‘Astounding it is,what Lidice carries’: The transport of Czechoslovak weapons for the Algerian National Liberation Front in 1959

Chinese vessels under the Czechoslovakian flag

The main impetus for the development of the shipping business in landlocked Czechoslovakia came from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As a ‘Western’ response to the Communists taking power in China in 1949, the country was subject to an embargo imposed by the United States and its allies. When the PRC joined the war in Korea, the Truman Administration declared a total embargo on China, ⁷ which was followed by a naval blockade. In order to circumvent these restrictions, Communist China ran its ships under the flag of another (socialist) state, formally owned by a third party residing in a socialist country. Based on a secret agreement concluded between the Czechoslovak and Chinese governments in 1953, ⁸ Czechoslovakia ranked among the countries that provided a flag for the PRC’s ships. ⁹ From 1953 to the mid-1960s, when this cooperation was terminated mainly for political reasons, seven Chinese (officially Czechoslovak) ships were run in this way, including the Lidice. This ship was purchased in 1954 in Finland as a new-built vessel on behalf of a Chinese partner, entered in the Czechoslovak naval register and named after the central Bohemian village of Lidice, which had been burned in 1942 by the Nazis.

Deliveries of weapons and munitions from Czechoslovakia to Algeria reflected Czechoslovak support for the insurgents of the National Liberation Front (FLN) and aligned with Moscow’s policy. After the cancellation of the Paris Summit in 1960, which was intended to resolve the Berlin question, Soviet support for the FLN intensified. An important variable was the intensifying struggle to gain influence in the countries of the so-called Third World as a part of the Cold War. Similarly, until 1958, Czechoslovakia limited its support to contacts with French Communists. In September 1960, Antonín Novotný, president and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, met with the representative of the Algerian Provisional Government (Gouvernement provisoire de la République algérienne, GPRA), following Nikita Khrushchev’s example. Czechoslovakia recognized the GPRA de facto in 1961 and de jure in March 1962. ¹⁰ At the same time, Czechoslovakia concluded an agreement with the GPRA on deliveries of ‘goods of a civil character’ worth up to 15 million crowns.

Nevertheless, supplies of ‘non-civil’ goods that had been delivered since the second half of the 1950s were much more significant in this cooperation. Shipments of Czechoslovak weapons to Algerian insurgents started immediately after the 1956 Suez and Hungarian crises, which caused a significant deterioration in the West-East relations. The deliveries were made via Morocco, with the first shipment arriving without problems in Alexandria, while the second, which was shipped to Casablanca, was formally seized by the Moroccan police and then handed over to Algerian rebels. Available archival sources do not include any detailed information about the way the first shipments were transported. Then, in January 1958, the Yugoslav ship Slovenija was seized by the French Navy with a ‘shipment of 55 tons of weapons and 95 tons of ammunition’. ¹¹ This affair negatively affected Franco-Yugoslav relations, as happened with Franco-Czechoslovakian relations when the Lidice a year later. ¹²

Then, in January 1959, the West German ship Mönkedamm transported without any complications 900 tons of weapons from Gdynia to Casablanca. In this case (probably due to the interception of the Slovenija), the Czechoslovak Main Technical Administration of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (HTS) ¹³ initially wanted Morocco to cover the costs of the shipping. After negotiations, the Czechoslovak authorities agreed to deliver the consignment as CIF Moroccan port (Cost, Insurance and Freight). This represented a very lucrative business worth 16.2 million crowns ($802,000), which was deemed worth the effort and the risk. It is not clear what circumstances led the officials to a decision that the next delivery (11.75 million crowns/$ 1,632,000) would be transported on a Czechoslovak ship. Saving money for freight costs, and a supposition that self-management of the delivery would guarantee a smooth handover, may have played a role. This latter assumption, however, was ultimately the most mistaken. ¹⁴

Leaking of information about a secret consignment

The French security forces intensively gathered information on possible supplies of weapons to prevent their transfer to Algerian insurgents. Concerning the consignment transported on the Lidice, there exist several hypotheses explaining its disclosure. The first is about money. The successful transfer of weapons by the West German ship Mönkedamm had been arranged by Vimmer Lanquet, a representative of the Liechtenstein-based Nawiland Trust, which initially participated in this transaction. In February 1959, however, Vimmer Lanquet was excluded from the negotiations ‘due to unsatisfactory payment conditions he had offered’ to a Czechoslovak partner. ¹⁵ Then, the HTS department (Ministry of Foreign Trade) responsible for the transaction began to negotiate directly with representatives of the Moroccan Ministry of National Defence.

According to some hypotheses, the shipment of arms on the Lidice could have been disclosed as a broker’s reply (‘revenge’) for being excluded from the deal. ¹⁶ But, this explanation has one weak point: why would a businessman take ‘revenge’ by leaking the contract if he could point out his activities in this way? It seems that the Czechoslovak State Security constructed this argument later because it could not find out with certainty where the disclosure occurred. On the other hand, the report by the Ministry of State Control investigating the case highlighted the fact that the crew could move freely in the port of Gdynia (and thus a crew member probably leaked the information about the cargo), while in the case of the Mönkedamm, seafarers were not allowed to go ashore when the loading of weapons commenced. ¹⁷

The Lidice’s shipmaster pointed out that the disclosure occurred in Poland, due to poorly managed loading rather than crew behaviour. Thus ‘the French intelligence service had known about the cargo of weapons from the very departure of the ship from a Polish port and watched her way from its beginning’. ¹⁸ In addition, the French Navy and French intelligence services made a great effort to search for illicit deliveries of weapons. ¹⁹ The French officials therefore had precise information about what the Lidice was transporting and for whom. On top of this, they had gained another advantage, double shipping documents prepared by Czechoslovaks: the original set for a target customer (delivery of weapons for Morocco) and a ‘cover’ bill of lading (general cargo sent to Vietnam, Haiphong) for customs control during the voyage, if necessary. ²⁰

A French press agency reported that the Czechoslovak ship Lidice was carrying weapons to Casablanca on 5 April, when they expected Lidice to approach African shores. However, the ship was delayed by 56 hours due to fog and a refrigerator repair made in Kiel. The same day, the Moroccan government received reports ‘from its informants’ that French warships had set forth against the Lidice. In an attempt to stop the French Navy’s activities, the Moroccan government announced a ‘legal business between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Moroccan Kingdom’. In order for the explanation and the ‘legality of business’ to be trustworthy, the shipmaster had to be advised without any delay to submit original documents in the case of ship inspection.

Unfortunately, 5 April was a Sunday, and nobody was working at the Ministry of Foreign Trade in Prague; they received this highly important message from Morocco on the morning of Monday 6 April. The ship’s delay provided some time to warn and instruct the shipmaster via telegraph. However, in Prague, they did not understand an encrypted dispatch from the HTS unit in Morocco. The text reading, ‘Reason for preventing the known activity of Frantisek [Francis – encryption for French]’, should be understood as, ‘Usual activities of the French when military equipment is transported to North Africa’ – that is, the French vessels were looking for military cargo and its inspection. Instead, responsible authorities in Prague understood it as an allusion to ‘the activity of French journalists and photographers in the port during arms unloading’. As a result, no action was taken in Prague to prevent the incident, and the captain did not receive information about what to expect nor instructions on how to respond to the French Navy. ²¹

Five days of ship’s detention ²²

The ship inspection and detention were inevitable; Lidice was called to stop by a French war ship on 7 April 1959 at 6:14 a.m. She stopped four minutes later, when a blind salvo was fired ahead of her bow. After 32 minutes, the French Navy’s eight soldiers and two officers came aboard the ship and ordered her to change the course to the Algerian port of Oran. The captain protested on the grounds that the ship was not in the territorial waters of France, but on the high seas. His protest was denied and he was forced to steer the ship towards Oran.

The French officers then asked for the ship’s manifest, bill of lading and crew list. At this moment, the captain could not have had any idea whether the French had accurate information about the cargo of weapons. So he decided to present the ‘cover’ (false) manifest with an explanation that during the voyage, the ship had been ordered to change a course towards Casablanca. In the night, while going to Oran, the captain and the radio officer created a false telegram from Prague that ordered a change in course to Casablanca to make the explanation plausible. This may seem like a stupid or naive decision; on the other hand, considering the captain’s situation, this might also be interpreted as an effort ‘to save what is possible’, which required a great deal of courage.

Shortly after the ship detention, the shipmaster informed the officer for political affairs, the Communist Party Committee Chairman and the head of the crew trade unions that the ship had been illegally detained and that, according to international maritime law, they must obey the order and follow the military ships. Then the officer for political affairs instructed the crew how to testify when being investigated by the French – a universal answer was: that they did not know anything about the cargo and had learned about a stopover in Casablanca via telegram from headquarters. The ship’s Communist Party organization called a meeting where several rules were decided: crew members would not speak with the French, or help with unloading, or let foreigners photograph them. In the case of interrogation, a seafarer should not be left alone with an interrogator. All crew members should avoid provocation, refuse any suggestions to accept asylum, resist any proposals to abandon the ship, and fully support the shipmaster and his decisions. ²³

In some cases, the recommendations were pragmatic; others prove the Communist Party’s fear of the situation, particularly about possible defection of crew members or leaking of information about the cargo. A particular difficulty was the fact that the Communist Party decided on the behaviour of the crew, not the captain, who is (or should be) the highest authority on the ship. Even a contemporary Czechoslovak law states (in conformity with the international maritime law) that all the orders ‘issued within the captain’s authority must be unconditionally fulfilled by all crew members, passengers and all other persons on the ship’. ²⁴ Later on, the Party extended its measures to the behaviour of the crew: after the ship’s arrival in Oran, ‘the collective would stand behind an individual in the case of attempts to drag off any crew member, including the captain’. Besides this, the Party meeting agreed that the officer for the political affairs would be present at every contact or negotiation between Czechoslovaks and the French authorities, which, again, undermined the captain’s powers. ²⁵

On the next day (8 April) at 10:55 a.m. the ship arrived in Mers El Kebir, Oran’s military port. Upon arriving, chaos on the ship was caused by the presence of a ‘pack’ of journalists and other media representatives and the fact that a lot of people were bursting into the ship: officers of the French Navy, Foreign Legionnaires, members of the secret police and other authorities. Probably, only soldiers and policemen in uniform were identifiable, while information about other people and officials was merely speculation. One notable moment offers a comparison of the two testimonies: while the captain reported that 15 men from the French Navy and other authorities boarded the ship in Oran, the officer for political affairs claimed that about 30 men, all foreigners, came on board. It is evident that this officer made a striking effort to exaggerate the whole intervention and to stress its ‘danger’ because he was the main person responsible for the shipment of weapons. ²⁶

The French officers requested an inspection of the cargo, which consisted of 3,996 boxes weighing 581,157 kg, declared as general cargo for Haiphong. The captain protested, but he was, according to his words, laughed at. Upon discovery of the first crate with bullets, the French naval officer declared the cargo suspicious, confiscated it and ordered unloading. The shipmaster again tried to make a protest, but he was ‘pungently ironized and ridiculed’. Some crew members were interrogated – the officer for political affairs, the steward representing trade unions in the crew, and the chief officer, while the second officer, a Greek citizen, was offered a possibility of immediate repatriation to Greece. A little physical skirmish (not described in detail in the report) also occurred between the seafarers and the police. The captain once again requested an opportunity to get in touch with the Czechoslovak embassy, and was promised that he would be able to make this contact.

During the day, a strict inspection of all the cabins was executed. The officer for political affairs admitted that some seafarers were ordered to film and take photos of the French activities, although the police on the ship strictly forbade such behaviour. It is notable that several armed men were on the ship and some seafarers were required to break their orders regardless of the consequences. And the situation remained tense as evidenced, for example, by a description of a minor incident between seafarers and French soldiers, one of whom threatened crew members with a firearm. The instructions to take photos ‘over the prohibition of the police’ ²⁷ indicated the officer for political affairs’ disrespect for the life of the men, of a total disregard for the safety of seafarers. At 7 p.m., the unloading of military cargo was interrupted for the night, with the ship strictly guarded both from the shore and aboard by armed seamen.

On the third day of detention (9 April), the weapons were still being unloaded. When the second hold was to be opened, the crew declined. That is why the French officer warned the shipmaster that if they refused the request again, local workers and soldiers would open the hold, without responsibility for any damage to the ship’s equipment, cargo or injury. The captain knew well that the crew was prepared to reject this work; it was also included in the resolution of the ship’s Communist Party organization. Because he was afraid that French soldiers could cause problems or damage intentionally, he explained the situation to the officer for political affairs and the chairman of the Communist Party, stressing all the risks. They quickly organized a Party meeting. As a result, the deck crew picked up ship cranes and put them aside. The hold was opened by local workers. This story represents another good example of the ship’s hierarchy during Communist rule and the fact that the shipmaster could not fully use his rights and decision-making power.

In the evening, the captain could finally get in touch with the Czechoslovak authorities in Casablanca. The business department of the embassy instructed him to continue protesting against the seizure of the cargo and the manner of dealing with the crew. He should claim to French officials that the cargo was addressed for the Ministry of National Defence of the Kingdom of Morocco, and to be delivered according to an agreement concluded between Czechoslovakia and the Moroccan government. Concerning the documents, he should only present that the ship carried the cargo with documents to Haiphong and then received an order to change direction to Casablanca. At that moment, however, such an explanation was confusing and unreliable: if the ship had transported official cargo for Morocco, why was the delivery provided with documents only for Vietnam? The ‘cover’ ship manifest represented both a good reason for seizing the cargo and a serious problem that could not be satisfactorily explained by Czechoslovak officials. ²⁸

On the fourth day of detention (10 April), the captain again protested against the ship detention and cargo unloading. During the day, the third hold was being unloaded, while the unloading of the last, fourth, cargo area began at 6 p.m. Contrary to previous days, the hold was opened without problems. The next day, 11 April, in the morning, the shipmaster was invited to visit the Deputy Admiral in Oran to receive a response to his written protest. After some hesitation, the captain finally decided to leave the ship for two reasons: 1) according to the Admiralty, the departure of the ship depended on this visit; 2) a courier had told the captain that the Vice-Admiral guaranteed his freedom. At the Admiralty, Lidice’s shipmaster was informed that the ship would be unloaded around eight o’clock in the evening, and then, she would be released. The captain was also offered help if he needed drinking water or something else. He asked only for the map of the Gulf of Oran for safe navigation. The map was delivered to him almost immediately, and ‘that was the end of the conversation’. The description of the meeting shows a high degree of correctness in dealing with the captain and probably also a sign of solidarity among those who work at sea. Lidice left Oran at 23:40 and on 12 April at 00:05, she set out for Port Said.

Due to the crew’s discipline and the correct attitude of the French armed forces, five days of detention passed quite calmly, as each of the parties ‘fulfilled their duties’. This was positively influenced by the fact that the French put great emphasis on not using violence, as was documented in the record of the interview between the French Ambassador Boisanger and Czech Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Hájek. ²⁹ Nevertheless, conflict arose between the Czechoslovak and France governments concerning this affair. The next section focuses on this tension, particularly on what was happening in Prague during the five days of the ship’s detention, on the matters and tasks that responsible representatives of the Communist Party and the government cared about, and where they placed their priorities.

Activities of the state and Party authorities, 7-11 April 1959 ³⁰

In addition to the warnings that came from the HTS Morocco on 5 April, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade had at their disposal the information from the French press agency’s news on 6 April, the day before Lidice’s detention. However, they did not focus on it until 7 April. This is just one piece of a whole mosaic of unprofessionalism, bad organization and underestimation of the situation demonstrated by the responsible authorities in Prague. The actions taken immediately before and after the ship detention were also affected by a fear of making any decision that could later endanger the political or Party career of the persons involved.

On 8 April, the HTS representative in Casablanca warned the HTS Director in Prague, General František Macek, that the shipowner (also based in Prague) had no connection with the ship. Later, the Czechoslovak Press Office issued a special report stating that the Lidice had been detained. The documents available do not give a reliable answer to why Macek did not inform either the Minister of Foreign Trade or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He decided to report to the Foreign Trade Minister only after receiving another telegraph from Casablanca at 12:30 p.m., which quoted the Agency France Press report that the ship had been inspected in Oran. In the evening, the Czechoslovak embassy in Paris received the French side’s official information on the detention of the ship; the message was forwarded to the deputy minister, Jiří Hájek, and the head of a responsible territorial department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. None of them, ‘did anything that day’, as is stated in the report. While the captain and the crew remained isolated in the Algerian harbour, information about their situation spread relatively slowly in Prague. When the responsible staff began to act, they focused on the political aspect of the matter and on defending their actions (and offices, of course). None of the available documents indicate that any official was much concerned about the crew.

On 9 April at around noon, the deputy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hájek, sent the Embassy in Paris instructions to make a sharp oral protest that the Lidice was carrying weapons for the Moroccan government. The protest was presented at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the morning of 10 April. On the same day, the whole matter was presented at the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC). The Politburo approved a draft of the first protest note to the French government, which was also published by the Czechoslovak media. The reasoning was the claim that a legal contract concluded with the Moroccan government stipulated that the ship was carrying ‘commercial cargo’. Consequently, according to the Czechoslovak authorities, her detention was in breach of international law. In the Czechoslovak press, the French actions were used for Cold War propaganda, emphasizing the illegality of the seizure of the ship. ³¹ Problems in Czechoslovak-Morocco relations arose, too. Initially, Moroccan authorities protested against the detention of the ship. However, when the Moroccan ambassador in Paris was informed that the ship documents had been issued for Haiphong, ‘justified doubts about the correctness of the Czechoslovak actions’ provoked distrust between the partners.

Finally, on 11 April, the Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the president and the first secretary of the Central Committee of Czechoslovak Communist Party, Antonín Novotný, about the whole affair. ³² On 14 April, the Minister of State Control was ordered to identify immediately investigate who was responsible for the deficiencies during the voyage and violated the regulations on the delivery of weapons. In the meantime, negotiations at the highest political and diplomatic levels continued.

Diplomatic disputes with France and the issue of financial compensation ³³

Czechoslovak officials were informed by a foreign pressman that the French were well aware that documents were not right, and the ship had been carrying weapons for the FLN. But the officials continued to insist that the documents confirmed the ship had transported weapons destined for Morocco according to a contract with the Moroccan government. However, they could not explain why the captain had submitted ship documents for Haiphong and why there were no documents on the ship that would indicate the Moroccan government was the final ‘customer’ (the shipmaster did not present these documents on ship inspection).

The second Czechoslovak protest note was formulated in a similar tone as a previous one – pointing out to the detention of the ship outside the international law, a request for giving back the cargo and payment of all related damages and recurrent costs. What is more interesting about this document are the handwritten notes on it, which were probably made by the General Secretary of the Communist Party. These remarks indicate that despite the purpose and place of delivery of the arms consignment, the Politburo thought that the whole incident could be resolved (and won) in the International Court of Justice in Hague.

Altogether, the cause of the Lidice’s detention became a subject of five protest notes by Czechoslovakia against France. All notes were focused on the unlawfulness of the French Navy’s intervention because the ship was detained on the high seas. ³⁴ On the other hand, the ‘triumph’ of France was the concealment of the true nature of the consignment, incorrect documents and an unforeseen diversion of the ship. These facts were given as clear evidence that the delivery was ‘an underhand supply of weapons and ammunition in favour of the revolt taking place in the territory of the French Republic’. ³⁵

Even though confronted with these facts, the Czechoslovak government did not want to settle the incident ‘in silence’. It demanded compensation for damage and strove to use the affair advantageously as propaganda. The government and Communist Party officials also considered submitting the whole case to the United Nations Security Council to achieve a considerable political response, especially from the African and Asian states. Taking in mind the bipolar division of the world and the Cold War context, political achievements of this sort would be very beneficial in the two superpowers’ struggle to gain influence in African and Asian countries, especially former colonies. One can only guess whether the idea to resolve the dispute in the highest international forum was caused by the clumsiness of Czechoslovak officials in foreign policy or by a desire to ‘please’ the Soviet Union by showing their reliability and loyalty. After consultation with the Soviet Union – an essential step in making important decisions on (international) politics – it was decided to continue diplomatic negotiations and not to take any action with the United Nations. ³⁶

Czechoslovak Communist Party officials also claimed financial compensation for damages caused by the ship’s detention and seizure of the cargo. They abandoned this requirement, too, because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned that the measures taken against France to cover the damages might have serious consequences for the economic relationship between the countries. There were particular restrictions on exports and imports, the loss of Czechoslovak positions in the French market and threats to exports to the African countries of the French Community. However, the measures would not affect the French side significantly. ³⁷ The compensation claims thus concentrated on insurance premiums.

The shipment was insured at $1,795,200. ³⁸ The insurance value was covered by three sources: 1) insurance contracts concluded in capitalist countries (68.55%) ³⁹ ; 2) insurance contracts concluded with partners in socialist countries (23.37%) ⁴⁰ ; and, 3) the Czechoslovak State Insurance Company (8.08%). Major insurance payouts were to be settled by the main insurer, which was Willis Faber & Dumas, a British company. Of course, the London office drew attention to discrepancies in the shipment documents. The Czechoslovak authorities were of the opinion that the damage had been caused solely by the piracy of the French and that the administrative error in the transport documents could not affect the insurance settlement. ⁴¹ No other relevant materials are available concerning the discussions between Willis Faber & Dumas’s representatives and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia about the issue. Finally, in April 1960, this insurance company gained consent to pay premiums from all insurers, except for two French companies – La Nationale and Caisse, which refused to pay out because the case had been caused by smuggling. ⁴² As a result, Czechoslovakia imposed a financial penalty on France in the form of ‘cessation of compensation payments’ for the nationalization of its possessions in Czechoslovakia in 1945 ⁴³ ; accordingly, 6.6 million crowns were seized in 1959. ⁴⁴

From the point of view of the highest Czechoslovak Communist Party authorities, compensation, apart from insurance pay outs, was due for the loss of profits during the ship’s detention, the stay of strangers on the Czechoslovak ship and the detriment of the supplier’s reputation. These damages were estimated at $88,500 plus reasonable (unspecified) ‘compensation for gross and violent restraint of seafarers’ personal freedom, ⁴⁵ threatening the shipmaster, officers, and the crew with guns’. ⁴⁶ The whole issue of the financial settlement between the countries related to the Lidice’s case was not resolved until July 1963. ⁴⁷

Investigation: was it the captain’s fault? ⁴⁸

Parallel to the diplomatic disputes and damage negotiations, the Ministry of State Control executed an investigation to find out who was responsible for the affair. The available documents prove there was a significant effort to impute the greatest share of blame to the captain. This ‘tactic’ should, among other things, conceal the faults of the persons and offices responsible for the transport plan and organization, including those at the highest levels of the Communist Party hierarchy. The final report of the investigation committee describes the shipmaster as a person unfit for his role because he suffered ‘higher blood pressure and strong neurotic problems’. However, if the captain’s health had been so serious, he would not have been found capable of navigating during a compulsory medical examination that he had undergone in July 1958, a few months before the voyage. In the same report, the captain is portrayed as ‘untrustworthy’, with much of the argument built on his ‘political unreliability’.

From the point of view of ‘real’ misconduct, however, the control bodies could identify only the fact that between the French Navy’s command to stop and the moment when the French soldiers came aboard there were 32 minutes when the captain could announce ‘this extraordinary and pirate event to the world’. The Communist Party bodies here referred to a chance to make SOS calls (and, implicitly, to use the affair for propaganda purposes). However, the Lidice did not face a life-threatening or piratical situation, so calling SOS or other forms of help (and for attention) was not adequate. Furthermore, the captain was convinced that the cover documents were sufficient to resolve the situation.

In contrast, the Ministry of State Control emphasized that the captain had made a major mistake by presenting cover documents at the moment of detention. The responsible director from the forwarding company Čechofracht (Main Technical Administration of the Foreign Trade Department/HTS acted as a broker) during the investigation stated that the captain had been instructed to present the cover documents only when passing the Kiel Canal. On the other hand, the captain said that he had been instructed to hand over original documents just in Casablanca and cover documents during the voyage. So there are two contradictory claims. Most likely, the captain did not receive any strict instruction regarding ship detention since no one in a position of responsibility in Prague thought that such a situation could occur, due either to an ignorance of similar cases, such as the detention of the Slovenija, or simply from over-confidence or unprofessionalism.

The intelligence service (State Security) carried out its independent investigation, where it pointed out that the captain had made mistakes mainly in negotiations with the French Navy, either due to a lack of courage or because he had not known what to do in the given situation. ⁴⁹ Indeed, the shipmaster did not have enough knowledge on how to behave when the ship was detained. He was forced to stop after a gunshot across the ship’s bow; then, two French naval vessels watched the Lidice and some soldiers boarded the ship. The unarmed crew was essentially helpless against them. The captain therefore decided to keep calm on board and ensure the safety of the seafarers. Any accusation of a lack of courage is unfair.

The final decision on the punishment corresponded with the fact that the shipmaster followed all valid company directives, legal provisions (including maritime law), without any major fault. Finally, he underwent a Communist Party ‘interview’ and admonition. As a sort of punishment, the Party authorities recommended that he be degraded to chief mate and to employ him as a captain only ‘in exceptional cases’. Lack of skilled professionals in maritime navigation was most probably the reason why the punishment was not more severe. In 1960, he embarked as chief mate on the tanker Ostrava. A year later, captain Ladislav Makový sailed on the Ostrava as shipmaster. ⁵⁰ During the voyage, he died at dinner of heart failure. ⁵¹

Conclusion: faults of involved Czechoslovak authorities ⁵²

Organizers of the business of military cargo transport, the Main Technical Administration (HTS) of the Foreign Trade Ministry and Čechofracht, the state forwarding agency, were severely criticized for poor concealment of the delivery, for setting a bad route through the Kiel Canal, for the unnecessary (sic!) preparation of two sets of documents, and for inadequate instructions to the shipmaster. During the investigation, the state authorities also pointed out that disclosing the cargo in the Kiel Canal could cause significant problems for Czechoslovakia because it was considered a violation of international regulations, and a security breach of the canal. Besides, the Ministry of State Control’s report criticized the state trading and diplomatic apparatus involved in the issue, for they had not worked properly and reliably, especially at critical moments.

As a result of the investigation, Macek, the director of the HTS General, was removed from the office and transferred back to the Ministry of Defence, because ‘he did not manage well the issue of foreign trade and overestimated a military-technical side of the HTS’s work’. The director of the maritime department in Čechofracht (forwarding agency) was also removed from the office and ‘assigned with less responsible office function’ in the company. A Čechofracht representative in Gdynia was recalled for violating valid directives for concealment of the cargo. Other responsible officials were admonished, ⁵³ in a similar fashion to the shipmaster.

The penalties, as mentioned above, can be considered relatively moderate when taking into account the scope of the incident and related harm in the field of international politics. Probably the final decision on penalties was affected by the fact that the supreme state and Communist Party authorities did not want to draw too much attention from the Czechoslovak public to the entire case, especially when it was publicized and propagandized as a French ‘act of piracy’ against Czechoslovakia. However, in the historical context of the Communist rule, the sanctions represented a ‘cadre offense’ with a possible long-term effect on one’s professional life (and sometimes also his family).

The disclosure of the military cargo on the Lidice was caused by a mix of unfortunate coincidences and circumstances on the one hand, and dilettantism at various levels on the other. Besides, the Lidice affair is unique in the sense that in the whole history of Czechoslovak maritime shipping from 1945 to 1989 (in 1998, the fleet was sold out), this was the only case of a military cargo transport when both the ship and the crew were seized and the cargo confiscated. After this affair, the Politburo decided that in future Czechoslovak ships ‘will not carry weapons and all exceptions to these resolutions will be approved by the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee’. ⁵⁴ In practice, it meant that the government abandoned for some time the use of Czechoslovak ships for military transport. However, the responsible authorities also learned from ‘the Lidice case’, and, in the following 30 years, Czechoslovak ships transported a large number of weapons or military equipment.

The gradual development and professionalization of the Czechoslovak shipping business played an important role in these activities, too. As a result, the transport of military cargo quite often became seafarers’ everyday routine:

There was no trouble in the world that we didn’t participate in, be it Cuba, India, Iraq, Syria. In Syria – it was mainly tanks, Umm Qasr in Iraq – tanks, BVP [infantry fighting vehicle], and rocket launchers, India, anti-missile guns. I don’t give the secret away. It’s been time-barred. ⁵⁵

Thus the seafarers could observe the participation of Czechoslovakia in various armed conflicts, in line with the then ruling politics, ideology and bilateral organization of the world. This was in sharp contrast to proclaimed assertions of Czechoslovak political representatives about its ‘peace’ policy, especially, when, in some cases, seafarers witnessed arms being supplied to both sides in a conflict.