Recruitment Process in Salafi-Jihadist Groups in the Middle East (A Qualitative Study)

Abstract

Studies on the psychology of terrorism and fundamentalism place great importance on the role of groups, with a central concept of “us” versus “them.” The present study examines how and why Salafi-jihadist groups in the Middle East have attracted typical citizens. The participants in this qualitative study were unremarkable Kurdish people living near the western borders of Iran with an allegiance toward Salafi-jihadist groups. We selected 12 people for the purposes of this study. Findings indicate that “group adaptation” and “rejection of the other” are the two overarching themes pointed out by the participants. Group adaptation included four sub-themes: (a) Idealization of, plus identification and assimilation with the leader, (b) developing strong group bonds, (c) direct and nonhierarchical agency of the individual in the group, and (d) group hypnotic suggestion. The “rejection of the other” included two sub-themes: (a) in-group rejection (reducing legitimate Islam to Salafism) and (b) out-group rejection (rejection of non-Muslims). The results of the study highlight the importance of a sense of belonging to the group in the process of recruitment and assimilation of individuals into jihadist groups. Findings also indicate that the concepts of adaptation and rejection play a pivotal role in the formation of fundamentalist Salafi-jihadist groups and resultant violence. We discuss the implications of group analysis for possible ways to counterterrorism.

Keywords

jihadist groups group process recruitment rejection of the other Salafism violence

Introduction

As a source of fear and anxiety, religious terrorism exposes people to violence, mass murder, and mutilation. Extreme violence is commonly inflicted on people from different walks of life, regardless of age, gender, and race (Kenny, 2015). Terrorism and religious fundamentalism are not specific to a particular religion or region of the world (Loza et al., 2011). Sicariis were the first group to systematically commit murder and political assassinations—before the birth of Christ. They did not hesitate to kill the dissident Jews and the occupying Romans (Law, 2016). In 1572, Catholic terrorists committed the infamous St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre, in which an estimated hundred thousand French Protestants were killed by their fellow, but denominationally distinct Christian co-religionists (Sinclair, 2004).

Over the past decades, a new wave of Islamic fundamentalism, in the form of Salafism, has developed in reaction to modern global changes, giving birth to terrorist “franchises” such as Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al Shabaab in Somalia, and ISIS in Iraq and Syria. These groups reportedly moved beyond the geographical borders of these countries (Juergensmeyer, 2016). Given that deprivation and death are common to jihadists, a necessary psychological inquiry relates to understanding the motivation and decision processes underlying participation in these groups.

The psychological literature has suggested a variety of factors to explain terrorist behaviors. These include mental disorders (Cooper, 1978; Horgan, 2003; Johnson & Feldmann, 1992; Pearlstein, 1991; Pearce & Macmillan, 1977), childhood trauma (Borum, 2004; Victoroff, 2005), unconventional, dogmatic, and illogical thinking, (Beck, 2002; Hamouda, 2006), and emotional factors including disappointment, frustration, fear, and hatred toward other religions (Feeney, 2002; Goertzel, 2002; Hudson, 1999).

Despite such theorizing, empirical researchers typically agree that a common characteristic shared by terrorists is their normality (Crenshaw, 1981). They believe that the causes of terrorism lie not in aberrant individual psychology but in well-known “group, organizational, and social psychology” processes (Post, 2010; Webber & Kruglanski, 2018). A central issue in the psychology of religious terrorism is the attraction of these fundamentalist groups for otherwise unremarkable people and how ordinary people decide to join and adapt to their extremist ideology. Social psychologists have stressed the impact of group spirit on individuals for more than a century (e.g., Kelly, 1901; Triandis, 2018). To explain individuals’ tendency toward religious fundamentalist groups, Sparke (2019) points out that while religion can result in radicalization, membership in social groups and the psychological impacts of such memberships can be the main reason for radicalization and engagement in violent extremism. Moghadam (2006) believes that identity crises and confusion can be employed, based on Tocqueville’s theory, to describe the tensions of membership in any politically dependent society such as apartheid South Africa, Tamil Tiger Sri Lanka, and fascist Germany. Moghadam (2006) also points out that the more politically and ideologically confused a person is, the more likely they are to become an active member of an extremist group and the more attached they might feel to that group. Additionally, Silke (2003) summarizing previous work stated that, “quite simply, the best of the empirical work does not suggest, and never has suggested, that terrorists possess a distinct personality or that their psychology is somehow deviant from that of ‘normal’ people.” As a result, they are more likely to engage in terrorist acts against other groups in order to encourage intragroup action, and thereby increase their sense of belonging and loyalty to their group. Consistent with Silke’s summary, Post et al. (2003) conducted a study using a semi-structured interview with 35 imprisoned Middle Eastern terrorists. They found that when individuals join fundamentalist groups, individual identities fuse with a new collective identity. A general feeling of group bond overwhelms individuals and pushes them deeper toward fundamentalism. The Post et al. (2003) interview revealed that the transformation of individual identity into group identity played a key role in the development of group solidarity.

In a related idea, Gerges (2014) opined that people from the West join ISIS and other extremist groups in an attempt to be part of a cohesive community that enjoys a strong identity. Kruglanski and Fishman (2006) believe that people who view the world in absolute, clear-cut terms and resist gray identities usually look for a solid and coherent cause and join extremist groups mostly because these groups provide a coherent ideological image and resultant unambiguous identity. By joining them, these individuals, who have little tolerance for ambiguity, find basic, concrete, and uncomplicated answers to their questions, while becoming part of a larger, cohesive whole. The extreme nature of the group vanishes in the shrunken scope of relevant issues entering their psychological space (Kruglanski, 2014). Numerous studies have shown that terrorism is a group activity that involves intimate relationships between a small number of people, in which individuals become violent and act violently primarily from their social relationships rather than ideology (Sageman, 2004; Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Sparke, 2019). Evidence suggests that roughly 90% of Sunni terrorists committing violent attacks in the United States become radicalized through social networks (Kleinmann, 2012).

This representative review of empirical research suggests that group dynamics is a primary factor reinforcing the tendency toward radicalization. Groups that encourage fanaticism in their members disapprove of and delegitimize those who oppose their ideals to create a picture of an irredeemable enemy in their members’ minds. Further, when communities and group bonds are defined based on common values (such as in Salafi groups, whose common aspiration is to return to early Islam), being members of such “enlightened” groups is thought to provide them with their identity. Seeking to leave the group is emotionally painful because it involves severing close emotional bonds. In extremist groups, otherwise benign individuals commit violent acts to meet the common goals set by the group leaders. The Milgram (1963) experiment and Haney et al.’s Stanford Prison Study (1973) experiments and Eichmann trial showed that ordinary people can commit serious violence against innocent victims when they are placed in a group situation and are under immense social pressure resulting from such situations (Arendt, 2006; Victoroff & Adelman, 2012; Zimbardo, 2004). Thus, being a member of a group may lead to violent terrorist attacks that individuals would be unable to commit on their own. Drawing on evidence from the Milgram (1963) experiment on obedience to authority, as well as previous studies on organizational manipulation, group suggestion, and group belonging and loyalty, Atran (2006) tried to explain retroactively suicide terrorists’ personality from a psychological perspective. Also, in their study, Post et al. (2009) laid a huge emphasis on factors such as collective identity, charismatic leadership, de-individualization, and in-group against out-group enmity as the main factors leading the individuals toward extremist groups and suicide attacks. Zimbardo (2004), in his book The Lucifer Effect, points out that the process of joining extremist groups, which involves rejecting and dehumanizing outsiders, renders the individuals merciless enough to commit inhumane brutal attacks.

After the Arab Spring and the defeat of nationalism in the Middle East, Salafi-jihadist groups sought to shape a universal identity against regional nationalism and return to the earlier and hypothetically purer form of Islam. The number of members of extremist groups dramatically increased shortly after the proclamation of the Caliphate. If we consider a terrorist group as a pyramid, all who share the same beliefs as the terrorists qualify for membership, with terrorists themselves on top of the pyramid. The base of this pyramid lies on those who sympathize with what the terrorists say and fight for (McCauley, 2006).

Arguably, what is been done in the Middle East as the fight against terrorism and extremism is doomed to failure due to the implication of the inappropriate method. In other words, eradication of the current extremists needs a phenomenological approach that unearths the roots of the problem rather than considering it as some individual groups and organizations. Counterterrorist organizations and political decision-makers prefer to define and evaluate current extremist groups in the Middle East, in terms of their existing organizational capacity rather than the actual threats posed by the groups.

After the emergence of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, a group of Salafists residing along the border areas of Iran volunteered for jihad and joined ISIS, resulting in many of them losing their lives on the ISIS battlefields. Lacking from the literature is a phenomenological view identifying and examining factors entering the decision-making of those who show a tendency toward fundamentalist ideology and translate that proclivity into jihadist behaviors. More specifically, the current study set out to provide new information about the lived experiences of previously “typical citizens” with a Salafi-jihadist creed who went on to join a jihadist group. Typical citizens in this article refers to Kurdish individuals in Iran who, prior to contact with Salafists, were typical of the common citizen; religious, but not uncommonly devout or zealous, and not politically involved. This article from this point will use the word “typical” to describe these individuals.

Methodology

This qualitative study employed a phenomenological approach. As already mentioned, the main question addressed here is: how can we characterize Salafis’ experience of assimilation in the collective identity of Salafism?

Researchers have employed the qualitative phenomenological approach to address this question. The participants in this study were typical citizens embracing the Salafi-jihadist ideology, living in the western border provinces of Kermanshah and Kurdistan in Iran. A total of 12 participants were selected using the purposive sampling method, with the sampling criteria as follows: (a) local sources should confirm the participants’ Salafi tendencies, (b) the participants themselves should accept and confirm their Salafi-jihadist identity, (c) the participants should be willing to share their experience of Salafism, (d) the participants should have already attended Salafi meetings, and (e) the participants should identify themselves as Salafists for less than one year.

The researchers, who speak the same language as the Salafis in the region, participated in their gatherings for two years in the border areas of Iran. The main interviewers in the study were from these areas and, thus, were able to communicate with these people and earn their trust. Field observation primarily occurred around Friday prayers held in the local mosques. The researchers asked sample members, who were now well acquainted with the researchers, to participate in some individual interviews. Of those asked for an interview, 12 people agreed to take part through which the data were collected. The participants were assured that they would remain anonymous throughout the research process and were given the right to determine where and when the interviews would be conducted.

The research data was collected primarily through in-depth interviews with open-ended questions to investigate the issue in question from a phenomenological perspective. Initially, interviewers asked the participants to describe the group atmosphere they experienced in Salafi gatherings. Then, the interviewers used open-ended, follow-up questions to examine closely the participants’ experience of attending these gatherings. Also, the thematic analysis method (Braun & Clarke, 2006), used in different qualitative studies, including phenomenological studies, was employed to analyze the data. Each interview and observation record was read several times and the significant statements, sentences, or quotes were highlighted in order to gain an understanding of the Salafists’ experiences as a whole. These statements were then categorized into meaning units or clusters of preliminary themes. These preliminary themes then were compared and a thematic meaning structure, consisting of two main themes and several subthemes, was developed. The concepts thus derived directly from the comments of participants in the study and observations of the researchers strengthen the trustworthiness of the findings. The use of a peer coder also added rigor to the analysis and provided an acceptable level of conformity.

To follow research ethics, the experimenters informed the participants of their right to end their participation in the research process at any point without consequence. Additionally, the researchers informed them that their responses would remain confidential and participants would remain anonymous. Under these circumstances, we did not request signed written consent.

Results

Group recruitment and assimilation process used by Salafi-jihadists includes two main themes, namely group adaptation and rejection of the other. Group adaptation, in turn, consists of four subthemes, and rejection of the other encompasses two subthemes, as presented in Table 1.

Table 1.

Themes and sub-themes for group recruitment used by Salafi-jihadists.

Main Themes	Subthemes
Group adaptation	idealization, assimilation, and absorption into the leader
	developing a community with close group bonds
	direct, nonhierarchical agency of the individual in the group
	group hypnotic suggestions
Rejection of the other	in-group rejection (reducing Islam to Salafism)
Rejection of the other	out-group rejection (rejection of non-Muslims)

Theme 1: Group Adaptation

All participants referred to some aspects of their perceived experience of being oriented toward Salafism, which shows they had adapted themselves to Salafism. This theme clearly represents the power of Salafi collective identity for the participants, such that their perception of their individual identity was completely overshadowed. Observations of Salafis’ gatherings showed that the group leaders possessed a kind of hypnotic and suggestive power. The individuals are influenced powerfully by the Salafi collective identity in complete disregard of their own individual identity. Group adaptation is comprised of themes such as idealization, assimilation, and absorption into the leader figure, developing strong group bonds, direct, nonhierarchical agency of the individual within the community, and group hypnotic suggestions.

Sub-theme 1: Idealization, assimilation, and absorption into the leader. In their description of their religious Salafi leader, the participants mostly presented an idealized picture of him, attributed qualities such as bravery and wisdom to him, and identified themselves with him, all showing they were somehow absorbed and assimilated into his personality and wanted to follow his path.

For instance, participant No. 1 said, “When I went to Mullah Abdul-Hamid, I found him quite intelligent and knowledgeable in answering questions. I enjoyed his answers. So, I began to love Mullah Abdul-Hamid [observation: his tone of speech and gesticulations often shifted to mockery when talking of other mullahs, but he spoke highly of Mullah Abdul-Hamid].” His acquaintance with the leader of this group reinforced his tendency toward Salafism and, identifying himself with the leader, he took the same path the leader had previously taken and joined the jihad in Syria.

Participant No. 2 explained his assimilation into his Salafi leader. Similarly, he depicted a picture of his leader, which was completely different from that of the ordinary people who knew him: “When I was sitting next to him, I was mysteriously attracted by his power because he talked quite differently from other people and from what I had in my mind. I had a close relationship with Mullah Abdul-Hamid and I always asked him my questions and realized he always told the truth and other people were just lying or simply wrong.”

Participant No. 3 had similarly identified himself with the leader, and said, “I’m first a Muslim, then a Kurd, just like what Kak Mehdi [a Salafi leader] says. Do you understand what I say? [He repeated this sentence throughout the interview].” All other participants referred to a similar process of idealization and identification with their Salafi leader, indicating a kind of group adaptation through assimilation into the leader.

Sub-theme 2: Developing a community and strong group bonds. The participants in the present study highlighted the importance of their group gatherings and relationships, which indicates the participants’ endeavor to build a community and develop strong group bonds. Salafis put great value on their regular gatherings. For example, they always used the term “we” when talking about themselves, like “We Salafis, we are like this, we reject Sufism and its followers… .” This ideology results from their effort to define themselves as a group and reject individual identities.

Participant No. 1, as another example, said, “We occasionally get together and talk about different scholars’ opinions about different topics. Like, we speak about Sayyid Qutb [a Sunni scholar who is believed to have had great influence on Salafism], and we recommend books to each other about different topics.”

Participant No. 2, similarly, stressed the significance of developing group relationships: “When you first believe in this [Salafi] ideology, you need to try to stay in touch with Muslims, even by phone because you will get quite discouraged and lose your beliefs if you lose touch with other Muslims.”

As part of field observation, the researchers attended a Friday prayer three days after the Charlie Hebdo shooting in 2015, and felt the presence of an unbreakable bond and sense of community among the individuals as well as their identification with the Salafi collective identity. The Imam of the Friday prayer, who was a young, bearded man, while extolling the terrorists attacking the newspaper office for their courage, chastised himself and the other participants for not being courageous enough to do such acts of valor. An interesting point the researcher noticed in this field study was that most participants in the Friday prayer were of almost the same age as the Imam and had long beards and simple outfits, which somehow contributed to the community identity. There were very few elderly people among the participants. The presence of a large number of young or even teenage participants, who were mostly bearded, created a special atmosphere in the mosque. The participants seemed excited and spirited, probably because of the Charlie Hebdo shooting incident.

Other participants in the present study talked about similar processes of developing a community and a feeling of collective bond, which once again highlights the importance of adaptation and collective identity for the members, who found their new collective identity superior to their individual identities.

Sub-theme 3: Direct, nonhierarchical agency of the individual within the group. The participants in the study also referred to a kind of group process that differentiated Salafism as a community completely different from other similar communities. One can think of this process as a crucial factor in group adaptation as well as assimilation into the leader. Unlike other religious groups, such as Muslim Brotherhood and Sufi groups, which involve inflexible hierarchy and require members to have a high level of knowledge and education to attain a high position in the group, Salafi groups allow their members to act as an agent and interpret hadiths and Salafi ideology. This provides individuals with a distinct identity and a position equal to that of a leader because they do not have to go through hierarchical stages.

For example, participant No. 1 illustrated his position as a preacher of the ideology of his group as follows: “Thank God I’ve been able to direct a lot of people to the right path. All my brothers’ family members, except one, have become true believers in Islam. My uncles’ and aunts’ families have also changed and become true Muslims and many of my friends.”

Participant No. 6 prides himself on his role in convincing one of his relatives to follow Salafism: “One of my relatives, who has an M.A in law, had completely secular ideas, but is now a true Muslim. We’ve been friends since childhood. I kept talking to him the way I’m just doing now, but for a much longer time, say, six months maybe and he finally found out the truth.”

Participant No. 4 similarly stressed the crucial role of each member as a promoter of Salafism: “I’d like to invite them all to Salafism every day because they will never enter Paradise if they die an unbeliever. When talking to my friends, I tell them we have to discuss our ideas convincingly, based on logic and knowledge or we won’t be able to guide the unbelievers to the right path.”

The field observations of the researcher indicates that, unlike other similar groups in the region, the Salafis do not follow a hierarchical structure, as a result of which individuals act an agent from the very beginning and promote their ideology as a leader among their relatives and friends.

Sub-theme 4: Group hypnotic suggestions. The atmosphere in the gatherings of Salafist is replete with a kind of hypnotic induction and suggestion. In such gatherings participants experience a kind of hypnotic atmosphere, which can be described as both verbal and nonverbal suggestions and induction—or even brainwashing— through which the individual identity of members is targeted and finally replaced with a collective identity.

For example, participant No. 1 shared his experience of a feeling of shame and humiliation in these gatherings as they had been told accounts of what non-Muslims had done to Muslims, which had made them cry, and feel guilty and powerless: “Muslim girls have killed themselves because they have been raped [by unbelievers]. It’s shameful. They’ve raped mothers and sisters of Muslims [tears rolled down his face when he was saying these]. I think nothing is left for us to talk about. What else can I tell you? I feel ashamed I’m telling you these.”

The researchers’ observation of a Salafi gathering in the region showed how a kind of group hypnotism influenced the participants. They were profoundly influenced by the powerful rhetoric of the preacher and feelings of shame, humiliation, and guilt somehow prepared them to develop a strong belief in what the leader was promoting as the target of the group and finally identify themselves with the leader. The preacher tried his best to fill the participants with a feeling of anger and rage by making them feel ashamed and humiliated, highlighting the misery Muslims were living in, intensifying the feeling of hostility toward non-Muslims, and stirring up men’s sense of gallantry and protection toward Muslim women. The preacher’s shouts, loud cries, and his flaming face influenced the audience even further. “Not a day goes by without Muslims around the world being killed. The followers of the Islamic community are humiliated and ridiculed [He was shaking with rage and I could feel the anger and see the flush in his face], but nobody dares to say a word about this.”

The same theme is detected in a speech by one of the Salafi leaders in the region. “Shame on you, all! It’s a real shame! You just claim to be a Muslim! An infidel has dared to mock Prophet Mohammad, peace be upon him, and drawn a caricature of him. Shame on you! How can you consider yourself a true Muslim? No! A true Muslim stands for Prophet Mohammad and is ready to give his life! [A few moments of silence] You say you condemn it. But you just claim to do so. What would you do if someone drew a mocking caricature of your sister or mother, [the preacher uses the word Namus here], published it in the media and disrespected your honor? Would you just stand by and watch?”

Field observations of Salafi gatherings suggested that there was a hypnotism-induced atmosphere within the group. The researchers also realized how the new members’ individual identity is inadvertently swallowed up by the Salafi collective identity such that, overwhelmed by such emotions, they rush to join jihadist groups in Syria. In addition, the researchers witnessed how vehemently the leader verbally attacked the participants to arouse their feeling of honor and duty: “We are a man? No, a woman, less courageous that a woman!”

Within Salafi groups, depicting “the other” as hostile to motivate their followers to participate in jihad against unbelievers is very common. Thus, in the Salafi communities in this region, through hypnotic suggestion and evoking feelings of shame and guilt in members, followers are motivated to take action to attain what has been set as goals. This process can be seen as a kind of group adaptation and assimilation into the group, as a result of which members identify themselves with the leader and try to achieve their goals.

Theme 2: Rejection of the Other

One of the themes closely related to group assimilation is the concept of “rejection of the other.” All participants in the present study, when talking about their experiences, somehow implied how intolerant of “the other” they were and how decisively they rejected their views and opinion altogether. They went even further and regarded them as enemies, reducing Islam to Salafism and considering all other religious groups as “others” that should be rejected. Some of them were even more fanatical and rejected those Salafi groups who refused to take part in jihad, considering them as outsiders too. Thus, the in-group rejection can occur at two levels: the rejection of all religious groups popular in the Iranian Kurdistan, such as Sufi groups and Maktab-Quran², and advocates of Muslim Brotherhood, or the rejection of other religious groups outside the region, such as Shia Muslims and Saudi Sunnism. However, sometimes it occurs in the form of out-group rejection—rejection of all nonreligious Kurds in the Middle East and supporters of Kurdish parties with a Western ideology. It seems that Salafis view Sufism as an outsider within the Middle East. They seem to highlight Sufism as the main “other” in the region and Western capitalism as the main out-group enemy. They perceive jihadist Salafism as a collective group identity, while rejecting other religious groups either inside or outside the Middle East as “the others.”

Sub-theme 1: In-group rejection (reducing Islam to Salafism). The participants in the interviews openly expressed their reluctance to tolerate other religious groups’ ideologies, and criticized and even ridiculed their rituals and beliefs. They described members of other Muslim groups as “others” and rejected them outright. Salafis strongly believe that their ideology is in stark contrast with that of Sufism. In effect, they strongly disapprove of Sufis ideas and rituals, such as their visits to the tombs of religious figures and tawassul (supplication to God through an intermediary), and find it to be a kind of idolatry. It seems that followers of Sufism are regarded as “the other” with a position even lower than that of the followers of other religions. It should be noted that the ideology of other Muslim groups in the region, such as that of advocates of Muslim Brotherhood and Maktab-Quran, is unacceptable to them.

Participant No. 2, strongly rejected in-group “others,” cited a hadith from Prophet Muhammad and expressed that salvation can be achieved only through Salafism and rejected all other religious groups and ideologies: “Prophet Mohammad says that in the Hereafter the Muslim community will be divided into 73 groups, of which only one will enter the Heaven; others will go to Hell. Only those who follow the Qur’an and sunnah (tradition) will achieve salvation. This is a reliable hadith. I think we can say it is only Salafis who truly follow the Qur’an and sunnah and enter the Heaven. We’ve been studying all religious trends and found problems with each of them and found out that Salafism is the greatest of all.”

Participant No. 4, defending an even more extreme ideology, defined non-jihadist Salafis as “the other”: “there are Salafis who we call non-jihadists. They do not believe in jihad… . You know … like the Iraqi non-jihadist Salafis who do not believe in jihad and claim that Masoud Barzani³ is the leader of Muslims. Masoud Barzani is not a true Muslim, trust me! Even Yusuf al-Qaradawi, God damn him, should have ordered Muslims to take part in jihad this year.”

The comments by some participants clearly showed they found Sufism unacceptable and not worthy of respect: “In the Qur’an and sunnah and hadiths we hear a lot about mosques. But some sheikhs have established khanqahs [monastery for Sufis] and do not care about what the Qur’an and sunnah and hadiths tell us. They do the exact opposite. Sufism is not a political ideology; it comes from their whims and wishes. Sufism is full of personal desires. Now, the Sufis in our region are all Sunni Muslims but they’re no different from the Shias. They appeal to sheikhs and Shias appeal to Imam Ali and other religious figures for help. There is no difference between the two.”

Salafis also criticized the followers of the Muslim Brotherhood for their lack of belief in jihad as well as not dealing with polytheism (shirk) and blasphemy. They strongly believed that Muslim Brotherhood adherents are not true Muslims: “Why don’t followers of Muslim Brotherhood discuss tawhid [oneness of God]? Why don’t they talk about polytheism and blasphemy?! I’m telling you Brotherhood Muslims and followers of Maktab-Quran have even been here in this region for the past 10 years, but they have never discussed tawhid. They believe in a parliamentary system and tell you what, those who believe in such a thing they are infidels.”

Thus, Salafis not only disapproved of religious groups in this region, they also harshly criticized other religious groups such as Shias or even religious governments in Saudi Arabia. They believe that true Islam is not practiced in such countries and thus regard them as enemies and reject their beliefs and ideologies.

Participant No. 9 said, “Saudi Arabia as a Muslim country and, for example, has spent five million dollars fighting against ISIS! It’s a joke! Saudi Arabia is not practicing true Islam. It’s not an Islamic nation, just like Iran. I, as a Salafi, find them to be infidels. The Iranian government is not Islamic at all. Followers of the Shia ideology are all infidels just like Sufis in our region, even worse.”

It can be concluded that all participants believed and engaged in developing the concept of “other” and considered all other religious groups outsiders and rejected them. They viewed the other religious groups as misled because they opposed the Salafi ideology and rejected their beliefs and, therefore, they were all considered infidels and polytheists.

Sub-theme 2: Out-group rejection (rejection of non-Islamic groups). As already discussed, the participants rejected all religious groups that did not follow Salafism and viewed them as “others.” In the interviews, they also rejected all non-Muslim groups, as an instance of out-group rejection, and dubbed them infidels and polytheists, and found jihad against them legitimate. This out-group rejection included all Kurdish people who gave precedence to their nationality over their religion. For example, they considered Kurdish militant groups, such as the Democratic Union Party (PYD), non-Muslims and infidels, despite having fought against ISIS. They also declared Western countries, above all the United States and Israel, as infidel others and found jihad against them a religious obligation.

Participant No. 5 thought of out-group others as enemies: “We see everybody from any other movements from anywhere in the world as our brothers as long as they truly believe in Allah and the sunnah. But those who don’t believe in God and Prophet Muhammad are our enemies even if they are our brothers. All those who go astray from the right path [Allah and the sunnah] are neither our brothers nor our friends, but our sworn enemies.”

Participant No. 7 regarded all Kurdish leaders as non-Muslim. Regarding the Siege of Kobani, he took the side of Salafis and called the Kurdish fighters traitors: “I never call Barzani a Muslim. He is worthless to me because he is not a Muslim. Everything that goes on in the Kurdish Parliament is anti-Islamic. I think Salafis are absolutely right in issues such as the siege of Kobani. Masoud Barzani, Jalal Talabani⁴, and Abdullah Öcalan⁵ are all infidels.”

Similarly, participant No. 8 declared one of his own fellow citizens, a commander of the Syrian Democratic Army who was killed by ISIS during the Kobani war, as an infidel. This was because he believed he had fought against Muslims: “He was a worthless infidel because he fought against Islam. It’s absolute nonsense to like your homeland over Allah’s decree.”

As we can see from the comments quoted earlier, the participants viewed all non-Muslims and even non-Salafi Muslims as “others,” regarded them as infidels, and called for jihad against them. As another example, participant No. 9 called the Jewish and the Americans “filthy dogs,” thus, regarding them as “others,” devoid of human status and deserving death: “The Jewish have occupied Jerusalem and made it unclean and impure! It was Muslims’ first qiblah. The bastard Americans attacked Iraq in 2003. The great Saladin saved Quds from the dirty Jews. But for the last 60, 70 years infidels have controlled Quds and the Muslims don’t dare to object.”

The Salafi participants of the present study all rejected other non-Muslim and non-religious groups. They praised suicide attacks against the “infidels,” approved of killing Americans and Israelis, as the most important non-Muslim others, and viewed jihad against them a religious obligation: “Suicide attack is right when it is against infidels, above all Americans and Israelis, but only when there is no other choice. Jihad should be against infidels only and against the innocent it is sinful.” (Participant No. 6)

The participants rejected other groups and viewed them as enemies because of their opposition to Islam. Their out-group rejection of “the other” included groups ranging from all the Kurds who do not find Islam superior to their nationality to the Western countries that openly oppose Islam. Just as is the case about in-group rejection, out-group rejection by Salafis is an active mechanism through which members are assimilated into the Salafi identity, which is characterized by branding in-group and out-group “others” as infidels who deserve death.

Discussion

Concerning the behavior of fundamentalists and terrorists, most researchers have concluded that terrorists suffer from personality disorders and assorted psychological abnormalities, and are easily influenced by external factors (Harris et al., 2014; Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Silke, 2003; Victoroff, 2005).

The results of the data analyzed in the present study about the assimilation of typical citizens to Salafi-jihadist groups provided us with two main themes of group adaptation and the rejection of the other. Major aspects of group adaptation include (a) idealization, identification, and assimilation with the group leader, (b) developing a community and strong group bonds, (c) direct, nonhierarchical agency of the individual within the group, and (d) group hypnotic suggestions. The second theme can be categorized into the sub-themes of in-group rejection (reducing Islam to Salafism) and out-group rejection (rejection of non-Islamic groups).

Concerning group adaptation, all participants somewhat referred to their growing tendency toward Salafism, which clearly shows their adaptation to Salafism as a group. They perceived Salafism as an ideal collective identity to assimilate into. This reveals how the Salafi collective identity can act to swallow the participants’ individual identity. Freud, in his seminal book Group Psychology and the Analysis of Ego, criticizes the past theoreticians for neglecting the decisive role of leader within the group. He believes that to keep their authority and influence members of the group, leaders ought to possess firm beliefs, iron will, and a charismatic personality. Following McDougal, Freud highlighted the importance of group organizations and bonds for group stability and strength (Mansfield, 2000). Gerges (2014) believes that Western teenagers and youths join ISIS or other extremist groups mainly because they desire to be part of a cohesive society with a strong, cohesive identity. Such individuals mostly seek straightforward, right or wrong answers to their radical questions, mostly leading them to extreme ideologies (Güner, 2014). Salafi leaders and ideologues possess such qualities and consequently succeed in attracting individuals. Factors such as peer pressure, group solidarity, and the psychology of group dynamics played an important role in making individual stay in such groups (Hudson, 1999; Stern, 2004). Typically, extremists easily submerge their individual identity in favor of a desirable collective identity (Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Stern, 2004). Such factors can both motivate and disinhibit group members to do things they would be unable to do as individuals. Additionally, when assuming the group’s identity, individual values become secondary to group values (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2010). Group adaption will also lead to “in-group love and out-group hate,” indicating that individual identity melds with the collective identity (in-group love) and could definitely foster the individuals’ perspective toward the out-group agents (hating the out-group individuals). A strong group affiliation can gradually motivate individuals toward involvement in terrorist acts (Hronick, 2006) and adaptation to group can play a part in the growth of fanaticism (Taylor, 1991).

Developing a community with strong group bonds highlights another important sub-theme. Salafis attach great importance to developing a community and try hard to strengthen group bonds. Fundamentalist ideology fosters self-confidence within individuals, and by transforming out-group bonds into intergroup ones, individuals are empowered and intellectually supported, as a result of which members do not find themselves isolated or notorious but rather righteous, superior to others and worthy of praise. Drawing heavily on a literal, simplistic interpretation of their religious texts, they hope for redemption promised in these texts. They find no reason for disappointment and hesitation as they see the “right path” the only way to happiness, and, to them, the goal of life is predetermined (Kenny, 2015). Fundamentalist and Salafi groups attract individuals to fundamentalist ideology and reinforce tendencies toward fundamentalism by developing strong in-group bonds. Group members tailor their interaction based on harmonious coexistence and their obedience to the group leader is not necessarily out of fear. By training the members and developing a sense of belonging in them, the leaders of these groups try to brainwash them (Karimi, 2019).

Roy (2014) pointed out that the Islam promoted by ISIS seeks to strengthen fraternity and intimate group bonds and, therefore, the Salafi discourse provides its followers with a unique identity. Those who identify themselves with the Salafi discourse do not conceal their affiliation, but rather publicize it as a way to challenge the existing social and cultural context. They also usually have similar looks and dress in a similar way, which can enable them to express their distinct identity and attract the attention of others.

Participants in the interviews mentioned the members’ direct, nonhierarchical agency in Salafism, which distinguishes Salafi groups from other similar groups in the region and plays a key part in group adaptation and assimilation. This factor enables the members to develop rapidly and take agency, and provides them with a distinct identity and the status of a leader.

Simplicity in speech and function characterizes Salafism. This simplicity provides followers with trust and confidence, and a simple path through which they play their role and take steps toward eternal happiness in the other world. Simply following basic religious rules absolves them of concerns complexities existing in other religious discourses or the pressure exerted by authoritarian institutions (Imad, 2014). Hushangi (2010) suggests that fundamentalist leaders’ lack of advanced educations and their reliance on personal studies into religion and religious discussions can be among the most important causes of fundamentalism. The simplicity of the Salafi discourse and its ability to create binaries, such as tawhid (monotheism) versus shrk (polytheism), wilaa (friendship) versus barra (enmity), sunnah (tradition) versus bid‘ah (innovation in religious matter); taqlid (imitation) versus ijtihad (independent reasoning); salaf (predecessor) versus khalaf (successor), have made Salafism especially attractive to the unsophisticated. Salafist discourses contain no complicated discussions on philosophical, theological, secular, political, or even Western values that have found their way into the Islamic societies. Salafi discourse seems to be more powerful than all other discourses in indoctrinating individuals with Salafi ideology since it puts more emphasis on religious beliefs than politics.

Most Salafis know relatively little about modern sciences, which they dismiss as false. The only truth to Salafis is a religious faith. In a word, to Salafists, the only reliable knowledge is religious one, while natural science is of no importance. So, this way they can equip themselves with an illusion of faith, viewing themselves as religious scholars with knowledge superior to the “false” knowledge of infidels. They firmly believe that they are better equipped with knowledge and science than others and think that by relying on their religious faith they can refute any argument put forward by followers of other ideologies (Ben Omar, 2013 as cited in Evazpouer et al., 2017). The semantic system of Salafism is simple, straightforward, and easily accessible to its followers.

Membership in the fundamentalist groups brings about radical changes in the individuals’ beliefs and attitudes through their interactions with one another. According to the theory of social influence, such individuals are deeply influenced by fundamentalist groups such that it is the group that controls the individual rather than the other way around (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Guadagno et al., 2010; Webber & Kruglanski, 2018). The themes mentioned earlier, such as strong identification and fusion with the leader, set the grounds for hypnotizing and undermining the individual identity of the followers. In the present study, negative emotions such as shame, humiliation, and guilt overwhelmed the novices while attending the Salafi initiation meetings, where the participants were prepared, through the process of identification and assimilation to join the jihad in Syria. Houghton (2014) points out that group adaptation occurs when individuals become mentally involved in well-organized in-group activities. In such situations, individuals overlook their own personal motives.

The concept of rejection of the other, both in-group rejection and out-group rejection, could be inferred from the participants’ comments about other groups and ideologies. They rejected anyone who disagreed with their ideology and viewed them as enemies. Consequently, Islam is reduced to Salafism and all other Muslim groups are thought of as “others.” To some participants, even the Salafi groups who do not take part in jihad are outsiders, deserving criticism. Salafi discourse utilizes takfir (ex-communication) to fight “the others” and reject all other Islamist movements. As Jones (2008) has pointed out, demonizing and dehumanizing the other in religious terrorism is a powerful tactic to facilitate terrorism. Juergensmeyer (2016), similarly noted that demonic enemies cannot be changed and should only be destroyed.

To explain the concept of “rejection of the other” from a psychoanalytic perspective, it can be said that by accepting and defending “splitting,” Salafis develop a dichotomy of “us” (insiders or men of God) versus “them” (the others or men of Satan) to commit violence and kill “the others.” As Kenny (2015) has pointed out, identical divisions recur throughout history in different struggles between different groups. During wars, our enemies are no longer our human brothers; they start to become infidels (in the Crusades and other “holy” wars), brutal creatures (native Indian Americans and native Australians), beasts (German soldiers), vermin (as Hitler described the Jews), monkeys (like Japanese soldiers), and cockroaches (the victims of the Rwandan genocide; Kenny, 2015).

Increased adaptation and conformity to the insider group push the followers to prejudicial dismissal of the other and the other’s narratives. This, in turn, leads to the rejection of “the other.” In a prejudiced thinking, Salafists reject others without meeting them and hearing about their mindsets and ideology (Baron et al., 2007). One reason for the rejection of the other is one’s belief in his superiority. All participants in this study drew on the Firqah and Najiyah hadith, to defend their belief in jihadist Salafism being the only way to gain redemption on resurrection day. Different studies (e.g., Bruneau, 2016; Halevy et al., 2008; Weisel & Böhm, 2015) demonstrated that loyalty and adaptation to one’s own group cause members to underestimate the values held by other groups. Further, they showed that prejudgment toward other groups increase when in-group bonds and identity are stronger, causing group members to view their own characteristics as superior, while depreciating those of out-group members (Bruneau, 2016; Halevy et al., 2008; Weisel & Böhm, 2015). This explains how Salafis, with ISIS as their newest representative, view a vast range of Islamic ideologies as unacceptable and their followers as infidels, including followers of Muslim Brotherhood, Sufis and all Shias (Bunzel, 2015).

Out-group rejection ranges in intensity from Kurdish groups, which are mostly secular, to the Western nations, against whom they find jihad an obligation. Middle Eastern extremist group have openly rejected Western culture (Karimi et al., 2019; Loza et al., 2011; Mazarr, 2007; Mokaitis, 2007) because they believe that Western civilization is intrinsically and indelibly corrupt (McCauley, 2002) and claim that the West has been threatening their religious in different ways (Orbach, 2001). They also try to reinforce the negative attitude existing in the Muslim countries toward non-Muslim culture (Littman, 2005; Mokaitis, 2007).

By popularizing concepts such as the out-group enemy, fundamentalist groups try to develop a strong and cohesive collective identity to shape groups based on extremist ideal and ideologies. Thus, without considering group adaptation, recruitment methods, and organization in these groups, a comprehensive understanding of the movements in the Middle East is unattainable and inevitably would lead to errors that would then form the bases for unsound decision-making.

Conclusion

Psychological studies on terrorism and fundamentalism focus considerable attention on the role of group and concepts such as “us,” “them” and “the other.” Group has played a great role in most violent attacks by terrorist organizations. Researchers suggest that members of a group, even when not in a battlefield situation, embrace negative emotions and participate in activities they characteristically avoid when on their own (Glover, 2012). Membership in an omniscient group grants its members a psychologically justified superiority and arrogance that can induce previously typical citizens to commit merciless, brutal murders, entirely vindicated by the importance of identification with the extremist group, it’s ideology and it’s leadership.

Most studies on extremist movements in the Middle East have been theoretical, nonphenomenological, and conducted by Western researchers, which might be the reason why such studies have mostly failed to provide us with a comprehensive understanding of the more subtle, cultural and interpersonal issues. The main interviewers of the present study live in the Middle East and are intimately familiar with the language, religion and culture of the region. The present study has focused on “typical citizens” in Salafi-jihadist groups. The phenomenological methods and in-depth interviews with ordinary individuals with a tendency toward Salafi groups have helped us shed light on factors reinforcing the tendency of these people toward the Salafi ideology. Phenomenological studies provide a better understanding of the local population, who are the targets of terrorist exploitation. This type of study can reveal their similarities and differences from other extremists, while their concerns and complaints can be recognized. History has shown that wars against such organizations often end in failures since with the defeat of one organization, another one with a similar ideology emerges. What is of importance is to rely on a phenomenological viewpoint, free of preconceptions, to understand the mentality of these people, and to identify the reasons for their tendency toward such groups. This can help us lessen violence in the Middle East and even throughout the world. Phenomenology is one instrument to provide a more intimate, personal and accurate grasp of the mentality of the local people and effectively prevent terrorism.

Footnotes

Authors’ Note

The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not represent the views of any institution.

Acknowledgments

The authors express their deepest gratitude toward Wagdy Loza for their constructive comments and suggestions to our manuscript.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

ORCID iD

Yusef Karimi

Author Biographies

Yusef Karimi, PhD, in counselling psychology, is an independent researcher whose research interests include political and social psychology, psychological roots of extremists in the Middle East in particular. Interested in applying qualitative research, phenomenology approach, to address extremists and terrorism.

David Nussbaum, PhD, a retired assistant professor (Psychology; University of Toronto), chaired the CPA Section for the Study of Extremism and Terrorism (2014–2021) Research interests include neurobiological bases of decision-making, aggression, and extremism and terrorism. Elected Fellow of both Canadian and American Psychological Associations, he founded the Allen K. Hess Institute for Integrative and Forensic Behavioural Science (2016).

Razgar Mohammadi, PhD, from counselling psychology at Shahid Chamran University, Ahwaz, Iran. His research focuses on the psychological bases of religious radicalism and the psychological roots of terrorism in the Middle East. He is interested in the application of qualitative research especially phenomenology in the field of psychology and counselling.

References

Arendt

(2006). Eichmann in Jerusalem . Penguin.

Atran

(2006). The moral logic and growth of suicide terrorism. Washington Quarterly , 29(2), 127–147.

Baron

R. A.

, Byrne

D. E.

, & Branscombe

N. R.

(2007). Mastering social psychology : Pearson/Allyn and Bacon.

Beck

A. T.

(2002). Prisoners of hate. Behaviour Research and Therapy , 40(3), 209–216.

Ben Omar

(2013). Proof of identity in other sosiology, reading sico-sosiologianin the emergence of the Salafi phenomenon in Tunisia. Add-on Magazine , 23–24, 214–227.

Borum

(2004). Psychology of terrorism . University of South Florida.

Braun

, & Clarke

(2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology , 3(2), 77–101.

Bruneau

(2016). Understanding the terrorist mind. Cerebrum: The Dana Forum on Brain Science , November–December. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5198759/

Bunzel

(2015). From paper state to Caliphate: The ideology of Islamic State . Brookings Institute.

10.

Cooper

(1978). Psychopath as terrorist. Legal Medical Quarterly , 2, 253.

11.

Crenshaw

(1981). The causes of terrorism. Comparative Politics , 13(4), 379–399.

12.

Evazpouer

, Mirahmadi

, Akvai

, & Mokhtari

(2017). Contemporary Salafist discourse in the Arab world. Political and International Approaches Journal , 7(2), 34–67.

13.

Feeney

D. J.

(2002). Entrancement in Islamic fundamentalism. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), The Psychology of terrorism: Theoretical understandings and perspectives (psychological dimension to war and peace) (VoI. III, pp. 191−209). Praeger.

14.

Gerges

F. A.

(2014). ISIS and the third wave of jihadism. Current History , 113(767), 339.

15.

Glover

(2012). Humanity: A moral history of the 20th century . Yale University Press.

16.

Goertzel

T. G.

(2002). Terrorist belief and terrorist lives. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), The Psychology of terrorism: A public understanding (psychological dimension to war and peace) . Praeger.

17.

Guadagno

R. E.

, Lankford

, Muscanell

N. L.

, Okdie

B. M.

, & McCallum

D. M.

(2010). Social influence in the online recruitment of terrorists and terrorist sympathizers: Implications for social psychology research. Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale , 23(1), 25–56.

18.

Haider-Markel

D. P.

, & Joslyn

M. R.

(2010). Social identities and the attribution of blame [Paper presentation]. APSA 2010 Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, September2–5, 2010.

19.

Halevy

, Bornstein

, & Sagiv

(2008). “In-group love” and “out-group hate” as motives for individual participation in intergroup conflict: A new game paradigm. Psychological Science , 19(4), 405–411.

20.

Hamouda

(2006, January 20). El-fatwa ashd min el-katl [The religious opinion that is worse than killing]. Al-Ahram New Paper .

21.

Haney

, Banks

W. C.

, & Zimbardo

P. G.

(1973). A study of prisoners and guards in a simulated prison. Naval Research Reviews , 9(1–17). https://blog.iriomk.com/research/2019/06/25/2002-stanford-prison-experiment.html

22.

Harris

, Gringart

, & Drake

(2014). Understanding the role of social groups in radicalization . Edith Cowan University.

23.

Horgan

(2003). The search for the terrorist personality. A. Silke (Ed.), Terrorist, victims, and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequence (pp. 3–27). John Wiley.

24.

Houghton

D. P.

(2014). Political psychology: Situations, individuals, and cases . Routledge.

25.

Hronick

M. S.

(2006). Analyzing terror: Researchers study the perpetrators and the effects of suicide terrorism. National Institute of Justice Journal , 254, 8–11.

26.

Hudson

R. A.

(1999). The sociology and psychology of terrorism: Who becomes a terrorist and why? Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

27.

Hushangi

(2010). Role of modernity in the spread of fundamentalism in the Muslim world. Political Knowledge , 6(1), 181–210.

28.

Imad

A. G.

(2014). Islamists between revolution and the state: An epilogue. Contemporary Arab Affairs , 7(2), 283–298.

29.

Johnson

P. W.

, & Feldmann

T. B.

(1992). Personality types and terrorism: Self-psychology perspectives. Forensic Reports , 5(4), 293–303.

30.

Jones

(2008). Blood that cries out from the earth: The psychology of religious terrorism . Oxford University Press.

31.

Juergensmeyer

(2016). Terror in the mind of God: The global rise of religious violence (Rev. ed.). University of California Press.

32.

Karimi

(2019). A psychological phenomenology of tendency toward Salafism in Iran’s Kurdistan [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. Allameh Tabatabai’e University.

33.

Karimi

, Cimbura

, & Loza

(2019). Assessing the prevalence of Middle Eastern extreme ideologies among some Iranians. Journal of Strategic Security , 12(3), 157–169.

34.

Kelly

(1901). Government or human evolution: Vol. II. Individualism and collectivism . Longman.

35.

Kenny

D. T.

(2015). God, Freud and religion: The origins of faith, fear and fundamentalism . Routledge.

36.

Kleinmann

S. M.

(2012). Radicalization of homegrown Sunni militants in the United States: Comparing converts and non-converts. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism , 35(4), 278–297.

37.

Kruglanski

A. W.

(October 28, 2014). Psychology not theology: Overcoming ISIS’ secret appeal. E-International Relations . http://www.e-ir.info/2014/10/28/psychology-not-theology-overcoming-isis-secret-appeal/.

38.

Kruglanski

A. W.

, & Fishman

(2006). The psychology of terrorism: “Syndrome” versus “tool” perspectives. Terrorism and Political Violence , 18(2), 193–215.

39.

Kruglanski

A. W.

, & Fishman

(2009). Psychological factors in terrorism and counterterrorism: Individual, group, and organizational levels of analysis. Social Issues and Policy Review , 3(1), 1–44.

40.

Law

R. D.

(2016). Terrorism: A history . John Wiley & Sons.

41.

Littman

D. G.

(2005). A culture of hate based on jihad and martyrdom: Saudi Arabian and Egyptian schoolbooks today. Midstream , 51(2).

42.

Loza

, Abd-El-Fatah

, Prinsloo

, Hesselink-Louw

, & Seidler

(2011). The prevalence of extreme Middle Eastern ideologies around the world. Journal of Interpersonal Violence , 26(3), 522–538.

43.

Mansfield

(2000). Subjectivity: Theories of the self from Freud to Haraway . NYU Press.

44.

Mazarr

M. J.

(2007). Unmodern men in the modern world: Radical Islam, terrorism, and the war on modernity . Cambridge University Press.

45.

McCauley

(2002). Psychological issues in understanding terrorism and the response to terrorism. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), The psychology of terrorism: Theoretical understandings and perspectives (psychological dimension to war and peace ) (Vol. 3, pp. 3−29). Praeger Security International.

46.

McCauley

(2006). Jujitsu politics: Terrorism and response to terrorism. In P. R. Kimmel & C. E. Stout (Eds.), Collateral damage: The psychological consequences of America’s war on terrorism (p. 45–65). Praeger.

47.

Mokaitis

T. R.

(2007). The “new” terrorism: Myths and reality . Greenwood Publishing Group.

48.

Moghadam

(2006). The roots of suicide terrorism: a multi-causal approach. In A. Pedahzur (Ed.), Root causes of suicide terrorism: The globalization of martyrdom (pp. 101–127). Routledge.

49.

Orbach

(2001). Usama Bin Ladin and Al-Qa’ida: Origins and doctrines. Middle East Review of International Affairs , 5(4), 54–68.

50.

Pearce

K. I.

, & Macmillan

(1977). Police negotiations: A new role for the community psychiatrist. Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal , 22(4), 171–175.

51.

Pearlstein

R. M.

(1991). The mind of the political terrorist : Scholarly Resources.

52.

Post

, Sprinzak

, & Denny

(2003). The terrorists in their own words: Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists. Terrorism and Political Violence , 15(1), 171–184.

53.

Post

J. M.

(2010). “When hatred is bred in the bone:” The social psychology of terrorism. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences , 1208(1), 15–23.

54.

Post

J. M.

, Ali

, Henderson

S. W.

, Shanfield

, Victoroff

, & Weine

(2009). The psychology of suicide terrorism. Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes , 72(1), 13–31.

55.

Roy

(2014). Holy ignorance: When religion and culture part ways . Oxford University Press.

56.

Sageman

(2004). Understanding terror networks . University of Pennsylvania Press.

57.

Silber

M. D.

, & Bhatt

(2007). Radicalization in the West: The homegrown threat . New York City Police Department.

58.

Silke

(2003). Becoming a terrorist. In A. Silke (Ed.), Terrorists, victims and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences (pp. 29–53). Wiley.

59.

Sinclair

(2004). An anatomy of terror: A history of terrorism: Pan Macmillan.

60.

Sparke

(2019). The religious vs. social radicalisation debate: Current understandings and effects on policy. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism , 14(1), 82–96.

61.

Stern

(2004). Terror in the name of god . Ecco.

62.

Taylor

(1991). The fanatics: A behavioural approach to political violence: Brassey’s.

63.

Triandis

H. C.

(2018). Individualism and collectivism . Routledge.

64.

Victoroff

(2005). The mind of the terrorist: A review and critique of psychological approaches. Journal of Conflict Resolution , 49(1), 3–42.

65.

Victoroff

, & Adelman

(2012). Why do individuals resort to political violence? Approaches to the psychology of terrorism. In Marie Breen-Smyth (Ed.), The Ashgate research companion to political violence (pp. 137–168). Routledge.

66.

Webber

, & Kruglanski

A. W.

(2018). The social psychological makings of a terrorist. Current Opinion in Psychology , 19, 131–134.

67.

Weisel

, & Böhm

(2015). “Ingroup love” and “outgroup hate” in intergroup conflict between natural groups. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 60, 110–120.

68.

Zimbardo

P. G.

(2004). A situationist perspective on the psychology of evil: Understanding how good people are transformed into perpetrators. In A. G. Miller (Ed.), The social psychology of good and evil (pp. 21–50). The Guilford Press.