A Case of Culture

Abstract

The purpose of this study was to investigate the use of cultural evidence toward an automatism defense, and whether such evidence would be detrimental or beneficial to a male versus a female defendant. U.S. participants (N = 208), recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, read a fictional spousal homicide case in which the defendant claimed to have blacked out during the crime. We manipulated the gender of the defendant and whether a culture-specific issue was claimed to have precipitated the defendant’s blackout. ANOVAs revealed that cultural evidence positively affected perceived credibility for the female defendant, whereas there were no differences for the male defendant. Results also demonstrated that when cultural evidence was presented, the female defendant was seen as less in control of her actions than was the male defendant. Furthermore, lower credibility and higher perceived defendant control predicted harsher verdict decisions. This investigation may aid scholars in discussing concerns regarding a clash between multicultural and feminist objectives in the courtroom.

Keywords

homicide cultural contexts cultural defense

Juror decision-making is a complex task, requiring laypersons to assess the actions of diverse others. However, what constitutes a “reasonable” action in the eyes of a juror may differ based on any number of extralegal factors. A myriad of psychological research has uncovered biases that can interfere with such decision-making (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Although previous researchers have investigated the role of juror attitudes toward the insanity defense, gender, and race (see Bloechl, Vitacco, Neumann, & Erickson, 2007; Quas, Bottoms, Haegerich, & Nysse-Carris, 2002; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001), attitudes toward diverse cultural viewpoints in the courtroom remain relatively unexplored. What is more, according to the 2010 Census, immigration trends show that cultural diversity is an increasing inevitability in the United States. For example, since 2000, the Asian American population has grown at more than 4 times the rate of the United States total population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). Within the globalization characteristic of the modern world, it is prudent to understand the consequences of what may be viewed as “deviation” from the norm. Indeed, Dundes Renteln (2004) argued that the “ordinary person” that jurors may use as a reference point is essentially a person from the dominant group, that is, someone living in the United States who has had exposure to U.S. customs and has internalized them.

Although culture can greatly shape our viewpoints, at present, cultural evidence serves only to augment other formal defenses, such as provocation (R. v. Humaid, 2006; R. v. Nahar, 2002) and mistake of law (State v. Kargar, 1996). In Regina v. Muddaruba (unpublished decision as cited in “The Cultural Defense,” 1986), the jury was simply asked to consider how a “reasonable” person from the defendant’s culture would have acted. Scholars continue to debate the merits of a stand-alone “cultural defense”—wherein a defendant can ask the court to consider how conflict between the dominant culture and his or her culture should mitigate punishment or excuse the crime—under British and U.S. law. Dundes Renteln (2004) argued that the chief benefit of a substantive cultural defense would be to ensure consideration of cultural evidence (even if it is subsequently deemed irrelevant to that case), given that it is seldom allowed.

However, legal systems have hesitated to adopt an independent cultural defense, for fear of “excusing” assailants from their crimes (“The Cultural Defense,” 1986). Especially where such cases involve violence toward women, failing to punish a defendant risks setting a dangerous precedent. For instance, the U.S. case of People v. Chen (1989), in which a man murdered his wife, provoked such concerns when Mr. Chen received only 5 years probation due in part to cultural evidence. The Chen case has been influential in debates surrounding potential misuse of the cultural defense, and ways in which that misuse may be symptomatic of ethnocentrism on the part of the legal system. Therefore, one of the main objections raised against implementing a substantive cultural defense is the possibility that feminist goals and cultural issues will be at odds in the courtroom (Volpp, 1996). Volpp (1996) cautioned against taking this stance in a way that depicts U.S. culture as “feminist” and “non-European immigrant culture as male” (p. 1577). Noting that “Asian culture” is often scapegoated as the cause of violence in Asian communities, Volpp (1994) reminded us of the dangers of reducing culture to simple stereotypes. However, it is possible that jurors adopt such a standpoint. As Dundes Renteln (2004) remarked, many people reject the principle of a cultural defense outright, on the grounds that it promotes disorder.

If jurors indeed assume that any use of a cultural defense is tantamount to an abuse of it, then the cultural defendant may suffer. Moreover, attributing domestic violence to “foreign” culture misappropriates blame and reinforces negative stereotypes. Given that the legal system is founded on principles of justice and equality, it is necessary to fix a critical eye on decision-making that tacitly encourages essentializing of any groups. Although the overall purpose of presenting cultural evidence is to provide the juror with relevant information as to the defendant’s state of mind, cultural biases may negate that assumption. To the aim of understanding whether a “cultural defense” will result in poorer outcomes for a defendant, and whether those outcomes are gender dependent, it is necessary to build a body of empirical evidence. The purpose of this study was to investigate juror decision-making in a spousal homicide case in which a Chinese defendant claimed to have blacked out during the crime (i.e., pleading not guilty by reason of automatism), compared with one in which cultural evidence was provided in support of that defense. If, in reality, presenting cultural evidence fosters biased decision-making rather than aiding in the defendant’s case, then the assumption that cultural context can mitigate responsibility does not hold.

Defining Culture

As many researchers would confirm, defining culture is a difficult feat. Van Broeck (2001) defined culture as “an intersubjectif system of symbols, which offer the human being an orientation toward others, the material world, him or herself and the non-human” (p. 8). Although culture can subsume issues pertaining to gender and race, it can also be regarded as a distinct construct. Various cultures may contain distinct social constructions of gender, and people of different races may belong to the same culture. In many ways this study investigates the cultural aspects of such variables. Therefore, we use the word culture to refer to a broader categorization, under which persons have internalized the same values. Dundes Renteln (2004) described culture as essentially synonymous with “a way of life” (p. 10). She asserted that the key to an affirmative argument for the cultural defense is that we tend to internalize cultural ways of life automatically and unconsciously, referred to as “enculturation.”

Triandis and Suh (2002) maintained that culture is comprised of “shared standard operating procedure, unstated assumptions, tools, norms, values, habits about sampling the environment, and the like” (p. 136). They highlighted the role of shared language in the influence of culture, given that it plays a significant role in how one perceives his or her environment. Hence, culture is shared by people who reside in a specific historical period, and who are in close proximity (Triandis & Suh, 2002). It should be noted that the nuance arising from subcultures is beyond the scope of this study. Rather, we consider the potential problems associated with the viewpoint of the dominant group (i.e., persons who are enculturated in the United States). Granted, identifying the line between “dominant culture” and “subculture” is further complex. Specific variables can work in orchestra to constitute a subculture. Thus, a heightened appreciation for the power of intersectionality may provide insight as to the many systematic forces that contribute to marginalization. We recognize that individuals are unlikely to identify with only one type of culture. Indeed, scholars have discussed the complexities arising from diaspora—broadly, the dispersion of populations into different geographic areas. As Canagarajah and Silberstein (2012) asserted, given both temporal and geographic shifts of groups from their homeland, people sharing the same heritage may develop different values and identities. For the goals we lay out in this article, we examine cultural identities associated with national, ethnic, and gendered group membership as a point of departure for future cultural defense research.

Significantly, as Volpp (1994) articulated, one must not assume that the U.S. court is devoid of culture. In fact, she emphasized that dichotomizing the terms “Asian” and “American” in many ways dismisses the “fluid, shifting nature of the American identity” (p. 61). Accordingly, she underscored that calls for the cultural defense show how immigrants, or simply racialized “others,” can be psychologically distanced from U.S. culture, as though somehow cultural diversity did not contribute to U.S. identity. There are myriad ways in which a person of Asian descent might self-identify, where “American” might be separate, parallel, or in unison with this identity. Therefore, here we conceptualize “dominant” to represent the culture subscribed by the U.S. legal system, that is, in which a defendant’s frame of mind is touted as a deviation from normality. Testing whether juror decision-making diverges from the mere mention of culture can thus inform this cultural distancing of the defendant.

Culture and Legal Decision-Making

The definition of a “reasonable” story is markedly divergent cross-culturally. For instance, in the case of Kong Moua (1985), the defendant claimed to have carried out the ritual of “marriage by capture,” which resulted in a charge of rape. Some researchers have asserted that rituals serve to communicate and achieve social goals, as well as to maintain the status quo (Hoffman & Medlock-Klyukovski, 2004; Rothenbuhler, 1998). As Hoffman (2004) elaborated, ritual is a means of “resisting unwanted identities” (p. 393); these symbols that are used to create meaning and prescribe values (Hoffman, 2004) are epitomized in the courtroom. It may be unreasonable to assume that jurors who are unfamiliar with certain cultural practices will be willing to accept a story as plausible. Levine (2003) noted that, when considering the defendant’s intent, the jury may find him or her not guilty if they are provided with “an alternative and plausible” (p. 47) account for the behavior. Although as a matter of law, “intent” is considered distinct from one’s actions, cultural viewpoints may dictate what we assume to be the intent behind the crime (Levine, 2003). Jurors’ beliefs about a morally defensible act may be heavily influenced by cultural moral codes. This notion is particularly relevant in cases in which there is no dispute that the defendant physically committed a crime, but rather there is disagreement regarding how that crime should be understood.

Although a diverse array of scholars has discussed whether there should be a stand-alone cultural defense (e.g., Dundes Renteln, 2004; Levine, 2003; Van Broeck, 2001; Volpp, 1996), few empirical studies have been undertaken to explore the impact of cultural differences in court. However, using archival data, T. S. Taylor and Hosch (2004) investigated the possibility of either a similarity-leniency or a black sheep effect regarding Hispanic and Anglo defendants and jurors in Texas. Notably, Texas juries are asked to make sentence length recommendations in addition to verdict decisions. T. S. Taylor and Hosch (2004) hypothesized that a bias to show leniency toward in-group members (similarity-leniency) could be demonstrated through fewer convictions for members of the numerical ethnic majority on the jury (i.e., at least seven jurors). Conversely, they hypothesized that harshness toward in-group members—as a means to dissociate with a negative act (black sheep effect)—could be demonstrated through higher conviction rates for defendants who were members of the minority of a jury composed of an extreme ethnic majority (i.e., 10 or 11 jurors). Results did not support these predictions; however, they found that case strength and number of Hispanic jurors interacted to affect sentence length. They concluded that there may have been key differences in how Hispanic and non-Hispanic jurors interpreted the evidence with regard to sentencing. It is likely that there were additional factors that affected juror decisions, which would not manifest through archival data. Given that T. S. Taylor and Hosch (2004) used Hispanic surnames as a marker to ascertain juror ethnicity, they granted that the jurors’ self-reported ethnic identity could not be observed. They also remarked that some jurors may have been culturally Hispanic, but did not have a Hispanic surname, whereas some with a Hispanic surname may not have identified as such. Investigating the extent to which participants may “other” a defendant in terms of cultural viewpoints, rather than simply ethnic classifications, might therefore be illuminating.

In their study of causal attributions and ethnocentrism, D. M. Taylor and Jaggi (1974) demonstrated the power of group differences. In a sample of people of the Hindu faith, they found that participants tended to use internal causal explanations when explaining positive events for another Hindu person, but tended to use external causal explanations for negative events. Conversely, participants tended to attribute negative events to internal causes when evaluating the actions of a Muslim person. These findings imply that, when asked to evaluate another’s actions, people may ascribe different causes based on group membership alone, an effect that is certainly problematic for jurors. In examining the effect of explicitly mentioning culture, we might better ascertain whether a potential in-group/out-group bias works as a function of alerting jurors to a “difference” between the defendant’s culture and U.S. culture. As aforementioned, cultural issues may yet subsume other relevant variables; most notably, gender differences may emerge as a function of culture.

Defendant Gender

In general, juror decision-making researchers have implicated defendant gender as an important variable of interest. For instance, Dean, Wayne, Mack, and Thomas (2000) found that men were rated as having a higher likelihood of guilt than women in both assault and theft cases. Mazzella and Feingold (1994) asserted that because of the overrepresentation of males among offenders, jurors might more easily associate a male defendant with guilt. In their meta-analytic review of gender-based jury studies, they found a small pattern of punitive harshness toward male defendants. They also found that jurors were harsher in terms of both guilt and punishment when cases involved a female as compared with a male victim. However, a more recent meta-analysis conducted by Devine and Caughlin (2014) demonstrated a different pattern when examining community samples. They found that female defendants were somewhat more likely to be convicted than male defendants for studies involving community members, but the opposite pattern for student samples. Notably, female defendants were more likely to be found guilty in studies that used dichotomous as opposed to continuous verdict variables. Overall, they concluded that research in the time after Mazzella and Feingold’s (1994) study shows that the stereotype associating men with crime may be less powerful than previous estimates. However, they granted that results varied slightly across case types, given that many involved gender issues, such as domestic homicide.

McCoy and Gray (2007) argued that paternalism may be responsible for leniency toward female defendants, whereby women are portrayed as “childlike” (p. 1579). In fact, Wilczynski (1997) examined the treatment of men and women in parent–child homicide cases, and concluded that men tend to receive a “bad” label and women a “mad” label. That is, men who kill their children are evil, but women who kill their children are ill. Traditional gender roles that diminish the agency of women may therefore contribute to the disparate treatment of male and female defendants.

Culture and Defendant Gender

When investigating culture in the courtroom, it is imperative to consider whether any factors will operate differently according to gender, especially considering the objection that multiculturalism and feminism objectives are potentially antithetical in the courtroom (Volpp, 1996). Volpp (1996) warned against instances in which such viewpoints are premised on the assumption that immigrants have arrived in a “liberated, enlightened, and emancipated society” (p. 1577); Africa and Asia are simply labeled as patriarchal, yet Western culture too is patriarchal. However, a cultural distancing of “us” and “them” could lead to harshness toward the cultural defendant, such that he is condemned on the basis of his culture. Dick (2011) underscored the dangers in attributing the actions of an out-group defendant to culture, while attributing the same actions to lack of control for a same-cultured defendant. Much as D. M. Taylor and Jaggi (1974) showed in their study of Hindu and Muslim participants, defendants who belong to the dominant culture might be viewed according to external factors, unlike their minority culture counterparts, whose behavior is attributed to their culture (Dick, 2011). Phillips (2003) further discussed “vulgar” (p. 516) definitions of culture, in which people assume that minority ethnic groups are driven by such “primitive” belief sets, whereas they do not judge members of the majority by their cultural background. As Volpp (1994) described with respect to People v. Chen (1989), the defense expert’s insistence that violence by a husband against his wife would be a normal aspect of Chinese culture also served to “obliterate” (p. 62) the concept of gender oppression. Much of the controversy surrounding that case is owing to the decision to sentence Mr. Chen to probation, which some argue fails to value the victim, Jian Wan Chen (Volpp, 1994). Relatedly, jurors who are resistant to a cultural defense may have more difficulty using it when it will result in the defendant’s outright release, as with automatism.

The Automatism Defense

As previously stated, fears surrounding “excusing” a cultural offense are founded on the possibility of tacitly encouraging crimes on cultural grounds. Notably, the current study investigated a defense that does not claim mental illness, to avoid the potentially confounding effect of insanity defense attitudes. Automatism is a full defense in which the defendant argues that he or she was not conscious of his or her action, which was entirely involuntary. The automatism defense—in both Canada and the United States—is therefore used to negate the voluntariness of the crime (Kasian, Spanos, Terrance, & Peebles, 1993), which if successful, results in the acquittal of the defendant. The defendant does not dispute that he or she committed the act, but instead argues that he or she did so in an automatic state. One of the most well-known cases of automatism in Canada is R. v. K. (1971), in which a man killed his wife after she told him that she would be leaving him. Mr. K. claimed that he only remembered embracing her, and later realized that she was dead. Mr. K. successfully argued that the news of his wife’s decision to leave served as an “emotional blow” parallel to a physical blow to the head in which he lost control (Arboleda-Florez, 2002).

In the U.S. case of People v. Wu (1991), a Chinese woman claimed that she was sent into a fugue state due to the shame of rejection from her lover, which led her to strangle her son (Dundes Renteln, 2004). Wu was later granted a retrial, during which she was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Notably, the court commented that there was no reason that the jury could not be instructed to take Wu’s cultural background in to account. As Dundes Renteln (2004) noted, this case demonstrates the partial success of a cultural defense, given that it did not excuse the crime completely. The use of automatism in cases involving emotional rather than physical shock has set precedence for an automatism claim that is not per se physical. Therefore, an extreme violation of cultural values attached to an incident, which elicits such an emotional shock, can qualify for automatism.

The Current Study

Spousal murder is a crime that sparks serious debate about the role of culture and gender in the courtroom. People v. Chen (1989) has been one of the most cited cases in support of preventing the use of cultural evidence in court. Phillips (2003), however, warned against simply swapping one form of essentialism for another. Because it is in the interests of justice to ensure that all forms of stereotyping are avoided in the jury room, it is important to compare juror decisions as a function of both defendant gender and cultural variables. In the current study, participants read a fictional spousal homicide case, loosely based on People v. Chen (1989), in which the defendant claimed to have blacked out after learning of his or her spouse’s affair. We manipulated the gender of the defendant and whether a culture-specific issue was claimed to have precipitated the defendant’s blackout. We then employed a 2 (male defendant vs. female defendant) × 2 (cultural automatism vs. classic automatism) factorial design, to uncover whether such variables affected perceived defendant credibility, defendant control, and verdict decision.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Given that spousal homicide is a crime for which gender issues are salient, we expected a gender by defense type interaction. As Volpp (1996) highlighted, people belonging to Western cultures may perceive Asian cultures as patriarchal and archaic. Hence, for the male defendant, we expected that perceived defendant control (a blame-related attribution; Weiner, 1985) would be higher when cultural evidence was presented compared with when there was no explicit reference to culture. That is, we expected participants to be less likely to consider situational factors. However, we predicted that for the female defendant, perceived control would be lower when cultural evidence was presented than when there was no explicit reference to culture. As Wilczynski (1997) argued, the “mad” label may be more readily applied to women, who are sometimes viewed as lacking agency over their decisions. Participants might be more ready to consider uncontrollable attributions such as cultural forces for the female as compared with the male defendant. Although the notion that a Chinese man’s behavior might be attributed to his culture could also imply that he would be seen to have less agency (i.e., stereotyped as culturally driven), the issue of control in the context of automatism relates to the voluntary use of violence to exert power over the victim, which is akin to a blame attribution. We therefore expected this to manifest as greater perceived defendant control.

Hypothesis 2: We predicted that for the female defendant, perceived credibility would be higher when cultural evidence was presented than when there was no explicit reference to culture. Again, we predicted that participants would be more willing to accept the female defendant’s claim. We expected the opposite pattern for the male defendant, such that perceived credibility would be lower when cultural evidence was presented compared with when there was no explicit reference to culture. That is, for the male defendant, cultural evidence should only serve to increase the aforementioned prejudice toward Asian cultures.

Hypothesis 3: We predicted that the readiness of participants to accept the female but not the male defendant’s claim would extend to verdict decisions. We hypothesized that, for the female defendant, verdicts would be harsher in the absence of cultural evidence as compared with when cultural evidence was presented. Conversely, for the male defendant, we expected verdicts to be harsher when cultural evidence was presented compared with when there was no explicit reference to culture. We expected this pattern to hold when comparing likelihood of selecting a guilty (where manslaughter and second-degree murder were combined) versus not guilty verdict, as well as when comparing likelihood of selecting second-degree murder versus manslaughter. It is instructive to consider whether the manipulations affected acquittal versus punishment, or whether cultural factors contributed to a partial excuse.

Method

Participants

An advertisement was placed on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, which was only visible to U.S. workers. They were screened for juror eligibility in the United States (i.e., U.S. citizens, 18 years of age or older, with no felony convictions) prior to analyses. The initial sample was comprised of 268 participants; however, 72 participants were excluded due to failed manipulation checks (see “Results” section). The final sample resulted in a participant age range from 18 to 76 years (M = 33.32 years, SD = 12.00 years). Men (n = 69) comprised 34.5% of the sample and women (n = 127) comprised 63.5% of the sample, whereas 12 participants declined to specify their gender. The sample was 78.5% Caucasian, 9% Black/African American, 6% Asian, 2% Latino/a, 1% East Indian, 0.5% American Indian, 2% Other, and 1% of participants declined to answer.

Materials

Trial transcripts

Participants were randomly assigned to one of four fictional trial transcripts—loosely based on People v. Chen (1989)—in which either a classic automatism defense or an automatism defense with a cultural component was presented. The defendant was male in half of each case type, and female in the other. The trial transcripts featured heavy use of male versus female pronouns in referring to the defendant.

The automatism defense with a cultural component trial described a Chinese defendant, charged with second-degree murder, who hit his or her spouse with a hammer after the spouse made an adultery confession. The defense argued that he or she received a severe psychological blow due to the intense shame of infidelity in Chinese culture, and was compelled to act violently. All conditions included expert testimony from Dr. Green, a psychiatrist, who stated that the defendant was likely unable to control his or her body during the crime. The manipulation concerned whether culture was mentioned as a reason for the loss of control. The classic automatism defense transcript described the exact same parties of the trial, including Dr. Green, but without reference to culture at any time. It was simply argued that the defendant was so upset by the news that an intense psychological blow and blackout resulted. After participants had completed all outcome measures in the trial questionnaire, they completed a manipulation check, which asked, “Please indicate whether the following statement is true or false: The psychiatrist argued that traditional cultural values contributed to the defendant’s fugue state.”

Procedure

Participants were directed to a link via Mechanical Turk to the survey using Qualtrics, a type of online study software. The survey was made available on Mechanical Turk for a period of 2 weeks. After completing informed consent, participants read one of the four randomly assigned fictional trial transcripts. Participants were instructed on the burden of proof, reasonable doubt, and the criteria for the automatism defense.

Dependent variables

After reading the trial transcript, participants were asked to make a verdict decision: not guilty by reason of automatism, guilty of manslaughter, or guilty of second-degree murder. Participants also rated their confidence in that verdict (where 1 = not at all confident and 10 = very confident). We also measured how much participants believed that the defendant was in control of his or her actions (where 1 = not at all in control and 10 = very much in control), and how credible participants perceived the defendant to be (where 1 = not at all credible and 10 = very credible).

Questionnaires

Participants next completed a modified version of the Cortés, Rogler, and Malgady (1994) biculturalism scale, which consists of 20 items assessing how much the participant’s other culture is part of his or her life. The questionnaire was slightly reworded for use on a diverse ethnic sample. That is, participants were asked whether they identified with a culture other than the United States, and if so to indicate that culture and fill out the 20-item measure. Only 13% (n = 27) of participants identified as bicultural, whereas 87% (n = 181) did not. Therefore, the majority of this sample identified only with U.S. culture. Finally, participants read a one-page debriefing form, which described the purpose and rationale of the study, our predictions, and some sources for further reading. They were then provided with a completion code to receive compensation.

Results

The data were first screened for failed manipulation checks. Overall, 72 participants incorrectly answered the manipulation question (31 for the cultural automatism condition and 41 for the classic automatism condition), which asked whether the psychiatrist had stated that cultural issues were relevant to the case. These participants were excluded from the analyses reported in this article.

For the trial involving a female defendant, 16.5% of participants selected a verdict of not guilty by reason of automatism, 57.7% selected manslaughter, and 25.8% selected second-degree murder. For the trial involving a male defendant, 12.7% of participants selected not guilty by reason of automatism, 54.9% selected manslaughter, and 32.4% selected second-degree murder. Table 1 displays verdict decision percentages according to condition.

Table 1.

Percentage of Verdict Decisions by Condition.

	Culture Condition	No Culture Condition
Male defendant	Automatism: 9.8%	Automatism: 16.7%
	Manslaughter: 54.9%	Manslaughter: 57.3%
	Second-degree murder: 35.3%	Second-degree murder: 26.0%
Female defendant	Automatism: 18.4%	Automatism: 14.9%
	Manslaughter: 55.1%	Manslaughter: 59.6%
	Second-degree murder: 26.5%	Second-degree murder: 25.5%

Analytic Strategy

We used ANOVAs to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, which predicted that cultural evidence would decrease perceived defendant credibility for the male defendant, and decrease perceived defendant control for the female defendant. To test for the influence of cultural evidence and gender on verdict decisions, we conducted two separate ANOVAs. We first compared whether these variables evinced greater certainty in a not guilty verdict versus a general guilty verdict that would imply that the behavior was punishable (i.e., murder and manslaughter). We then compared whether any differences would emerge in certainty of manslaughter versus second-degree murder verdict, to compare an outcome that implied partial excuse versus one that implied there were no mitigating factors.

Defendant Control

We conducted a 2 × 2 ANOVA using participants’ perceptions of the defendant’s ability to control his or her actions as the dependent variable, and defendant gender (male defendant, female defendant) and defense type (cultural automatism, classic automatism) as the independent variables. The data did not yield any main effects of defendant gender or defense type. In partial support of Hypothesis 1, which predicted that cultural evidence would decrease perceptions of the female defendant’s ability to control her actions, there was a significant gender by defense type interaction, F(1, 207) = 4.64, p = .03, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .02. Figure 1 depicts control ratings by gender and defense type. Independent-samples t tests revealed that the gender difference did not meet our criteria for significance (α = .05), but the difference showed a small effect size in the presence of cultural evidence, t(102) = −1.89, p = .06, d = −.38, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [−0.91, 0.16], such that the female defendant was seen as less in control of her actions (M = 5.88, SD = 2.80) than the male defendant (M = 6.93, SD = 2.85). There were essentially no differences for the classic automatism case.

Figure 1.

Gender differences in perceived defendant control as a function of defense type.

Defendant Credibility

We again conducted a 2 × 2 ANOVA, using perceived defendant credibility as the dependent variable. Results revealed a main effect of defendant gender, F(1, 204) = 5.64, p = .02, d = .32, 95% CI = [0.002, 0.64], such that the female defendant was seen as more credible (M = 5.64, SD = 2.40) than the male defendant (M = 4.88, SD = 2.34). There was also a main effect of defense type, F(1, 204) = 7.84, p =. 006, d = .38, 95% CI = [0.06, 0.69] such that the defendant was seen as more credible in the presence of cultural evidence (M = 5.69, SD = 2.50) as compared with no explicit reference to cultural issues (M = 4.81, SD = 2.20). In partial support of Hypothesis 2, these effects were qualified by a medium effect size for the difference between the classic and cultural automatism conditions for the female defendant only (Figure 2). However, the ANOVA interaction fell short of the significance threshold of α = .05, F(1, 204) = 3.62, p =. 06, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .02, so results should be interpreted with caution. In line with our hypothesis, independent-samples t tests did reveal a significant effect of defense type for the female defendant, t(100) = −3.34, p = .001, d = .67, 95% CI = [0.23, 1.11], such that she was seen as more credible in the presence of cultural evidence (M = 6.39, SD = 2.37) than when there was no explicit reference to culture (M = 4.88, SD = 2.19). Contrary to our prediction that the male defendant’s credibility would be lower in the presence of cultural evidence, there was virtually no difference.

Figure 2.

Difference in perceived defendant credibility between defense types as a function of defendant gender.

Guilty Versus Not Guilty

A continuous verdict score was calculated by multiplying a combined dichotomous verdict variable (where −1 = not guilty by reason of automatism and 1 = guilty of manslaughter or second-degree murder), with participants’ confidence in their verdict (where 1 = not at all confident and 10 = very confident), resulting in a scale from −10 (very confident that the defendant was not guilty) to 10 (very confident that the defendant was guilty). Therefore, higher scores reflect greater certainty in the defendant’s guilt. We then conducted the same 2 × 2 ANOVA using this continuous verdict measure as a dependent variable. Contrary to our prediction in Hypothesis 3 that cultural evidence would lend to harsher verdicts for the male defendant, but more lenient verdicts for the female defendant, we observed no main effects or interaction effects.

However, we also conducted multiple regression analysis to ascertain whether perceived defendant credibility and control significantly predicted continuous verdict. Results suggested that this model was a good fit, yielding an R² of .48, and an adjusted R² of .47. Defendant control was a significant predictor of verdict, B = 1.38, SE = 0.12, β = .68, t = 11.70, p < .001, 95% CI = [1.15, 1.61], sr² = .40, such that the more in control the defendant was seen to be, the harsher the verdict rating. However, defendant credibility did not emerge as a significant predictor of confidence in a guilty versus not guilty verdict.

Manslaughter Versus Second-Degree Murder

For a second metric, we wished to compare the likelihood of selecting manslaughter or second-degree murder (where −1 = guilty of manslaughter and 1 = guilty of second-degree murder). We once again multiplied this dichotomous variable by participants’ verdict confidence. We conducted a 2 × 2 ANOVA using this continuous verdict measure as a dependent variable. Again, contrary to our prediction in Hypothesis 3 that cultural evidence would lead to harsher verdicts for the male defendant, but more lenient verdicts for the female defendant, we observed no main effects or interaction effects.

Multiple regression analyses revealed that both perceived defendant control and perceived defendant credibility significantly predicted this continuous verdict measure. The data revealed that the predicted model was a good fit, yielding an R² of .20, and an adjusted R² of .19. Defendant control was a significant predictor of verdict, B = 0.89, SE = 0.25, β = .27, t = 3.62, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.41, 1.38], sr² = .07, such that the more in control the defendant was seen to be, the harsher the verdict rating. Defendant credibility also predicted confidence in a manslaughter versus murder verdict, B = −0.95, SE = 0.25, β = −.28, t = −3.82, p < .001, 95% CI = [−1.44, −0.46], sr² = .08, such that higher credibility was associated with higher confidence in a more lenient verdict.

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to explore juror decision-making in the absence versus presence of cultural evidence for a male compared with a female defendant. Scholars have vigorously debated the compatibility of multicultural and feminist goals in the courtroom; empirical investigation of biased decision-making in culturally-based cases can add to this discussion. The findings of this study imply that, in this particular case type, cultural evidence can support a female defendant’s credibility, but it incurs neither benefit nor detriment with respect to a male defendant’s credibility. Furthermore, it appears that when cultural evidence is used, a female defendant is perceived to be less in control of her actions than a male defendant. Notably, cultural evidence did not affect verdict decisions directly.

The potential mechanism by which cultural evidence served to bolster the female defendant’s credibility, whereas the male defendant remained unaffected, warrants discussion. As Volpp (1996) contended, it is not uncommon for people to make the automatic assumption that Asian and African cultures are primitive and patriarchal. The results regarding the female defendant may indicate that, consistent with this belief, when explicitly told that consideration of culture was appropriate, jurors accepted the defendant’s claim more. It is important to note that this finding does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that cultural evidence was used “properly,” as it could be a product of benevolent sexism. Historically, women have been on the receiving end of the label of “out of control,” perceived as lacking full agency. It may be that because the defendant was female, participants were motivated to use evidence that an external force affected her actions. Indeed, the female defendant was perceived as less in control of her actions than was the male defendant. As Huckerby (2003) noted, a “bad” or a “mad” label may be employed to explain a threatening person as “evil” or as “ill.” The cultural evidence could have been most compatible with the “ill” label. Of course, general sympathy for the female may have been involved. In fact, it is possible that participants were engaging other stereotypes that we did not measure to inform that decision. For instance, perhaps due to the rareness of female homicide defendants, participants were simply more willing to search for situational explanations for her behavior. Given that we did not consider other potential attitudes, this constitutes a limitation on our findings.

Finally, it seems that credibility had an impact on the relative harshness of a guilty verdict, but was not a significant deciding factor that tipped the balance from innocence to guilt. It was perceived defendant control that accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in certainty of guilt versus innocence; control may speak more directly to the automatism claim. To vote not guilty, one must accept the automatism defense as valid, having more to do with perceptions of legal responsibility. If the participant believes the defendant lost control, and that this is a real phenomenon, then automatism is appropriate. The distinction between murder and manslaughter may have more to do with perceptions of the defendant’s character, wherein higher credibility provides a means to mitigate, but not absolve, responsibility. Both control and credibility predicted certainty in a harsher guilty verdict (i.e., manslaughter vs. second-degree murder).

Strengths and Limitations

This study represents one facet in the project of uncovering issues surrounding a cultural defense. However, there are a number of methodological strengths that lend confidence to our findings. First, we explored juror decisions within a community rather than a student sample, providing stronger ecological validity. Bray and Kerr (1982) argued that because students are not typically selected as jurors, community samples are more appropriate. In addition, Sears (1986) asserted that college students differ from community members in terms of cognitive skills and attitude development. Although the use of Mechanical Turk for recruitment poses some limitations (i.e., different workers may freely choose certain tasks based on the amount of pay), in our view, other methods of community recruitment tend to face the same criticisms.

One potential limitation of Mechanical Turk is the lack of control over specific geographic location. Therefore, the reader should exert caution in generalizing these findings to the greater population of jurors. With respect to our sample, it was composed mainly of White women. It is possible that jurors from other ethnic backgrounds would differ in terms of their decision-making. However, when including juror gender in the above analyses, we did not observe any effects of this variable; therefore, the fact that the sample was comprised mainly of women is less of a concern. The large number of manipulation check failures is potentially prohibitive. Interestingly, it seems that many of our participants indicated that a cultural argument had been used where none was presented. It is possible that the use of Chinese names prompted participants to consider the defendant’s ethnic background. However, the manipulation failures may also be a product of using Mechanical Turk for recruitment; participants may simply have failed to attend to the trial transcript closely. In addition, Mason and Suri (2012) reported that the average income among Mechanical Turk workers was US$30,000. Although we did not ask for information about participants’ income, it is possible that socioeconomic status affected our findings.

Finally, as we alluded to in the introduction, there are some limitations in terms of our definition of culture. Due to the fact that this study is an early step in this program of research, we investigated only a general application of culture. It may be fruitful for other researchers to examine subcultures, and the intersection of other important variables that might manifest distinct cultural viewpoints, such as socioeconomic status, race, and geographic location. The need to consider other variables is particularly important in light of the fact that some of our findings fell short of traditional significance cutoffs. Although, in our view, there is ample reason to continue to investigate gender and multiculturalism in the courtroom, the addition of such moderator variables can lend greater precision. Future researchers may also wish to manipulate cultural variables in other ways, such as testimony on immigrants and assimilation, or simply through language barriers.

Despite these limitations, the design of the study permitted exploration of the influence of culture rather than simply race. As aforementioned, the defendant had a Chinese name in both cases, but cultural evidence was put forth in only half of the cases. The lack of empirical studies in this realm is surprising; this study provides experimental data to discussions regarding a stand-alone cultural defense, and may open up more dialogue surrounding the risk of biases in the courtroom. Bearing in mind the paucity of research on the topic, it is necessary to note some further caveats with respect to the scope of the findings. This study represents one among several potential utilities of cultural evidence; other case types may show different results. Cultural evidence likely impacts on certain crime types differently. For instance, gender may be less salient for crimes that do not involve broader issues of violence against women. In addition, there are many different possibilities as to how such biases will operate for other cultures; therefore, more research will be necessary to explore these questions.

Conclusion

This study helps to ignite programs of research aimed at contributing empirical evidence to the debate on issues surrounding culture in the courtroom. In particular, we sought to better understand juror decision-making in a crime for which gender was a salient issue. One of the gravest criticisms leveled against a potential stand-alone cultural defense is that it conflicts with important societal goals, such as the need to condemn structures that maintain violence against women. However, our findings suggest that a female defendant might in some ways benefit from cultural evidence, whereas it does not affect the male defendant’s case. These findings, in orchestra with future research in the area, will help to highlight the danger of biases on behalf of all vulnerable groups.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was funded by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Insight Development Grant awarded to the second author.

Author Biographies

Susan Yamamoto is a doctoral student in the forensic psychology program at Carleton University. She received her MA in psychology from Carleton University, and her BA (hons) from the University of Manitoba. Her research interests include discrimination and juror decision-making, as well as attributions, punishment orientation, and the insanity defense.

Evelyn M. Maeder is an associate professor and Director of the Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Carleton University. She is also cross-appointed in the Department of Psychology, and is the director of the Legal Decision-Making Lab. Her research interests include the influence of culture, race, gender, and other extra-legal information on juror decision-making, as well as the insanity defense and punishment orientation.

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