Abstract

John Hagan’s Who Are the Criminals? attempts to further the avenues through which politicians interact with policymakers, citizens, and academics to alter perceptions about crime and crime control. John Hagan is an expert on war crimes and human rights as well as being a prolific author. Hagan received the Stockholm Prize in Criminology in 2009 for his work on genocide and Darfur. He currently is the John D MacArthur professor of law & sociology at Northwestern University as well as the editor of the Annual Review of Law & Social Science.
The latest book by Hagan examines crime policy from the age of Roosevelt (1933-1973) through the age of Reagan (1974-2008). These time periods include the presidencies of their namesakes and are elaborated on in the book. Hagan addresses this in the book and says that although the time periods are somewhat vague they are still used for the purpose of the book. From the outset, Hagan makes three key arguments that are the premise for the book. First, the ongoing interaction of ideas and politics shape crime policies in America. Second, racial and class inequality led to differential treatment of street crime and white-collar crime throughout the ages of Roosevelt and Reagan. Third, the book contends that the incredible growth and overcrowding of prisons in the United States together with the deregulation of the economy during the Reagan era beset the United States with the challenge of funding punitive programs in a time of economic recession.
Chapter 1 examines a crime report that was commissioned in 1984 by the Reagan Administration that was subsequently denied release by the Department of Justice. The report heavily emphasized the power of the fear of crime. Hagan argues that despite the downturn in crime in the early 1980s, the Reagan Administration advocated and achieved the passage of more severe sentencing laws. The author calls the burial of the crime report a missed opportunity to slow down the expansion of the prisons as a result of increasingly punitive policies. Hagan discusses the shift in crime policy and rhetoric from making decisions based on the reality of crime to those based on the fear of crime during the Reagan era. In contrast to the age of Roosevelt, which produced legislation like the Securities and Exchange Commission Act, the increasing focus of the age of Reagan was to address street crime most of all. This shift in focus, Hagan contends, left the business sector free to act in such a way as to contribute to the subprime mortgage crisis and the way in which criminal justice has addressed white-collar criminals.
In the second chapter, Hagan discusses the fear of crime and perceptions of crime and criminals. Immigrants have long been the subject of citizen’s fears of victimization. Particularly, different ethnic groups have been associated with certain drugs in the past and that helped to facilitate the prohibition of these drugs by playing on people’s fear of immigrants. Hagan asserts that crime and the fear of crime are distinct. This can be supported by the falling crime rates in the United States since the early 1990s coinciding with increasing fear of crime among people. By creating a moral crusade against alcohol, cocaine, marijuana, and opium, politicians of the past have successfully criminalized cocaine, marijuana, and opium to this day, with the current exception of medicinal marijuana.
Chapters 3 and 4 look at the theoretical explanations for crime in the Roosevelt and Reagan eras respectively. The Roosevelt era was characterized by the dominance of structural functionalism, symbolic interactionism, and conflict theory. These theories declined in standing during the Reagan era but still remain relevant in explaining crime today. Hagan discusses specific theories of each school and the overall contribution to criminology of the different groups of classical theories. The Reagan era consisted of the adaptation, evolution, and criticism of Roosevelt era theories as well as the emergence of new theories. Theories such as Life Course theory, Routine Activities, and others rose in prominence throughout the age of Reagan. Hagan shifts focus for the rest of the book to broaden the knowledge of crime and crime control.
Chapter 5 analyses the fears of street crime under a critical collective framing perspective. This perspective looks to understand the relationship between political and other powerful groups and the definition of criminality. Specifically, Hagan argues that the age of Reagan witnessed the criminalizing of street crime and a subsequent deregulation of the financial sector. Hagan notes three social and economic crises that have risen out of Reagan era policies: the mass imprisonment of upwards of one million African Americans, the subprime mortgage collapse, and the federal bailouts that sought to restore balance. The way in which the Reagan era framed the fears of the streets led to significant growth in incarceration rates in the United States.
Chapter 6 examines deregulation of the economy under Reagan, which has led to several economic crises throughout the past few decades, most notably the subprime mortgage fallout. Hagan asserts that Reagan specifically sought to limit government regulatory power and to increase economic freedom. Several pieces of legislation stopped hiring for some federal agencies as well as restricted the ability of regulatory agencies to make new rules. This created an economic climate that was conducive to the reckless pursuit of profit. Despite the iconic Wall Street white-collar criminals Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken being charged with a multitude of crimes, there was still a vague societal focus on white-collar crimes. Hagan emphasizes the need to understand the link between the crime on the streets and the deregulation of the suites.
In the final chapter 7, Hagan broadens the scope of his examination to include the interaction of America with international entities on topics such as international law, state crime, and war. Hagan incorporates the Abu Ghraib prison incidents, the genocide in Sudan and Darfur, and other examples to demonstrate the extension of the mentality of the war on crime to the war on terror. The author articulates the importance of understanding the framing process that characterized the age of Reagan. Hagan continues to point out the need for the United States to apply international principles to guide the progress of the nation’s involvement in the war on terror as well as dealing with war crimes.
Hagan concludes with a look at the Obama administration and its reaction to the subprime crisis. Again, Hagan stresses the link between the crime of the streets and the deregulation of the suites. In assessing whether or not the Obama administration has ushered in a new age in America, Hagan posits that two things must happen. First, the incarceration of 25% of the world’s prison population in the United States needs to be addressed and reversed. Second, the financial crises facing the United States. need to be remedied. If the state attitudes toward street crime and suite crime can be brought into line, Hagan foresees a new age of crime and its control in America.
