The Organizational Correlates of Terrorism Response Preparedness in Local Police Departments

Abstract

Since the development of homeland security, scholars have debated the relationship between community-oriented policing and homeland security innovations in local police departments. Most of the literature that assesses this relationship has been “conjecture or anecdotal,” and few studies have systematically measured these impacts. Few studies have examined the influence that organizational structures and administrative factors have on terrorism response preparedness among local law enforcement agencies. To fill these gaps, this study evaluates a national sample of local police agencies drawn from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ 2003 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) Survey. Results show that community policing efforts are positively correlated with terrorism preparedness efforts. Results also show that a number of organizational factors including organization size, budget per capita, and functional differentiation were positively correlated with terrorism preparedness, whereas formalization and spatial differentiation were negatively correlated.

Keywords

homeland security terrorism community-oriented policing police strategy

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the challenges of terrorism prevention and response have become salient issues confronting law enforcement agencies. Oliver (2007) asserted that on 9/11, “policing entered the era of homeland security” (p. 1). DeLone (2007) similarly claimed that the events of 9/11, “have forever changed the duties and responsibilities of American law enforcement” (p. 218). Homeland security has increasingly become an “institutional response” for law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, and local levels to prevent and respond to terrorism and natural disasters (Oliver, 2009). There is a general consensus in the literature that in recent years, antiterrorism efforts have become increasingly prevalent in policing organizations (Oliver, 2004; Pelfrey, 2007, 2009). As first responders, local police departments play an integral role in maintaining homeland security. As specified in a myriad of federal documents (e.g., Homeland Security Presidential Directives, The Office of Domestic Preparedness guidelines, and the National Response Plan), local police departments are expected to serve a variety of important Homeland Security functions.

Although the federal government has directed local law enforcement agencies to take certain steps toward terrorism prevention and preparedness, the mandated objectives of homeland security are ambiguous and provide limited guidance (Pelfrey, 2009; White, 2004). Homeland security policing is in its nascent stages of development, which leads to a variety of looming questions in the literature: What role do local police agencies play and what steps have they taken to prevent and respond to threats of terrorism? What should agencies do, and what can they feasibly do to prevent and respond to terrorism threats? What organizational, administrative, and environmental factors are conducive toward terrorism response preparedness innovations in local police departments?

Immediately following 9/11, the federal government invested billions of dollars in homeland security through the rubric of prehomeland security era federal grant programs (e.g., The State Domestic Equipment Support Program [SDESP] and the Local Law Enforcement Local Block grant Program [LLEBG]; General Accountability Office, 2003; Office of Management and Budget, 2010). Between the years 2001 and 2004 the federal government invested US$11 billion in terrorism preparedness at the local level (Roberts, 2005). In recent years, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has continued to invest heavily in terrorism preparedness at the local level through a variety of redeveloped federal grant programs (e.g., Homeland Security Grant Program,¹ the Urban Areas Security Initiative, and the Emergency Management Performance Grant; Office of Management and Budget, 2010).

With significant increase in federal funds, many local law enforcement agencies have taken steps to become more prepared for terrorism threats; however, there is limited data on which agencies have made the most progress and specifically what areas they have progressed (Pelfrey, 2007). According to the National Research Council (2004), “little is known about the capability of local police agencies to handle these weighty responsibilities” (p. 209). Most studies examining these factors have been conducted at the state level (Donnermeyer, 2002; Giblin, Schafer, & Burruss, 2009; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Pelfrey, 2007, 2009; Thacher, 2005). Few studies have systematically measured these factors at the national level (Davis et al., 2004, Davis, Mariano, Pace, Cotton, & Steinberg, 2006).

Another question that many scholars have debated concerns how the new era of Homeland Security has been influenced by community-oriented policing (Chappell & Gibson, 2009; Jones & Suspinski, 2010; Lyons, 2002; Oliver, 2004, 2006; Pelfrey, 2005). Community-oriented policing, which has been a prominent policing model since the 1990s, seeks to increase police accountability and effectiveness by shifting police agencies away from their traditional focus on crime control toward a more holistic and proactive problem-solving approach that focuses on broader community-based outcomes (Greene, 2000). Many scholars have debated whether community policing and homeland security are incompatible or complementary approaches to policing.

This study has two goals: First, this study seeks to add to our understanding of terrorism preparedness by examining organizational, administrative, and environmental factors that are hypothesized to be significant correlates of policing outputs in a variety of contexts ranging from terrorism response preparedness to community-oriented policing (Chappell, MacDonald, & Manz, 2006; Langworthy, 1986; Maguire, 1997). Second, this study seeks to provide insight into the relationship between community policing and homeland security, by testing whether policing organizations that are less committed to community policing efforts, are most prepared for terrorism response. To address these research questions this study uses data drawn from three sources; the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ 2003 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey, the 2000 U.S. Census, and the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) County Characteristics 2000-2007 data set.

Literature Review

Assessing the Impacts of Homeland Security on Law Enforcement Agencies

Subsequent to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, state and local governments have been given significant responsibilities in the prevention and response to terrorism incidents. Fulfilling these new responsibilities has been problematic because local governments have been given limited guidance concerning how to accomplish these objectives (Pelfrey, 2007; White, 2004). Department of Homeland Security directives given to state and local governments have been ambiguous; consequently, the role that local law enforcements agencies play in maintaining homeland security has been “elusive and contradictory” (Oliver, 2006, p. 51). The Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (2003) defines national preparedness as, “the existence of plans, procedures, policies, training, and equipment necessary at the federal, state, and local level to maximize the ability to prevent, to respond to, and recover from major events.” State and local governments have struggled to interpret the implications that this directive has for their respective agencies and operationalize the steps and processes that they need to take to increase their preparedness (Pelfrey, 2007). The Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) Prevention Guidelines (2003) provide a clearer description of what steps local governments need to take, but the document fails to provide specific criteria to assess and audit their implementation (Pelfrey, 2007). In respect to local law enforcement agencies, there is limited guidance concerning what types of programs are available to achieve homeland security objectives (White, 2004).

In the midst of the confusion concerning the role of local law enforcement agencies in maintaining homeland security, a growing number of empirical studies have examined the steps that local law enforcement agencies have taken to increase their preparedness for terrorism threats and the factors that are associated with these steps. The Rand Corporation conducted a national survey that measured the levels of emergency response preparedness of 209 state and local law enforcement agencies, 1 year after the September 11, 2001, terrorism attacks (Davis et al., 2004). The study found that subsequent to 9/11, larger law enforcement agencies reported undertaking a variety of terror prevention and response preparedness measures, including undergoing risk assessments, conducting training exercises, and updating mutual aid and agreements, response plans, and standard operating procedures. The size of an agency’s jurisdiction, perceived risk of a terrorist threat, and receipt of federal funding were significant predictors of agencies undertaking terror preparedness activities. Perceived risk was a significant predictor of funding; however, jurisdictional size was not a significant predictor of either perceived risk or the receipt of federal funding. Larger jurisdictions, which had low levels of perceived risk, were less likely to receive funding than smaller jurisdictions that had high levels of perceived risk (Davis et al., 2004).

Another national survey, conducted by Foster and Cordner (2005), assessed the impacts that homeland security had on the functions, personnel, responsibilities, and resource allocations of state and local law enforcement agencies. The authors found that officers in local law enforcement agencies were given greater responsibility for conducting vulnerability assessments and mobilizing communities in terror prevention and response efforts. Whereas, state law enforcement agencies were primarily responsible for interacting with federal agencies and served as central hubs for the collection and dissemination of intelligence. State agencies also invested relatively larger amounts of resources than local jurisdictions toward terror prevention and response efforts, including terrorist threat investigations and the protection of critical infrastructure.

Most research that has evaluated terrorism preparedness consists of statewide and single-department case studies. Pelfrey’s (2007) study of South Carolina law enforcement agencies found that few agencies had developed terror response coordinator positions that are independent of the chief executive. Consequently, these agencies did not have personnel solely devoted to the task of terrorism prevention and response. Pelfrey found that only 25% of agencies had developed policies and written response plans to address incidents of terrorism. These findings are consistent with the study conducted by Fricker, Jacobson, and Davis (2002), who found that prior to September 11, 2001, most agencies did not have written response plans that addressed incidents of chemical or biological attack.

Donnmeyer (2002) found in his study of Ohio law enforcement agencies that many agencies expressed a need for improved terrorism preparedness policies and procedures, training, interorganizational communications, equipment, and funding to invest in these areas. In addition, another study of small police organizations in Illinois conducted by Schafer et al. (2009) found that many small agencies were concerned about not having enough budgetary resources to address the planning, training, and equipment components of terrorism preparedness. Schafer et al. (2009) also found that there are marginal differences in the level of terrorism concerns and preparedness across small Illinois police agencies. The authors concluded that many of the variations across small agencies were likely the result of the smaller agency’s proximity to larger jurisdictions. As a result, the authors hypothesized that small agencies may have benefited from training exercises and shared infrastructure with nearby larger jurisdictions.

Caruson, MacManus, Kohen, and Watson (2005) found evidence that local agencies generally cooperate with regional organizations and other jurisdictions of government to increase emergency response preparedness. However, it is also important to note that agencies are often reluctant to coordinate activities with other governmental agencies when they perceive the policy goals as being beyond the scope of their agency’s mission (Kettl, 2006). Kettl suggests that interorganizational efforts to solve “wicked problems,”² such as terrorism and disaster response, are frequently contingent on the intervention of policy makers to “connect the dots,” by mandating local agencies to improve coordination, communication, and collaboration to address cross-cutting issues.

Community Policing and Homeland Security

An important question debated by scholars is whether community policing and Homeland Security are incompatible or complimentary approaches to policing (Chappell & Gibson, 2009; Jones & Suspinski, 2010; Lyons, 2002; Oliver, 2004, 2009; Pelfrey, 2005). The increased focus on community policing in the past few decades represents a fundamental shift in the “operational mission” of police organizations and the relationship between citizens and police officers (Reisig & Giacomazzi, 1998). Community-oriented policing shifts the focus of policing away from the traditional reactive strategy of responding to calls toward a more “proactive problem-solving” approach, which seeks to mobilize citizens by developing “police−community partnerships” that address a variety of crime-related issues (Goldstein, 1987; Reisig & Giacomazzi, 1998; Scott, 2001). An effective community policing model strengthens the bonds of police−citizen relationships and builds the capacity of the overall community to effectively resolve, recover, and prevent a variety of crime-related issues. Many police departments throughout the nation have adopted community policing measures, which include training officers in community policing, taking police officers out of squad cars and placing them on foot and bicycle patrols, establishing citizen awareness campaigns, decentralizing operations, and creating substantive opportunities for citizen involvement in crime prevention programs (Greene, 2000; Mastrofski, 1993).

Both practitioners and academics have debated whether homeland security can be achieved within the rubric of existing community policing strategies or whether the two models of policing are “diametrically opposed” (Oliver, 2009). According to Oliver (2007), homeland security in some respects reflects a reversion back to the traditional crime control model of policing. Homeland security policing strategies place emphasis on maintaining law and order through intelligence gathering, detaining and arresting suspects, and the development of a centralized intelligence gathering system. Some view these strategies as being antithetical to the community policing model’s emphasis on decentralized police operations, improving police−community relations, and order maintenance. Thacher (2005) identified that communities have limited tolerance for increased police surveillance and the targeting of potential threats in an “abstract class of suspects” when the community has low perceptions of an imminent threat of terrorism. The targeting of groups who are suspected of terrorism activities is viewed by many citizens as being “racial profiling” and an illegitimate use of police power. Consequently, many local police agencies, that have low levels of perceived threats of terrorism, are reluctant to use their authority in ways that are deemed by the community as being illegitimate (Thacher, 2005; Tyler, 2004).

According to Oliver (2009), much of the literature that assesses the relationship between community policing and homeland security innovations has been “conjecture or anecdotal” although a few studies have systematically measured these impacts (p. 258). Chappell and Gibson’s (2009) study of Virginia police chiefs found that police chiefs who had 4-year degrees, and who worked for agencies with community policing focus, generally believed that community policing was not waning as a result of homeland security initiatives. Many police chiefs viewed community policing and homeland security as complementary policing strategies. Jones and Supinski (2010) conducted a review of literature and found several studies indicating that the tactics and strategies of community policing can be used to enhance antiterrorism efforts. Lyons (2002) suggests that community policing tactics can be used to assist homeland security, particularly by fostering stronger relationships with Arab American communities. A case study conducted in Dearborn, Michigan, illustrates how community-based policing tactics can be adopted to address homeland security needs (Thacher, 2005). Thacher discovered that instead of initiating an intelligence-led process of identifying and detaining suspects of terror-related activities, the city of Dearborn adopted a community-based approach that engaged a “community protection” strategy, which emphasized “target hardening” and emergency response planning.

Organizational Theory of Police Agencies

Organizational studies of police agencies have shown that organizational and administrative factors can either facilitate, or inhibit, innovation in police agencies and the implementation of policing programs (Angell, 1975; Cordner, 1978; Wilson, 2005). Components of organizational “complexity and control” have been assessed by a number of scholars to determine the impacts that organizational structures and administrative factors have on the implementation of a variety of innovative policing programs (e.g., community policing, information technology) and the evaluation of policing outcomes (e.g., use of force complaints; Chappell et al., 2006; Hickman & Piquero, 2009; Langworthy, 1986; Maguire, 1997; Mullen, 1996; Wilson, 2003). It seems reasonable to hypothesize that organizational factors, which have been determined to be significant predictors of successful policy change and implementation in other areas of policing policy, may also be significant predictors of terrorism response preparedness.

Although most local police departments are responsible for performing similar functions, police agencies vary substantially in their structure, size, administrative apparatus, and operating policies and procedures (Maguire, 1997; Wilson, 2005). Following the work of Blau (1970) and Blau and Schoenherr (1971), Langworthy (1986) identified spatial, hierarchical, occupational, and functional differentiation as core structures of police organizations. Zhao (1996), Maguire (1997), and Wilson (2003, 2005), applied many of Langworthy’s organizational structure variables to their studies of police organizations. Maguire (1997) elaborated on these organizational attributes by adding formalization, administrative density, and task scope as additional measures of organizational structure and complexity in policing organizations.

Studies of police organizations often view organizational structures in terms of structural “complexity and control” (Maguire 1997; Wilson 2003, 2005). Complexity refers to the structural differentiation within an organization. According to Langworthy (1986), differentiation occurs along the spatial, hierarchical, occupational, and functional dimensions of police organizations. Spatial differentiation refers to the degree that an agency’s operations are spread geographically. Hierarchical differentiation refers to the vertical command structure of an agency. Some agencies have relatively complex chain of commands, while others have “flatter” hierarchical structures. Occupational differentiation refers to the extent that an organization employs specialized staff or trained workers. Functional differentiation refers to the number of specialized units, or departmental units, that an agency uses to perform its tasks (Maguire, 1997).

Structural control refers to the mechanisms in which complexity within an organization is coordinated and managed (Maguire 1997; Wilson 2003, 2005). Prior studies have defined centralization, formalization, and administrative density, as components of structural control within an organization. Centralization refers to the command structure within an organization in which decisions are made. Formalization refers to the extent that an agency uses formally written policies and procedures. Formalization essentially prescribes what, how, and who is responsible for performing tasks within an organization (Wilson, 2005). Administrative density refers to the size of the administrative component of an organization (Langworthy, 1986; Maguire, 1997).

Terrorism response preparedness is frequently viewed as an innovation in local police agencies. Generally, innovation in the policing literature has been described as something “new to the field of policing” (King, 2000). There has been substantial disagreement concerning the correlates and causes of innovations in police organizations. Zhao (1996) concluded that environmental factors were the primary causes of COP innovations in local law enforcement agencies. Contrarily, Mullen (1996) concluded that internal departmental factors were the primary causes of information technology innovations in local police agencies. Damanpour (1991) conducted a meta-analysis of 23 empirical studies of organizational innovation, and found that a variety of organizational factors were significantly correlated with organizational innovation including professionalism, administrative density, functional differentiation, specialization, slack resources, internal and external communications, and managerial attitudes toward change, whereas centralization negatively affected organizational change.

Zhao (1996) studied the impact that internal and external factors had on COP implementation. Controlling for organizational size and region, he found that hierarchical differentiation, measured as the number of line officers as a percentage of departmental personnel, was positively associated with externally focused change but not internally focused change. He found no association among factors on internally focused change including spatial differentiation, measured as the number of divisions and patrol beats, occupational differentiation, measured as the percentage of civilian in departmental personnel, or hierarchical differentiation, measured as the number of ranks within the agency.

Maguire (1997) studied organizational change in 236 police agencies over a 6-year period. He measured whether the organizations had implemented COP, were planning to implement COP, or not planning to implement COP. Controlling for task scope and organizational size, Maguire measured five factors of organizational structure including civilianization, organizational height, functional differentiation, administrative density, and formalization. He found no significant changes in administrative density, formalization, or civilianization in any of the organizations that he studied. He found that contrary to expectations functional differentiation increased and, consistent with expectations, organizational height decreased. He found no significant differences in these variables whether the organizations had implemented COP, planned to implement COP, or had not planned to implement COP. Wilson’s (2005) study of COP implementation among LEMAS agencies found that several organizational factors including formalization, funding, police turnover rate, and organizational age, were each significantly correlated with successful COP implementation. Wilson also found that agencies located in the Western region were more likely to have implemented COP measures.

Applying organizational theory to innovations in terrorism response preparedness may assist in developing theories concerning what types of organizational structures are most conducive to terrorism preparedness. The structures of organizations fall along a continuum ranging from organic to mechanistic (Wilson, 2005). Organizations that have an organic structure tend to be less formal, geographically dispersed, have flattened hierarchies, and limited functional and occupational differentiation. Organizations that have a mechanistic structure tend to be more formalized, spatially concentrated, and complex in terms of having a high degree of functional, occupational, and hierarchical differentiation (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Wilson, 2005). Burns and Stalker (1961) found that organizations that operate in unstable task environments have organic and informal internal structures, whereas organizations that operate in stable environments tend to be more formal and mechanistic.

The organizational influences of terrorism response preparedness remain relatively unexplored in the homeland security literature. Although prior studies have identified several components of organizational context, including jurisdiction, organizational size, and external funding as being significant predictors of terrorism response preparedness, our understanding of the influences that internally focused organizational factors (complexity and control-related variables) have on terrorism response preparedness remains limited (Davis et al., 2004; Pelfrey, 2004). This study seeks to add to the literature by testing unexamined organizational complexity and control-related variables, which have been identified as important predictors of policy innovation and implementation in police organizations.

Method

Data for this study came from three sources: the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ 2003 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey, the 2000 U.S. Census, and the ICPSR County Characteristics 2000-2007 data set. The LEMAS survey, which serves as the primary source of data in this study, measures a variety of administrative characteristics of law enforcement agencies across the United States. The 2003 LEMAS survey was chosen because it is the most current data available at the time of this study. The LEMAS survey includes data from 1,947 local police departments, 863 Sheriff’s offices, and 49 State law enforcement agencies reflecting an overall response rate of 90.6%. This study samples 450 local police departments drawn from the LEMAS survey, which served jurisdictional populations ranging from 25,000 to 8,085,742. Although the sample of 450 agencies evaluated in this study reflect only 3.5% of the nation’s law enforcement agencies, these agencies serve nearly 25% of the nation’s population and employ 27% of the nation’s full-time sworn police officers.

Dependent Variable

The level of terrorism response preparedness among local police departments was measured using an index of 14 items drawn from the LEMAS survey. Individual items of the scale and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. The index measures whether agencies had a written plan that specifies actions to take in the event of a terrorist attack, whether agency plans included mutual aid or cooperative agreements with other agencies, the types of emergency response equipment that the agency possessed, and additional terrorism preparedness activities employed by the agency. The index items were used to create a summative scale. The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .73.

Table 1.

Terrorism Preparedness Index (Percentage Reported for Each Scale Item)

Scale items	Yes (1)	No (0)	M	SD
Does your agency have a written plan that specifies actions to be taken in the event of terrorist attacks?	81%	19%	0.81	0.38
Does your agency’s plan include mutual aid or cooperative agreements between, city, county, transit, public works, and or other agencies?	80%	20%	0.80	0.39
Do the public safety agencies operating in or nearby your jurisdiction (including your agency) use a shared radio network infrastructure?	68%	32%	0.68	0.47
As of June 30, 2003, did your agency have any of the following types of emergency response equipment?
a. Personal protective equipment (PEP)	73%	27%	0.73	0.44
b. Chemical detection equipment	17%	83%	0.17	0.38
c. Radiological detection equipment	20%	80%	0.19	0.39
d. Biological detection equipment	10%	90%	0.09	0.29
e. Chemical/biological decontamination equipment	16%	84%	0.16	0.37
f. Explosives detection equipment	29%	71%	0.29	0.45
In which of the following terror preparedness activities did your agency engage during the period ending June 30, 2003?
a. Partnership with culturally diverse communities	24%	76%	0.24	0.43
b. Public antifear campaigns	14%	86%	0.14	0.35
c. Dissemination of information to increase citizen preparedness	49%	51%	0.49	0.50
d. Community meetings on homeland security preparedness	39%	61%	0.39	0.48
e. Increased sworn officers present at critical areas	79%	31%	0.79	0.40

Note: SD = standard deviation.

Independent Variables

A variety of organizational and environmental factors, that are hypothesized to be significant correlates of terrorism response preparedness in police organizations, were evaluated in this study (descriptive statistics for independent measures are presented in Appendix A). Internally focused organizational factors evaluated in this study include hierarchical, functional, occupational, and spatial differentiation, task scope, formalization, and community policing. Environmental factors used in this study include the size of the jurisdiction served by the agency, the region of the United States that the agency is located in, whether the agency is located in a large or small metro area, the number of sworn officers per 10,000 residents, and the agency’s operational budget per capita.

This study uses the population of residents falling under each agency’s jurisdiction as an indicator of agency size. The square root function of the population variable was used because there was skewness and nonlinear influences that occurred in the raw distribution of population variable. Organizational size is commonly measured by the total number of sworn police officers employed by police agencies (Blau, 1971; Maguire, 1997; Wilson, 2005). The number of sworn officers was not used as a measure of organizational size because there was a high correlation between the number of sworn officers and the population variable. The rate of police employees was alternatively used as a control for the rate of police employment. The number of sworn officers was operationalized as the number of sworn officers per 10,000 residents (Hickman et al., 2009), which provides a meaningful indicator of the relative proportion of resources that police agencies allocate toward police officers.

To assess the availability of agency resources, the ratio of each agency’s operational budgets per capita was used. The operational budget per capita ratio provides a meaningful indicator of the availability of agency resources (internal funding) in relation to the size of the population that the agency serves. Hierarchical differentiation is operationalized as the difference between the base salary for entry-level police officers, and the chief executives of police agencies. Larger values for this variable indicate higher degrees of hierarchical differentiation and greater degrees of disparity between the rank of entry-level officer and the chief executive.

Functional differentiation was measured using an additive index of 12 questions asking whether the department had full-time staff dedicated to specialized units within the agency to address a variety of different issues. Agencies that had no staff dedicated to the each specialized function were coded as 0 and agencies with staff were coded as 1. Higher scores on this index reflect a higher degree of functional differentiation within the agency. The Cronbach’s Alpha score for this measure was .75. Spatial differentiation was measured using a survey question that asked how many facilities, precincts, or community substations separate from the department’s headquarters were operated by the agency. A higher score on this measure indicates a higher degree of spatial differentiation within the agency. It is important to not confuse a high level of spatial differentiation with the concept of decentralization as it applies to police organizations (Wilson, 2005). Decentralization refers to the horizontal flattening of the hierarchical command structure in which decisions are made, which is not necessarily related to the spatial or geographical dispersion of the police organization’s operations.

Occupational differentiation was operationalized as the ratio of full-time administrative personnel (nonsworn employees) and full-time sworn police officers. Higher ratios (ranging from 0 to 1) on this variable indicate a higher proportion of administrative personnel in relation to police officers with general arrest powers. Formalization is an additive index that measures the number of written policies and procedures utilized by an agency (Appendix B). Higher values for this index indicate a greater degree of formalization. The Cronbach’s alpha score for this index was .61. Task scope is an additive index that measures the number of different functions that an agency has primary responsibility for. Tasks measured in this scale consist of a variety of categorical police functions including law enforcement, traffic, criminal investigation, court-related functions, public safety functions, detention-related functions, 911 dispatch, special operations, and miscellaneous other operations. The Cronbach’s alpha score for this scale was .79. Community policing is a summative index that uses a variety of survey items including COP planning and training, SARA-type problem solving, fixed geographical assignments, the presence of a formal COP policy, and police−citizen interaction (Appendix B). The Cronbach’s alpha score for this scale was .67.

Viewing terrorism response preparedness as an innovation in local police departments, regional differences may be a predictor of terrorism response preparedness because prior studies have shown that police agencies in the West tend to be more innovative (e.g., community policing adoption and implementation) than agencies located in other regions (Maguire, 1997; Wilson, 2005; Zhao, 1996). The U.S. Census categorizes the United States into four regions including the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. In this study, region was coded as a dichotomous variable, the Western region was coded as one, and the Midwest, South, and Northeast regions were coded as zero.

Following from the work of Schafer et al. (2009), urbanization data compiled from the ICPSR County Characteristics 2000-2007 data set were used to test whether agencies located in larger metropolitan jurisdictions were more prepared for a terrorism incident than agencies located in smaller metropolitan areas. Schafer et al. (2009) found that smaller agencies that are located in larger metropolitan areas frequently benefit from shared training and infrastructure with larger neighboring agencies. To test this hypothesis, an urbanization variable titled “metro” was used. Metro is coded as a dichotomous variable, whereas agencies located in large metro areas with greater than 1,000,000 residents were coded as 1 and agencies located in small metro areas with less than 1,000,000 residents were coded as 0. All of the police agencies evaluated in this study are urban and located in either large or small metropolitan areas.

Results

Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis was used to assess the relationship between the identified environmental and organizational factors and terror response preparedness. Bivariate correlations between each of the independent variables were relatively low and not high enough to warrant concerns about multicollinearity (Appendix C). A variance inflation factor (VIF) test was run and the highest VIF score was 1.70. The relatively low VIF scores in the models further suggest that multicollinearity is not a concern. Many scholars follow the general rule of thumb that muliticollinearity becomes a concern when VIF values exceed 4 (Fisher, J., & R. Mason, 1981). Table 2 presents regression coefficients, standard errors, and t statistics for the OLS model. Diagnostic statistics indicate that the model fulfills the assumptions of OLS regression.³ The adjusted R² value indicates that the model as a whole explained 19.8% of the variation in terrorism preparedness among the sampled agencies.

Table 2.

Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results

	Model: Terror Preparedness Index
Variables	β	b	SE	t
Environmental
Jurisdiction population	.205	.007	.002	3.16**
Western region	−.077	−.103	.068	−1.51
Metro area with population > 1,000,000	−.013	−.014	.054	−0.27
Sworn officers per 10,000 residents	−.039	−.002	.002	−0.70
Organizational
Operational budget per capita	.131	.008	.003	2.35*
Community policing	.114	.025	.009	2.49*
Formalization	−.132	−.049	.017	−2.97**
Occupational differentiation	.036	.009	.012	0.76
Task scope	.059	.009	.008	1.30
Hierarchical differentiation	.037	.028	.034	0.82
Functional differentiation	.243	.017	.003	4.57***
Spatial differentiation	−.112	−.009	.004	−1.99*
F				10.12***
Adjusted R²				.198

Note: N = 444. β represents the standardized coefficients, b represents unstandardized coefficients, SE represents the standard error, t represents the t statistics, F represents the F statistic, and R² represents the adjusted R-squared statistic. Unadjusted R² = .219.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

As expected from the literature review, results from this analysis (Table 2) indicate that the size of the jurisdiction that the agency served was a significant predictor of terror response preparedness (p < .01). Agencies that served larger jurisdictions scored higher on the terror preparedness index. Agencies that had larger budgets per capita were also statistically more likely to be more prepared (p < .05). Functional differentiation was also statistically correlated with agency preparedness (p < .001). Agencies that had a greater number of specialized units, and staff dedicated to their operations, were statistically more likely to be prepared. Community policing was also positively correlated with terror response preparedness (p < .05). Formalization was negatively correlated with terrorism preparedness (p < .01). This result indicates that agencies, which had fewer formal policies and procedures, were more likely to adopt terrorism response preparedness measures. Spatial differentiation was negatively correlated with terrorism response preparedness (p < .05). This result indicates that agencies, which had a lower number facilities and sites independent of their agency headquarters, were more likely to have higher scores on the terrorism response preparedness index. Region, metro population, the number of sworn officers per 10,000 residents, occupational differentiation, hierarchical differentiation, and task scope were not statically correlated with terrorism response preparedness.

It is important to acknowledge that these findings have significant limitations in respect to assessing the impacts that 9/11 had on emergency preparedness among local law enforcement agencies. The 2003 LEMAS survey data were collected less than 2 years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and thereby fails to account for the full impact that homeland security has had on local police departments. As identified by Sabatier (2007), the implementation of public policy can frequently take as long as a decade to adequately evaluate. Despite these limitations, the 2003 LEMAS data arguably provides a valuable snapshot concerning the immediate impacts that the events of 9/11 had on terrorism response preparedness activities among local law enforcement agencies. The policy responses of both federal and local governments to the events of 9/11 were swift and dramatic, and undoubtedly had a substantial impact on many of the local police agencies evaluated in this study. Considering the absence of a baseline of comparison, this study does not seek to measure the impacts of 9/11 but rather assesses the organizational correlates of terrorism response preparedness activities adopted by local law enforcement agencies.

In addition, it is also important to address the limitations of interpreting the results of the terrorism response preparedness and community policing indices. Both indices rely on agency claims that community policing and terrorism response actions had been taken, whereas these responses may not reflect actual implementation activities. It is possible that some organizations may have responded “yes” to each of the items in the survey, whereas the organizations may not have taken substantive steps toward adopting these innovations. Maguire (1997) acknowledged a similar limitation in his use of the LEMAS to measure COP implementation. Trojanowicz et al. (1998) also observed in their study that some agencies, which claimed to have adopted COP measures, had not faithfully fulfilled its requirements. Furthermore, these limitations are augmented by measurement errors that results from the dichotomous and ordinal response categories that were provided in the LEMAS survey. The dichotomous and ordinal level response categories lack the measurement precision that interval-based measures could have alternatively provided.

Discussion

As expected from previous studies, jurisdictional size was a significant predictor of preparedness (Davis et al., 2004; Pelfrey, 2007). Although the correlation between jurisdictional size and terrorism response preparedness is already well established in the literature, the LEMAS data offers additional insight into this relationship. Cross-tabulation analysis of the data shows that many organizations that ranked highly on the terrorism response preparedness index were not necessarily the largest police organizations but were relatively large agencies serving urban jurisdictions between 100,000 and 300,000 citizens.

The negative correlation between formalization and terrorism response preparedness at face value seems to be counterintuitive. This finding indicates that agencies, which had fewer formally written rules and procedures, were more likely to report being prepared for a terrorism incident. It is reasonable to expect that large and resourceful police departments that are most prepared for a terrorism incident should also have a relatively greater number of written rules and procedures than smaller agencies that are less prepared. Hypotheses set forth in the organizational innovation literature provide insight into this relationship. According to Damanpour (1991), organizations that are less formal are expected to be more innovative because greater flexibility and less emphasis on rules and procedures are conducive to departmental innovations. Less formal work environments are more open and encourage new ideas and adaptive behaviors.

The positive relationship between functional differentiation and terrorism response preparedness is consistent with Damanpour’s (1991) meta-analysis, which found that functional differentiation was positively correlated with organizational innovation. This finding indicates that organizations that had a greater number of specialized units with dedicated staff were more likely to score higher on the Terrorism Preparedness Index. This finding is logical because agencies that serve larger jurisdictions are more likely to have more specialized units and staffing resources specifically designated to terrorism response preparedness activities. According to Damanpour (1991), functional differentiation is conducive to organizational innovation because “coalitions of professionals form in differentiated units, that both elaborate on and introduce changes in the units’ technical system, and influence changes in their administrative systems” (p. 5).

Spatial complexity was negatively correlated with terrorism response preparedness. This finding indicates that organizations that were most prepared for a terrorism event were spatially concentrated and did not have many facilities, precincts, or community substations separate from the department’s headquarters. The results of this study are confounding because the findings fail to conform to existing models of organizational structure. The structures of organizations fall along a continuum ranging from organic to mechanistic. Organizations that have an organic structure tend to be less formal, geographically dispersed, have flatter hierarchies, and limited functional and occupational differentiation. Whereas, organizations that have a mechanistic structure tend to be more formalized, spatially concentrated, and complex in terms of having a high degree of functional, occupational, and hierarchical differentiation (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Wilson, 2005). These results are confounding because they suggest that police agencies that were most prepared for terrorism response possessed characteristics of both organic and mechanistic organizational structures. As a result, it is difficult to draw conclusions concerning where police agencies that were most prepared fell along the organic to mechanistic spectrum of organizational structures. Further research in this area may be able to clarify these issues and provide a better description of what types of organizational structures are most conducive toward terrorism response preparedness activities.

The positive correlation between budget per capita and terrorism response preparedness is insightful because it reveals the impact that internal budgetary resources have on preparedness. It is important to acknowledge that the absence of federal funding from this model presents a significant limitation in this study, considering the fact that prior studies have consistently shown that federal funding is a key predictor of terrorism response preparedness (Davis et al., 2004; Pelfrey, 2007). Despite this failure, this finding is valuable because it reveals that wealthier agencies that have larger proportions of available funding (internal funding), relative to the size of the populations they serve, were more likely to invest in terrorism response preparedness. These findings are also consistent with Schafer et al.’s (2009) study of small police organizations in Illinois, who found that many small agencies did not have enough internal budgetary resources to address the planning, training, and equipment components of terrorism preparedness. Similarly, Donnmeyer (2002) found in his study of Ohio law enforcement agencies that many agencies that expressed a need for improved terrorism preparedness policies and procedures, training, and equipment, lacked funding to invest in these areas.

The statistical significance of budget per capita is consistent with Damapour’s (1991) meta-analysis, who found that slack resources were a significant predictor of organizational innovation. Damanpour defines slack resources as “the resources that an organization has beyond what is minimally required to maintain operations” (p. 36). Although larger budgets per capita are not a direct measure of slack, it is reasonable to assume that agencies with larger budgets per capita may have financial resources beyond what is minimally required to maintain core operations. As a result, organizations with higher budgets per capita may have sufficient resources to undergo terrorism response preparedness activities and bear the costs of instituting these innovations.

Many scholars have wrestled with the question whether community policing and homeland security are conflicting or complimentary models (Chappell & Gibson, 2009; Jones & Suspinski, 2010; Lyons, 2002; Oliver, 2004, 2009; Pelfrey, 2005). The positive relationship between community policing and terrorism response preparedness adds value to the homeland security versus community policing debate because it shows that community policing and homeland security are not necessarily “diametrically opposed” and may in fact be complimentary concepts. This finding supports Chappell and Gibson’s (2009) study of Illinois police chiefs, which suggested that community policing programs are not waning as a result of homeland security. This finding also supports the work of Jones and Supinski (2010), Lyons (2002), and Thacher (2005), who found that the tactics and strategies of community policing can be used to enhance antiterrorism efforts.

Arguably, the positive correlation between the presence of community policing programs and terrorism response preparedness activities results from the fact that both reform initiatives have been heavily driven by federal grants. Evidence shows that prior to 2003, large police organizations with higher budgets per capita were more likely to adopt both community policing and homeland security measures than smaller police organizations, arguably because larger agencies were in a better position to match federal funds and receive grant awards. Immediately following the events of 9/11, local law enforcement agencies received considerable pressure from policy makers and federal funding to swiftly increase their levels of terrorism response preparedness.

Prior to the 2003 LEMAS survey, homeland security and community policing grants were formula driven and biased toward law enforcement agencies in larger municipalities. The State Domestic Preparedness and Equipment Support (SDPES) grants administered by the Office of Domestic Preparedness and the Department of Justice (DOJ) were allocated based on a formula that provided each state with a base amount, but the rest of the grant funds were distributed to local jurisdictions on the basis of population, therefore larger agencies received more funds (General Accountability Office, 2003). Furthermore, other grants including the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant (LLEBG), the Emergency Management Performance grant (EMPG), the Byrne Formula Grant Program, the Public Safety Partnerships grant, and Community Policing Grant (COPS) were each contingent on the ability of local governments to match federal funds (General Accountability Office, 2003). Subsequent to the implementation of the LEMAS survey in 2003, homeland security grants were redesigned to better address terrorism risk, which has reduced the bias of grant allocations toward larger jurisdictions.

Conclusion

The results of this national study provide an insightful snapshot of the organizational correlates of terrorism response preparedness shortly after the events of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. These findings add to our understanding by providing additional knowledge concerning the relationship between the organizational structures of police organizations and terrorism response preparedness. In addition, the findings suggest that community policing programs in many police organizations have not waned as a result of terrorism response preparedness activities. Although this study offers insight concerning the relationship between organizational structures and terrorism response preparedness, it is important to acknowledge that this study is limited because it fails to account for key external factors including risk assessment and the receipt of federal funding, which have consistently been shown to be important predictors of terrorism response preparedness. These findings provide a reflection of the state of affairs in 2003, which may have changed in recent years. Policy evaluation research is particularly challenging because the impacts of a policy’s implementation often take as long as a decade to develop, which merits further testing of the relationships found in this study.

Research in the area of terrorism response preparedness is a challenging endeavor, given the fact that terrorism response policies were swiftly developed in response to 9/11 with limited guidance, which led to the fragmented and haphazard implementation of homeland security policies across the nation. Systematic empirical testing in the area of homeland security policy implementation is sparse, and most studies have focused on individual states and single police departments. Theoretical development in this area is limited and many theoretical propositions lack empirical testing. The era of homeland security has undoubtedly had a substantial impact on policing organizations, but knowledge concerning these impacts is scarce, therefore much work needs to be done to determine if and how, the new era of homeland security has altered the functions and operational philosophies of policing institutions. Much work needs to be done to understand what role local law enforcement agencies are playing in the national homeland security strategy, and which factors are conducive to agency adoption and implementation of homeland security measures.

Footnotes

Appendix

Appendix C

Bivariate Correlations Between All Variables

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Terrorism Preparedness (index)	1.00
2. Spatial differentiation	0.14	1.00
3. Functional differentiation	0.39	0.29	1.00
4. Task Scope (index)	0.11	0.09	0.17	1.00
5. Hierarchical differentiation	0.14	0.13	0.18	−0.11	1.00
6. Occupational differentiation	−0.06	−0.05	−0.17	0.15	−0.04	1.00
7. Formalization (index)	−0.24	−0.12	−0.23	−0.01	−0.08	−0.08	1.00
8. Community Policing (index)	0.20	0.05	0.28	0.02	0.05	−0.13	−0.20	1.00
9. Operational budget per capita	0.13	0.15	0.07	0.03	0.12	−0.16	−0.07	−0.07	1.00
10. Sworn officers per 10,000 residents	0.00	0.06	−0.04	0.04	0.10	0.12	0.05	−0.14	0.46	1.00
11. Metro area with population > 1,000,000	0.05	0.05	−0.00	0.14	0.07	−0.14	−0.04	−0.04	0.27	−0.06	1.00
12. Western region	0.00	−0.06	0.06	−0.11	−0.11	−0.36	−0.62	0.15	0.09	−0.30	0.12	1.00
13. Jurisdiction population	0.29	0.62	0.49	0.05	0.22	−0.17	−0.18	0.08	0.13	−0.10	0.14	0.20	1.00

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article.

Notes

Bio

Blake M. Randol is a graduate student in the PhD Criminal Justice program at Washington State University. His research interests include policing, homeland security, and criminal justice administration. This manuscript is a significantly revised version of a paper that the author presented at the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association’s annual conference in Spokane, WA, October 14-16, 2010.

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