An Analysis of Written Conductive Energy Device Policies

Abstract

Although scholars have recognized the utility of conductive energy devices as less-than-lethal force tools, there have been concerns over the misuse of the device and the adverse health effects associated with its use in the field. In an attempt to improve policy, scholars and policing organizations, such as the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), have developed “model” written CED policies as guidelines. It is expected that adherence to these policies can improve the overall effectiveness of the device as well as reduce many negative outcomes. This study reviews and compares the written CED policies of 124 municipal policing agencies to the model policies set forth by PERF. The findings indicate that municipal police agencies have done a rather poor job meeting these recommendations. Implications and recommendations for making broad improvements to CED policies are discussed.

Keywords

conductive energy device taser use of force policy

Recent publicized events and reports by human rights groups have called into question the current state of departmental policies regarding the use of conductive energy devices (CEDs). Perhaps no document has been as critical or as influential as the Amnesty International report published in 2004. In this report, the influential human rights organization highlighted several examples of questionable, although often legally justified, deployments of CEDs as well as noting numerous cases in which resisting suspects experienced adverse health effects post-CED application. More important, however, the report highlighted the lack of uniformity, quality, and specificity in CED deployment policies across law enforcement departments in the United States (see also Government Accountability Office, 2005; Thomas, Collins, & Lovrich, 2010).

In response to these rising concerns over ill-developed and overly permissive CED deployment policies, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) have developed “model” use of force policies outlining the elements of effective written policies regarding CED deployments (see also Alpert & Dunham, 2010). These model policies emphasize the importance of clearly defining the circumstances permitting the use of CEDs (specifically against individuals exhibiting active resistance), identify officer responsibilities and restrictions when deploying the device (issuance of verbal warnings, limiting cycles), and explicitly prohibit the use of the devices against certain at-risk groups (e.g., pregnant women, children, the elderly) unless exigent circumstances exist. Finally, these model policies mandate medical treatment post-CED deployment. The models were developed after extensive research and consultation with experts from various fields, including experienced police use of force researchers and medical authorities (IACP, 2005; PERF, 2005). Both PERF and the IACP believe that adherence to these model policies can simultaneously improve the effectiveness of CEDs in law enforcement and increase the safety of police officers and citizens alike.

To date, no study has systematically reviewed the written CED policies of municipal police agencies to examine the extent to which they are in accord with the model policies provided by PERF and IACP. This void in the literature is alarming for several related reasons. First, as noted above, there has been considerable concern over the misuse of CEDs in the field, their ability to achieve desired policy goals, and the adverse health effects associated with their use. These concerns are explicitly addressed by these model guidelines. Second, previous research has indicated that departmental policy regarding CED use is influential in a number of use-of-force outcomes (Thomas et al., 2010; see also Downs, 1967). Third, these professional guidelines have been developed to guide officer decisions to ensure that CEDs are used in a manner that achieves maximum effectiveness at minimum risk of harm.

For instance, vague or unclear guidelines on deployment give individual officers too much discretion, likely leading to a greater number of questionable deployments. Likewise, the failure to specify the circumstances and high-risk groups against whom CED deployment is prohibited may lead to increased citizen complaints and may increase the risk of serious injury or death to arrestees. Finally, requiring medical follow-up assessments for all individuals who receive a CED shock may reduce in-custody and arrest-related deaths even further. Indeed, the quality of written CED policies of policing agencies, and an evaluation of those policies, has several important practical implications.

This study provides an analysis of the written policies of 124 municipal police agencies from across the United States. These documents were first gathered as part of a large nationwide study reviewing CED policy and agency-generated effectiveness assessments (see Thomas et al., 2010). Specifically, this study sheds light on the current state of written CED deployment policies among a large cross-section of U.S. municipal police departments. Furthermore, it assesses the extent to which policing agencies have adopted the model CED policy developed by PERF, a comprehensive set of guidelines that serves as an excellent reference document when evaluating written CED policies. In the end, the results of this study offer researchers and practitioners a clearer understanding of the current state of CED deployment policies in the United States and provide citizens and the police departments serving them with information concerning CED deployment guidelines to improve the effectiveness, and reduce the risk of harm, of their written use of force policies.

CED Policy and Police Use of Force

CEDs were adopted beginning in the early 1990s as a way for departments to provide a broader range of use of force options for their officers. It was believed that the immediate incapacitating effects of the device accorded officers the ability to resolve a potentially violent situation in a swift manner while limiting their need to use hand-to-hand combat and “hard” force tools (e.g., batons) that increase the risk of injuries to both officers and suspects (Adams & Jennison, 2007). A number of these studies have reported that CEDs have been effective in achieving some important policy goals such as reducing injuries to officers and suspects (Alpert & Dunham, 2000; Carr, 2005; Hopkins & Beary, 2003; Jenkinson, Neeson, & Bleetman, 2006; Mesloh, Henych, & Wolf, 2008; Meyer, 1992; Seattle Police Department, 2004; Taylor & Woods, 2010) and reducing the need to resort to the use lethal force in high-risk confrontations (Force, 2004; Hopkins & Beary, 2003; Seattle Police Department, 2004; Thomas et al., 2010).

Despite these noteworthy benefits, the adoption of CEDs has also led to some well-documented unfavorable outcomes. Force (2004) reviewed the effectiveness of CEDs in Phoenix, Arizona and found that although the department had seen significant reductions in the utilization of lethal force, they also experienced a 139% increase in overall use of force after equipping all of their officers with CEDs. Moreover, Gau, Mosher, and Pratt (2010) examined the relationship between ethnicity and CED display decisions and found that ethnicity was a significant determinant of an officer’s decision to threaten to discharge CEDs, with Hispanic suspects being twice as likely as Whites to have CEDs displayed against them.¹ Gau and colleagues note that these race and ethnicity-based discretionary decisions can have potentially harmful effects on police–community relationships (see also Adams & Jennison, 2007).

In yet another review, Lee and colleagues (2009) assessed the effects of CED deployments on reductions in lethal force and in-custody deaths among policing agencies in California. Their results were quite sobering, indicating that departments had reported no reduction in the need to use lethal force since adopting CEDs and at the same time had witnessed a significant increase in the number of in-custody deaths. While the limitations of this study have been well documented (see Kaminski, 2009; O’Riordan, 2009),² the results are nonetheless troubling and do reinforce the anecdotal evidence presented by Amnesty International (2004) regarding the potential lethality of the CED device. Moreover, such preliminary findings, in combination with the relatively inconclusive research on the potentially long-lasting negative physiological effects of CEDs (Dawes, Ho, Reardon, & Miner, 2010; Dennis et al., 2007; Jauchem, 2010; Jauchem, Sherry, Fines, & Cook, 2006; Strote & Hutson, 2006; Valentino et al., 2008; Vilke et al., 2007), may warrant a periodic review of departmental policies governing the use of the device.³

Given these findings of research into CEDs which occasion due concern, questions arise as to whether policing agencies should do more to reduce the potential negative effects associated with CED deployment. A well-written use of force policy based on empirical work is one of the few options police departments have to control police discretion (see Walker, 1993). Such a policy provides guidelines for the pre-, peri-, and postdeployment responsibilities of officers when deploying a use of force tool. Extant research suggests that departments differ widely in their respective CED policies (GAO, 2005), a finding which at the very least may be partially causing differences in use of force outcomes across departments (Thomas et al., 2010). For instance, departments with vague language in their CED policy may be providing overly broad discretion to officers resulting in overdeployment against high-risk individuals. In contrast, departments requiring medical treatment for suspects against whom CEDs are used may experience fewer in-custody injuries or deaths; this is one policy recommendation that has been made by several researchers in the medical field (Fish, 1993; Jauchem et al., 2006). Given these possibilities, PERF has sought to develop a “model” written CED policy that is based on research and can improve the overall effectiveness of the tool while reducing some of the negative effects known to be associated with its use.

CEDs and Model Written Use of Force Policies

In 2005, PERF held a national summit with the purpose of developing training and policy guidelines pertaining to the use of CEDs. In advance of this conference, PERF conducted a comprehensive review of extant research assessing the benefits and liabilities of CEDs and consulted police practitioners and experts from various fields including medical science. In the end, this summit sought to formulate effective, empirically based policy recommendations as a guide for police departments across the country.⁴

By the conclusion of the summit, PERF had developed 52 distinct policy guidelines regarding CEDs. These recommendations covered a wide range of use of force topics, including preadoption considerations, policy recommendations on the placement of CEDs on the use-of-force continuum, officer responsibilities prior to deploying the device, restrictions on the contexts and individuals against whom officers can use CEDs, reporting guidelines for officers after activation, and the follow-up medical protocol for suspects who received CED shocks. The comprehensiveness of the PERF guidelines makes it an important reference when evaluating the quality of written CED policies. Although some of the PERF recommendations pertain to issues that would not be covered even in the most comprehensive written use of force policy, this study will focus on only those commonly addressed issues that are found in use of force policy documents. In this regard, for the sake of parsimony, we believe that the PERF recommendations can be placed into three distinct categories: predeployment guidelines, perideployment guidelines, and postdeployment guidelines.

Predeployment Guidelines

While PERF puts forth several guidelines that apply directly to the responsibilities of individual officers equipped to use CEDs in the field (discussed below), a handful of their policy recommendations concern the development of the wider organizational CED policy by department administrators prior to their adoption as a use of force tool. On the most basic level, PERF recommends that each department develop a written policy specific to the use of CEDs. Prior research has indicated that some departments simply adopt a “general” use of force policy, applying the same vague description of situations permitting use to all force tools and the medical and reporting protocol after their use (Walker, 1993). For example, when guiding officers as to when various use of force tools can be used, some written policies only direct officers to use a level of force proportional to the amount of resistance being offered rather than describing the situations permitting the use for each particular tool (see Klinger, 1995; Schachter, 1984). Although the idea of proportionality is accepted by all departments, applying such a vague definition of permitted use leaves officers with high levels of discretion and an ill-defined concept of when to use a particular force tool.⁵

In regard to CED-specific policies, PERF recommends that police administrators clearly define the circumstances that permit CED use. For instance, policies may inform officers to use CEDs in situations where verbal attempts to assuage the situation are ineffective and the officer reasonably believes that a failure to use a CED could result in a physical injury. Note that such a description, although open for some interpretation by officers, more clearly defines the circumstances that permit CED use. Similarly, PERF also recommends that police administrators define situations in which CED use is not permitted. It is recognized that police use of force is situational in nature and ambiguous interpretations on the permissibility of CED use can lead to officers using the devices in situations not supported by organizational policy (Gellar & Scott, 1992; Schachter, 1984; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). By clearly defining the circumstances that both permit and prohibit CED use in commonly encountered situations, law enforcement departments are able to not only guide police officer decisions as to when CEDs can be used but also guide their decisions as to when not to use CEDs. In general, PERF has recommended that police administrators permit the use of CEDs against individuals who actively resist arrest and prohibit the use of the device against individuals offering only passive, verbal resistance (see also Adams & Jennison, 2007; Alpert & Dunham, 2010).

A final predeployment policy recommendation is that police departments explicitly place CEDs on their agency’s use-of-force continuum. Although researchers have moved toward using scenario-based responses when examining the permissiveness of use of force policies (Alpert & Dunham, 2010; Mesloh et al., 2008), the traditional and commonplace use-of-force continuum remains an important staple of departmental policies (Garner, Schade, Hepburn, & Buchanan, 1995; Terrill & Paoline, 2007; Thomas et al., 2010; Williams, 2002). Importantly, the use-of-force continuum serves as an important reference for officers when deciding how to respond to active and unlawful resisters. As the number of force options available to officers continues to grow, a use-of-force continuum policy provides officers with concrete guidance on the level of encountered provocation required to use a particular type of force relative to other force options (Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Ultimately, placing CEDs on the use-of-force continuum allows departments to not only help define the level of resistance appropriate for CED deployment but also promote the proper use of other force tools when CED use would be inappropriate.

Perideployment Guidelines

Although an officer’s decision to use force in any given situation is highly situational in nature, officers must be responsive nonetheless to departmental policies prior to any decision to use a particular force tool. This is especially important in regard to options that fall on the more extreme end of the continuum, such as use of deadly force (Thomas et al., 2010; Walker, 1993). Use-of-force policies may be particularly important for CED use given the limited, albeit rapidly growing, experience-based fund of knowledge on the adverse physiological effects of CEDs. For example, there is a growing body of literature indicating that the use of CEDs on certain sensitive populations (such as pregnant women) is associated with an increased risk of injury or death. Cognizant of these concerns and findings, PERF developed several guidelines for officers when they face situations requiring the use of force.

Prior to CED deployment, it is recommended by PERF that officers provide a verbal warning indicating that the use of the device is imminent. The reason for the warning is threefold: (a) warning resisting suspects that they are about to be subdued by a CED may act as a deterrent and persuade the suspect to forego any further resistance; (b) verbal indication of the imminent use of the device allows fellow officers to avoid crossing in the path of the CED and to prepare to restrain the suspect after the application; and (c) indicating that the device being withdrawn from the holster is a CED clarifies any possible confusion that the officer may be preparing to use deadly force on the resisting suspect.

Several types of people have been shown to be at a disproportionate risk to adverse health effects of CED application. Small children, for instance, are at a greater risk of experiencing heart and respiratory problems after being exposed to CEDs. Medical research has found an inverse relationship between body size and adverse health effects, specifically finding that those smaller in body mass are more likely to test for abnormal heart and breathing rhythms and are at greater risk of dying post-CED application (Dennis et al., 2007; Esquivel, Dawe, Sala-Mercado, Hammond, & Bir, 2007; McDaniel, Stratbucker, Nerheim, & Brewer, 2005). The elderly are also at a greater risk of experiencing serious injury or death due to the frailness of their bodies and the weakness of their cardiovascular systems, making them incapable of handling the temporary stress imposed on the body by CEDs.

CED deployment on pregnant females occasions a risk of losing the fetus; the incapacitating effects of the device can lead to loss of muscle control and subsequently cause violent falls.⁶ Similarly, “other” individuals who are located on high grounds or driving motor vehicles are at a high risk of serious injury as a result of the loss of muscular control. Regarding the former, the loss of motor controls can lead to serious falls for individuals who are standing on building ledges, other high points, or simply on uneven ground (see Bryan v. McPherson, 2010). Amnesty International (2004), for instance, cited the case of a middle-aged male who was sitting in a tree. After failing to comply with officer orders to get down from the tree, he was “tased” by officers on scene. The suspect’s fall from the tree ultimately resulted in his paralysis from the neck down. When the incident was reviewed by a departmental review board, the board concluded that the use of the device was appropriate and did not violate administrative policy regarding the use of the CED. For individuals operating motor vehicles, the loss of muscle controls can lead to motor vehicle crashes that can result in serious injuries.

The PERF guidelines also recommend that CEDs should not be used in combination with certain other force options. The electronic nature of the device causes sparks to project when deployed, and the sparks can cause explosive combustion around flammable materials. Similarly, alcohol-based O.C. sprays can also catch fire when used in conjunction with CED devices. Because of this, it is recommended that police departments explicitly prohibit the use of CEDs in situations where flammable materials are present or when O.C. spray has been previously applied. PERF also recommends that agencies prohibit the use of CEDs against individuals who are handcuffed or hogtied, unless extraordinary exigent circumstances exist. The reason for this prohibition has to do with both force proportionality and safety reasons. First, it is rare for individuals who are under such restraints to offer a level of resistance sufficient enough to warrant the use of CEDs. Second, lying on one’s stomach with one’s hands restrained behind their back places substantial pressure on the chest and lungs; that pressure can be exacerbated by the physiological effects of CEDs, resulting in a high risk of serious injury or death (O’Halloran, 1993; Truscott, 2008). Finally, PERF notes that suspect flight is not a sufficient justification for the use of the CED; instead, other circumstances must be present and taken into consideration to permit the use of the device (e.g., the suspect poses a reasonable safety risk to others if he or she evades arrest, or the subject is frail and the use of CED is the safest means to detain the subject).

To promote the safe use of CEDs, the final set of perideployment guidelines specified by PERF restricts the application of the device even in situations that otherwise permit its use. Specifically, PERF recommends that departments limit the number of officers who apply the device to a subject at any given time. In other words, once an officer has applied a CED to an actively resisting subject, all other law enforcement personnel on the scene should refrain from simultaneously deploying their respective devices. Research has found that applying multiple CEDs simultaneously increases the adverse health effects associated with CED-related deaths exponentially (White & Ready, 2009). Moreover, multiple simultaneous CED applications are unlikely to have added overall disabling effect on resisting subjects. PERF also recommends that departments limit the number of consecutive cycles that officers apply to resisting suspects. Standard CEDs elicit electrical impulses in 5-s cycles; however, at the end of the cycle, officers retain the ability to administer additional cycles if initial attempts to subdue the resister prove ineffective. Importantly, continual application of cycles places prolonged stress on an individual’s cardiovascular system, and the added stress increases the risk of adverse health effects and death (Jauchem, 2010; see also White & Ready, 2009). Furthermore, as PERF notes, if CEDs continue to be ineffective after several applications, it is unlikely that subsequent cycles would achieve the intended goal of incapacitating the resisting subject.

Postdeployment Guidelines

PERF discusses two general departmental guidelines for officers after deploying CEDs in the field which are noteworthy here—namely, full incident reporting and medical protocol. Regarding reporting, it is recommended that written CED policies contain information on the reporting procedure for officers who use the device in the field. More specifically, PERF suggests that departmental policies should mandate reporting in all situations where a CED is deployed (either threatened or discharged). Not only do mandatory reporting policies make it possible for departments to track trends in CED deployments at both departmental and individual levels but also does it allow police administrators to evaluate each CED deployment and maintain accountability for appropriate use of the device (Walker, 1993).

Given the concerns raised about the limited understanding regarding the adverse health effects of CEDs discussed above (see also Amnesty International, 2004), PERF highlights the importance of a well-defined medical protocol in each department’s respective written use of force policy. Again, the CED works as an incapacitating device by deploying two 1-in, penetrating prongs that force strong electrical impulses into the subject’s body. Those electrical impulses disrupt communication in the central nervous system, causing the subject to lose control of their bodily movements. In the process of incapacitating resistant suspects, CEDs can cause several serious negative health effects, which are occasioned by falls due to loss of muscle control and/or from the physiological effects of CEDs. For instance, the electrical pulses distributed through the body when CEDs are being applied can also disrupt other vital bodily functions such as those derived from the cardiovascular and respiratory systems (Jauchem, 2010; Levine, Sloane, Chan, Dunford, & Vilke, 2007; cf. Eastman et al., 2008; Vilke & Chan, 2007). Individuals with preexisting conditions or under certain states, such as those experiencing excited delirium, are particularly at-risk to these negative effects (Cao, Shinbane, Gillberg, & Saxon, 2007; Jauchem, 2010; Sanford, Jacobs, Roe, & Terndrup, 2011). Moreover, as Amnesty International (2004) points out, many of the individuals experiencing negative effects do so a number of hours after having CEDs applied against them. Ultimately, these findings and concerns have prompted PERF to recommend that all subjects who experience a CED being used against them receive mandated medical treatment from emergency personnel. Close monitoring and medical follow-up assessment post-CED deployment can ensure that serious physiological conditions resulting from CEDs are identified and prevented in the future if at all possible (Adams & Jennison, 2007; Sanford et al., 2011).

Why Should Departments Adopt PERF Guidelines?

In their published guidelines, PERF acknowledges that the final guidelines are their responsibility and not all stakeholders were involved in the development of the model policy. Even among those that took part in the development of the guidelines, not all of these stakeholders agreed with the entirety of the final recommendations. This raises the question of whether departments should be expected to adopt the PERF guidelines in their entirety or instead make use of them as a guide to policy review. We are indeed aware that police administrators need to consider the needs of their specific jurisdiction carefully when adopting use of force policies and that the PERF guidelines are likely to feature at least some elements which will not fit the circumstances of a particular jurisdiction.

Although being sensitive to these concerns, we believe that PERF’s model policy does provide an important guide for police administrators who are reviewing and developing their respective policies and also serve as an important reference for evaluating the quality of current CED policies across the United States. First, the PERF guidelines provide adequate coverage of the CED-related issues of varying importance. Many of the recommendations made cover issues that have been cited by scholars and human rights groups as areas of concern regarding the deployment of the device. These include health effects and improper and over use (ACLU, 2005; Adams & Jennison, 2007; Amnesty International, 2004; White & Ready, 2009). By meeting the PERF recommendations, departments are indicating that they have studied and addressed these important policy concerns. Second, just because there are some detractors of the PERF guidelines does not necessarily mean that their recommendations have no utility. Although there was not always unanimity for each guideline, PERF notes that a strong consensus was reached in each instance. Moreover, PERF draws on the extant, albeit limited, empirical research on CEDs to develop many of their policy recommendations so that the device can achieve maximum effectiveness and also reduce the negative consequences associated with its use. Finally, the guidelines set forth by PERF also have a substantive and practical value as well. For example, existing policy guidelines are often cited by both the plaintiff and/or the defense in civil cases, where officer and/or police agency liability is in question (see the list of civil and criminal cases in the reference section for more information on this issue). A departmental review of its use of force policies on CEDs vis-à-vis the PERF recommendations for model policy represents due diligence on the part of the department and hence adds to its liability defense in the case of a civil claim.

By failing to meet and/or seriously consider these recommendations law enforcement agencies are increasing the risk of experiencing several negative consequences. Failing to explicitly describe the situations that permit (and prohibit) the use of CEDs accords officers inappropriate levels of discretion which can result in tenuous police–community relationships (Adams & Jennison, 2007) and create liability issues for departments and individual officers. The use of CEDs against individuals who are at particular risk of experiencing adverse health effects increases the likelihood that relatively nonviolent situations will turn violent. Similarly, failing to require trained medical personnel to assess the effects of CEDs on the resisting subject decreases the likelihood that potentially negative health consequences are identified and in turn increases the possibility of future adverse outcomes from CED use.

Taken together, it is our view that the recommendations developed by PERF provide an appropriate point of reference when reviewing the state and quality of CED policies across the United States. Nearly all of the recommendations that are addressed in this study relate to issues that have been identified by other policing organization, human rights groups and scholars as central concerns to CED deployment and as ways for departments to improve the effectiveness of the device. Moreover, by modeling their written CED policies on comprehensive policy provided by PERF, policing agencies are better informing individual officers and the citizens on the appropriate use of CEDs.

Scope of the Current Study

In summary, PERF in consultation with stakeholder groups and scholars (Adams & Jennison, 2007; Alpert & Dunham, 2010; IACP, 2005), has made several specific recommendations regarding model policies and practices related to CED use. These recommendations have the potential to improve overall effectiveness of CED use in law enforcement while increasing the safety of both officers and resisting subjects. Many of the empirical studies cited above either contributed to PERF’s policy recommendations or bolstered the advisability of their guidelines after their development. The degree to which municipal police departments across the country are adopting these policy recommendations, however, is unknown at this time.⁷

To address this question of extent of adoption, we provide an analysis of written CED policies of a large cross-section of municipal policing agencies located across the United States. Using the PERF recommendations as a guideline, we systematically review and compare a large number of use of force policies to assess: (a) the quality and specificity of current CED policies and (b) using a pre-/peri-/postframework, determine the extent to which municipal police departments are adhering to the guidelines set out by PERF.

Data and Method

The policies used to conduct the analysis in this study were gathered as part of a large national study of municipal policing agencies which examined CED policy effects on targeted use of force outcomes. Municipal policing agencies employing 100 or more sworn officers were identified using the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (2003) data and were subsequently mailed surveys inquiring about CED policy and the perceived effectiveness of the device over the course of the 2008-2009 academic year.⁸ More than 200 agencies participated in the institutional survey (see Thomas et al., 2010 for a discussion on the survey methodology). As part of that study, agencies were asked to report whether their department had a written policy pertaining to the use of CEDs, and if they indicated this was the case, they were instructed to attach the CED policy material to their survey. Of the final sample of 210 departments taking part in the survey, 98% (n = 206) reported that they had a written use of force policy pertaining to CEDs; 60% (n = 124) of those agencies attached their respective policies when returning the survey. These written policies are used to compare against PERF’s recommendations in the analysis presented here.

Coding

A coding template consisting of 23 dichotomous variables was created to represent each of the PERF model policy recommendations discussed above. For each variable a value of 1 indicates that the written policy addresses the recommendations of PERF, and a value of 0 indicates that the policy failed to do so. The task of coding the recommendations proved to be easier for some of the recommendations than for others. For instance, when determining whether a department had a separate use of force policy for CEDs, departments were given a 1 if they had a stand-alone policy that addressed issues specific to the use of CEDs and a 0 if they only possessed a general use of force policy pertaining to all force tools. Similarly, departments were determined to have met PERF recommendations if their written policy explicitly requires, whenever possible, that verbal warnings be issued before deploying the device; limit the use of the device to one officer at a time; limit the number of consecutive cycles officers can deploy; required active resistance as the minimal level of subject defiance; and prohibit its use against specific at-risk groups unless exigent circumstances exist. Departments were also coded as having met PERF’s training recommendations if their written policy explicitly states that officers be trained in the use of CEDs before they are allowed to use them in the field. Furthermore, departments were determined to have met the reporting and medical follow-up recommendations if they mandate reporting and follow-up medical examinations in their written policies.

Coding some of the other recommendations required a more in-depth review of the policies in question. As stated above, PERF suggests that departments be clear on the situations that permit use of CEDs. This requires that departments provide clear definitions on permitted use. To determine whether departments achieved such clarity, we independently reviewed each policy to assess the clarity of permitted use language. As expected, there was considerable variation in this regard. For instance, one department’s policy allows officers to use CEDs when it is reasonable “in lieu of using other force options.” In contrast, another department defined appropriate use to be when

a suspect is actively resisting the officer’s commands and factors indicate the officer, offender, or others would be endangered by the use of other use of force alternatives; specifically when lesser or equal force options may be ineffective due to the danger existing to the officer, subject, or other.

It was determined that the former did not clearly define appropriate use in accordance with PERF recommendations, and thus the department’s policy was coded as a zero. The latter, however, did clearly define the situations permitting CED use, and it was coded as a 1. Similar coding criteria were used to determine whether written policies clearly defined situations that did not permit the use of CEDs. Further examples of how departments defined appropriate and inappropriate uses of the device are presented in the results section below.⁹

Results

Predeployment Guidelines

Table 1 displays the results of the analysis assessing the degree to which departments are meeting the predeployment guidelines set forth by PERF. The results of the policy coding process indicate that 70% (n = 87) of the police departments participating in the survey possessed a written force policy specific to the use of CEDs. The remaining departments simply collapsed CED guidelines under a more general use of force policy and did not address issues specific to the use of the electric shock-based tool. A small number of agencies did not even mention CEDs in their respective use of force policy and instead group all force options except for firearms into a single “less-lethal force” rubric. For those police agencies which have a separate policy, only around half (52%) placed CEDs on a use-of-force continuum (n = 64).

Table 1.

Predeployment Guidelines (n = 124)

Guideline	n	% (Total)	% (Given separate policy)
Separate written policy	87	70.16	—
Use-of-force continuum	64	51.61	—
Define appropriate use	71	57.26	81.61
Define inappropriate use	49	39.52	56.32
Training	107	86.29	—
Discuss effective use	49	39.52	56.32
Discuss physiological effects	39	31.45	44.83

There was considerable variation in the specificity of appropriate use defined by U.S. municipal police departments. Several local law enforcement agencies were quite detailed in their explanation of situations that permit CED use. For instance, one department maintained that officers could only use CEDs in situations where they objectively perceive the subject as potentially violent or engaging in active resistance. They go on to define “potentially violent and active resisters” as (a) those who physically demonstrate intent to resist and (b) those who fail to comply with verbal warnings after being given a reasonable opportunity to comply. Another agency also provided higher levels of specificity when discussing appropriate use, authorizing implementation when “lesser control methods are inadequate, for example: when the subject makes physically evasive movements to defeat the officer’s attempt at control and transport or takedown techniques would in all likelihood fail.” Other agencies were much more subjective when describing appropriate use, with some informing officers to use “reasonable judgment” without providing examples, and others failing to address the issue at all. In total, 71 of the police departments taking part in the study defined the concept of appropriate use to a substantial degree; this corresponds to 73% of all departments which possess a separate written CED policy.

Considerably fewer departments explicitly defined circumstances where the use of a CED is inappropriate, but again considerable variation exists across policies. Some departments which fulfilled this recommendation explicitly prohibit the use of CEDs against individuals who are passively resisting arrest and/or are engaged in peaceful/verbal disobedience. Others went further and provided scenario-based examples of circumstances that do not warrant the use of the device. While clearly defining the situations that do not warrant CEDs has its obvious benefits (discussed above), only 40% of all responding departments and 56% of the 87 agencies which have a CED-specific policy discuss inappropriate use (n = 49).

Regarding the other predeployment guidelines, 107 of the 124 total written policies required training in the device before an individual officer could make use of it in the field (86%). Note, however, that departments were only coded as meeting this requirement if their written policy explicitly discussed training requirements, and thus our coding may underestimate the proportion of departments which require training. Indeed, previous research using a larger portion of this national data found that 96% of departments required officers to receive at least 2 hr of training before using the device in the field (Thomas et al., 2010). About 40% of departments described how to maximize the effectiveness of the CED (56% of departments with CED-specific policies). Meeting this recommendation would include having informed officers that probe deployment is most effective at a distance of 15 to 21 ft and when aimed at the torso and is less effective in frigid conditions. Finally, only 39 of the 124 policies received discussed the potentially harmful effects of CEDs; only 45% of those with CED-specific policies make note of potentially harmful effects.

Perideployment Guidelines

The perideployment guidelines refer to the officers’ responsibilities immediately preceding and during the deployment of the CED. The results of the review of these guidelines are presented in Table 2. This analysis reveals that, in accordance with the PERF recommendations, a majority of municipal police departments taking part in the survey are requiring that suspects display active resistance before an officer is permitted to deploy the device. Specifically, 60% of all departments explicitly stated that CEDs are to be used against those exhibiting active resistance or placed the CED on the use-of-force continuum on a level that, at minimum, corresponds to active physical resistance (n = 75). Seventy-seven percent of departments which have a CED-specific policy require that officers provide a verbal warning, whenever possible, to subjects informing them that the device will be imminently discharged (n = 67, or 50% of the departments participating in the study). Remarkably, just 19% of all departments prohibit the simultaneous use of CEDs by more than one officer, and nearly a third (32%) do not limit the number of cycles officers can administer; this is despite the growing body of medical research documenting the increased health risks of such deployments of CEDs.

Table 2.

Perideployment Guidelines (n = 124)

Guideline	n	% (Total)	% (Given separate policy)
Provide warning	67	50.43	77.01
Restrict to use by 1 officer	23	18.55	26.44
Limit number of cycles	40	32.26	45.98
Suspect must be active resister	75	60.48	86.21
Prohibit pregnant females	79	63.71	90.80
Prohibit elderly	57	45.97	65.52
Prohibit children	62	50.00	71.26
Prohibit flammable	86	69.35	98.89
Prohibit OC spray	43	34.68	49.43
Prohibit fleeing	16	12.90	18.39
Prohibit handcuffed	53	42.74	60.92
Prohibit other at risk	75	60.48	86.21

Moreover, as discussed above, PERF prohibits the use of CEDs in certain situational contexts and against particularly at-risk individuals because of the increased potential of adverse health effects or due to the fact that the deployment would not meet the resistance level that warrants the use of the CED. These prohibitions include deploying the device in areas with flammable products present and in combination with O.C. spray. Furthermore, use of the device is prohibited against pregnant females, small children, the elderly, and other at-risk individuals as well as individuals already restrained with handcuffs and those who are fleeing from officers, unless exigent circumstances exist. Nearly every department (99%) which has a CED-specific policy prohibits the use of the device in situations where flammable products are present (69% of all responding departments). Nearly half (49%) of departments having CED-specific policies explicitly prohibit the use of the device in collaboration with O.C. spray (35% of total departments). Sixty-one percent of departments with CED-specific policies prohibited the use of the device against those already in handcuffs or other restraints. Just 18% of those departments with a CED-specific policy met PERF’s recommendation of prohibiting CED use against fleeing suspects.

The results of our analysis suggest that the municipal police departments which took part in the study tend to fare poorly on the matter of protecting some of the at-risk groups from CED exposure. More than 90% of departments with a CED-specific policy prohibit the use of the device against pregnant females (64% of all responding departments), but just 66% of these departments prohibit its use against the elderly (46% of total) and 71% prohibit CED use against small children (50% of total). To their credit, 86% of departments with CED-specific policies prohibited the use of the device against other at-risk groups (60% of total); primary among those groups were persons operating motor vehicles and subjects in elevated positions who could be seriously injured by a substantial fall.

Postdeployment Guidelines

The postdeployment guidelines developed by PERF refer to the reporting of deployments and the conducting of medical assessment follow-ups after a CED is used by officers. Specifically, we coded whether the reporting and medical protocols are outlined in the written CED policy, and whether those responsibilities are mandated by departmental policy, as per PERF’s recommendations. Unlike many of the other issues raised by the model policies developed by PERF, the vast majority of departments discussed reporting and medical procedures in their written policies, including departments which did not possess a CED-specific policy (see Table 3). Indeed, 86% of all responding departments (n = 107) outlined the reporting protocol expected of officers after the use of the CED. Many of the departments required the presence of a departmental supervisor at the scene of the incident. Moreover, as recommended by PERF, a large proportion of the departments required officers to file a use of force report after deploying a CED (85%).

Table 3.

Postdeployment Guidelines (n = 124)

Guideline	n	% (Total)
Medical protocol	109	87.90
Reporting procedures	107	86.29
Medical attention mandatory	67	54.03
Reporting mandatory	105	84.68

The vast majority of departments discussed the medical protocol that should be used for suspects upon whom a CED was discharged. This discussion most often included (a) the procedure by which personnel remove CED probes that have penetrated a subject’s skin; (b) symptoms of which officers should be aware indicative of an adverse reaction to the CED; (c) how long officers and jail officials should monitor subjects who have experienced a discharge of the device; and (d) the circumstances that require attention from trained medical professionals. PERF recommends that all suspects who have CEDs applied against them be monitored by trained medical personnel, given the as-yet-limited understanding the scientific community has regarding the device’s adverse effects. Just 67 of the 124 (54%) responding departments require such mandatory medical attention in all CED incidents, either from EMTs arriving at the scene of the incident or from doctors after the subject is transported to a medical facility. Some police departments, however, do require medical examinations only when the device is deployed against specific at-risk groups such as pregnant females or the elderly.

Total Summary Scores (TSSs)

As summary composite measures, we created an overall TSS for each department as well as a comparable score for each of the subcategories (pre-, peri-, and postdeployment guidelines). The TSSs were created by summing the dichotomized variables and dividing by the total number of guidelines under each respective category. For example, the TSS for perideployment guidelines was created by adding the binary guidelines that make up the perideployment category and dividing that value by 12. By doing this, we are able to provide a percentage value describing how well departments are meeting the recommendations of PERF overall. Furthermore, based on a traditional grading system, we assign a letter grade to further illustrate the quality of each department’s written policy (i.e., ≥90% = A, 80%-89% = B, 70%-79% = C, 60%-69% = D, ≤59% = F).

Table 4 presents the overall TSSs calculated. As indicated, an average departmental written CED policy covers about 54% of the total PERF guidelines described in this article. There is considerable variation in meeting the guidelines across the different categories, however. The findings observed suggest that, on average, written policies are covering a little more than half (54%) of the predeployment policy recommendations put forth by PERF and just less than half (45%) of the perideployment policy guidelines. Fortunately, law enforcement agencies appear to be doing a relatively good job at meeting the postdeployment policy recommendations of PERF, with departments meeting three out of the four guidelines specified under that subcategory.

Table 4.

Model Written Policies: Recommended Guideline Categories (n = 124)

Coded guideline categories^a		Total Summary Score^b (%)
Pre	Do they have a written policy?	53.69
	Do they have a separate CED policy?
	Do they place CED on use-of-force continuum in policy?
	Do the only permit use against active resisters?
	Do they explicitly define the circumstances when CEDs can be used?
	Do they define when CED cannot be used?
	Do policies discuss the medical effects of CEDs?
	Do policies discuss when CEDs are most effective?
Peri	Prohibit against fleeing suspects?	45.43
	Prohibit against pregnant women?
	Prohibit against elderly?
	Prohibit against young children?
	Prohibit use against other at risk groups?
	Prohibit use around flammable material?
	Prohibit use with OC spray?
	Prohibit when suspect is handcuffed?
	Require warning before deployment?
	Do policies limit number of cycles?
	Do policies restrict the number of officers who can deploy CEDs at the same time on a single suspect?
Post	Do policies discuss the medical protocol after CED deployment?	78.23
	Do policies require medical attention after application?
	Discuss reporting procedures?
	Is reporting mandatory?
Total	Pre, Peri, and Post averages combined	53.65

Not all categories that were originally incorporated in the coding scheme are included in this table. A full list is available on request from the authors.

Total Summary Score (TSS) percentile was calculated by taking the sum of each variable category (Σi) within either the Pre, Peri, or Post guideline categories, divided by the total number of observations (Σx) in each of the corresponding Pre, Peri, or Post guideline categories ([Σi/Σx] × 100 = TSS %).

The distribution of departmental grades is presented in Table 5. Specifically, this table describes the letter grade each individual department would receive for their written CED policy based on a traditional grading system. The table indicates that only 26 of the 124 departments would receive a passing grade for their written CED policies (C or higher). Indeed, the modal overall grade for written policies is an F using a conventional grading scheme. When looking across each subcategory, the results are again quite alarming. The overwhelming majority of departments received failing grades vis-à-vis PERF’s pre- and perideployment guidelines. As with the overall TSS, the modal grade for the pre- and perideployment recommendations is an F. For the postdeployment guidelines, however, the vast majority of departments are receiving passing grades.

Table 5.

Departmental Grade Distribution Frequencies

Grades	A	B	C	D	F
Predeployment	5	16	26	0	77
Perideployment	8	7	10	13	86
Postdeployment	61	0	38	0	25
All three subcategories	4	10	12	26	72

Note: Police departments included in the “all three subcategories” met all requirements for the assigned letter grade.

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to assess the current state of written CED policies among municipal policing agencies across the United States. The limited, albeit expanding, knowledge regarding the effectiveness of the device and the growing concerns over their unintended effects has prompted the development of “model” CED policies that specify pre-, peri-, and postdeployment guidelines for police departments and officers using this less-than-lethal device. These guidelines include defining the circumstances that permit and prohibit the use of CEDs, identifying officer responsibilities and restrictions when deploying the device, and mandating reporting and medical treatment post-CED deployment. To date, no study has assessed the extent to which police agencies have adopted these policy recommendations, and this study provides several noteworthy findings in this regard.

First, there is considerable variation across municipal police departments in the quality and specificity of their written CED policy. Just more than 70% of departments included in this study have constructed a stand-alone CED policy. This finding suggests that, although many of the surveyed departments are discussing policy issues specific to CEDs, some simply collapse their policies regarding CED deployment under a general use of force policy that covers all less-than-lethal force tools. Moreover, when comparing the grades of the departmental CED policies, we see further evidence of variation in pre-, prei- and postpolicy inclusion. Several departments received relatively high marks with regard to their compliance with PERF guidelines, indicating that these police agencies have a detailed policy clearly outlining the responsibilities of officers when deploying a CED. Many other departments, however, fared poorly in their adoption of policies reflecting the PERF guidelines, ultimately suggesting that their policies do not cover many of the important issues which arise with the deployment of the CED.

Second, despite this variation in policy coverage, it is apparent in our review that the vast majority of law enforcement agencies are failing to meet many of the important CED policy recommendations addressed by PERF. The TSSs presented above suggest that police agencies, on average, are only meeting around half of the pre- and perideployment guidelines set forth by PERF. More specifically, just more than 60% of the surveyed departments explicitly require a level of active resistance before officers are permitted to use the CED, and even fewer require officers to provide a verbal warning prior to deployment.

Even among the recommendations set forth to improve the safety of the device for both police and citizens, a surprising number of municipal police departments are not meeting PERF guidelines. For instance, a sizeable portion of the surveyed departments do not prohibit the use of a CED against individuals who are at a substantial risk for experiencing adverse health effects, such as pregnant females, children, and the elderly. Moreover, well below half of the surveyed departments place restrictions on the number of officers who can deploy a CED at one time and on the number of 5-s cycles individual officers can apply to a resisting subject, despite the adverse consequences these have physiologically. Indeed, this general failure to comply with the PERF model guidelines is quite alarming given their empirical basis.

The policies of the municipal policing agencies surveyed in this study appear to be doing a much better job meeting the postdeployment guidelines set forth by PERF. The modal grade for these departments regarding the postdeployment guidelines is an A, and the TSS indicates that U.S. municipal police departments are covering more than 75% of the postdeployment guidelines assessed in this study. Still, there are some important caveats with these positive findings—namely, the small number of guidelines in the postdeployment subcategory and the relatively liberal requirements to meet these recommendations. To be clear, the policing agencies analyzed in this study were considered to have met 50% of PERF’s postdeployment guidelines (two of the four) by simply mentioning the reporting and medical protocol after deploying a CED. One could argue the relative importance of including these as postdeployment guidelines since PERF’s model policy actually mandates both reporting and medical follow-up assessments. Viewed from this perspective, the current state of the postdeployment policies of municipal policing agencies is less positive, particularly in reference to the requirement of medical follow-up treatment. Just more than half of the surveyed departments required medical follow-up for subjects who have experienced a CED administration. This low proportion is unfortunate given the limited understanding of the adverse health effects of CEDs and the potential benefits routine medical follow-ups can have on improving the safety of resisting suspects.

Taken together, we feel comfortable making policy recommendations based on the findings of this study. First and foremost, policing agencies should adopt a written policy specific to the concerns of CEDs. Although CEDs have been regarded by many as an important and effective force option for officers in the field (Alpert & Dunham, 2000; Hopkins & Beary, 2003; Jenkinson et al., 2006; Mesloh et al., 2008; Meyer, 1992; Taylor & Woods, 2010), they nevertheless have unique considerations that should be addressed by policing agencies through the development of stand-alone CED policies (Alpert & Dunham, 2010). Second, all policing agencies should, at minimum, consider modeling their CED policy after the PERF recommendations. In essence, this calls for the creation of a universal CED policy that is adopted and practiced throughout the United States. We support the view that individual departments construct policies that are most effective for the jurisdiction in which they work, and much of the debate regarding the pros and cons of adopting a universal CED policy surrounds the issue of the proper placement of the CED on the use-of-force continuum (Thomas et al., 2010). Still, many of PERF’s recommendations do not directly pertain to issues of effectiveness, and even further a large proportion of these policies concern matters that should not vary across jurisdictions. For instance, there is no empirical reason to believe that prohibiting the use of CEDs against pregnant females will adversely affect the effectiveness of CEDs in some jurisdictions but not others. Conversely, prohibiting such use should have uniform benefits across jurisdictions (e.g., increasing the device’s safety, improving police–citizen relationships).

Similar logic can be applied to many of PERF’s recommendations—including defining appropriate and inappropriate use, requiring the issuance of verbal warnings prior to deployment, and mandating medical treatment. All three of these policies would seem to have the potential of enhancing the effectiveness and safety of the device across all jurisdictions. Indeed, this differs from the way universal use of force policies are typically discussed, and instead of imposing guidelines on when in the encounter officers are permitted to use the device across all police agencies, it simply requires that departments clearly define these circumstances and take the necessary actions to ensure that the device is getting used in the safest and most effective way possible. The Police Chief of the Columbia, Missouri Police Department echoed similar sentiments when their department fully adopted PERF’s guidelines, saying that “the guidelines are comprehensive, but they in no way hinder our ability to utilize [CEDs] as a justifiable force option” and that “the citizens of Columbia will be safer and the police will be better served knowing when and where not to use the [CED]” by implementing the guidelines (Randall, 2009).

This is not to say that all departments must fully adopt PERF policies or that the guidelines set by PERF should be viewed as unwavering. Departmental administrators must carefully think through the implications of the policies before adopting them, and the subsequent effects of the policies should be reviewed regularly to ensure the device is achieving maximum effectiveness in each jurisdiction it is being applied. To be clear, whereas many of the PERF guidelines addressed here deal with issues related to the medical safety of the device, and in our view should be adopted by all police departments, others are affected by jurisdictional and situational factors that should be carefully considered by officers and departmental administrators. This is the precise reason that the PERF guidelines use flexible language in their recommendations—written policies cannot anticipate every type of incident an officer may encounter. Nevertheless, the policies should be used as a guide for use of force decisions, and officers should be able to articulate the totality of circumstances that led them to depart from the guidelines when a departure did occur.

It is possible that the adoption of these more detailed policies can also have implication for litigation surrounding police use of force. Several cases have been brought testing whether the use of CEDs in certain circumstances violates an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force (Brooks v. Seattle, 2010; Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 2009; Bryan v. McPherson, 2010; Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City, 2010; Cook v. City of Bella Villa, 2009; Crowell v. Kirkpatrick, 2010; Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago, 2010; Galvan v. City of San Antonio, 2010; German v. Sosa, 2010; Henry v. Purnell, 2010; Heston v. City of Salinas, 2009; Jacobs v. City of Fort Worth, 2010; Kijowski v. City of Niles, 2010; Mann v. Taser International, Inc., 2009; Mattos v. Agarano, 2010; McCown v. City of Fontana, 2008; Oliver v. Fiorino, 2009; Orsak v. Metropolitan Airports Commission Police Department, 2009; Sanders v. City of Dothan, 2009; Tabatabainejad v. University of California Los Angeles, 2007). The judgments reached in these cases have fallen in favor of both police and the defendants alternatively. The point to be taken here, however, is that in the cases where the judgments have favored the defendants, the individual officer as well as the officer’s department can be liable for damages, and those can reach hundreds of thousands of dollars. In some of these cases, the use of a CED resulted in death to the suspect/defendant; this is an outcome that is both irreversible and unacceptable in a democratic society such as ours. Therefore, by clearly outlining many of these issues addressed by PERF, policing agencies may be in a position to guide officers’ decisions on permitted and prohibited use and also be better equipped to deal with the many liability issues that may well arise.

Limitations

There are some noteworthy limitations to the current study that should be addressed. First, all departments that took part in the study were municipal police departments that employ 100 or more sworn officers. Accordingly, the findings on the quality of written CED policies should not be generalized to state or county agencies or to departments smaller in size. Second, the 2005 PERF model policy used as a referent in this study possessed 52 policy recommendations, from which we constructed 23 pre-, peri-, and postdeployment guidelines. Although we believe that the selected guidelines addressed in this study are the most important policy issues concerning CED deployment, the analysis here does not encompass all of PERF’s recommendations.

A third limitation is the decision to use dichotomous measures when coding the policies. The reason for using the dichotomous measure for each standard is twofold. First, most of the policy recommendations were designed in a way where departments either met or did not meet PERF recommendations, and the use of a multilevel scale was unwarranted (e.g., departments either prohibit or do not prohibit the use of CEDs against children). Second, dichotomous measurement was clear and convenient for achieving the purpose of this study—which is to provide information on the current state of CED policies in the United States. The large number of policies that we were able to gather for this study allowed for an exploratory analysis on a large scale to address this goal; however, in doing so, it also compromised our ability to go in-depth when reviewing the many policy materials received. Indeed, the decision to use a dichotomous measure oversimplifies the complexity of written policies, and the data collected do not shed full light on the qualitative differences present across departments.

Finally, we acknowledge that it is possible that police departments have policies in accordance with PERF’s recommendations but they do not address them in their written policies submitted for our review. For instance, departments may teach officers that CEDs are prohibited against children in training but not explicitly state it in their written policy. In this way, police departments may be more in accordance with the PERF recommendations than is reported in this article. However, it is also possible that the current state of written CED policies is even bleaker than expressed in this article. Of the 210 departments who returned completed surveys regarding placement on the use-of-force continuum and CED effectiveness, only 60% attached a copy of their written CED policy. Although we cannot definitively say that these participating agencies are doing a better job of meeting PERF’s guidelines, it may be reasonable to expect that nonresponding agencies are likely doing worse in this regard.

Conclusion

Despite these noteworthy concerns regarding the limitations of this study, this analysis does shed considerable light on the current state of CED policies among municipal policing agencies in the United States. More specifically, it has assessed how well these agencies are addressing the explicit policy concerns outlined by PERF. Although the findings reported here tend to highlight the inadequacy of the current CED policies of municipal policing, they can serve as a positive catalyst for change in those police departments looking to improve the effectiveness and safety of the CED device. When appropriate, policing agencies are encouraged to modify their policies to meet the empirically based recommendations made by PERF. Furthermore, agencies should continue to make the appropriate changes in CED use practices as the incidents of harm add up and the physiological science is deepened in its understanding of CED-use consequences for differing types of people. There will be a clear need for future researchers to replicate this study as policy recommendations are adjusted with the growing knowledge on the effects and effectiveness of CEDs, and it is hoped that such studies will reveal a higher degree of adoption of PERF model policies.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Otwin Marenin, Stephanie Pratt, David Myers, and two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments and support on this manuscript and also the Washington State University Division of Governmental Studies and Services and the CougParent fund for their assistance on the project.

Authors’ Note

An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2010 American Society of Criminology annual conference in San Francisco, California.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Bios

Kyle J. Thomas is a graduate student in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Maryland. His research interests include groups and crime, peer influence, criminological theory, policing and organizational policy.

Peter A. Collins is an assistant professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at Seattle University. He received his PhD from Washington State University in 2011. His research interests include criminal law and courts, corrections, drug courts, substance abuse treatment, criminal justice management/organization, theory, cost benefit and evaluation research.

Nicholas P. Lovrich holds the rank of Regents Professor in the Department of Political Science & Criminal Justice Program and is a Claudius O. and Mary W. Johnson Distinguished Professor in Political Science. His scholarship has appeared in major journals in Political Science, Public Administration and Criminal Justice, and his monographs have been published by Oxford University Press, MIT Press, Washington State University Press, Garland, McGraw Hill, Houghton Mifflin, Praeger, and Westview. Dr. Lovrich serves on the Advisory Committee to the Washington State Center for Court Research in the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) as a representative of the state’s academic community.

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