Beyond Panic: Variation in the Legislative Activity for Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Across States Over Time

Abstract

Nationwide moral panic has long served as a primary explanation for sex offense laws. These laws, however, remain primarily left to state legislatures, which implies potential variation in their content over time. Variation in legislative content, to the degree that it represents implementation, not only suggests differential consequences for registrants and communities, but also it would raise questions to the sufficiency of moral panic as a sole explanation for sex offense policy change. I build upon earlier work by exploring variation in the content and timing of sex offender registration and notification (SORN) reform in all 50 states over time. After documenting variation in these laws, I present the ways in which SORN legislative content has evolved differently across states. In addition, the timing of legislative reforms differed not only across states but also within states over time. These findings have implications for existing theoretical assertions regarding criminal justice policy.

Keywords

sex offender registration and notification sex offense laws criminal justice policy policy change mixed method

For decades, legislators have enacted various laws against offender populations deemed to pose the greatest threat to their electorates, particularly the sexual victimization of children. From this perceived threat, myths have emerged that applied various inaccurate and exaggerated beliefs about sex offending (Sample & Kadleck, 2008). According to many scholars of sex offense policies, sex offending myths have contributed to a sex crime panic (Jenkins, 1998; Zgoba, 2004) that seems to be persistent over time (Burchfield, Sample, & Lytle, 2014). Consequently, policy makers have championed sex offense legislation in an effort to respond to growing public fears and media coverage about sexual victimization (Sample & Kadleck, 2008). Much of the research on sex offense laws has focused on the consequences of sex offense laws on registrants, communities, and the criminal justice system itself, especially at the federal level. Although federal laws have certainly been key to understanding shifts in our societal responses to sex crimes, sex offender registration and notification (SORN) laws have been primarily state-specific policies. One would expect, then, significant variation in the content of these laws across states. Variation in the content of SORN laws across states, to the degree that statutory content reflects implementation, could indicate differential consequences for both registrants and communities.

Although some research has identified variation in the presence and composition of these laws across states (Lytle, 2015; Mancini, Barnes, & Mears, 2013), there has not yet been a comprehensive analysis of variation in the content of SORN laws both nationwide and over time. Until this variation over time has been identified, we must continue to assume variation in these laws when designing and pursuing research questions relating to lawmaking and innovation. As noted above, existing explanations typically identify events situated in a social moment, such as nationally covered sex crimes, as integral to the rise and persistence of sex offense laws. An analysis of legislative content across all states over time, then, would not only establish and describe the variation in SORN laws assumed in current research, but it may also contribute to the investigation of policy processes underlying sex offense laws and criminal justice policy.

In this study, I expanded upon Lytle’s (2015) exploration of variation in the content of SORN laws nationwide over time. I used a sequential exploratory mixed-methodological approach, incorporating both thematic content analysis and longitudinal multilevel modeling to identify differences in how states use registration and public notification statutes to respond to concerns about sex crime. The variation in legislative content and action speaks to the existing theoretical assertions about punitiveness and policy responses to sex offenses (e.g., sex crime panics; Jenkins, 1998; Zgoba, 2004) as well as criminal justice policy more generally (e.g., New Penology; Cheliotis, 2004; Feeley & Simon, 1992) by identifying supporting anomalous evidence in relation to these theories. These findings, therefore, not only contribute to how we understand changes in statewide responses to sex offending over time but also the application and generation of theory to explain state-level responses to crime.

Defining Policy Change and Justifications for Its Study

In the field of criminology and criminal justice, policy change has received little attention, especially when compared with studies of policy consequences and adoption (Garland, 2013; Lytle, 2015). To the degree that policy represents a societal response to some socially identified problem, policy change could indicate some combination of a shift in the goals for the policy, a change in the problem that policy is intended to address, or an evolution in the public attitudes surrounding the propriety of the policy’s implementation. If we consider the typical process by which policy maturates,¹ policy change may also represent practical inefficiencies (e.g., difficulty in implementation) or mistaken theoretical applications (e.g., problem identification or consideration of policy options).

Much of the existing literature on criminal justice policy change has focused on the impetus for or consequences of legislative reforms. For example, researchers that have investigated criminal justice responses to drug crime have attributed expanding drug war policies (e.g., three-strikes laws) to growing public anxiety about drug-related crime (Farraiolo, 2014; Hawdon, 2001; Hill, Oliver, & Marion, 2012; Meier, 1992; Omori, 2013; Wozniak, 2016). Furthermore, drug policy scholars have noted unintended consequences for offenders and communities (e.g., prison overcrowding, impact on families, etc.; Engen & Steen, 2000; Lutman, Lynch, & Monk-Turner, 2015). More recently, scholars have begun to question the longevity of drug war policies (Scherlen, 2012). Within this literature, the mechanisms and implications of change to the content of drug war policies have received relatively little attention.

Despite our tendency to focus on widespread policy reforms, criminal justice policy change actually refers to a more specific and localized political behavior. In particular, policy change includes revisions made to the content of the law as well as adjustments made by implementers to respond to some obstacle when putting the law into effect (Lytle, 2015). Whereas change in the implementation of a criminal justice policy represents a change in the reality of a response to crime, change to the content of these laws would indicate a shift in the policy’s ideal or intention. Both forms of policy change pose important implications for societal responses to crime and the meaning we ascribe to such responses. Furthermore, investigation into the reality of law allows researchers to understand the ways in which society actually does criminal justice, whereas the ideal of the law focuses on the intentions of lawmakers and, by extension, their represented publics. Certainly, to generate accurate explanations of how and why society responds to crime, we need both the reality (i.e., how) and the ideal (i.e., why).

To contribute a starting point for a broader academic conversation on criminal justice policy change, this study analyzed change in the content of SORN laws across all 50 U.S. states over time. SORN laws were selected for this study for two reasons. First, SORN laws are not only present in every state, they have been established for at least two decades in most states (Evans, Lytle, & Sample, 2015; Mancini et al., 2013). This was preferable for a study of policy change as it removed the need to account for the lack of policy adoption processes at the state level. Second, SORN laws have an existing body of literature regarding several aspects of the policy process (Jenkins, 1998; Mancini et al., 2013; Zgoba, 2004), expansion (Levenson, Ackerman, Socia, & Harris, 2013; Zgoba et al., 2015), and consequences (Jennings, Zgoba, & Tewksbury, 2012; Levenson & Cotter, 2005; Ragusa-Salerno & Zgoba, 2012; Sample, Evans, & Anderson, 2011). This literature served as a guide for my analysis of state-level legislative change. In particular, existing research on SORN laws (and sex offense laws more broadly) have pointed to rising public anxieties regarding sexual victimization as key to the development and popularity of these laws (Anderson & Sample, 2008; Burchfield et al., 2014; Jenkins, 1998; Sample et al., 2011; Zgoba, 2004). In combination with other, broader explanations of policy change, there already exists a body of literature to inform my analysis of change in the content of SORN laws over time.

Explanations of Change to Sex Offense Laws

The most popular explanation for the evolution of sex offense laws has been that these laws were a legislative response to moral panics (e.g., Meloy, Saleh, & Wolff, 2007). Moral panics are by definition exaggerated, sporadic, and episodic (Cohen, 2002; Garland, 2008; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009; Young, 2009). In its application to law, this framework considers policy to be an official response to public anxieties (Cohen, 2002; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009). Once policy actors become aware of the public’s concerns, they adopt (or reform) laws to demonstrate their responsiveness to public fears. These responses have often taken the form of “knee-jerk” legislation due to the sporadic nature of moral panics. In addition, due to the exaggerated nature of moral panics, panic-driven policies have been more inclined toward symbolic rather than instrumental motives. Scholars have identified clear connections between sex offense policies and moral panics (Meloy et al., 2007). The exponential growth of sex offense policies since the 1980s has been attributed to a series of nationwide sex crime panics (Craun & Theriot, 2009; Jenkins, 1998; Zgoba, 2004). Consequently, legislation passed in response to sex crime panics has not only occurred in a knee-jerk fashion (Wright, 2015; Zgoba, 2004), but they also appear to be primarily symbolic in nature, with an emphasis on government attention to public safety (Meloy, Curtis, & Boatwright, 2013a, 2013b; Sample et al., 2011; Sample & Kadleck, 2008).

Although moral panic frameworks were initially used to explain the widespread adoption and popularity of sex offense laws, I argue here that such explanations are limited in their application to sex offense policy change. First, by definition, moral panics should be brief and sporadic (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009). However, the sex crime panic linked to consistent public attention (Burchfield et al., 2014) and legislative action (Lytle, 2015) in sex offense policies seems to stray from this traditional definition. Second, the burgeoning field of policy sciences (e.g., political science, public administration; Smith & Larimer, 2009) demonstrate a more complicated process for policy adoption and reform than responding to public sentiments alone (Sabatier, 2007; Smith & Larimer, 2009). Third, policy change may occur with little to no public attention (Lytle, 2015). Considering the emphasis moral panic frameworks place on public opinion and attention, policy change without public attention would not fit within the framework of panic-driven policy. Although moral panic may provide important information in understanding sex offense policy processes, it seems logical to conclude that moral panics are not sufficient for explaining policy change. Therefore, we must consider other explanations, perhaps in addition to moral panic, when examining the factors contributing to sex offense policy processes.

The policy sciences have provided other explanations for change in sex offense laws using a variety of theories related to the policy process (Lytle, 2015). For example, punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) has indicated that policy change typically takes the form of incremental adjustments (i.e., policy equilibrium), punctuated occasionally by periods of abrupt yet dramatic policy action (i.e., policy punctuations; Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). Policy punctuations arise when policy actors change the framing of key policy issues presented to the public.

On its face, PET seems a good fit for policy change in SORN laws, especially prior to the mid-1990s. During this time period, states that already have SORN laws in place made minor changes to the law (Lytle, 2015). In the early to mid-1990s, however, there was what appears to be a policy punctuation in SORN legislative action, during a period of increased attention to child sexual victimization (Jenkins, 1998; Nelson, 1984). Although PET may have face validity as an explanation for change in sex offense laws, research has indicated these laws may not be driven by media accounts and public attention alone (Easterly, 2015).

Another popular theoretical explanation for policy change in the policy sciences has been multiple streams theory (MST; Kingdon, 2003). Within this theoretical framework, major policy change occurs during periods of convergence in the interests of public and political environments, commonly referred to as a policy window. In some states, SORN laws existed for decades before the recent wave of sex offense laws starting in the 1990s (M. Cohen & Jeglic, 2007). SORN laws may have been more experimental during this time, gaining interest from legislators nationwide but remaining lost in the policy “garbage can” (M. D. Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972) until a new policy window opened. The recent wave of sex offense laws beginning in the 1990s, then, would be the result of a policy window produced by a converging of public attention (e.g., moral panic) and political interests (e.g., tough on crime) with a viable policy. Although existing research on sex offense laws appears to validate this explanation, there is a limited amount of research applying MST to state laws. Specifically, existing research has shown public interests in sex crime and legislation reaching peak levels during the most recent wave of sex offense laws (Clear & Frost, 2014; Jenkins, 1998), which has continued to recent times (Burchfield et al., 2014). During this period of public interest in sex crimes, political environments emphasized retributive and populist crime policies (Beckett, 1997; Garland, 2001). Therefore, MST would predict continual large-scale reforms to sex offense laws due to a persistently open policy window.

Variation in Content of SORN Laws Over Time

To date, existing research on variations in SORN laws across states has been limited to single year snapshots, often focusing on the presence of SORN laws within states (Adams, 1999, 2002; Baldau, 1999; Mancini et al., 2013). In addition, scholars have noted change in general attributes of the law, such as juvenile and lifetime registration. The restriction of their analysis to general attributes potentially overlooks other key components of SORN laws, which may speak to the differential treatment of registration across states as well as the meaning of variation in the content of the law. For instance, if states vary in their verification procedures, we might infer differences in legislative processes across states as well as the trust given to registrants to notify authorities. Although these existing studies have been important in exploring the prevalence of SORN laws in the United States, they treat the laws as static and their content and legislative processes as uniform.

Lytle (2015) attempted to address these limitations using a sample of five Midwestern states. Although limited in its generalizability to SORN laws nationwide, Lytle (2015) identified variation in the timing of SORN law actions in these five states as well as several emergent themes and typologies. Specifically, states varied in their definition and classification of registry-worthy sex offenders, registry information to be disseminated to the public, as well as the fervor and types of revisions passed across states. Lytle (2015) also introduced a typology of revisions based on the impact a revision has on existing law, ranging from the cosmetic (tinkering revisions) to altering the existing law’s intended operation (procedural revisions) and scope (net-widening revisions).

This study explored two research questions. First, I expanded upon Lytle’s (2015) analysis to explore the gaps left by limited sample size and coverage of years. The first step in identifying variation in the content of SORN laws, then, was to establish that the content of the law does vary over time and across all 50 states. Therefore, I began by exploring my first research question as follows:

Research Question 1: Has the content of SORN laws changed over time?

Considering the shifts in cultural and political attention to sex crimes (Burchfield et al., 2014; Jenkins, 1998; Mancini, 2014), along with variation in the content of SORN laws in a more focused sample of states (Lytle, 2015), I anticipated variation in the content of SORN laws nationwide and addressed a second research question using the same analytic approach as the one used in Lytle (2015):

Research Question 2: In what ways does the content of SORN laws vary over time?

The current study, then, built upon Lytle’s earlier analysis by incorporating all SORN laws from all 50 states between the adoption of SORN in the state to 2012. With this population of state SORN laws, I produced a historical analysis that speaks to change across all 50 states. Changes to SORN laws have implications on our existing explanations that treat SORN laws as static or, at least, do not account for their dynamic nature. If SORN laws have changed across states, scholars should account for their dynamic nature in theoretical accounts of SORN policy change. Furthermore, this historical analysis allowed me to identify key components of change in SORN laws over time. These components may guide us in assessing the theoretical fit of existing explanations for SORN law change. For example, if states emphasized the creation of special classes of registrants (e.g., sexual predators, sexual recidivists), it may indicate boundary shifts in target populations (e.g., witch hunt and moral panic frameworks; Mancini & Mears, 2016; Zgoba, 2004). However, components related to procedural routines, such as changing the location of verification processes, would be less obviously relevant to traditional explanations of sex offense policy change and, consequently, would merit further consideration in existing theoretical accounts. Ultimately, this study’s findings were intended to facilitate future research on SORN policy change and theoretical development for policy processes driving SORN laws.

Method

Data

To answer these research questions, I collected SORN statutes from all 50 U.S. states from their inception to 2012. Specifically, I searched three data sources using relevant keywords (“sex offen*,” “regist*,” and “notif*”) to ensure comprehensiveness in my data set. First, I searched LexisNexis for current SORN statutes and, using the “History” section, identified previously passed iterations of the law. Second, I applied the same search criteria to the state legislature websites for all 50 states along with any specific legislation identified in the “History” subsection of LexisNexis. Unfortunately, downloadable versions of historical SORN laws were not available in every state using these two steps alone. The third and final step in data collection, then, included the HeinOnline Session Laws Library² that allowed me to search and download any historical laws not already available in the other steps.

Prior to analysis, statutes unrelated to the registration and notification of sex offenders were excluded from the final data set.³ Once included in the sample, statutes were immediately coded for state, date passed (including month and year), and relevance to registration or notification law (or both). Ultimately, the final sample for the qualitative analysis was made up of 1,053 state SORN statutes that spanned 57 years (Table 1).

Table 1.

Statewide Sex Offender Registration and Notification Legislative Activity Through 2012.

State	# statutes	HLM sample	Earliest statute
AL	10	7	1967
AK	6	4	1993
AZ	33	23	1983
AR	20	9	1987
CA	81	27	1955
CO	44	28	1991
CT	20	14	1994
DE	17	9	1994
FL	24	17	1992
GA	10	9	1994
HI	13	9	1995
ID	26	13	1993
IL	49	29	1986
IN	29	14	1994
IA	11	14	1995
KS	15	10	1993
KY	13	9	1994
LA	56	15	1992
ME	22	10	1991
MD	35	15	1995
MA	14	10	1996
MI	17	9	1994
MN	27	19	1991
MS	15	12	1991
MO	10	9	1994
MT	19	8	1989
NE	9	6	1996
NV	22	14	1961
NH	22	14	1992
NJ	16	11	1994
NM	5	4	1995
NY	37	23	1995
NC	31	19	1995
ND	14	13	1991
OH	17	12	1963
OK	31	21	1989
OR	33	17	1989
PA	10	6	1995
RI	29	14	1992
SC	18	8	1993
SD	23	14	1994
TN	37	17	1994
TX	25	9	1991
UT	30	18	1983
VT	14	8	1995
VA	38	16	1994
WA	33	21	1990
WV	12	10	1993
WI	15	8	1993
WY	11	8	1994

Note. # statutes = includes original statutes for registration and/or notification; MLM sample = legislative activity by month excluding original statutes.

To assess levels of variation in the frequency of state legislative actions, the difference in time between legislative reforms was calculated in months. This composite variable was used as an outcome for a longitudinal, multilevel model (MLM; Hoffman, 2015; Singer & Willet, 2003). Because the MLM was intended to analyze the frequency with which states were passing revisions, the number of revisions made in a single month was not deemed critical for this analysis. Therefore, in cases where multiple reforms passed in the same month, only one reform was included in the analysis. In addition, the initial law was removed from this analysis as it could not represent a change to legislation. The analytical sample for the MLM, then, included 662 revisions across all 50 states. The number of revisions within states in this sample ranged from four in New Mexico to 29 in Illinois (Table 1).

Mixed-Methods Analytic Approach: Thematic Content Analysis and Longitudinal MLMs

I used MaxQDA (Version 11.1) software to help manage codes and themes in a two-stage thematic content analysis (Kuckartz, 2014).⁴ The initial coding stage included an intra-state analysis of variation in the content of SORN laws throughout its existence in the state. During initial coding, I coded key attributes of each statute that emerged from the data (Gibbs, 2007; Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas, 2013).⁵

The initial coding stage alone seemed to be enough to establish variation in the content of SORN laws over time (and, thus, answers my first research question). Nonetheless, my second research question required additional analysis. To answer my second research question, I used a comparative analysis across states of the coding categories developed during initial coding (Kuckartz, 2014).⁶ The comparative analysis produced 17 components of change (Table 2) that identified the common ways in which states have reformed their SORN laws over time.

Table 2.

Components of Change in SORN Laws Across States.

Component of change	# states	Initial year	Initial state	Definition (in the SORN law itself)
Definition	50	1955	CA	Definition of “sex offender”
Distinct	44	1990	WA	New label(s) for special category of RSOs
Registrable offenses	50	1955	CA	List of registrable offenses
Registering agency	49	1961	NV	The agency responsible for gathering and managing registry information
Time to registration	50	1955	CA	Deadline for initial registration or updating information after a change
Verification	49	1991	OR	Required check-in and update of registry information by RSOs
Notification	50	1990	WA	Requirement to disseminate registry information to the public
Legislative finding	32	1967	AL	Statement of motive, intent, and justification for legislative change
Petition for relief from registry	42	1961	NV	Procedure for requesting relief from duty to register
Length of registry	50	1963	OH	Definite term of registration
Registry violation	50	1955	CA	Definition and penalty for registry violation
Juvenile registration	40	1990	WA	Explicitly includes juveniles in registry
Registration information	50	1961	NV	Information to be gathered for registry
Out-of-state offenses	49	1961	NV	Registrable offenses from other states
Lifetime registration	42	1983	UT	Removes possibility of relief from registration
Retroactive application	28	1983	UT	Includes persons convicted prior to law’s effective date
Transient RSO	22	1997	CA	Special verification procedures for RSOs without physical residential address

Note. Frequencies for components of change represent revisions that include explicit language referencing the component. “# States” indicates the number of states that had revisions that addressed that component of change. “Initial Year” and “Initial State” identify the year and state of the earliest law that addressed the component of change. SORN = sex offender registration and notification. RSO = Registered Sex Offender.

To assess the degree of SORN policy activity attributable to factors either between or within states, I replicated Lytle’s (2015) unconditional, longitudinal MLM with this expanded data set. Unconditional models typically serve to identify a longitudinal MLM (Hoffman, 2015; Singer & Willet, 2003). Specifically, this model presents the degree and source of variation in the outcome variable both between and within groups of one’s grouping variable. For this study, the unconditional model identified the level of variation in SORN policy change activity due to change occurring across states (i.e., time-invariant) and within states (time-dependent). In addition, Stata (Version 14.1) produced statistical tests of changes in likelihood ratio that compared the fit of the longitudinal MLM with that of a traditional regression analysis that does not control for time. A likelihood ratio test was significant, it justified using a longitudinal multilevel over a traditional regressive model due to better model fit.

Findings and Discussion

Variation in the Content of SORN Laws Over Time

As of 2012, SORN laws had been reformed at least once in every U.S. state. Each state had made multiple revisions of their SORN law, including changes to its operation and scope. To support this finding, the appendix shows the initial year in which a component of change to SORN statutes was passed in a state. Also, the order of the revision is included in the parentheses (e.g., 1 means the initial law, 2 means the first revision, 3 means second revision, etc.). The appendix demonstrates differences in years both within individual states (i.e., by row) as well as across states (i.e., by column). Although statistical models were not used in this part of the analysis, the findings of the thematic content analysis provided ample evidence to support the finding that SORN laws have changed nationwide over time.

For example, South Dakota established their sex offender registry, without public notification, in 1994 (1994 Session Laws, chap. 174). Public notification, along with retroactive application of the SORN law, was added to the existing registration law the following year (1995 Session Laws, chap. 123). SORN in South Dakota was extended to juveniles in 1997 (1997 Session Laws, chap. 135). One of the latest revisions to SORN in South Dakota within my data period occurred in 2010 when the state created an offense-based system for classifying danger among registry-worthy sex offenders (Tiers 1, 2, and 3) and mandated lifetime registration for registrants classified as most dangerous, which included the newly defined “Recidivist Sex Offender” (2010 Session Laws, chap. 119). Overall, South Dakota made 22 revisions to their SORN law. Although the product of some of the legislative activity in South Dakota during this period may be considered relatively low impact (tinkering or redefining concepts; Lytle, 2015), at least six components of change in SORN laws identified in this study were introduced over four revisions since the law’s initial adoption in 1994.⁷

The finding that SORN laws evolved within states has several key implications on how we think about state legislative action as we explore the processes underlying sex offense laws. First, explanations of policy action taken in response to sex crimes should not be treated as static. These laws not only varied across states, they appeared to have remained in policy-making agenda for state legislatures for decades following their adoption. This finding raised questions about the sufficiency (though not the necessity) of moral panic and other theoretical explanations that assume brevity in periods of major policy change (e.g., PET; Baumgartner & Jones, 2009) or the immediacy of change in public attention following the response (e.g., moral panic; Burchfield et al., 2014; Cohen, 2002; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009).

Second, in addition to supporting the claim that SORN laws have been dynamic rather than static over time, appendix also provides guidance in identifying a time period in which policy change has been concentrated across the United States. I find support for claims in existing research that many states, although not all (e.g., New Mexico), have made revisions to SORN laws with fervor over time, especially since the mid-1990s (Figure 1). In addition, there appeared to be differences in the timing of certain components of SORN laws, which indicates a pattern of policy evolution for SORN laws. Some components were present at the adoption of SORN laws for the state, such as the timeline to register, definitions of “sex offender,” a definite length of registration, a list of registry-worthy offenses, and the information to be provided to registering authorities. These components were present early in the evolution of SORN across states and, consequently, represent the earliest stages of SORN policy development. In the early to mid-2000s, we see components of SORN that received increased attention from states, though there were varying levels of uniformity. As of 2012, the components initiated within this time period included special verification procedures for homeless registrants. Finally, several components of SORN laws appear to be adopted by states variously throughout the time span, including petitioning for relief from registration, retroactive application, registration of juvenile offenders, and lifetime registration.

Figure 1.

The number of states with SORN revisions by year, 1950-2012.

Differences in the Content of SORN Laws Across States

One of the findings of my thematic content analysis was that states differed from each other not only in the presence of components of SORN but also in the timing in which legislatures adopted certain components. For example, the elements of SORN laws included in every state included a definition of registrable sex offenders, a list of registry-worthy offenses, community notification laws, registration information, penalties for registry violations, registering agency, and the timing of initial and updating registration by registrants. The more infrequent elements of SORN laws across states include procedures for transient or homeless registrants (25 states), retroactive application (30 states), and legislative findings (30 states). The differences in the presence of these components implies that as of 2012, there remained substantial differences in the methods being used to track and monitor registered sex offenders across the United States.

In addition, states varied widely in the timing of the adoption of these components. For example, there was a 21-year time span across states in the adoption of juvenile registration, ranging from 1990 with Washington’s Community Protection Act (Washington 1990 Laws, chap. 3) to 2011 in Tennessee (Tennessee 2011 Laws, chap. 483). In addition to the year in which laws were passed, however, the timing of these components also varied in how soon the revision was made relative to the initial SORN law. With regard to juvenile registration, 11 states had juvenile registration in their initial SORN law, whereas eight states added juvenile registration to their SORN laws more than 15 years after adopting their initial law. The disparity in the timing of SORN law components raised questions about factors in policy decision making in that existing literature. For example, the existing literature offers little clear explanation for why Washington writes juvenile registration into their initial law 21 years before Tennessee includes juveniles on their registry. Could states have varied this dramatically in their perceptions of juvenile sex offending as a social problem in need of legislative reform? Although a definitive answer to this question was beyond the scope of this study, future research should attempt to tie these findings to public perception data.

Another trend in change to the content of SORN laws across states over time was that these laws became increasingly more restrictive on registrants, required registering agents to become more intimate with the lives of registrants, and grew in scope. With few exceptions (i.e., tinkering and definitional revisions; see “Updating Lytle’s (2015) Typology of Revisions” section), changes to SORN laws introduced new procedures for registrants and registering agents to follow. Examples included the introduction of verification procedures, electronic monitoring, and requiring registration in multiple jurisdictions simultaneously (e.g., jurisdictions of residence, employment, education, etc.). Furthermore, many changes made by state legislatures to existing procedures required registrants to provide more information, shortened deadlines for updating registry information (e.g., time to register following release from prison or court), while increasing the severity of penalties for violating these changes. In many states, registrants had less time to notify their registering agency of changes in their permanent or temporary information, including changes of residence or employment as well as movement for a weekend trip. Along with the ever-expanding net of state SORN laws, SORN laws nationwide demonstrated a common transition in the monitoring and tracking of registered persons to be more involved in the lives of those required to register within the state.

Updating Lytle’s (2015) Typology of Revisions

As a result of this comprehensive, inductive analysis, two new types of revisions, which reflect within-state variation in the content of the law, emerged that were added to Lytle’s (2015) existing typology of revisions: housekeeping revisions and net-narrowing revisions. Within the hierarchy represented by Lytle’s (2015) typology of revisions, however, these new types of revisions do not represent new levels of impact on existing law. Therefore, as I define and discuss each of these new types of revisions, I also identify where that type of revision exists on the existing hierarchy of impact to existing law (Table 3).

Table 3.

Lytle’s (2015) Typology of SORN Law Revisions (Updated).

Typology of revisions (lowest impact first)	Example(Words added to existing law are in italics, deleted words are struck out)
1. Tinkering revisions	“ . . . complete a registration form that includes, at a minimum, . . . the description, license numbers, and vehicle identification numbers of motor vehicles the sex offender or child kidnapper has access to, regardless of whether that access is regular or not . . .” (Alaska 2008 Laws chap. 42)
1a. Housekeeping revisions	“The following entities shall be immune from liability for good faith conduct under this section subchapter” (Pennsylvania 2000 Public Laws 74, §18)
2. Definitional revisions	“‘work’ includes employment that is full-time or part-time for a period of time exceeding 14 days or for an aggregate period of time exceeding 30 days during any calendar year, whether financially compensated, volunteered, or for the purpose of government or educational benefit.” (Minnesota 2000 Laws chap. 311, Article 2, §1(b)(3)(ii))
3. Procedural revisions	“Any offender working, enrolled, or volunteering in a public or private elementary, secondary or postsecondary school or institution of training shall notify the center of that status and shall register with the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over that campus.” (Arkansas 2003, 2nd Extraordinary Session Act 21)
4. Net-widening revisions	“ . . . ‘sex offense’ means . . . false imprisonment, as provided in Section 30-4-3 NMSA 1978, when the victim is less than eighteen years of age and the offender is not a parent of the victim . . .” (New Mexico 1999 Laws, chap. 19, §3(b)(2))
4a. Net-narrowing revisions	“The provisions of this chapter shall apply to any person who~~18-1507A (possession of sexually exploitative material for other than a commercial purpose)~~ . . .” (Idaho 2012 Session Laws chap. 268, §4)

Note. SORN = sex offender registration and notification.

Housekeeping revisions included within-state changes made to existing law to conform to revisions elsewhere in state law. For example, any references to altered statutory codes elsewhere in state law would also be reflected in statutory code for sex offenses cited in the list of registrable offenses (e.g., Wyoming 2007 Public Acts No. 80). Another example of housekeeping revisions included a change in the title of an agency, such as the change from the “Board of Pardons” or “Board of Parole” to the “Board of Pardons and Parole” (Connecticut 2000 Public Acts No. 234, §2). The defining characteristic of housekeeping revisions, then, was their link to statutes outside of the state’s SORN law. As these changes made did not affect the definition or implementation of the existing law, housekeeping revisions were considered to have the same level of impact as tinkering revisions.

In addition, net-narrowing revisions resulted in a more focused application of SORN than present in the existing law. Net-narrowing revisions typically manifested as the removal of an offense from a state’s list of registrable offenses, such as California’s removal of the crime “loitering around a public toilet for purposes of engaging in or soliciting lewd or lascivious acts” from its list of registrable offenses (California 1997 Laws chap. 821). Also, net-narrowing revisions also took the form of limiting the scope of other aspects of SORN laws, such as the inclusion of non-registered persons in state notification sites (California 1999 Laws chap. 730). Although these types of revisions were rare in my analysis (15 total), they were concentrated in more recent legislation, possibly indicating a desire to limit the expansion of registration and notification laws. As net-narrowing revisions adjust the scope of application for the law, this type of revision should be considered to have a similar level of impact on existing law as net-widening laws.

Timing of Variation in the Content of the Law

The longitudinal MLM reported that states varied in the rapidity of their reform of SORN laws (Table 4). Time-invariant factors accounted for 15.6% of the difference in time between revisions made by states. Therefore, Lytle’s (2015) finding that significant variation in the timing between SORN policy changes can be attributed to time-invariant factors (such as state-level context) was replicated when expanded to a national data set. In addition, this finding supports existing research that has questioned the sufficiency of nationwide factors in explaining SORN policy change (Burchfield et al., 2014; Easterly, 2015). The variation in policy change due to state-specific factors could also be observed in the number of states making a policy change nationwide in Figure 1.

Table 4.

Multilevel Model Testing Variation in Timing of SORN Policies.

Random effect	SD	Variance component	% of total	df	χ²	p
Intercept, u₀	25.838	81.484	16	49	37.22	<.0001
Level 1, r_ij	24.994	434.371	84

Note. Model summary: Level 1 model: DIFFTIME_ij = β_0j + r_ij; Level 2 model: β_0j = γ₀₀ + u_0j; mixed model: DIFFTIME_ij = γ₀₀ + u_0j + r_ij. SORN = sex offender registration and notification.

Upon further exploration of state-specific change in SORN policy change over time, there were only a few clear patterns in the timing of SORN policy change. Although the adoption of SORN laws varied widely across states (41 years, 1955-1996), there were no clear patterns in policy change or the rise of certain components of SORN laws. One of my hopes upon beginning this analysis was that I would be able to identify states that were consistently early in the development of innovations in SORN law (a la Justice Brandeis’ conception of state governments as laboratories; Karch, 2007; New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 1932). Interestingly, the “pioneering” state differed for nearly every component. Further statistical and case study analyses may be needed to unveil patterns in the openness to SORN policy innovations within and across states over time.

Although no patterns emerged in the timing of state SORN policy change relative to the content of the law, there were points in time that were critical to the evolution of SORN laws nationally. For example, every state created a community notification component to their SORN laws between 1990 and 1997, indicating that the push for notification was specific to the early to mid-1990s, likely in response to the adoption of the federal Megan’s Law for many states. Also, the addition of verification procedures and distinctive classes of registrants were located primarily within the 1990s. However, SORN laws continued to evolve in the 2000s and 2010s. For example, juvenile registration and the inclusion of education and employment information in registries and notification websites generally began in the late 1990s and continued into the 2000s. Furthermore, more restrictive verification procedures for transient registrants began to rise in popularity in the last decade of my analysis. Generally, these trends indicate that state legislatures have continued to identify new ways to track and monitor registrants over time. Furthermore, these innovations typically take several years (if not decades) to spread across states, which implies that there has been interference, perhaps due to political culture (Elazar, 1984, 1994) or public opinion (e.g., Karch, 2007; Key, 1968), with policy innovation in some states that was not present (or significant) in other states. Although my thematic content analysis cannot account for key mechanisms through which these policies may be diffusing across and within states, this finding may serve as an impetus for future research by focusing scholars on certain trends in, as well as the epidemiology of, SORN policy innovation over time.

There was another general pattern related to SORN policy change worth noting. There was a sustained rise in the number of states with legislative activity following the mid-1990s (Figure 1). Prior to this time period, states exclusively adjusted existing elements of the law, such as the definition of sex offenses or the amount of time registrants had for initial registration post-release from prison. After the mid-1990s, however, many states began to introduce new elements of the law (e.g., verification or lifetime registration) while also making adjustments to existing procedures and definitions. This trend continued into the 21st century, including the introduction of special verification procedures for transient offenders and retroactive application of SORN.

As a result of the frequent revisions to sex offender laws following the mid-1990s, many changes to the content and operation of sex offender laws may have gone unnoticed by the public and the media. In states that frequently revised their SORN laws, policy change may become normal. Indeed, for many state legislatures, it was an exceptional year if lawmakers did not revise their state’s SORN law. During these times, then, it would be reasonable to believe that policy makers could make major revisions to the law with very little interest from the public or media. To the degree that public scrutiny might be lessened during periods of feverish SORN policy change, one might predict that a lack of legislative action would actually be more likely to trigger public interest than the passage of new or revised law. If this was the case, the finding that SORN policy change was both more frequent and persistent should inform future analyses of policy decision making.

Discussion

These findings contribute to our understanding of the key factors and mechanisms present in the evolution of sex offense laws. Existing explanations for these laws have focused on the role of public opinion, especially centering on moral panic (Jenkins, 1998; Zgoba, 2004). Although these explanations are certainly important to the narrative of the evolution of sex offense laws, a growing body of literature has begun to question the sufficiency of such explanations (Burchfield et al., 2014; Easterly, 2015). This study was intended to encourage and guide this discussion.

We can assess the fit of existing theory using the trends and components of change in SORN laws over time identified in this analysis. Namely, the trend of nationwide policy change questioned the notion that legislatures throughout the country have been in a perpetual state of motion regarding policy change (Lytle, 2015; Zilney & Zilney, 2009). To be clear, this is not to say that all state legislatures have attended to their SORN laws sporadically as much as it is to say that not all state legislatures have been as preoccupied with SORN as their counterparts. Indeed, the unconditional model of the longitudinal MLM presented in the findings indicated significant amounts of variation within states (i.e., legislative activity was due to changes specific to each states) as well as differences across states. Unsurprisingly, then, this study replicated Lytle’s (2015) conclusion that SORN law change cannot be attributed to nationwide influences alone. More interestingly, however, Lytle’s exploratory finding that SORN laws should be treated as dynamic instead of static may not apply equally to all states. New Mexico, for example, made relatively few changes compared with more active states like California or Illinois. Ultimately, then, future research should explore the mechanisms responsible for such variation both across and within states. Fortunately, the findings relating to my second research question, along with theoretical alternatives from the policy sciences, can offer guidance.

In addition to the fervor of action across and within states, legislative action across states also varied in the content of the revisions themselves. I identified 17 components central to SORN policy change across all 50 states. The areas that states felt necessary to alter may speak to the symbolic or instrumental intentions of their policy action. For example, New York and Pennsylvania adopted community notification at the same time as their broader registration laws in 1995. Considering their geographic and temporal proximity, these states should have similar exposure to both time- and region-specific panic-driven media. However, SORN procedures in these states differed from each other. Pennsylvania limited community notification to persons that formally requested registration information (Pennsylvania 1st Sp. Sess. Act 1995-24). However, New York established a risk-based system for notification, wherein registrants have their information made available to the public depending on their risk of reoffending as determined by a risk assessment tool (New York 1995 Laws chap. 192). Also, Pennsylvania included registration procedures for juvenile offenders in 2004 (Act 2004-152), whereas New York continues to keep juveniles off of their registry. Finally, Pennsylvania applied their SORN law retroactively in 1996 (Pennsylvania Act 1996-46, §2), whereas New York had not included retroactive application in their statutes as of 2012. Although these two states still fit the broader trend of increasing restrictiveness, they offer an example of the differences that have emerged between states.

We would expect legislatures motivated by public anxiety and panic to apply greater restrictions upon sex offender populations. Although this was a broad theme across states over time, there were a variety of legislative changes that seem less clearly associated with public panic, such as limiting the discretion of the courts or law enforcement in registration decision making in petitions for relief from registration. To the degree that changes in the content of SORN laws reflect the concerns of the legislature, variation in components of change (as well as their timing) may indicate variation in problem identification at the legislative level. Though comparisons of the evolution of SORN laws in specific states were beyond the scope of this study, such comparisons would be an important next step in understanding the issues and mechanisms central to SORN policy change.

Alternatively, variation in the timing or content of SORN policy change across states may also indicate variation in the politico-cultural context of states. In essence, policy change is a social behavior that occurs within a political context (Garland, 2001; Simon, 2007). Scholars have repeatedly documented strong ties between culture and punishment (Barker, 2009; Garland, 1990, 2001). One could logically conclude, then, that a comprehensive account of SORN policy processes should incorporate state-level political and cultural contexts. The significant variation identified in the unconditional model in this study offers a justification for such research, although statistical models with appropriate predictors and controls will be necessary to investigate this more fully. For example, the emphasis on identifying special classes of dangerous sex offenders, along with the incorporation of lifetime registration and other extensions of registrant monitoring, appears to fit New Penology explanations for the evolution of SORN laws (Feeley & Simon, 1992; Simon, 1998, 2000). States may be demonstrating a growing interest in classifying and managing risk when governing crime. Although state legislatures have presented a change in policy as a form of public protection rhetoric (i.e., governing through crime; Simon, 2007), consequent changes to procedures may be motivated by a desire to better identify and manage perceived risks posed by registered sex offenders.⁸

The current study also has implications on the methodology we use to study sex offense laws. Despite variability in the regularity of policy change across states, SORN laws do not remain static at the state level. The variable yet dynamic nature of the law should be taken into consideration when continuing to explore state SORN policy processes. This seems especially important for studies of effectiveness in SORN laws. When evaluating the effectiveness of SORN laws over time, we often compare trends in the rates of sex crimes or recidivism by registrants before a specific reform with a trend line in the period following the reform. Consequently, we may have discounted any changes made to the law during the follow-up period. In essence, we have treated the law as unchanging following the implementation of the reform. Although these approaches may have utility in evaluating how specific reforms affect crime or recidivism rates, we run the risk of ignoring potentially significant factors if we do not account for additional reforms in our models. This may especially be the case with procedural and net-widening/narrowing revisions that occur during the follow-up period, as these types of policy revision have the greatest impact on the implementation of the law.

Conclusion

Ultimately, this study’s purpose was to assess whether or not state SORN laws have varied over time and in what ways using a nationwide population of state laws. In addition to providing a definitive “yes” to questions of whether these laws vary over time, this study also offered insight into the ways SORN laws have evolved across states over time. Generally, the direction of SORN law development has been a tightening of supervision procedures with an ever-widening scope. More specifically, states have shifted from establishing general registry procedures to classifying and more closely monitoring individuals deemed to be more dangerous than the “average” registrant. In addition, the timing and procedures for relieving registrants from registry duties have been delayed in many states. Finally, the frequency with which states reform SORN varied over time. In particular, states not only differed from one another in their attention to reform, they have changed individually over time.

Hopefully, these findings will serve as an impetus for further investigation into the mechanisms through which states have reformed their SORN laws. In particular, future research should look to better identify factors that might contribute to the variation between states documented in this study. In addition, the finding that significant variation in legislative activity for SORN laws can be attributed to within-state factors justified additional exploration of the evolution of SORN laws within states.

Beyond the implications for future research, this study also raised questions about the sufficiency of panic-driven explanations for the evolution of sex offense policies. Although public attention certainly plays a key role in policy decision making (e.g., Key, 1968), these explanations may be limited in their application to policy change more broadly. Indeed, it may be that sex crime panics were influential in the adoption of sex offense policies and, occasionally, even periodic shifts in scope and procedure. This may be the case with memorial laws, such as Megan’s Law or Jessica’s Law. However, we may not be able to rely solely on sporadic moral panics to explain sex offense policy change that has been shown to be persistent over time. Furthermore, panic-driven explanations seem limited in explaining less impactful changes to the law, such as tinkering, definitional, or even some less publicized procedural changes to the law. Finally, the differences in the timing and content SORN policy change between states raises questions about the sufficiency of nationwide panics as an explanation for sex offense laws.

It would be inadvisable to dismiss the influence of moral panic, or public attention more broadly, in criminal justice policy processes. However, based on the findings presented in this article, it is my conclusion that the time has come for criminal justice policy researchers to expand our investigation of SORN policy change to include other explanations. It is time to account for sex offense legislative activity that goes beyond moral panic.

Footnotes

Appendix

Appendix.

Components of Change in SORN Laws, 1955-2012.

State	Definition	Distinct	Registrable offenses	Registering agency	Time to registration	Verification	Notification	Legislative finding	Petition for relief	Length of registry	Registry violation	Juvenile registration	Registration information	Out-of-state	Lifetime registration	Retroactive application	Transient RSO
AK	1993 (1)	1998 (3)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	NA	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	NA	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	NA
AL	1967 (1)	2001 (6)	1967 (1)	1967 (1)	1967 (1)	1998 (4)	1996 (3)	1967 (1)	NA	1999 (5)	1967 (1)	1999 (5)	1967 (1)	1967 (1)	2001 (6)	2011 (9)	2011 (9)
AR	1987 (1)	1997 (2)	1987 (1)	1987 (1)	1987 (1)	1997 (2)	1997 (2)	1997 (2)	1997 (2)	1987 (1)	1987 (1)	1999 (3)	1987 (1)	1987 (1)	2001 (4)	NA	NA
AZ	1995 (4)	1995 (4)	1983 (1)	1983 (1)	1983 (1)	1996 (5)	1995 (4)	1995 (4)	2007 (24)	1998 (7)	1996 (5)	2001 (8)	1983 (1)	1993 (3)	NA	2001 (8)	2006 (21)
CA	1955 (1)	1996 (11)	1955 (1)	1994 (3)	1955 (1)	1997 (16)	1994 (7)	1993 (2)	1993 (2)	1996 (9)	1955 (1)	1993 (2)	1955 (1)	1993 (2)	NA	NA	1997 (19)
CO	1991 (1)	1997 (10)	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	1995 (3)	1995 (4)	1995 (4)	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	1994 (2)	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	2001 (20)	1999 (13)	2012 (40)
CT	1995 (1)	NA	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1998 (2)	1998 (2)	NA	1998 (2)	1995 (1)	1998 (2)	NA	1995 (1)	NA	1999 (3)	NA	NA
DE	1994 (1)	NA	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1997 (4)	1996 (2)	2002 (9)	1996 (3)	1996 (3)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1998 (6)	2008 (13)	2007 (12)
FL	1995 (2)	1997 (6)	1998 (7)	1997 (6)	1992 (1)	1998 (7)	1995 (3)	1992 (1)	1998 (7)	1997 (6)	1997 (6)	2000 (10)	1992 (1)	1998 (7)	1997 (6)	2000 (10)	2004 (12)
GA	1994 (1)	1996 (2)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1996 (2)	1994 (1)	2006 (9)	2006 (9)	1996 (2)	1994 (1)	2010 (10)	1994 (1)	1996 (2)	1996 (2)	NA	2010 (10)
HI	1995 (1)	2005 (7)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1997 (2)	1997 (2)	1997 (2)	1995 (1)	1997 (1)	1995 (1)	NA	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1997 (2)	1995 (1)	2006 (8)
IA	1995 (1)	1998 (3)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1999 (4)	NA	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	2009 (10)	NA
ID	1993 (1)	1998 (3)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1998 (3)	1993 (1)	1998 (3)	1996 (2)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1998 (4)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1996 (2)	NA	NA
IL	1986 (1)	1999 (10)	1986 (1)	NA	1986 (1)	1997 (8)	1995 (7)	NA	2007 (34)	1986 (1)	1986 (1)	1995 (6)	1986 (1)	1986 (1)	1997 (8)	NA	2006 (22)
IN	1994 (1)	1998 (3)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	2006 (13)	1994 (1)	NA	2007 (15)	1995 (2)	1994 (1)	2002 (5)	1994 (1)	2006 (12)	2001 (4)	NA	2007 (15)
KS	1993 (1)	2001 (7)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1996 (3)	1994 (2)	NA	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	2002 (8)	1993 (1)	1997 (4)	1994 (2)	NA	NA
KY	1994 (1)	1998 (2)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	2000 (3)	1998 (2)	NA	1998 (2)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	NA	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1998 (2)	NA	NA
LA	1992 (1)	2004 (18)	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	2006 (23)	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	1997 (7)	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	2004 (18)	NA	NA
MA	1996 (1)	1999 (3)	1996 (1)	1996 (1)	1996 (1)	1996 (1)	1996 (1)	1996 (1)	1996 (1)	1996 (1)	1996 (1)	1996 (1)	1996 (1)	1996 (1)	1996 (1)	2003 (5)	1999 (3)
MD	1995 (1)	1997 (2)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1997 (2)	1995 (1)	NA	2009 (22)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	2009 (22)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1999 (5)	2001 (9)	2010 (27)
ME	1991 (1)	1998 (3)	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	1995 (3)	1998 (4)	NA	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	1999 (5)	1991 (1)	1995 (3)	1998 (4)	2001 (6)	NA
MI	1994 (1)	2011 (14)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1999 (4)	1996 (3)	2002 (5)	2002 (5)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	NA	NA
MN	1991 (1)	2000 (13)	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	1997 (7)	1996 (6)	1996 (6)	NA	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	1994 (4)	1991 (1)	1994 (4)	2000 (13)	2000 (13); repeal 2001	2005 (18)
MO	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1998 (4)	1998 (4)	NA	2009 (10)	2000 (5)	1995 (1)	2008 (9)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	2000 (5)	1995 (1)	NA
MS	1991 (1)	1997 (4)	1991 (1)	1994 (2)	1994 (2)	1997 (4)	1995 (3)	2000 (6)	1994 (2)	1994 (2)	1994 (2)	1995 (3)	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	2000 (6)	NA	NA
MT	1989 (1)	1997 (5)	1989 (1)	1989 (1)	1989 (1)	1997 (5)	1995 (2)	1997 (5)	1995 (2)	1989 (1)	1989 (1)	NA	1989 (1)	1997 (5)	1995 (2)	2001 (9)	2007 (15)
NC	1995 (1)	1997 (3)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1997 (3)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1997 (3)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	2001 (6)	2010 (18)	NA
ND	1991 (1)	1997 (6)	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	NA	1995 (4)	NA	NA	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	1999 (9)	1991 (2)	2003 (13)	2007 (15)	NA	NA
NE	1996 (1)	2009 (8)	1996 (1)	1996 (1)	1996 (1)	1996 (1)	1998 (2)	1996 (1)	NA	2002 (3)	1996 (1)	NA	1996 (1)	1996 (1)	2002 (3)	2009 (8)	2006 (6)
NH	1992 (1)	NA	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	1996 (2)	NA	NA	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	2008 (15)	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	NA	NA
NJ	1994 (1)	NA	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	NA
NM	1995 (1)	NA	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1999 (2)	1999 (2)	1995 (1)	NA	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	NA	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	NA	NA	2005 (5)
NV	1961 (1)	1997 (6)	1961 (1)	1961 (1)	1961 (1)	1997 (6)	1995 (4)	NA	1961 (1)	1997 (6)	1961 (1)	1997 (6)	1961 (1)	1961 (1)	1997 (6)	1997 (6)	2011 (21)
NY	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	NA	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	2002 (6)	NA	NA
OH	1963 (1)	1995 (6)	1963 (1)	1963 (1)	1963 (1)	1995 (6)	1995 (6)	NA	1995 (6)	1963 (1)	1963 (1)	2002 (9)	1963 (1)	1963 (1)	1995 (6)	NA	NA
OK	1989 (1)	1997 (5)	1989 (1)	1989 (1)	1989 (1)	1997 (5)	1995 (4)	1997 (5)	2006 (19)	1989 (1)	1989 (1)	2001 (11)	1989 (1)	1989 (1)	1998 (6)	NA	2009 (20)
OR	1989 (1)	1997 (4)	1989 (1)	1989 (1)	1989 (1)	1991 (2)	1991 (2)	1991 (2)	1991 (2)	1989 (1)	1991 (2)	1997 (4)	1989 (1)	1991 (2)	NA	NA	NA
PA	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	2004 (7)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	2004 (7)	1995 (1)	1996 (2)	2000 (4)	1995 (1)	2011 (10)
RI	1996 (2)	1996 (2)	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	1996 (2)	1996 (2)	NA	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	1992 (1)	NA	NA	NA
SC	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1996 (2)	1994 (1)	NA	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	NA
SD	1994 (1)	2010 (19)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1995 (2)	NA	2005 (11)	2005 (11)	1994 (1)	1997 (4)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	2010 (19)	1995 (2)	NA
TN	1994 (1)	2000 (6)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1997 (3)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	2011 (23)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	NA	1994 (1)	2008 (17)
TX	1991 (1)	1997 (2)	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	1997 (2)	1997 (2)	NA	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	1997 (2)	1991 (1)	1991 (1)	1997 (2)	1997 (2)	1997 (2)	2009 (17)
UT	1983 (1)	NA	1983 (1)	1983 (1)	1983 (1)	1997 (7)	1996 (6)	1987 (3)	1983 (1)	1983 (1)	1983 (1)	2006 (16)	1983 (1)	1984 (2)	1983 (1)	1983 (1)	NA
VA	1994 (1)	1997 (2)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1997 (2)	1998 (3)	1994 (1)	1997 (2)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	2006 (17)	2005 (13)	2010 (37)
VT	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	2003 (4)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	2009 (10)	1995 (1)	1995 (1)	2001 (3)	2009 (10)	NA
WA	1990 (1)	1990 (1)	1990 (1)	1990 (1)	1990 (1)	1995 (7)	1990 (1)	1990 (1)	1991 (3)	1990 (1)	1990 (1)	1990 (1)	1990 (1)	1990 (1)	2000 (18)	1991 (3)	2001 (20)
WI	1993 (1)	1995 (3)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1995 (4)	NA	1997 (5)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1995 (3)	NA	NA	NA
WV	1993 (1)	1997 (3)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	1997 (3)	1996 (2)	1998 (4)	1998 (4)	1993 (1)	1993 (1)	NA	1996 (2)	1993 (1)	1998 (4)	1999 (5)	NA
WY	1994 (1)	1999 (3)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1999 (3)	1997 (2)	NA	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	NA	1994 (1)	1994 (1)	1999 (3)	NA	NA

Note. SORN = sex offender registration and notification.

Acknowledgements

The author acknowledges the University of Nebraska–Omaha’s Office of Graduate Studies for funding the data collection necessary for this project. Also, author expresses gratitude to Drs. Lisa Sample, Amy Anderson, Ryan Spohn, and Robert Blair for comments made to an early draft of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biography

Robert Lytle is an Assistant Professor with the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock. His current work has focused on the processes underlying criminal justice policy, especially those driving policy change, as well as the social contexts of crime and desistance.

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