Addressing Challenges to Homeland Security Information Sharing in American Policing: Using Kotter’s Leading Change Model

National Law Enforcement Environment

Many of the impediments associated with effective information sharing in homeland security result from the current structure of the American criminal justice system. American policing alone is a decentralized system of about 18,000 loosely connected police agencies with more than 750,000 police officers (Banks, Hendrix, Hickman, & Kycklehahn, 2016; J. G. Carter et al., 2014; J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015; Cilluffo et al., 2011). It presents a number of challenges when attempting to harness the resources of these agencies for homeland security purposes (Chermak et al., 2013; Kruger & Haggerty, 2006; Osborne, 2006; Taylor & Russell, 2012).

Each of these law enforcement entities has a traditional mission that includes reducing crime and disorder, responding to calls for service, and solving a variety of problems in their jurisdictions that are not addressed by other government organizations. The relatively new concept of homeland security and the activities that it entails, specifically information and intelligence sharing, have not been a routine part of the police mission. J. G. Carter and Phillips (2015) point out that new policing philosophies are difficult to diffuse in a decentralized justice system.

To overcome this fragmented law enforcement system, there was a need for a unifying vision and strategy to encourage police organizations to expand their mission to incorporate homeland security functions such as intelligence collection and information sharing (Randol, 2013; U.S. Department of Justice, 2003). The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) was created in the wake of 9/11 to establish such a strategic vision (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003). It was designed to provide a blueprint for police agencies of all sizes to develop an intelligence and information sharing capacity, with requisite policy guidance, staffing, training, and technology to support this effort. It was broad enough to include not only terrorism-related intelligence but also criminal intelligence that aligns with the core mission of police agencies everywhere. The NCISP was designed to balance the need to collect and share intelligence while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of its citizens. The NCISP is a guide for implementation of intelligence-led policing at the state and local levels (J. G. Carter et al., 2014).

Follow-up strategic documents such as the Fusion Center Guidelines (U.S. Department of Justice, 2005), the Baseline Capabilities for State and Urban Area Fusion Centers (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008), the 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing (Executive Office of the President, 2007), and the 2012 National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (Executive Office of the President, 2012) reinforced the framework for information sharing across the law enforcement spectrum. The evolution of intelligence fusion centers and other preexisting field-based information sharing entities such as the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) and the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program has bolstered the foundation for information sharing across law enforcement. In addition, the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and it’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) expanded the homeland security intelligence capacity. One of its initiatives was the development of the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) to enhance information sharing across public safety disciplines. HSIN along with other collaborative information systems such as the Regional Information Sharing Systems network (RISSNET) and the Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal (LEEP) have provided law enforcement with the technological capacity to share homeland security information across agencies. Despite these efforts, this strategic vision of the collection, analysis, and sharing of homeland security information and intelligence is still a work in progress in police agencies.

There are a number of barriers to homeland security information sharing within policing. Sharing information across these organizations requires collaborative leadership and coordination in an environment known for its decentralized nature (Crowther, 2014; Lewandowski et al., 2017a; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008; U.S. Department of Justice, 2003, 2005). Information sharing within the policing environment has been an abstract term, open to various interpretations. Crowther (2014) defines information sharing as

The common stewardship of information through the acts of partnering, dissemination, and fusion, with the objectives of shared understanding, consistent decision-making, and coordinated action to achieve collaborative goals. (p. 136)

By highlighting the need to partner, collaborate, and fuse information, Crowther has pointed to some of the difficulties that confront police departments that operate autonomously. Some of these barriers relate to police leadership and organizational culture that will be discussed below.

Information Sharing Leadership Uncertainty

The information sharing challenge requires innovative leadership at all levels with a shared vision for the future (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2013; Lewandowski et al., 2017; Offices of the Inspectors General, 2017; Ratcliffe, 2008). Unlike the United Kingdom or Canada, there is not a national intelligence strategy for the whole of law enforcement (J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015; Walsh, 2015). The two versions of the NCISP, the National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding, the Fusion Center Core Operational Capabilities, and the DHS Target Capabilities List (TCL) (U.S. DHS, 2007) are prescriptive, rather than mandatory, for information sharing entities and police agencies.

Because many of these strategic documents are developed from a federal perspective, they do not always filter down to a critical mass of state and local police agencies. Survey research by J. G. Carter, Carter, and Chermak (2013) found that 34% of police agencies and 28% of fusion centers surveyed were unfamiliar with the NCISP and a smaller percentage, 29% of agencies and 16% of fusion centers, were less versed about the philosophy of intelligence-led policing. Even if these documents were widely read by the law enforcement community, federal entities have little leverage to incentivize police departments to adopt the voluminous set of objectives set in these strategies.

Complicating this landscape are multiple, often competing information sharing leadership organizations. Prior to 9/11, there existed an array of field-based information sharing entities that provided federal, state, and local law enforcement with shared intelligence capacities (Taylor & Russell, 2012). The RISS, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice and the HIDTA program funded by the Office of National Drug Control and Prevention, support the sharing of criminal- as well as terrorism-related information. In other cases, large police departments had their own intelligence units of varying size and complexity. Other federal agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) have specific intelligence centers for drug and firearms intelligence. Special issue intelligence centers are sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice in the case of the National Gang Center and the FBI’s National Gang Intelligence Center (Bureau of Justice Assistance [BJA], 2016). These entities were developed along specific mission areas such as street crime, drug enforcement, or firearms crime. These various efforts created information stovepipes.

As a step toward developing a more coordinated information sharing effort, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) was formed (Office of Justice Programs & U.S. Department of Justice, 2016). The CICC is a working group under the U.S. Department of Justice, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) that was established to represent all law enforcement organizations in the development of a more intelligence-led strategy (U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). It serves as an advisory body to the U.S. Attorney General and has had a strong voice in addressing concerns of police executives at all levels of government particularly with developing information sharing policy that affects state and local policing.

As mentioned, the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks led to the creation of the U.S. DHS and its Office of I&A to support intelligence and information sharing capability and operations across policing and public safety. DHS I&A has become a major champion of building the fusion center network through policy development, staffing, technical assistance, technology, and resource funding. The Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) advises the DHS secretary and includes leaders from state and local government as well as the private sector.

In addition, professional associations such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA), the National Sheriffs Association (NSA), and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) have played a role in developing a strategic response to information and intelligence sharing (MCCA, 2010), which affects efforts at the state and local levels.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) outline how institutional pressure from outside entities influence organizations such as the police department as they adopt new philosophies, programs, and practices. Environmental influences from professional associations such as the IACP or PERF, federal and state agencies like the U.S. DHS and the FBI, and peer agencies such as nearby police departments and fusion centers exert pressure on police organizations to adopt new practices such as community policing or intelligence-led policing.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) labeled these institutional pressures as isomorphism or the “constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set if environmental conditions” (p. 49). They argue that three processes can result in isomorphism, coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures. Coercive isomorphism involves the adoption of new policies or practices as a result of legal, regulatory, or funding mandates. For instance, fusion centers were required to develop privacy policies among other mandates as a grant-funding requirement. Mimetic isomorphism occurs when organizations adopt practices that mirror similar ones in other agencies. Many police agencies and fusion centers hired analysts, purchased analytical software, and produced intelligence products as they built intelligence and information sharing capacities after 9/11 (J. G. Carter et al., 2014). Through site visits and the implementation of the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (2002) standards, police departments and fusion centers replicated organizational structures, policies, and business practices used in other agencies. Third, normative isomorphism entails adopting best practices and specialized knowledge through the interaction of organizational actors at conferences, joint training sessions, and by following guidelines such as the NCISP.

Furthermore, as a result of the 9/11 Commission report (Kean & Hamilton, 2004), federal efforts through the evolution of the FBI’s intelligence capabilities along with the creation of the DHS and later the Project Manager–Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) and ODNI have enhanced information sharing. Another coordinating entity, the Information Sharing Council (ISC) advises the President and the PM-ISE regarding the development of standards, policies, and procedures to implement information sharing.

The problem is that these numerous stakeholders have not spoken with a common vision or voice to state and local policing. Entities such as the Department of Justice, DHS, FBI, PM-ISE, and the National Fusion Center Association among others have similar but distinct agendas when interacting with state and local policing. The PM-ISE was granted authority by Congress to plan, oversee, and manage the Information Sharing Environment, which would include all federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, but it has no authority to mitigate siloed information sharing projects from specific agencies. For example, the FBI and DHS are involved with critical infrastructure information sharing through InfraGard and the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection, respectively, but these efforts are not necessarily aligned, causing police agencies to collaborate with these parallel efforts.

This is further evidenced by the lack of an actual common law enforcement network for homeland security. Instead, HSIN, RISSNET, IP Gateway, eGuardian, and LEEP have sprouted up separately, leaving local policing to decide which networks to utilize for homeland security missions. Although these federal entities have made great organizational progress in determining the path to coordinating information sharing efforts, there remains a significant disconnect between the national intelligence infrastructure and local, state, and tribal policing (BENS, 2016; Jenkins et al., 2014; Randol, 2013). Multiple information sharing systems confuse, not clarify, the information sharing process.

State and Local Barriers

Related to that lack of strategic information sharing clarity at the national level are associated state and local issues. State and local police lack a clear information sharing mission (Randol, 2013). Randol summarized this challenge noted by other authors stating that American police departments have

. . . been resistant to sharing information, many local police agencies lack the intelligence capacity necessary to prevent terrorism, and intelligence surveillance activities pose a potential threat to civil liberties, which makes some law enforcement officials reluctant to undergo surveillance efforts (D. Carter & Carter, 2009; Shernock, 2009; Thacher, 2005). (p. 162)

It has been a difficult task to expand the role of local and state police agencies to include homeland security functions including information sharing. D. Carter and Carter (2009) explain that information gathering and sharing involves the reengineering of an agency intelligence function or, in many cases, the development of a new intelligence function. The wider philosophical shift to an intelligence-led policing (ILP) is, consequentially, a major departure from traditional reactive policing. It is far from clear whether the majority of police agencies have integrated homeland security activities into their mission.

Although empirical evidence of homeland security mission adoption in policing is sparse (Carter, 2016), the 2007 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, & Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011) found that 94.5% of police departments reported not having a nonsworn staff and 75.4% not having a sworn officer with primary duties related to terrorism intelligence.

There was one question on the 2013 LEMAS survey (U.S. Department of Justice, OJP, & BJS, 2015) of police departments across the country that provides a hint of the integration of homeland security into traditional police roles. The LEMAS survey question was, “How did your agency address the following issues, problems or tasks—terrorism/homeland security?” The results of this query were that 62.7% of responding departments indicated that they either had no dedicated personnel or have not formally addressed this issue. Police departments have not incorporated some of the necessary tasks such as suspicious activity reporting (SAR), critical infrastructure protection, threat assessment, and intelligence functions in general as recommended by the NCISP guidelines.

Turning specifically to information sharing activities, departments are often reluctant to support robust intelligence functions for the reasons listed above, as well as an awareness of past abuses committed by police intelligence units in the past (D. Carter & Carter, 2009). For instance, Thacher (2005) discusses the Dearborn, Michigan Police Department’s efforts to assist the U.S. Department of Justice following 9/11 with mass interviewing recently immigrated Middle Eastern males in their community. In addition, the Denver Police Department was the subject of a lawsuit in 2003 as a result of their intelligence collection activities targeting peace protesters (American Civil Liberties Union, 2003). These cases typically occur when police agencies fail to have procedures and standards in place to monitor intelligence activities.

The NCISP Version 2.0 (NCISP2; 2013) proposes that all law enforcement agencies have an intelligence function or access to resources through some type of field-based information sharing entity. Although there is evidence that police agencies are making progress in building intelligence capacity, the majority of departments do not have a structured intelligence or crime analysis function (Carter, 2016; Chermak et al., 2013; Osborne, 2006). This puts police organizations behind the curve in a data-driven criminal and homeland security environment. Many police agencies have been unable to identify emerging trends such as the opioid epidemic or increases in gang-related violence due to the lack of an intelligence or crime analysis capacity.

It should be noted that the NCISP is built as a scalable strategy that can be adapted to any police agency size (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003). In larger agencies, there may be a highly structured intelligence unit or real-time crime center. These agencies may have adopted ILP as a department-wide philosophy. In other agencies, a formalized ILP strategy or analytical unit is not feasible, yet can still contribute to the law enforcement information sharing mission. The NCISP promotes the concept of information sharing in smaller agencies where their role might be to simply collect and submit information to a field-based information sharing entity. Information sharing capabilities should conform to the unique circumstances of police agencies.

Chermak and his associates surveyed police agency and fusion center staff in 2007 and 2008, finding that only 13.3% had the capacity to identify threats and 9.3% believed they had sufficient intelligence capacity in general. Therefore, despite the significant efforts of the national leadership groups mentioned above, the authors concluded that more work needs to be done to fulfill the vision of a comprehensive information sharing capacity across state and local law enforcement. Homeland security threats as well as emerging crime problems such as cybercrime will only accentuate the need for a more intelligence-driven crime prevention system. The following section discusses the organizational and cultural obstacles to information sharing across state and local law enforcement.

Traditional Policing Versus the Homeland Security Mission

Police executives develop their law enforcement priorities in conjunction with their communities’ needs and desires (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2015). Despite the continuance of homegrown terrorist attacks in the United States, crime and disorder issues still are high concerns for citizens, state and local policy makers, and most police departments (Cilluffo et al., 2011). Police chiefs confront frequent property crime, various levels of violent crime, traffic issues, drug abuse, and a host of disorder issues. Allocating resources to counterterrorism functions such as intelligence and information sharing often will affect traditional patrol and investigative functions given current resource limitations (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008).

At the line level, police officers, the actual information collectors, need to be convinced of the efficacy of information sharing, which includes the acceptance of homeland security as an agency priority (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). The lack of buy-in has limited the ability of fusion centers, for example, from receiving information from external agencies as well as internal units in agencies that sponsor these information sharing entities (Lewandowski et al., 2017a). There needs to be clear direction and incentives for police departments to expand their mission. Agencies can embrace information sharing in the areas such as SAR if they receive adequate training to identify preoperational terrorism planning as outlined in the federal guideline, TCL (U.S. DHS, 2007). J. G. Carter et al. (2014) found that organizations that adopted the recommendations of the NCISP were more likely to integrate intelligence into decision making, reward information sharing, and create intelligence products. They illustrate the adoption of intelligence-led policing through a series of actions consistent with NCISP.

Fully engaged police agencies should gather homeland security information during routine day-to-day activities. They should inventory and regularly communicate with critical infrastructure and other potentially high-risk locations and key assets. Yet, police practitioners often lack expertise in conducting threat or vulnerability assessments. Officers also should be cognizant of privacy guidelines such as Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2017; U.S. Department of Justice, 2013) commonly called 28 Code of Federal Regulations Part 23 (28 CFR Part 23) and technology systems available to collect and analyze intelligence. There is some evidence that police departments are implementing intelligence-led policing and are incorporating privacy guidelines in their organizations (Carter, 2016). Fusion centers were mandated to develop privacy policies as part of their funding requirements.

Organizational Culture Barriers and Information Sharing

Beyond the strategic issues discussed above, police organizational culture presents other information sharing challenges (Chermak et al., 2013; Desai, 2005; Joyal, 2012; Lewandowski et al., 2017a; Ratcliffe, 2007; Sanders & Henderson, 2013; Sheptycki, 2004; Walker & Katz, 2001; Walsh, 2015). Traditional, functionally structured police departments often create information silos where information in one division or unit is not shared with another division or unit (Ratcliffe, 2007; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). For example, gang units often gather information and intelligence that is not accessible to narcotics units. In some cases, investigative units have not shared information with fusion centers within their own organization.

Sheptycki (2004) labels institutional friction, where various commands within a police agency withhold information from other units, as a factor in stunting two-way communication. In some agencies, internal rivalries exist where detectives still do not share information with patrol officers. Sanders and Henderson (2013) explain that some agencies in Canada view their organization as an empire where working collaboratively to share information is both an issue horizontally and vertically.

Part of this reluctance to share information traces back to officers’ hesitance to share any information they have gleaned for their own investigations. Information hoarding is often the result of organizational cultures that value keeping information within small circles (Kelley, 2003; Kruger & Haggerty, 2006; Osborne, 2006; Ratcliffe, 2007; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008; Sheptycki, 2004). In other circumstances, there are cultural barriers between investigators and intelligence analysts who are relatively new to police subcultures, as witnessed by the author working in a fusion center. Other agencies have realigned analysts to work directly with investigators and managers to resolve this hurdle (Ratcliffe, 2007; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). Lewandowski et al. (2017a), using interviews of fusion center staff, explain the cultural disconnect between civilian analysts and sworn officers. Ratcliffe (2008) expands on this point by arguing that civilian analysts are considered to have lower status than sworn officers do in a police department, therefore justifying restricted access to specific types of information and intelligence. This civilian/sworn divide intensifies the silos of information that exist within and across police agencies.

Police officers often share information informally with their peers in other agencies, and in some cases regional task forces assist in the sharing of cross-jurisdictional information but these are the exceptions. In other circumstances, criminal information is not shared among neighboring agencies or among local, state, and federal agencies (Joyal, 2012; Lewandowski et al., 2017b; Randol, 2013; Sheptycki, 2004). Officers are reluctant to cede control to other agencies for the same reasons noted above as well as believing that other agencies are less competent or lack a need to know (Taylor & Russell, 2012; U.S. Senate, 2013). A smaller survey (Cilluffo et al., 2011) found that police agencies did share information, but were more inclined to share locally, than regionally and federally.

Information sharing across police agencies and, more problematically, across homeland security organizations and the private sector is a reflection of differing organizational cultures. Interagency collaboration is also not institutionalized across policing (J. G. Carter, 2015; Joyal, 2012; Kelley, 2003; Kruger & Haggerty, 2006; Randol, 2013; Sanders & Henderson, 2013; Sheptycki, 2004; Taylor & Russell, 2012; Walker & Katz, 2001). Chermak and their colleagues (2013) found that most agencies responded on their survey that they were not satisfied with their current relationship with federal. state, other local law enforcement, fusion centers, and the private sector. However, J. G. Carter and his colleagues (2014) learned that police agencies that adopted the principles of the NCISP were 3 times more likely to have information sharing relationships with other departments and 4 times more likely to provide intelligence to them. Building better collaboration is a key element for homeland security information sharing.

The presence of complex information and intelligence sharing guidelines in and of itself creates another barrier to information sharing. For example, under the Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies standard 28 CFR Part 23, only information on persons and organizations that rise to the level of reasonable suspicion of a definable criminal activity or enterprise can be entered into a criminal intelligence system (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2017). It requires that this information meet both source reliability and content validity criteria to be entered in a system and, therefore, eligible for sharing. Sharing that information with other internal or external entities further requires that this information is relatively current and that an audit trail is established to ascertain dissemination. Other privacy and civil liberties guidelines exist for terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement information promulgated under the PM-ISE that limit information sharing that includes Personally Identifiable Information (PII) or data on U.S. persons (Information Sharing Environment, 2015). Police agencies that want to participate in the Information Sharing Environment that includes members of the intelligence community arguably will have to comply with privacy and civil liberties guidelines that protect individuals from invasions of privacy or constitutional protections such as free speech. There are a number of criteria that must be met to submit or receive terrorism or homeland security information, making it highly unlikely that most police organizations can put in place these safeguards. These guidelines are appropriate but do complicate the process of information sharing.

J. G. Carter et al. (2014), however, surveyed organizations, and found that larger agencies reported greater working relationships with other departments as well as provided more intelligence to external agencies. This may reflect the more evolved intelligence capacities of larger agencies in the policing system.

Information Sharing Implementation Complications

The implementation of an information sharing and intelligence function within police organizations is an area where most agencies have little experience. The collection of criminal intelligence is not a new idea in policing; it has been used for organized crime, gang, and drug investigations for decades. Despite that, many agencies have no formal intelligence function to handle routine criminal information, not to mention terrorist-related intelligence (Osborne, 2006; Randol, 2013). The LEMAS 2007 survey (U.S. Department of Justice, OJP, & BJS, 2011) found that reporting departments employed an average of 1 sworn and 0.5 nonsworn staff for intelligence analysis. Smaller agencies can use regional fusion or intelligence centers but larger agencies would have the need for their own analytical staff.

Intelligence is an underutilized function in policing due to a number of factors. First, there is a perceived lack of utility to everyday police work (Sanders & Henderson, 2013; Walsh, 2015). Collecting information and intelligence that benefits homeland security is not a normal part of maintaining order or conducting police investigations. Second, police departments have a less defined role in the collection of homeland security intelligence (Holden, 2003; White, 2004). The lack of an accepted national strategy to plan, collect, analyze, and distribute information and intelligence from local and state first responders to federal agencies and the jurisdictional issues mentioned previously creates uncertainty for police agencies. For instance, in the Chermak et al. (2013) survey, only between 3.5% and 15.4% of state, local, and tribal police staff reported that their agencies were aligned with the NCISP and only 3.5% to 6.7% were aligned with the TCL as it referred to intelligence and information sharing. J. G. Carter et al. (2014) report that “agencies mostly follow the NCISP, somewhat align their intelligence capacity with the TCL” (p. 438).

Third, traditional police agencies are less analytically oriented and focus on more reactive, intuitive decision making, which Cope (2004) describes as a lack of understanding how analytics can affect policy. A fourth factor is that standard information sharing business processes and protocols have not been formalized at the state and local levels to submit this information to a central intelligence analysis entity. For instance, the TCL (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007) recommends that law enforcement and appropriate agencies have plans, processes, and technologies in place to receive reports about suspicious activities from criminal or terrorist entities. Currently, the FBI, DHS, state fusion centers, and many local agencies collect suspicious activity reports from citizens and police officers. Some police departments can report directly to eGuardian or to the urban area or state fusion center. Terror-related SARs are passed to the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) for investigative follow-up, but it is difficult to find evidence that police departments have written directives and training in place to guide that information gathering process at the local level.

Although there has not been a substantial amount of empirical research examining information sharing and intelligence implementation in police agencies, the literature cited above leads one to conclude that progress has been made by the field in general but has not reached maturity yet (J. G. Carter, 2015; J. G. Carter et al., 2014; Chermak et al., 2013). The NCISP2 (U.S. Department of Justice, 2013) and the TCL outline steps American law enforcement agencies can take to build their information sharing and intelligence capacities, but the scope of organizational change can be overwhelming without a roadmap to guide agencies.

One substantial limitation to the cited works of Chermak, Joyal, Carter, and Lewandowski has been the reliance on survey and case study methods to assess information sharing capabilities with fusion center and other intelligence center staff. Some of this survey work was conducted at a DHS-sponsored intelligence training; therefore, these survey respondents may be more proactively developing information sharing practices than the average police department. In addition, some of this survey work was conducted approximately 10 years prior during the early stages of a broader ILP implementation effort and may not reflect current trends that show agencies trending more toward information sharing practices.

However, in more recent assessments, Lewandowski et al. (2017a) found that although strides were toward more information sharing methods, they are not institutionalized and remain more dependent on personal relationships built across agencies. Others (J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015) conclude that the adoption of intelligence-led policing requires significant organizational capacity.

The next section highlights an organizational change process that can assist state, local, and tribal police departments to buy into, build, and institutionalize a homeland security information sharing mission.

Establishing a Sense of Urgency

Kotter begins the discussion of leading change by stating that establishing a sense of urgency is necessary in gaining buy-in across an organization and, in this case, across the policing landscape. The 9/11 attacks were a wake-up call to American police executives that the world had changed. Great progress has been made to expand the reach of the intelligence community. Large agencies such as the New York and Los Angeles police departments have established robust homeland security divisions, but these departments may be the exception.

Having moved 16 years away from the 9/11 attacks, it can be argued that complacency regarding the homeland security mission in general has set in throughout many parts of policing. It is a consequence of the absence of a major attack in their jurisdictions, as well as a level of denial that “It can happen here” for many police departments that are already overburdened and underresourced, similar circumstances that Kotter (2012) discusses in other organizations.

With the continuing threats of locally derived terrorist attacks in Boston, San Bernardino, Orlando, and Ohio State, as well as international incidents in London, Paris, Brussels, and Barcelona, police leadership at all levels need to reemphasize that there is a continued sense of urgency (Lewandowski et al., 2017a; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). There remain a wide variety of potential soft targets such as shopping malls, information systems, government buildings, and sports and entertainment venues within each jurisdiction. For police agencies to effectively address these continuing and dynamic homeland security threats, organizational goals must shift.

The organizational hurdles that stifle change are narrow functional goals and internal measurement systems (Kotter, 2012) that do not capture information sharing accomplishments such as collecting suspicious activity reports and counterterrorism awareness training. Emphasizing some of the tenets of the NCISP2 such as establishing an intelligence capacity, accessing the HSIN and the RISS can incorporate police objectives to share information. Integrating information sharing metrics can reiterate the urgency of homeland security missions.

Creating the Guiding Coalition

The next stage of leading change entails creating a guiding coalition of change agents across the law enforcement discipline that has enough key players with high levels of credibility and leadership skills to drive permanent change. Although that is difficult in one police agency, it is exponentially more complex in a multilevel, decentralized policing system. The example of community policing adoption illustrates that real organizational change can occur in traditionally focused departments. For information sharing, in particular, to become woven into the police mission, national leaders need to integrate the views of police executives, down through line officers and staff. Police agencies operate as part of a large community and political system and, therefore, other stakeholders such as elected officials, community leaders, and the private sector must be part of that guiding coalition. These stakeholders have substantial influence on the mission of police agencies (Crank, 2003; Ratcliffe, 2007) and the subsequent allocation of resources.

Although many police leaders may be aware of these information sharing challenges, there has not been enough emphasis on achieving organizational buy-in from state and local officers in the field. With ILP, in general, and information sharing, in particular, leaders have to maintain commitment to implementation goals (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2013; Lewandowski et al., 2017b; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). In many jurisdictions, political and community leaders are unaware of homeland security information sharing efforts. The authors experience has been that many law enforcement homeland security efforts are created and implemented with little input from political officials or the community. Attempts to engage private sector entities in these efforts have largely been mixed (McNeill, 2010). Building advisory boards or private sector communities of interest would improve the level of partnership needed to sustain information sharing endeavors.

The NCISP2, the CICC, and elements of the National Response Framework (U.S. DHS, 2013) lay out a direction to achieve improved law enforcement information sharing. This vision must take hold at the ground level in state and local policing. One of the core concepts of the NCISP2 is to develop partnerships with other police agencies, the private sector, public safety and homeland security organizations, community groups, and privacy advocates. Partnering with existing field-based information sharing entities such as RISS, HIDTA, fusion centers, and crime analysis centers will change the police culture to one that fosters information sharing (MCCA, 2010). Greater participation from police organizations across the country will contribute to a collaboration and information sharing mind-set among law enforcement.

More regionally focused state and local information sharing coalitions are closer to the problem and will be able to translate national strategies into realistic change outcomes. Lewandowski et al. (2017b) report that intelligence recipients are most interested in products that address local law enforcement concerns. Coalitions that incorporate fusion centers, regional HIDTA and RISS sites, police agencies, as well as regional FBI, DHS, and other federal law enforcement entities will provide a more robust set of stakeholders (U.S. DHS, 2013; U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). One such entity is the Northeast Regional Intelligence Group, which does include the abovementioned organizations, but other regional groups across the United States are less robust. This effort came about in the aftermath of several terrorist attacks such as the Boston Marathon Bombing and the Sandy Hook Elementary School mass shooting, where it became clear that primary fusion centers were overwhelmed during the crisis state, but could accept assistance from other information sharing entities if protocols were in place (Northeast Regional Intelligence Group, and Project Manager—Information Sharing Environment, 2016). These guiding coalitions should include public officials with oversight responsibilities for police organizations. Developing supportive partnerships at this level enables local input for establishing homeland security and criminal intelligence policy.

Developing a Vision and Strategy

Kotter (2012) argues that strategic visions should be grounded in a clear and rational understanding of the organization and its capabilities. Visions should be imaginable, desirable, feasible, focused, flexible, and communicable. Imaginable, in that, they are grounded in the reality of services that can be provided, and desirable, in that, it appeals to professionals in these entities. Strategic shared visions should stretch but not overwhelm organizational resources, and therefore, should be focused on specific objectives. Ratcliffe (2008) states that developing an analytical vision for the department signifies the importance of this concept for the organizational mission. An assessment of organized crime policing strategy describes the lack of a shared vision and conflicting priorities across various levels of government as a detriment to successful implementation (Ratcliffe, Strang, & Taylor, 2014). They argue that analysts and commanders at the local level often have a different perception of the crime problem than do those experts at the state and national levels. This applies to homeland security information sharing in the United States as well.

A lack of a coordinated homeland security information sharing vision appears in other settings as well. Complaints from intelligence staff in at least one study (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2015) support the author’s experience in a fusion center where commanders and policy makers expected these units to be all things to all people, reflecting a lack of strategic vision as well as the multiple demands placed on analytical units by local, state, and national stakeholders.

Communicating the Change Vision

Although failure to adequately communicate a change vision is a common problem in many organizations in transition, it is surmountable across an entire profession. Kotter advises that communicating the vision should be simple, leaving out complex jargon. In the first iteration of law enforcement information sharing post 9/11, there was an abundance of terminology unfamiliar to police professionals. Concepts such as the intelligence cycle, situational awareness reports, priority intelligence needs, national information exchange model (NIEM; 2016a), and other language more aligned with national security business processes did not resonate with state and local policing, based on the author’s experience providing technical assistance to police agencies.

The change message should be consistent with national strategies but broadcast in a variety of ways to reach police practitioners. Police leadership organizations such as the IACP, PERF, and Major City Chiefs Association should champion information sharing messaging in conjunction with their regional, state, and local counterparts. Unions and professional associations such as the International Association of Intelligence Analysts (IALEA) and the International Association of Crime Analysts (IACA) are natural partners to spread the vision among analytical staff.

Information sharing 2.0 needs to be based on two-way communication (J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015). Initial national and state efforts toward building shared networks and processes across law enforcement often took a top-down approach. Breaking down resistance to sharing requires a high level of input from first responders to show how these initiatives help them on an everyday basis. Police officers and analysts can enhance existing investigations, increase situational awareness, and have the ability to identify emerging trends if they collect and share police information broadly (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). Highlighting the benefits of having more information to support investigations and community problem solving will increase buy-in (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2013).

Reducing information silos benefits routine police work. Bringing widespread information sharing to policing will require buy-in from not only leaders but also the street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980) who carry out new initiatives and policies. Darroch and Mazerolle (2013) state that their examination of successful ILP implementation was driven by leadership reinforcement and commitment to the philosophy resulting in a positive subculture. Other authors (Lewandowski et al., 2017a; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008) have argued that leadership commitment to ILP and information sharing is critical to institutionalization of these concepts. This includes educating other government officials about the benefits of cross-agency information sharing (U.S. Department of Justice, 2013).

Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action

Kotter’s fifth stage for leading organizational change involves empowering employees for what he terms “broad-based action.” Leadership’s role is to set up proactive staff for success by supporting them and removing any organizational barriers to change activities (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). Leaders in many police agencies provided staff to fusion centers, HIDTAs, and regional JTTFs. In another agency, leaders made information sharing and intelligence a priority that changed the culture (Joyal, 2012). Ratcliffe and Guidetti (2008) outline a case study where leadership in a large traditional law and order style police agency adopted intelligence-led policing as an organizational strategy, enabling sworn and analytical staff to innovate in a way that led to one of the most robust fusion centers in the country.

Sending future police leaders to the FBI National Executive Leaderships Institute or the Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense is another tangible effort to enhance information sharing in organizations (U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). Another key component of empowering change among information sharing professionals is to provide adequate training (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2015). Information sharing and intelligence production require an array of professional development activities at all levels from analytic standards training through the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) and the Criminal Intelligence Systems 28 CFR Part 23 programs for rank and file officers (D. Carter, 2004, J. G. Carter, 2016; Ratcliffe, 2008; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008; U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). Online information sharing training programs can supplement professional development opportunities for practitioners. At least one assessment (J. G. Carter et al., 2014) reported that police departments that educate their officers and staff in intelligence training are more likely to use intelligence-driven decisions.

Having written directives that support these new mission objectives to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate homeland security information is another avenue to empower officers to collect and share information (U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). It also protects the department from potential backlash from civil liberties critics. One study (Chermak et al., 2013) reported that police departments at the state, local, and tribal levels, in addition to fusion centers, were familiar with intelligence and information guidelines but have not fully developed policy and procedure that institutionalize those guidelines in their own organizations. This reflects a gap in policy development that can be addressed by leaders.

The Privacy, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Policy Development Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Justice Entities (U.S. Department of Justice, 2012) or simply the Privacy Guide is another avenue to empower intelligence personnel to develop department guidelines to decrease resistance to intelligence sharing. For instance, analysts and officers will have a greater understanding of what data can be entered into an intelligence database as a result of completing the Criminal Intelligence Systems 28 CFR Part 23 online training (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2017). Carter and his associates (2014) found that the creation of intelligence policies, including privacy guidelines, increased the likelihood of developing intelligence products.

Aligning current performance systems to the information sharing vision is another method to encourage adoption of homeland security objectives. For an intelligence-led framework to become part of the standard for 21st-century policing, officers and analysts must be rewarded for these efforts (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2013). The present state of policing does not give credit to officers for collecting, submitting, or sharing field interview or intelligence reports on criminal activity or suspicious activity reports for homeland security. Police performance measures do not always reflect this type of information sharing activity, but could be seamlessly incorporated.

Police leaders who adopt an intelligence-led philosophy and use information and intelligence to support policy choices empower their subordinates to adopt this new mission. In many police departments, there are change resisters that have to be convinced of the benefits of homeland security information sharing. Leaders who model information sharing practices can influence traditional managers who may not buy-in initially (Lewandowski & Carter, 2017; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). Creative employees will find ways to collect data, use information systems, and produce intelligence products for their departments and surrounding agencies once they are convinced that they have the backing of management.

Generating Short-Term Wins

Developing an intelligence-led police culture will be incremental and based on illustrating effectiveness in the field. Weiss (1997) found that police departments mimic successful practices in other agencies. What can assist in clarifying the utility of homeland security information sharing is a set of short-term wins for organizational champions pursing this change vision. Using the National Suspicious Activities Reporting Initiative (NSI) as an example, police agencies can provide the Line Officer SAR Training program officers, design a coherent SAR submission policy to fusion centers, and then share disseminated intelligence products in the department. Adoption of intelligence practices diffuses across neighboring agencies as they observe the utility of these ideas, which creates more short-term wins (Carter, 2016).

Enrolling significant portions of officers and analytical staff in national information sharing systems such as RISS, HIDTA, LEEP, and HSIN are other cost-effective short-term wins that support day-to-day police activities. Formalizing reporting relationships with fusion centers, DHS, and FBI entities is another example of collaboration across the field. Creating statewide or regional information requirements and intelligence production plans as illustrated by the National Capital Region Fusion Centers’ Concept of Operations (National Capital Region Fusion Centers, 2016) is a major milestone for sharing across organizations.

Many information sharing entities such as fusion centers have provided short-term wins by collocating detectives and analysts as well as analysts from different police agencies together (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003, Ratcliffe, 2007). This has allowed the development of informal as well as formal interactions between personnel to create a more analytical culture.

Within agencies, the development of information planning, collection, and analysis strategies is another way to achieve acceptance for the street-level bureaucrats in police organizations who are critical to information sharing goals (U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). Building a criminal intelligence capacity in a police agency is likely to take hold if it prioritizes “all crimes” as well as homeland security information sharing (Carter, 2016; Lewandowski & Carter, 2017). In smaller agencies, this may mean outsourcing their information sharing to a fusion or intelligence center. Changing the culture will occur if the information sharing and intelligence function is concentrated on what police officers, analysts, and their leaders confront every day.

Producing routine information and intelligence bulletins for officers is another concrete step for information sharing progress (Lewandowski & Carter, 2017; U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). This has been successfully accomplished in policing when fusion centers and other intelligence centers have analyzed serial burglary, metals theft, and gang violence. Convening regular briefings based on information collected in these situations is another example of effective change efforts. Many departments have established online portals or email lists to disseminate intelligence products to patrol officers and detectives. Officers are more likely to collect data if they receive feedback in the form of analytical products that are relevant to their work.

Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change

Police departments such as other traditional organizations not only are initially change resistant but also harbor latent resistance even after changes have begun (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Guyot, 1979; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). Kotter (2012) points out that certain managers or units in an organization may withhold their criticism until an opportunity presents itself. This was certainly the case with policing and homeland security where many law enforcement policy makers are critical of fusion centers, particularly when it siphons funding from other activities. In some cases, policy makers would rather procure a command post than hire an intelligence analyst.

The evolution of short-term wins to Stage 7, consolidating gains and producing more change, occurs when change leaders leverage those small successes to illustrate to those in the department that information sharing in this case can improve agency performance (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). Although the establishment of an intelligence function may occur at Stage 6, generating short-term wins, a more robust capacity might involve the hiring of full-time analysts and expanding analytical software such as mapping and social media tools (Carter, 2016). This may involve incorporating event, subject, and target deconfliction processes when dealing with multijurisdictional cases (U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). It could include providing more training opportunities to midmanagers, officers, and analysts; creating intelligence policies; or the development of a permanent intelligence unit (J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008; U.S. Department of Justice, 2015).

Consolidating gains in organizational change efforts is critical for traditional organizations in a stable environment, which tend to minimize internal interdependence (Kotter, 2012). This occurs in policing to a large degree due to organizational structures that are functionally differentiated. Police patrol divisions often operate separately from investigative units and administrative support entities within a department (Sanders, Weston, & Schott, 2015). Developing an information sharing process that supports investigators will reinforce the efficacy of intelligence analysis (Lewandowski, et al., 2017a; Randol, 2013; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008).

As the criminal and homeland security threat environment shifts rapidly, the need for information sharing should be apparent as should the interdependence of police functions within both an agency and externally (Joyal, 2012). For instance, patrol officers may very well have critical information that can enhance not only criminal investigations (Greenwood, 1979) but also terrorism intelligence gathering and analysis. Incorporating an SAR collection process into daily police operations would be a substantial benchmark for police agencies pursuing a homeland security information sharing vision (U.S. Department of Justice, 2013; Wormeli, 2014).

Aligning police information systems to the agency’s goals of information sharing also illustrates a commitment to the mission change. Updating police information systems that enable sharing and basic analysis for analysts and officers is a major level of progress from the traditional technologies that lock down and silo information across the agency (U.S. Department of Justice, 2013).

Initial information sharing wins will highlight the utility of this vision across departments. Darroch and Mazerolle (2013) found that leadership efforts to build bottom-up support and celebrate the successes of ILP were critical to its successful rollout. Patrol commanders who can use intelligence generated from SARs and field interview reports will ensure that further information collection by their subordinate units is conducted in a timely manner. Middle managers can add more change by expanding homeland security and intelligence-led policing concepts into other areas such as critical infrastructure protection and the use of the DHS’ IP Gateway vulnerability assessment tool. Officers will find innovative ways to use the information now available to address street crime as well as homeland security threats.

Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture

Interagency homeland security information sharing failures reflect, in part, the lack of buy-in from individual police agencies (D. Carter & Carter, 2009; Randol, 2013). Most police departments and their information sharing goals are internally focused (Chermak et al., 2013), more concerned with using information to address their routine police business. Information sharing across the broader police and homeland security environment is more of a concern for police leaders than officers.

Police organizational culture has a strong influence on shaping the department’s everyday mission (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008; Sanders & Henderson, 2013; Sheptycki, 2004). This is particularly an impediment when attempting to integrate homeland security and information sharing into a culture that has focused on the narrow mission of crime fighting without relating how it can assist that mission (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2015; Nagin, Solow, & Lum, 2015; Randol, 2013). Carter’s (2016) and Darroch and Mazerolles’ (2013) research found that the crime control benefits had a substantial impact on the adoption of intelligence-led policing, as an example.

Kotter’s final stage of organizational change involves anchoring new approaches in the culture. Police agencies have long been resistant to change as have many bureaucratic agencies, which directly affect the ability of those agencies to adapt and innovate (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Guyot, 1979; Skolnick & Bayley, 1986; Sparrow et al., 1990; Weisburd & Braga, 2007). Police departments are traditional organizations with strong internal cultures and often change resistant labor unions (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2015; Kadleck, 2003).

Some paradigm change attempts such as team policing, community policing, and arguably intelligence-led policing have not taken hold due to the inability of leaders and stakeholders to change the culture over the long term (Lurigio & Skogan, 1994).

It can be argued that the homeland security enterprise, in general, has failed to energize a large segment of policing, partly due to an underestimation of the power of organizational culture within the profession (Ratcliffe, 2008). In many instances, police officers do not see their role as the first line of defense against terrorism. But information sharing as an element of homeland security strategy will be more acceptable to line officers if it also assists with their traditional roles of crime reduction, order maintenance, and problem solving. Ratcliffe and Guidetti (2008) reflect on the ways to change traditional investigative culture through changing the organizational structure, enhanced training, and redesigning the reward structures to include information sharing as an operational objective. Rather than focus on traditional measures such as arrests or drug seizures, they highlight improved metrics including the quality and quantity of intelligence entries and products.

Constant communication about the importance of sharing information across police departments will buttress commitment to the vision (Kotter, 2012). Leaders who stay on message and continue to reward those individuals and units that were early adopters of homeland security information sharing underline the importance of the vision to the rest of the department (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008).

The information sharing change vision has to not only be constantly communicated but also be effective as a policing strategy. Enabling patrol officers to have access to intelligence systems such as RISSNET to identify serial burglars or using intelligence analysts to produce threat assessments using police data for special events provides a more data-driven approach to deployment decisions. Viewing maps of hot spots for violent crime or locations where various critical infrastructure facilities intersect have tactical and strategic benefits for police agencies (U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). The final element of the intelligence cycle, receiving feedback on intelligence products, will improve two-way communication and provide analysts with better direction to fulfill intelligence gaps (Lewandowski et al., 2017a).