What Counts as Rape? The Effect of Offense Prototypes,Victim Stereotypes,and Participant Gender on How the Complainant and Defendant are Perceived

Abstract

Jurors rely on a range of schemas when evaluating allegations of rape and sexual assault. For example, they may be influenced by the prototypicality of the alleged offense, the stereotypicality of the victim, or gender-related stereotypes. These schemas have often been conflated however, making it difficult to determine the unique impact of each on jurors’ perceptions. To be able to effectively counter any schema-related misconceptions, we must first identify which beliefs are important and when. An experiment (N = 420) examined the independent effects of offense prototypicality and victim stereotypicality on mock jurors’ perceptions. As expected, victim stereotypicality had a greater effect on judgments in the counter-prototypical (acquaintance) assault scenario than in the prototypical (stranger) assault scenario. When the complainant was described as being a counter-stereotypical victim in the acquaintance rape scenario, the defendant was seen as less likely to be guilty and evaluated more positively and the complainant less positively compared with when the complainant was described as being a stereotypical victim. Analysis of the qualitative data suggested a focus on different factors in reaching verdicts in the stranger and acquaintance rape scenarios. Results were interpreted as evidence that jurors “step down” through a hierarchy of schemas in their attempts to determine what happened in cases of rape and sexual assault.

Keywords

rape sexual assault victim stereotypes offense prototypes

Rape and sexual assault are physically and psychologically heinous crimes for which reporting, prosecution, and conviction rates remain disproportionately low in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS], 2005) as in other countries (Daly & Bouhours, 2010). Convictions for sexual assault are often dependent on circumstantial evidence, as there is typically little corroborating evidence (Kebbell & Westera, 2011). Because of this, jurors in rape or sexual assault cases are likely to draw on their existing knowledge or cognitive schemas to interpret what happened and how blame should be apportioned (Ellison & Munro, 2010; Pennington & Hastie, 1992). In generating these accounts, research has repeatedly demonstrated that people are influenced by schemas, which encompass both crime prototypes (Finkel & Groscup, 1997; Smith, 1991; Wiener, Richmond, Seib, Rauch, & Hackney, 2002)—cognitive representations of the typical or ideal features present in a particular crime—and stereotypes—simplified evaluative cognitive representations of the people involved in the crime. It is therefore critical to understand how jurors use these schemas to interpret information and form impressions about the blameworthiness of the defendant and the complainant.

The most commonly studied form of sexual assault is rape. Although relevant rape schemas can be readily identified—specifically offense prototypes, victim stereotypes, and gender stereotypes (Buddie & Miller, 2001)—they have been confounded in much research to date. While elements of these schemas overlap (Schuller, McKimmie, Masser, & Klippenstine, 2010), independent elements exist. To understand when they are likely to impact jurors’ decision making, it is therefore critical to examine their independent (and interactive) effects. A preliminary scenario study by Masser, Lee, and McKimmie (2010; also see Schuller et al., 2010) demonstrated that the gender stereotypicality of a female rape complainant only impacted perceptions of blameworthiness when her behavior as a victim was also counter-stereotypical. What has yet to be explored experimentally is whether offense prototypes interact with victim stereotypes (Daly & Bouhours, 2010; cf. Horney & Spohn, 1996). As such, the aim of the current study was to “step up” the proposed hierarchy of rape schemas, with the prediction that victim stereotypes would only impact judgments in the context of acquaintance (non-prototypic) as opposed to a stranger (prototypic) rape offense. A further aim of this study was to determine whether these different rape contexts lead to different interpretations of complainant and defendant behaviors. This information will allow a better understanding of how the pernicious effects of these schemas can best be challenged (Ellison & Munro, 2009).

Offense Prototypes, Victim Stereotypes, and Rape Myths

Rape myth endorsement is one of the most consistent predictors of increased victim blame and decreased defendant blame (e.g., Brinson, 1992; Finch & Munro, 2005; Frese, Moya, & Megias, 2004; Krahé, 1991; Sheldon & Parent, 2002; Sleath & Bull, 2012). Rape myths are oversimplified and rigid cognitive schemas that focus on the victim, the act, and the perpetrator (Buddie & Miller, 2001). These oversimplified schemas supply a structure around which information provided in a trial can be organized (Bodenhausen, 1988). Rape myths are frequently reflected in jury verdicts, police prosecutorial decisions, and personal reactions to female rape complainants (e.g., Jordan, 2001, 2004; Sleath & Bull, 2012; Taylor & Joudo, 2005; Temkin, 2000).

The effects of rape myths can be broad in terms of how blame for the offense is assigned to the complainant and defendant (Burt, 1980; Chiroro, Bohner, Viki, & Jarvis, 2004). Rape myths also have a more specific function by prescriptively describing “real” rapes and “real” victims (Estrich, 1987). As DuMont, Miller, and Myhr (2003, p. 469) note, according to such rape myths, “real” rape is an act “committed by a stranger during a blitz attack in a public deserted place,” whereas a “real” victim is a “woman who is physically injured while resisting.” As such, these myths prescribe the circumstances of the offense (offense prototypicality), the behavior of the victim around the time of the offense (victim stereotypicality), and broader gender-based information about the characteristics of women who are raped (gender stereotypicality). These prescriptions are often far from the reality of rape (Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994) and may derive from the belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980). For example, the mistaken belief that the prototypical rape occurs between strangers (DuMont et al., 2003) can buffer women from the negative psychological consequences of the threat of rape in society (Bohner, Siebler, & Raaijmakers, 1999; Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994). Such beliefs can also act as a psychological release for those who wish to perpetrate rape (Bohner et al., 1998). Importantly in the context of juror decision making, these beliefs help exonerate rapists by narrowly defining who is a genuine victim and what counts as rape (Anderson & Doherty, 2008).

Research has shown that these prescriptive schemas have negative consequences for women who are victims of sexual assault and rape. When an assault deviates from the offense prototype and when victims deviate in their behavior from victim stereotypes (DuMont et al., 2003) and/or gender stereotypes (Abrams, Viki, Masser, & Bohner, 2003), the victim’s claims are more likely to be treated with skepticism (Horney & Spohn, 1996; Spohn & Spears, 1996) and they are more likely to be blamed for their assault (e.g., Sheldon & Parent, 2002). For example, victims of acquaintance rape are blamed more for their assault than victims of stranger rape (Coller & Resick, 1987; DuMont et al., 2003; Grubb & Harrower, 2009). Victims are also blamed more when they have not been chaste in the past (DuMont et al., 2003), have been drinking (but not necessarily drunk; Briody, 2002; Scronce & Corcoran, 1995; Wenger & Bornstein, 2006), dress “provocatively” (Johnson, 1995; Vali & Rizzo, 1991), fail to physically resist their assailant (Cook, David, & Grant, 2001), delay in reporting their assault (Jordan, 2001; Kelly, 2002; Spohn & Spears, 1996; Stewart, Dobbin, & Gatowski, 1996), or do not appear emotionally traumatized (Jordan, 2001; cf. Buddie & Miller, 2001).

Similar effects have been found in non-experimental research. For example Feldman, Ullman, and Dunkel-Schetter (1998) found that victim blame was associated with certain assumptions about how the world works. Campbell (1998) found that when weapons and injury were involved in the assault, rapes were perceived as “real” crimes, leading to a greater likelihood of prosecution. Campbell also suggested that victims who were perceived as “good victims,” in that they showed distress and wanted help, may be more likely to receive help from the medical and mental health systems. The evidence for victim blaming as a function of such beliefs may, however, be limited to perceivers who do not know the victim well—Ahrens and Campbell (2000) found no evidence for victim blaming among friends of victims of sexual assault. Problematically for victims, the various decision makers and sources of potential support that they will encounter fall into that former category.

While these findings demonstrate the pervasive problem of the prescriptive schemas that stem from rape myths, the independent impact of violation of each of the key schemas—offense prototypes, victim stereotypes, and gender stereotypes—is not well understood (Daly & Bouhours, 2010). In focusing on the victim’s behavior at the time of the assault and the relationship between the complainant and alleged perpetrator, studies typically confound these schemas. For instance, Sims, Noel, and Maisto (2007) explored the impact of alcohol presence and resistance type on blame attributions for rape. In the high resistance condition, participants were informed that “the woman states that she tried to forcefully push her assailant away, and screamed ‘no, no’” (p. 2771), whereas in the low resistance condition, the complainant and assailant were presented as “mutually kissing, when she suggested to him that they had better stop” (p. 2771). Thus, victim and gender stereotypes appear to have inadvertently been confounded (as both “real” victims and “good” women do not get visibly drunk; Abbey & Harnish, 1995; Landrine, Bardwell, & Dean, 1988). There also appears to be a conflation of offense prototypes and victim stereotypes. In the stereotypical victim portrayal—where the complainant physically resists—it is unclear whether her assailant is a stranger or an acquaintance. In contrast, in the counter-stereotypical victim portrayal, it appears that through the act of mutual kissing, that the complainant and her assailant are, at least, acquainted.

Disentangling the Schemas

It is unclear how offense prototypes, victim stereotypes, and gender-based stereotypes influence perceptions of sexual assault victims (McKimmie & Masser, 2010)—the results of much research to date can be explained by any one of these schemas. The less prototypical the offense, the less the complainant seems like the stereotypical victim and the less that the woman is seen in terms of positive traditional gender stereotypes, the more a juror will blame her for the assault (and not the offender; Viki, Abrams, & Masser, 2004). Understanding precisely when these schemas influence perceptions is therefore a critically important first step in identifying how to understand and overcome their potentially negative influence, which is likely to be particularly relevant in the context of juror decision making in sexual assault trials.

In an initial exploration of the independent effects of victim and gender stereotypes, Masser et al. (2010) conducted a conceptual replication of Abrams et al. (2003). Abrams et al. showed a relationship between the endorsement of prescriptive gender stereotypes (benevolent sexism; Glick & Fiske, 1996) and blame of acquaintance (but not stranger) rape complainants. While these results highlighted the potential importance of gender stereotypes in judgments of victims of acquaintance rape, Masser et al. (2010) argued that Abrams et al. may have inadvertently confounded gender stereotypicality with victim stereotypicality of the complainant in their scenario.

To explore the independent effects of victim and gender stereotypicality, Masser et al. (2010) presented participants with a scenario in which the gender and victim stereotypicality of the complainant was orthogonally manipulated. Consistent with Abrams et al. (2003), belief in prescriptive gender stereotypes was assessed with a measure of benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996). A significant three-way interaction between victim stereotypicality, gender stereotypicality, and benevolent sexism indicated that the previously documented association between gender stereotypicality and benevolent sexism was evident only in the context of counter-stereotypical rape victims. It was only in the condition where victims acted counter-stereotypically that the gender stereotypicality of the complainant mattered in attributing blame.

What has yet to be explored experimentally is how offense prototypes interact with or relate to victim stereotypes (Daly & Bouhours, 2010). Consistent with the “step down” model of the influence of gender stereotypes on victim blame proposed by Masser et al. (2010), Estrich (1987) suggested that complainant characteristics would only influence rape case decision making in the context of acquaintance (counter-prototypical) assaults. An archival analysis of a sample of rape cases reported in Detroit in the late 1980s by Horney and Spohn (1996) found no evidence for the effect of victim stereotypes being moderated by offense prototypicality. However, there is merit in exploring this possibility experimentally by manipulating victim stereotypicality independently of other key schemas. As such, the aim of the current study was to “step up” the proposed hierarchy of sexual assault-related schemas and examine the impact of victim stereotypicality independently of gender stereotypicality in the context of stereotypical and counter-stereotypical offenses. The results of Masser et al. and reasoning of Estrich (1987) suggest that the complainant’s adherence to victim stereotypicality will only impact judgments related to the crime when considered in the context of a counter-stereotypical—that is, acquaintance—rape offense.

Furthermore, perceivers may focus on qualitatively different issues for stranger and acquaintance assault scenarios. The result of this difference in focus may be a need to draw on additional schemas to provide an account of what should have occurred before the event can be categorized as rape. For instance, in acquaintance rape cases, where consent may be more easily presumed (Krahé, Bieneck, & Scheinberger-Olwig, 2007), jurors may believe it appropriate to focus on whether the complainant forcefully resisted the attack (Ellison & Munro, 2009). However, in cases of stranger rape, where consent is less likely to be presumed, the focus may be less on the complainant’s behavior and more on the location of the attack and the behavior and identity of the perpetrator. Thus, qualitative analysis of the reasoning behind participants’ verdict decisions was also undertaken with the aim of providing insight into why a victim stereotypes may only impact juror decision making within the context of an acquaintance rape offense (Ellison & Munro, 2009).

The Current Study

The potential independent manipulations of offense schemas and victim stereotypes in the context of rape allows for a stringent test of the importance of victim stereotypes in accounting for reactions to rape victims. As such, the aim of the current research was to independently manipulate these elements in a scenario depicting a rape. Such an approach allows for a more systematic exploration of the role that victim stereotypes play in different types of rapes. Building on the findings of Masser et al. (2010) and the reasoning of Estrich (1987) and specifically relating them to decisions and perceptions likely to be made in a courtroom setting, we expected that victim (counter) stereotypicality would reduce perceptions of defendant guilt and lead to more positive evaluations of the defendant and the case made by the defense and more negative perceptions of the complainant and the case made by the prosecution, only in situations of acquaintance rape. We expected no impact of victim stereotypicality in the context of a stranger rape scenario.

Method

Participants and Design

Participants were 420 members of the community (51% women), ranging in age from 18 to 64 years (M = 42.91, SD = 12.97). The median age was somewhat higher (44.00 years) than the median for the population (36.60 years), and the gender ratio was similar to that for the population (50.3% women; ABS, 2008). There were no differences in age across the experimental conditions, all Fs < 1.16, all ps > .28. Male and female participants were evenly distributed across the design, χ²(1) = 0.62, p = .43. In the stereotypical offense condition, 52 females and 57 males read about a stereotypical victim, and 53 females and 53 males read about a counter-stereotypical victim. In the counter-stereotypical offense condition, 54 females and 49 males read a scenario describing a stereotypical victim, while 54 females and 48 males read about a counter-stereotypical victim. Participants reported a varying range of educational achievement (39.5% high school; 28% undergraduate degree or higher; 26% Technical and Further Education (TAFE) certificate; 7% other or unspecified) that appeared broadly representative of the population as a whole. According to the ABS (2008) report, 59% of the population aged 25 to 64 years had a qualification following formal schooling (vs. 54% in our sample), with 24% obtaining an undergraduate degree or higher (versus 28% in our sample). Twelve percent of participants indicated that they had previously served on a jury.

The study employed a 2 (offense stereotypicality) by 2 (victim stereotypicality) between-subjects design. Given the previously reported robust effects of participant gender on rape blame attributions (e.g., Davies, Rogers, & Whitelegg, 2009; Grubb & Harrower, 2009), participant gender was also included as an additional subject variable, with male and female participants randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions made up by the manipulation of the two independent variables.

Materials and Procedure

Participants were recruited though Survey Sampling International (SSI; see http://www.surveysampling.com for more information). The study was advertised online to urban and rural potential respondents in Australia as being about “perceptions of sexual assault.” Following completion of other unrelated survey research conducted by SSI, participants were screened for eligibility on the basis of age and gender before being randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. To be eligible, participants had to be 18 years of age or greater, and the recruitment strategy was to include an equal number of men and women in the sample. The experimental manipulations were operationalized by presenting participants with one of four written summaries of a case involving allegations of rape. The scenarios were approximately 460 to 520 words in length, and described the alleged rape of Karen by Jim.

Manipulation of offense stereotypicality

To manipulate offense stereotypicality, the case summary described either a stranger or an acquaintance rape scenario based on Abrams et al. (2003) and Masser et al. (2010). In the acquaintance rape (counter-stereotypical offense) scenario, participants were told that Karen had accepted an invitation to go back with Jim to his apartment to talk and have coffee following a party at which they had met. Once at his apartment, Karen and Jim began kissing and caressing each other, before Jim then grabbed Karen and tried to take her clothes off. In the stranger rape (stereotypic offense) condition, Karen was approached by Jim as she walked to her car after the party. Although Karen ignored Jim, he walked with her until they came to an unlit part of the street, at which point he grabbed her and tried to take her clothes off. In all conditions, Karen asked Jim to stop when he tried to take her clothes off.

Manipulation of victim stereotypicality

In the stereotypical victim condition, participants were told that Karen repeatedly tried to push her assailant away and cross her legs so that her clothes could not be removed. In addition, Karen was portrayed as being willing to fully co-operate with the police in their investigations. In the counter-stereotypical victim condition, participants read that Karen did not try to physically resist her assailant and was generally unwilling to co-operate with the police in their investigation. In Masser et al. (2010), these manipulations significantly impacted the ratings of victim stereotypicality, but not gender stereotypicality of the victim.

Verdicts

Following the scenario, participants were asked to indicate whether they thought Jim was guilty or not guilty of raping Karen. Following this, participants were asked to spend a minute writing down all of the factors that they took into account when reaching their verdict. To obtain a continuous measure of guilt-related perceptions, participants were asked to indicate how likely it was that Jim had committed sexual assault, from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).

Evaluations

Next, participants were asked to indicate what they thought about each side of the case. Participants were asked to think back to the evidence presented by the prosecution/defense and to rate the evidence on the 7-point semantic differentials (two items were reverse scored). For example, participants were asked to indicate how weak versus strong, unconvincing versus convincing, clear versus unclear the case was (prosecution, α = .81; defense, α = .87). The composite score was calculated as a mean (as for all multi-item measures used in this study).

Participants were also asked to indicate on a five-item scale how much the complainant and the defendant were to blame for the events described in the scenario. For example, they were asked how much they thought Karen should blame herself for what happened, from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely), and how much control they thought Karen had over the situation, from 1 (none) to 7 (total; one item was reverse scored; α = .85). Comparable items assessed perceptions of blame in relation to the defendant (two items were reverse scored; α = .81).

The credibility of the complainant and the defendant was also assessed across three items. For example, complainant credibility was measured by asking participants to indicate the extent to which they believed Karen’s claims that she was raped, from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely, α = .96). Likewise, an example item for the measure of defendant credibility asked the extent to which participants believed Jim’s claims that he did not rape Karen, from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely; one item was reverse scored; α = .88).

Rape myth acceptance (RMA)

RMA was measured with 15 items from Costins’ R scale (Costin, 1985), with one item reverse scored. For example, participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with items such as “Many women really want to be raped” and “If a woman is going to be raped, she might as well relax and enjoy it,” from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree; α = .89). Higher scores indicate greater agreement with rape myths.

Prior to being debriefed about the study, participants’ demographic information was recorded—age, gender, educational and jury experience.

Results

Overview

Binary logistic regression was used for the measure of participants’ verdicts with RMA as an additional predictor to control for its influence (see Tables 1 and 2). The subsequent analyses used a series of 2 (offense stereotypicality) by 2 (victim stereotypicality) by 2 (participant gender) between-subjects ANCOVAs with RMA as the covariate (see Masser et al., 2010) for the measures assessing case judgments (guilt likelihood), case evaluations (prosecution and defense convincingness), complainant evaluations (credibility and blame), and defendant evaluations (credibility and blame). Significant two-way interactions in the ANCOVAs were followed up by analyses of simple effects (see Tables 3 and 4). Following this, participants’ responses to the open-ended questions were entered into NVivo and coded according to emergent categories.

Table 1.

Logistic Regression Analyses Predicting Verdict by Offense Prototypes, Victim Stereotypes, and Participant Gender With RMA.

Verdict	Offense		Victim				Participant Gender
Verdict	Stereotypical	Counter-Stereotypical	Stereotypical		Counter-Stereotypical		Female	Male
Not guilty	31	50	27		54		25	56
Guilty	184	155	185		154		188	151
			B	SE	Wald	p	Exp(B)	95% CI Exp(B)
			B	SE	Wald	p	Exp(B)	Lower	Upper
RMA			−0.68	.13	26.54	.000	0.51	0.39	0.66
Offense stereotypicality (0, counter-stereotypic; 1, stereotypic)			1.60	.69	5.47	.019	4.97	1.30	19.07
Victim stereotypicality (0, counter-stereotypic; 1, stereotypic)			1.17	.58	4.08	.044	3.22	1.04	10.00
Participant gender (0, female; 1, male)			−.49	.45	1.20	.273	0.61	0.25	1.47
Offense stereotypicality × Victim stereotypicality			−1.00	.04	0.92	.336	0.37	0.05	2.83
Offense stereotypicality × Participant gender			−1.07	.82	1.73	.188	0.34	0.07	1.69
Victim stereotypicality × Participant gender			0.06	.76	0.01	.941	1.06	0.24	4.64
Offense stereotypicality × Victim stereotypicality × Participant gender			0.67	.25	0.28	.595	1.94	0.17	22.55

Note. RMA = rape myth acceptance; CI = confidence interval. Values associated with each dichotomous variable included in parentheses. Verdict was coded as 0, not guilty, and 1, guilty.

Table 2.

Means (Standard Deviations in Parentheses) for Significant Main Effects of Offense Prototypicality, Victim Stereotypicality, and Participant Gender.

Measure	RMA		Offense		Victim		Participant Gender
Measure	B (SE)	$η_{p}^{2}$	Stereotypical	Counter-Stereotypical	Stereotypical	Counter-Stereotypical	Female	Male
Guilt likelihood	−0.38 (.06)	.08	5.81 (1.32)	5.43 (1.63)**	5.85 (1.36)	5.39 (1.59)**	5.78 (1.32)	5.47 (1.61)*
Prosecution convincingness	−0.28 (.05)	.06***	5.12 (1.17)	4.83 (1.35)*	5.32 (1.23)	4.63 (1.22)***	5.04 (1.23)	4.92 (1.30)
Defense convincingness	0.35 (.05)	.11***	3.32 (1.16)	3.50 (1.25)	3.02 (1.21)	3.80 (1.07)***	3.46 (1.20)	3.37 (1.21)
Complainant blame	0.65 (.05)	.28***	2.41 (1.17)	3.35 (1.50)***	2.58 (1.32)	3.18 (1.49)***	2.81 (1.38)	2.95 (1.45)
Complainant credibility	−0.59 (.06)	.18***	5.69 (1.37)	5.21 (1.70)***	5.78 (1.28)	5.12 (1.75)***	5.60 (1.40)	5.30 (1.65)*
Defendant blame	−0.46 (.05)	.20***	6.16 (1.00)	5.53 (1.24)***	6.01 (1.07)	5.69 (1.26)**	5.96 (1.01)	5.74 (1.29)*
Defendant credibility	0.62 (.06)	.22***	2.26 (1.31)	2.81 (1.60)***	2.30 (1.29)	2.78 (1.65)***	2.42 (1.37)	2.66 (1.56)*

Note. RMA = rape myth acceptance. The significance level of differences between pairs of means within each factor is indicated by *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p< .001; df(1, 411).

Table 3.

Means (Standard Deviations in Parentheses) and Simple Effects for the Interaction Between Offense Stereotypicality and Victim Stereotypicality.

Measure	F value	$η_{p}^{2}$	Offense
			Stereotypical		Counter-Stereotypical
			Victim		Victim
			Stereotypical	Counter-Stereotypical	Stereotypical	Counter-Stereotypical
Guilt likelihood	7.61**	.02	5.86 (1.29)	5.77 (1.35)	5.84 (1.43)	5.01 (1.71)***
Prosecution convincingness	10.30**	.02	5.29 (1.25)	4.96 (1.06)*	5.36 (1.21)	4.30 (1.27)***
Defense convincingness	0.96	.00	2.99 (1.19)	3.67 (1.02)***	3.05 (1.22)	3.94 (1.10)***
Complainant blame	4.59*	.01	2.22 (1.10)	2.60 (1.21)*	2.93 (1.41)	3.76 (1.46)***
Complainant credibility	10.79**	.03	5.81 (1.26)	5.57 (1.47)	5.75 (1.30)	4.67 (1.86)***
Defendant blame	10.57**	.03	6.17 (1.06)	6.15 (0.94)	5.85 (1.04)	5.22 (1.34)***
Defendant credibility	14.84***	.04	2.25 (1.25)	2.27 (1.38)	2.34 (1.32)	3.29 (1.72)***

Note. The significance level of differences between pairs of means within each level of offense stereotypicality is indicated by *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Significant interaction effects for each measure are indicated by *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; df(1, 411).

Table 4.

Frequency of Reasons Given for Guilty Verdicts as a Function of Victim Stereotypicality, and Participant Gender for the Stereotypic Offense Scenario.

Stereotypic Victim	Gender			Counter-Stereotypic Victim	Gender
Stereotypic Victim	Female (n = 49)	Male (n = 48)	Total (N = 97)	Counter-Stereotypic Victim	Female (n = 50)	Male (n = 37)	Total (N = 87)
Perpetrator acted like a predator “Karen did not want him to escort her to her car. Jim followed Karen and harassed her.”	26	21	47	Perpetrator acted like a predator “ . . . and stayed with her even though she made it obvious that she wanted to be rid of him.”	32	19	51
Jim should have stopped when Karen said no “He did not stop when she told him to”	20	12	32	Jim should have stopped when Karen said no “ . . . she asked him to stop. Whether or not he thought that was fair he should have respected her wishes.”	30	20	50
Complainant’s behavior indicated non-consent “She fought to protect herself”	16	10	26	Accounting for complainant’s behavior or explanation that complainant’s behavior not relevant “ . . . that she didn’t physically resist is not important as many people who do end up badly injured . . . ”	26	14	40
Total	62	43	105	Total	88	53	141

Preliminary Analyses

RMA

To ensure that the independent variables did not impact participants’ levels of RMA, a preliminary 2 (offense stereotypicality) by 2 (victim stereotypicality) by 2 (participant gender) between-subjects ANOVA with RMA as the dependent variable was conducted. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of participant gender, F(1, 412) = 41.29, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .09, such that male participants scored significantly higher on this measure (M = 2.98, SD = 1.08) than female participants (M = 2.34, SD = 1.01). The effect of offense stereotypicality was also significant, although much smaller, F(1, 412) = 4.34, p = .04, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .01—participants scored higher on the RMA in the counter-stereotypical offense condition (M = 2.75, SD = 2.06) compared with the stereotypical offense condition (M = 2.56, SD = 1.13). All other main effects and interactions were not significant.

Main Analyses

Verdict

Overall, there were 339 guilty verdicts and 81 not guilty verdicts given in response to the scenarios. Binary logistic regression analysis was performed via SPSS on verdict decision as an outcome of offense stereotypicality, victim stereotypicality, participant gender, and their interaction terms. A test of the full model with RMA and all predictors and their interaction terms against a constant-only model was statistically reliable, χ²(8, N = 420) = 69.92, p < .001, indicating that the predictors, as a set, reliably impacted verdict decision (see Table 1). The analyses showed that while RMA was a significant predictor—with stronger endorsement of rape myths associated with a lower likelihood of a guilty verdict—participants were still more likely to give a guilty verdict when the offense was stereotypic and also when the victim was stereotypic. The effect of participant gender was not significant, and nor were the interaction terms.

Analyses of covariance

For the ANCOVAs testing the predictions for the remaining measures assessing participants’ case judgments (guilt likelihood), case evaluations (prosecution and defense convincingness), complainant evaluations (credibility and blame), and defendant evaluations (credibility and blame), there were broadly consistent effects. The means (and standard deviations) of the variables of interest for the following analyses are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Higher scores on the measure of RMA were significantly associated with lower ratings of guilt likelihood, prosecution convincingness, complainant credibility, and defendant blame. Higher scores were also significantly associated with higher ratings of defense convincingness, defendant credibility, and victim blame.

There were significant main effects of offense stereotypicality on the measures of guilt likelihood, F(1, 411) = 8.18, p < .01, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .02; prosecution convincingness, F(1, 411) = 6.39, p < .05, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .02; complainant blame, F(1, 411) = 77.65, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .16; complainant credibility, F(1, 411) = 13.63, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .03; defendant blame, F(1, 411) = 44.56, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = 10; and defendant credibility, F(1, 411) = 20.99, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .05, such that participants had more positive perceptions of the complainant and the prosecution case and less positive evaluations of the defendant in a stranger compared with an acquaintance rape scenario.

Furthermore, there were significant main effects of victim stereotypicality for all measures: guilt likelihood, F(1, 411) = 11.76, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .03; prosecution convincingness, F(1, 411) = 37.55, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .08; defense convincingness, F(1, 411) = 55.57, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .12; complainant blame, F(1, 411) = 33.06, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .07; complainant credibility, F(1, 411) = 26.51, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .06; defendant blame, F(1, 411) = 11.78, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .03; and defendant credibility, F(1, 411) = 16.07, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .04. Participants had more positive perceptions of the complainant and the prosecution case and less positive evaluations of the defendant and the defense case when the complainant acted stereotypically compared with counter-stereotypically.

There were also significant main effects of participant gender for guilt likelihood, F(1, 411) = 4.91, p < .05, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .01; complainant credibility, F(1, 411) = 5.20, p < .05, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .01; defendant blame, F(1, 411) = 4.92, p < .05, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .01; and defendant credibility, F(1, 411) = 3.88, p < .05, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .01. On these measures, female participants were more confident, thought guilt more likely, had more positive perceptions of the complainant, and less positive evaluations of the defendant compared with male participants (see Table 2).

The effects of offense stereotypicality and victim stereotypicality were qualified by an interaction between these two variables again for all measures except defense convincingness. As predicted, victim stereotypicality generally had no effect or a lesser effect on participants’ perceptions in the stranger rape condition compared with the acquaintance rape condition. In the latter condition, participants had more positive views of the complainant and the prosecution case and less positive views of the defendant when the victim was stereotypical compared with counter-stereotypical (see Table 3). In this condition, participants thought that defendant was less likely to be guilty, that the prosecution had a less convincing case, the complainant was more to blame and was less credible, and the defendant was less to blame and more credible when the complainant acted counter-stereotypically than when she acted stereotypically.

Furthermore, the effects of victim stereotypicality and participant gender were qualified by an interaction between these two variables for complainant, F(1, 411) = 4.88, p < .05, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .01, and defendant credibility, F(1, 411) = 8.57, p < .01, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .02. When the victim was stereotypical, the ratings of complainant credibility (M_Male = 5.77, SD = 1.36; M_Female = 5.79, SD = 1.16), F(1, 411) = 0.02, p = .90, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .00, and defendant credibility (M_Male = 2.25, SD = 1.32; M_Female = 2.35, SD = 1.24), F(1, 411) = 0.36, p = 0.55, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .00) were consistent for all participants. However, when the victim was counter-stereotypical, male participants rated the complainant as less credible (M_Male = 4.82, SD = 1.79; M_Female = 5.41, SD = 1.58), F(1, 411) = 10.01, p = .002, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .02, and the defendant as more credible (M_Male = 3.08, SD = 1.69; M_Female = 2.48, SD = 1.48), F(1, 411) = 11.79, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .03, relative to female participants.

Open-Ended Responses

Participants’ responses to the question asking them to write down all of the factors that they took into account when reaching their verdict were coded until all responses fitted into coding categories. Categories were generated from theory and were data-driven. Three researchers agreed on the categories to be used, and one researcher assigned the responses to categories blind to the condition that the response was associated with. Answers in each category were checked to ensure that they were representative of their assigned category. Similarly themed categories were grouped together into higher-order categories. This resulted in six higher-order categories: accounting for the complainant’s behavior or explanation that the complainant’s behavior was not relevant; the complainant’s decisions or behavior on the night put her at risk of rape; the complainant’s post-event behavior casts doubt; the complainant’s behavior clearly indicated non-consent; the complainant’s post-event behavior was appropriate; and the perpetrator acted like a predator. There were additional categories that were not aggregated (Tables 4 to 7 provide some examples of these).

Table 5.

Frequency of Reasons Given For Guilty Verdicts as a Function of Victim Stereotypicality, and Participant Gender for the Counter-Stereotypic Offense Scenario.

Stereotypic Victim	Gender			Counter-Stereotypic Victim	Gender
Stereotypic Victim	Female (n = 49)	Male (n = 39)	Total (N = 88)	Counter-Stereotypic Victim	Female (n = 40)	Male (n = 27)	Total (N = 67)
Jim should have stopped when Karen said no “ . . . she said no and did not consent to sexual intercourse so therefore jim [sic] is guilty of rape”	32	20	52	Jim should have stopped when Karen said no “NO means NO”	33	16	49
Complainant’s behavior indicated non-consent “Trying to remove her clothing while she is tryig [sic] with every effort to stop him doing so.”	14	7	21	Accounting for complainant’s behavior or explanation that complainant’s behavior not relevant “Karen was possibly afraid of consequences if she had resisted further”	19	4	23
Complainant’s post-event behavior appropriate “took into accout [sic] that police said “she cooperated in the investigation.”	10	6	16	Jim forced himself on Karen “That he used physical force to penetrate her”	10	4	14
Accounting for complainant’s behavior or explanation that her behavior not relevant “Even though Karen had mentioned kissing … is still not permission for sexual intercourse”	9	7	16	Complainant’s decisions or behavior put her at risk of rape “She should not have gone to his house as some men consider that to be “consent” Don’t know/No comment/Indifference	8 2	45	127
Total	65	40	105	Total	72	33	105

Table 6.

Frequency of Reasons Given for not Guilty Verdicts as a Function of Victim Stereotypicality, and Participant Gender for the Stereotypic Offense Scenario.

Stereotypic Victim	Gender			Counter-Stereotypic Victim	Gender
Stereotypic Victim	Female (n = 3)	Male (n = 9)	Total (N = 12)	Counter-Stereotypic Victim	Female (n = 3)	Male (n = 16)	Total (N = 19)
Evidence purely hearsay “It is simply her word against his.”	2	3	5	Complainant’s decisions or behavior put her at risk of rape “Karen didn’t resist so the alleged crime has conflict on if it was consensual or not.”	3	9	12
Insufficient evidence or information “In the summary given there was not enough evidence to prove guilt beyond any doubt.”	2	3	5	Complainant’s post-event behavior casts doubt “She was also unco-operative with the police in the initial enquiries.”	2	4	6
				Insufficient evidence or information“I dont [sic] think Jim is guilty as not enough evidence was produced”	1	6	7
Total	4	6	10	Total	6	19	25

Table 7.

Frequency of Reasons Given for Not Guilty Verdicts as a Function of Victim Stereotypicality, and Participant Gender for the Counter-Stereotypic Offense Scenario.

Stereotypic Victim	Gender			Counter-Stereotypic Victim	Gender
Stereotypic Victim	Female (n = 5)	Male (n = 10)	Total (N = 15)	Counter-Stereotypic Victim	Female (n = 14)	Male (n = 21)	Total (N = 35)
Complainant’s decisions or behavior put her at risk of rape“If she did not intend to have sex, she should not have put herself in that situation. Every girl knows that . . . ”	4	5	9	Complainant’s decisions or behavior put her at risk of rape“If she was serious, she would have physically tried to stop him.”	12	18	30
Comment about appropriate punishment“during this year in prison he will understand that he have committed something wrong . . . ”	2	3	5	Evidence purely hearsay“It was her word against his.”	3	3	6
Evidence purely hearsay“It was purely her word against his.”	2	4	6	Complainant’s post-event behavior casts doubt“I thought it was odd that Karen changed her story . . . ”	3	7	10
Insufficient evidence or information“there is no mention of physical injuries sustained to either party that may indicate resistance . . . ”	2	5	7
Total	10	17	27	Total	18	28	46

Tables 4 to 7 show the top response categories for women and men (excluding categories where the total category count for women and men was two or less) as a function of verdict, offense stereotypicality, and victim stereotypicality. For responses to the stranger rape scenario, the categories produced were consistent across male and female participants, with the same three categories emerging for both male and female participants within each victim type and verdict decision. Responses of male participants to the acquaintance rape scenario were generally more diversified than the responses of female participants; however, the same higher order categories of responses emerged for both genders.

Accounting for guilty verdicts in the stranger rape conditions

The primary focus of responses given by participants for a guilty verdict in the stranger rape scenarios (Table 4) was on the menacing nature of the defendant, with this consistent across both victim stereotypicality conditions. Participants specifically noted that the defendant approached the complainant in the street, would not leave her alone when asked, and waited until they were in an unlit area of the street. The issue of consent was secondary, with the behavior of the complainant considered after this. Where the behavior of the complainant was mentioned in the counter-stereotypic victim condition, an emphasis was placed on accounting for her behavior (i.e., she was afraid she may be killed) or clarifying why a consideration the complainants’ behavior was not relevant.

Accounting for guilty verdicts in the acquaintance rape conditions

In the acquaintance rape scenarios, respondents’ accounts centered on whether the complainant gave consent, rather than the nature of the defendant (Table 5). In both victim stereotype conditions, the complainant asking the defendant to stop was given as the primary reason for the verdict. Despite this initial consistency, differences in the accounts provided by those participants exposed to the stereotypical victim vs. the counter-stereotypical victim scenarios emerged after this point.

In the stereotypical victim condition, as in the equivalent stranger rape scenario, the complainant’s stereotypic behavior (both during and after the event) comprised dominant themes. However, in this context, the complainant’s stereotypic behavior was used by respondents to overcome the question of whether consent had been provided by her behavior. In this condition, this broader category consisted entirely of the response categories “Kissing and caressing not consent to sex”; “Karen accepting invitation to Jim’s apartment does not mean she was consenting to sex”; and “Women have the right to change their mind.”

While at the broad level the theme of “accounting for the complainant’s behavior or explanation that complainant’s behavior not relevant” was also dominant in the acquaintance rape counter-stereotypical victim condition, the lower order categories of responses related to a broader range of behaviors than evidenced in the acquaintance rape stereotypic victim condition. These included explaining why the complainant did not physically resist the defendant or why she may not have been cooperative with the police. While (some) participants thus attempted to explain why the counter-stereotypic behavior of the complainant should not be relevant, the fourth most frequently given reason related to “Complainant’s decisions or behavior on the night put her at risk of rape.” This category of reasons was not present in the accounts provided in the stereotypic victim condition and included references to the fact that the complainant had gone back to the defendants apartment and had been physically intimate. As such, even among participants who found the defendant guilty, in this condition the non-consent of the complainant is seemingly qualified in part by her counter-stereotypical victim behavior.

Accounting for not guilty verdicts

The focus on the counter-stereotypical behavior of the complainant is more clearly evident in the accounts of the minority of participants who gave a not guilty verdict. In both the stranger (Table 6) and acquaintance rape (Table 7) scenarios, the “complainant’s decisions or behavior on the night put her at risk of rape” was the most frequently given reason for a not guilty verdict. However, the greater number of participants mentioning this in the acquaintance rape scenarios suggests that this context appeared to legitimize a focus on the complainant’s behavior.

Furthermore, in the acquaintance rape scenarios, the salience or centrality of the complainant’s behavior differed depending on its stereotypicality, with more than three times as many participants mentioning this in the counter-stereotypical versus stereotypical condition. In both victim stereotype conditions, this category comprised comments about the victim’s decision to go home with the defendant and be physically intimate. However, in the counter-stereotypic victim condition, this broader category also comprised discourse related to the fact that the complainant had not physically resisted her attacker.

Discussion

Our predictions were based on the findings of Masser et al. (2010) and consistent with Estrich’s (1987) reasoning. We predicted that in the case involving a counter-stereotypical victim compared with a stereotypical victim, the defense case would be evaluated more positively, and the defendant would be seen as less guilty and also evaluated more positively. We also predicted the opposite pattern for the measures relating to the victim. This pattern was expected to hold only in the context of a counter-stereotypical rape, which was described as an acquaintance rape scenario. Consistent with the proposed hierarchical model of decision making, we expected that in the context of a prototypical (stranger) rape, the stereotypicality of the victim’s behavior would have no impact on perceptions and evaluations made in this context. Furthermore, we suggested that mock jurors would focus on different factors in reaching their verdicts in stranger and acquaintance rape cases. Specifically, we expected a focus on the location of the attack and the behavior and identity of the perpetrator in the stranger rape case. This would be consistent with the central question of whether the defendant is the alleged perpetrator. In contrast, in the acquaintance rape case we expected a greater focus on the complainant’s behavior—consistent with the question of whether the sexual interaction portrayed is rape or consensual sex.

The quantitative results of the current study broadly support our hypotheses. Across a variety of measures, victim stereotypicality generally had no effect or a lesser effect on participants’ perceptions in the stranger rape condition. However in the acquaintance rape condition, victim stereotypicality did matter. Participants rated the likelihood that the defendant was guilty as higher, had more positive views of the complainant and the prosecution’s case, and less positive views of the defendant when the victim was stereotypical compared with counter-stereotypical. Analysis of the qualitative data also suggested a focus on different factors in reaching verdicts in the stranger and acquaintance rape conditions. In the stranger rape scenario, the focus was on the defendant and his behavior. In contrast, in the acquaintance rape scenario, the central themes were focused on establishing whether consent to the sexual act was given or implied. Consistent with hierarchical models of impressions formation, such as the continuum model (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), these results suggest that perceivers generally start with the “real rape” crime prototype (Estrich, 1987) in attempting to interpret what happened and how blame should be apportioned in cases of alleged rape. As seen in the qualitative data, this classification may motivate different questions to be asked of the evidence, leading to a “step-down’ through the hierarchy of schemas and, subsequently, the use of victim stereotypes to evaluate the complainant in counter-stereotypical cases.

Although effects of participant gender were observed on a number of measures, gender did not qualify the interaction between offender and victim stereotypes. This suggests that the “step-down” between schemas occurs equally for men and women. However, the presence of two significant interactions between gender and victim stereotypes suggests that victim stereotypicality has somewhat different effects for men and women—at least in terms of how the defendant and complainant are perceived as being credible—but that these differences do not vary as a function of offense stereotypicality. It was only when the victim was counter-stereotypical that male and female participants had different ratings of complainant and defendant credibility. Male participants tended to rate the complainant as less credible and defendant as more credible in this condition, and so males appeared to be more strongly influenced by the manipulation of victim stereotypicality on these measures.

While the majority of the results support such a hierarchical model, the qualitative results and elements of the quantitative results suggest that for some, the consideration of offense prototypes and complainant behavior did not occur in the hypothesized order. Consistent with the results of the earlier archival analysis by Horney and Spohn (1996), the stereotypicality of the complainant’s behavior appeared to either be considered concurrently to the offense prototypicality or considered in lieu of it. This is most clearly seen in the qualitative results for those who gave a not guilty verdict. With the exception of the stranger rape/stereotypic victim condition in which not guilty verdicts were rare, in all conditions the “complainant’s decisions or behavior on the night put her at risk of rape” was the most frequently given reason for this verdict. This theme was most dominant in the acquaintance rape/counter-stereotypical victim condition.

This focus on the complainant’s behavior for the majority of those who gave a not guilty verdict may represent the chronic accessibility of beliefs about rape-complainant behavior for some individuals. Alternatively, it may reflect the post hoc (vs. “on-line”) reasoning that participants engaged in within the current study to account for their verdicts. That is, having taken a “verdict driven” approach (Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983) some individuals may not have been cognizant of the reasoning they engaged in to arrive at their verdict. As such, when asked to provide an account of a decision that had already been made, they may have simply drawn on the salient components of the scenarios. These components were, as rape cases are, predominantly focused on the complainant (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). Such a suggestion is consistent with Dreben, Fiske, and Hastie (1979) who found that people know exactly how they feel about somebody without recalling their reasons for those feelings.

Future research should explore this possibility by asking participants to highlight in real time the information they see at that point in time as being important to their decision making. Such an approach may help to elucidate the order of consideration, and impact, of crime prototypes and victim stereotypes. Furthermore, future research may wish to ensure that—as far as possible—the complainant’s behavior is not particularly emphasized. This could occur through providing equivalent amounts of information about the defendant and complainant. While this may impact further the ecological validity of the stimulus material (Anderson & Doherty, 2008), one possibility is that this provision may attenuate the focus on the complainant’s behavior and the evaluation of this in light of victim stereotypes. Alternatively, and as suggested by recent research by Elyssel and Bohner (2011), the provision of more information may simply heighten perceivers’ entitlement to judge and their reliance on stereotypes.

In the context of the counter-prototypical rape, and consistent with our hypotheses, victim counter-stereotypicality resulted in less positive views of the complainant and more positive views of the defendant and his case than when the complainant behaved in a stereotypical manner. The qualitative analyses provide some insight into the reasoning engaged in by participants in their attributions across these conditions. While, consistent with the law, the verbal non-consent of the complainant was a key consideration for participants, the relationship of the complainant’s behavior to the consensual heterosexual script (Metts & Spitzberg, 1996) was also important. Consistent with Ellison and Munro’s (2010) findings, the active resistance of the stereotypical victim persuaded participants as to the veracity of the complainant’s non-consent despite the apparent match of elements of her behavior with the consensual sexual script. In contrast, in the counter-stereotypical victim condition the consistency of the complainant’s behavior with the consensual sexual script appeared to motivate participants to distribute blame across both the complainant and the defendant. Participants appeared to flexibly account for non-diagnostic aspects of the complainant’s behavior depending on the activation of the “good” (stereotypical) or “bad” (counter-stereotypical) victim categorization. Such a process is consistent with Kunda and Thagard’s (1996) parallel-constraint-satisfaction theory of impression formation.

While the demonstration of stereotypical behaviors by the complainant, particularly the active physical resistance of the assault (Ellison & Munro, 2010), appeared to be a key concern for participants in distinguishing whether sexual assault or consensual sex took place, what remains unknown is how the behavior of the perpetrator interacts with this (Clark & Quadara, 2010). Consistent with other research (e.g., Abrams et al., 2003; Viki et al., 2004) and drawing on the predominant focus of rape trials (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966), the current study only focused on systemically varying the behavior of the complainant. In reality, however, the behavior of the perpetrator should also contribute to the categorization of an alleged assault as rape or consensual sex.

The consensual sexual script is generally agreed upon within cultures and across genders (Krahé et al., 2007). As such, perpetrators of such assaults may work within this script rather than against it (Abbey & Jacques-Tiura, 2011; Clark & Quadara, 2010), and use the behaviors that characterize consensual sex to cast doubt on their complainant’s account. Uniform attribution of blame to a perpetrator of sexual assault in an acquaintance (counter-prototypical) case may therefore only occur when the behavior of both the complainant and the perpetrator are stereotypical and are both in contrast with the consensual sex script. In attributing blame for an assault, or even in deciding whether the assumption of consent by the defendant was reasonable (Fileborn, 2011), perceivers may evaluate the behavior of the perpetrator to see its match with the consensual sexual script. As such, the perpetrator of an assault in which the complainant actively resists may be treated more leniently if he behaves in a manner that is consistent with consensual sex scripts. For example, if he calls her the next day to ask her out for dinner compared with if he flees the scene after the alleged assault and does not make contact again (Clark & Quadara, 2010). This may occur even if the post-assault behavior of the perpetrator is strategically contrived rather than genuine. Future research should systematically explore the role of offense prototypes, victim stereotypes, and perpetrator stereotypes in cases of alleged sexual assault and rape.

An additional and related consideration for future research is the methodology used in the current study. Anderson and Doherty (2008) noted that the use of the scenario method in rape perception research may lead to an over-reliance on the categorizations provided to participants in those scenarios. We have previously argued that the contextual salience of the role of jurors in an actual trial for sexual assault would lead to similar role categorizations (Masser et al., 2010). In addition, similar conclusions about attributions of blame in an acquaintance rape case were reached by Ellison and Munro (2010) on the basis of nine different live simulations of shortened trials. While their research varied a number of complainant factors and procedural variables across a small number of trials, their findings highlight and reinforce the importance of the stereotypicality of the complainant’s behavior for jurors in attributing blame and deciding upon a verdict.

Conclusions and Implications

The aim of the current study was to build on the research of Masser et al. (2010) and the reasoning of Estrich (1987) and consider the impact of victim stereotypicality in the context of stranger (prototypic) or acquaintance (non-prototypic) rape offenses. Furthermore, we sought to consider the qualitative rationale provided by participants for their interpretations of what happened and how blame should be apportioned. We orthogonally manipulated offense prototypes and victim stereotypes in a scenario study. While the results of the current study provide broad support for a hierarchical model of schemas in rape cases, in which victim stereotypicality impacts most strongly in non-prototypical offenses, the qualitative analyses reinforce the importance of the consensual sexual script in apportioning blame for assault. Such a focus highlights the need to consider the perpetrator’s behavior and its relationship to consensual sexual scripts in future research.

Taken in conjunction with the results of Masser et al. (2010), the results of the current study suggest that distinct schemas impact rape case decision making in a hierarchical order. Masser et al. demonstrated that the gender stereotypicality of the complainant is only considered by those for whom gender is a chronically accessible category and only in the context of complainant behavior that is counter-stereotypical. The current research “stepped up” the hierarchy of sexual assault schemas and demonstrated that when manipulated orthogonally, the stereotypicality of the victim’s behavior is predominantly considered for subjective evaluations of the complainant, defendant, and case in the context of non-prototypical or acquaintance assaults. As seen in the verdicts delivered in the current study, while the eradication of the influence of stereotypes would be beneficial in all cases of sexual assault, the results suggest that efforts to eliminate the impact of victim stereotypes—perhaps through pre-conscious egalitarian goal activation (Moskowitz & Li, 2011)—should be concentrated in those assaults that do not fit the prototype of “real” rape (Estrich, 1987).

These findings also suggest another potential strategy to reduce the effect of victim stereotypes, and that is to educate jurors about the actual base rates of the different types of sexual assaults. This strategy would aim to broaden jurors’ conception of “real” rape to include the acquaintance assaults (which occur more frequently) in the same category as the stereotypical stranger assaults. The effect of such re-categorization would be to reduce the influence of other stereotypes that are relied upon in counter-stereotypical cases—namely victim and gender-related stereotypes. While there is a reasonable chance that such educative efforts might be effective (Ask, 2010)—a similar strategy has been used in relation to child witnesses to contextualize their responses (Goodman-Delahunty, Cossins, & O’Brien, 2010)—it remains possible that the representativeness heuristic may limit the impact of base rate information (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).

Finally, further work is needed to understand the effects of such stereotypes on others involved in cases of sexual assault, not just those taking the role of jurors. In particular, it remains unexplored using an experimental methodology how and when offense and victim stereotypes influence the perceptions and decisions of police officers who are responsible for gathering information in such cases and deciding whether that there is a reasonable chance of prosecution (Ask, 2010; Sleath & Bull, 2012). In many jurisdictions, police receive training specifically about cases of sexual assault, and so it is possible that while these stereotypes might not exert a substantial influence over how they perceive the victim’s complaint (cf. Sleath & Bull, 2012), it may influence their decision about whether to pursue the matter due to their perception of how the jury might evaluate the victim’s complaint. Thus, thinking that the jury would be influenced by offense and victim stereotypes, even though they themselves are not, might still impact decisions to prosecute.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by an Australian Research Council Discovery Grant (DP1093581).

Author Biographies

Blake M. McKimmie, PhD, is an Associate Professor (Reader) in the School of Psychology at the University of Queensland. His research investigates how jurors make decisions and the effect of being in a group on individuals’ attitudes and behaviors. He runs the Applied Social Psychology Lab in the School of Psychology:

Barbara M. Masser, PhD, is an Associate Professor (Reader) in the School of Psychology at the University of Queensland, Australia. Her research interests include basic and applied aspects of attitudes and social cognition, gender, sexual aggression, and blood and blood production donation.

Renata Bongiorno, PhD, is in the School of Psychology at the University of Queensland. Her research examines gender inequality, collective action, and social change.

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