Abstract
Philip MacDougall's informative study focuses on two connected issues: the Anglo-Russian trade that supplied the British Navy with its necessary supplies (timber, pitch, hemp and tar) and Anglo-Russian involvement in naval conflicts throughout the eighteenth century, primarily fought in the Baltic Sea. Both have been studied by earlier scholars, but MacDougall may be the first to combine the topics to provide a single narrative about the mutual dependence of the two empires. Scholars more familiar with Britain's Atlantic empire or the East India Company's expansion into Asia might be surprised at how important the Anglo-Russian connection was for Britain's imperial successes. At the start, MacDougall acknowledges that calling this relationship an ‘alliance’ may be inaccurate, but defines alliance as ‘a union or association formed for mutual benefit’ (xiii) – a loose definition that better fits the relationship between the two.
The military component emphasizes the European conflicts that Russia entered, including multiple conflicts with Sweden and the Ottoman Empire. MacDougall also provides the context for the odd reversal of the diplomatic system in the middle of the eighteenth century that led the Russians to ally themselves with France in the Seven Years’ War. For historians more familiar with the history of the Atlantic World in the eighteenth century, the interconnectedness of these global conflicts may come as a surprise. The Baltic emerges as an extension of the Atlantic system rather than a separate arena for conflict. Furthermore, MacDougall's approach emphasizes that the British Navy needed the commodities supplied by Russia to maintain its global presence – a trade that continued even while their allies fought each other during the Seven Years’ War.
The trade material covered here has been thoroughly examined before this study. Arcadius Kahan's The Plow, the Hammer, and the Knout: An Economic History of Eighteenth-Century Russia, Herbert Kaplan's Russian Overseas Commerce with Great Britain: During the Reign of Catherine II and my own Enterprising Empires: Russia and Britain in Eighteenth-Century Eurasia have detailed extensively the Anglo-Russian trade throughout the century, relying on the same customs records that MacDougall details at length. 1 MacDougall's focus on the Baltic, like Kaplan's, potentially overvalues the Baltic arena in Russia's overall economy at the expense of neglecting the value of its overland connections. In the 1980s, the Russian historian A. I. Iukht demonstrated that, in the 1730s and 1740s, Russia's trade from Iran imported through Astrakhan exceeded the total value of trade from all of its European ports in the Baltic and Arkhangelsk. When the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 was signed, it was to guarantee not only the trade relationship but also Russia's interest in exploiting the British Russia Company to support its ongoing Caspian trade. This fact reveals that Britain needed Russia more than the reverse, even if Britain supplied technical experts for the Russian Navy. Knowing that Russia rejected Britain's attempt to negotiate a commercial treaty in the 1710s only reaffirms Britain's weak negotiating position in the first half of the eighteenth century.
The focus on Russia's naval history produces an alternative perspective on some well-worn tropes of Russian history. Admiring Anna Ivanovna for continuing ‘the westernisation process’ (80) begun by Peter the Great was a surprise, as her reign was well known for rejecting Petrine reforms, neglecting the Academy of Sciences and ongoing information and technology exchanges, and using military force to achieve religious uniformity. However, as MacDougall illustrates, she continued to support the nascent Russian Navy and hired more foreign military experts. Russia's involvement in the Pacific could be better integrated into the text, as it directly impacted the Anglo-Russian relationship. British diplomats in Russia provided wary updates on the progress of the Second Kamchatka Expedition (1733–1743), and later attempted to wrest concessions from the Russian government by offering new navigation charts following James Cook's expeditions. Joseph Billings, one of Cook's navigators, entered Russian service and led its cartographic expedition at the end of the eighteenth century, but is absent from MacDougall's study, though he only provides further evidence of the connection between the states.
MacDougall has produced an accessible and informative history of one of the most important relationships in the eighteenth century – the Anglo-Russian naval connection. It highlights Britain's dependence on Russian materials to supply its navy. Moreover, it demonstrates the interconnected nature of eighteenth-century diplomacy. Russia emerges not on the margins of European naval conflicts but rather as a central player. In this context, its policy of armed neutrality in the 1770s is not an attempt to influence European policies but a reflection of its long-term engagement with international relations across the continent. Specialists in either empire will likely be familiar with this narrative, but general readers will encounter a new approach to understanding the long eighteenth century.