Understanding the Role of Cross-Sector Collaborations on the Success of Florida’s Drug Courts

Abstract

Many have lauded the success of the Florida Adult Drug Court Model in terms of recidivism, sobriety, and court processes. Yet, none seems to focus on the cross-sector collaborations. Most studies on the evaluation of drug courts underplay the role of this relationship; however, those relationships are a key component to the success of drug courts. Using Bryson, Crosby, and Stone’s theoretical framework for understanding cross-sector collaborations, this work examines what factors and mechanisms are in place within the Florida Drug Court Model that give us insight into how these cross-sector partnerships are able to be successful. In addition, the framework also allows us to examine any necessary factors and mechanisms not currently present, which may further strengthen the role of these partnerships in the success of the current drug court model. Ultimately, the broader goal of this research is to shed light on the role that cross-sector collaborations play in the success of drug courts in the Florida Drug Court Model. Given the lack of emphasis afforded to these relationships in the academic literature, our understanding of the success of the drug court model may be incomplete.

Keywords

cross-sector collaborations Florida drug courts cross-sector frameworks

Cross-Sector Collaborations and the Success of Florida’s Drug Courts

Although some have documented the involvement of the courts in therapeutic treatment back to the 1920s (Belenko, 2002), it was not until Miami’s formalized Drug Court Program in 1989 when nationwide court involvement in the therapeutic treatment of drug offenders gained national attention. Such innovative court programs challenged the traditional role of the judiciary and led to dynamic cross-sector collaborations in Florida’s judicial system. Cross-sector collaborations are at the heart of drug courts in Florida. The Florida State Legislature explicitly called for multiple agency involvement—public, private, and nonprofit agencies—in the support and enhancement of drug court programs’ effectiveness. They argue that these agencies working together enables them to better meet client needs through shared responsibilities and resources (FL. STAT. 397.334). In 2001, the legislature mandated an operational drug court in each judicial circuit in Florida. Two years later, in 2003, that mandate was lifted and now more than 10 years later, each judicial circuit continues to maintain at least one operating drug court.

When discussing crime in the United States, the 1980s stands out as being a time of increased awareness of drug use, punitive criminal justice responses, and the closing of mental health facilities, all of which helped contribute to the need for a therapeutic remedy to the growing drug problem across urban America. Fighting a growing caseload and overflowing jail system, the courts were compelled to develop strategies to deal with the problem. The response of the Dade County Court in Miami, Florida, was a diversionary court, which intertwined alternate case processing with treatment (Goldkamp, 1999). It offered participants the ability to obtain treatment for their drug addiction as an alternative to the traditional court related sanctions of jail time or probation. This work sets out to use an established framework for successful cross-sector collaborations to examine the specific factors and mechanisms present in or deficient from the Florida Drug Court Model. On a larger scale, it attempts to give policy makers and practitioners a glimpse into the practical uses of theoretical frameworks, such as this, in guiding the formation and maintenance of successful cross-sector partnerships. Yet, Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006) caution that there are challenges involved in providing such practical guidance to policy makers (and in this case practitioners as well) regarding the design and implementation of such cross-sector collaborations.

Cross-Sector Collaborations in Drug Courts

Public–private partnerships and cross-sector collaborations are words used to describe the dynamic relationships that occur when organizations in two or more sectors link together to share “ . . . information, resources, activities, and capabilities to achieve jointly an outcome that could not be achieved by organizations in one sector separately” (Bryson et al., 2006, p. 44). Such partnerships involve the government and profit or nonprofit entities who perform a traditionally public activity (Bryson et al., 2006; Savas, 2000). Consequently, this work uses the words partnership, cross-sector partnership, and cross-sector collaborations interchangeably throughout the text.

One of the views offered by Linder (1999) depicts these partnerships as power sharing where control is spread horizontally instead of vertically between members involving shared responsibility, knowledge, and risk. Among these diverse actors, there must be a “careful balance between synergy and respective autonomy, which incorporates mutual respect, equal participation in decision making, and mutual accountability and transparency” (Brinkerhoff, 2002, p. 21).

Thompson and Perry (2006) sum these parts as,

A process in which autonomous actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them together; it is a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial interactions. (p. 23)

The actors in these cross-sector collaborations join together to produce what each individual entity could not produce on their own with respect to capital, resources, and expertise (Ghere, 2001; Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004; Salamon, 1995). Bryson et al. (2006) notes that, in earlier times, environmental complexity provided the impetus for organizations forming such partnerships to decrease uncertainty and increase stability. Currently, scholars still believe that environmental complexity still plays a role as problems have simultaneously become more global and more local, thereby “inviting customized approaches” to complicated problems (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004, p. 7).

Goldkamp, White, and Robinson (2001) note that an important challenge for drug court research is to determine the relative contribution of individual drug court components, in this case, these cross-sector collaborations, on the overall impact of the program. Similarly, Taxman and Bouffard (2005) suggest that additional research is needed in this area to “optimize the effectiveness of the drug court model as a tool for addressing the needs of substance abusing offenders” (p. 47). Shaffer (2011) takes up the suggestion made by Taxman and Bouffard (2005) and conducts a meta-evaluation of the drug court literature to determine how the drug court’s structure and processes are associated with their effectiveness. She concludes that based on the peer-reviewed literature, few studies have been conducted that focus specifically on how the programmatic components of the drug court model impact its success.

Hiller et al. (2010) offer, “The operational components of drug courts and how these affect participant outcomes remain largely unknown. However, a number of characteristics are considered distinctive to drug courts” (p. 934). I would argue that cross-sector collaborations are one of those characteristics, which, to my knowledge, has not been acknowledged as a programmatic component of the drug court model that has the potential to influence the program’s success. As such, this study aims to begin this discussion by looking specifically at the collaborative partnerships that exists between actors in the drug court model. The quality of such relationships has a direct impact on the outcomes and accountabilities of the drug court model. If the actors have differing or conflicting priorities and/or perspectives or exhibit other characteristics of a dysfunctional relationship, it can negatively affect drug court processes, offender rehabilitation, and the overall success of the drug court model.

Why Form Partnerships in Drug Courts?

Both the state court system and the municipal governments fund and administer the state’s drug courts (Florida Supreme Court Task Force on Treatment-Based Drug Courts, 2004a). However, Florida Statutes 397.334 states, “If a county chooses to fund a treatment-based drug court program, the county must secure funding from sources other than the state for those costs not otherwise assumed by the state pursuant to s.29.004.” Consequently, if the courts cannot provide drug treatment services, often there is a municipal government counterpart, such as the Department of Health, which may be able to provide comparable services. Yet, most drug courts choose to collaborate with private organizations for treatment services. Why do courts collaborate with private organizations in this area? Why do private organizations get involved in these relationships?

Collin (1998) suggests that municipalities join partnerships with private organizations for two main reasons: lack of resources or of a special competency and gaining competitive equality. This may seem the case with drug courts, in particular, as courts are not traditionally known to offer drug treatment and counseling services; it would seem logical for courts to join partnerships with private organizations that specialize in therapeutic treatment services.

According to the Florida Supreme Court Task Force on Treatment-Based Drug Courts (2004b),

Pursuant to key component #10, codified in section 397.334, Florida Statutes, drug courts use a collaborative approach, partnering with other existing agencies to provide access to services already in existence, but often not easily accessible by the populations that drug courts serve. (p. 14)

Nolan (2001) noted that the majority of drug courts contract for treatment services with private organizations; 14% with the county health department; 9% with probation departments; and 8% with the courts itself. These numbers are a bit more exaggerated in Florida with 35 out of the 43 adult drug courts partnering with local-community based nonprofits or for-profit treatment organizations, while services for eight drug courts are provided by municipal providers (i.e., Departments of Health; Office of the State Courts Administrator, 2009).

The use of nonprofit organizations in this area is not a novel idea. Some argue that the use of such partnerships can date back as far as the Roman Empire or even to the nation’s founding in the United States (Forrer, Kee, Newcomer, & Boyer, 2010). As illustrated by Salamon and Anheier (1998), nonprofit organizations are known to have initiated the first public works projects as well as provide the first social services to alleviate the government’s inability to provide public services for a growing population. These organizations may serve public purposes such as providing homeless shelters, educational benefits, food assistance, and other activities that are seen as benefitting the public. Saidel (2011) notes that there is a substantial dependence on government revenues by these organizations, noting specifically, “Between 1995 and 2005 the number of public benefit nonprofits increased by 66 percent” (p. 159).

Nonprofits are very strong in situations where customers or clients “require extensive trust” or “need hands-on” personal attention (Rosenau, 1999, p. 11). Salamon (1995) argues that the nonprofit sector acts as proxy “to offer the purchaser a degree of assurance that the goods or services being purchased meet adequate standards of quality and quantity” (p. 40). Specifically, Hansmann (1987) states,

nonprofits of all types typically arise in situations in which, owing either to the circumstances under which a service is purchased or consumed or to the nature of the service itself, consumers feel unable to evaluate accurately the quantity or quality of the service a firm produces for them. (p. 29)

As these nonprofits are in the business of charity and not profit, individuals may be more likely to trust that adequate services will be provided to consumers.

The courts would be unable to provide such services on their own due primarily to the growth of the program and the court’s capacity to provide such services. Some of the clientele served through the drug court program could not have been able to receive such treatment services on their own due primarily to a lack of self-motivation to seek out services or that such services are cost prohibitive. For example, according to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration’s Drug and Alcohol Services Information System Report (2008), in 2005, the criminal justice system was the principal source of referrals of primary methamphetamine/amphetamine substance abuse treatment admissions at a rate of 49% with self/individual referrals at 24%.

Both public and private agencies benefit in such partnerships. In the case of drug court’s cross-sector collaborations, private agencies benefit by having a new source of revenue, an avenue with which to utilize their expertise, as well as being able to provide a service that impacts the public good. Public agencies benefit from these partnerships primarily because private agencies offer expertise in an area where the public agency may be lacking, such as providing the necessary treatment services at a greater capacity than could be provided by the public agency counterpart. Overall, this drug court partnership mutually benefits both the public and private agencies.

Actors in the Florida Drug Court Cross-Sector Collaboratives

Nolan’s (2001) text, “Reinventing Justice” traces the evolution of the roles of actors involved in therapeutic justice. The descriptions that follow are adapted from Nolan’s text. According to Nolan’s description, the greatest innovation in the drug court model is the shift away from the traditional roles for the judge, prosecutor, client, and defense. The drug court approach asks all of the actors to abandon their adversarial approach and come together to ensure the safety of the public and the long-term benefits of sobriety to the client. In essence, they are asked not to operate in their usual conflict-based relationships, but to instead adopt the “team-approach” where they work together to create a rehabilitative environment (Nolan, 2001).

From Defendant to Client

Defendants are no longer required to defend themselves against the charges brought forth by the prosecutor; instead, they become treatment clients. As such, the clients’ role in court is to accept and abide by the terms of the drug court, including its mandated treatment component.

From Judge to Proactive Therapist

In most drug court interactions, it is usually the judge, client, treatment providers, and case managers engaging one another to report on the client’s progress in the program. According to Roper and Lessenger (2007), a majority of drug court judges volunteer for the task because they believe they can make a difference and would rather improve the system rather than “grind through cases” (p. 284).

From Protector of Rights to Doing What Is Right: Defense Attorneys

In the drug court model, defense attorneys are asked to “consider the ‘higher’ priorities of helping solve the client’s drug addiction problem” (Nolan, 2001, p. 77). On one hand, defense attorneys should be their client’s advocates and seek the deal that is in their client’s best interest, but in the drug court situation, what is in a client’s best interest, legally, may not be in their overall best interest.

From Guardians of Public Safety to Restoring Drug Offenders: Prosecutors

The role of the prosecutor in the traditional adversarial setting is that of protecting the public interest, seeking justice for victims, and ensuring the just prosecution of criminal defendants. In the drug court setting, prosecutors play a very limited role and may sit silently during a drug court session (Nolan, 2001).

Probation Officers

In many post-plea drug court cases, defendants agree to a term of probation. As such, probation officers are at the drug court hearings to report on the defendant’s compliance with the terms of their probation and to determine from the judge if actions taken by the client are a violation of probation. Often, they look to the drug court judge to provide such guidance. On the other hand, in traditional courtroom settings, such things would be in their discretion.

Treatment Providers

A courtroom is not the traditional venue for drug treatment providers but on a drug court-docket day, various treatment providers and case managers are present in court to report to a non-therapist on a client’s progress in the treatment portion of the drug court diversion. According to Hiller et al. (2010),

77% of drug courts in a national sample had a formal agreement or contract with a treatment provider, and only 48% of programs allowed the treatment provider a role in decisions to admit clients to the drug court (Belenko, Hiller, Taxman, Young, and Perdoni, 2009). (p. 936)

All of these actors, with the exception of treatment providers are existing members of the traditional court environment. However, under the drug court model, they all agree to serve the common interests of client sobriety. In sum, the change in perspective of the traditional actors along with the addition of treatment providers yields a partnership where in theory everyone is working toward the same goal. According to Saidel (2011), governance by partnership takes place when government revenues are exchanged for services delivered by nonprofit organizations where these actors’ mission, values, and goals are aligned.

Framework for Understanding Cross-Sector Partnerships

With such a large number of drug courts in Florida choosing to collaborate with private organizations, Florida’s drug courts present a unique case for analyzing cross-sector collaborations. Bryson et al. (2006) present a theoretical framework for understanding successful cross-sector collaborations, which include the environment in which collaborations occur, processes within collaborations, structure and governance, contingencies and constraints, outcomes, and accountability. This section introduces you to the framework and its components.

Initial Conditions

The initial conditions component emphasizes the general environment in which collaborations occur. It discusses environmental factors that work to promote or enhance cross-sectoral relationships. They note that cross-sector collaborations are more likely to occur in a turbulent environment. One can imagine in such an environment, no single entity is in full control of the situation/problem or capable of solving the problem alone. Other conditions such as when unilateral efforts to address a public problem have failed, also lead to a greater likelihood of organizations forming cross-sector collaborations. The last condition addressed by Bryson et al. (2006) in this area deals with the ways powerful brokers and stakeholders, whose reach often spans across sectors, can serve to bolster attention to a public problem. These are individuals who by their very nature can easily draw together a set of stakeholders from all sectors to address how they can come together to solve the problem.

Process

Process components include forging initial agreements, building leadership, building legitimacy, building trust, managing conflict, and planning. Initial agreements (both formal and informal) are used to agree on the purpose of the collaboration, structure, role, decision-making authority, composition, and so on—to deal with the overall administration of the collaboration. These newly formed collaborative entities need to build leadership through both formal and informal means. In terms of building legitimacy, when these organizations first form, they are not automatically regarded as being a legitimate organization. To be successful, they have to be seen as being the legitimate authority when dealing with the specific problem they were tasked to address. Along these same lines, to be successful cross-sector collaborators, these groups also need to build trust, both within and outside of its structure. According to Bryson et al. (2006), partners in these collaborations can build trust by sharing information, knowledge, competency, good intentions, and follow-through. All of this information serves to aid future organizations and agencies who find themselves faced with forming cross-sector collaboration. It does so by detailing the steps they need to go to ensure that they effectively function as an entity, be recognized as being as a legitimate authority, and earn the trust of members and non-members.

The process component also presents a discussion of how these partnerships manage conflict. Bryson et al. (2006) note specifically that conflict arises in such groups due to “differing aims and expectations that partners bring to a collaboration” (p. 48). Power issues can arise,

As groups try to agree on the nature of the problem that concerns them, issues are likely to revolve around convening and inclusion; as they debate the direction they should take in dealing with the problem, issues concern the shaping of the collaboration agenda and sharing of relevant information; once the implementation is under way, power issues revolve around the exercise of influence, action authorization, and resource control (Gray 1996). (Bryson et al., 2006, p. 48)

The last component of the process area is planning. Bryson et al. (2006) state, “Careful articulation of mission, goals, and objectives; roles and responsibilities; and phases or steps, including implementation, are often cited as an important key to success” (p. 48). They note that within the planning there should be both deliberate and emergent planning as well as making use of the distinctive competencies that each actor brings to the table. Overall, the planning should build on the “distinctive competencies of the collaborators” (p. 48).

Structure and Governance

Structure and governance include the need for organizations to integrate across structures as well as coordinating and monitoring activities. As denoted in their framework, Bryson et al.’s (2006) structure usually encompasses elements such as, “Goals, specialization of tasks and division of labor, rules and standard operating procedures, and designated authority relationships” (p. 48). Within such partnerships, the structure is likely to be influenced by environmental factors, ambiguity of membership, and complexity in the nature of tasks performed at the client level (Bryson et al., 2006). Governance, however, is seen as a set of “coordinating and monitoring activities” that must occur in order for collaborations to survive (p. 49). The importance of structure and governance in implementing as well as successfully maintaining such collaborative relationships is tantamount. These rules, procedures, and monitoring activities dictate how the collaboration functions. In so doing, one can use the components of this section of the framework to become better oriented with what the literature has shown to work with regard to structure and governance within collaborative partnerships.

Contingencies and Constraints

Contingencies and constraints focus on the overall sustainability of the cross-sector collaboration with an emphasis on collaboration type, power imbalances, and competing institutional logics. The collaboration type distinguishes among partnerships formed for system-level planning, administrative level, and service delivery partnerships. Bryson et al. (2006) argue that important differences exist among the types of partnerships formed under these conditions. Specifically, “Service delivery partnerships are more frequent and easier to sustain than those aimed at planning for systems change because system-level planning activities . . . involve negotiating tough questions about the problem and create solutions” (p. 50). Overall, one may have different types of collaborative relationships based on the type of collaboration they are undergoing.

Another important element that can help to determine the success of a cross-sector collaboration is what resources they have in place to deal with power imbalances. Within their own respective sectors, each partner has a certain level of autonomy and decision-making power, which may not transfer to cross-sector collaborations. Bryson et al. (2006) contend, “Power imbalances become most significant when partners have difficulty agreeing on a shared purpose” (p. 50). Another area that can affect the success of such collaborations in a way similar to power imbalances is competing institutional logics. According to Bryson et al. (2006), “Institutional logics are macro-level historical patterns, both symbolic and material, that establish the formal and informal rules of the game and provide interpretations of action” (p. 50). Some actions and logic that may seem viable from one sector’s vantage point may not be viewed in the same way from another sector’s view.

Outcomes

A priority outcome within such collaborations should be public value. The very nature of an individual’s or an entity’s need to be part of a collaborative should result in the production of public value (Bryson et al., 2006). Specifically, “Especially valuable is the creation of a ‘regime of mutual gain’ that produces widespread, lasting public benefits at reasonable cost and taps people’s deepest interest in and desire for a better world” (p. 51). Other outcomes include public value; first-, second-, and third-order effects; and resilience and resentment. According to Bryson et al. (2006),

First-order effects are immediately discernible as a direct result of the collaboration process. These include the creation of social, intellectual, and political capital; high-quality agreements; and innovative strategies. Second-order effects are likely to occur when collaboration is well under way, or else they may occur outside the formal boundaries of the effort. These might include new partnerships, coordination and joint action, joint learning that extends beyond the collaborative, implementation of agreements, changes in practices, and changes in perceptions. Finally, third-order effects may not be evident until some time later. (p. 51)

With regard to resilience and reassessment, Bryson et al. (2006) suggest that to be successful, these collaborations need to know how to rebound after failure. Rebounding in this case calls for regrouping and reassessment, instead of partnerships falling apart as a consequence. The underlying theme of this component is the need for outcomes to determine whether public value has been produced.

Accountability

Last, accountability encompasses a system that will allow partners to track inputs, processes, and outcomes. Bryson et al. (2006) suggest that such partnerships need a measurement system to document results of the partnership. Not only do they need to document results of the partnership but also they need to know how these results change over time and how they can use this information to improve the performance of the collaborative.

Framework for Successful Cross-Sector Collaborations Applied to the Florida Drug Court Model

Using Florida’s drug courts as an illustration, this section utilizes Bryson et al.’s (2006) framework to better understand how the cross-sector partnership between the courts, municipalities, and private organizations in Florida’s drug courts can document and maintain their success. This framework will allow us to examine the conditions under which this partnership initially formed, as well as recognize areas whose processes and results need to be formalized (see Figure 1). The author uses Florida’s drug courts to illustrate this framework for two reasons: (a) It is the birthplace of the modern drug court movement and (b) the author has work-related experience with this program.

Figure 1.

Bryson’s framework applied to Florida drug courts.

Initial Conditions

Overall, the initial conditions component focuses on the general environment in which collaborations occur (under what conditions). Bryson et al.’s (2006) framework speaks specifically of environmental factors, sector failure, and direct antecedents. One can argue that the Florida Drug Court model exhibits evidence of each of these initial conditions. The Florida Drug Court cross-sector collaboration initially formed due to the drug epidemic of the 1980s, overcrowding prisons, and closing of mental health facilities, all of which act as environmental factors supporting the growth of this collaboration. Both the courts as well as the treatment facilities attempted to address this problem unilaterally, but failed due to the sheer growth of the problem. In the end, knowing what conditions make such partnerships more likely to occur will allow practitioners, academics, and policy makers the foresight in such situations to know when collaborations may be useful in solving public problems.

Proposition 1: Ensure that the environment within each judicial circuit is ripe for cross-sector collaboration. The 1980s Miami drug scene provided the ideal illustration of an environment ripe for the formation of cross-sector collaborations.

Process

On implementation of drug courts in Florida’s circuit courts, the Office of the State Courts Administrator created a drug court coordinator, position to coordinate the efforts of this newly formed partnership between the courts and treatment providers. In addition, according to Florida Statutes 397.334, “Each coordinator shall provide direct support to the treatment-based drug court program by . . . providing case management, monitoring compliance of the participants in the treatment-based drug court program with court requirements, and providing program evaluation and accountability.” Most circuits also appoint a dedicated judge to the drug court dockets to maintain the program’s consistency.

The Florida Courts have created a Task Force on Treatment-Based Drug Courts to guide them in ensuring the sustainability of drug courts, maintain the appropriate scope of confidentiality in drug court cases, maintaining continuing education opportunities for drug court-team members on substance abuse issues, and develop a proposal for a statewide drug court evaluation. According to the Florida Supreme Court, this task force was designed to “make recommendations on the legal, policy, and procedural issues confronting treatment-based drug courts and explore the extent to which this concept can provide a meaningful solution to the devastating effect of substance abuse on our society” (Supreme Court of Florida, 2007). In addition, many courts, municipalities, and nonprofit treatment providers form these partnerships through both formal and informal channels. One such channel is a memorandum of understanding. The other is a contract between the courts and treatment providers. They both outline the agreement of these agencies to be lateral members of the drug court program with regard to implementation, service delivery, and continued decision-making. The Florida Supreme Court Task Force on Treatment-based Courts “Tool Kit” of recommended drug court practices are based on FL State 397.334 (2001), which specifically gives recommendations for collaborative planning and teamwork. They specifically outline, “Every drug court should formally define its mission, goals, eligibility criteria, operating procedures, and performance measures during the planning process and routinely re-evaluate them” (Florida Supreme Court Task Force on Treatment-Based Drug Courts, 2007, p. 2).

Proposition 2: Florida’s Adult Drug Court “Tool Kit” can be considered a planning tool as it provides recommendations to assist with the implementation of drug courts.

Structure and governance

The Supreme Court of Florida created a statewide drug court steering committee made up of members representing all jurisdictions within the state. Some localities, such as Palm Beach County, Florida, created their own local drug court steering committees or advisory committees “to serve as a formal group whose goal is to improve interagency partnerships and work together to develop and support drug court” (Palm Beach County, FL Drug Court Standard Operating Procedures). Such committees are charged with maintaining the quality of treatment, resources, and services available to the drug court-team program. However, such committees are not active in all jurisdictions. Furthermore, Wolfe, Guydish, and Tajima (2004) noted within their study, there was confusion about the management structure of drug court. Some respondents were even unaware of monthly management meetings, which are similar in nature to Florida’s drug court steering committees. Florida Statutes 397.334 (2001) requires that drug court programs “ . . . shall include therapeutic jurisprudence principles and adhere to the following 10 key components”:

Drug court programs integrate alcohol and other drug treatment services with justice system case processing.

Using a non-adversarial approach, prosecution and defense counsel promote public safety while protecting participant’s due process rights.

Eligible participants are identified early and promptly placed in the drug court program.

Drug court programs provide access to a continuum of alcohol, drug, and other related treatment and rehabilitation services.

Abstinence is monitored by frequent testing for alcohol and other drugs.

A coordinated strategy governs drug court program responses to participants’ compliance.

Ongoing judicial interaction with each drug court program participant is essential.

Monitoring and evaluation measure the achievement of program goals and gauge program effectiveness.

Continuing interdisciplinary education promotes effective drug court program planning, implementation, and operations.

Forging partnerships among drug courts, public agencies, and community-based organizations generates local support and enhances drug court program effectiveness.

Beyond these 10 key components, each jurisdiction has discretion over the exact structure and governance of its drug court. How these structures work in the everyday management of drug court to ensure the successful running of Florida drug courts remain unknown. They state specifically that they present recommended practices with the understanding that drug courts by their very nature are unique. Nevertheless, I would argue that despite their “unique nature,” there are components, specifically formation, structure, and processes, that need to be adopted and standardized by the Florida State Legislature.

Proposition 3: The Florida State Legislature should adopt and standardize documentation of formation, structure, and process of these partnerships.

Public and private logics about necessary actions

One can envision the situation where although these actors are asked to drop their adversarial approach, conflict still exists between public safety and client sobriety. Particularly, Lutze and Van Wormer (2007) note that the difficult part of drug court is organizing and collaborating with agencies that have a history of mistrust. What we do not know is how these agencies work through such conflict in a cross-sectoral environment. We also do not know if there are mechanisms in place to deal with such situations. Whose concerns triumph in such situations: public safety, client sobriety, or a balanced solution? The structure, processes, and inner workings of these partnerships are not formalized throughout the state of Florida, not even in the “Tool Kit.” As such, we have no way of systematically assessing or evaluating the value of these partnerships. However, just because the information is not formalized, does not mean that it is not worthy of knowing. In Wolfe et al.’s (2004) study, respondents expressed concern about the unequal status of stakeholders in discussions. In particular, they noted that the courts should have less of a leadership role and decision-making should be the result of collaboration.

Currently, the Florida Supreme Court has not issued Standard Operating Procedures for Drug Courts, but, instead relies on the 2007 Supreme Court Task Force’s “Tool Kit” of recommended practices. As these are recommendations and not mandates, we should expect a large amount of variation in exactly how these partnerships operate on a day-to-day basis. For example, Palm Beach County, Florida, is one of the counties in Florida that has created standard operating procedures for its drug court that have been documented through judicial administrative orders. Hiller et al. (2010) note, “Not having a means for systematically quantifying the level to which individual programs adhere to the key components also hinders organizational studies that may shed light on how variations in their implementation affect program effectiveness” (p. 936).

Proposition 4: Resolve differences between private and public logics about necessary actions by adopting unified statewide standard operating procedures.

Motivation for forming and sustaining these partnerships

Shaw (2003) suggests that researchers have not fully studied the circumstances under which such partnerships form or are sustained. What factors promote a municipality’s choice to collaborate with a private agency to provide drug treatment services to drug court participants? What promotes the private agency to collaborate with a municipality to provide drug treatment services? Lack of resources? Lack of expertise? Expansion of clientele? Increased revenue for service capacity? Alternatively, is it solely the commitment to both public safety and client sobriety?

Thus far, this article has provided possible reasons for forming an initial partnership, such as a need for capital, resources, and expertise. Are these reasons enough to sustain these drug court partnerships? Can we identify “the glue” that keeps these partnerships alive? Knowing this information can arm partnerships with the tools necessary to sustain such ventures, which would, in turn, decrease uncertainty and foster greater trust.

Proposition 5: Document partnership best practices from within the state that will serve as a guide for effective drug court practices.

Outcome measures: Measurement systems to document results

The Supreme Court Task Force “Tool Kit” recommends that each drug court formally define its performance measures during the planning process and routinely re-evaluate them. The Supreme Court has outlined the following as critical performance indicators and data elements for Adult Drug Courts in Florida (Florida Supreme Court Task Force on Treatment-Based Drug Courts, 2004a).

Performance indicators: Recidivism and program retention

Data elements:

total number of persons offered participation in drug court;

number of eligible persons admitted to the program;

[demographic] characteristics of persons admitted to the program;

cost of drug court operations, and the source of funding for each operational component.

Absent from this discussion is the nature of treatment received or client sobriety. Currently, based on publicly available information, there is no requirement to disclose the nature of treatment services provided or the extent of client sobriety. Beyond these elements listed above, the Florida Supreme Court does not require any other outcome or performance measures. Furthermore, as the majority of these partnerships with treatment providers are with private organizations, there is no public requirement to report any other information other than to their boards and shareholders.

Proposition 6: To strengthen the partnerships in this area, these groups should merge their respective outcome measures or come up with common measures beyond what has been provided by the Florida Supreme Court. Furthermore, the Florida Legislature should re-evaluate the use of their prescribed outcome measures.

An additional deficiency in this area is data access. According to Peyton and Gossweiler (2001), most drug courts do not have management information systems that can be tied to justice and treatment management information systems. In practice, Wolf et al.’s (2004) study participants stated that obtaining data was problematic and expressed a need for improved data systems and access. In addition, Rogers and Weber (2010) urge members of these partnerships to think harder and pay more attention to the kinds of outcomes being produced from such partnerships.

Proposition 7: Readily provide partners access to pertinent drug court data to attain more robust outcome measures. The Florida State Legislature should try to find ways to fund a statewide drug court database that will be used to track outcome measures.

Differing accountability frameworks

Public agencies are accountable to the public whereas the private treatment providers are held accountable to their clients and stakeholders. Sometimes, the goals and objectives of public agencies may be at risk when they rely on nonprofit agencies, who may not share those same goals and objectives, in such partnerships (Salamon, 1995). How do these cross-sector partnerships resolve these differences? Forrer et al. (2010) suggest that public agencies need not only be aware of the accountability mechanisms they will use for their private partners but also how they will be accountable to the private partners. Yet, the public sector needs to “play the upper hand” to ensure that public interests are met through these partnerships (Forrer et al., 2010).

Proposition 8: According to Goldsmith and Eggers (2004), it is recommended that public agencies consider: properly aligning incentives, creating routinely measured performance measures, building and sustaining trust, and appropriately sharing risk. More importantly, the state should formally prescribe these items.

How Does This Framework Help Us Understand Drug Court Effectiveness?

Overall, these components of Bryson et al.’s (2006) framework provide evidence that the Florida Drug Court Model contains elements within its cross-sector collaboration that have been shown to foster successful cross-sector partnerships. First, it calls for having a public problem that cannot be solved unilaterally. Second, it calls for such a turbulent environment that any one actor’s individual actions are insufficient to address the problem. Third, it calls for all partners in their drug court cross-sector collaboration to be lateral members of the drug court program with respect to implementation, service delivery, and continued decision-making.

To ensure continued success, there should be formalized plans for how these partners are going to manage conflict. Without systematic conflict management strategies documented through by-laws or agreements, members will deal with such issues in an ad hoc fashion. Over time, as conflict occurs there is no “formula” in place to address such issues, such unresolved/unattended conflict, especially regarding power issues, can threaten to dissolve partnerships well before the public is able to see the benefit.

In future studies, to determine whether these areas of improvement are addressed in any part during the evaluation of Florida’s Drug Courts, all published process evaluations (both professional and academic) within the state of Florida should be examined. However, this suggestion, in and of itself, presents a problem as very few process evaluations are found in this area. Nonetheless, this work is a start to merging the study of the uniqueness of the Florida Drug Court Model with respect to the role that cross-sector partnerships play in the success of the drug court model. By presenting a broad examination of Florida Drug Court’s cross-sector partnerships, using Bryson et al.’s (2006) framework for success in cross-sector collaborations, this allows for the identification of deficiencies in our understanding of these partnerships within Florida’s Drug Courts.

To appreciate these deficiencies, additional investigation into the similarities and differences between public agencies and nonprofit agencies in these areas is warranted. Gazley and Brudney (2007) provide a survey-based study on which future work in this area can be based. Specifically, they look at commonalities and differences in the goals and achievements of public–private partnerships involving local government and nonprofit organizations. Conducting such research will also allow others to examine the opportunities and challenges of public–private partnerships as seen by those involved in the partnership.

Having this information at hand can add to the existing literature regarding both cross-sector partnerships and the evaluation of drug court success. Specifically, it will add to our understanding of the role that cross-sector relationships play in the success of drug courts. For example, Nored and Carlan (2008) set out to examine the perceptions of drug court judges and administrators to examine what components of a drug court they believed made it successful. However, notably absent from their analysis was the treatment partners’ perception of these key components. Linking the work of both Gazley and Brudney (2007) about the nonprofit sector and that of Nored and Carlan (2008) about successful drug courts, future work in this area should examine the quality of the partnerships from the perspective of its partners as well as the areas of deficiency outlined in this work. Doing so may provide evidence of what role this information plays in the success of drug courts throughout the state and nationally. As a start, the state of Florida could document best practices in the area of cross-sector partnerships and drug court success and distribute them to all operating Drug Courts in the state. The greater goal within the state should be to address and formalize the components of successful cross-sector partnerships, as outlined by this application of Bryson et al.’s (2006) cross-sector collaboration framework.

Footnotes

Author’s Note

An earlier version of this article was originally presented at the Southeastern Conference for Public Administrators on September 23, 2011, in New Orleans, Louisiana.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biography

Natasha V. Christie is an assistant professor at the University of North Florida, Jacksonville where her primary studies involve the intersection of public policy/public administration and criminal justice studies. Her main areas of interest are accountability in criminal justice agencies, felon disenfranchisement, and the collateral consequences of a felony conviction.

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