Examining the Relationship Between Civil Service Commissions and Municipal Police Diversity

Abstract

Despite the widely held goal of increasing diversity in policing, police organizations have struggled to diversify. Previous research highlights the role of civilian involvement in the process by illustrating the impact of mayors and city councils on diversity in police departments. This scholarship has overlooked the important role of municipal civil service commissions, which oversee public personnel policies and set hiring standards. Research has demonstrated that some of these hiring standards disproportionately impact minority applicants. As a result, civil service commissions may be a missing link in understanding how civilian oversight can promote or impede diversification in policing. This article presents an introduction to civil service commissions and processes and illustrates their potential impact on diversity in policing. Areas for future research are discussed.

Keywords

administration community policing race research and policy

Introduction

Discussion of civilian oversight of police organizations typically concerns the role of civilian commissions in curtailing police misconduct. Despite the tendency to characterize civilian oversight in this way, several types of civilian oversight in policing are not exclusively concerned with misconduct. Civilian oversight refers to the empowerment of individuals, who are not sworn police officers, to influence or control police departmental policies and procedures (Clarke, 2009). This includes civilian influence, or control, over broad issues such as general policy directives or over specific tasks such as officer appointments. Whereas some civilian police commissions have substantial authority to set policy or to perform specific tasks, such as selecting the chief, others function in only in an advisory capacity influencing police activities through recommendations to departments (Miller & Merrick, 2002).

Some scholars extend the idea of civilian oversight beyond these types of commissions to other types of groups that may influence police departments. Bass (2000) characterizes community groups organized around particular issues, such as reduction of neighborhood violence or combating police harassment, as a form of civilian oversight. Similarly, Miller and Merrick (2002) maintains that neighborhood residents attending beat meetings in community-oriented policing efforts represent embedded civilian oversight. Both argue that these groups are a kind of civilian oversight because they influence policing policies even if they lack the power to enact departmental changes.

In contrast to these community groups, political officials and administrators often have authority to influence police organizations. Given that these individuals are external to policing organizations, they might be viewed as representing another type of civilian oversight. At the local level, mayors and city councils have substantial authority to effect policy and procedural changes in local law enforcement operations. Despite this authority, these individuals are rarely considered as part of civilian oversight. This may reflect the recognition that, although these individuals have greater authority than citizen groups, they may not oversee police operations on an ongoing basis. Despite potentially intervening only on a limited basis, a substantial body of academic work has focused on the impacts these individuals have on various aspects of policing (O’Brien, 2003; Saltzstein, 1989; Zhao, He, & Lovrich, 2005; Zhao & Lovrich, 1998).

Another way in which civilians impact police department policies and procedures results from the classification of police officers as civil service employees. Designed to insulate government employees from politics, employment and promotion in civil service positions is awarded through defined merit processes. These processes, including the rules that determine which candidates are ineligible for hiring, are promulgated and maintained by civil service commissions or boards. Like most public commissions, these commissions are made up of civilians (Dougherty & Easton, 2011). These civilians wield authority to directly influence the nature and implementation of administrative procedures (Kellough & Selden, 2003). Thus, based on both influence and authority, civil service commissions may be viewed as a form of civilian oversight in policing. However, few researchers have characterized civil services commissions as oversight, and little consideration has been given to the impact of this type of civilian influence on police organizations. This is an interesting limitation given the general debate surrounding many civil service issues.

Despite the goal of insulating employees from politics, management of civil service is a highly politicized endeavor. Advocates for strong civil service regulation assert that merit processes exclude favoritism and the legal protections given to civil service employees ensure job stability in times of political upheaval. In contrast, critics challenge civil service processes by asserting that many civil service rules tie the hands of public organization managers creating inefficiency, protecting poorly performing employees, and limiting the ability to accomplish organizational goals (McGrath, 2013).

Within this overarching debate over merit-based civil service systems, civil service commissions must balance a variety of conflicting interests, including the administrative needs of the public organizations they oversee, issues of equal employment and pay equity, issues involving unions and union contracts, and the needs of the general public served by public organizations (S. W. Hays & Kearney, 1995). Individual civil service commissions navigate this continual conflict by adjudicating between often mutually exclusive values (Kellough & Selden, 2003). This process results in policies and decisions that reflect the greater political environment in which civil service commissions operate (Waldinger, 1994). As a result, civil service rules and processes vary between jurisdictions. Whereas some commissions may exert substantial power or operate in climates conducive to change, others may have less influence or limited ability to alter previously set guidelines. Despite this variation, inadequate attention has been paid to the effect of civil service commissions on the composition of municipal police organizations.

Police officers are civil service employees in many jurisdictions, and the hiring of officers is typically accomplished through a process defined by the local civil service commission (Bradley, 2005). Civil service commissions control hiring practices of police organizations by managing the rules and testing procedures that are used to disqualify applicants. Although many of the criteria and testing procedures being used are readily accepted by municipalities, a developing body of research suggests that some of these processes may have negative consequences. The tests themselves may disproportionally disqualify Black applicants due to potential bias in instrumentation (Ho, 2005; Riccucci & Riccardelli, 2014).

Civil service rules may disproportionally disqualify Black applicants by establishing requirements that may reflect underlying social disparity (Kringen & Kringen, 2015). For example, civil service commissions may adopt rules related to applicants’ criminal histories or financial backgrounds based on beliefs that applicants’ possessing negative histories should not be police officers. Criminal background rules may disproportionately affect minority applicants, who experience disproportionate minority contact as youth, whereas financial rules may disproportionately affect minority applicants, who are more likely to have faced financial difficulty. The disproportionate disqualification of minority candidates can prohibit individuals from entering the profession; thus, it may inhibit police organizations’ ability to diversify.

The impact of this disparity is troubling, as diversity is an important goal for police organizations. Because a racially diverse police force indicates a commitment to social justice, diversity in policing fosters perceptions of legitimacy (Raganella & White, 2004). Furthermore, greater diversity in policing increases cultural participation in the policing process and helps develop representative bureaucracy (Sun & Payne, 2004; Theobald & Haider-Markel, 2009). Representative bureaucracy, where public agencies mirror the society they serve, is an often cited organizational goal because diverse public-sector organizations are believed to be important to a well-functioning democracy (Mosher, 1982; A. E. Smith & Monaghan, 2013; Van Riper, 1958). Representative bureaucracy is believed to be essential to legitimizing power within a bureaucracy because it demonstrates equal access to power, value for differential expertise and experience, a reflection of group preferences, and the willingness of groups to participate in the bureaucratic process (Kennedy, 2012; Rourke, 1978; Selden, 1997).

Beyond these underlying social goals, advocates of diversification assert that diversity in policing delivers operational advantages. Evidence of this phenomenon is mixed. While some research suggests that greater minority representation in policing reduces community tensions (O’Brien, 2003; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993), other studies suggest that minority officers are just as likely to elicit community complaints (Pate & Fridell, 1993). Some evidence suggests that diversity aids in the successful implementation of community policing strategies, particularly in areas where traditional policing strategies have been ineffective (Viverette, 2005). However, other studies suggest that minority officers actually get less cooperation from minority citizens than White officers (Mastrofski, Snipes, & Supina, 1996). The contradictory evidence is sometimes viewed as demonstrating that minority officers do not differ from White officers when performing their jobs; however, this position may overstate the evidence.

Currently, the conflicting evidence suggests that the actual operational benefits of utilizing minority officers in predominantly minority communities are unclear (Sklansky, 2006). Recent research suggests that diversity in police organizations may have an impact on community police relations, but that effect may be tempered at the individual level by the contextualized nature of policing (Brunson & Gau, 2015). Brunson and Gau (2015) state that a diverse police force may aid in community relations generally, but that the race of an individual officer may have little bearing on citizens’ perceptions of their interactions during police–citizen encounters particularly in encounters that result in arrests. This effect may be amplified given evidence that minority officers more often work in socially disordered, high-crime areas (Brunson & Gau, 2015; Fyfe, 1981; Weitzer, 2010).

In contrast, Theobald and Haider-Markel (2009) find that citizens’ perceptions of the legitimacy of stops, as well as searches, depend on the race of both the citizen and the police officer. Interestingly, the race of the police officer had an effect on the perceived legitimacy for both Black and White citizens. Black citizens were more likely to believe that the police officer’s actions were appropriate if the officer was Black, and White officers were more likely to believe that the police officer’s actions were appropriate if the officer was White. Thus, individual-level sentiments about police legitimacy may be affected by representativeness.

Although the social push toward diversity in policing is well detailed, increased diversity in policing has been difficult to achieve. Previous research has focused attention on the ways that civilian involvement, including the influence of the mayor and city councils, has affected diversity in policing (O’Brien, 2003; Saltzstein, 1989; Zhao & Lovrich, 1998). However, little acknowledgment has been given to the effects that civil service commissions may have on police diversity. Considering that the procedures and requirements related to the hiring of officers are defined by civil service boards rather than by police departments themselves, this is an interesting limitation.

Given that police agencies are civil service organizations and police employment standards are largely controlled by municipal civil service commissions, civil service commissions likely play an important role in defining police organizations’ ability to diversify. This essay explores unaddressed questions about the interaction between civil service commissions and police diversity. First, an overview of the history, function, and political reception of civil service systems and commissions is presented for context. Next, issues of police diversity are explored. The applicant screening process, typically defined by civil service commissions, is presented, and the link between civil service commissions and potentially problematic hiring processes is explained. Finally, promising areas for future research on civil service and police diversity are identified.

Civil Service Systems and Commissions

Civil service systems are personnel systems in which some important decisions about hiring, firing, and promotion are made by an external commission rather than by the employing agency itself. Civil service systems are a distinct feature of the public sector and have no equivalents in the private sector (Frant, 1993). Individuals who serve on these commissions are typically volunteers appointed by the mayor (Dougherty & Easton, 2011). Often, these individuals set and maintain public hiring rules.

History of Civil Service

Prior to the adoption of civil service in the United States, government employment at the federal, state, and municipal levels was characterized by the patronage or spoils system. Described as “replete with ‘spoils’ and rotation of public jobs among the plebeian masses” (McGrath, 2013, p. 639), the patronage system in the 19th century was defined by politicians directly controlling public employment. These politicians distributed jobs to loyal supporters, often firing previous public employees when elected to reward campaign supporters.

Reformers advocated for merit-based civil service as a normative move toward good government (Hoogenboom, 1961; Johnson & Libecap, 1994; Van Riper, 1958). They advocated for a system modeled on the Weberian Prussian and British systems that restricted the powers of elected officials limiting nepotism and favoritism in hiring and promotion (Frant, 1993; McGrath, 2013). In 1883, federal government passed the Pendleton Act adopting a merit system. The act included two key provisions. The first established the principle of merit-based recruiting based on competitive examinations, and the second prohibited the firing or demotion of employees for political reasons (Griffith, 1974; White, 1949).

After the federal adoption of a merit system, many state and local jurisdictions followed suit. Despite beliefs that merit systems could create neutral competence and that a true political/administrative dichotomy could exist (Kaufman, 1956; Wilson, 1887), the political processes surrounding state and local adoptions suggested that public employment would always be regulated by an environment of conflict. While reformers sought merit systems for moral reasons, economic and political forces largely influenced the process (Shafritz & Hyde, 2007). In many cases, politically dominant groups supported merit systems to maintain status, to insulate policy or economic gains, and to protect political advantage (S. P. Hays, 1974; Ting, Snyder, Hirano, & Folke, 2012; Weinstein, 1968). Likewise, dominant Anglo-American groups embraced the merit system, establishing civil service rules that were difficult for other groups to meet (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Waldinger, 1994). Thus, many of the underlying issues that influenced the debate over adopting merit-based civil service continued to influence the civil service process after merit systems were in place (Shafritz & Hyde, 2007).

As merit-based civil service became more common, public employment became synonymous with merit, resulting in the belief that a merit system was essential for government performance (Kellough & Nigro, 2006; Selden, 2006). Consequently, the merit system became institutionalized as a necessary component within the traditional model of public administration (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). This tendency is clearly reflected in jurisdictions where previously enacted civil service rules are viewed as necessary by public agencies despite later commissions dropping the requirements from their personnel rules (see, for example, Riccucci & Riccardelli, 2014).

Criticism, Reform, and Political Tension

Despite the institutionalization of the merit system in public employment, the debate continued. Critics asserted that mandatory merit systems tied the hands of managers and contributed to waste and procedural delays, especially at the municipal level (McGrath, 2013). By the 1970s, frustration with poor government performance was often attributed to the merit system, and the Carter administration responded by supporting the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA; Argyle, 1982; Pfiffner & Brook, 2000). Passed by Congress in 1978, CSRA sought to improve federal civil service while preserving the merit system through new management tools including performance review and merit pay (Bach, 1977; Finkle, 1977).

Even after the reforms, public-sector managers continued to express negative sentiments about civil service hiring standards indicating that they rendered agencies unable to hire qualified individuals who met organizational needs (Frant, 1993). Furthermore, state and local merit-based systems not affected by CSRA continued to control public employment in most jurisdictions. However, by the mid-1990s, the new public management approach, which was defined by the concept of reinventing government, gained traction (Battaglio & Condrey, 2006). Whereas the merit system was characterized by closed bureaucracies governed by rules, paperwork, and rigid proceduralism (Maranto & Condrey, 2001), new public management emphasized productivity, a service orientation, and accountability (Kettl, 2000; Pfiffner, 1997; Shafritz & Hyde, 2007).

One component of these reforms was altering the personnel systems that defined merit-based civil service. This involved moving toward at-will employment removing many employee rights procedures. Moving away from employee protections was an attempt to provide managers effective tools to manage employees (Battaglio & Condrey, 2009). Critics contend that these changes resulted in an outright demolition of job security in the public sector (Battaglio & Condrey, 2006); however, public-sector unions continued to be a strong force. Although not all jurisdictions underwent radical reform and many merit systems remained unchanged, the environment and rhetoric of radical change polarized the environment in which intact civil service commissions operated.

Police Diversity

Lack of diversity in police departments is an ongoing issue in the United States. Recently, this issue became a topic of interest in mainstream media after the shooting of an unarmed teenager by a White police officer in Ferguson, Missouri. Although two thirds of the residents in Ferguson are Black, there are only three Black police officers among the 53 officers in the Ferguson Police Department (Lowrey, Leonnig, & Berman, 2014). Ferguson Police Department is not an anomaly. Of 755 cities, where the U.S. Census had data on police officers, 75% of the cities had a higher percentage of White police officers than the percent of White residents in the city’s population. In some of the cities, the difference between the racial composition of the police department and the community was quite large; in 52 of the cities, the percentage of White police officers was 3 to 5 times greater than the percent of White residents. (Keating, Badger, & Elliot, 2014). This underrepresentation has been highlighted as one of the issues that led to community mistrust in police.

Some research supports this perspective. Blacks have disproportionate contact with police as Blacks are more likely to be stopped and are more likely to be arrested (Gelman, Fagan, & Kiss, 2007; Parker, Stultz, & Rice, 2005). Thus, mistrust of police among the Black community may result from disproportionate contact, which primarily involves interaction with White officers (Weitzer, Tuch, & Skogan, 2008). Similarly, critics assert that police legitimacy may be related to representativeness and that representativeness may be an important aspect in reducing community tensions (O’Brien, 2003; Raganella & White, 2004). These arguments are consistent with community accountability theory (Reiss, 1971), which asserts that hiring more Black officers will reduce hostility between Black citizens and the police thereby improving police–community relationships (Decker & Smith, 1980; Greene, 2004; Kelly & West, 1973; Mast, 1970; B. W. Smith & Holmes, 2003). Although the effects of diversifying police organizations are not clear, diversification has become an important social goal.

As recently as the 1960s, police organizations were typically characterized by exclusively White male workforces. Since that time, policing has grown much more diverse (Sklansky, 2006). In 2007, Black officers made up 11.9% of all sworn police officers compared with 13.6% of the total population. In contrast, White officer made up 74.7% of all sworn police officers compared with 63.7% of the total population (Hixson, Hepler & Kim, 2011; Reaves, 2010). Recent estimates indicate that Black representation has not increased since then despite approximately 27% of all full-time police officers being members of a racial or ethnic minority as of 2013 (Reaves, 2015).

Although this indicates an increase in diversity since the 1960s, three issues remain. First, policing has yet to achieve a proportional representation of Black officers (Reaves, 2010; Sklansky, 2006). Second, although Blacks increased their representation in policing between the 1960s and the late 1980s, in recent years the progress has stalled. Black officers made up 11.3% of the nation’s police force in 2000 indicating only a limited increase in representation since then (Reaves, 2010). Third, the nature of Black representation in policing may be misrepresented by aggregate statistics (Morabito & Shelley, 2015; Walker, 1985). Black representation varies remarkably between agencies. Although some agencies are representative, others employ no or few Black officers (Jordan, Fridell, Faggiani, & Kubu, 2009). This indicates that improvements in police diversity have varied between departments, and there is substantial progress left to be made (Sklansky, 2006).

Black representativeness varies between departments based on size and location (Reaves, 2012). In smaller agencies, like the Ferguson Police Department, Maple Heights (Ohio) Police Department, and Dougasville (Georgia) Police Department, Black police officers are more likely to be underrepresented than in larger police departments (Ashkenas & Park, 2015; Reaves & Hickman, 2002). Suburban and independent cities have significantly lower representation of Black officers, whereas more populous cities have had greater success hiring Black police officers (O’Brien, 2003). The recent media spotlight on Ferguson has prompted other areas to reconsider the demographic makeup of their departments, especially smaller departments within larger Black communities (Rice & Rizzo, 2014).

Another issue affecting diversification is the changing legal environment in which police organizations exist. Legislation, executive orders, and judicial decisions have compelled departments to diversify. The 1964 Civil Rights Act, Executive Order 11246 in 1965, and the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act formed the legal foundation for affirmative action programs and subsequent legal challenges (Morabito & Shelley, 2015). Based on the legislation and governing case law, agencies of federal, state, and local governments must pursue a good faith effort to remove unnecessary barriers to minority progress and enhance the involvement of historical victims of discrimination in the public workforce. Importantly, a large portion of adjudication of affirmative action law has involved equal employment opportunity issues in law enforcement, and many legal actions have resulted in consent decrees requiring departments to change their procedures (Lovrich, Steel, & Hood, 1986). As a result, departments and civil service commissions have attempted to rework hiring practices to reduce disparate impact on minority groups or to ensure that any hiring requirement that disproportionately impacts minority groups tests for bona fide occupational qualities that are necessary to successfully complete job tasks (Morabito & Shelley, 2015). Although affirmative action programs had a strong early effect on diversity in policing, evidence suggests that this effect has plateaued (Reaves, 2010).

Police departments nationwide have attempted, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to diversify (Weitzer, 2000). However, despite the push for diversity in police agencies, agencies struggle to successfully hire minority officers (Shusta, Levine, Harris, & Wong, 1995). As a result, many local police forces do not reflect the demographics of their communities (Sklansky, 2006). Scholars have attempted to understand this phenomenon related to Black representativeness by exploring individual-level and institutional-level factors that may keep Black individuals from pursing policing careers.

Individual-level explanations suggest that the lack of diversity in policing may result from cultural and historical issues that influence individual perceptions of police. This may manifest as a lack of interest in the profession. For example, Blacks may choose not to become police officers due to perceptions that the profession is hostile toward them (Kenney & McNamara, 1999). In contrast, institutional explanations suggest that the organizational culture within police departments may influence the level of Black representation. This may relate to issues that create perceptions of institutionalized racism (Shusta et al., 1995) such as strained race relations within the department (Holdaway, 1991), few Black role models within the department (Milgram, 2002), the lack of a Black chief (Zhao et al., 2005; Zhao & Lovrich, 1998), or the lack of features indicating that the department is committed to diversity such as targeted recruiting practices (Jordan et al., 2009).

Although individual- and institutional-level factors may explain a lack of diversity in police organizations, some researchers have considered the possibility that various forms of civilian involvement in the administration of police organizations may impact representativeness in the field. There have been two approaches to this issue. The first focuses on the impact of the mayor, and the second focuses on the impact of city councils, both of whom have authority to influence department policies. Greater representation of Black officers within the police department has been attributed to the presence of a Black mayor (Saltzstein, 1989). Likewise, an increased proportion of Black city council members has been related to higher proportion of Black officers (O’Brien, 2003). Although these findings suggest that civilian involvement does play a role in police diversity, there is mixed evidence for this conclusion. Specifically, civilian oversight through political channels may not impact representation of minority officers within police departments because newly elected officials may not have the institutional knowledge and political power necessary to produce conclusive results (O’Brien, 2003; Zhao et al., 2005).

Civil Service Rules, Applicant Screening, and Diversity in Policing

Although minority mayors and more racially diverse city councils may relate to higher levels of minority representation on police forces, the limitations noted for each of these forms of civilian oversight reflect the fact that they affect diversity within police departments in indirect ways (Zhao et al., 2005). In contrast, by controlling personnel practices, civil service commissions exert a direct influence. As civil service rules used to select candidates specifically control who can and cannot be hired, civil service commissions exert much greater influence on overall representativeness within police departments than other forms of civilian involvement.

The selection and hiring processes for police applicants in many jurisdictions are defined by the civil service commission. Typically, the adopted process involves a multiple hurdles approach where a variety of tests are used to isolate the best candidates from an available pool of applicants (Sanders, 2008). Applicants must successfully pass a variety of tests to be hired (Cavanagh, 2004). Although individual departments’ screening processes vary, most civil service commissions have adopted similar requirements and established analogous tests to determine applicant suitability (Hickman & Reaves, 2006). Despite the ubiquitous nature of this approach, there is little consensus as to what defines good officers and even less consensus on whether the screening processes predict these qualities (Sanders, 2008). Because the multiple hurdles system is a “selecting out” approach, it precludes individuals from demonstrating their ability to do the job, and, without altering employment requirements, the validity of the selection criteria can be difficult to evaluate (Scrivner, 2006).

Although several court cases have demonstrated the disparate impact of many civil service tests (see, for example, Berkman v. City of New York, 1982; Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 1979), less academic attention has been focused on these issues. However, a developing body of research suggests that police employment screening and the associated tests may pose significant barriers to diversity (Ho, 2005; Kringen & Kringen, 2015; O’Brien, 2003; Riccucci & Riccardelli, 2014). For example, written examinations have been shown to disproportionately affect Black applicants (Riccucci & Riccardelli, 2014). As Ho (2005) notes, “The primary race-related controversy in the police selection process focuses on the adverse impact of testing instruments on racial minority applicants due to their socioeconomic constraints” (p. 456).

Beyond potential bias in testing instruments, civil service employment rules may also restrict diversity in policing. An integral part of the screening process involves establishing the applicant’s previous criminal history. This is accomplished through application materials, background investigations, and polygraph examinations. Once established, an applicant’s criminal history is referenced against a standardized set of rules adopted by the civil service commission. The rules establish the limits of previous criminal activity that are allowable among applicants. Exhibiting a criminal history that extends beyond these accepted standards results in disqualification from the process.

Research has shown that a disproportionate number of Black applicants are disqualified from the process due to criminal history, even for minor offending (Kringen & Kringen, 2015). This is particularly problematic in light of research that suggests that Blacks may demonstrate more recorded criminal history simply as a reflection of their greater risk of being stopped or arrested (Parker, Stults, & Rice, 2005; Warren, Tomaskovic-Devey, Smith, Zingraff, & Mason, 2006; Welch, 2007).

Civil service rules on other issues such as employment history and financial responsibility may also disproportionately affect minority applicants (Kringen & Kringen, 2015). The number of departments using some type of credit check has substantially increased in recent years (Hickman & Reaves, 2006) despite the ongoing documentation of financial hardships and workplace challenges faced by minority groups (Rothstein & Wonzy, 2013; Westin & Pettit, 2005). Thus, the presence of these civil service rules may pose barriers to diversity in police departments illustrating the importance of civil service boards’ role in the diversification process.

Future Research on Civil Service and Police Diversity

As many police departments follow the civil service rules in their hiring and promotional processes, it is important to understand the impact of civil service processes on minority hiring. Despite the direct involvement of civil service boards in establishing police personnel policies, no research has evaluated the impact of civil service boards on diversity in police organizations. Underscoring this issue is the general lack of scholarship on municipal civil service boards (see, for example, Dougherty & Easton, 2011). Given the history of civil service, the recent environment of radical reform, and the ideological disputes that may impact the function of civil service, there are important implications for future research.

Understanding Municipal Civil Service Boards

In contrast to federal civil service, which has received substantial academic attention, little work has been conducted on civil service at a municipal level. Significant variation between municipal civil service boards exists, yet there is inadequate understanding of the operations and authority of individual boards to establish what is and is not common. Furthermore, almost no research has focused on the municipal civil service boards themselves. According to Dougherty and Easton (2011), “the absence of research in this area leaves us not knowing . . . what they do, who serves on them, and what effect they have on administrative processes” (p. 520).

Given the likely variation in responsibility, authority, political orientation, and membership between municipalities, this lack of knowledge is problematic. There are several ways in which this limitation affects the state of knowledge about policing. Presently, the exact number of municipalities that employ a civil service board is unknown. As a result, it is unclear how many police agencies are regulated by civil service boards. Furthermore, the level of authority held by these boards is also unknown, making it difficult to understand their impact on issues such as diversity in policing.

Variation in Municipal Civil Service Boards’ Potential Effect on Police Diversity

Previous research has linked diversity in policing to the presence of a minority mayor or to diversity in city council membership. The composition of municipal civil service commissions may be important in understanding diversity in policing. Given the limited scholarship presently available, understanding police diversity and its relationship to the composition of local civil service boards is an important task. The variation in composition of civil service boards may relate to a variety of issues that impact diversity goals. Although some civil service commissions may embrace changes, such as adopting affirmative action–based hiring or the movement to oral boards to assess applicant qualities not typically measured by written tests, other civil service commissions may resist change and hold closely to previously established rules. Furthermore, as civil service commissioners are typically volunteers, many lack the experience or training to consider complex issues such as equal opportunity hiring rules, testing in the context of bona fide occupational qualities, and public liability. The impact of commission membership on police departments’ ability to diversity needs exploration.

In contrast, several jurisdictions today do not have civil service personnel systems. Questions about diversity in these jurisdictions also merit exploration. Particularly salient is the question of whether or not jurisdictions without civil service commissions are able to adopt changes in personnel policy more easily than jurisdiction under civil service. Furthermore, have these jurisdictions outpaced civil service jurisdictions in moving toward diversity? Because of a tendency to focus on the federal government when studying civil service, little information about these local processes is available. Finally, there is no relevant literature on police diversity in these jurisdictions.

Diversity in Policing in the Context of Modern (Radical) Civil Service Reform

Although most literature on modern service civil service reform has assessed the effects of reform (see, for example, Bowman & West, 2006; Crowell & Guy, 2010; Goodman & French, 2011; Green, Forbis, Golden, Nelson, & Robinson, 2006; Nigro & Kellough, 2008; Williams & Bowman, 2007), including the impact of civil service reform on employee performance and morale, delivery of public service, citizen trust in government, and due process in employment issues, none of this research has focused on policing. Considering that certain civil service processes may function to maintain the status quo and impose barriers to diversity, there is cause to believe that civil service reform may serve to increase diversity in policing. However, given research that suggests that minority applicants are more motivated by the security of civil service rather than the idea of policing itself (Alex, 1976), it is possible that civil service reform may actually reduce diversity in policing. This possibility of opposite effects of civil service reform needs exploration.

Civil service reform in the United States reflects its federalist system. As a result, modern civil service reform is a collection of individual efforts. This has resulted in a variety of different reforms that vary at each level of government and across jurisdictions. Although the public personnel literature has articulated a need for evaluation of these reforms (Condrey, 2002; Kellough & Nigro, 2002; West, 2002), little attention has been focused on policing. Understanding the nature of these reforms in the context of policing is essential considering that jurisdictions may change personnel policies with only limited understanding of the impact that may incur.

Conclusion

Several studies have focused on the relationship between various types of civilian involvement and police diversity (O’Brien, 2003; Zhao et al., 2005; Zhao & Lovrich, 1998). These studies have found that the race of a mayor or the composition of city council can have an effect on municipal police diversity. While these findings indicate that indirect influences affect representativeness in police departments, civil service commissions play a direct role by setting the rules that impact who police departments can and cannot hire. Thus, municipal civil service commissions may directly influence diversity in municipal police departments.

Although merit-based civil service ideally removes bias from the hiring process, the history, reform, and conflict surrounding civil service suggest that civil service processes may be less than ideal. The rule-based merit system was created as an improvement over the previously existing patronage system; however, the adoption of merit-based civil service has allowed some groups of individuals to implement hiring rules that help them maintain status and power, at times by directly excluding others. In contrast, some civil service commissions may pass rules with best intentions but lack adequate understanding of the potentially negative impacts. Therefore, the relationship between civil service commissions and police diversity warrants further exploration.

Several ways that civil service commissions may impact police diversity need to be considered. While the impact of the presence or absence of a civil service commission on police diversity has yet to be established, given variation between municipal civil service commissions, several key questions focus on differences between municipalities where civil service commissions control police hiring rules. Particularly salient is the question about who serves on civil service commissions. Representative bureaucracy underlies claims that diversity in policing results in greater police legitimacy. Similarly, questions about the impact of the representative bureaucracy in civil service commissions should be answered. Specifically, does the composition of municipal civil service commissions affect levels or rates of diversification in municipal departments? How does representativeness on civil service commissions relate to diversity within the jurisdiction, and does the composition of civil service commissions buffer the effects of other types of civic diversity on diversity in policing? Finally, which civil service rules or processes create barriers to diversification?

If civil service rules limit racial diversity, they may also limit other types of diversity in police employment including the representation of women. Beyond demographics, it is important to also consider the possibility that these rules may affect diversity in other contexts. As healthy organizations are defined by diversity of perspective and variety in thought, understanding the impact of structural factors such as civil service rules on institutionalized values and homogeneity is imperative. Civil service commissions and the personnel rules that they promulgate may represent an important piece of the puzzle that challenges public organizations’, such as police departments, ability to adapt to the needs of a changing society.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biography

Anne Li Kringen is an assistant professor of criminal justice at the University of New Haven. Her research focuses on structural impediments to change in police organizations. Her recent research has been published in Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice and Feminist Criminology.

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