Ethical Concerns About Private (and Public) Corrections: Extending the Focus Beyond Profit- Making and the Delegation of Punishment

Abstract

Common criticisms of privatized corrections are that tying punishment to profits is unethical and that the administration of punishment should not be delegated to private entities. Such criticisms are important to consider but other ethical concerns also arise when privatizing corrections. For example, do private correctional entities protect individuals’ rights? The focus on profit-making also overlooks ethical considerations that arise with public corrections. Indeed, focusing only on the ethics of financially incentivizing punishment or the delegation of punishment obscures important nuances about the ethics of privatization and corrections generally. To these ends, a framework is presented that highlights that a range of ethical considerations attend to private corrections as well as to public corrections. It also reveals that a focus on ethics, while a good unto itself, could improve the effectiveness and efficiency of private and public corrections.

Keywords

privatized corrections ethics public corrections private prisons

Introduction

Contemporary governments in America and across the globe frequently contract out or privatize aspects of corrections. Although such practices are widespread, there have been persistent debates about the ethical implications of using private entities to administer state-sanctioned punishments, treatments, and services (Reisig & Pratt, 2000; Sparks & Gacek, 2019; Thomas, 1991; see also The New York Times, 2016; Sessions, 2017; Yates, 2016). Critics of privatization argue that tying financial incentives to the administration of punishment and justice is unethical and, more specifically, that service quality will suffer because private entities will prioritize approaches that maximize their profits (Albin-Lackey, 2014; American Civil Liberties Union, 2011; Logan, 1988, 1990; Stillman, 2014). They also argue that governments should not delegate the responsibilities of state-sanctioned punishment (DiIulio, 1990; Robbins, 1989; see also Reisig & Pratt, 2000). Not least, critics argue that privatization creates opportunities for abuses and harms of individuals under correctional supervision, corrections systems generally, and society to occur.

These arguments, while compelling and important, focus on a narrow part of the spectrum of potential ethical issues that may arise when privatizing corrections. Ethical quandaries in privatized corrections can and do extend beyond the potential influence of financial incentives and the legal authority of private corrections organizations. For example, how well do private entities protect the legal rights of individuals under their supervision? Does the private sector contribute to unnecessary expansions of formal social control? Are private corrections more likely than public corrections to spend taxpayer dollars efficiently? Scholars recognize the importance of such questions (e.g., Feeley, 2002; Gaes, Camp, Nelson, & Saylor, 2004; Lundahl, Kunz, Brownell, Harris, & Van Vleet, 2009; Robbins, 1989; Sparks & Gacek, 2019). This broader range of ethical issues, however, is sometimes considered secondary to the potential influence of profit-making and the delegation of punishment.

The narrow focus of arguments about privatization also gives limited attention to ethical concerns that can and do arise when using public corrections. To illustrate, if empirical research were to demonstrate that privatized corrections, as compared with public corrections, implement higher quality services, achieve better outcomes, and do so at a lower cost, it could be viewed as unethical not to consider privatizing corrections (Lindsey, Mears, & Cochran, 2016). In addition, public corrections entities and staff are not immune from engaging in unethical practices. Indeed, some of the same abuses that occur in private corrections also occur in public corrections (e.g., Allen, 2012; Miller, 2017; Ovalle, 2018).

The goal of this article is to argue that the ethical considerations that attend to privatization go well beyond the notion that for-profit ventures in the punishment arena are intrinsically problematic. A related goal is to argue that ethical concerns that arise with privatization can arise too in public corrections. This article does not aim to promote the use of private corrections or public corrections. Rather, it argues that a balanced consideration of the diverse array of ethical concerns that arise with private corrections or public corrections may help to reveal practices that contribute to improvements in the implementation of all of corrections, whether public or private. To these ends, the article starts by defining “ethics” and discussing ethical considerations of privatization advanced by scholars, policy-makers, and the media. Second, a framework that identifies six ethical concerns that are relevant for comparing private and public corrections is presented. Third, building on the insights that arise from this framework, five approaches that may promote more ethical corrections are presented. Finally, the article concludes with a discussion about the framework’s implications for theory, research, and policy.

Background

Correctional Ethics

Philosophers have long debated about the foundation and meaning of ethics (MacIntyre, 2005). There is some agreement, though, that, at the broadest level, to be ethical is to do the right thing and to act in moral and appropriate ways (see, generally, Banks, 2016; MacIntyre, 2005; Pollock, 2013; Russell, 1910). Ethics have been described as “the discipline of determining good and evil and defining moral duties” (Pollock, 2013, p. 6). Ethics have also been described as “making moral judgments about what is right or wrong, good or bad” (Banks, 2016, p. 3).

These descriptions are helpful for understanding what ethics means; however, they shed little light on what is or is not ethical. This limitation is problematic given that scholars have argued that ethics should serve as a guiding beacon for government decision-making and practices (see, generally, Banks, 2016; Latessa, Cullen, & Gendreau, 2002; Mei et al., 2018; Sparks & Gacek, 2019). This problem is compounded in corrections by a lack of scholarship delineating what practices align with citizens’ sensibilities about appropriate ways to respond to crime.

One correctional practice that is frequently questioned on ethical grounds is privatization (Albin-Lackey, 2014; American Civil Liberties Union, 2011; Bannon, Nagrecha, & Diller, 2010; see also Logan, 1988, 1990) To date, however, there exists scant scholarship to suggest that privatization is, in fact, less ethical than public corrections or, as proponents would suggest, more ethical than public corrections. In what follows, the roots of privatization are briefly described. This description is followed by a discussion of common ethical arguments about privatization.

Ethics of Privatizing Corrections

The meaning of privatization is diverse and complex (Starr, 1988). A common type of privatization entails contracting out the provision of services to nongovernmental agencies, organizations, or companies (Starr, 1988). Accordingly, when services are privatized, the government remains involved through the selection of providers, execution of contracts, and monitoring of vendors and contracted services. In their service provision, private providers are required to meet the contractual obligations set forth and agreed upon by both the provider and the government. A recommendation for jails and prisons, but that also applies to other aspects of corrections, is that, “contractors should be required to meet state laws, regulations, and policies” (Hackett et al., 1987, p. 5).

Throughout history, governments have enlisted private entities, both for-profits and nonprofits, to assist with the implementation of correctional punishments, treatments, and services. In juvenile justice, for example, private organizations have supervised probationers and operated juvenile facilities (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1989; Flexner & Baldwin, 1914; Schultz, 1973). In adult corrections, governments have privatized the operations of community facilities, jails, and prisons (Carson, 2018; Minton, 2015; Stephan, 2008). In addition, the labor of juveniles and adults under correctional supervision has a long history of being contracted out to private business people (e.g., Mullen, Chabotar, & Carrow, 1985; Reed, 2016). Several other aspects of corrections also are operated by for-profit or nonprofit organizations, including, among other punishments and services, fine collection, community supervision, and rehabilitative treatments (Ericson, McMahon, & Evans, 1987; Feeley, 2002; Lindsey et al., 2016).

Although the practice of privatizing corrections has long-standing roots and is widespread in contemporary corrections, there remain divisive debates about its use (e.g., Sessions, 2017; Yates, 2016). These debates frequently center on the ethics of privatizing or not privatizing aspects of corrections. Critics argue that tying punishment to profits is unethical in part because privatizing corrections may incentivize the implementation of lower quality services that do not prioritize public safety or improved outcomes among the correctional population (Albin-Lackey, 2014; American Civil Liberties Union, 2011; Stillman, 2014; see also Logan, 1988, 1990). In short, they argue that “private companies, by their very nature, must put cost before quality and therefore quality will suffer” (Logan, 1990, p. 120). There also are questions about whether it is appropriate or legal for governments to delegate the administration of punishment to private entities (DiIulio, 1990; Eisen, 2019; Robbins, 1989; see also Reisig & Pratt, 2000).

Critics argue, too, that the presence of financial incentives may motivate private providers to invest in approaches that produce higher recidivism rates and that perpetuate severe punishments. To date, there exist a handful of studies that test these assertions (Bales, Bedard, Quinn, Ensley, & Holley, 2005; Duwe & Clark, 2013; Farabee & Knight, 2002; Gaes, 2019; Lanza-Kaduce, Parker, & Thomas, 1999; Powers, Kaukinen, & Jeanis, 2017; Spivak & Sharp, 2008). Results about how private versus public incarceration influence recidivism are inconsistent; however, a recent review of the literature concluded that privatized confinement may increase the likelihood of recidivism (Gaes, 2019). In addition, in a conference presentation, Mukherjee (2019) reported finding that individuals incarcerated in private prisons tended to receive more disciplinary reports, which contributed to longer terms of incarceration.

On the other side of the debate, proponents of privatization argue that governmental bureaucracy limits opportunities for innovation and hinders the development of improved solutions to correctional issues (see Logan, 1988, 1990). Privatization proponents, in corrections and other aspects of government, also argue that public agencies spend taxpayer dollars inefficiently and do so in ways that may reduce the effectiveness of services (Buchanan, 1978; Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, 2015; Niskanen, 1968; Tanner, 2013). Indeed, this perspective views the privatization of public services as a response to “governmental failure” (Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987, p. 59). Press and Washburn (2002) echoed these sentiments when discussing the privatization of services for at-risk youth: “Problems in the youth-services field are by no means confined to the private sector. In both the mental-health and juvenile-justice fields, it was government’s failure to provide adequate care that paved the way for privatization” (p. 39).

A primary argument for privatizing corrections is that the practice can save taxpayer dollars. Austin and Coventry (2001) summarize this argument: “Private firms claim that they can save 10 to 20 percent in prison operations due largely to efficient handling of labor costs” (p. 16). There is some support to suggest that private entities can build new prisons at a lower cost than can the government (Austin & Coventry, 2001). However, cost–benefit analyses of prison operations do not come to the same conclusion. Although there exist several cost comparisons of public versus private prison operations, evidence is mixed about which sector operates more cost-effectively (Pratt, 2019).

A Focus on the Ethics of Privatization

This framing of the debate—privatization entails profiting from punishment and so is intrinsically problematic versus privatization necessarily saves taxpayers’ dollars and so is intrinsically better—ignores the more complicated reality of both private and public corrections (Montes & Mears, 2019). Indeed, privatization debates often obscure what are a broad set of considerations about the expectations society has for responding to and punishing crime. These debates also tend to focus on the “private” side of the debate and ignore the ethical merits of public corrections. Consideration of the full range of ethical dimensions for both public and private corrections is warranted (Lindsey et al., 2016). This gap in the literature is notable given the pervasive use of privatized corrections (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1989; Carson, 2018; Ericson et al., 1987) as well as the frequent and widespread debates about that use (Sessions, 2017; Yates, 2016; see also Logan, 1988, 1990). A scholarly focus on the ethics of private corrections—and, indirectly, the ethics of public corrections—may produce several benefits.

First, a focus on ethics may shed light on whether governments respond to crime in ways that align with the public’s sensibilities about how lawbreaking behavior should be addressed. A previous study concluded that moral legitimacy around privatization contributed to states’ use of private prisons (Burkhardt, 2014). There also exist several examples of the public deeming a particular response to crime as inappropriate and then advocating for changes to that response. The death penalty, for example, has been the subject of moral questioning with citizens, at times, believing it inappropriate to sentence people to the death penalty and, at other times, believing it inappropriate not to sentence people to the death penalty. In contemporary society, such questioning has contributed to the decision by several jurisdictions to abolish its use (Baumgartner, De Boef, & Boydstun, 2008). Discerning whether privatization is or is not ethical may be important for assessing effects and efficiencies, but it also is important in and of itself.

Second, a focus on the ethics of privatized corrections can serve as a prism through which to better understand the ethical dimensions of correctional approaches and decision-making more broadly. To what extent, for example, do decision-makers consider ethics or recalibrate their decisions based on new information about ethical dimensions? To illustrate, decision-makers may believe that privatization is ethical because it will save taxpayer dollars without compromising quality. These cost savings, though, may never come to fruition. How do correctional administrators respond to these errors in decision-making (see, generally, Forst, 2004; Mears & Bacon, 2009)? When new information is not considered, a corrections system may not be operated as ethically—or effectively and efficiently—as it otherwise could operate.

Third, empirical and theoretical assessments of the ethics of privatization may improve evaluations of effectiveness and efficiency. Scholars argue that correctional assessments should focus on more than just impacts and costs, and that effective corrections will be guided by “ethical principles” (Latessa et al., 2002, p. 47). If privatized corrections were found to reduce recidivism, for example, but did so in ways that violated societal sensibilities about what is ethical, it is unlikely that citizens would consider such an approach effective.

Fourth, and not least, a focus on ethics aligns with calls by scholars to give attention to questions of “what’s right” (Sparks & Gacek, 2019, p. 390). Sparks and Gacek (2019) advance the argument that scholarship and policy typically focus first on whether policies are effective and efficient and, while important, that focus can mean that “effective” or “efficient” policies are prioritized over “ethical” ones (see also Ericson et al., 1987). A focus on ethics, then, can inform debates about what policies to use, above and beyond whether, for example, recidivism is reduced or costs are lowered.

Framework for Examining Ethical Dimensions of Public and Private Corrections

This article advances the argument that the ethical considerations about privatization extend well beyond concerns that profit-making should not be a part of corrections or concerns about whether the government should or should not delegate the administration of punishment (for a discussion about these two aspects of the debate, see DiIulio, 1990; Eisen, 2019; Feeley, 2002; Robbins, 1989). The focus on morality and legality are important to any debate about privatization. However, the existence of privatized corrections implies that some jurisdictions have decided that privatization, at least under some circumstances, is moral and legal. Accordingly, just as relevant to the privatization debate is consideration of the broader range of ethical concerns that can and do arise when punishment is privatized.

Also illuminated in this article is the importance of considering the ethical concerns that may exist with publicly operated corrections. For some people, the opportunities for profit-making by the private sector will always make public corrections the more ethical approach. However, even when concerns about public corrections do not outweigh the concerns about private corrections or even when nonprofit privatization is employed, a balanced consideration of the ethics of public and private corrections may create greater compliance with what society views as appropriate ways to “do” corrections.

Against this backdrop, this article focuses on the question: What ethical concerns may arise when using privatized corrections or when using public corrections? To these ends, a framework is developed that identifies six dimensions along which ethical concerns arise for both public and private corrections. The purpose of the framework is not to provide an exhaustive discussion of every moral or ethical issue that has occurred in a public or private corrections program or facility. Rather, it aims to delve deeper into some of the larger categories of ethical issues that are known to occur in correctional settings and to emphasize that the conditions that allow for unethical activities to occur can exist in public, for-profit, and nonprofit corrections. The framework suggests that scholarly and policy discussions about privatization might be most productive when the issues of profit-making and legality are not the only focal points. In the framework that follows, ethical concerns that fall along six dimensions are discussed: (1) correctional goals, (2) means of achieving correctional goals, (3) service amount and quality, (4) individuals’ rights, (5) cost-efficiency, and (6) identifying and addressing ethical issues.

Dimension 1. Prioritization of Correctional Goals

Several goals guide the implementation of the diverse range of correctional activities. An analysis of the mission statements of primary stakeholders, United States’s correctional agencies found an emphasis on the following goals:

guaranteeing the safety of the public, staff, and inmates (96.2 percent); providing the opportunity for inmate self-improvement, treatment, and rehabilitation (65.4 percent); reducing recidivism or assisting the offender’s reintegration into society (53.9 percent); respecting the dignity of inmates and treating them humanely (48.2 percent); operating cost-efficient and well-managed institutions (30.8 percent); insuring victims’ rights by promoting the goals of restorative justice (26.9 percent); and offering meaningful work either as an end unto itself or as a goal of rehabilitation (21.2 percent). (Gaes et al., 2004, p. 9)

What these findings do not indicate is the extent to which correctional agencies prioritize these goals. Do prison operators, for example, prioritize the safety of incarcerated individuals? Do they in fact prioritize efforts that provide individuals with opportunities to improve themselves?

Several of the arguments against privatization rest on assumptions that private entities, especially for-profit companies, are unlikely to prioritize correctional goals (e.g., Albin-Lackey, 2014; American Civil Liberties Union, 2011; Stillman, 2014). For-profit companies, the argument suggests, are distinct correctional stakeholders with goals that conflict with those set forth by the government’s correctional leaders. When a company’s goals to expand their business conflict with the public’s goals for corrections, the business goals, critics contend, are the ones likely to be prioritized (see, generally, American Civil Liberties Union, 2011; Austin & Coventry, 2001; Davis, 2000). Critics also argue that private organizations may be less motivated than public agencies to develop approaches that save taxpayer dollars or to promote policies that would shrink the size of the correctional population.

Such critiques may persist in part because private organizations have engaged in practices that are detrimental to correctional goals. In 2008, for example, it was learned that a private company had been giving local judges financial kickbacks for placing youth—many of whom had committed only minor forms of delinquency—in private youth centers (Getlen, 2014). Abuses such as this one may be unlikely to occur when there do not exist financial incentives for administering punishments.

On the surface, it may appear that the goals of public agencies are well aligned with those of corrections. Concerns about unaligned goals, however, extend also to public corrections. Similar to administrators and wardens in private facilities, public corrections employees may receive bonuses, even when their facilities suffer from staffing shortages and violence: “The federal prison system paid $1.6 million in bonuses to its top executives and wardens during the past two years despite chronic staffing shortages and sharp critiques of prison management leveled by Congress” (Johnson, 2019). Similarly, scholars argue that public employees across several agencies are incentivized by opportunities for promotions and higher salaries to operate inefficiently (Buchanan, 1978; Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, 2015; Niskanen, 1968; Tanner, 2013). Employees may expand their department’s scope of work unnecessarily as a way to justify increases in resource allocations. It is also argued that when departments operate efficiently and underuse their budget, they may be penalized in the form of cuts to “unneeded” budgets and resources. It is feasible that such a situation motivates departments to use all of their allocated funds even when there is not a need to do so. Such practices would directly conflict with correctional goals in part because they divert funds away from other needed resources.

Dimension 2. Using Ethical Means to Achieve Correctional Goals

The prioritization of correctional goals is an important aspect of ethically operated corrections, but prioritization alone is not enough. Entities administering punishments and treatments also must rely on ethical means for achieving correctional goals. The vast majority of correctional agencies, for example, prioritize “the safety of the public, staff and inmates” (Gaes et al., 2004, p. 9). If, in their efforts to achieve this goal, prison administrators place the majority of incarcerated individuals in solitary confinement, not only is that a questionable way to proceed, but it also may violate society’s sensibilities about how governments should respond to crime. In addition, by using this method to achieve one goal, they likely are compromising other goals, such as treating people humanely and using cost-efficient approaches.

Privatization critics have raised concerns that private organizations will not rely on ethical means to achieve correctional goals. They might instead rely on approaches that increase opportunities for profit. Private fine collectors, for example, can impose steep collection fees on individuals who owe court fines. For some individuals, these collection fees contribute to long-term cycles of debt as well as jail time for failing to pay the private organization’s collection fees (Bannon et al., 2010; Harris, Smith, & Obara, 2019; Stillman, 2014).

Reform advocates have also voiced concerns about how governments implement various aspects of corrections. Some states, for example, can mandate the castration of sex offenders, a practice that advocacy organizations have argued constitutes cruel and unusual punishment (Ducharme, 2018). In addition, decisions to privatize corrections are made by public entities, and private contractors are monitored by public entities. Critiques of private corrections could be interpreted, then, as critiques of the means used by governments to achieve correctional goals.

Dimension 3. Providing the Appropriate Service Amount and Quality

Many jurisdictions rely, at least on paper, on ethical means for responding to crime. What is less known is whether those means are provided in the “right” amount and quality (Mears, 2010). Services not implemented in their appropriate amount and quality may undermine efforts to achieve correctional goals. Consider functional family therapy (FFT). To assess if it is being implemented in an ethical manner, information is needed about whether counseling sessions are provided by a qualified, trained therapist, if all components of the FFT curriculum are provided, and if staff members are treating participants appropriately. When all FFT’s components are not provided, there may be limited opportunities for improved family functioning and, in turn, improved youth behavior. This outcome is, in and of itself, ethically problematic. It is also problematic because it means funds are being used on interventions that are not being implemented as intended and, thus, are less likely to achieve their intended outcome.

A common concern of privatizing corrections is that private entities may deliberately compromise on important aspects of implementation, such as staff vetting and training. A basis does exist for raising such concerns. To illustrate, a private juvenile facility in Florida hired a staff member who had just months earlier been fired from a prison for kissing and inappropriately touching an inmate (Miller & Burch, 2017). That staff member eventually began soliciting sex from a youth housed at the juvenile facility (Sullivan, 2014).

Concerns about service amount and quality are just as prevalent in public corrections. Critics of public services argue that bureaucratic processes and union protections make it difficult to fire employees, even when an employee exhibits poor performance (Logan, 1988, 1990; see also Levinson, 1985). In addition, abuse of individuals can occur in public correctional settings. In the 1950s and 1960s, at Florida’s state-run Dozier School for Boys, youth frequently experienced beatings and death. More than 80 boys died at the school, and more than 300 men have shared stories about the abuse they endured at Dozier (Allen, 2012).

To date, there has been limited empirical research comparing the service quality and amount of public and private corrections. The studies that exist focus on the quality of juvenile facilities and prisons (Armstrong & MacKenzie, 2000, 2003; Crewe, Liebling, & Hulley, 2011; Lundahl et al., 2009; Perrone & Pratt, 2003), with limited research focusing on the vast array of other correctional activities and no studies systematically comparing the amount of services provided (see, generally, Lindsey et al., 2016). Scholarship does not yet point clearly to one approach, public or private, as providing superior service quality (Lundahl et al., 2009; Perrone & Pratt, 2003). What is clear is that concerns about whether the appropriate amount and quality of services are being provided exist for both public and private corrections.

Dimension 4. Protecting Individuals’ Legal Rights

When placed under correctional supervision, individuals forfeit certain rights. For example, individuals can be detained involuntarily, and they may lose their right to vote, access social services, or live in certain locations (Petersilia, 2003; Travis, 2002, 2005). They do, however, maintain their right to due process and to protections from cruel and unusual punishment (see, generally, Bonta & Gendreau, 1990; Call, 1995; Dolovich, 2009; Singer, 1970). Staff who oversee and supervise correctional populations also have rights that must be protected. Such rights include, among others, minimal staff stress, limited safety concerns, and receipt of proper training (e.g., Armstrong & Griffin, 2004; Brodsky, 1974; Triplett & Mullings, 1996; see also Hogan, Lambert, Jenkins, & Hall, 2009). An important aspect of implementing ethical corrections, then, entails protecting the rights of the individuals under correctional supervision as well as the rights of the individuals employed to work in correctional settings.

Private corrections have been criticized for creating environments that fail to prioritize these legal rights. In 2005, 6% of private adult facilities were “under court order to limit the size of their inmate population” and 7% were “under court order . . . for specific conditions of confinement” (Stephan, 2008, p. 3). In addition, some facilities suffer from staffing shortages, which, in turn, contribute to unsafe working conditions for staff and to increases in violence among incarcerated individuals (Prentice, 2013; United States Department of Labor, 2014).

Scholars have found that public correctional settings may experience similar issues. One study revealed that public and private facilities have a similar likelihood of experiencing judicial intervention for poor conditions (Burkhardt & Jones, 2016). In 2005, “1% of public facilities were under a court order to limit the size of their inmate population” and “fourteen percent of all public facilities were under court order for specific conditions of confinement” (Stephan, 2008, p. 3). Public prisons also experience severe staffing shortages. Florida’s Secretary of Corrections argued that a primary contributing factor to Florida’s increase in prison violence is “the fact that nearly half of the state’s corrections officers have less than two years of experience” (Brown, 2017). Her argument suggests that high rates of staff turnover have created environments that require inexperienced staff members to respond to a range of prison issues, including safety concerns, that they may not be equipped to handle.

Recourse options when one’s rights are violated also might differ for people under private versus public supervision. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Richardson v. McKnight that privately employed correctional staff can be sued for violating individuals’ rights (DaCosse, 1998; Lemkemeier, 1998). Other rulings, though, have contributed to a lack of clarity about the rights of individuals under private supervision. In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Minneci v. Pollard that inmates in private federal prisons “may not bring actions for violations of their Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment and may instead bring actions sounding only in state tort law” (Waks, 2013, p. 1065). Critics argue that such rulings create additional barriers for the individuals in privately run prisons who want to seek recourse for a violation of their rights (Waks, 2013; see also Volokh, 2013).

Another assessment of the Minneci v. Pollard ruling suggests that individuals placed in public corrections facilities who attempt to seek recourse for a violation of their rights could face more barriers than their counterparts in private prisons (Volokh, 2013). In addition, scholars argue that the 1996 Prison Litigation Reform Act and other similar laws severely limit litigation options for all incarcerated individuals, whether in public or private facilities (Burkhardt & Jones, 2016). Ethical considerations about individuals’ legal rights are relevant, then, to both public correctional settings and private correctional settings.

Dimension 5. Prioritizing Cost-Efficient Uses of Taxpayer Dollars

One concern frequently expressed by citizens is whether taxpayer dollars are being used efficiently. Determining the cost-efficiency of correctional approaches, and of privatization in particular, though, is not easy (Mears, 2010; Pratt, 2019). Cost-efficiency analyses extend beyond how much money is spent on a particular service. There is also a need to know what exactly is received in exchange for a specific amount of money. For example, what service amount and quality is provided and for what cost? Is that service in line with the public’s goals for those funds? What impacts did the service achieve? Were there unintended consequences of using that service?

Cost-efficiency, then, is not just about spending the least amount of money possible. It is about receiving the right services in the right amount and quality and receiving services that achieve their intended impact while also avoiding unintended harms. Put differently, when taxpayer dollars are not used in a cost-efficient manner, it means that money is being spent on unnecessary, and perhaps even harmful, services. To date, there exists no consistent evidence that privatization operates cost-efficiently or saves taxpayer dollars (Pratt, 2019).

Net-widening—that is, individuals who otherwise would not have experienced formal social control are being placed under correctional supervision (Blomberg & Mestre, 2014)—is a common concern in corrections that directly bears on discussions about cost. When net-widening occurs, there may be harms caused to individuals who should not be targeted by correctional efforts (see, generally, Bowditch & Everett, 1987; Feeley, 1991). Indeed, individuals who otherwise would have avoided the net of formal social control may now be subject to all of the direct and collateral consequences of criminal justice contact. It also means, though, that more money is being spent on corrections than what is necessary. It could mean, too, that funds are being diverted away from alternative interventions or approaches that are more likely to achieve correctional goals.

Contractual agreements with private entities can create conditions that contribute to net-widening and, in turn, cost-inefficiencies. It is feasible, for example, that certain types of contractual obligations could result in individuals receiving a certain sanction (e.g., drug counseling, incarceration) not because the sanction is necessary but because there exists a contractual obligation to continue referrals or to maintain a certain occupancy rate. These types of agreements could result in individuals receiving improper treatment if where they are referred for services is based on the existence of a contract rather than on the individuals’ needs. There also is concern that contracting will open the door to individuals receiving an unnecessarily severe sanction, especially when the government is contractually obligated to maintain particular occupancy rates within private institutions (see Eisen, 2017a). Indeed, Kansas’s former Secretary of Corrections expressed this apprehension about the use of private prisons:

My concern would be that our state would be obligated to maintain those [occupancy] rates and subtle pressure would be applied to make sentencing laws more severe with a clear intent to drive up the population. (Johnson, 2012, p. A1)

Not least, the presence of contractual obligations, such as occupancy rates, may mean that jurisdictions allocate taxpayer dollars to unnecessary services.

It is also feasible that public corrections use practices that result in net-widening and, in turn, an ineffective use of taxpayer dollars. For example, when the California legislature was considering “three-strikes” legislation, the union for state correctional officers “launched an intense statehouse lobbying effort to pass the means to lock up habitual offenders” (Mahtesian, 1996; see also Logan, 1987; Shichor, 1998). Similarly, when governments respond to temporary service needs by using public corrections, those services may be difficult to stop using when that need subsides. Those services may then remain in use, targeting people who might not need the service, for the long term (see, generally, Lindsey et al., 2016).

These examples focus on whether correctional interventions target the “right” individuals. This example is but one. There are several other ways correctional organizations may use funds inefficiently. The use of any approach that does not align with correctional goals, prioritize ethical means, provide appropriate service amounts and quality, and protect individuals’ legal rights constitutes an inefficient use of taxpayer dollars.

Dimension 6. Processes for Identifying and Addressing Ethical Shortfalls and Their Causes

Correctional organizations, whether public or private, that have not identified ethical problems but that do not have processes in place for doing so, cannot be considered to be operating ethically. Perhaps the most common concern leveled against privatized corrections is that profits create “perverse incentives” that may produce “unintended consequences at odds with the interests of the policymakers who created the incentives” (Eisen, 2017a, p. 186). Indeed, policy-makers and the media have highlighted several instances when opportunities for profit-making appeared to drive correctional decision-making. One source estimates, for example, that in the 26 years prior to 2015, corrections companies spent more than $35,000,000 on political campaigns and pro-privatization lobbying efforts (Cohen, 2015). Pro-privatization groups also have been heavily involved in policy-making efforts across the country (see Eisen, 2017a). There exist, though, few mechanisms for determining to what extent this involvement adversely influences the correctional system or population. Absent processes for identifying ethical shortfalls, it will remain unknown to what extent, if at all, they are occurring. It also means there will be little knowledge about how to address shortfalls or how to improve implementation.

A Summary

Arguments against privatization often focus on the ethical concerns that can arise when financial incentives are present. They also focus on whether it is appropriate for governments to delegate the administration of punishment. The framework highlights that there exists a much broader range of ethical concerns that can arise in correctional settings. It highlights, too, that ethical considerations are not unique to private corrections—They also arise in public corrections. Indeed, a public-only corrections system would not provide a magic-bullet solution for rooting out unethical correctional activities (see, generally, Butts & Pfaff, 2019; Feeley, 2014).

A logical corollary arises from this framework: The most ethical approach to corrections may have little to do with whether a correctional activity is “public” or “private.” It instead may entail consideration of whether a service provider, public or private, prioritizes correctional goals, uses ethical means to achieve those goals, provides high-quality services in their appropriate amount, protects individuals’ legal rights, operates cost-efficiently, and has processes in place for identifying and addressing ethical issues. Consideration of this broader range of dimensions may be instructive for ensuring that society’s expectations for how individuals should be treated are not violated, even when individuals are being subject to state-sanctioned punishments. Not least, it emphasizes that correctional punishments should not be inflicting undue pains or deprivations.

Approaches That May Promote Ethical Corrections

Scholars posit several approaches that may, directly or indirectly, contribute to more ethical public and private corrections (see, generally, Butts & Pfaff, 2019; Gaes et al., 2004; Harding, 1997, 2000; Montes & Mears, 2019; Shichor, 1993, 1995; Sparks & Gacek, 2019). First, greater transparency is needed about what occurs in public and private corrections (Geraghty & Velez, 2011; Tartaglia, 2014). To date, little is known about the inner workings of correctional agencies, their programs, and their facilities (Mears, 2008). Even less may be known about private corrections:

Aside from a handful of states where legislation extends public records disclosures to private corporations taking government money . . . private prisons are not covered by the same freedom of information and open records laws as are other government functions, making it difficult for the public to learn the most basic information about what life is like behind its doors. (Eisen, 2017b; see also Eisen, 2017a)

Transparency is a prerequisite to any system of accountability or monitoring, which, as will be described below, are approaches frequently recommended by scholars for improving public and private corrections. In addition, knowing what happens in correctional programs and facilities is the only way the public can decide whether or when to support privatization (see, generally, Geraghty & Velez, 2011).

Second, an investment in systematic and ongoing empirical comparisons of public and private corrections may shed light on the operations and impacts of all correctional activities (see, generally, Gaes et al., 2004; Lindsey & Mears, 2018; Lindsey et al., 2016; Shichor, 1993, 1995) and, in so doing, help to discern the salience of particular ethical issues. To identify when and how ethical concerns come to fruition, evaluations would need to consider each of the concerns in the framework described above. For example, how does each type of corrections compare in their efforts to achieve correctional goals, protect individuals’ rights, and so on? In addition, each dimension would need to be considered over time and across several jurisdictions.

An investment in systematic and ongoing empirical comparisons will help to create evidence and advance the scientific understanding about how diverse punishment practices are used and whether they are appropriately implemented (Gaes et al., 2004; Lindsey et al., 2016; Mears, 2010). Although this information cannot resolve ideological concerns about private organizations profiting from the administration of justice, it can help to resolve empirical questions about when it might be appropriate or inappropriate, in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, to use privatized corrections.

Third, rigorous monitoring of both public and private corrections is needed to minimize the occurrence of ethical issues (see, generally, Gaes et al., 2004; Harding, 1997; Lindsey & Mears, 2018; McDonald & Patten, 2003). Such monitoring should entail a wide range of efforts. It should start with a robust vetting process of potential service providers (see Harding, 1997). For example, does the provider have a history of implementing quality services and achieving intended outcomes? It entails, too, having clear expectations written in a contract or service agreement (Hackett et al., 1987). This upfront clarity about what is expected can help to hold service providers, whether public or private, accountable for implementing correctional activities in an ethical manner.

Ongoing empirical assessments can also be used to assist in identifying and addressing ethical issues as they arise. Such processes need to include having processes in place for responding to these issues and for changing providers, if needed. If, for example, it is learned that a public agency is providing subpar drug treatment, there needs to be a way to ensure those services are improved or to halt the service provision from that agency. If a private prison is failing to ensure that contracted rehabilitative programs are provided to incarcerated individuals, there needs to be a way for governments to intervene.

Fourth, governments could use contracts and financial incentives to mandate and promote ethical corrections (see, generally, Cullen, Jonson, & Mears, 2017; Davilmar, 2014; Lindsey & Mears, 2018; Wright, 2010). In the United States, contracts typically obligate private organizations to provide particular services, such as bed space within a prison facility (see Eisen, 2017a). Other countries, though, have developed less conventional contracts that require the achievement of outcomes that align with the public interest. Australia and New Zealand have executed “performance-based contracts” with prison operators, which award the company bonuses for achieving recidivism rates that are lower than those of the government and fine the company for “unacceptable events like riots, escapes, and unnatural deaths” (Eisen, 2018).

A similar incentives structure could be used with public corrections. Corrections organizations that provide certain levels of service quality could receive additional funds the following year. Other types of incentives could also be leveraged. Governments could, for example, make employment promotions contingent on the achievement of certain outcomes, such as maximizing the departmental budget, which would first require rigorous monitoring and evaluation about service quality, impacts, and costs.

Fifth, leveraging the strengths of both public corrections and privatized corrections may promote more ethical corrections; the most ethical approach may be one that entails supplementing public corrections with private services that can address the government’s limitations. It also may entail public and private entities learning from each other and, in so doing, advancing correctional goals (see Harding, 1997, 2000, 2001). Such an approach accords broadly with Harding’s (2000) argument about prisons: “In the long run, the most robust justification for privatization may lie in its impact on the performance of the public prison sector, with consequential improvement of the system as a whole” (Harding, 2000, p. 647).

Conclusion

The long-standing use of privatized corrections continues to be marred by debates about its merits and, in particular, about the ethics of outsourcing punishment. It is argued in this article that a common framing of the ethical concerns of privatized corrections provides only a limited scope of the range of ethical dimensions that are relevant for adjudicating which approach, public or private, has a stronger ethical foundation.

This article’s framework draws attention to the complex realities surrounding privatization. In so doing, it highlights an array of research opportunities. Scholars might examine the relevance each of the ethical dimensions has for the diverse correctional stakeholders and for each aspect of corrections from fine collection to prison operations. In contemporary society, stakeholders “include [public officials and employees, prisoners, and public interest] but also voters, labor unions, private for-profit corporations, communities housing prisons, and the politicians, lobbyists, and political organizations that represent all these interests” (Tonry & Petersilia, 1999, p. 12). They also include individuals under community supervision, community and nonprofit organizations, and agencies providing correctional treatment or reentry assistance. Each of these stakeholders may have goals that are distinct from those of other stakeholders. This article’s framework examines overarching correctional goals and is not specific to any particular stakeholder. Future research might build on this framework by assessing the ethical orientation of each particular stakeholder along each of the framework’s dimensions.

Studies also may be used to examine whether certain ethical dimensions are more, or less, relevant for different groups of people. For example, do the impacts of poor service quality differ for minorities as compared with White individuals? What about for males compared with females? When correctional goals are not prioritized, are certain communities more likely to suffer? Scholars also might examine whether privatization expands the net of formal social control generally and of racial and ethnic minorities in particular (see Sparks & Gacek, 2019).

It is conceivable that a focus on ethics will contribute to improved effectiveness and efficiency of corrections. When correctional goals are prioritized, for example, it may be more likely that intended impacts, such as reduced recidivism and improved public safety, will occur. A focus on ethics could, however, strain contemporary corrections through the financial costs of addressing some of the ethical concerns highlighted by the framework. For example, it would take a substantial sum of money to address the staffing issues many prisons are currently facing. Such investments, though, may be offset by long-term cost savings and improvements in quality, impacts, and treatment of individuals. Not least, doing so may be the most ethical approach.

A focus on correctional ethics can be argued to constitute a good unto itself. It can also serve as an opportunity for advancing the scientific understanding of correctional operations and impacts. To date, there is little generalizable understanding of how corrections operate or under what conditions they are likely to be implemented appropriately. The framework presented in this article could be leveraged to expand knowledge about what correctional approaches, whether public or private, rest on an ethical foundation and, at the same time, can contribute to scholarship about correctional decision-making, operations, and impacts.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Drs. Daniel P. Mears, William D. Bales, Sonja E. Siennick, Eric A. Stewart, and Melissa Radey for their comments on an earlier draft of this article. She also thanks the anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Andrea N. Montes

Author Biography

Andrea N. Montes, PhD, is an assistant professor at Arizona State University, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice. Her work has appeared in Crime and Delinquency, Criminology and Public Policy, and Criminal Justice and Behavior. Her research focuses on theories of crime and punishment, crime prevention and school safety, and privatization.

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