Twenty Years After

Terms and Methodology: Dissident, Dissident Tradition, and Living in Truth

The research presented here is based on a reflectivist position emphasizing the significance of convictions, ideas, and beliefs in politics and political decisions, and framing them as “important elements in the explanation of policy choice, even if preferences are clear and actors are motivated purely by self-interest. . . . All interests involve beliefs and . . . ideas.” ⁴

Dissent, dissident movement, and dissident are terms used in reference to a specific group of people from Communist countries who do not reject the Communist regime as such but who, adhering to a conflicting system of values, adopt a critical approach to a wide range of the regime’s key policies. ⁵ Many people labeled as dissidents have rejected being referred to as such, as they believe it is inappropriate to “use a specific term for a group whose definition is, in fact, more or less accidental.” Furthermore, many of these individuals also believe that “this term is etymologically questionable: the word ‘dissident’ means . . . ‘a defector’— ‘dissidents,’ however, do not feel like defectors, as they simply have not defected from anything” and it is a cruel paradox “that the more some citizens stand up for other citizens, the more they are referred to using a term separating them from these ‘other citizens’!” ⁶ In other words, using the term dissent turns the dissident movement into a homogeneous group of people, as it ignores the individuals’ pasts and their ideological foundations and marks these people as “identical” to each other while, at the same time, different from the rest of society.

The term dissident was applied to several groups of people who, for various reasons, were seen as coming into conflict with the Communist regime. For instance, people could have been considered dissidents if they had never worked in any positions in the Communist administration and could not, because of differing systems of values, unite with the Communist system and culture. The term also applied to those who had, for decades, adopted positions of conformity, making the culturalist concept of civil society difficult to understand for them and who, after 1968, encountered a conflict with the new regime of “normalization.” Finally, dissident encompassed even those who had participated in establishing the Communist regime, holding important positions in the Communist party structure, but who as a result of the unsuccessful attempt to reform the Communist system and of the oppression following the invasion of armies under the Warsaw Pact, were eventually cast away from the Communist system. Some of them even became dissidents against their own will. Thus, suddenly, people such as Václav Havel, whose relation to dissent needs no explanation, found themselves “in one boat” with former advisors or collaborators of Communist leaders—long-time members of the Communist party. All were absorbed by the homogenizing label of “dissent” when they came into conflict with the regime.

Although we understand the personal objections of such individuals against the terms dissent and dissident and are aware of the capabilities and limitations of the contemporary theory of opposition in nondemocratic regimes, we do not abstain from using these terms in the present research. We link the terms dissent and dissident to a certain historical period, to a certain political and social environment, to a certain type of activity performed by specific individuals, and to the specific system of values acknowledged by these people.

In the case of the Czech Republic, dissent may be considered a part of a broader anti-elite group. The anti-elite developed gradually starting at the end of the 1960s and encompassed anticommunists, noncommunist groups, ex-Communists expelled from the Communist party after August 1968, and the rather noncommunist upper-middle-class groups with inconsistent statuses. These upper-middle-class groups with inconsistent statuses were formed mostly of frustrated skilled professionals. Their level of political activity was lower than that required officially and because of the prevailing principle of total party loyalty, they lacked the opportunities to attain nomenclatural positions. In short, their social and economic statuses did not correspond to their qualifications. ⁷

From a social class point of view, the members of the anti-elite did not differ significantly from the old nomenclature cadres; they differed in the “manners of the heart” and in manières ďaur et de penser (ways of acting and thinking). ⁸ The anti-elite as a group behaved differently, thought differently, and had different manners; in other words, it differed from the nomenclature cadres through its demonstration of deep normative structures: codes, systems, topics, and discourses. Internalizing certain cultural codes, maxims, and values provided members of the anti-elite with what the Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka ⁹ labeled “civilization competences,” that is, a set of cultural premises inevitable in modern democratic, market-economy-based societies. In sum, the members of the new anti-elite differed from the nomenclature cadres and from the majority of the surrounding society in the culture they shared and had internalized: a culture that enabled them to reform the basic characteristics of political and economic life. The members of the anti-elite adopted rather Western views on matters such as work ethic, personal freedom, and citizens’ rights, leanings that primed them for integrating other Western social currents such as cultural cosmopolitanism, liberalism, and tolerance. Such an orientation toward cultural values pressed the members of the anti-elite into a peripheral position in Czech society and actually allowed them to preserve their personal independence and their group identity. ¹⁰ At the same time, it made them into a group that could replace compromised cadres after 1989, ready to seize political power on the victory of the revolution.

How do we then distinguish between the dissidents and the broader class of anti-elite? The simplest way of distinguishing the dissidents from the anti-elite is to emphasize the differences in value preferences of particular groups within the anti-elite. The dissidents acknowledged the culturalist concept of civil society and created a “civil society in conspiracy” or a “parallel polis” ¹¹ (Václav Benda)—“the other culture” ¹² (Ivan Jirous)—in direct opposition against the state and its institutions. The dissidents “recognised the [culturalist] importance of the civil society, they fought against the detrimental heritage of the Communist regime. . . . They protested against the non-authenticity of the official policy, double morality, and the lies of indoctrination and propaganda. The ideological mission was meant to restore and resurrect ‘truth,’ the true meaning of social participation and thus restore the identity and dignity of each member of the society.” ¹³ In other words, the dissidents refused “living in lie” and with lies, and decided to “live in truth”: “to restore the authentic human life towards . . . ‘human order.’ . . . They attempted to grasp their own responsibility once again.” ¹⁴ Not only did the dissidents not do certain things but they also decided “to do something specific, something that exceeds the direct self-defence against manipulation.” ¹⁵

In Czechoslovakia, the specific activities of dissent combined with lawfulness-promotion and with protests against unjust (unlawful) persecution. The dissidents “committed themselves to . . . pointing at offending laws and, within their capabilities, suggesting the ways of remedy.” ¹⁶ The normative frameworks of the Czechoslovak dissent movement had been and are the international human rights treaties concluded in the mid 1960s: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Czechoslovakia accepted them in connection with détente and the results of the process of Helsinki in 1976, and since then, Charta 77 (Charter 77) and other dissident groups have based their actions on the belief that “our citizens have the right and our state is obliged to abide by them.” ¹⁷

So far, we have characterized dissent and dissidents in the context of social and political development in Czechoslovakia, especially as representatives of “the civil society in conspiracy,” “the parallel polis,” and “the other culture.” Further analysis of dissident activity requires us to operationalize the term. For the purpose of further research, a dissident in practice is defined as one who has never been an agent or in the confidence of the State Security (Czechoslovak secret police); has signed the document of Charter 77; was active in an organization stemming from Charter 77, such as Výbor na obranu nespravedlivě stíhaných (VONS—Committee for the Defence of the Unjustly Persecuted), ¹⁸ Hnutí za občanskou svobodu (HOS—Movement for Civic Freedom), ¹⁹ Polsko-československá solidarita (Polish-Czechoslovak Solidarity), ²⁰ Demokratická iniciativa (Democratic Initiative), ²¹ Nezávislé mírové sdružení—Iniciativa za demilitarizaci společnosti (Independent Peace Society—Initiative for the Demilitarization of the Society), ²² Iniciativa sociální obrany (Initiative for Social Defense), ²³ Společnost přátel USA (SPUSA—Society of Friends of the USA), ²⁴ Československý helsinský výbor (Czechoslovak Helsinki Committee), ²⁵ Společnost T. G. Masaryka (Society of T. G. Masaryk), ²⁶ Jazzová sekce (Jazz Section), ²⁷ Mírový klub Johna Lennona (John Lennon’s Peace Club), ²⁸ Klub právní podpory (Legal Aid Club); ²⁹ such citizens’ initiatives as Most (Bridge) ³⁰ or České děti (Czech Children); ³¹ ecological groups such as Ekologická společnost (Ecological Society) ³² etc.; or the independent journalists association Východoevropská informační agentura (East European Information Agency); ³³ has emigrated because of political reasons and was politically active while in exile (such as by working as a journalist, publishing anti-Communist texts, or assisting dissidents in Czechoslovakia by smuggling books or supplies); was politically active against the regime; has committed an offense classified as non-political, but motivated politically; ³⁴ lived abroad and politically supported dissent; was a sponsor of dissent-related activities; worked in the exiled Czechoslovak Social Democracy, a group running a political party dissolved in Czechoslovakia; or one who was considered a dissident by public discourse.

Drawing from all of these possible actions, a dissident can be considered a person who was not only ostracized for political reasons or who emigrated but one who generated a certain amount of activity against the regime. The presented operationalization does not include those individuals whose thoughts are ideologically close to dissent—that is, individuals whose relations toward the Communist regime are edged or extremely negative and who may be presently considered the entrepreneurs of dissident tradition ³⁵ but because of their age, could not become members of the dissident movement before 1989—nor does it apply to the pasts of these people. That is, it does not take into account their activities prior to August 1968, or those that occurred before joining the dissent movement. With all of these boundaries taken into account, it must finally be noted that the presented analysis contains a latent risk that in connection with examination of the State Security archives, some of the Members of Parliament whom we have included among the dissidents may be identified as State Secret Security agents. In such a case, the person would be disqualified as a dissident and calculations would have to be adjusted accordingly. ³⁶

To analyze the activities of dissidents within the Czech Parliament and to determine which committees the dissidents work in and whether they are the entrepreneurs of the dissident tradition, the membership of both chambers of the Czech Parliament ³⁷ had to be divided into two groups: dissidents and nondissidents. This sorting was done according to the operationalization of the term dissident presented above, evaluating the activities of each individual before 1989. For each deputy, biographical data were collected from various sources, such as the biographies on the website of the Czech Parliament, biographical data from the political party headquarters, obituaries, memoirs of dissent representatives and witnesses of the pre-1989 events, and personal interviews. Finally, the collected data were discussed with each respective deputy or senator, with other representatives of dissent and with our colleagues, long-time researchers of pre-1989 Czechoslovak policy. ³⁸ In the case of the Chamber of Deputies, the period analyzed ran from 1993 (the date when the present Czech Republic came into being) through 2010, while in the case of the Senate it ran from 1996 (the date when the Senate was established) through 2010. The standard election term in the Chamber of Deputies is four years; the standard election term in the Senate is six years. However, one-third of senators rotate every two years, a move which impacts the membership of the committees. Therefore, the membership of the Senate committees was analyzed not over six-year periods but over two-year periods.

The term heritage of dissent in Czech foreign policy implies an understanding that the key concerns of the dissident movement, the protection of human rights and the furthering of democratic values, have become integral and legitimate parts of contemporary Czech foreign policy, ³⁹ and as such, have become principled beliefs. ⁴⁰ The term dissident tradition is more specific, referring to the specific concerns of Czech foreign policy with the protection of human and political rights and of democratic values, as well as with a causal persuasion ⁴¹ regarding the types of policies that would most effectively prevent human rights violations and promote democracy. This focus on human rights and democratization originated in the dissident past, which was based on respect for the moral stances of individuals, the rejection of living in lies and with lies, and protest against nondemocratic regimes and the oppression of citizens. The idea of living in truth that drove the beginnings of the dissident tradition represents a normative principle serving as a road map that “limits choice because it logically excludes other interpretations of reality” ⁴² —in other words, it reduces the number of acceptable alternatives; it “specifies criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust . . . and translates fundamental doctrines into guidance for contemporary human action.” ⁴³ The essence of the dissident tradition, then, is not the integration of human rights issues and democratic values into Czech foreign policy itself, but the orientation in one’s worldview toward specific human rights themes and issues. Such a stance manifests itself in a distinct approach to human rights policy and democratization policy, in the timing and the choice of policies, in the objectives of activities in the sphere of human rights, and in the choice of instruments or channels applied to implement such policies. Living in truth and awareness of a “greater responsibility” define the way, along which it is necessary to promote lawfulness, regardless of one’s own benefit or the economical interests of one’s own country or the country’s domestic companies, ⁴⁴ vis-á-vis any country violating principles that it has accepted; ⁴⁵ to sympathize with those unjustly prosecuted and persecuted; to fight against totalitarian regimes; and to protest against the nonauthenticity of the official policy, its duplicitous morality, and the lies of indoctrination and propaganda. Such a focus results in a lower level of concern with development-related themes and issues or the rights of minorities and indigenous citizens, and in a greater concern with the process of democratic transformation, the fight against nondemocratic regimes, and the assistance of those unjustly persecuted.

The heritage of dissent is also reflected in the manner in which human rights policy and democratization policy are justified today. In Czech politics, two arguments may be found for justifying these types of policies. The first—which might be called the argument of solidarity and understanding—is based on the fact that Czechs themselves, before 1989, felt encouraged when “a democratic foreign politician made a decision or assumed a clear position concerning the situation in Czechoslovakia” ⁴⁶ and “how important it was for the climate in this country [Czechoslovakia] before 1989, when a country, however minor, however negligible for the economy of this state, spoke up and supported dissent, supported the efforts of the fight against human rights violation in our country. All of us do remember that and nobody can say that a resolution of a minor, unimportant country was meaningless. It is not true [emphasis authors’ own].” ⁴⁷ Acts of support for dissidents from abroad were always intense personal experiences, pushing the thoughts and the behavior of an entire generation of dissidents toward gratefulness and an intrinsic need to help others. The argument follows that Czechs owe a lot to democratic societies for their support before 1989 and that they should pay off this debt by supporting democracy and by fighting against nondemocratic regimes. “Supporting all those threatened by malevolence of an anti-democratic state . . . represents the Czech attempt to introduce moral stances into foreign policy—as a way out of and inspiration by their own tragic experience.” ⁴⁸ The second argument—which might be called the principle of applying the lessons learned—is more progressive, and claims that the Czech Republic has undergone a democratic transformation and has developed a practical experience of transition to democracy, which it could offer, as a teacher, to other countries and societies. The first of these arguments is closer to the dissident tradition.

Dissent and Foreign Policy

The initial focus of the dissident movement was not foreign policy. The primary interests of the dissent were the standards of living and lawfulness within Czechoslovakia, though there existed certain potential foreign policy activities whose principles might have been brought in to fuel the dissident movement. One such foreign policy venture was that of the Communist reform wing that aimed to reduce the risk of Soviet military intervention by means of establishing special relationships with Yugoslavia and Romania; the effects of such actions would clearly create an environment more conducive to the domestic policy goals of the dissent. Finally, however, the opinion that “for now, it is desirable to leave foreign policy aside, not to mess with it, so that no frictions with the Soviets are created” ⁴⁹ prevailed among dissidents. Foreign policy was interpreted as a “wall,” behind which it was impossible to swap the bricks, “so that internal changes could take place undisturbed behind it.” ⁵⁰

The nature of the dissent’s interest in international and foreign policy began to change in the 1980s. During the first half of the 1980s, some representatives of the dissent started to orient themselves toward foreign countries where they either sought partners who would support their activities in theory or in practice, or where they could monitor adherence to the law and to human rights violations in other countries and express their support to those unjustly persecuted and to their families. Among the most internationally active dissident groups were Charter 77, the Committee for the Defence of the Unjustly Persecuted, and the Independent Peace Society. These groups maintained contacts with West German, British, French, and Dutch peace movements and with dissident movements in East European countries, ⁵¹ and participated in international peace congresses when the government allowed it. Dissent representatives also made themselves heard—usually by means of open letters or articles in periodicals and daily newspapers—concerning particular cases of human rights violation abroad. ⁵²

A specific sphere of dissent representatives’ international contact was informally meeting foreign representatives during their visits to Czechoslovakia or meeting diplomatic representatives of foreign countries accredited in Czechoslovakia. While in the first half of the 1980s, those meetings were limited to unofficial discussions with members of foreign presidents’ or prime ministers’ entourages, as perestroika and glasnost progressed, as the number of such visits and their assertiveness toward the Czechoslovak Communist regime increased, and as some of the personalities of dissent grew gradually more popular in Western countries, these meetings started to take place “at the highest level,” that is, dissidents were invited by the government to meet the prime ministers or the presidents of West European countries while they were making official visits to Czechoslovakia. ⁵³ A particularly important role in maintaining contacts between the representatives of the dissent and foreign representatives and in spreading awareness of Czech dissent belonged to those dissidents who had been exiled from Czechoslovakia.

In addition to these “foreign policy” activities of the Czech dissent, a group within Charter 77 had formed that discussed foreign and international policy issues and speculated about the future of Europe after the fall of the “bloc-to-bloc arrangement.” These discussions, however, concerned Czech foreign policy only indirectly. Jiří Dienstbier aptly characterized these discussions, calling them “dreaming of Europe.” ⁵⁴ The most important and, at the same time, the most deeply symbolic output of this debate, is the so-called Pražská výzva (Prague Declaration), ⁵⁵ published in March 1985 as a letter to the peace congress in Amsterdam. ⁵⁶ This document is symbolic especially because it is the first document in which Charter 77 expresses itself concerning international politics and the future of Europe, and which depicts themes and issues discussed among the Czech dissent, thus providing for the first time an image of what Czech dissidents considered most important. This document’s importance is given in the fact that it was written in Prague, the place where the new Czech foreign policy was beginning to form. ⁵⁷ Another significant text depicting the approaches of the Czech dissent to international relations is Jiří Dienstbier’s essay entitled Snění o Evropě (Dreaming of Europe). ⁵⁸ Both the Prague Declaration and Dienstbier’s essay agree on many points, a fact that may be attributed firstly to the fact that Dienstbier wrote his essay in the same year in which the Prague Declaration was published, and secondly to the fact that in those days, Dienstbier was one of the three spokespersons of Charter 77 who signed the Prague Declaration (alongside Eva Kantůrková and Petruška Šustrová).

The ideological foundations of both the Prague Declaration and of Dreaming of Europe grew out of the text Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its Final Act. Both texts see the Europe of the future as united, demilitarized, and without the bloc-to-bloc arrangement or its reminiscent structures (such as the European Economic Community, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Warsaw Pact). The second major theme of both texts is the division or unification of Germany and “the right of Germans to decide freely whether and in what form they want unification of their two states.” ⁵⁹ The third theme is the fight for human rights protection, for promotion and preservation of the meaning of nonpolitical policy, and for an authentic approach of the citizens to a political order. ⁶⁰ All three of these themes, put forth by dissident documents, echoed throughout Czechoslovak foreign policy in the first months of 1990. ⁶¹ While Czechoslovak policy gradually abandoned the emphasis on NATO and EEC dissolution—it was Václav Havel who first declared his support for NATO and EEC, ⁶² and later, through the proxy of Jiří Dienstbier, the Foreign Ministry did so as well ⁶³ —the issues of the unification of Germany and the fight for the protection of human rights and democratic values, especially civic and political values, still remained in official Czech foreign policy.

Dissent Tradition in Czech Foreign Policy

The objective of this chapter is to verify whether there exist marks of the dissident tradition in Czech foreign policy. To paraphrase K. Sikkink, the Czech Republic “can be said to have dissident tradition in foreign policy, when it has explicit mechanisms for integrating dissident tradition into foreign policy, and those mechanisms have modified foreign policy decisions in some cases.” ⁶⁴

The dissident tradition exists in Czech foreign policy in the form of general references to the necessity of human rights protection and the support of democracy and democratic values as foreign policy objectives in the first half of the 1990s. However, these objectives existed in a very general form and there were no specific mechanism allowing for the integration of the dissident tradition into foreign policy. Even the later strategic documents that were gradually accepted as parts of the foundation for formulating Czech foreign policy ⁶⁵ were not any more specific. In this context opinions emerged that the lack of a conceptual approach to the issues of human rights and of democratization does not represent a major problem for Czech foreign policy, as “the concept is to adhere to the applicable human rights documents, accepted by the Czech Republic, the concept is that the Czech Republic will not let pass, in silence, a human rights violation wherever . . . in the world.” ⁶⁶ This situation lasted until 1999, when a new document, Koncepce zahraniční politiky ČR (Foreign Policy Conception of the Czech Republic) was published. This document is more specific and contains both explicit references to human rights and democracy, and to the mechanism of their integration into foreign policy. It views human rights as inalienable and natural and it perceives democracy “not only as a domestic issue of individual states.” It interprets both human rights and democracy as key values in the framework of Czech foreign policy. As presented by this document, the key mechanisms of integrating these values into both international politics and Czech foreign policy are the application of existing international covenants and the creation of new contractual frameworks; the operation of international institutions; and political dialogue with other states regarding issues such as the inalienable nature of human rights and the application of value-oriented conditional development assistance. ⁶⁷ These prescribed mechanisms for integration had an effect on the implementation of the key issues at stake. Initially, issues relating to human rights and democratization were under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Ministry Human Rights Department, which was responsible especially for the international contractual framework, its observance, its support, and its development. ⁶⁸ Later, such issues came under the competency of the Department of Development Cooperation, and presently, they are under the authority of the Human Rights and Transformation Policy Department.

All later documents defining Czech foreign policy further develop the responsibilities pertaining to human rights and to democratization adopted in Foreign Policy Concept of the Czech Republic, published in 1999. This document’s specification of human rights and democratization policy integrated new themes and issues into Czech foreign policy, such as support and protection of civic society (including human rights defenders and NGOs), freedom of speech and freedom from coercion, freedom of the media, and cooperation with international implementations of human rights protection. The best-developed mechanisms of integrating human rights and democratization into foreign policy arose from internal Foreign Ministry documents: Směrnice pro postup delegace ČR na zasedání Komise OSN pro lidská práva (Directive for the Czech Delegation Procedure at the UN Human Rights Committee Session), Tematické priority zahraniční politiky ČR voblasti lidských práv (Thematic Priorities of Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic in the Human Rights Sphere—a document defining the issues in question and providing Czech diplomats with general instructions concerning the strategies of promoting these themes) and Manuál pro MZV ČR: lidská práva (Manual for the Foreign Ministry of the Czech Republic: Human Rights).

The most explicit mechanism of the inclusion of the dissident tradition is developed in Koncepce transformační spolupráce (Transformation Cooperation Conception), passed in 2005. The concept of transformation cooperation builds on the system of development cooperation and is defined as “the politics towards . . . transforming countries and also non-democratic regimes under which—in contradiction to the international law and respective liabilities of such countries—human rights and elementary freedoms are violated.” ⁶⁹ Transformation cooperation is justified by the principles of solidarity and the acceptance of responsibility for actions; thus, the concept returns to living in truth and the dissidents’ original goals.

To return to Sikkink, ⁷⁰ for the dissident tradition to be truly integrated into Czech foreign policy, his framework requires not only the existence of explicit mechanisms for its inclusion but also the modification of foreign policy by its tenets in some cases. This requirement has been met several times in Czech foreign policy. For example, the Foreign Ministry of the Czech Republic refused to issue a visa for Belarusian President Lukashenko to participate in the Prague NATO summit in 2002, in spite of the personal intervention of the NATO Secretary General; ⁷¹ the Foreign Ministry explicitly related this refusal to the nondemocratic nature of the Belarusian regime and to the unlawful persecution of antiregime groups. ⁷² In further protest against the antidemocratic policies in Belarus, the Czech Republic disagreed with the lifting of EU sanctions against the Belarusian regime in 2008, arguing that the improvements in respecting human rights were only minor and that there was no guarantee that they would be permanent. ⁷³

Another example of the effects of the dissident tradition on Czech foreign policy occurred when the Czech Republic asserted assistance to Cuban dissent within the EU. As a result of the pressure from the Czech Republic, the European Union lifted the sanctions applied to Cuba for human rights violation only conditionally, and it rejected the Spanish proposal that the member states be prohibited to invite dissidents to consular offices. ⁷⁴ The Czech Republic argued that the Cuban regime had not released the dissidents arrested and had not provided a legitimate reason for that decision in 2003. The Czech Republic proposed three resolutions to the UN Human Rights Committee (in 1999, 2000, and 2001) that criticized human rights violations in Cuba, in spite of Cuba’s threats that it would not repay its debts to the Czech Republic; these resolutions even lead to a short period of decline in U.S.–Czech relations, as the Czech Republic was not willing to agree to American requests concerning the wording of the proposal. ⁷⁵

In further dissent-inspired activity, the Czech Republic, in the long term, criticized human rights violations in Iran, the state of its democracy, and Iran’s engagement in Iraq. Because of the broadcast of RFE/RL (Radio Fardá, broadcasting in Persian from Czech territory), Iran introduced business restrictions against the Czech Republic in 2003 (they were lifted in 2007). ⁷⁶ In addition, the Foreign Ministry of the Czech Republic protested repeatedly against human rights violations in China and in Tibet, including protests concerning the arrests of specific people, such as the student leader of the pro-democratic demonstration at Tiananmen Square, dissident Wang Tan; ⁷⁷ further in that vein, the diplomatic mission of the Czech Republic to the UN attempted to implement a mention of the Responsibility to Protect into the resolution of the human rights situation in North Korea, issued annually by the UN General Assembly. ⁷⁸

Dissidents and Dissident Tradition in the Czech Parliament

The Czech dissident community was an exclusive group, was not very large, and, under Communism, was separated from other social groups and from the nondissident anti-elite, driven into an outsider position on the edge of official culture. However, it was this relative marginality that helped it to escape the pressure of Communist culture and to create the groundwork for a democratic opposition. Its attractive opposition standpoint gave rise to a certain self-satisfaction, allowing people opposing the socialist system to confidently erect mental barriers against the system’s ideological and cultural influences. ⁷⁹ The fall of the Communist regime lead, in the case of the Czech Republic, to an almost complete reversal of political leadership, ⁸⁰ as logically, the successors of former nomenclature cadres recruited from the anti-elite. In this way, former dissidents entered—often as absolute amateurs—all spheres of Czech politics, including foreign policy.

Before we analyze the memberships of the parliamentary chambers’ relevant committees and the activities of dissidents within the Parliament, it is necessary to explain the role of the Czech Parliament in the foreign policy process. ⁸¹ From a long-term perspective, we can observe the emancipation of the Parliament in its rebranding of itself as a regular foreign policy agent. ⁸² This freedom and self-concept became significant mainly during the process of negotiating membership in NATO and the EU, a process in which the Parliament actively participated. Without this cooperation, these negotiations and the fulfilment of obligations for membership in these organizations would not have been possible. In addition, periods of minority-run government led to a certain boost of the Parliament’s self-confidence and self-concept as a foreign policy agent. ⁸³

The influence of the Czech Parliament on contemporary foreign policy may be considered in three spheres: the Parliament can intervene in foreign policy based on its status (or the status of each of its chambers and of the relevant committees) within the domestic political system of the Czech Republic; it can act as a platform for discussion and for negotiations concerning foreign policy; and it can perform so-called parliamentary diplomacy. The competencies and the powers of the chambers of the Parliament differ slightly. Generally, in the sphere of foreign policy, the competencies of the Chamber of Deputies are larger than the competencies of the Senate. The main foreign policy-related activities of both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate are to ratify international covenants; ⁸⁴ to provide, or refuse to provide, approval for missions of the Czech armed forces in foreign countries and for the placing of foreign armed forces within the territory of the Czech Republic; to oversee the government’s budget (in this case, the category of the budget concerning the Foreign Ministry); to articulate standpoints concerning major foreign policy issues, both at their own discretion or on the request of the Government, in the form of a resolution (the Government is obliged to take these standpoints into consideration); and to make decisions concerning the performance of international contractual commitments of joint defense. In the case of the Chamber of Deputies, foreign policy may also be enacted based on the executives’ interpellation and supervision over the functioning of the Government—specifically by declaring confidence or no confidence—although it is quite uncommon. ⁸⁵ Both chambers may also perform so-called parliamentary diplomacy, that is, when deputies and senators meet and confer with representatives of foreign countries. The quality of parliamentary diplomacy and the effects of the chambers and of the committees of the Parliament on foreign policy are, to a large extent, affected by the level of interest of deputies and senators themselves, by the distribution of political power, by the nature of communication between the opposition and the governmental parties, and by the communication among the governmental parties themselves.

The work of the Czech Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies is organized into committees and commissions. The establishment of some committees is given by the law; others are established by the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies at their discretions. Senators and deputies associate in committees, according, among other factors, to the specialization and interests of each deputy/senator. There is one more aspect affecting organization, considered in the process of assigning the membership of the committees in the Chamber of Deputies, and that is maintaining the overall ratio of political representation in the entire Chamber of Deputies and in the committees. Senators may only be members of one committee each. They may only become members of other committees if such committees are obligatory for all senators. A deputy may work in, at most, two committees outside of the obligatory committees. A senator or deputy who is a member of the government in any other capacity may not be a member of any committees. The committees of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies discuss issues specified by the larger chambers as well as issues determined by the resolutions of their own members. ⁸⁶

Both in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate, there are obligatory ⁸⁷ committees and there are committees established by a resolution of each respective chamber. In the case of the Chamber of Deputies, the foreign policy and human rights agenda is dealt with by the Steering Committee ⁸⁸ ex officio, and also by the Committee on Foreign Affairs (existing continually since 1993), by the Committee for Defence and Security (existing continually since 1993), by the Committee on Petitions (in the first election term it existed under the name of “Committee for Petitions, Human Rights, and Minorities”), and by the obligatory Committee for European Integration (established in 1998, and in 2004, as the Czech Republic joined the EU, renamed Committee for European Affairs). In the case of the Senate, the foreign policy and human rights agenda is dealt with by the Committee on Agenda and Procedure ⁸⁹ ex officio, and also by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Security (existing continually since 1996), partially by the Committee on Education, Science, Culture, Human Rights and Petitions (existing continually since 1996), and by the Committee on European Integration (established in 1998, and in 2004, as the Czech Republic joined the EU, renamed Committee on European Affairs; between 1996 and 1998 there existed a subcommittee for European affairs as a part of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Security). The activities of the committees and their influences on foreign policy are derived from the competencies of each respective parliament chamber and from the competencies of each committee within its respective chamber. These committees chiefly discuss issues relating to foreign policy and, consequently, they recommend resolutions for the Parliament and evolve their own diplomatic activities. ⁹⁰ Through their committees, such as the Foreign Ministry, both chambers are informed of foreign policy (for the Foreign Ministry, informing the Chamber of Deputies is obligatory, while informing the Senate is voluntary). Generally, it is possible to say that the committees represent expert backgrounds and platforms of information analysis and evaluation. Resolutions issued by the entire Parliament are of a higher status than those issued only by one committee itself, as such resolutions are only recommendatory.

Considering the objectives of our research, we first calculated the percentage representation of dissidents in the entire Chamber of Deputies and Senate, and then their percentage representation in committees dealing, even partially, with foreign policy (for the list of these committees, see above; in the following tables these committees and their respective statistics are presented in bold print). For both chambers, we also included the committees on constitutional and legal affairs and the mandate and immunity committees, in which we expected a higher representation of dissidents, considering the topics and issues in their scope—key subjects such as lawfulness and human rights—(the committees and numbers printed in italics in the following tables) and then two or three other committees whose scopes of themes and issues completely differ from the issues of foreign policy, human rights, and lawfulness. We have included these other committees because it helps us illustrate the distribution of dissidents in parliamentary committees.

As illustrated by the following tables, our thesis that the concern with both foreign policy and human rights is higher among dissidents than among nondissidents is confirmed. ⁹¹ In the case of the Senate, the representation of dissidents in the Committee on Education, Science, Culture, Human Rights, and Petitions was, throughout the entire period of observation, significantly higher than the Senate average (in one case even three times as high). The thesis that dissidents demonstrate a higher concern with human rights than do nondissidents was thus confirmed in all cases. In Senate committees dealing with foreign policy (Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Security; Committee on European Integration; and Committee on Agenda and Procedure) our thesis was contradicted nine times (see Table 1, boxes with grey background) of 20 cases, that is, in almost one half of the cases. In three of the nine cases, however, the difference is minor (within the range of 0.7 to 1 percent difference between the Senate and committee rates). In committees that do not deal with human rights or with foreign policy, the representation of dissidents was significantly below the Senate average; here, our thesis was confirmed in all cases.

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Table 1

Dissidents in the Senate—Total and in Particular Committees

	Senate Total	VZOB	VEI/VEU a	VPLVVK	ORGV	UPV	MIV	VHZD	VURVSZP
1996-1998	18.5	33.3		38.5	40	7.7	8.3	7.7	7.7
1998-2000	20.7	20	45.5	30	11.1	10	0	9.1	0
2000-2002	23.1	18.2	44.4	36.4	37.5	9.1	16.7	18.2	9.1
2002-2004	21.7	10	16.7	70	28.6	18.2	25	8.3	9.1
2004-2006	18.5	20	27.3	45.5	20	9.1	30.8	8.3	10
2006-2008	12	11	0	33.3	7.7	30	16.7	0	0
2008-2010	8.6	25	10	10	7.7	10	0	0	0

Source: Our research data and calculations.

Note: Numbers represent percentages. Shaded cells show cases in which our thesis was not confirmed. VZOB = Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security; VEI = Committee on European Integration; VEU = Committee on EU Affairs; VPLVVK = Committee on Education, Science, Culture, Human Rights and Petitions; ORGV = Committee on Agenda and Procedure; UPV = Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs; MIV = Committee on Mandate and Parliamentary Privilege; VHZD = Committee on National Economy, Agriculture and Transport; VURVSZP = Committee on Public Administration, Regional Development and Environment.

a

The Committee on European Integration was founded in 1998, and in 2004, as the Czech Republic joined the EU, it transformed into the Committee on EU Affairs. Between 1996 and 1998, there existed a Subcommittee on European Affairs as a part of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Security.

In the case of the Chamber of Deputies, throughout the entire period of observation, the proportion of dissidents in the Steering and Foreign Affairs Committees was significantly higher, in almost all cases, at least two times higher, than the chamber’s overall average—even though it is considered desirable that the overall political party representation ratio of the chamber be roughly maintained within each committee (see Table 2). Our thesis that dissidents demonstrate a higher concern with human rights than do nondissidents was thus confirmed in all cases. In the Committee for European Integration (later the Committee for European Affairs), in one of four cases, our thesis was not confirmed. In the case of the Committee for Defense and Security, our thesis was contradicted twice. It is necessary to admit that in four of the cases in which our thesis was confirmed, the participation of dissidents in the work of the committee in question exceeds the average of the entire Chamber by only minor values, and therefore, the results lack cogency. In the Committee on Petitions, our thesis that in this committee, the participation of dissidents would be higher was not confirmed—of five election terms, the participation of dissidents in three of them is below the overall average. In committees that do not deal with human rights or with foreign policy, during the entire period of observation, the representation of dissidents was significantly lower than the overall average of dissident membership in the Chamber of Deputies. In three of the fifteen cases, however, the participation of dissidents in the work of these committees is above the average of the Chamber of Deputies (in two cases by only 0.3 percent, though).

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Table 2

Dissidents in the Chamber of Deputies; Total and in Particular Committees

	Total Chamber of Deputies	ZAV	VEI a	ORGV	PV	BBV b	MIV	UPV	VSPZ c	VSRZP d	VVVKM
1992-1996	15.2	33.3	-	21.4	6.7	10	13.3	31.6	12.5	8	13.7
1996-1998	15.4	28	-	23.7	13	9.1	15.3	13.6	9.1	9.7	24.1
1998-2002	10.6	30	15.7	29.1	16.7	13	7.7	9.5	0	8	9
2002-2006	8.4	26.9	15.7/10.3 e	15.3	14.3	8.6	0	14.3	3.2	4.5	4.3
2006-2010	4.5	10	0	19	0	8.3/4.6	6.3	16	4.8	4.8	0

Source: Our research data and calculations.

Note: Shaded cells show cases in which our thesis was not confirmed. ZAV = Committee on Foreign Affairs; VEZ = Committee for European Affairs; VEI = Committee for European Integration; ORGV = Steering Committee; VSPZ = Committee for Social Policy and Health Care; MIV = Mandate and Immunity Committee; PV = Committee on Petitions; UPV = Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs; VZ = Committee on Health Care; VSRZP = Committee for Public Administration, Regional Development and Environment; BBV = Committee for Defense and Security.

a

The Committee for European Integration was replaced by the Committee for European Affairs in 2004, as the Czech Republic joined the European Union.

b

The Committee for Defense and Security split in the term 2006-2010 into the Committee for Defense and the Committee for Security.

c

The Committee for Social Policy and Health Care was replaced by the Committee on Health Care in 2006.

d

The Committee for Public Administration, Regional Development, and Environment transformed into the Committee on Public Administration and Regional Development in 2006.

e

The first number represents the term 2002-2004, the second represents the term 2004-2006.

To conclude this analysis, we shall analyze the activities of dissidents in the Parliament and we shall verify whether it is the dissidents who carry the dissident tradition. To be able to do this, we have to give up the absolute anonymity of the members; however, we will disclose only as much personal information as is necessary to substantiate the presented arguments.

Since 1993 and 1996, there have emerged quite a few foreign policy initiatives in the Parliament, all of which undoubtedly grew out of the dissident tradition. In all of these activities, deputies and senators—former dissidents—played exceptionally active parts. For instance, since 1996, the issue of Chechnya and the legitimacy of the Russian military intervention in this territory was repeatedly discussed. A group of MPs was selected to travel to the Russian Federation and monitor the situation in Chechnya. In December 1999, the Chamber of Deputies discussed a resolution concerning the situation in Chechnya as a reaction to the military action of Russia in Chechnya. According to those submitting (three of the six were dissidents), the resolution was to show that the Russian move into Chechnya violated the standards of international law and that the threat declared by the Russian army constituted a crime against humanity. ⁹²

Dissidents further made waves when in 1997, when the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies repeatedly discussed a petition concerning human rights in China. The reporter of the petition in the committee was a dissident; those who rejected the petition and its main points ⁹³ most often claimed that the petition assumed universality of human rights, which was a European fiction and which would cause vast economical implications in the Czech Republic, as China would cancel its business contacts. ⁹⁴ Furthermore, in 1996, a group focused on the issues of Tibet and its political status was established within the Petition Committee of the Chamber of Deputies. The leader of the group was a dissident, and so were two of the three other members of the group. In 1997 and 1998, both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate repeatedly discussed the violation of human rights in China and Tibet. It was only the nondissidents who opposed the introduction of the issue into the proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.

In March 2008, a group of MPs calling themselves “The Group of Friends of Tibet” (founded in 2007) proposed a resolution commemorating the 49th anniversary of the anti-Chinese uprising, thereby showing disapproval of the violence in Tibet at the beginning of 2008. The resolution was accepted both by the Foreign Affairs Committee and by the entire Chamber of Deputies. This proposal was presented by two MPs, one of whom was a dissident. All who opposed this resolution or abstained in the respective voting process were nondissidents. By March 2010 the membership of this group had grown to twenty-six MPs, ten of whom were dissidents. In September 2008, the Chamber of Deputies was visited by a delegation from the Chinese Parliament. During the event, the MPs of the Green Party unrolled the Tibetan flag and the Chinese delegation left in protest. Those who advocated the act of unrolling the flag were exclusively dissidents; those MPs who sent an apologetic letter to the Chinese party were solely nondissidents.

Similarly, in July 2008, MPs of various political parties founded the Group of MPs for Democracy in Burma. This group of six members monitors the situation of human rights in Burma, organizes various events pointing at the practices of the Burmese military junta and appeals to the Government to deal with the issue consistently. Three of the members of the group are dissidents.

Since the second part of the 1990s, the matter of human rights in Cuba and the responsibility of assisting Cuban dissidents and their families have also been present in the Parliament. In both chambers of the Parliament, resolutions and petitions criticizing the situation of human rights in Cuba are regularly ⁹⁵ discussed and passed. Czech MPs regularly meet Cuban dissidents both in exile and in Cuba and appeal to the Government to keep the Cuban question among the priorities of Czech foreign policy. Dissidents are in the majority among those who support Cuban initiatives; if there are any opponents of criticism toward the Cuban regime among MPs, they are nondissidents.

Finally, since March 2006, the Temporary Commission for Identification of People Apprehended, Arrested, and Otherwise Persecuted by the Belarusian Regime Because of Political Reasons has been working within the Senate which, apart from the issues stated in its name, has dealt also with issues of a general human rights nature. This committee, for example, organized a seminar in the Chamber of Deputies on the activities of the International Criminal Court. The Temporary Commission has seven members, three of whom are representatives of dissent. ⁹⁶

Conclusion

During the twenty years since the fall of Communism, Czech society and its values, habits, and practices have changed significantly—it might be said that Czech society has “returned to Europe” and that its priorities came closer to those of West European societies. However, the particular historical experience of Central Europe has introduced several unique aspects into the Czech social and political practice. One of those aspects is the heritage of dissent and the dissident tradition. The dissent formed in the background of the protest against the practices of the Communist regime. During the more than twenty years of its existence, it has created specific cultural and social structures that are similar in sentiment to those present within Western societies but are also specific to Czech society because of the political, social, and economical conditions in which they formed. The fall of Communism and the change in political circumstances put an end to the marginalization of dissidents and to the pressing of dissidents to the edge of society, making dissent, in a short time, an obsolete mindset. However obsolete it may appear in the environment of the post-1989 Czech Republic, dissident activity has left its imprint on Czech society and politics. In Czech foreign policy, what remains of the active dissident stance is embodied by the dissident tradition, which embodies and carries forward the ideas that served as the driving forces of the initial dissident movement. It was the dissidents themselves who became the upholders of this tradition and who have participated in the creation of an explicit mechanism for the inclusion of the dissident tradition into the Czech foreign policy process; in quite a few cases, Czech foreign policy has actually been affected by this dissident tradition.

The introduction of the dissident tradition into Czech foreign policy was facilitated by the great concern of dissidents with foreign policy and with human rights issues, that is, with human rights issues outside the Czech Republic. We have demonstrated dissidents’ concern with foreign policy and human rights issues by analyzing the memberships in parliamentary committees of both chambers of the Parliament, as well as the dissidents’ activities in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. When activities originating from the dissident tradition emerge in the Parliament, the entrepreneurs of such activities are always, although not exclusively, dissidents; the opponents, always nondissidents.