsidiary company), one of the main suppliers established in 1898, did not introduce any mechanical devices until 1926. On the other hand, the Italian French company, Le Sénégal (established in 1913), introduced technical improvements early, such as a Ménada system (floating coaling structure), which increased returns in terms of coal bunkered. ³⁵ Thus, the workforce was crucial for handling all kinds of cargo to sustain the main port function of Dakar until the 1930s – its role as a stopover station for French and international shipping lines.

Most dock workers were recruited as daily labourers (informal hiring) by the private companies. The public administration also hired this kind of worker as labourers, although it also had a semi-permanent complement of low-skill and unskilled workers, including sailors, stevedores and sweepers from 1911 onwards. Most workers lived close to the port, mainly in Medina, the African neighbourhood created by the French in response to the 1914 yellow fever outbreak. ³⁶ They were emigrants from the inner regions who settled there temporarily and were forced to live precariously. Living conditions were hard and daily wages too low for individual needs. The workers relied on their existing social, cultural and family links, which meant they could share risks and expenditures because most of them continued to be tied to their rural households. ³⁷ Thus, the economic goal for these labourers was clear: to work for a while in the city during the export season and then go back home to prepare the next crop. Profits from the urban work would be invested in agricultural improvements, purchasing of livestock or marriage preparations, which would represent social promotion and public recognition in their respective communities. ³⁸ This labour structure prevailed over time. In 1936, Charles Morazé stated during a stay at Dakar that the ‘docks were silent, and nobody was there during the planting and harvest seasons’. ³⁹ Considering that Dakar was one of the most important seaports in West Africa, the shortage of stevedores and dockers during the agricultural seasons was a large obstacle for the port companies. This was true during peacetime, but escalated dramatically when the Great War broke out.

However, the pronounced shortage of workers did not begin until 1917, when the enlistment policy of the colonial rulers increased the pressure on the supply of men. Male workers in Senegal, both in the urban and country areas, literally disappeared in order to avoid the quota of soldiers that each village needed, recruited through the decisive intervention of local chiefs who also were responsible for collecting taxes (head, livestock and hut taxes). This recruitment policy required the decisive intervention and political cooperation of Senegal’s representative, Blaise Diagne, who also negotiated an improved supply chain for the Senegalese people who began to be deeply affected by hunger due to the economic crisis precipitated by war. Nevertheless, the fear of being enlisted and shipped to Europe drove people to run away, with many seeking protection in other neighbouring colonies under British rule. This painful situation was described by the General Governor, Joost Van Vollenhoven, the top political representative of the French Republic in FWA in his annual report:

Naming the tirailleurs recruitment, we have introduced a man hunt even more terrible than those that were part of the slave expeditions (. . .) our political action has not made progress but rather a setback (. . .) we dream in vain that our policies did not cause incoherence and disorganization (. . .) We found a primitive organization, I consider it as mediocre, but we have replaced it with nothing; we replaced hierarchy with anarchy. ⁴⁰

Public awareness of the conflict involving the port workforce began during the spring of 1918. Workers deserted their workplaces and increased their economic demands from employers. M. Antoni, top inspector of maritime affairs at Dakar, warned the Navy Commandant of the troubles generated by the labour shortage and the existence of a real auction market where wages tended to increase:

These labourers are engaged in the morning and they leave the workplace to go to other companies that offer them higher wages (. . .) the workforce shortage is not the only reason for this. I have noticed that many companies are paying even six or seven francs per day. These amounts are excessive, and the most evident consequence of these very high wages is that native workers have their subsistence assured for two or three days so they only work one day out of two or three. Thus, the workforce performance is defective. ⁴¹

The colonial inspector noted the insufficiency of labourers and how they decided to be hired depending on the labour conditions, including wages and other allowances. It was the first time the colonial officers at Dakar had faced this problem. In the same letter, the inspector suggested policies to be explored by the General Government. First, creation of a permanent staff of professional ‘dockers’ that assured the availability of a workforce for the Navy. Second, the establishment of an official board of wages to be immediately applied by the private operators to push down wages, with workers hired daily, fixing them to the workplace. Some days later, B. Bonnier, the General of the FWA Division, reported that vessels were being re-routed from Dakar to Freetown as there was an insufficient service due to the lack of workers. The 1916 inter-allied agreement clauses were threatened at Dakar. As a solution, he introduced the necessary replacement of free labourers by soldiers and compulsory workers treated under military regulations. It seems that it was not only a matter of ‘sauvegarder les intèrêts supérieurs de l’État’, but a way to hamper the collective organization of Senegalese workers:

It is true that many workers are available at Dakar, but their goodwill is becoming more demanding every day as they only need to work for a couple of days due to the excessive wages they claim, living with these wages during the month (. . .) this behavior seems to me as intolerable and compulsory measures should be introduced in order to solve the troublesome situation caused by the shortage of the workforce. ⁴²

Thus, compulsory work and the militarization of the workforce were political choices proposed by some officials as an appropriate remedy for solving the situation. A similar crisis was evident at Rufisque, which was the main groundnut export terminal for the whole FWA. African workers refused to be hired by European companies if wages did not increase. However, the regiments of tirailleurs were also insufficient. At the end of June 1918, 4,000 men formed the military contingent at Rufisque and there were around 10,000 new young recruits at Ouakam (a neighbourhood on the outskirts of Dakar), who were destined for Europe and other African territories. Officials stated that true surveillance of platoons was almost impossible, and desertions notably increased among the ranks. In addition, the number of native sub-officers was insufficient to keep order: one sergeant and four corporals for every 100 privates. ⁴³ Thus, if so many civil workers were mobilized, who would work in the countryside? And even more importantly, who would pay the taxes that sustained the colonial state’s political structure? Hence, the revenue imperative thesis proposed by Waijenburg is relevant to this case. ⁴⁴

Major disturbances continued throughout July 1918 when the first rains began to flood the Senegalese fields at the start of the wet season. Officials reported a massive run of workers despite the efforts made by foremen to keep them at Dakar. They rapidly quitted the city to join their extended families in the countryside to begin planting. No less than 100 soldiers from the seconde portion du contingent were mobilized, but fewer than 50 were effectively hired at the docks due to the difficulties in keeping the platoons together. ⁴⁵ The Dakar Chamber of Commerce demanded that an increased number of workers should be mobilized from the entire FWA (including Krumen populations from the Ivory Coast and Liberia) to work at the port of Dakar. As the economic activity of the colony was affected and directly controlled by the Government, the private operators demanded full state intervention in the port labour market, with specific measures to attract, and keep, fixed workers to the quays. Employers considered the possibility of offering basic housing for these imported workers in acceptable health conditions. Accordingly, if foreign African workers joined in large numbers, they would be accommodated properly to prevent the outbreak of epidemic diseases. Representatives of private companies proposed accommodating such labourers in former barracks close to the port so that both the private and public sectors could profit from their work. ⁴⁶ Moreover, they insisted on the need for workers to be shared among the private and public sectors. This advice was partially retained by the Service of Economic Affairs of FWA that scheduled the construction of a couple of caravansérails (traditional temporary shelters) for foreign workers close to the harbour. The FWA Governor asked the French Consul at Monrovia to hire 500 krumen to complete the demand for workers by the French Navy, the Maritime Transit Service and the private sector. These krumen workers arrived at Dakar in September 1918. ⁴⁷

Such mobilized workers were added to others recruited directly from the entire Senegal colony by the colonial Government of Saint-Louis under specific conditions. After several discussions in the economic cabinet about the need to accomplish inter-allied coaling agreements, the FWA Government officially fixed the overall labour conditions for these workers at the port of Dakar from July 1918. Workers would be hired for six months in groups (gangs) of 25 men under the control of an African foreman. These workers usually shared family and cultural linkages, so their integration would be relatively easy. Wages for labourers were fixed at three francs per day (75 francs per month) and foremen earned between 125 and 150 francs per month. If we consider the average wages paid by the public sector at the port of Dakar for the period 1915–1920, these wages were relatively high. The average wage for unskilled workers at the Port of Dakar was 1.96 francs per day and wages for low-skilled labourers reached 3.05 francs per day. ⁴⁸ Hence, wages for these workers represented an increase of 53 per cent compared to the average wages paid for unskilled workers during the period. The difference with the earnings of low-skilled workers was negligible due to the existence of a food allowance. Following the official closed budgets, for the workers hired directly by the Port (public sector) these allowances were progressively introduced during the second half of the 1920s (e.g., food, accommodation, and family allowances). Their wages were complemented by daily food allowances composed of 700 grams of rice and 400 grams of meat/fish, salt and oil. In addition, the public administration also granted free basic accommodation and relatively unlimited health protection at work. Lastly, these workers and foremen were exempt from military service. Such hiring conditions meant that bunkering tasks were fulfilled, and workers had an appropriate social profile guaranteed by the foremen. ⁴⁹ However, from 1917, the average wage paid by the private sector for unskilled workers reached four francs per day (five if they worked at night), but no other allowances were received. In addition, workers could be fired without compensation or prior notice. ⁵⁰

Once the General Government announced these working conditions to every regional and local colonial administration, they received a rapid response. ⁵¹ Colonial administrators from the inner and most impoverished regions, such as Saldé, Matam and Bakel, began to organize gangs under the close control of local foremen who also played a key role as controllers of social behaviour. ⁵²

Compulsory . . . but incomplete institutional changes

The path from coercion to compensation – building on the arguments proposed by Juif and Frankema ⁵³ – entailed institutional changes in labour policies at Dakar. The specificities of port labour demanded stability and efficiency in stevedoring activities. As the port represented the head and heart of the colony, port services were essential for the functioning of the entire economic system. However, port labourers (as in France) did not form part of a specific group of workers identified as specialists hired on a permanent or semi-permanent basis by the shipbrokers, the Navy and the coaling companies. Colonial authorities therefore faced the dilemma of creating a conscious urban working class with specific labour rights, and they needed to calculate their labour market intervention carefully in order to retain the political status quo. The introduction of social regulations that benefited workers was therefore limited to wartime, as the Civil Affairs service stated in September 1918:

The first of these Acts has as the main goal the availability and engagement of native workers for stevedoring tasks by the public services and private companies. They will load and unload cargoes for France and its Allies. Hence, these regulations are only applied during wartime and they are the consequence of the national needs which justify the administrative intervention. ⁵⁴

Certainly, these measures would not survive the 1918 Armistice. ⁵⁵ Nevertheless, projected and unfinished institutional changes in Senegal meant that social, economic and political issues converged. The Great War crisis definitively permitted a new understanding of an overlooked situation regarding dock labour at Dakar. Although it was not admitted by colonial rulers, it was necessary to constitute a specific labour category of dock workers that were clearly differentiated (chiefly for the coal services) from the unskilled African loaders. However, naval authorities refused to extend the social labour benefits proposed by the General Government, arguing that the wages and different allowances the Navy and the private sector would have to pay were a heavy economic load. Economic benefits from compulsory work and the mobilization of worker battalions were more important for the army. ⁵⁶ Moreover, the Maritime Intendancy aimed to introduce amendments to the General Government's proposal, including restrictions on the payment of wages on non-working days, which must be chosen by the companies. The Intendancy also aimed to reduce the health protection (i.e., medical treatments) to a maximum length of 45 days. ⁵⁷

Workers from the inner regions of Senegal arrived at Dakar throughout September. They were accommodated in military barracks and the existing caravansérails (traditional shelters). Nevertheless, although the authorities surveyed the workers’ health conditions, some cases of yellow fever were detected. To isolate sick labourers and prevent the outbreak of epidemic diseases, the General Government increased its control over the living conditions of workers. Housing and food were key issues and sanitary inspections increased. Despite the existence of compelling evidence that these labour codes were applied during the war, it seems clear that the colonial administration explored compensation measures that would benefit the stability of the colonial economic and political structures:

We should not forget that those workers who benefit from these conditions would create – through the spirit they are bound to acquire working in our port – a movement of positive opinion through their relatives and this should not be underestimated, or its further effects negated. ⁵⁸

Labour compensation was therefore one of the best ways to attract the workforce to meet the demand of the colonial private and public sectors. If the colonial state was able to provide appropriate conditions for them, Senegalese people would naturally accept their political submission:

They must be treated firmly but with justice and avoiding brutality. The compulsory engagement should be limited to the first gangs and we must make efforts to attract the natives living in our Senegal to freely join the workplace: doing that, we would have an abundant, loyal and sufficient workforce required for the development and expansion of the maritime and commercial traffic of Dakar. ⁵⁹

Colonial ideology is clearly condensed in this statement. African people were represented as a peuple-enfant who should be educated under colonial rule. Thus, work (free or compulsory) represented the civilizing mission. ⁶⁰ In addition, the institutional shifts – contingency reaction – adopted during the Great War precluded the colonial policies to be implemented in the aftermath of the war, when Sarraut’s herculean plan was the most representative. ⁶¹

However, these regulations were not applied during the 1920s and 1930s, despite some changes to the overall regional and local labour regulations, such as the indigenous labour codes of 1925 and 1926. Port labourers continued to be considered as a non-specific class of worker, as informal labourers who came to the wharves seeking short-term incomes before returning to country households. It was one of the main reasons why these workers did not benefit from specific status as dockers. Permanent workers directly hired by coaling companies and shipbrokers were classified into different categories set by the colonial administration. On the contrary, port labour continued to be unregulated and there were no specific conditions until the 1970 presidential decree signed by Léopold Sédar Senghor. This new labour code specified the nature of dock work and specific features related to wages, allowances and public insurance. This decree supposed the legal emergence of a new class of worker in Senegal: the docker. ⁶²

Nevertheless, the colonial government presented new dock labour regulations in October 1918 after discussions between the Navy, private operators and the government throughout the year. It was the first time that colonial institutions evaluated the possibility of introducing specific work regulations at the port of Dakar. The core draft of this regulatory framework was delivered in September 1918 as an essential measure for the strategic functioning of the port and the fulfilment of war coaling agreements:

The need to assure the correct delivery of coal at the Port of Dakar required the presence of a sufficient staff of African workers. This growing activity drove the higher authorities to protect the vital interest of the colony, enacting a work regulation that assured the employers and workers a minimal stability that perhaps has been lacking until now. ⁶³

In October, the project was definitively enacted. Article 2 established that native workers were free to be hired as day labourers or permanent workers by the private companies. Fixed wages (daily and nightly), food allowances (type and quantity of rations) were officially regulated as a mechanism toprevent the workers auctioning among companies (article 4). The same article regulated the accommodation expenditures covered by the employers. Moreover, the working day was established as 10 hours, including some notes on night work. In terms of specificity, dangerous handling tasks and related wage allowances were also recognized (article 6). In addition, health protection at work was also introduced so that companies must pay the costs of accidents and other labour-related diseases (article 8). Some articles introduced a number of protection clauses for private companies, such as the defence against absenteeism (article 9) and the unfair competition among employers (article 10, 11 and 12). ⁶⁴

These regulations were also complemented by a new decree enacted on 26 November 1918 through the creation of a special port office (syndic de la main d’oeuvre dans le port de Dakar) engaged to ensure the correct functioning of the labour market and the appropriate application of the prior Act, including the fulfilment of each article for natives and employers. This office controlled the discipline of gangs engaged by the public sector. In addition, the office provided legal protection to workers and it also inspected working conditions. ⁶⁵

Final remarks

This article shows how World War I led to the introduction of legislative initiatives that represented major advances in labour rights for African dock workers and precluded the international post-1945 regulation of dock labour in the form of specific dock offices and the legal status of dockers. ⁶⁶ However, the way in which the 1918 port-specific labour code was not truly applied until 1920 is hard to determine because available sources do not reveal how the code was carried out. Information regarding these regulations ended by mid-1919 and it is possible that all regulations were incorporated into the overall 1920 native labour code that covered the entire African workforce. ⁶⁷ The colonial administration moved quickly from coercion to compensation policies to assure the accomplishment of the 1916 coaling agreements. This institutional flexibility also shows compelling evidence that African workers played an agency role in terms of relative proto-unionism that rapidly evolved during the inter-war period. Hence, the Dakar waterfront was the operational theatre of major social changes in the city, especially during the Great Depression. It is also important to note that regulations enacted during World War I were suppressed, although an institutional path was created, as Governor Angoulvant noted:

Last, these Acts exclusively regulate the working conditions of labourers hired at the Port of Dakar for supply and National Defence. Even if these regulations are merely provisional, they could serve in a near future to organize further labour changes that serve to permanently attach the native workforce to us. ⁶⁸

Finally, this research has found compelling evidence that institutional reform at the port of Dakar was made necessary by the imperial economic and military interests of the Great War, but required the active participation of local populations. As we explored earlier, the 1917 massive recruitment policies had had a very negative public impact on the Senegalese people. In addition, the militarization of the workforce was not possible due to logistical constraints. Thus, we have shown how the compensation policy was not only necessary, but effective for providing optimal services at the port. Notwithstanding, French colonial institutions seemed to forget these regulations during the inter-war period. The 1920 labour code was official – it existed – but as Thiam has noted, its real application was very limited. ⁶⁹ Archival sources for the 1930s show how labour regulations were constantly infringed. ⁷⁰ Both the intense mobility of African workers and the usual shortage of port labourers continued. The introduction of a limited amount of mechanical equipment and the reduction of coal stevedores during the 1930s (due to the transition from coal to oil) also modified the structure of the labour market. However, the outbreak of World War II revived the same problems experienced 20 years earlier. This crisis would be even worse due to the absolute isolation of Dakar and FWA. Under the authoritative government of Vichy, the lack of workers would be solved by coercion and the militarization of the workforce. ⁷¹ Thus, as stated in recent literature on colonial institutionalism, and building on Crawford Young’s noted thesis, ⁷² colonial policies and institutions evolved and adapted depending on the existing balance of powers and local endowments.