Willingness to Pay for Police Reform

Abstract

Consent decrees, authorized by Section 14141 of the 1994 Violent Crime Control Act, represent one of the most powerful governmental tools used to encourage—and possibly force—police reform. The consent decree process, however, carries a significant fiscal burden; in some cases, the cost of police reform inhibits agencies’ cooperation with the decrees. One possible solution to this problem calls for the creation of a public-supported police reform fund, whose monies are reserved strictly for consent decrees. Guided by focal concerns theory, this study reports on a factorial survey experiment used to assess variation across individuals’ willingness to pay for police reform. Results indicate that the seriousness of a police reform issue and the agency’s ability to pay for reform act as significant drivers of endorsement of a police reform fund.

Keywords

police reform willingness-to-pay consent decrees factorial survey experiment

Public policing is under the microscope more than ever. Botched force encounters, questionable and even illegal shootings, allegations of implicit and explicit bias, expanded media coverage, and increased transparency (much of it forced) have all combined to put agencies on notice that even the mere appearance of impropriety will be dealt with seriously and swiftly. Criminologists are busily researching trends and correlates of use-of-force and officer-involved shootings, as evidenced by a surge in publications on the subject (e.g., Tregle et al., 2019). So significant is the scrutiny that police may have even curtailed their enforcement efforts in an attempt to avoid drawing adverse public attention (e.g., Rosenfeld & Wallman, 2019). Policymakers are exploring various options to force reforms, ranging from the formation of task forces and oversight boards to personnel changes and even forced federal intervention into local law enforcement affairs. Concerning the latter, U.S. Justice Department–mandated consent decrees are among the most significant mechanism used to address patterns of misbehavior in local law enforcement agencies (Chanin, 2015; Harmon, 2009; Rushin, 2017).

Section 14141 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 gives the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) authority to investigate and force reform within local police agencies that engage in patterns or practices of civil rights violations. If the DOJ investigates a local agency and finds evidence of impropriety, it will start by offering technical assistance, but if such an informal approach fails, it will consider memoranda of understanding and, in the extreme, litigation. The litigation route typically ends with a “consent decree,” which is a court-mandated agreement designed to force the agency into implementing specified reforms (Chanin, 2015; Powell et al., 2017; Rushin, 2014, 2017).

Consent decrees are controversial, in part, due to their generally exorbitant costs. They often require extensive reforms to policy and practice and require expensive oversight. All costs must be borne by the agency under the decree, fueling criticism of the practice. Evidence suggests the recently approved Chicago consent decree will cost the city US$25.7 million, including US$3 million for oversight alone (Blakley, 2019). These costs have fueled widespread resistance to consent decrees, particularly among police unions and the rank and file. In Oakland, for example, reforms were resisted for 9 years; in Cincinnati, a monitor was even kicked out of police headquarters (Domanick, 2014). Consent decree critics have described them as among the “most dangerous . . . exercises of raw power” and an “end run around the democratic process” (DeBow et al., 2008, p. 3). Resistance to consent decrees, and particularly proposed methods for overcoming that resistance, is the focus of this article.

One may never alleviate all concerns related to police reform. Financial barriers, however, could weaken if sufficient funds were made available to prospective consent decree agencies. Assuming the cost of implementing widespread reform serves as a barrier to reform acceptance, one should consider whether individuals support the creation of a dedicated police reform fund. The public serves as the victim of police abuse and perhaps acts as the largest stakeholder of correcting police misbehavior. Thus, the public may be willing to support police reform efforts as they represent a direct beneficiary of improved police behavior.

However, one should not expect the public to widely support the creation of a police reform fund. Important variation may exist across one’s assessment of a problem and willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a police reform fund. Using focal concerns as a theoretical guide, the seriousness of police misconduct problems, the threat to the community, and practical considerations are expected to model variations in support for a police reform fund.

Barriers to Reform

Consent decrees are but one example of law enforcement reform that is met with resistance. Indeed, policing history is replete with examples of failed reforms and refusal to change. As Walker (2005) observed, “[t]he history of police reform is filled with stories of highly publicized changes that promised much but evaporated over the long run with only minimal impact” (p. 17). Many people believe, as Walker noted, that “. . . the police subculture is resistant to all efforts to achieve accountability” (p. 17). Change is hard, and the police are not the only institution that struggles with it. Nevertheless, the context and culture of American policing combine to throw up multiple barriers to reform.

The fragmented nature of policing in the United States is perhaps the first obstacle. With more than 18,000 individual law enforcement agencies, there is no single manifestation of police culture. There is, though, a distinct hierarchy and “us versus them” mentality (e.g., Herbert, 1998) that can be difficult to disrupt. An ingrained “warrior mindset” (Stoughton, 2015) lures officers into a state of skepticism toward outsiders. Researchers have gone so far as to describe “ . . . a cultural milieu that tolerates or even facilitates illegal practices” (Gould & Mastrofski, 2004, p. 323).

Generally speaking, there are three main sets of factors that seem to thwart change in policing: sociological or situational, psychological or individual, and organizational. As Cohen (2017) noted, “[t]he first emphasizes the situational dynamics perceived by the officer, such as the race, gender, and demeanor of citizens” (p. 110). The second is concerned with individual officers, including the cultural mindset they are indoctrinated to absorb. The third consists of everything from organizational subculture and attitudes to policies and leadership hierarchy. A very practical organizational consideration is resources—particularly the lack thereof. Without the means, much less the will, to implement reforms, agencies will struggle and resist change. Given consent decrees’ often staggering costs, it is no wonder they meet with some level of resistance. To the extent their benefits outweigh their costs (Worrall, 2017), what can be done to minimize resistance and improve the prospects for lasting and meaningful reform? One answer requires the exploration of citizen support for police reform.

Willingness-To-Pay

Knowing that consent decrees are expensive, and knowing they are resisted in part due to their costs, what would happen if citizens voluntarily offered to pay additional tax dollars to aid in their implementation? On a handful of occasions, criminologists have studied people’s WTP for criminal justice policy reforms (e.g., Cohen et al., 2006; Nagin et al., 2006; Piquero & Steinberg, 2010). The lack of research in this area is surprising insofar as public support for criminal justice reform is only part of the equation. As Baker et al. (2016) note, “[t]he public must be willing to pay, presumptively through taxes, for their preferred approach; otherwise, their support is simply an indicator of policy preference” (p. 649).

Most prior WTP research has been confined to juvenile justice reform initiatives. Nagin et al. (2006) interviewed Pennsylvania residents using hypothetical scenarios to ask about WTP for incarceration- or rehabilitation-based approaches. Respondents were willing to pay around US$80 in additional taxes per year to incarcerate juveniles, but preferred to invest in rehabilitation and early prevention programs. Piquero and Steinberg (2010) adopted a similar approach in their four-state analysis. They found, too, that people were more willing to pay for rehabilitative approaches than incarceration-based ones. They went a step further and also explored predictors of respondents’ WTP additional money. Whites, younger respondents, and those who received the rehabilitation scenario expressed greater WTP. A third study (Cohen et al., 2006) reached similar conclusions: Respondents were generally more supportive of additional taxes for rehabilitation and prevention programs than traditional incarceration-based approaches.

We extend this line of research into the consent decree process. Consent decrees can be viewed as something of a rehabilitative mechanism, intended to improve patterns and/or practices of civil rights violations. Are people more willing to pay additional tax dollars to help reform police departments in the same way they appear supportive of rehabilitation and prevention programs? To answer this question, we drew on focal concerns theory to implement the same hypothetical scenario-based approach used in previous WTP research.

Focal Concerns Theory

Grounded in a rational choice perspective, focal concerns theory presents a framework for criminal justice decision-making. The core components of focal concerns theory suggest variations in decision-making occur as actors weigh offense seriousness, the threat posed to the community, and practical considerations (Steffensmeier et al., 1993, 1998). A confluence of these factors, then, is believed to predict decision variation across actors.¹

Assuming the perceived danger or threat of an act is high, harsher or more corrective actions are deemed necessary. Moreover, the seriousness of an action serves as a prioritization marker (Steffensmeier et al., 1993, 1998) In a judicial decision-making context, judges weigh offense seriousness and the degree of harm caused to the victim. Extending this notion to police organizational decision-making, a department in which questionable shootings resulted in the deaths of several individuals (as opposed to, say, one) may be called upon to reform. The same may be true for police organizations exhibiting patterns of misbehavior related to sexual assault investigations (Krakauer, 2016), racial profiling (United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2015), or illegal searches and seizures (Gupta, 2016).

The second core element of focal concerns theory centers on risk assessment of an offender’s threat to the community (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). This involves weighing considerations such as “case information, the offender’s criminal history, the facts of the crime. . . , and also perhaps . . . characteristics of the offender . . . ” (Steffensmeier et al., 1998, p. 767). Applying this to policing, meaningful reform must consider not just the severity of the instant act (or past acts), but must also consider the risk of continued wrongdoing. For example, an agency’s awareness of ongoing issues, but passive resistance to correcting misbehavior, may point to a pattern of future misconduct. The threat, then, lies in a police agency’s deliberate indifference to officer misconduct.

The third element of focal concerns theory, practical considerations, informs the available options (Steffensmeier et al., 1993, 1998). Put simply, desires are tempered by the limits of possibility; nonexistent and limited options cannot be pursued. Practical considerations are either individual or organizational (or both). In a police reform context, organizational considerations might include the need for the department to continue to perform its expected duties in the face of outside pressure to improve (as well as funding reform efforts and general police practices).

In one of its original manifestations, focal concerns theory was used to explain judicial decision-making patterns (Hartley et al., 2007; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000; Steffensmeier et al., 1998).² The theory has proven useful in a variety of other contexts, too, including solitary confinement decisions (Logan et al., 2017), police use of force (Crow & Adrion, 2011), variation in traffic stop searches (Higgins et al., 2012; Vito et al., 2018), processing of rape kits in police departments (Campbell & Fehler-Cabral, 2018), time until arrest warrants are served (Johnson et al., 2015), and victim cooperation in sexual assault cases (Kaiser et al., 2017). The demonstrated utility of the theory should prove useful to explain variation in police reform support.

How Focal Concerns Shape WTP for Police Reform

One of the chief problems facing police reforms lies in law enforcement agencies’ resistance to reform. In some cases, an agency’s reluctance (or outright defiance) hinges on financial inability or unwillingness to pay for corrective measures (Chanin, 2015, 2017; Rushin, 2017). This is a very real issue because federal and state governments, while requesting police departments to implement reform, do not provide financial assistance to correct long-standing misconduct (Harmon, 2009).

One solution to this problem involves the creation of a publicly funded police reform fund (Harmon, 2009). Should any agency receive a recommendation for police reform, the police reform fund issues grants designed to offset the costs of implementing change. Of course, creating a fund does not represent a panacea for all police reform resistance (as Harmon, 2009 notes, “such funding may instead result in strengthening the best departments further” [p. 66]); creating a public fund, however, removes a major obstacle to improved police practice, namely the lack of financial support to see reforms through to completion. Public monies allocated for such a fund necessarily require public approval, otherwise legislators face a considerable risk of backlash in terms of reelection process. Thus, modeling individual variation in financial commitment lends itself well to the study of police reform support.

Current Study

Operating within a focal concerns theoretical framework, the purpose of this study is to examine individual variations in public support for police reform. The principal research questions are as follows:

Research Question 1: Do individuals support the creation of a police reform fund?

Research Question 2: How much are individuals willing to commit to a police reform fund?

The origins of focal concerns theory suggest offense seriousness leads to harsher judgments against offenders. This assumption operates under the logic that those who acted in full knowledge of the consequences or dangers of their actions deserve a firmer, more punitive outcome. Alternatively, actors who appear less “blameworthy” for their actions (committing less serious offenses), although guilty of doing wrong, may receive a more lenient treatment.

Under a focal concerns framework, one may expect differences to arise with respect to a police reform fund. Establishing a source of public monies does not necessarily constitute a harsh outcome for an offending agency. However, the seriousness of behavior communicates the riskiness of ongoing behavior. Serious actions demonstrate a need, one that may prompt action in the minds of the public. With respect to a police reform fund,

Hypothesis 1 (H1): The seriousness of a police department’s behavior will influence an individual’s support for a police reform fund.

Hypothesis 1A (H1A): If the perceived seriousness of a police department’s behavior is high, individuals will be more likely to support establishing and funding a police reform fund.

Hypothesis 1B (H1B): If the perceived seriousness of a police department’s behavior is low, individuals will be less likely to support establishing and funding a police reform fund.

Focal concerns theory also attends to the likelihood of offender recidivism. Blameworthy actors who willfully continue misbehavior without correction may deserve additional punishment. Substituting the offender with an offending agency, it is likely public support to assist such an agency is weak or absent if an agency demonstrates a pattern of behavior indicating misbehavior will continue (especially if the agency is aware of long-standing issues). Awareness of a problem and failing to correct it suggests the agency poses a greater threat to the community. Deliberate indifference, then, may warrant a stern response. With respect to a police reform fund, the public may view agencies who are aware of ongoing problems as less deserving of public assistance to ameliorate professional misbehavior (i.e., a more punitive outcome). Thus,

Hypothesis 2 (H2): The threat posed by a police department’s wrongful actions will influence one’s support for a police reform fund.

Hypothesis 2A (H2A): If a police department is viewed as likely to continue offending, individuals will be less likely to support a police reform fund.

Hypothesis 2B (H2B): If a police department is viewed as unlikely to continue offending, individuals will be more likely to support a police reform fund.

Finally, practical considerations surrounding a potential decision are believed to influence outcomes. As noted earlier, one of the greatest barriers to effective police reform lies in the funding streams available to implement widespread reform. Creating a source of public monies to correct police reform is likely contingent on a perceived need to institute a fund. With respect to a police reform fund, individual support for its existence may hinge on an agency’s financial inability to fix its own mistakes. Regardless of the seriousness of an agency’s actions or the potential threat to a community, a lack of fiscal resources inhibits substantive change. One can assert the following:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Practical considerations are predicted to influence people’s support for a police reform fund.

Hypothesis 3A (H3A): If a police department possesses the means to fund police reform, individuals will be less likely to support a police reform fund.

Hypothesis 3B (H3B): If a police department does not possess the means to fund police reform, individuals will be more likely to support a police reform fund.

Data and Methods

A factorial survey experiment was conducted to assess variation in people’s WTP for a police reform fund. WTP surveys are a tool often used to assess individual levels of support for distinct public policy efforts (e.g., Baker et al., 2016; Bishop & Murphy, 2011; Cohen et al., 2004; Manning et al., 2016). The logic behind WTP methods suggests individuals who (hypothetically) commit to spending more in annual taxes or other payments support a policy initiative. In contrast, those who would pay less than average or opt to not pay anything at all are believed to be less supportive of a proposed policy. As such, WTP methods are appropriate for understanding an individual’s valuation of police reform.

From a methodological perspective, it is tempting to present information regarding recent facts and figures related to a policy initiative. For example, public health announcements directed at suicide prevention often provide statistics related to the onset and prevalence of the behavior (Luxton et al., 2012; Potter et al., 1995). Information can then be used to direct individuals to resources designed to prevent suicide. In the present context, statistics concerning the patterns, trends, and prevalence of police misconduct are difficult, if not impossible, to obtain (e.g., Alpert & MacDonald, 2001; Chanin, 2015, 2016; Pate & Fridell, 1993). Police departments are highly fragmented across the United States with no obvious governing body or process that mandates universal collection of police misconduct records.

The lack of a data-gathering mandate promotes definitional disputes surrounding the classification of police misconduct. Managing disparate policies and procedures, along with outlining criteria sufficient for behavioral classifications, also presents difficulties (Chanin, 2015; Harmon, 2009; Rushin, 2015, 2017). Due to these complications, it is impossible to deliver a “real world” estimate of the prevalence of long-standing police misconduct. A solution to these problems involves presenting a hypothetical scenario to study participants detailing the specific problems in one agency. In practice, news accounts tend to focus on the misbehavior of single agencies. From an experimental point of view, then, it is important for researchers to invoke a similar method. A single-agency vignette may thus be best suited to the dissemination of knowledge consistent with stories of police misconduct as it constitutes the best approximation of a real-world scenario (Auspurg & Hinz, 2015; Mutz, 2011; Shadish et al., 2002).³

With these concerns in mind, a hypothetical scenario describing a law enforcement agency’s experience with a federal investigation was presented to all study respondents. Survey takers were randomly assigned to various treatment conditions which were manipulated across the seriousness of an identified problem, the threat posed by the agency in question (i.e., awareness of an issue),⁴ and practical considerations (resistance to intervention due to the cost of reform). The various permutations of seriousness were drawn from a recent paper outlining the most prevalent acts of misconduct committed by police departments (D’Souza et al., 2019). The text of the vignette read:

An independent investigation team was commissioned by the federal government to evaluate claims of misconduct in a local police department. After a long exploration of the department, the investigative team discovered a pattern and practice of misbehavior that has existed for several years. The findings of the report shows officers [SERIOUSNESS: disproportionately rely on abusive use of force to control citizen encounters; many incidents result in the injury or death of a citizen. /are routinely rude to citizens and do not provide a means of filing complaints./often conduct illegal searches and seizures of citizens.] Internal documents show that department leadership [THREAT: was/was not] aware of these ongoing problems. The findings were published and sent to the police department and city council. However, the reforms required to correct the misbehavior are rather costly; some estimates suggest it may take a total $30 million over five years to reform the police department. [PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS: Despite the high costs, the city has committed to funding the reform initiative./ Due to the high costs, the city is resisting the reform initiative.]

With three different dimensions set at different levels, the experiment produced 2²3 factorial design (12 different treatment conditions). For analytical purposes, the reference categories for each treatment were the police rudeness (seriousness),⁵ unawareness of ongoing problems (threat to community), and commitment to funding reform (practical considerations).

Each survey taker then read and answered a multiple-choice question (with eight possible options) that asked them correctly identify the cost of the proposed police reform initiative (US$30 million). The question acted as a factual manipulation check for respondent attentiveness (see Auspurg & Hinz, 2015; Kane & Barabas, 2019; Mutz, 2011). Incorrect responses suggested treatment was not successfully delivered to respondents and compromised the legitimacy of any submitted answer. Respondents who answered the factual manipulation check incorrectly were dropped from the analysis.

Finally, survey takers were prompted with information about the nature of public policy efforts relying on tax dollars to pay for any expenses. A policy measure to institute a police reform fund suggested household taxes may increase by about $100 per year. Participants then indicated how much they would be willing to pay in whole dollar amounts using an open-response textbox (past examples of this approach are found in Cameron & James, 1987; Homburg et al., 2005; Krishna, 1991). The question stated the following:

Like any government program, it is impossible to implement police reform without a source of funding. If a police department is required to start the reform process, the city is responsible for funding the reform. Some lawmakers have proposed making a pool of money to help local cities and police departments defray the costs of police reform. To create the fund, lawmakers suggest raising household taxes by about $100 per year. How much would you be willing to pay in additional taxes per year for a police reform fund?

Providing an estimated increase in household taxes provides an anchoring point for respondents (see Simonson & Drolet, 2004). The suggested amount is also consistent with previous studies examining public WTP for criminal justice programs (e.g., Cohen et al., 2004; Nagin et al., 2006; although see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974 for a discussion on anchoring bias).

Sample

Study participants were recruited online via Amazon mTurk through an advertisement posted to the worker website. Amazon mTurk provides an online resource to solicit users for human intensive tasks who are then compensated for their time (Amazon Mechanical Turk, n.d.; Berinsky et al., 2012; Cheung et al., 2017). Human-intensive tasks may include coding images for disorder, participating in human cognition tasks for psychological experiments, or taking a survey. One can recruit study participants by posting an advertisement online that outlines the purpose of a project, inclusion criteria, a task description, and a note on expected compensation. Online samples are often used in business, health care, and educational fields (Chan & Holosko, 2016) and typically yield a more diverse participant pool than found in universities (Behrend et al., 2011). For the purposes of this study, respondents were told the survey was designed to solicit opinions regarding a variety of criminal justice issues, all views would be kept strictly confidential, and the estimated study time would take about 20 minutes. Each survey taker was compensated at a rate of $.10 per minute ($2.00 total).

After collecting the raw data, responses were filtered to identify potentially faulty data. Several criteria were used to restrict the sample. Survey responses were not analyzed if a participant failed all factual manipulation attention checks⁶ in the survey, did not correctly answer the factual manipulation check pertinent to this experiment, did not reside in the United States,⁷ demonstrated an excessively high reading speed⁸ (Carver, 1992), and/or provided an extreme outlier on the dependent variable of interest (WTP more than $500 a year in annual taxes for a police reform fund). Due to the series of sample restrictions, 843 of 1,243 respondents were preserved for analysis.

A power analysis (Brown, 1989; Cohen, 1988) with statistical significance set at .05 and power of .80 indicated medium-sized effects could be detected with 23 persons in each experimental group (63*12 = 756). With 843 valid responses, there was sufficient power to detect a medium-sized effect among treatment groups (should one exist). Sample demographics are summarized in Table 1.⁹

Table 1.

Demographic Information of Observed Sample, n = 843.

Variable	Frequency	Percent
Sex
Male	443	52.55
Female	396	46.98
Not disclosed	4	0.47
Ethnicity
African American/Black	89	10.56
Hispanic/Latino	52	6.17
White/Caucasian	576	68.33
Other	126	14.95
Income
Less than 20K	103	12.22
20K–35K	225	26.69
50K–75K	287	34.05
75K–99,999K	119	14.12
100K–149,999K	78	9.25
150K–199,999K	18	2.14
200K or more	13	1.54
Political views
Extremely liberal	123	14.61
Liberal	226	26.84
Slightly liberal	100	11.88
Moderate	168	19.95
Slightly conservative	72	8.55
Conservative	113	13.42
Extremely conservative	40	4.75

Dependent Variables

Support for a police reform fund can manifest itself in different ways. For example, it may be of interest to know if individuals are willing to pay any amount of money, whether one commits to paying above a certain threshold, or the degree of financial commitment. Toward this end, three dependent variables were used for analysis. First, a dichotomous variable indicated whether an individual was unwilling to pay any amount for police reform (0) or if a person indicated they would pay some amount of money (1) for police reform. A second binary variable indicated whether an individual was willing to pay $50 or more for police reform (1) or if they were unwilling to pay above the $50 threshold.¹⁰ Finally, the whole dollar amount one entered into the open textbox was treated as a discrete count variable to approximate how much one was willing-to-pay for police reform (with responses bounded between zero and infinity).¹¹

Distributional information for each covariate is presented in Table 2. Based on the data presented in Table 2, 87% of all respondents support creating a police reform fund. Nearly 60% of individuals indicated they would pay US$50 or more per year for such a fund (average = $59 per year).

Table 2.

Distributional Information of Dependent Variables, n = 843.

		Percent	Frequency
Willing-to-pay any amount		87.31	736
Willing-to-pay more than US$50		57.53	485
	Min.	1%	25%	50%	Avg.	SD	75%	99%	Max.
Willing-to-pay amount ($)	0	0	10	50	59	64.15	100	300	500

Covariates

Much of the focal concerns literature points to legal and extra-legal offender factors that shape decision-makers’ choices. Past examples include the ethnicity, criminal history, biological sex, and income status (Logan et al., 2017; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2004; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). Little, if any, focal concerns research examines the impact of decision-makers’ characteristics on specified outcomes; it is possible individual traits influence decisions in a predictable manner. Greater theoretical development is needed in the literature, but we begin here by providing a description of possible influences pertinent to this study.

Prior research demonstrates the importance of political ideology in informing policy preferences, solutions, and the relative merit of criminal justice-related issues (Dunaway & Cullen, 1991; Huntington, 1957; Lab, 2004; Miller, 1973; Tonry, 2013). Conservative persons tend to lean toward small government and lower household taxes. Right-leaning individuals are generally more likely to express interests in “backing the badge,” dissenting against individuals advocating for police reform movements, and fixing unbroken issues (Gerber & Jackson, 2017). On the other side of the political spectrum, left-leaning individuals are more likely to embrace the growth of the public sector to provide greater benefits to support a public good (even if said expansion increases a tax burden). They also report a greater likelihood of supporting criminal justice reform efforts in the areas of corrections, courts, and policing (e.g., Lab, 2004; Miller, 1973). A seven-point Political Ideology scale borrowed from the American National Election Study (2016) was included for respondents to indicate their political leanings. Responses ranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative, with a value range of 1 to 7.

Income may also influence financial commitments to a proposed police reform fund. The key survey question anchored tax increases at $100. On one hand, increasing taxes by $100 may discourage the less well-off from choosing to fund police reform, as the amount could seem too high. On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect that those with lower incomes will advocate strongly for police reform. As documented in the literature, police forces are often allocated to areas with higher calls for service (Braga et al., 2014; Hsieh & Pugh, 1993; Pratt & Cullen, 2005; Sherman et al., 1989; Vieraitis, 2000). High call volumes correlate with lower income areas; a direct impact of this empirical reality leads to increased contact with law enforcement officers. Due to a higher exposure rate to police officers, individuals in low-income areas may face the consequences of poor policing more often. A police reform fund may represent an enticing public policy initiative, as it could improve the quality of formal social control contact in the community. To account for this possibility, survey takers were asked to indicate their annual household Income. For analytical purposes, this covariate was treated as an ordinal variable.

Throughout the history of policing, a tenuous relationship has existed between minorities and law enforcement officials. The police have been accused of biased and discriminatory practices targeted toward ethnic minority populations, leading to perceptions and practices of discrimination (Cao et al., 1996; Dixon et al., 2008; Gau et al., 2010; Levin & Thomas, 1997; Smith et al., 1984; Waddington et al., 1984; Weitzer & Tuch, 1999, 2004). Given the importance of this issue, police departments are encouraged to review existing policies and procedures and curb asymmetric law enforcement practices (President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015).

As a result of the impact of both real and perceived police discrimination practices, advocacy groups (e.g., #BlackLivesMatter, American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU]) lobby for widespread reform to correct long-standing in justices. Assuming respondents’ ethnic background is linked to perceptions of the police, it is reasonable to suspect that members of certain ethnic groups will prioritize police reform more than others. If this proposition is correct, respondents’ ethnic background will predict variation in financial support for police reform. Ethnicity, then, was measured by asking respondents to indicate their ethnic background. Due to low cell counts, ethnic groups were condensed to White non-Hispanic (reference category), Black/African American, Hispanic/Latino, and Other (which includes Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, of Multiple Races, and Other).

Analysis

Respondents indicated their preference and support for a police reform fund by indicating how much in annual household taxes they would be willing-to-pay for police reform. Some researchers have examined binary outcomes in similar contexts (i.e., whether one is willing-to-pay for a public policy measure, regardless of the amount; see Baker et al., 2016). Others have focused on differences in the actual amount respondents were willing to contribute to particular causes (e.g., Cohen et al., 2004 for a review of WTP methods, see Breidert et al., 2006). Both approaches provide valuable inference to the study of police reform fund initiation. One approach establishes whether individuals want a police reform fund, while the other provides an estimate of how much (degree) one is willing-to-pay for such a fund. This study used both approaches.

With both binary and count outcomes, logistic and negative binomial regression models were estimated. For the logistic regression model, answers to the open textbox question were coded as “0” if a respondent did not wish to contribute to a police reform fund and a “1” if a respondent was willing to contribute any amount of money greater than zero to a police reform fund. A second binary variable indicated a respondent’s WTP more than $50 per year for a police reform fund (0 = no, 1 = yes). Survey takers also entered whole dollar amounts into an open textbox. This was treated as a count variable bounded by zero and infinity and estimated via negative binomial regression.

Results

Logistic Regression Results

The first model predicted a yes/no response while controlling for group membership (experimental/treatment) and control variables. As shown in Table 3, respondents’ WTP dollar amount did not hinge on the seriousness of a police department’s actions, or if the law enforcement agency was aware of ongoing problems. Consistent with theoretical expectations, an agency citing financial difficulties as a barrier to reform was more likely to receive support from survey takers (46% more likely than individuals receiving the condition the municipality would pay for the reform). Furthermore, one’s political ideology demonstrated less support for a police reform fund. A unit increase on the political ideology scale (more conservative) corresponded with a 20% reduction in the likelihood of paying any amount of money toward police reform.

Table 3.

Logistic Regression, WTP Any Amount of Money for Police Reform.

Variable	OR	SE	z value
Intercept	9.81	0.38	5.98
Seriousness
Use of force scenario	1.44	0.27	1.37
Illegal search scenario	1.16	0.25	0.59
Blameworthiness
Was aware	1.16	0.21	0.71
Practical considerations
Resists due to cost	1.46	0.21	1.79
Ethnicity of respondents
African American/Black	1.44	0.4	0.93
Hispanic/Latino	1.10	0.46	0.20
Other	1.53	0.33	1.28
Income of respondents	0.97	0.08	−0.37
Political ideology of respondents	0.80	0.06	−3.63

Note. Italicized coefficients indicate statistical significance at p < .05 for a one-tailed test. OR = odds ratio; WTP = willingness to pay.

Based on the distribution of the primary dependent variable, a second binary variable was created to represent whether a person was willing to pay $50 or more per year in additional taxes for a police reform fund. As shown in Table 4, a law enforcement agency cited for abusive use-of-force was more likely to prompt a larger financial commitment (relative to the rude/disrespectful scenario). Survey takers were 36% more likely to commit to paying $50 or more under that circumstance. Furthermore, in reference to White respondents, members of the Other ethnic group (which includes Asian, Native American, Pacific Islander, Other, and Multiple Races) were about 2.6 times more likely to pay $50 a year for police reform funds. Similar to the results of the previous model, one’s conservative leanings lead to about 15% lower odds of paying $50 a year toward law enforcement correction.

Table 4.

Logistic Regression, WTP More Than $50 for Police Reform.

Variable	OR	SE	z value
Intercept	1.55	0.26	1.72
Seriousness
Use of force scenario	1.36	0.18	1.71
Illegal search scenario	1.28	0.18	1.39
Blameworthiness
Was aware	0.99	0.14	−0.05
Practical considerations
Resists due to cost	1.17	0.14	1.09
Ethnicity of respondents
African American/Black	0.89	0.23	−0.45
Hispanic/Latino	1.07	0.3	0.23
Other	2.58	0.23	4.20
Income of respondents	1.01	0.06	0.19
Political ideology of respondents	0.85	0.04	−3.92

Note. Italicized coefficients indicate statistical significance at p < .05 for a one-tailed test. OR = odds ratio; WTP = willingness to pay.

Negative Binomial Regression Results

Table 5 reports the results of negative binomial regression models with the amount respondents would commit to police reform fund being the outcome. In this set of results, both seriousness scenarios yielded substantively meaningful findings. Respondents receiving either the use-of-force or illegal searches scenarios reported a more than 20% increase in financial backing for a police reform fund (relative to the rude police officer situation). Persons belonging to the Other ethnic group were (hypothetically) willing to pay 34% more in police reform funds than White respondents. Political ideology also played an important role in the amount respondents were willing to pay. With each unit increase on the ideology scale (again, as one self-identifies as more conservative), there was a 9% decrease in the amount committed to a police reform fund.

Table 5.

Negative Binomial Regression of WTP for Police Reform.

	IRR	SE	z value
Intercept	66.1	0.16	26.33
Seriousness
Use of force scenario	1.21	0.11	1.73
Illegal search scenario	1.25	0.11	2.00
Blameworthiness
Was aware	0.95	0.09	−0.58
Practical considerations
Resists due to cost	1.03	0.09	0.36
Ethnicity of respondents
African American/Black	1.14	0.15	0.88
Hispanic/Latino	1.07	0.19	0.34
Other	1.34	0.13	2.33
Income of respondents	0.99	0.03	−0.03
Political ideology of respondents	0.91	0.03	−3.7

Note. Italicized coefficients indicate statistical significance at p < .05 for a one-tailed test. IRR = incident rate ratio; WTP = willingness to pay.

Summary of Findings

The vast majority of respondents reported WTP some amount of money toward a police reform fund. Notably, the likelihood of contributing was higher if one was exposed to information suggesting an agency was under fire for abusive use-of-force. This trait also affected WTP more than $50 for a police reform fund—and the amount willing to be contributed to a police reform fund. Furthermore, the evidence suggests some individuals would commit to creating a fund if a police agency cited a lack of monies as a reason to resist reform. Finally, political ideology held important predictive power over WTP for police reform. Each component of the analysis demonstrated that conservative ideology lessens WTP for a police reform fund. However, this pattern of findings does not mean conservative persons fundamentally oppose establishing a source of public funds for police reform. Instead, the findings suggest right-leaning respondents may choose to pay less for such a fund.

Discussion

A few preliminary inferences can be drawn from the responses. First, the data suggest the majority of individuals (nearly 85% of all respondents) are willing to support establishing a police reform fund. Second, nearly half of all survey takers indicated a WTP $50 or more per year in household taxes toward a police reform fund. In particular, the average amount a person was willing to spend was about $60. Consistent with theoretical expectations, an agency’s inability to pay for reform increased the likelihood of supporting the creation of a fund. Exposure to information indicating relatively serious problems within a police department and political ideology served as important predictors of an individual’s WTP for a police reform fund, as well. Importantly, the study findings indicate focal concerns theory may prove useful in explaining an individual’s policy preferences.

Correcting long-standing, systemic, and systematic police misbehavior represents one of the greatest challenges and tasks necessary to improve public relationships with the police. As outlined in the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015; see also, Police Executive Research Forum, 2013), reforming police departments represents a useful method for increasing police legitimacy and collaborating with the public to combat crime. Once problems are identified, the federal government possesses the power to coerce reformation when agencies exhibit long-standing patterns or practices of police misbehavior (Chanin, 2015, 2017) The intrusive and powerful nature of this action represents one of the most useful tools for correcting misbehavior (Chanin, 2014, 2015; Harmon, 2009; Rushin, 2014, 2017). Despite the well-intended paths of police reform, resistance to change often emerges. One aspect, the cost of implementing reform efforts, serves as a barrier for initiating, maintaining, and accelerating police reform (Harmon, 2009).

Given the public’s relationship with police departments (and the primary beneficiary of well-behaved law enforcement agencies), society’s interest in paying for police reform is of paramount importance. Irrespective of individuals’ support for reform, financial backing provides a more measurable level of commitment (Cohen et al., 2004; Nagin et al., 2006). The contribution of this article, then, lies in its findings concerning the public’s (hypothetical) monetary support for police reform.

From a theoretical perspective, there is continued support for focal concerns in a new context. Specifically, we find that variations in seriousness and practical considerations play an important role in predicting one’s WTP for police reform. Focal concerns demonstrates its heuristic value, as it can be applied beyond the decision-making process of criminal justice practitioners in public opinion studies of policy issues. As shown in this study, other demographic factors play an important role in predicting support for police reform (namely, respondents’ ethnic backgrounds and political ideologies). In light of these findings, future studies using focal concerns theory as a framework should explore new arenas to apply its findings.

The notion of political ideology is of particular interest, given that judges in some states are elected officials. A magistrate’s political views may shape punishment preferences in a predictable manner, yielding deeper understanding of the sentencing process. Researchers should also consider how respondents’ demographic backgrounds predict variations in criminal justice processes. Respondents’ political belief system, ethnic background, education, and income could play a role in processing the seriousness of behaviors, practical considerations, and threats to the community. Decisions are nested within individuals; personal characteristics may exert predictable variations in the criminal justice (and other) arenas.

Greater theoretical development is needed to unpack these issues and thus extend the predictive power of focal concerns theory. As shown by our results, the theory may pay an important role in understanding public policy preferences for other criminal justice matters.

Limitations and Future Directions

This study’s findings permit limited inferences about the public’s preference for a police reform fund. Even so, readers should cautiously interpret the results from a convenience sample obtained from an online platform. First, the utility of Amazon mTurk comes at the cost of an unknown bias. Without using a large randomly drawn sample from the U.S. population, one cannot draw strong conclusions about the prevalence of how most people think in the United States.

Second, using a factorial survey experiment also carries its own set of issues deserving of careful consideration. First, the hypothetical scenario was written and controlled by social scientists. Direct control of a hypothetical scenario allows one to limit confounding factors, but the scenario essentially occurs in a laboratory setting. As a result, reasonable doubts concerning external validity are warranted (e.g., Auspurg & Hinz, 2015; Mutz, 2011; Shadish et al., 2002).

Third, societal discussions about police reform occur in dynamic environments tainted by political rhetoric. The treatment used in this study was devoid of any discussion of a political party (or other stakeholder) endorsing a course of action. Study results suggested individuals may make decisions consistent with one’s political ideology, but if one assumes political views predict police reform decision-making, then the identity and ideology of political communicator may influence thoughts about police reform. For example, an extremely liberal political figure may claim police reform represents one of the biggest social issues facing the nation. Liberal-minded individuals may endorse a similar point of view; however, conservative persons could resist police reform because of a perceived difference in values and ideology. To assess this possibility, one could devise a political communication experiment grounded in the research of elite cue-taking and agenda setting (Barbera et al., 2019; Butler & Hassell, 2018; Lenz, 2012). Insights from a political communication study could identify the degree political ideology shapes police policy preferences (especially as they relate to police reform).

Fourth, the question used to obtain the dependent variables in this study omitted information related to the government actor (e.g., federal, state, local) used to create the police reform fund. The question of interest was intentionally vague to limit the influence of a particular level of government on respondents’ answers. Given the fragmented nature of police departments in the United States, individuals may take issue with a particular government actor serving as the instigator and provider of police reform. Thus, a possible extension to this study involves manipulating the level of government responsible for funding police reform and evaluating support for a general police reform fund.

Finally, the study was primarily focused at determining one’s WTP for a police reform fund. At no point did the study provide insight into respondents’ belief in the need to recommend or force reform within police departments. One form of resistance to police reform involves whether state or federal governments should force (or simply recommend) reformation onto a local police agency. Depending on one’s political views, an individual may prefer state over federal (or vice versa) governments to instigate police reform. Uncovering a preferred regulatory body may encourage discussion about the need to create uniform police regulations in the United States and provide a means of auditing law enforcement agencies.

Conclusion

As public scrutiny of police departments increases, society faces considerable questions regarding the correction of police misconduct. One should ask which behaviors are inexcusable, what trends are unacceptable, and at what point external interference is necessary to prevent future harm. With an established threshold for harm, one’s focus shifts to establishing the means to sustainably curtail misconduct and increasing the scope of reformation. However, one must also ask another question: How much is police reform really worth? Answers to these questions demonstrate the true value of law enforcement reform to society.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Zachary A. Powell

John L. Worrall

Notes

Author Biographies

Zachary A. Powell is an assistant professor of criminal justice at California State University, San Bernardino. His research interests focus on police reform and public policy. Outside of academia, he is an avid runner and hobbyist photographer.

John L. Worrall is a professor of criminology and criminal justice at the University of Texas at Dallas. He has published articles and book chapters on a variety of topics ranging from legal issues in policing to crime measurement. He is also the author of several books, including the popular Crime Control in America: What Works? He currently serves as the Editor of the journal Police Quarterly and as the Executive Director of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences.

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