L. Candee & Co. and the U.S. Rubber Shoe Industry

Preventure: Imports and Entrepreneurs

The first pair of rubber shoes was reportedly brought to the United States in 1820 and exhibited in Boston (Rexford, 2000; U.S. Rubber Company, 1920). Rubber came from latex, a milky substance that was collected from trees in Para, Brazil. The latex was smoked near a fire for a day or 2 days to solidify. The rubber shoes were handmade by Brazil natives and were a roughly shaped overshoe with inconsistencies in size and shape; they often sported hand-engraved designs on the toe of the shoe, typically emulating a basic floral design (U.S. Rubber Company, 1920). Natural rubber is not a stable solid. The substance can become tacky when exposed to heat and rigid when cold, making rubber products unstable in the variable U.S. climate (Rexford, 2000). The rubber shoes imported from Brazil were a novelty and sold quickly because they kept people’s feet dry (Peirce, 1866). To improve the sizing and uniformity of the rubber shoes, wooden lasts were shipped to Brazil in 1825 (Pearson, 1897; U.S. Rubber Company, 1943). Shipment records for the port in Salem, MA, indicate that imported rubber shoes were sold by the case at auctions with as many as 275 cases that contained over 100 pairs each (White, 1841).

As rubber shoe imports continued to grow during the 1830s, entrepreneurs imported raw rubber and began efforts to manufacture rubber cloth goods and shoes in the United States (Peirce, 1866). The economy was growing in the early 1830s, and people invested in the formation of domestic rubber companies, believing this new industry had the potential to bring great wealth to investors (Lepler, 2012; U.S. Rubber Company, 1920). The earliest known manufacturer of rubber goods in the United States was the Roxbury India Rubber Company, founded in Roxbury, MA, by Edwin M. Chaffee, John Haskins, and Luke Baldwin in 1833 (Hayward, 1864). By spreading rubber onto fabric, the company created a variety of products including clothing, carriage tops, and wagon covers (Hubert, 1893; Slack, 2002). The company initially was a success, leading to the formation of additional rubber companies. The early popularity of their business came to a halt following a warm summer when the products became sticky and worthless (Peirce, 1866).

Documents from a competing company, Boston & Lynn India Rubber Co., incorporated in 1835, described some of the inconsistencies with early rubber products (Boston & Lynn, 1835). Correspondence between Samuel Chase, who purchased rubber goods for his shop, and Charles C. Nichols, a Boston & Lynn India Rubber Co. founder, discussed products made by their competitors and strategies for making comparable products (Chase, 1835). The letters also expressed concern over inferior products (Chase, 1835). The company continued to have quality and delivery issues that contributed to its closure in 1837 and dissolution in 1841 (Letter of Dissolution, 1841; Whitwell, Bond & Co., 1837). Rubber companies in Britain experienced similar challenges with sticky, stiff, and unpleasant-smelling products due to the chemicals and solvents used in processing, which caused consumers to lose confidence (Levitt, 1986). The ongoing challenges with rubber combined with a depression following the Panic of 1837 led to the closure of most of the early U.S. rubber companies (Roberts, 2010). The resulting economic depression also impacted rubber shoe imports, which decreased in value between 1837 and 1839 (Barker, 1939).

Existence or Infancy: Inventors and Persistence

Despite setbacks, innovators continued to experiment with rubber to find a solution to rubber’s instability and identify a practical method for manufacture. Rubber companies, such as the Roxbury India Rubber Company, often provided financial support for inventors. Charles Goodyear, who became the most renowned person in rubber in the United States, was an inventor whose obsession with rubber started in 1834 when he first encountered rubber goods at the Roxbury India Rubber Company (Loadman, 2005; Slack, 2002). After several years of funding from the company without successful results, he had incurred great debt and was asked to leave in 1838 (Slack, 2002). Goodyear’s friends described his obsession and tendency to rely on the financial support of others: “If you see a man with an India-rubber coat on, India-rubber shoes, and India-rubber cap, and in his pocket an India-rubber purse with not a cent in it, that is Goodyear” (Hubert, 1893, p. 163).

Another inventor, Nathaniel Hayward (who would later play a role in the establishment of shoe manufacturing at L. Candee & Co.), was first introduced to rubber when he purchased rubber fabric for a carriage top. In 1835, he sold his business and placed his focus on rubber full-time. After showing some of his results to the Eagle Rubber Company, another competing rubber manufacturer, he was hired to continue his experimentation. Hayward purchased the factory after the business closed and continued efforts by himself in 1838 (Hayward, 1864; Slack, 2002).

Hayward recognized the benefits of sulfur, the application of which helped to stabilize rubber, and printed an advertisement in 1838 for his improved India rubber cloth (Hayward, 1838, 1864; Slack, 2002). Later that year, Hayward filed a patent for his use of sulfur (U.S. patent 1090 granted in 1839) and assigned the patent to Goodyear, from whom he eventually received US$2,000 in compensation (Hayward, 1864). Believing the new patent solved the issues with rubber, Goodyear went to Boston and received a contract from the U.S. government to make 150 waterproof mailbags, but they became sticky in the warm shop. This failure diminished Goodyear’s reputation, making it difficult to secure financial support while he continued experimentation. In 1839, Goodyear stumbled upon vulcanization—a process that combined heat and chemicals to stabilize the rubber so that it was able to endure both warm and cold temperatures; however, he could not afford to pursue a patent (Loadman, 2005; Slack, 2002). Meanwhile, rubber shoe imports continued to grow. In 1836–1837, Salem imported nearly 70,000 pairs of rubber shoes; by 1840, over 141,000 pairs were imported (Pearson, 1897). Estimated total rubber shoe imports grew from 131,000 in 1837 to 415,000 in 1844 (Barker, 1939).

In 1841, William and Emory Rider of New York took a chance on Goodyear by financing as much as US$50,000 for him to continue experimentation and refine his process (Hayward, 1864; Hubert, 1893; Slack, 2002). Goodyear again employed Hayward to develop a consistent process for vulcanizing rubber and granted him a license to manufacture as well as the ability to authorize others to manufacture rubber shoes, cloth, and clothing under any of Goodyear’s patents beginning on April 3, 1841. This was intended to be a temporary license that would end once Goodyear paid Hayward US$1,000. Hayward perfected the vulcanization process, but by 1842, he had yet to receive compensation from Goodyear and retained the rights to authorize licenses for all patents including the patent for vulcanization, which was awarded in 1844 (Babcock, 1966, Hayward, 1864; U.S. Patent 3633).

Leverett Candee was one of the first entrepreneurs to form a business utilizing Goodyear’s new patent. He was born in Oxford, CT, on June 1, 1795, and received minimal education before moving to Hartford, CT, to find work at age 15 (R. M. Hartley, 1943; Johnson, 1929). Unlike rubber innovators Goodyear and Hayward, Candee was an entrepreneur who, prior to rubber shoes, owned dry goods businesses in Hartford and New York City, and later, a company that made book paper in Westerville, CT. When the paper company failed in 1842, he sought a loan of US$3,000 from Henry and Lucius Hotchkiss for his new venture into rubber goods. The company initially made elastic suspenders but quickly transitioned to rubber shoes (Atwater, 1887; R. M. Hartley, 1943; Johnson, 1929; Pearson, 1897).

Early Growth: Industry Leaders and Followers

Some sources credit L. Candee & Co. as the first to obtain a license for Goodyear’s patent (Babcock, 1966; R. M. Hartley, 1943). L. Candee & Co. (1898) claimed in their catalogs and promotional materials to be the “oldest manufacturers of rubbers in the world” (p. 1). Candee reached out to Hayward in 1843 and received a response authorizing a license for making rubber shoes for US$1,000 (Hayward, 1843a, 1864). For additional funds, Hayward sold his rubber manufacturing equipment to Candee and agreed to work for him for 1 year. In a letter to Hayward, a friend of Candee stated that “there will be no Goodyear play here,” which meant that they expected professionalism and results as opposed to Goodyear’s reputation for lack of follow-through and issues with debt (Coburn, 1843).

Original correspondence between Nathaniel Hayward and L. Candee and his associates indicate that L. Candee & Co. was granted a license to Goodyear’s patent on August 22, 1843, with all terms being satisfied, including employing Hayward to assist with the initial setup and manufacture of rubber shoes, by the end of September 1843 (Candee, 1843; Hayward, 1843b). This transaction may have made L. Candee & Co., the earliest producer of rubber shoes under the Goodyear’s license (Babcock, 1966). On September 7, 1843, L. Candee & Co. was formalized through a partnership between Henry Hotchkiss, Lucius Hotchkiss, and Leverett Candee to make rubber shoes (Atwater, 1887; Hotchkiss, 1843). By September 20, 1843, the factory was set up and ready to begin operation (Candee, 1843).

Besides L. Candee & Co., several sources cite a company in Naugatuck, CT, as acquiring the first license to Goodyear’s patent (McCain, 2008; Pearson, 1897; U.S. Rubber Company, 1943). According to writings by Goodyear, he authorized the first license to the Samuel J. Lewis Company (later the Goodyear Metallic Rubber Shoe Company) in Naugatuck in 1843 (Babcock, 1966; U.S. Rubber Company, 1943). Lewis converted his Naugatuck knitting mill into a factory for rubber shoes (McCain, 2008). The Samuel J. Lewis Company began operation in the fall of 1843. Additional sources mention the Naugatuck India Rubber Company, founded by William DeForest, a prominent woolen mill owner, as one of the earliest companies to use Goodyear’s license (Pearson, 1897; Slack, 2002). By 1845, DeForest’s rubber manufacturing business was outperforming his wool and cotton mills with a value of US$120,000 per year for the rubber facility, compared with US$110,000 and US$23,500 for the wool and cotton warp mills, respectively. By 1850, the Naugatuck India Rubber Company employed 130 people, which was 3 times more than DeForest’s other businesses (Green, 1948).

The early years of L. Candee & Co. focused on creating a superior product and establishing a market among skeptical consumers (Johnson, 1929). During the first year, the shoes were sold on commission due to rubber’s previous unreliability (Atwater, 1887). Company lore states that the first shoes were carried from store to store in a market basket and some samples were given to influential women in the community to help build confidence (Catalogue of the Celebrated, 1878). As the industry grew, rural areas were transformed into manufacturing communities (Dublin, 1993). Much like with the early textile mills, young girls moved to Hamden, CT, to work in the new factory. Sixteen-year-old Mary Jane Beecher began working for L. Candee & Co. in 1843 making elastic suspenders, but she switched to making rubber shoes before the end of the year (C. S. Hartley, 1956).

Expansion or Sustained Growth: Competition and Intellectual Property

Vulcanization was considered to be one of the biggest technological discoveries of the 19th century (Levitt, 1986). Multiple new businesses formed once the initial rubber companies under Goodyear’s license demonstrated success. Some of the new companies were started by workers who had been employed by one of the original licensing companies but left to create new firms with their acquired expertise (Catalogue of the Celebrated, 1878; C. S. Hartley, 1956). Most companies sought to manufacture under a Goodyear’s license. By the late 1850s, eight well-established rubber shoe manufacturers thrived under this license (Babcock, 1966).

Other entrepreneurs either denounced Goodyear’s ownership of his discovery or blatantly used his process without paying for the license, which led to years of legal battles. This issue of intellectual property violation plagued companies that operated under Goodyear’s license, and they came together as one to combat reported infringements. In 1848, through leadership from Candee and Hayward, six firms joined a voluntary group called the Goodyear Shoe Association. They paid into a common fund to prosecute patent infringers (Babcock, 1966; Pearson, 1897). Records show that Hayward and other licensees investigated cases of patent infringement and wrote letters to infringers asking them to stop violating Goodyear’s patents on behalf of the Goodyear Shoe Association (Halsted, 1859; Hayward, n.d.). A letter from Nathaniel Hayward to Horace Day on April 7, 1851, states, “and furthermore I think you are no more entitled to the heated gum, than I am; but that it solely belongs to Charles Goodyear as he was the discoverer of the application of heat” (Hayward, 1851).

In 1851, 21 firms operated under Goodyear’s license (Babcock, 1966). Horace Day became well known for his opposition to Goodyear’s patents and was the driving force behind the 1851 trial, challenging the validity of Goodyear’s patents that garnered national attention (Loadman, 2005). The Goodyear Shoe Association raised money and paid lawyer Daniel Webster US$15,000 in legal fees to represent the license holders in this federal case. In 1852, the courts ruled in Goodyear’s favor (Green, 1948) and ordered Day to pay compensation for the years he operated in violation of the license (Loadman, 2005). The results of this trial solidified Goodyear’s place in the history of rubber development.

Bolstered by the court decision that upheld the validity of Goodyear’s patents, L. Candee & Co. was formally organized and incorporated in June 1852 with Candee owning 50% of the shares in the company (Johnson, 1929). The remaining shares were distributed among Henry and Lucius Hotchkiss and Timothy Lester (Articles of Association, 1852). The company’s capital at the time of incorporation was US$200,000. As the business continued to grow in the 1850s, L. Candee & Co. produced shoes in its factories in both New Haven and Hamden. By the late 1850s, all production was moved to the larger factory in New Haven (R. M. Hartley, 1943; Pearson, 1897).

The battle over patents and intellectual property protection was not done. In 1858, Goodyear filed for an extension to his patents (Woshner, 1999). This received heavy opposition from Day and others; however, the patents received a 7-year extension (Loadman, 2005). A contributing argument for the extension was because Goodyear had received little compensation for his patents due to the expense required to combat intellectual property violation. The U.S. Commissioner of Patents summarized the sentiment of Goodyear loyalists in his 1858 statement:

No inventory probably has ever been so harassed, so trampled upon, so plundered by that sordid and licentious class of infringers known in the parlance of the world as “pirates.” The spoliation of their incessant guerilla warfare upon his defenseless rights has unquestionably amounted to millions. (Hubert, 1893, p. 177)

Charles Goodyear died in 1860 (Loadman, 2005), but his license holders and supporters, particularly Nathaniel Hayward, continued to uphold Goodyear’s intellectual property rights.

By the 1860s, the rubber industry had grown from a new industry full of entrepreneurs willing to take risks, to large corporations with large product volume and large profits. In addition, the leaders of companies that initially formed under Goodyear’s license were of age to retire and there was leadership turnover. Candee retired from his position as president shortly before his death in 1863 (Johnson, 1929) and was succeeded by his partner Henry Hotchkiss. Upon Henry’s passing in 1871, his son, Henry L. Hotchkiss, was elected president and treasurer of L. Candee & Co. (Atwater, 1887).

Goodyear’s patent was denied a second renewal and expired in 1865, which led to the formation of new rubber footwear companies over the next several decades (Woshner, 1999). Due to demand, the cost of crude rubber soared toward the end of the 1860s. Imports went from 3,000 tons in 1865 to 5,200 tons worth US$4,228,926 in 1871. The value of rubber boots and shoes in 1871 was US$8,000,000 (Wolf & Wolf, 1936). Beginning in 1871, the company sold directly to customers instead of using agents. L. Candee & Co. continued to rank among the top rubber shoe companies in the United States (McKinney, 1889).

Until the 1870s, L. Candee & Co. faced minimal competition due to licensing agreements (Babcock, 1966, p. 23). While some style offerings were expanded, very little was changed in the method of production throughout most of the 19th century. Typical shoe styles included the sandal, a type of low overshoe that was worn over the shoe and sometimes secured using a strap across the top of the foot; the Alaska, which sported a high instep to protect the top of the shoe; the arctic, a type of ankle boot that fastened with buttons or buckles; the gaiter, a boot with a fitted (often cloth) upper that covered part of the calf; and the traditional boot, which was easily pulled on and reached the knee (see Figure 1). L. Candee & Co. sought improvements to its products. One example is the development of a varnish to help keep rubber shoes from becoming discolored over time (Atwater, 1887). Another was the addition of straps to the tops of boots to assist with pulling them over the foot (Catalogue of the Celebrated, 1878). In 1880, L. Candee & Co. was assigned a patent for a counter lining to prevent slippage in the heel of the rubber boot (Watkinson, 1880).

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Figure 1.

Excerpt from a catalog for rubber boots and shoes. Note. These pages show illustrations of selected styles offered by L. Candee & Co. from A. E. Quimby’s illustrated catalogue, ca. 1890s. Source: Author’s private collection.

Following the complete loss of the New Haven factory in 1877 due to fire, it was rebuilt to double its size and capacity with the latest precautions to prevent future fires. The new factory employed over 1,000 laborers and could produce 1,000 cases or 25,000 pairs of shoes per day (Catalogue of the Celebrated, 1878). By the mid-1880s, the factory employed around 1,500 workers, and 2–3 million pounds of raw materials were consumed annually. Rubber continued to be imported from Para, Brazil; however, rubber production and importation had expanded to other countries (Atwater, 1887). By 1889, the L. Candee & Co. facility had grown to cover a large expanse of about 2.5 acres with nine buildings. The buildings were marketed as having the latest technology and safety features, including well-lit and ventilated workspaces, abundant fire escapes, and communication through open-wire bridges between the buildings. Steam power was used to operate the machinery in the factories (McKinney, 1889).

Maturity: Big Business

By the end of the 19th century, the industry was well established, and the veteran rubber shoe companies sought ways to maintain their dominance and reduce competition in the industry. This was not the first-time rubber shoe companies had discussed creating a united front to protect their interests. According to Nelson (1988), “between 1865 and 1892, the history of the rubber boot and shoe industry was largely the history of these anticompetitive combinations” (p. 9). In 1853, the eight firms of the Goodyear Shoe Association, which held the rights to Goodyear’s license, proposed merging into one company. Although the motion was denied, the license holders adhered to agreed-upon quotas for rubber shoe production (Babcock, 1966; Green, 1948). Another unsuccessful push to merge occurred between 1886 and 1888. The first large-scale unification came in the form of a trade association, the Rubber Boot and Shoe Manufacturers’ Association in 1889. At this time, 10 of the 14 operating rubber boot and shoe companies joined the association (Babcock, 1966).

In the 1890s, a wave of mergers swept through multiple industries in the United States (Lamoreaux, 1988). One of the main reasons for these mergers was to avoid competition. In 1892, unification of the rubber shoe industry occurred through the formation of the U.S. Rubber Company, one of the first horizontal integrations of the era. This was not strictly a merger. Companies, such as L. Candee & Co., “subscribed” to the U.S. Rubber Company, which allowed the subscribers to continue manufacturing as independent brands (U.S. Rubber Company, 1892a). As part of the consolidation, some of the responsibilities were centralized and distributed among industry leaders. Two of the executives from L. Candee & Co. became directors in the newly formed U.S. Rubber Company. Henry L. Hotchkiss, the President of L. Candee & Co., became the Director of Purchasing and was responsible for the acquisition of crude rubber for all the member companies. Charles L. Johnson, who also served as the Secretary and Treasurer of L. Candee & Co., became the director of sales and was responsible for employing selling agents, reporting marketing conditions, and overseeing advertising (Babcock, 1966; McKinney, 1889; U.S. Rubber Company, 1892a).

Besides horizontal integration, the U.S. Rubber Company also sought vertical integration to ensure a ready source of products and create barriers for competition (Lamoreaux, 1988). As was a popular strategy among mergers in other industries, the U.S. Rubber Company chose to focus on carefully differentiated brands and utilized existing brand awareness of the companies that were enfolded into their merger to their advantage. Based on the executive committee’s decision, for example, L. Candee & Co. was designated to manufacture high-quality goods at standard prices set by the company, while some of the other brands focused on less expensive products (U.S. Rubber Company, 1893). By 1893, the U.S. Rubber Company controlled 50% of the market, and with the purchase of the Boston Rubber Shoe Company in 1898, they held three quarters of the industry’s output (Nelson, 1988). The brands continued to operate their factories independently and each brand reported their production and sales figures to the U.S. Rubber Company. L. Candee & Co. (1896) reported manufacturing 2,194,961 pairs of shoes between April 1 and December 31, 1896, worth a value of US$1,946,840.83.

Advertising artifacts, such as trade cards and catalogs printed with rubber shoe imagery, were evidence of the lingering brand independence in the 1890s and early 1900s. L. Candee & Co., and other brands and companies, created a plethora of trade cards and catalogs as part of a direct mail campaign in the 1890s (U.S. Rubber Company, 1943). New advancements in technology, such as chromolithography, an inexpensive color print process developed in 1876, were widely used for catalogs and trade cards. Because trade cards were inexpensive, merchants could distribute them to customers for free as a form of advertising (Chansky, 2009). Manufacturers such as L. Candee & Co. produced cards that had blank areas so that individual businesses and sellers could stamp their information onto the trade card (Trade cards, n.d.).

In addition to affordable color printing, the Kodak Company introduced film paper, which facilitated the use of photographic prints on trade cards beginning in the 1880s (Chansky, 2009). L. Candee & Co. employed this technology with a series of trade cards in 1897 containing photographic prints of women, men, and children wearing and admiring rubber shoes (see Figure 2). The advertising cards worked to highlight the fashionability of rubber shoes. For example, Candee introduced a “watered silk” style that was achieved by using embossed rubber imitating the look of watered silk or moiré taffeta on the upper portion of the shoe or boot. Special pamphlets were sometimes given as souvenirs at world fairs during the 1890s, including a 30-page pamphlet given by the Boston Rubber Shoe Company at the 1893 World’s Fair. It was printed with color images describing the history of the rubber footwear industry and rubber shoe production (Boston Rubber Shoe Co., 1890).

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Figure 2.

Trade Card (ca. 1897). Note. This trade card from L. Candee & Co. represents the use of photographic prints. Each trade card contained information about rubber shoes or the company on the reverse. Source: Author’s private collection.

L. Candee & Co. distributed salesman samples to further highlight the variety of styles and the fashionability of their shoes (see Figure 3). By the mid-1890s, L. Candee & Co. was producing 250 kinds of rubber boots and shoes, each in different patterns, shapes, and sizes. In 1897, L. Candee & Co. claimed to make 5,000,000 pairs of rubber shoes in a year and had a capacity to make 30,000 pairs of rubber shoes per day. By 1900, technology had advanced to enable large-scale color printing for magazines and other publications, leading to a decline in the popularity of trade cards (Trade cards, n.d.).

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Figure 3.

Sample Rubber Shoes (ca. 1890s). Note. Sample rubber shoes were created to represent products sold by L. Candee & Co. The Beacon Slipper style is on the left, along with a sample-sized box for the shoes. The Fairy boots are on the right and feature an embossed watered silk effect. Source: Author's private collection.

Decline: Facing Newcomers and Change

The turn of the century marked a new era in the rubber footwear industry. The industry was facing increasing costs of crude rubber due to high demand for other products such as industrial belts and tubing as well as the increased popularity for pneumatic tires on bicycles and automobiles. The rubber shoe industry faced increased competition from the leather shoe industry. New machinery developed by the United Shoe Machinery of Boston enhanced the quality and consistency of leather shoes and subsequently lowered their cost. In addition, new rubber footwear companies continued to differentiate themselves using new and improved technology and offered new shoe styles. Despite challenges, the total rubber footwear industry grew from a value of US$9,705,724 employing 4,662 in 1880 to a value of US$70,065,296 employing 18,991 in 1905 (Barker, 1939). The industry was valued at US$18,722,000 and employed 6,928 in Massachusetts alone in 1909. By 1913, the value of rubber shoe manufacturing in Massachusetts was US$24,733,926 and employed 7,957 (American Trust Company, 1915). The U.S. Rubber Company (1895) tracked the financial accounts of their associated businesses and sought ways to increase efficiency and reduce costs. To increase its competitive position, it developed uniform lasts for its footwear companies and worked to create a central mark or brand logo that could be used to indicate the high quality of its footwear (Babcock, 1966).

The U.S. Rubber Company (1892b) carefully documented and monitored the amount of imported rubber, its origins, and its cost. The demand for rubber continued to increase in the early 20th century. In 1903, the U.S. Rubber Company acquired 30,000,000 acres in Brazil. A letter from an employee of the Chicago-Bolivian Rubber Company stationed in Bolivia indicated the demand for rubber was so great that it was difficult to prepare and ship the rubber fast enough (Jackson, 1903). To meet the demands for rubber, the U.S. Rubber Company harvested seeds from Brazil in 1910, acquired acreage, and cleared jungles to plant rubber tree plantations in what is now Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. These actions were similar to those of other U.S. and European rubber companies that were later criticized for inhumane treatment of natives forced to work on the growing landscape of plantations in South America, Africa, and Asia (Loadman, 2005; Tully, 2011). By 1940, the U.S. Rubber Company held the largest privately owned plantations, with 132,000 acres and 10,000,000 rubber trees, employing 23,000 natives (U.S. Rubber Company, 1943).

One of the biggest challenges for the domestic rubber industry in the early 1900s was related to labor issues. While other industries turned to mass production by the end of the 19th century, the manufacture of rubber boots and shoes remained labor intensive. Labor unions emphasized the craftsmanship involved. Although minor improvements had been made and styles added throughout the 19th century, there were no substantial changes to the process of making rubber shoes. Another challenge for the rubber shoe industry was that the jobs of cutting and making required intelligence, speed, and agility—and therefore higher wages; other positions in the shoe factory did not require as much skill. The difference in pay between skilled and unskilled laborers created a challenge for maintaining unions for rubber workers (Nelson, 1988).

Many of the early rubber unions were small, local, and independent, like the Rubber Workers Union that formed in Cambridge, MA, in September 1900. When the Amalgamated Rubber Workers Union of North America formed in 1902, local unions, including one from Cambridge, sought membership to be part of a larger union community (Nelson, 1988; Rubber Workers Union, 1900). By 1903, it included 14 local chapters. As the unions grew and factory conditions became more restrictive, employees engaged in strikes. There were 19 strikes between 1901 and 1905. One strike in 1903 took place at the L. Candee & Co. plant following the introduction of a new shoe line that required additional labor. Although this strike was amicably resolved through a raise in wages, other strikes failed. Membership in the union declined, and in 1905, the union was dissolved (Nelson, 1988).

Journalists and health officials reported on unsafe and unpleasant working conditions in the rubber factories. Workers often experienced side effects from exposure to the chemicals and solvents used in the manufacturing process. Lead poisoning was an issue cited by the New Jersey Board of Health in the 1880s. Severe headaches were a common complaint. In 1916, workers continued to experience naphtha and benzine poisoning, which resulted in some workers experiencing symptoms similar to alcohol consumption (Levitt, 1986; Nelson, 1988).

Employee turnover was an industry-wide problem before and after World War I. In 1919, L. Candee & Co. reported a 90% turnover rate of its 1,599 employees (Babcock, 1966). By the second decade of the 20th century, the U.S. Rubber Company turnover ranged from 50% to 200% per year. Some rubber companies offered incentives to attract employees. Strategies included offering language classes for non-English speaking immigrants, conducting extensive safety campaigns, and investing in housing for the laborers, and in 1917, the U.S. Rubber Company offered a pension plan (Nelson, 1988).

Until 1917, the U.S. Rubber Company operated as a holding company. Due to declining profits and increasing debts, it became necessary to take more unifying steps. In 1917, L. Candee & Co. was 1 of the 14 companies that deeded its land and interests to the U.S. Rubber Company (Babcock, 1966). After continued financial trouble, the U.S. Rubber Company was overhauled in 1920 (Nelson, 1988). To address ongoing struggles, the company moved toward a more centralized branding strategy focused on the U.S. Rubber Company name. Footwear continued to be made under the L. Candee name into the 1920s, but by 1927, the brand had shrunk in size and limited its focus to making four-buckle arctics, a type of winter ankle boot. In 1929, the U.S. Rubber Company reorganized and the L. Candee & Co. plant was closed in March of that year. By 1932, all the original factories associated with the early rubber companies were closed, except for one located in Naugatuck (Babcock, 1966; Nelson, 1988). The factory closures eliminated jobs for thousands of U.S. Rubber Company workers (Nelson, 1988). By the time the United States entered World War II, the original rubber shoe companies were gone, and new companies emerged with the development of synthetic rubber.

Conclusions

This study illustrates the effectiveness of the business life-cycle model by Lichtenstein and Lyons (2008). In the first stage, preventure, consumers were introduced to rubber footwear through imports from Brazil. As entrepreneurs saw the potential of this new commodity, they began to experiment with domestic rubber production. During the second stage, existence or infancy, the birth of the rubber shoe industry in the United States was a result of intelligent and ambitious risk-takers. Candee, Hayward, and Goodyear had the foresight to see the potential of the rubber industry and the willingness to invest in untested business ventures such as L. Candee & Co. The third stage, early growth, was one in which L. Candee & Co. became established as a leader in the rubber shoe industry. Candee and other industry leaders demonstrated that the rubber shoe industry was successful, and other companies followed. As L. Candee & Co. matured during the fourth stage, expansion or sustained growth, Goodyear’s license provided the company with a competitive advantage. In order to maintain this competitive edge, L. Candee & Co. and other licensees actively sought to protect the intellectual property rights of Goodyear’s patents and the profits of license-holding businesses.

During the maturity stage, new competition emerged. Efforts such as increased use of marketing materials, the formation of the U.S. Rubber Company, and centralization of purchasing were strategies employed to maintain a competitive edge and gain leverage in the supply chain. Over time, these protectionist measures centralized innovation and removed creative control from the individual rubber shoe brands and may have suppressed their ability to compete. In the last stage, decline, the rubber shoe industry was faced with many challenges including the continued use of craftsmen when other businesses were automated. The rising cost of crude rubber, poor working conditions, and the entrance of new innovative businesses led to increased competition among manufacturers and high employee turnover. By not changing manufacturing processes and product offerings, the original rubber footwear industry was unable to survive and was replaced by businesses that embraced new synthetic rubber technology.

The business life-cycle model proposed by Lichtenstein and Lyons (2008) helps scholars better understand the contributions of L. Candee & Co. to the rubber shoe industry and leads to a broader understanding of the growth, maturity, and decline of the rubber shoe industry in the United States as influenced by entrepreneurship, new technologies, and economic cycles. This model can be used as a guide for future research on U. S. business history, including that of shoes, clothing, and related businesses.

This L. Candee & Co. case study illuminates a company with involved leaders who pushed the rubber shoe–making industry forward in order to find success in an era of great change and uncertainty. Taking risks on rubber, a new material, and on new rubber technologies resulted in great reward. During the early growth period, rubber manufacturing began to outperform other existing industries (Green, 1948). The actions of L. Candee & Co. contributed toward the growth of a large and profitable industry. The success experienced during the period of expansion resulted in reduced focus on technology and innovation and opened the door for new competition. During the maturity stage, rubber shoe companies were forced to consolidate and merge to maintain profitability. Consolidating led to measures that focused on protecting existing production methods and access to raw materials over innovation, and eventually, new enterprises and technologies threatened to make the more established companies obsolete. L. Candee & Co.’s life cycle contains similarities to other clothing and textile industries and can be used for future comparison and analysis.

This study demonstrates how the business life-cycle model presented by Lichtenstein and Lyons (2008) may be used to investigate specific clothing and textiles industries, particularly those that have received less attention in current literature. As analysis of other clothing and textiles industries throughout history expands, this model has the potential to lead to a broader analysis of business life-cycle trends represented within clothing and textile industries. The implications are that as more companies and industries are analyzed, a larger view and understanding of the clothing and textiles industry will develop (development, growth, and decline) and thus contribute toward further theory development. Understanding the life cycle of past industries, like the rubber shoe industry, can provide lessons for current and future clothing and textile industries.

Limitations and Future Research

A limitation of this study was that most of the primary source material focused on the stages of preventure through maturity. Few primary source records were found that related to the period of decline for the rubber shoe industry. Individual perspectives, inconsistencies, and gaps in archival records were addressed by consulting additional sources published concurrently with the primary source material as well as secondary sources that later reported on the rubber shoe industry. Future researchers may expand the use of the business life-cycle model to analyze other businesses in the clothing and textiles industry, past and present. For example, an analysis of the leather shoe industry would enable a comparison with the rubber shoe industry to identify similarities and differences in the life cycles of two established industries in the United States.