A Comparative Study of Totalitarian Style Partner Control in Seoul and Beijing: Confucian Sex Role Norms,Secrecy,and Missing Data

Abstract

Totalitarian style partner control is seldom studied apart from intimate partner violence (IPV) independently as an outcome. This article uses a comparative study of Beijing and Seoul to begin to address this gap in the research. We collected three-stage probability proportional to size cluster samples of married/partnered women from Beijing (n = 301) and Seoul (n = 459), using refusal conversion to keep response rates high. We hypothesized (1) totalitarian style partner control will be positively associated with Confucian sex role norms at the (a) individual and (b) neighborhood levels, (2) totalitarian style partner control will be positively associated with IPV secrecy at the (a) individual and (b) neighborhood levels, and (3) totalitarian style partner control will be positively associated with the need for refusal conversion. Mixed effects (multilevel) regression models supported all three hypotheses at the individual level. Surprisingly, neighborhood socioeconomic status was positively associated with totalitarian style partner control. The combined data conceal important differences between Beijing and Seoul. The rate of totalitarian style partner control is more than 5 times higher in Seoul, and Confucian sex role norms, at both the individual and neighborhood levels, predict totalitarian style control there. Based on our findings, we infer that cultural emphases on face may play very different roles in the etiology of totalitarian partner control in the two cities.

Keywords

domestic violence totalitarian cultural contexts

Introduction

For what is now close to half a century, the problem of intimate partner violence (IPV) against female partners has been conceptualized and problematized not so much as a problem of physical violence per se, but as a problem of power and control (Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Emery, 2011; Johnson, 1995; Pence & Paymar, 1993; Stark, 2007; Whitehurst, 1974). It is, hence, surprising that relatively few researchers have focused purely on power and control in intimate relationships without feeling a need to combine the phenomenon with physical violence (but see Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Commuri & Gentry, 2005). Not all power differentials need be insidious, so long as basic rights of each party in the relationship are observed and respected. However, when one party constructs and consistently maintains an elaborate set of rules to control partner or couple behavior in “mundane areas of everyday life that are not normally thought of as norm- or rule-governed” (Stark, 2007, p. 229) penetrating nearly every aspect of life, power differentials are rightly deemed to be malignant. About 3.5% of women in intimate relationships in the U.S. population are in “high control” relationships (Outlaw, 2015). Such relationships, classified as totalitarian style (Emery, 2011) and little studied as a dependent variable anywhere, are particularly underresearched in non-Western contexts. This article uses comparative random sample surveys of Beijing and Seoul to study totalitarian style intimate relationships in Chinese and Korean culture. The article examines the relationships between Confucian sex role norms, secrecy, and totalitarian style control. It also tests Johnson’s (1995) hypothesis that such totalitarian style relationships are underrepresented in quantitative survey data, and uses mixed effects (multilevel) models to examine the relationship between critical community characteristics and totalitarian style control.

Defining Totalitarian Style Partner Control: Reinstating Power as a Criterion

Emery (2011) argued that in using control motive as the criterion for distinguishing between types of IPV, Johnson (2008) effectively, if unintentionally, abandons power as an essential criterion. In response to this problem, Emery (2011) rejected Johnson’s (2008) concept of intimate terrorism and instead constructed a typology that included the totalitarian dictatorship type of IPV, which occurs in relationships characterized by high order and high power disparity. In such relationships, the perpetrator controls the subordinate partner via an elaborate system of rules over behavior not normally rule governed, consistently backing up the victim’s deviation from those rules with violence. As opposed to authoritarian power, “totalitarian domination . . . aims at abolishing freedom, even at eliminating human spontaneity in general, and by no means at a restriction of freedom no matter how tyrannical” (Arendt, 1979, p. 405). We agree with Emery (2011) that totalitarian style partner control is an important classifier of IPV, but further argue that even in the absence of physical violence, such control constitutes a form of emotional abuse that Stark (2007) referred to as a liberty crime. The concept of totalitarian style partner control is related to Stark’s (2007) coercive control in its focus on control over mundane areas of the victim’s life that are not normally rule governed. Totalitarian style partner control is distinguished from coercive control, in that, (a) complete and utter domination of the victim is the explicit goal and end-game of the perpetrator and (b) the concept of totalitarian style partner control is nested in a larger, logically exhaustive and rigorously theoretically defined relationship typology (Emery, 2011). Totalitarian style partner control differs from Johnson’s (2008) intimate terrorism, in that, a power differential, rather than control motive, is the explicit criterion. For these reasons, this article uses the concept of totalitarian style partner control.

Totalitarian Style Control Tactics

At present, to our knowledge, there are no published studies of totalitarian style partner control as an explicit empirical outcome. However, the literature on coercive control (Stark, 2007) specifically, and power and control generally is highly relevant. Traditionally, the power and control wheel (Pence & Paymar, 1993) are used to conceptualize and measure control. These tactics include emotional abuse (manipulation, humiliation, and mind games), isolation, minimization and blame, using children, using male privilege, economic abuse, coercion and threats, and intimidation (Pence & Paymar, 1993). Extensive research shows these tactics are related to IPV and poor outcomes for victims (Graham-Kevan & Archer, 2003; Johnson, 2006; Johnson & Leone, 2005; Kelly & Johnson, 2008; Leone, Johnson, & Cohan, 2007). Postmus, Plummer, McMahan, Murshid, and Kim (2012) found that economic abuse was highly correlated with other forms of IPV and predicted lower levels of victim economic self-sufficiency. Tanha, Beck, Figueredo, and Raghavan (2010) found that coercive control was highly correlated with physical IPV, and was disproportionately perpetrated by men.

Generally, research on what might give rise to totalitarian levels of control in intimate relationships can be divided into two types: research focused on motivation for control and research focused on factors that provide opportunities for control. Research on motivation (cf. Kesner & McKenry, 1998) often focuses on the perpetrator’s childhood attachment. Following Waller’s (1937) logic, research on opportunity often focuses on access to resources (Commuri & Gentry, 2005; Foa & Foa, 1980). Stark (2009) argues that sexual inequality is a fundamental cause of coercive control. Very little research to date examines what may give rise to extreme partner control in non-Western contexts.

Confucian Sex Role Norms and Secrecy

This article focuses on cultural norms held by female partners and communities that may provide opportunities for control by male partners. The last dynasties that reigned in Korea (Joseon, 1392-1910) and China (1636-1912) in the early 20th century both embraced Confucianism (Carter, Ki-Baik, Ick, Robinson, & Wagner, 1990). Scholars of Confucianism often contend that the “domination of men over women seems to be one of . . . [its] defining characteristics” in theory and practice (Bell, 2008, p. 164). Whatever possibilities exist in theory, Confucianism as culturally interpreted in these dynasties was brutal to women. A 17th-century Dutch observer of Korea wrote,

A woman who kills her husband is buried up to her shoulders along highway over which many pass. Beside her is placed a wooden saw with which all passers-by, except nobility, must saw once at the head until she dies . . . A man who kills his wife goes free if he can prove he had any reason, such as adultery or the like. (Hamel, 1998, p. 58)

Qing dynasty China was similarly brutal to women (Edwards, 1990; Gao, 2003). Confucian sex role norms held by Korean men have been linked to IPV (Emery, Kim, Song, & Song, 2013), but were unrelated to IPV injury in Beijing (Emery, Wu, & Raghavan, 2015). Community gender norms have been linked to IPV in India, but not in Bangladesh (VanderEnde, Yount, Dynes, & Sibley, 2012). This article tests a different argument. Female partners in Korea and China who hold traditional Confucian sex role norms may present an opportunity for men to exercise totalitarian style control. Female partners, as well as community members who hold similar norms, may function as what Arendt (1979) termed a “front organization.” Front organizations hold sympathetic, but more moderate, beliefs in comparison with totalitarian party members. They simultaneously insulate those with totalitarian norms and present a more moderate face of totalitarian control to the rest of the world (Arendt, 1979). This argument is similar to subcultural arguments in criminology that claim community nonintervention norms may shield criminal gangs (Gould, 1987; VanderEnde et al., 2012). Hence, both individual family members and neighborhood communities may function as front organizations. This leads to the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Totalitarian style control will be predicted by Confucian sex role norms held by (a) female partners and (b) neighborhoods.

South Korea and China are both face cultures (Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003). Face is divided into self-face and other-face, and is correlated with conflict resolution style (Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003). Concerns about the effect of face on participant response to questions about IPV led to the implementation of a measure of IPV secrecy in both the Beijing and Seoul data (Emery, Wu, & Raghavan, 2015). IPV secrecy is not correlated with victim IPV injury in Beijing (Emery, Wu, & Raghavan, 2015). However, Emery, Wu, and Raghavan’s (2015) data was a small subset of the entire Beijing data set. Moreover, the research question here pertains to whether secrecy facilitates totalitarian style control rather than physical violence. The logic behind this hypothesis is similar to the argument behind the Confucian sex role norms hypothesis; partner and community face norms that favor concealing undesirable family characteristics may shield potential perpetrators of totalitarian control from scrutiny, thus providing them with opportunities to perpetrate. This leads to the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Totalitarian style control will be predicted by IPV secrecy norms held by (a) female partners and (b) neighborhoods.

Totalitarian Control and Missing Data

The practice of drawing a distinction between high control and ordinary IPV began with Johnson’s (1995) use of a missing data argument to bridge the family violence/woman battering research controversy. Johnson (1995, 2008) argued that gender parity in IPV rates calculated by quantitative surveys occurred because women (and men) in highly controlling violent relationships were more likely to refuse to participate in surveys, resulting in a missing data problem. This kind of hypothesis is, by nature, difficult to test because it somehow requires one to obtain the apparently unobtainable: missing data. There is some empirical evidence to support Johnson’s argument. Johnson, Leone, and Xu (2014) obtained data from ex-spouses, which, compared with current spouses measured on surveys, support the missing data argument. Emery (2010) analyzed item nonresponse patterns in Chicago data, and found strong support for systematic underreporting of IPV, but only weak support for specific underreporting of male partner violence. Other studies suggest that gender parity more or less holds (Straus & Gozjolko, 2016), even for what Johnson (2008) termed intimate terrorism and Emery (2011) termed totalitarian dictatorship.

However, by and large, the literature on this problem (cf. Johnson et al., 2014) fails to consider a textbook statistical approach for the handling of refusals. Prevalence estimates can be debiased (i.e., corrected; see Emery, Eremina, et al., 2015, for an example) if one develops a way to sample the refusals. Repeated contacts by well-trained interviewers and the offer of incentives to participate can lower refusal rates (Scheaffer, Mendenhall, & Ott, 1996). Based on Johnson’s (1995) argument, we hypothesize that a refusal conversion sample, generated by repeated contacts and additional monetary incentives for participation when the initial response is a refusal, will be positively associated with totalitarian partner control compared with the ordinary respondent sample.

Hypothesis 3: Totalitarian style control will be predicted by whether refusal conversion was necessary to recruit participants.

Model Logic

The relationships between victim IPV secrecy, Confucian sex role norms, and totalitarian partner control may be bidirectional, if the use of isolation, for example, can succeed in brainwashing victims. However, we choose the opportunity/vulnerability approach, both because this is not a study of physical violence and in the expectation that this approach may give more agency to potential victims. Cultural interaction effects are tested for the hypotheses because the relationships may be different in the two different cultures.

The criminology literature review suggests IPV may be related to neighborhood socioeconomic status (SES; Cunradi, Caetano, Clark, & Schafer, 2000; VanderEnde et al., 2012); the models hence control for this. Respondent’s age, marital status, household income, household size, and whether or not the respondent resides in a high-rise apartment or other dwelling type are also controlled.

Method

Participants and Procedure

The data come from statistically random probability proportional to size cluster samples of partnered women in Beijing (Emery, Wu, Kim, Pyun, & Chin, 2017) and Seoul (Emery et al., 2019). Data were obtained from 506 couples in 50 Beijing neighborhoods and 541 couples in 34 Seoul neighborhoods. Administrative districts (within the Beijing fifth ring road) indicated neighborhoods. Census population data were obtained for all administrative districts in Beijing and Seoul. The R program was used to draw probability proportional to size random samples of districts in Beijing and Seoul. After districts were selected into the sample, maps of every district were obtained. Within-district sampling was carried out using the R program to procure two random draws from the uniform distribution to locate a random start point on the map. Effectively, the procedure located a random set of Cartesian coordinates on each map. The random points were then checked against maps available online to insure that interviewers were not being sent to the middle of a park, pond, or institution. If so, another random point was drawn. Interviewers were sent to the start points. After arrival at a start point, interviewers were provided with detailed instructions on how to locate the nearest dwelling and begin door-to-door recruitment of the 10 to 15 couples interviewed in each district. A refusal conversion protocol was used to keep response rates high (80.2% in Beijing, 63% in Seoul). Refusal conversion included repeat visits to households, further explanation of confidentiality and study benefits, and offering larger monetary incentives for participation.

Interviewers had to complete a 2-day training, written exams, and a certification interview. These tested sensitivity to IPV and knowledge of oral informed consent procedures and confidentiality. Interviewers were trained to emphasize the voluntary nature of the study, and that participants could withdraw at any time or not answer questions they did not wish to. Moreover, given the sensitive nature of the topic of totalitarian style control, the survey was divided into three sections, with the second section containing all the sensitive items. Interviewers were trained to conduct an ongoing assessment of the environment. If the environment was not suitable for protecting the privacy of participant responses for Section 2, or if the environment stopped being suitable for protecting privacy (e.g., the male partner or another family member appeared), interviewers were trained to withhold or desist from administration of Section 2, following up at a later point if possible. This procedure aimed to eliminate the potential for reprisals for study participation. Eligible participants were those in a marriage or cohabiting relationship within the last year. Restricting the sample to female respondents with complete data reduced the sample sizes to 301 cases in Beijing and 459 in Seoul in the mixed effects regression models.

Measures

For the Beijing study, all measures were translated into Chinese by one member of the study team and back-translated into English by another. The study team as a group then went through the measures item by item to arrive at a consensus that the Chinese translation sufficiently captured the English meanings of the measures. A similar process was carried out for the Seoul study, with the exception of Confucian sex role norms, the original measure of which was in Korean (Emery et al., 2013). Psychometric findings presented below (e.g., Cronbach’s αs) are from the current study.

Totalitarian partner control

Measures for totalitarian style control were not developed when the data were collected. Hence Johnson and Leone’s (2005) measure from the Violence Against Women Survey was used (see Johnson, 2008). These seven Likert-type items were your spouse (a) tries to limit your contact with family and friends, (b) is jealous or possessive, (c) insists on knowing who you are with at all times, (d) puts you down in front of others, (e) makes you feel inadequate, (f) shouts or swears at you, and (g) prevents you from knowing about or having access to the family income. Cronbach’s alpha was .88. Responses were measured on a 1 to 5 Likert-type scale ranging from never (1) to always (5). Screeplot analysis of the factors indicated an elbow after the first factor, indicating that a one-factor model is probably adequate. To improve statistical sensitivity, the items were summed into a single continuous measure and divided by the number of complete responses for the mixed effects models. For descriptive (dichotomous) comparisons, totalitarian levels of control were indicated when the individual score was two standard deviations above the (combined) sample average.

Confucian sex role norms

The seven Confucian sex role norm (Emery et al., 2013) Likert-type items were (a) men should be the leaders in society, (b) men should take the initiative in romantic relationships, (c) wives should do most household chores, (d) the family’s economic decisions should be made by the husband, (e) wives should follow their husbands’ opinions about the wife’s job, (f) the husband’s opinion is more important than the wife’s in making important decisions about the children, and (g) from time to time, it is OK for husbands to use violence against their wives to preserve the husband’s authority. Screeplot analysis of the eigenvalues after factor analysis suggested a single-factor solution is adequate, and Cronbach’s alpha was .83. Possible responses were (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) disagree, and (4) strongly disagree. All items were reverse coded; items were then summed and divided by the number of complete responses to make a scale.

Secrecy about IPV

Women’s secrecy about IPV was measured with the following six Likert-type items (Emery, Wu, & Raghavan, 2015): if my spouse ever hit me, I would try to keep it secret from (a) my friends, (b) my family, (c) my neighbors, (d) my coworkers, (e) my boss, (f) everyone. Screeplot analysis of the eigenvalues after factor analysis suggested a single-factor solution is adequate, and Cronbach’s alpha was .94. Possible responses were (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) disagree, and (4) strongly disagree. All items were reverse coded; items were then summed and divided by the number of complete responses to make a scale.

Refusal conversion was measured as a 0 to 1 indicator, depending on whether refusal conversion was necessary to recruit the participant.

Neighborhood-level Confucian sex role norms and IPV secrecy were measured by calculating neighborhood-level (administrative district) averages for Confucian sex role norms and secrecy about IPV.

Control Variables

Husband’s IPV

Husband’s IPV severity in the last year was measured but not included in multilevel models. Victim report of six physical violence items was used: (a) slapped; (b) pushed, grabbed, or shoved; (c) hit with object; (d) punched, kicked, or bit; (e) beat up; and (f) used or threatened to use a knife or gun. These items are based on a modified version of the Conflict Tactics Scale– Short Form (CTS2S), which has good concurrent validity with the longer form, the CTS2 (Straus & Douglas, 2004). Possible responses were once in the past year, twice in the past year, 3 to 5 times in the past year, 6 to 10 times, 11 to 20 times, more than 20 times, not in the past year but before, and never. Reliability for the overall scale was good (Cronbach’s α = .81).

Level 1: Individual-level demographic control variables were the wife’s age and education, whether the family resides in a high-rise apartment, household size, and income.

Level 2: (neighborhood-level) controls. The survey measured household income, size, and the respondent’s education. Screeplot analyses of eigenvalues produced by factor analysis suggested these load onto a single factor. The three variables were standardized, added together (household size × −1), and averaged over each neighborhood to create neighborhood SES. Conceptually, Beijing/Seoul is a Level 3 variable. However, for these analyses, this is mathematically equivalent to entering it as a Level 2 variable.

Analytic Issues

Hypotheses were tested using mixed effects (multilevel) regression models in Stata11 (Luke, 2004). The individual’s response in the first level of our model is estimated as a function of the P individual predictors and controls outlined in the hypotheses:

Y_{i j} = β_{0 j} + \sum_{p = 1}^{P} β_{p} X_{p i j} + r_{i j} .

The neighborhood mean of totalitarian partner control is estimated in the second level of our model as a function of neighborhood averages in SES, Confucian sex role norms, and IPV secrecy. This is illustrated in the equation below:

\begin{array}{l} β_{0 j} = γ_{00} + γ_{01} (S E S) + γ_{02} (Y E A R S) \\ + γ_{03} (S O L I D A R I T Y_{C E}) + γ_{04} (I S C_{C E}) + u_{0 j} . \end{array}

The model was first run for the combined Beijing and Seoul data for each hypothesis. Models were then run for each city separately. A limited interaction model was then used to test whether the main predictors (Confucian sex role norms and IPV secrecy at individual and neighborhood levels) had different relationships with outcomes in the two different cities. Then, a full interaction model was run to test whether the overall model differed between cities. The results of all five models are presented in Table 2, but coefficients are only shown for the first four models. Inclusion of the same variables at both individual and neighborhood levels resulted in large variance inflation factors (circa 21 and higher on average) rendering tests statistically conservative.

Results

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for Beijing and Seoul. Significant differences between these cities are indicated by T tests and chi-square statistics. Totalitarian levels of partner control were reported by a total of 5.2% (37 women); the mean continuous score was 1.67, with a standard deviation of 0.69. Among women reporting totalitarian levels of partner control, 27% reported physical violence by the husband. Of women who did not report such high levels of control, the rate of last year physical violence by the husband was 9.9% (Z = 3.27, p < .01). Confucian sex role norms were higher in Beijing than in Seoul (2.14 vs. 1.77, p < .001). Regarding IPV secrecy, Beijing (3.03) also had significantly higher (p < .001) levels than Seoul (2.56). The rate of physical violence (IPV) by husbands in the two cities was not significantly different (9.7% in Beijing and 11.4% in Seoul). Household incomes were significantly higher in Seoul, but more Beijing participants resided in high-rise apartments (68.77% vs. 41.79%, p < .001). Seoul women had more years of education (13.61 vs. 12.65, p < .01). More than 90% of the participants in both cities were married.

Table 1.

Sample Descriptive Statistics.

Variable	Beijing			Seoul			Difference
Variable	N	M	SD	N	M	SD	T/χ²
Any husband IPV	289	9.69%	0.30	431	11.37%	0.32	0.43
Secrecy about IPV	300	3.03	0.82	458	2.56	0.74	6.25***
Totalitarian partner control (continuous)	298	1.39	0.55	455	1.86	0.75	6.63***
Totalitarian partner control (dichotomous)	298	1.34%	0.12	455	7.69%	0.27	11.73***
Confucian sex role norms	301	2.14	0.48	459	1.77	0.47	6.72***
Neighborhood Confucian sex role norms	302	2.23	0.22	462	1.79	0.19	9.47***
Neighborhood IPV secrecy	302	3.09	0.38	462	2.62	0.26	6.61***
Neighborhood SES	301	−1.52	1.60	462	2.06	1.11	12.16***
Household income (monthly, US$)	298	997	815	462	4,367	2,353	17.56***
High-rise apartment	325	68.77%	0.46	414	41.79%	0.49	13.33***
Household size	290	3.37	1.07	450	2.71	0.92	7.62***
Wife’s age	292	42.82	12.07	453	44.27	9.57	1.27
Wife’s education (years)	296	12.65	3.49	458	13.61	2.53	2.70**
Married	301	94.68%	0.22	435	92.18%	0.49	1.92

Note. IPV = intimate partner violence; SES = socioeconomic status.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 2 shows the results for the predictive model for totalitarian style partner control by the husband. The full interaction model (coefficients not shown) indicates the models are significantly different between cities (χ² = 29.8, df = 12, p < .01). The first column shows the results for Beijing and Seoul combined, the second for Beijing only, the third for Seoul only, and the fourth column shows an interaction model indicating whether the relationships between Confucian sex role norms, secrecy about IPV (at individual and neighborhood levels), and totalitarian control were different in the two cities.

Table 2.

Explaining Totalitarian Partner Control.

Variable	Full Model(n = 629, 86)		Beijing Model^a (n = 271, 53)		Seoul Model^a (n = 358, 33)		Interaction Model^b (n = 629, 86)
Variable	B	SE B	B	SE B	B	SE B	B	SE B
Level 1
Confucian sex role norms	0.25***	0.06	0.13^†	0.08	0.34***	0.09	0.35***	0.08
Secrecy about IPV	0.08*	0.04	0.13**	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.02	0.05
Wife’s age	−0.01*	0.003	−0.01*	0.003	−0.01	0.005	−0.01**	0.003
Married	0.10^†	0.06	0.18*	0.08	0.03	0.09	0.10	0.06
Wife’s education (years)	−0.02*	0.01	−0.02	0.01	−0.04^†	0.02	−0.03*	0.01
Household income (US$1,000)	−0.02	0.01	0.08	0.05	−0.03^†	0.02	−0.02	0.02
High-rise apartment	0.10^†	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.17*	0.08	0.10^†	0.06
Household size	−0.04	0.03	0.005	0.03	−0.10*	0.04	−0.04	0.03
Refusal conversion	0.31**	0.09	0.01	0.14	0.50***	0.13	0.32**	0.09
Level 2
Neighborhood SES (neighborhood mean)	0.06*	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.15***	0.04	0.06*	0.03
Confucian sex role norms neighborhood (M)	0.20	0.17	0.006	0.19	0.55*	0.25	0.42^†	0.24
IPV secrecy neighborhood (M)	−0.14	0.11	−0.16	0.12	0.01	0.17	0.02	0.17
Beijing	−0.50***	0.14					1.09	0.77
Interactions
Beijing × Confucian sex role norms							−0.21^†	0.12
Beijing × norms (neighborhood)							−0.39	0.32
Beijing × IPV secrecy							0.11	0.07
Beijing × secrecy (neighborhood)							−0.25	0.22
Variance components
Intercept	0.03*	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03*	0.01
Level 1 residual	0.38***	0.02	0.26***	0.03	0.46***	0.04	0.38***	0.02
R² within (between)	.07	(.32)	.09	(.29)	.09	(.43)	.08	(.30)
R² overall	.21		.09		.20		.23

Note. Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) coefficients followed by standard errors. IPV = intimate partner violence; SES = socioeconomic status.

Full interaction model shows Seoul model significantly different from Beijing (χ² = 29.8, df = 12, p < .01).

Interactions: χ² = 9.6, df = 4, p = .048.

†

p < .10, *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

The combined data model suggests that the wife’s Confucian sex role norms (B = 0.25, p < .001) and secrecy about IPV (B = 0.08, p < .05) are both significantly and positively related to more totalitarian style control when age, marital status, education, household income, high-rise apartment residence, household size, neighborhood SES, and refusal conversion are controlled. The models for each city suggest that, at the individual level, the wife’s Confucian sex role norms are only predictive for Seoul (B = 0.34, p < .001) and the wife’s IPV secrecy is only predictive for Beijing (B = 0.13, p < .01; although Confucian sex role norms are marginally significant in the Beijing model). At the neighborhood level, only Confucian sex role norms significantly predicted totalitarian partner control, and only for Seoul (B = 0.55, p < .05). Counterintuitively, holding individual SES indicators constant, mean neighborhood SES was positively (B = 0.06, p < .05) associated with totalitarian style partner control of women. This finding appears to be driven by the Seoul data (B = 0.15, p < .001). The high level of collinearity in the models biases inferences in the direction of non-significance, making these findings conservative.

The limited interaction model suggests that the relationship is only marginally different for individual-level Confucian sex role norms (B = −0.21, p < .10) between Seoul and Beijing. Joint significance tests of interactions help to ameliorate bias from collinearity. These suggest that taken together as a whole, the four interaction terms were significantly different from zero (χ² = 9.6, df = 4, p = .048). This is consistent with the idea that the relationships of these independent variables with totalitarian control may be different between the two cities.

Refusal conversion was positively associated with totalitarian control in the full (B = 0.31, p < .01) and Seoul (B = 0.50, p < .001) models when age, marital status, education, household income, high-rise apartment residence, household size, neighborhood SES, Confucian sex role norms, and secrecy about IPV are controlled. The significant relationship between refusal conversion and totalitarian style partner control also held when a bivariate mixed effects logistic regression was used to estimate the odds of being in the high control group. Requiring refusal conversion to participate was associated with 2.37 times higher odds (p < .05) of being in the high totalitarian style control group. As the significant relationship is driven by the significant Seoul findings, the refusal conversion data allow us to reestimate the prevalence of totalitarian style control in Seoul, based on underreporting. The survey response rate in Seoul was 63%. Without refusal conversion, the response rate would have been 54%. Using the response rate to reweight the prevalence of totalitarian style control for the refusal conversion and ordinary participant samples yields (0.54 × 0.069) + (0.46 × 0.12) = 0.092. Hence, taking into account bias from nonresponse, we estimate the prevalence of totalitarian style partner control in Seoul to be about 9%. It is likely that this still underestimates the prevalence.

At the individual level, wife’s age (B = −0.01, p < .05) and marital status (B = 0.18, p < .05) were associated with totalitarian style partner control by the husband in Beijing. In Seoul, high-rise apartment residence (B = 0.17, p < .05) and household size (B = −0.10, p < .05) were associated with totalitarian style partner control. In the combined model, (only) wife’s years of education was negatively associated with totalitarian partner control (B = −0.02, p < .05). Controlling for all other variables, Beijing residents reported significantly less totalitarian style control by husbands (B = −0.50, p < .001).

Discussion

Individual-Level Hypotheses: Confucian Sex Role Norms, Secrecy, and Missing Data

Hypothesis 1 posited a positive relationship between women’s Confucian sex role norms and reported totalitarian style partner control by the husband. A positive association was found in the combined Seoul and Beijing data, and in the Seoul data. The relationship in the Beijing data was positive and marginally significant. The marginally significant interaction term hints that the relationship between Confucian sex role norms and totalitarian partner control may be weaker in Beijing than in Seoul. It is possible that the relationship is truly stronger in Seoul, as Seoul has higher levels of totalitarian style partner control overall, and Confucian sex role norms may play a more important role in shielding perpetrators of totalitarian style control. Given significantly higher levels of IPV secrecy in Beijing, however, it is also possible that the measurement of totalitarian style control is noisier in Beijing. More measurement error reduces effect sizes. To what extent does the positive relationship with totalitarian control represent selective targeting of traditional women by controlling men versus attempts to engineer a resocialization of women within a highly controlled context? Alternately, do the findings indicate higher rates of totalitarian control within a traditional Confucian subculture? Emery et al. (2013) found a positive interaction between husband’s Confucian sex role norms and husband’s child abuse in predicting husband’s IPV. Our findings together with these earlier findings suggest that a subcultural argument (Arendt, 1979; Gould, 1987; VanderEnde et al., 2012), in which norms relegating women to secondary status and norms permitting physical abuse of children combine with particularly pernicious effects, may be worth considering.

Hypothesis 2 postulated a positive relationship between secrecy about IPV and totalitarian style partner control. Findings from the combined data were consistent with Hypothesis 2; there was a significant positive relationship with IPV secrecy and totalitarian style control. However, the pattern for cities was inverted with respect to Confucian sex role norms. IPV secrecy was predictive of totalitarian style control in Beijing, but not in Seoul. This finding is not consistent with more measurement error of totalitarian control in Beijing, and hence undermines that as an explanation for the marginal, smaller effect size finding for Confucian style sex role norms in Beijing. This finding is more consistent with the idea that totalitarian style control may be shielded from scrutiny by different sets of norms in Beijing versus in Seoul. Norms about keeping family issues secret may play a larger role in shielding totalitarian control in Beijing, whereas Confucian style sex role norms may play a more important role in Seoul.

The null finding for IPV secrecy in Seoul is important for another reason. One of the limitations of this cross-sectional study is reverse causality bias: Does IPV secrecy provide opportunities for totalitarian style control or is totalitarian style control more likely to cause women’s secrecy about IPV? We have chosen to investigate the former relationship, but the latter is a viable competing alternative explanation. However, there is no reason to suppose that perpetrators are less likely to try to isolate victims by inculcating them with secrecy norms in Seoul than in Beijing. If anything, higher levels of totalitarian style control in Seoul would suggest the reverse. Moreover, the Seoul sample size was substantially larger than in Beijing. The difference does not appear to stem from a lack of precision in Seoul, but rather from the fact that the Seoul coefficient for IPV secrecy is very close to zero. More research is needed to disentangle reverse causality bias for this case. At present, the findings appear to be more consistent with the idea that victim secrecy presents an opportunity for control, rather than that control succeeds in effecting secrecy.

In the combined and Seoul data, requiring refusal conversion to participate was positively associated with totalitarian style partner control, consistent with Hypothesis 3. Johnson (1995, 2008) argues that survey estimates of IPV that show gender symmetry in IPV are biased because totalitarian dictatorship (Emery, 2011) type violence is vastly underrepresented in the data. Our analysis of the refusal conversion cases, which would not have been in the survey data without substantial additional investment of time and money by the research team, generally support the first part of Johnson’s (1995, 2008) claim. However, the overall finding in the combined data is driven by the Seoul data, for which the coefficient is large and significant. In the Beijing model, the refusal conversion coefficient is nonsignificant and near zero. This finding suggests a problem with Johnson’s argument (1995, 2008). To be sure, Johnson makes this claim with respect to U.S. data only; however, the critique centers not on the United States, but on the scale used (the CTS; Straus & Douglas, 2004). Our findings suggest that the link between totalitarian style partner control and nonresponse may be strong in some cultural contexts (Seoul) but not in others (Beijing). We contend that the literature on the nonresponse problem on IPV surveys remains largely immune to a discussion of relevant cultural context, and that this is a problem that requires rectification. Given the findings of underreporting for Seoul, we recommend that any high-quality surveys of totalitarian partner control or IPV should include time and resources devoted to refusal conversion. Such efforts must, of course, be tempered with respect for the right of potential respondents to refuse to participate.

Neighborhood-Level Hypotheses: Confucian Sex Role Norms, Secrecy, and SES

Holding constant individual-level measurements of the same characteristics, neighborhood SES was associated with significantly more totalitarian style control in the combined and Seoul data; neighborhood Confucian sex role norms were associated with significantly more totalitarian style control in Seoul. Combining neighborhood average and individual-level scores on the same variable in the same model dramatically inflates standard error estimates, making these findings statistically conservative. Overall, the neighborhood findings appear to have been driven by large coefficients in the Seoul data. The finding that neighborhood-level Confucian sex role norms in Seoul are positively associated with totalitarian partner control is consistent with Part b of Hypothesis 1. In Seoul, both partner and neighborhood Confucian sex role norms may shield perpetrators from scrutiny and provide them with an opportunity to employ totalitarian style control tactics against their female partners (Arendt, 1979; Gould, 1987; VanderEnde et al., 2012).

The fact that high neighborhood SES was positively associated with totalitarian style control in Seoul constitutes an anomaly with respect to the social disorganization literature on crime (Kornhauser, 1978). Social disorganization theory links crime, generally, and IPV, specifically (Browning, 2002), to neighborhood-level disorganization or disorder. Hence, social disorganization theory would suggest the coefficient should be significant but negative. Emery (2011), however, argued that maintaining totalitarian style control required organizational skills and consistent application of rules that might make such control more common in professional classes. Coefficients for women’s education (significant) and household income (not significant) were negative however. In Seoul, another class marker (residence in a high-rise apartment building) was positively associated with totalitarian style control. In short, for Seoul at least, women’s education appears to be a protective factor but markers of neighborhood class, including SES and high-rise apartment residence, appear to be risk factors for totalitarian style partner control.

Beijing–Seoul Differences

A significant contribution of this study is that it constitutes the first comparison of totalitarian style partner control in Beijing and Seoul. On the surface, these two high-density megacities appear to have much in common. Both capitals of adjacent countries recently dubbed economic miracles, Beijing and Seoul control the world’s second and 15th largest economies, respectively (United Nations, 2012). Although China and Korea have been independent nations since antiquity, historic ties also run very deep. The last Korean (Joseon) dynasty was founded in 1392 when General Yi Seong-gye, whose mother was ethnically Chinese, refused an order to attack China, turned his army around at the Chinese border and returned to the capital, deposing the last king of the Goryeo dynasty (Carter et al., 1990). Consequently, the Joseon dynasty retained a close relationship with China from 1392 to 1910. Both Chinese and Korean political and cultural leadership stressed a return to Confucian values during this period (Carter et al., 1990). Confucian values that stress respect for learning, filial piety, harmony (Ornatowski, 1996), and face (Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003) continue to inform everyday decisions about how much to support parents financially (Chang, 2009; Kleinman et al., 2011; Sung, 1995) and how to push children up in a high-stress competition to enter elite universities (Fong, 2006) in both Beijing and Seoul.

Profound and striking socioeconomic and cultural differences remain. GDP per capita in Seoul is US$33,638 (36,244,000 KRW; Korean Statistical Information Service, 2016) versus US$17,000 in Beijing (ChinaDaily, 2017). Linguistically, both Chinese and Korean make more use of titles (rather than names) compared with English, but Korean verb endings are extremely sensitive to hierarchical age and status differences between interlocutors (Kang, 2003). Each sentence spoken makes implicit reference to age differences (even of just 1 year; Kang, 2003). Chinese grammar makes no such distinction. However, Beijing has recently experienced mass rural to urban migration on a historic scale (Tong, 2011). Mass migration may be a contributing factor to precedence for informal rules over formal rules in China (Gong & Zhou, 2015), as knowledge of formal local procedure (rules) may often be absent. Prosaically, the informal rules for crossing a busy street or boarding a crowded train are remarkably different in the two cities, the process in Beijing being less predictable.¹ Finally, Koreans have a much higher level of uncertainty avoidance (85 vs. 30) than Chinese (Hofstede-Insights, 2018).

High uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede-Insights, 2018), combined with a culturally and linguistically scripted hierarchical worldview (Kang, 2003), may partially explain the significantly higher level of totalitarian style partner control in Seoul. If Korean men are in fact both more hierarchical and uncertainty avoidant, they may be more inclined to render their lifeworld predictable via control of female partners. Previous research has also found higher levels of severe (and, hence, perhaps controlling) IPV among Korean Americans when compared with Chinese Americans (Kim & Sung, 2000). Why both individual and neighborhood Confucian sex role norms play a predictive role in Seoul (but not in Beijing), whereas IPV secrecy plays a predictive role in Beijing (but not in Seoul), is harder to explain.

Anecdotal evidence supports the supposition that totalitarian style partner control of women by men may be a particular liability for Chinese elites, but not necessarily for Koreans. In China, as in Korea, elite status is conferred by education and money. However, in China, elite status is also influenced by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) membership and rank within the party. The ideological legacy of the cultural revolution, that true communism mandates the equality of men and women, still informs CCP ideology (Thorborg, 2017). Recently, the political leadership in Beijing has been strongly promoting control of salary and resources by the wives of high-ranking cadres (Author, 2018). This is because the leadership views extramarital affairs and the keeping of mistresses as a significant source of both moral and fiscal corruption within the party (Author, 2018). Totalitarian style partner control by a husband in China would be considered a violation of party discipline and would require concealment to maintain one’s status. If totalitarian style partner control by men is generally a liability to status and face in China (and particularly the political capital Beijing), absent secrecy about family matters, social and political pressure might undermine such control over time. This could explain why IPV secrecy is predictive of totalitarian style control in Beijing but not Seoul.

It is possible that Confucian sex role norms are predictive in Seoul but not Beijing because higher female labor force participation in China (63%; Statistica, 2016) versus South Korea (52%; GlobalEconomy, 2017) renders Chinese women more financially independent. Greater control by women over material resources may render normative elements less relevant to totalitarian style partner control. However, both this hypothesis and our hypothesis regarding the reason for the importance of secrecy in Beijing require empirical support from future research.

Implications

We found evidence that suggests totalitarian style partner control is significantly underreported in survey data. This evidence is consistent with Johnson’s (1995, 2008) argument. Lack of findings for Beijing suggests the IPV/survey refusal argument requires much more culturally informed nuance. However, good-quality survey research, going forward, should employ refusal conversion to decrease bias from underreporting. More research to understand the relationships between face, Confucian sex role norms, secrecy, and totalitarian style partner control is much needed in the East Asian context. Our findings suggest that both family and community sex role norms may provide opportunities for totalitarian style partner control in some contexts. Likewise, norms stressing concealment of anything that could be used to shame the family may also help to protect perpetrators of totalitarian style control from scrutiny. In the United States, efforts to change community-level norms have proved difficult but have met with some success (Melton, 2014). In China, efforts aimed at promoting trust and removing potential disincentives for disclosure, particularly among women, may help to reduce totalitarian style partner control.

The data suggest that nearly one in 10 married Seoul women are in relationships characterized by totalitarian levels of control. Even holding all other factors constant, Seoul women experienced significantly higher levels of totalitarian partner control than women in Beijing; in fact, that coefficient was one of the largest in the models. This is a serious problem in and of itself, and also leaves women at higher risk of physical IPV and related negative outcomes (Graham-Kevan & Archer, 2003). This suggests social change is needed to alter normative expectations of men and women in intimate relationships. The data suggest that Seoul women who themselves have or who reside in neighborhoods with stronger Confucian sex role norms are at risk of totalitarian style control by male partners. Women isolated in high-rise apartment buildings and in higher SES neighborhoods also appear to be at higher risk. Public education efforts that highlight the difference between self-control (which is positive) and controlling others (which is problematic) may be helpful. Efforts to empower women via education (which was significantly protective in the combined data) may also help. The employment rate for Korean women is 21 percentage points below that of South Korean men, making the relative female labor force participation rate among the lowest in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD; Patterson & Walcutt, 2014). Hence, efforts to empower women via making employment and an independent income more viable are probably vital. Policies with teeth that can combat the ongoing and serious discrimination against Korean women in the labor market are much needed.

Limitations

These findings for totalitarian style partner control are subject to self-report bias. The data are cross sectional and nonexperimental; hence, findings cannot be said to indicate causal relationships. The results are only generalizable to Beijing and Seoul. Some null findings (particularly in the Beijing model) may have occurred because of a lack of statistical power and variances inflated by multicollinearity; however, significant findings for both cities are statistically conservative. They showed significance in the model despite bias to the contrary. The measure for totalitarian partner control was developed for the measure of intimate terrorism (Johnson & Leone, 2005) because an empirical construct for Emery’s (2011) type had not been developed at the time of data collection. The measure, thus, asks about attempts at totalitarian control rather than achieved totalitarian control, and is subject to Emery’s (2011) critique that it pays insufficient attention to power.

Conclusion

This study is significant as the first study of totalitarian style partner control as an outcome in either Beijing or Seoul, as well as the first study to compare totalitarian style control in these two related, yet profoundly different, cultures. Taken together, our findings suggest that Confucian sex role norms, secrecy, higher neighborhood SES, and refusal to participate in surveys are indicators of risk of totalitarian style partner control. These risk factors should be taken seriously with respect to policy development and quantitative research. However, our findings also highlight the importance of meaningful cross-culturally comparative survey research. The results reveal not only differences in prevalence in totalitarian control but also substantial differences in its etiological footprint, despite many cultural similarities between these two Confucian cultures. These findings help us to unpack risk factors for these two similar but different cultures in ways that would be impossible based on single-culture studies. Women in Seoul are at substantially and significantly higher risk of totalitarian style control for women in Beijing; risk of such control is more than 5 times higher in Seoul. However, in Seoul, totalitarian control is more strongly related to Confucian sex role norms in both the family and the community, as well as neighborhood SES. In Beijing, secrecy and marital status play a much more important role. Although both Korean culture and Chinese culture stress the importance of face (Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003), we suspect that the role this cultural stress plays in relation to totalitarian partner control may be substantially different in the two cultures.

In Beijing, women may conceal negative information about family members from others to save face; this may provide husbands with opportunities to establish totalitarian style partner control. In Seoul, a hierarchical social orientation and high uncertainty avoidance may persuade some husbands to exercise high levels of control over their wives. This may directly promote totalitarian style partner control, or surround many women with communities that act like front organizations (Arendt, 1979), presenting a more moderate face of extreme control to the outside world while insulating perpetrators of totalitarian control from scrutiny. Research on cultures that highly value face is much needed to further test and unpack these inferences. The establishment of policies to promote equality in relationships is much needed. If gains in women’s equality are to be protected, governments must commit to extending the logic of equal political rights to the home.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Support for this study was provided by the H.F. Guggenheim Foundation (grant 2011-2012).

ORCID iDs

Clifton R. Emery

Shali Wu

Ko-Ling Chan

Notes

Author Biographies

Clifton R. Emery is an associate professor at University of Hong Kong. His research interests include informal social control of domestic violence and child abuse, understanding the effects of violence on children, and theory development. He is also affiliated with Yonsei University in Seoul, South Korea.

Shali Wu is a professor at the School of Management at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, South Korea. A University of Chicago graduate, prof. Wu’s research interests include cross-cultural decision making and collective family decision making in an East Asian context. She is also affiliated with Tsinghua University in Beijing, China.

Ko-Ling Chan is a professor at the Department of Applied Social Sciences of Hong Kong Polytechnic University. A Fulbright Scholar, his research interests include partner violence, child abuse and neglect and internal migration in mainland China. He is also affiliated with University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan.

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