Mughal port officials and European company-men: The dynamics of a commercial relationship in the seventeenth century

When the Mughal horses were galloping towards Gujarat in the 1570s, they not only signalled the arrival of another entrant to the patchwork of polities that defined the political landscape of the region, but also presaged the dawn of a new era. The pre-existing situation was reconfigured in that the entrenchment of the Mughals in the region unlocked access to the vast hinterlands of the Indian subcontinent, which had great implications for the volume of trade, and also for the leverage that its gatekeepers, the Mughals, had over those competing to exploit its immense potential; it rendered obsolete any future attempts to forcefully reshape the structure of the trade in the region as the Portuguese had done; it assuaged the confidence of non-European mercantile elements, which had major ramifications for the maritime milieu of the region; and, lastly, it generated state-induced, unprecedented demand for strategic imports such as horses, bullion and specialised military labour.

To operationalise the exercise of their authority in a region that was different from the rest of the kingdom owing to its maritime character, and at the same time was critical to the fundamental interests of the state, ¹ it was imperative to devise special administrative arrangements. Consequently, the Mughals, while retaining the port of Surat as part of the subah of Gujarat, instilled it with a fair degree of autonomy and renamed it as Bandar-i Mubarak (Blessed Port), in homage to its association with the movement of hajj traffic. Within the port, the Mutasaddi, or Governor, was settled at the apex of port administration, entrusted with the implementation of the maritime policy of the Mughals and the discharge of critical duties such as the superintendence over general administration, looking after customs collection and control over the surrounding parganas. ² In fact, it would not be an overstatement to liken him to the hub in the wheel of port administration.

Baptised with generalised policy prescriptions, ³ and hemmed in by bureaucratic discipline, the mutasaddis were installed into what was arguably one of the most demanding civilian positions within the empire, because the appointees were not only to work towards the promotion of trade in the region, but also to reconcile the differing interests of resourceful groups with connections running deep at the imperial court. It was probably in recognition of this challenge that the instructions at the court to an incumbent were kept open-ended to enable sufficient space for manoeuvre. However, it is important that we are aware of the link between the scope of administrative autonomy, enjoyed by the local officials, and governance goals, set at the highest echelons of administration, so as to get a balanced perspective on the following discussion.

We should also note the salient role played by the European trading companies in contributing to the maritime prosperity in the region by inaugurating developments such as the undercutting of the naval belligerence of the Portuguese, opening of new vistas of trade by the forging of newer connections and giving a great fillip to the intra-Asian as well as global trade. In addition, and far more importantly, they contributed to the general conditions of trade by inadvertently strengthening the bargaining position of the Mughals vis-à-vis the Europeans because the competing interests of the different European companies played into the hands of the Mughals as they enabled them to play them one against the other by dangling the carrot of greater concessions and thereby retain the ecumenical character of the trade in the region.

In the light of our discussion so far, it needs to be emphasised that our focus is on the dynamics of the interactions between the Mughal coastal bureaucracy and the European trading companies against the backdrop of the Mughal presence, and on determining the extent to which the maritime trajectory of the region was impacted by the convergence of the three variables along the western seaboard of the Mughal empire. As opposed to this approach, most of the extant historiography has focused on the delineation of the post of the Mutasaddi in a manner divorced from the linkages that organically bound the port to the strategic interests of the state. The first major work centred on carrying out a multi-dimensional study of a coastal official was written by W.H. Moreland in the context of Shahbandar in the Asian waters. ⁴ He was, after a long hiatus, followed by M.N. Pearson who, in his path-breaking work on Gujarat, underscored the dangers of looking for a homogenous response of the different constituents of the population towards the Europeans. ⁵ A general overview of different facets of the office of Mutasaddi was provided by S.A. Nadeem Rezavi. ⁶ Yet the class of coastal administrators as critical determinants of historical processes found its true saviour in Farhat Hasan who not only highlighted the diverse functions they performed, but also, more importantly, questioned the degree of imperial control over port officials. ⁷

Mutasaddi and Europeans: The making of a relationship

The post of mutasaddi was highly demanding, but that did not deter Mughal officials from seeking an appointment to the role. This may be explained by the simple fact that it was lucrative to the same degree as it was challenging. An incumbent was the first point of contact for traders, both foreign and local, with the Mughal state, and consequently the mercantile elements flocked to him with all manner of requests for favours and grievance redress. At the same time, given his exalted stature, the mercantile elements clamoured to ingratiate themselves with him and expended considerable resources to this end. To top it all, almost every incumbent through the seventeenth century participated in overseas trade in their individual capacities, which offered a quick route to wealth creation. It is in this context that a possible relationship between the mutasaddi and the Europeans can be discerned.

Cooperation and collaboration

A major factor leading to greater congruence between the two had to do with the fact that their respective strengths complemented each other in ways both benign and insidious. In other words, the mutasaddi could use the Europeans to fortify their position politically and financially, whereas the Europeans could rely upon the mutasaddi for timely and targeted interventions to help them develop their interests in the region. The manner in which this relationship played out determined the maritime trajectory of the region during the seventeenth century.

The functions that the mutasaddis were expected to perform vis-à-vis the royal court led them to seek closer and deeper engagement with Europeans, many of whom had far-flung trading networks and commensurate political connections. Therefore, be it promotion of trade or procurement of commodities for the emperor, a healthy, business-like partnership with the Europeans was bound to keep the mutasaddis in good stead in the fulfilment of their stated objectives. In fact, some of the mutasaddis actively enlisted European cooperation to further their political and economic ascendancy. For instance, aware of the weakness of the Mughal emperor Jahangir for exotic rarities and other luxury goods, Jamshed Beg, during his tenure as mutasaddi, collected a cache of European commoditiess and proceeded to the court to trade these goods in return for his reappointment to the post. That the English were aware of this facet of their engagement with the mutasaddis comes out from the following observation: ‘Jamshead Beage, by meanes of our goods sent by him, hath gotten much respect with the Prince. Hee is in hope to retorne againe your Governour’. ⁸

Apart from utilising them for political purposes, the mutasaddis used such connections for personal enrichment. Speaking of Mir Musa, the President of the English Factory noted that:

the Governour of Surat professes to be eager for jewels or other rarities, especially emeralds in the form of tablets and beads. He also desires satins and velvets of the most durable light colours. ⁹

Significantly, this was independent of the order placed for ‘the kinge expresslye for the buying of jewells and other rarities’. ¹⁰

Cooperation also extended to safeguarding the commercial interests of the mutasaddis by the Europeans. It is important to remember that during this period the Mughal officials were investing considerable sums in commercial operations, and having the Europeans on board must have acted as a surety for their overseas investments. ¹¹ Tavernier states that ‘on arrival for embarkation at Surat, you find plenty of money. For it is the principal trade of the nobles of India to place their money on speculation for Hormuz, Bassora and Mocha and even for Bantam, Achin and Phillipines’. ¹² Some mutasaddis developed strong commercial partnerships with Europeans and traded extensively through and with them. On one occasion, the English, at the requests of Azim Khan, the Governor of Ahmedabad, and Jam Quli Beg, the mutasaddi of Surat, concealed their goods and smuggled them past the custom authorities of Gombroon in recognition of the favours received from Khan and Beg. Appreciating the efforts expended by the English agents at Gombroon in this regard and offering justification for this demand on them, the President at Surat wrote that ‘their eminence, superintendency, power at court, and dependence which our masters affaires have on their protection, favour and furtherance induced us to gratify their desires’. ¹³ Similar gratitude towards Mughal authorities can also been seen in the decision of the English to risk a breach with the Safavid officials by transporting horses from Basra to Surat at the request of the mutasaddi of Surat, despite vociferous objections from the Safavid authorities. ¹⁴

In exploring openings for cooperation, the mutasaddis pursued the best deals by cultivating partnerships with different players and studiously avoiding a reliance on any specific partner. For instance, Mir Musa traded with the English and Portuguese simultaneously for similar goods, and made his decisions on sound business grounds. Referring to Mir Musa, Thomas Kerridge, the President of the English Factory at Surat, wrote: ‘Thinks the Governor will desire the jewels, for he cannot get anything cheaper from the Portuguese’. ¹⁵ Apart from trading in commodities and precious gems, the mutasaddis sometimes incurred debts on the account of the company, ¹⁶ the settlement of which often turned into a nightmare for the Europeans. The English underwent a chastening experience in 1649, when the outgoing mutasaddi, Mir Musa, was found to have an outstanding debt ‘amounting to 27,221 rupees 46 pice’. ¹⁷ The refusal of his successor, Mirza Arab, to comply with the customary manner of resolution of such complications compelled the English to send a representative to the imperial court in order to get the debt satisfied. ¹⁸

Aside from working towards personal enrichment, mutasaddis made use of their influence over the company officials to further the scope of regional commerce. They actively pursued profitable ventures for imperial ships and in equal measure worked to attract more trade to the ports they served. As to the latter, we have the letter written by Mir Musa to the English ‘soliciting passes for Indian vessels to Achin, Malacca, and the neighbouring ports’. ¹⁹ Although the identity of the merchants was not specified, given the casual tenor of the letter one might take it as not representing imperial shipping per se. Further, there was an incident in which Mustafa Khan became incensed when a Malabar vessel bound for Surat was waylaid and seized by the English. He construed this action as leading to the erosion of customs of the port and, convinced of the validity of the seized ship and its crew, forced the English to relinquish their claims over the ship. ²⁰ In the same breath, however, it must be admitted that despite these efforts, the mutasaddis, through their recurrent irresponsible and myopic behaviour, often served to undermine the trade at the port and instances of them living up to the spirit of their duty are far outnumbered by the instances where deliberate indiscretions negated what was legitimately expected from a mutasaddi.

The initial difficulties faced by the Europeans in settling along the western coast of India had convinced them of the necessity of winning over powerful friends to sustain their interests. To the Europeans, who were on the look-out for a patron in this corner of the world, fraught with cut-throat competition and entrenched interests, the mutasaddi appeared the obvious choice. Their experience with Muqarrab Khan in their initial years had convinced them of the significance of this office, ²¹ which encouraged them to invest considerable resources in trying to win an incumbent over to their side. The English and the Dutch even competed and tried to outbid each other in their zeal to win official favour by bestowing costly gifts on the mutasaddi. ²² In 1631, the expenses incurred by the company in winning the favour of the mutasaddi exceeded that expended on gaining the support of the emperor. ²³

They also ventured to gather advance information about the weaknesses of new appointees so that they could work out how to bring them round to their point of view. For instance, in 1656, as soon as the name of Shaikh Mahmud Amin was finalised as a replacement for Hafiz Muhammad Nasir, a report was sent to the English settlement at Surat stating that ‘the new Governour is held to bee a very covetuous man; one that will doe nothing without, but anything with, money. Of this I thought good to give you notice, that you may know how to deale with him’. ²⁴ However, such prying into the profile and character of successive mutasaddis was rarely effective in ingratiating the incumbent with European objectives. Once in the saddle, they gave precedence to their own schemes of aggrandisement over anything else. Instances abound of the hopes of the English being dashed when they tried to influence an incoming mutasaddi. For example, the optimism generated at the replacement of Ishaq Beg by Jamshed Beg initially sent out a great buzz, which soon fizzled out, leading Thomas Kerridge and Thomas Bastell to wryly observe: ‘Their troubles have been mitigated by the arrival of the new Governor and wee restored to our former liberty; besides we have many fayre promises, but no further accion’. ²⁵ The appointment of Inayat Khan and subsequent events also induced a similar outpouring of unfulfilled expectations. The dejection is writ large in the account: ‘Hee made us great proffers of favours that hee would shew us uppon all occasions … [then] wee had noe great occasion to make use of him; but when wee had, hee came short of his promise’. ²⁶ Further, during negotiations to resolve disputes that bubbled up from time to time, the company officials always took care to humour the vanity of the mutasaddi. Accordingly, even when a resolution did not reflect well on an incumbent, in order to assuage his resentment Europeans took care to convey an impression to the contrary so as to convince the public at large that they had relented before the resolve of the mutasaddi. ²⁷

Notwithstanding the prestige and influence enjoyed by the mutasaddi at Surat, the fact remains that in the Mughal administrative hierarchy he stood at a subordinate position. Moreover, the uncertainty of their tenures also exposed Europeans to the precarity of relying on them for favours that apparently constituted an overshooting of the limits of their brief. Thus, officials of European companies had to take recourse to the imperial court in order to obtain farmāns laying the institutional framework of their operations in the Mughal territories. ²⁸ The real value of mutasaddis for the Europeans lay in the indispensability of their collusion in effectively watering down the provisions of the imperial edicts to suit their interests. ²⁹ Unless closely monitored by the imperial authorities, local officials abetted European efforts to deliberately misread the provisions of the edicts to their advantage. ³⁰

Although not directly referred to in the sources, but having disproportionate implications for the viability of European commercial ventures, mutasaddis played a key role in smoothing off the rough edges of the myopic policies conceived by an often underinformed emperor. Given their wide field experience they had a better grasp of the nature of difficulties that any hasty initiative might encounter. Consequently, they voiced their concerns regarding certain policies with an intention to have them either reworked or scuttled altogether. Their action, depending upon the situation, was occasioned by commercial and political self-preservation as well as utilitarianism. The role played by Mir Musa, aided by the merchants of Surat, in defusing the crisis created by Prince Aurangzeb's decision to punish the Portuguese for their insolence in repeatedly failing to pay homage to him, underscores his trepidation at the possibility of prolonged disruption of commerce due to war causing immense damage to all those, including himself, who had strong commercial interests. ³¹ On the other hand, the initiative taken by the same mutasaddi, sensing the obstructionist intentions of the Europeans, in the aftermath of the imposition of indigo monopoly by Shah Jahan, highlights the utilitarian underpinnings. ³² Whatever may be the justification of a mutasaddi's action, the fact that it served to thwart any move leading inadvertently to disturbance in trade was a great service to European companies in India.

Another major strand of the European reliance upon the mutasaddis was the ability of the latter to inject much needed running capital into their often cash-starved commercial machinery. It must be noted that in this capacity they only supplemented the services offered by the big merchants and other moneyed people of the port. ³³ On several occasions, the money lent by mutasaddis proved critical in riding the crisis. For instance, Mir Musa offered a pecuniary breather to the English on at least two occasions. During the first intervention, Mir Musa ‘lent the factors Rs. 1,500, which proved very useful’. ³⁴ He followed this up by lending several years later a much higher sum of ‘Rs. 75,000, with which at once they paid off so much debt. They are gradually discharging the loan from the newly-coined money, but the greater part is still owing’. ³⁵ Apart from providing capital intended to serve as a stop-gap arrangement, the mutasaddis sometimes offered long-term loans to the Europeans. In fact, Mirza Arab, who served as the mustasaddi of Surat on two occasions with an interval of seven years separating the termination and initiation of the first and second tenures respectively, lent considerable sums of money to the English during his first stint and demanded repayment of the capital along with interest when reappointed. ³⁶ In the process, some of the mutasaddis came to forge a more durable relationship with the Europeans. A case in point is that of Mustafa Khan. After a brief spell of intense antagonism initially, there came about a pronounced improvement in relations. The magnitude of this momentous transformation can be seen in a contemporary report of the Surat Council:

He became ever, from the time that wee were reconciled, a very civill, friendly person, full of kindness and respect. He is now at court, and there made the kings steward. Your President had lately a very curteouss letter from him, wherein hee confermes his promise that hee would bee our solicitor to the king in whatever your occasions shall att any time require his assistance in; and we have assurance, from his soe many affectionate expressions and abearances to your President, that hee will act verry cordially when ever wee shall make use of him in your behalf. ³⁷

Despite this apparent bonhomie our sources repeatedly refer to tensions and conflicts arising between the two partners. Sometimes the bickering would even threaten to translate into a full-blown conflict necessitating intervention from the imperial court. In fact, it would be reasonable to state that this spectre of sparring apparently defies all logic, particularly when the protagonists were aware of what a deeper engagement entailed for both parties. This paradox is investigated in the next section.

Conflict and contestation

Left to themselves, the mutasaddis might well have forged a stronger and more durable partnership with the Europeans. However, because of their accountability to a continental power centre that did not initially grasp the nuances of closer alignment of political and commercial tendencies in the Indian Ocean region of the day, they had to submit to certain myopic arrangements that possibly lay at the root of some disagreements between mutasaddis and Europeans. The most intense stress in the relationship was generated by the malevolent influence exerted by the pernicious practice of farming out the office of mutasaddi.

According to the farming out system, the post was handed over to an individual who promised to furnish the emperor with the most port revenue. Since the amount had to be agreed in advance, the hopefuls, in their zeal to grab the lucrative post of mutasaddi, gave their assent to unrealistic and disproportionately large sums, and after appointment coerced and fleeced the mercantile classes to make good their commitment. The English Company came to resent this practice from its earliest days on account of the damaging consequences it had for their financial situation. The English factors, in a letter to the Surat Council, gave vent to their frustration:

Isack Beag is made Governour of Surratt, and a firmaen is given for Jemshearbeages remove. If reporte be true, hee hath promised two lakes maodes yearly to the Prince from the porte of Suratt more than formerly, which wee feare the most parte will be extorted from our hands. ³⁸

Similarly, Mir Musa secured appointment after promising ‘to make good unto the king from this Suratt custome house, vizt. 800,000 mahmudis, 3/8ths more than his predecessor, Hackyme Messiah Ulzman’. ³⁹ What bred corruption and subsequent discontent was the initiation by the mutasaddis of frantic measures geared towards rationalising their incomes with previously agreed obligations to the emperor in order to retain royal favour. ⁴⁰ Most of these measures were arbitrary and violated conventional commercial practices.

Of the measures usually resorted to by desperate officials the most common was ‘the evill auncient custome of overrating goods in custome house’. ⁴¹ The European companies were also targeted and subjected to several abuses. Mir Musa was particularly harsh on the Dutch and ‘under a pretense of buying theire goods, he deteyned them two or three months without coming to a price for them, and them always underbuyes the market’. ⁴² This high-handedness caused a breach with the Europeans despite failing to fulfil the intended objective, for Mir Musa fell from grace because he promised ‘more then hee could performe by 31 lacks or 3,100,00m[ahmudi]s, which hee yet owes the king, and is therefore called to court to cleare acco[unt]s, which it knowne he cannot doe’. ⁴³ He was replaced by Mirza Jam Quli Beg, ‘on whose knowledge and approved fidelity hee (the King) much confides’. ⁴⁴ And thus the cycle continued. Soon afterwards, however, this obnoxious system was discontinued by Shah Jahan, ⁴⁵ but, by then, the damage had already been done and subsequent mutasaddis learned of the economically viable cracks in the commercial edifice of the region that could be exploited for personal aggrandisement.

Another major cause of friction stemmed from the role played by mutasaddis in furthering the commercial interests of the emperor. Mirza Arab, for instance, refused to give permission to English ships to enter Gombroon ‘until the king's junks are laden hither’. ⁴⁶ In a similar manner, he turned down a Dutch request to take Indian goods on freight to places frequented by the emperor's ships. ⁴⁷ These seemingly small disagreements in fact caused big losses to the Europeans, for it was critical for the viability of their undertakings that they stick to a strict schedule. ⁴⁸

The Mughal emperors, to some extent, contributed to the disharmony evident in the evolving relationship between the mutasaddis and Europeans. They expected the mutasaddis to do justice to the roles assigned to them and take stern action against those found guilty of misdemeanour and impropriety. ⁴⁹ The transgressing officials trembled and mellowed at the threat of their activities being reported to the emperor. ⁵⁰ They also tried to dissuade the disgruntled individuals from presenting their case before the emperor in order to avoid rebuke and dismissal. Once, when a group of principal commercial elements from Surat threatened to lodge a strong complaint against the mutasaddi at the royal court, the concerned official tried to ‘break up the combination by cleverly detaching some of its members, promising them better treatment’. ⁵¹ Instances abound of threats of being reported to the emperor leading to corrective action. M.N. Pearson has pointed out the change of heart that came about in Mustafa Khan when, following a threat of abandonment of port by the English in the wake of some mistreatment, the merchants made a forceful protestation before the mutasaddi, directing his attention towards their loss of ‘some of their best customers’, which entailed an erosion of king's revenues. ⁵² Thus, while absolving the Mughal emperors of any direct and conscious role in causing the intermittent breakdowns in mutasaddi-European relations, they were culpable for their administrative opacity in repeatedly acting on complaints of a similar nature without seeking structural and behavioural rectification.

In fact, the real blame for the failure rests with the officials themselves. The quid pro quo between the two parties would often come under strain on account of the prospect of money making through nefarious and underhand practices. ⁵³ Furthermore, by their arrogance, arbitrariness, avarice and proclivity for ‘playing vex’, ⁵⁴ the mutasaddis damaged their nascent partnership with the Europeans. In this context, it is worth stating that the extent of the damage was influenced by the dispositions and prejudices of different mutasaddis. For instance, Hafiz Muhammad Nasir lacked any imagination and initiative in dealing with administrative issues and invariably chose to wait for instructions from the king before acting. ⁵⁵ In contrast, Mirza Arab, an energetic official, ‘was determined to be known to be Governour’, ⁵⁶ and showed ‘an unpleasant readiness to deal sternly with the English’. ⁵⁷ His tenure was punctuated with several run-ins with the English, so much so that an English factor observed that ‘in everything that an abuse can be fastned, the opportunity is not let slip’. ⁵⁸ Likewise, a vindictive Masih-us-zaman made use of his appointment as mutasaddi to settle accounts with the English who, 12 years prior to his appointment, had detained him for 40 days as a prisoner on their vessel. A servant of his had also been killed by an Englishman at Surat four years previously. Unsurprisingly then, he was particularly harsh towards them and revelled in anything ‘which tends to our (the English's) prejudice’. ⁵⁹ Also, on occasions, an appointment to this powerful post worked to bring out the baser tendencies in a hitherto reasonable individual. For instance, the appointment of Ali Akbar, a highly successful Iranian merchant with influential connections at court, to the post of mutasaddi induced a similar transformation in him, so much so that an English factor lamented: ‘This Governor, Mirza Alieckbar, an ancient and very good friend to our nacion whist hee continued a merchant, but since chainged both in quality and condicion, became as very a villaine to all in general as ever officiated that charge’. ⁶⁰

Another aspect of the mutasaddis’ functioning that did not sit well with European interests was the arbitrary periodic imposition of localised monopolies and taking recourse to extortionate practices. In effect, the mutasaddis confiscated European goods at the Surat custom house on account of their refusal to accept the low prices offered for them by the officials. The impasse would sometimes result in the goods being detained for years on end and then returned in a damaged condition. ⁶¹ Also, it was common for the mutasaddi to visit the port at the time of the embarkation of ships and compel merchants and passengers to part with commodities to which he took a fancy. In 1638, the mutasaddi compelled Mandelslo to give him a bracelet of yellow amber in spite of the latter's protests. ⁶² Bribes were unashamedly demanded, with incumbents such as Jamshed Beg even deliberately creating difficulties for the Europeans so that money could be obtained for easing these illegitimate restrictions. ⁶³ All limits of propriety were breached when Shaikh Mahmud Amin, upon his arrival as mutasaddi, in a departure from protocol, undertook the unprecedented step of visiting the homes of ‘all men of greatest ranck in the city’ so as to enrich himself by compelling them to offer presents befitting his rank. ⁶⁴ The mutasaddis further misused their position by forcing the Europeans to sell them goods below the market price. ⁶⁵ Even the supposedly friendly Mir Musa did not let go of an opportunity to augment his income to the detriment of the European recipients of his benevolence. ⁶⁶ In fact, he temporarily imposed a monopoly on lead shipments, which the English desperately tried to circumvent. ⁶⁷ The conflict of interest and possibility of a showdown between the two sides appeared greatest when the incumbent possessed extensive commercial interests of his own. ⁶⁸ The difficulty faced by the English in getting along with Ishaq Beg and Ali Akbar is probably reflective of this trend. So intense was the English dislike for Ishaq Beg that records describe him contemptuously as ‘Isack Beag, that Jew’. ⁶⁹

The impunity, moreover, with which certain mutasaddis, along with their kinsmen, went about violating the trust reposed in them beggars description. Europeans and Indians were equally vulnerable to their high-handedness. For instance, Shahamat Khan falsely implicated the banias and other well-to-do people in spurious cases and then offered to extricate them in return for money. ⁷⁰ Their avarice did not spare subordinate officials at the customs either. ⁷¹ Not content with the resources they had managed to generate by manipulating the powers delegated to them for the advancement of the port for their own narrow gains, some of the mutasaddis even sought to place their kinsmen and followers in lucrative positions. Inayat Khan, after assuming the role of mutasaddi at Surat, not only appointed his son to the post of Shahbandar, but also replaced all the officials of the previous administration ‘by his favourites’. ⁷² In the long run, however, this arrangement did more harm than good. The indiscretions of his son at the custom house coupled with his murder of a man who had dared to mock his father for cowardice during the sack of Surat by Shivaji ⁷³ led to Inayat Khan's dismissal.

The indiscriminate outrages committed by mutasaddis made it imperative for Europeans to formulate a response commensurate with the magnitude of the problem. It was critical that in their modus operandi they struck a balance between sufficiently convincing the royal court about their plight without doing anything that let mutasaddi paint them in an unfavourable light before the same court. In implementing this strategy they mastered the art of accentuating their soft power and made it an inalienable part of their credo. The Europeans, particularly the English, as a matter of policy settled disputes by violent means only after having exhausted all conceivable negotiating options. More often than not their swagger only served to stiffen the resolve of the Mughal authorities, leading to setbacks to their continental supply channels. This does not imply, however, that there was no recourse to arm-twisting tactics on part of the Europeans. In fact, except when the molested ships belonged to the high and mighty in the realm, the threat of violence had its merits in getting the job done. Still, it did not constitute the first level of European response, as force might provoke imperial intervention. Thus, it made more sense to apply for restitution at the imperial court and then gradually raise the stakes. Also, the Europeans demurred when it came to inviting sustained commercial losses to avenge the wrongs done to them by precipitating a conflagration with the Mughals. For example, when Matthew Andrews, the President of the Council at Surat, pressed for an armed resolution of an impasse, he was overruled by his council members who did not want ‘his impetuosity to rush them into disaster’. ⁷⁴

A major component of European soft power was the investment of resources in buying royal favour and putting the same towards the advancements of their interests. Even while appointing brokers to serve their interests in places closer to continental power centres, they took care to give preference to candidates who enjoyed crucial links with, and influence at, the imperial court. Both ‘Ananti Das’ and ‘Tulcidas’, who served as brokers at different periods, possessed extensive contacts with leading nobles at the king's court. ⁷⁵ According to one report, the total expenses incurred by the company at Agra far exceeded the sums spent at Surat. Justifying this trend, a factor explained that:

the reason for larger expenditure here than at Surat is that our nation heere is in great esteem and respect with the king and nobility, whom very often we visite about our business; and if soe be we come not in that decency as others have formerly done, we shall not be admitted their presence. ⁷⁶

Likewise, when, following the death of Jahangir, the still uncrowned Prince Khurram passed by Surat, a delegation comprising the highest officials of English and Dutch settlements, aware of his impending elevation, called on him and offered him presents. ⁷⁷

Anticipating recurrent persecution at the hands of mutasaddis, the English also found it prudent to enlist the support of well-disposed princes and officials stationed in and along commercially significant regions. ⁷⁸ Probably an important motivation for this was the fact that these regions had organic linkages with Surat, because the goods produced there relied upon the port's overseas trade arteries to connect them to the exchange economy. Consequently, officials in these regions must have had a sense of concern over the situation at Surat which, in turn, constituted a deterrent for the mutasaddis. It is no surprise that on account of its closeness to Surat, the presence of critical feeder and commercial routes traversing through its largely arid landscape and a highly productive hinterland, the subah of Ahmadabad held deep significance for the economic interests of the Europeans. Consequently, vigorous efforts were made by them to win the favour of successive governors of the subah. To this end, the presents were directly channelled to Ahmadabad by landing them on the subah's coastal strip rather than routing them through Surat, so as to avoid their confiscation by the port's mutasaddi. ⁷⁹ Furthermore, in order to ingratiate themselves with an incumbent official, Europeans sometimes went out of their way to incur commercial losses to gain influence over him. In this context, the English and the Dutch readily bought inferior quality Ahmadabad indigo at prices higher than its market price from the wife of Azim Khan, the Governor of Ahmadabad. ⁸⁰ That this sacrifice did not go in vain was evident in the strong action initiated by Azim Khan against the complaints by the English about the delivery of the adulterated Sarkhej indigo to them. ⁸¹ Similarly, the factors were also advised against haggling over prices of commodities with eminent grandees such as ‘Mahabat Khan and Hakim Khush-hal’ for they ‘hath always proved our friend’. ⁸²

The Europeans were also astute enough to cultivate a clear understanding with individuals who stood in high favour with the king at that particular juncture. For example, a delegation was dispatched to Agra with specific instructions to lobby Dara Shikoh and Jahan Ara for their support. Lavish presents were sent for the two favourite children of Shah Jahan. While Dara Shikoh received two of the choicest horses from the Company's stables, Jahan Ara was given ‘the cabinet, the piece of embroidery and the mirror’. ⁸³ The English also consented, albeit somewhat reluctantly, to provide an escort for Dara's junks bound for Gombroon, because of the favours received from him. ⁸⁴ Even local port officials of much lower status did not escape the strategic munificence of the Europeans. ⁸⁵ Their closeness with the qiledar of Surat castle once even led to a serious crisis when this official resisted the mutasaddi's high-handedness towards the English. ⁸⁶

The European offensive to moderate the reckless abuse of authority by mutasaddis had another significant strand. From the very beginning, the English and the Dutch realised that without a display of might and grandeur their entrenchment in these regions would be precarious. The persecution suffered by them at the hands of early mutasaddis, notably Muqarrab Khan, ⁸⁷ Zulfiqar Khan ⁸⁸ and Ishaq Beg, ⁸⁹ only confirmed their fears. Recounting the barbarity of Ishaq Beg, an Englishman complained:

For three years they have suffered injuries at the hands of the Governor, Mirza Ishaq Beg, who also, beinge the greatest [merchant] of this place, doth laboure to depresse all others for increase of his owne gayne, without any regard to the Princes service or benifitt. Thus he has prevented men selling goods to them, and at the same time has prohibited the English from importing certain commodities, though the Prince's customs revenue suffers in both cases; he forces them under pain of his displeasure to sell him their goods at his own price, and then pays at his pleasure; he does them no justice, and his servants continually insult and abuse them … Their servants are whipt and they themselves affronted by every base peon. Ishaq Beg recently asserted that the principall of us was his sarvante, called him Seg muder bu[c]ta (Son of a Bitch), that hee would cut his throate, and such like base termes, which wee both deny and despise. ⁹⁰

Given this scenario, the Europeans felt it prudent to adopt measures that would raise the prestige of their nations and act as a bulwark against official atrocities. Justifying the assiduous emulation of oriental regalia by leading Europeans in India, Ovington asserted that ‘this creates a Respect from the Natives as they pass along, strikes them with a Regard to the English whenever they meet them; makes them value our friendship, and place an Honour in our Intimacy and Acquaintance’. ⁹¹ Pietro Della Valle, recounting the splendour of the English and the Dutch, concurred, saying ‘a gawdy show, and great noise adds much to a Public Person's credit in this country’. ⁹² Likewise, the Dutch sent an embassy to the court of Shah Jahan:

to impart to him some knowledge of their nation, in order that a beneficial influence might thus be produced upon the minds of the governors of sea-ports, and other places, where they have established factories. They hoped that those governors would be restrained from offering insult, and obstructing their commerce, by the consideration that they belonged to a powerful state, that they could obtain access to the king of the indies to induce him to listen to their complaints, and to redress their grievances. ⁹³

The observation from close quarters of the ways and manners of successive mutasaddis made their transition to aristocratic mode quite effortless. Mandelso's detailed description of the pageantry displayed in the procession of an incoming mutasaddi virtually became a prototype for Europeans:

In front of the governor's procession was a company of infantry and a number of palankeens, and after these came an elephant on which sat a man carrying a banner of red taffeta. The elephant was followed by about a hundred foot-soldiers, behind whom were twenty others each of whom carried a little banner in his hand … Then came the governor mounted upon a fine Persian horse and attended by several persons of quality and a great number of officers on horseback. At the tail end of the procession was carried the governor's palankeen, gilt all over. The people thronged the streets and received their new ruler with loud acclamations. ⁹⁴

Although it was not possible for the Europeans to arrive in such pomp and splendour, they still endeavoured to retain the essentials. Concerning the aristocratic ways of English, Fryer remarked: ‘The President has a Noise of Trumpets, and is carried himself in a Palankeen, an Horse of State led before him, a Mirchal (a Fan of Ostrich Feathers to keep off the sun), as the other Ombrahs or Great Men have’. ⁹⁵ Elaborating further, Ovington noted:

The President and his Lady are brought hither in Palanquins, supported each of them by six peons, which carry them by four at once on their shoulders. Before him at a little distance, are carried two large Flaggs, or English Ensigns, with curious Persian or Arabian Horses of State, which are of great value, Rich in their trappings, and gallantry equipt that are led before him. ⁹⁶

The congruency with mutasaddis’ procession is unmistakable. However, not content with this display alone, the Dutch went a step further in working to buttress the might of their nation so as to attain a commensurate status in the region. They took great pains to leverage their naval victories for securing greater concessions, so much so that they were even prepared to ‘give a twist to their not-so-successful ventures’. ⁹⁷

Conclusion

Despite the efforts of Europeans to enhance their reputation and hold their own against the mutasaddi, not much tangible success came their way. In fact, theoretically speaking, more than anything else, the mutasaddis owed the power wielded by them to their position as the executors of the authority of the Mughal emperors, and so long as their backs were being watched over by the latter they could do as they pleased if they did not invite chastisement from the court for it. As far as the state per se was concerned, it was alive to the importance of the maritime supply channels for the delivery of strategic goods, such as horses and bullion, and felt compelled to exert occasionally its presence in the region, which also affected the profile of the mutasaddis vis-à-vis the different mercantile interests. The most consequential outcome of these state interventions was that they prevented the Europeans from sharing political power and reduced them largely to an economic entity. This played into the hands of the mutasaddis, who used the situation to tighten their stranglehold over the European traders in a manner not commensurate with their respective strengths. So, the effective exercise of political power by the Mughals was the key to the fortunes of the mutasaddi. Consequently, through the seventeenth century, the Europeans, by and large, played second fiddle to the mutasaddis at every point of contact with them. It was not until the mid-eighteenth century that, after decades of political flux and the receding presence of the Mughals, Europeans, particularly the English, assumed political sovereignty when the myopic officials in the port administration sucked them into the vortex of political transformation at Surat, which altered the balance of the relationship to the detriment of the institution of mutasaddi. ⁹⁸