The European Union,Russia,and the Future of the Transnistrian Frozen Conflict

Unfreezing the Frozen Conflicts

Generally speaking, “frozen” conflicts are simply conflicts that were not formally concluded by a peace agreement. This is a vast and heterogeneous category ¹ including, for example, the Korean War and the Cyprus crisis. The post-Soviet frozen conflicts, however, represent a very homogenous subcategory. Leaving aside crises that could have evolved in the same direction but finally took a different course—such as Crimea or Tatarstan—there are four such conflicts located in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh. All were initiated during the terminal phase of the Soviet Union as reactions against the independence moves of Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. In most cases, they were mainly ethnic conflicts (Transnistria’s situation is more complex). From the very beginning, they were supported and instrumentalized by the Soviet and then Russian leaderships in a divide et impera logic. The Kremlin tried to keep the three Soviet republics first within the crumbling USSR and then within the Russian sphere of influence. It has to be noted that during the early 1990s, Chişinău, Tbilissi, and Baku were the most centrifugal members of the Commonwealth of Independent States and their membership in this organization is due in a large measure to the constraints associated with the four frozen conflicts. The crises degenerated into civil wars that were won by the secessionists with the military support of Moscow. Peacekeeping arrangements were made and enforced with the mediation of Russia and with the participation of its forces (except for Nagorno Karabakh). Militarily, all conflicts were completely “frozen” until 2008. However, from a political point of view there was no significant progress despite almost two decades of negotiations.

Because of their almost identical profiles, the post-Soviet frozen conflicts can be analyzed as a unitary phenomenon characterized by the following elements. First, its mainly political nature. The term conflict has obvious military connotations and indeed in each of the four cases there was a brief war. Moreover, as shown by the August 2008 Georgian episode, the use of force has always remained an option. Still, after 1992-1994 the probability of military operations decreased considerably. The political instrumentalization of the secession, on the contrary, has been frequent and visible. Second, the breakaway enclaves have developed very similar de facto states ² pursuing coherent state-building projects. They are “highly authoritarian and militarized, and their populations confined to a Moscow-centered informational environment.” ³ They are also characterized by a “political economy of crime, corruption, trafficking and violence.” ⁴ Third, the frozen conflicts have hampered seriously the development of the three former Soviet republics as they “drain economic resources and political energies from these weak countries and impoverished societies,” generate rampant corruption and organized crime, and prevent the consolidation of their nation-states. ⁵ Fourth, from the very beginning these were three-sided and not bilateral conflicts. Moscow has been a decisive actor that provided the secessionists with military, political, moral, economic, and financial support. It prevented greater international involvement and used its position in the negotiating mechanisms to protect the de facto states. ⁶ It also granted Russian citizenship to many of the residents of the secessionist republics, thus creating the basis for extraterritorial interventions under the pretext of protecting its own citizens. ⁷ Moscow’s policy paradigm with respect to these conflicts was defined by Vladimir Socor as “controlled instability.” It promotes Russia’s geopolitical interests by perpetuating Russian military presence, fostering state weakness and chaotic conditions in the target countries, distracting the latter from the agenda of systemic reforms, and discouraging Western interest in developing close relations with Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. ⁸

This already “classical” picture of the post-Soviet frozen conflicts is affected today by a set of new factors. Because of successive enlargements, NATO and the European Union are now close to and interested in the southwestern part of the CIS. The concerned post-Soviet republics have undergone significant changes in both their domestic affairs and foreign relations and try to strengthen their relations with the West. ⁹ For its part, Russia is engaged in a policy of “pragmatic reimperialization” that seeks to restore Moscow’s regional dominance and reestablish zones of “privileged interest” in the former Soviet bloc. ¹⁰ In this context, the frozen conflicts “are gradually becoming cornerstones for a renewed foreign policy of Russia” ¹¹ as they allow Moscow to prevent “the conclusive resolution of a Eurasian security order, something to which it is deeply and instinctively opposed.” ¹² The Kremlin’s negative attitude toward NATO and its eastern enlargement is not new. One of its consequences was the August 2008 “heating” of the frozen conflict of South Ossetia. Brussels, on the contrary, was not considered a danger before the mid-2000s:

The EU [was] perceived by pro-government elites in Russia as a heterogeneous conglomeration of states, which Russian can divide from within, using energy resources and by corrupting some European politicians.¹³

Yet in recent years the European Union has become increasingly involved in certain ex-Soviet republics. In Moscow, this led to an important change of perception:

The EU is more and more on the offensive in its relations with Russia . . . [and] acts as a tough adversary and competitor. . . . The EU is starting to become a competitor for Moscow already on the Russian territory itself, let alone in the post-Soviet space.¹⁴

Consequently, Russia tries to “freeze the process of European integration and replace it with a regional bipolarity” ¹⁵ that would limit drastically the EU influence in the CIS republics.

As already mentioned in the Introduction, newly democratizing Moldova is the most likely target of Moscow’s anti-EU initiatives. This makes Transnistria an interesting case study. For Russians and Europeans alike, it provides an opportunity to increase their influence and prestige. Consequently, the evolution of the Transnistrian crisis is a good indicator of the regional balance of power between the Kremlin and Brussels. Moreover, the outcome of this duel will influence considerably Moldova’s chances of following the European trajectory of its western neighbors.

The Poorest Land in Europe: Moldova

All or part of what is today the Republic of Moldova changed hands—mainly between Romania and Russia—in 1812, 1856, 1878, 1918, 1940, 1941, 1944, and 1991. Soviet social engineering changed deeply its ethnical and social composition. Consequently, the ideological debate concerning the Moldovan identity is an extremely complex and yet unsolved matter. ¹⁶ The dismantlement of the Soviet Union triggered a traumatic economic downfall. Between 1991 and 1993, Moldova’s production dropped by 60 percent and the purchase power by 80 percent. ¹⁷ Today, 53 percent of the Moldovans still live in rural areas. More than one quarter of the active population works abroad. Moldova is the world’s second remittance recipient (36.2 percent of the GDP) and Europe’s poorest country. ¹⁸

Predictably, all these elements had negative consequences on the Moldovan democratic life. According to the assessment of Freedom House, Moldova’s post-independence hybrid regime ¹⁹ was followed in 2001 by a semiconsolidated authoritarian regime ²⁰ that lasted until 2009. That year, rigged elections, the brutal police repression of ensuing large-scale youth protest, and early elections led to the fall of the ruling Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova. ²¹ Four mainly liberal parties formed a coalition government that adopted a pro-democracy and pro-Western stance. However, its parliamentary seats were too few to allow the election of a president. New early elections were held in November 2010. The renewed anti-communist governing coalition won a larger majority but continued to be unable to elect a president. Consequently, the situation is not yet stable. The new leadership has to either change the Constitution or call new early parliamentary elections, while electoral support for the Communists remains strong. But this has not affected hopes that the ruling coalition will be able to create a genuinely consolidating Moldovan democracy.

However, for almost two decades the main political preoccupation of the Moldovans has not been democratization, EU accession, or relations with Romania. All these matters have been secondary in relation to Transnistria. The secession of the eastern province has been a question of capital importance for both the political elite and the public opinion. This is due to a number of reasons. First, from a legal and constitutional point of view, the Moldovan state cannot accept the loss of a part of its national territory. Second and perhaps more importantly, in symbolic and ideological terms Transnistria is essential for the definition of the Moldovan identity. Unlike the rest of the republic, it has never belonged to Romania ²² and it is inhabited by large Russian and Ukrainian communities that reject firmly any perspective of union with the neighboring country. Moldova’s reunion with Transnistria would represent implicitly a guarantee of independence vis-à-vis Romania. Third, the Transnistrian conflict is frozen but not extinguished. This means that at least in principle, Chişinău has to cope with a possible military threat. Fourth, the secession of Transnistria preserves the conditions allowing the presence of Russian troops on Moldova’s territory and gives Moscow an important means to influence Moldovan politics. Fifth, most of the republic’s industry is located in Transnistria and therefore outside Chişinău’s control. All taxes go to the self-proclaimed government in Tiraspol. Sixth, the secessionist republic controls the main transport and communication lines with Ukraine and can cut them in order to put pressure on the Moldovan government. Seventh, Transnistria is a hub of illegal activities, many of which extend to Moldova. Finally, the politicians in Chişinău have instrumentalized constantly the Transnistrian question in their own interest. This has kept it high on the Moldovan political agenda and very visible to the public.

Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the settlement of the Transnistrian crisis represents one of the major tasks of Moldova’s new democratic government. The latter’s pro-Western orientation combined with increased EU interest in the region undoubtedly create new opportunities. The same factors, however, can have serious negative consequences.

The Making of Transnistria

The first Transnistrian political-administrative unit was created by Moscow in 1924 as an autonomous “Moldovan” republic within Soviet Ukraine. This artificial construct had the role of preparing the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia. When this Romanian province was invaded in 1940 and again in 1944, its northern and central parts were merged with the western strip of the prewar autonomous republic to form the new Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic. While having no special administrative status, diminished Transnistria became the industrial core of Moldova and home to the Soviet 14th army. The latter’s mission in case of war—occupying Istanbul in no more than seven days—led to the creation of huge stocks of weapons and ammunition.

In 1989, Moldovans represented 39.9 percent of Transnistria’s 546,000 inhabitants; Ukrainians, 28.3 percent; and Russians, 25.5 percent (by 2004, the balance had changed to 31.9 percent, 28.8 percent, and 30.3 percent respectively). ²³ While far from representing a majority, the Russians nevertheless controlled the region. ²⁴ One might think of Gramscian hegemony, but blunt Brezhnevian domination is perhaps a more appropriate term. However, at the end of the 1980s the dominant position of this Soviet elite was threatened by Moldovan moves toward independence. Transnistria’s predominantly Russian and Ukrainian directors and leading personnel from the state enterprises feared for their positions and career opportunities. When new language legislation favoring the use of Romanian/Moldovan was adopted in autumn 1989 they mobilized the urban Russian and Ukrainian population behind plans to establish an autonomous Transnistrian republic. ²⁵ This was the beginning of a political process aptly described by Steven D. Roper as a “conflict between Moldovans and a regionally concentrated Russophone population that had a ‘Soviet’ identity.” ²⁶

The Moldovan Supreme Soviet elected in spring 1990 adopted new state symbols and a declaration of sovereignty while the very active Popular Front announced that union with Romania was its political goal. In response, Transnistrian politicians proclaimed a separate Transnistrian Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic on 2 September 1990. During 1991 and early 1992 they evicted the Moldovan executive and judicial authorities with the help of personnel of the Soviet 14th army. ²⁷ Its commander, General Gennadii Yakovlev, even accepted the position of Transnistrian Defense Minister in December 1991. ²⁸ As in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh, the Kremlin encouraged a process destabilizing a republic that seemed ready to escape Moscow’s control. In fact, the strongly pro-Romanian agenda of the Popular Front did not receive broad popular support. ²⁹ The Moldovan government became less nationalistic after the ousting of Popular Front Prime Minister Mircea Druc in May 1991 and adopted a defensive stance. ³⁰ Trying to avoid bloodshed, the Moldovans left most of Transnistria. ³¹ It was only on 19 June 1992, when the Transnistrian forces attacked the last police station controlled by Chişinău in the town of Tighina/Bender, that the Moldovan President Mircea Snegur finally ordered a counterattack. Yet on the night of 20-21 June 1992 the 14th army intervened, defeated the Moldovans, and occupied the town. ³² Moldova ceased all military operations as it was clear that it could not defeat the Moscow-supported Transnistrians. The left (eastern) bank of the Nistru River as well as the town of Tighina/Bender on the right bank became a de facto independent state.

Sisyphus: The Endless Negotiations

The armed conflict was “frozen”—but not ended—through a trilateral peacekeeping operation reuniting Russian, Transnistrian, and Moldovan troops. Even today, they monitor a demilitarized security zone under the supervision of a Joint Control Commission. This was the result of the “Yeltsin-Snegur Agreement” of 21 July 1992. At first, peace negotiations were held in the so-called “4” format, that is, between Russia, Ukraine, Romania, and Moldova (Bulgaria declined to participate). In 1993, Bucharest was excluded from the process. The same year, on Moldova’s request the OSCE started a civilian long-term mission in Chişinău and became involved in the peace process. After 1994, the negotiations continued in the “5” format (Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, Moldova, and Transnistria). It was only in May 1997 that Moldova and Transnistria signed a Memorandum on the principles of the normalization of their relations. But this document included the ambiguous term common state. Disputes on its interpretation have prevented any further progress. ³³

In 2001, one of the factors that contributed to the electoral victory of the Communists was their promise to settle the Transnistrian conflict. This was credible because the communist leader, Vladimir Voronin, was openly pro-Russian and advocated reconciliation with the separatist region. His party’s electoral platform could have been written by the Transnistrians: it included the official status of the Russian language in Moldova, the accession to the Russia–Belarus Union, and the deepening of economic relations with the CIS partners. Relations with Tiraspol improved rapidly. In May 2001, four bilateral cooperation agreements were signed. But that same month, the Russian State Duma proposed multilateral consultations for the accession of both Moldova and Transnistria to the Russia–Belarus Union. This generated extremely negative reactions within the Moldovan society, further fuelling the 2001-2003 anti-communist mass demonstrations. Voronin was forced to abandon his most ambitious projects. In turn, the Transnistrians blocked the negotiations. ³⁴ Moscow nevertheless realized that having the Moldovan Communists in power was a unique opportunity that should be exploited. It therefore prepared the 2003 “Kozak Memorandum,” a project that would have allowed the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria until 2020. Another critical aspect was the creation of an upper chamber of the Moldovan Parliament composed of twenty-seven representatives equally divided between Moldova, Transnistria, and Gagauzia. This would have given the Transnistrians and Gagauz the means to block any major Moldovan constitutional and political change. Again, fierce public protest forced Voronin to reject the agreement he had initially accepted. Moreover, it was obvious that Russia continued to support its Transnistrian protégés, thus preventing the Moldovan Communist from obtaining a much needed political victory. This was one of the main reasons that determined Voronin to adopt an increasingly pro-European stance, implicitly downscaling his Russophile orientation.

In a speech at the 2004 Istanbul NATO summit, the Moldovan president asked for the first time for the departure of the Russian troops from Transnistria. At the same time, the Orange Revolution in neighboring Ukraine created the conditions for a new approach. In April 2005, the new Ukrainian President, Viktor Yushchenko, launched what came to be known as the “Yushchenko Plan.” It was a seven-step proposal based on the organization of free, democratic elections for the Supreme Soviet of Transnistria and on increased international (and Ukrainian) involvement. Yet for the leaders in Tiraspol, the acceptance of this plan would have been suicidal. For its part, Moldova was afraid of legitimizing a democratic but not necessarily friendly Transnistrian leadership. The plan failed. ³⁵

A new impetus was due to Brussels’ increased interest in Moldova. In November 2005, the European Union sent a Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. It also became, together with the United States, an observer of the Transnistrian negotiations. The present “5+2” format was thus created. There are two main negotiators (Moldova and Transnistria), three mediators (the OSCE, Russia, and Ukraine), and two observers (the United States and the European Union). This has improved the negotiating capacity of Moldova, which can use international support to compensate for Moscow’s pro-Transnistrian parti pris. A number of European actions seemed to succeed in pushing Tiraspol toward an agreement. ³⁶ Still, by 2008 it became obvious that no major breakthrough could be achieved in the short term. This came at a time when Voronin had already taken the decision to improve relations with Moscow and believed that solving the Transnistrian problem would help win the 2009 election. Consequently, he reverted to secretive trilateral negotiations with Russia and Transnistria. In September 2008, the Moldovan prime minister even stated that some elements of the Kozak Plan would be accepted by Chişinău. ³⁷ Yet no major progress was made before the April 2009 election. Later, political turmoil, new election, and the creation of the anti-communist government coalition completely changed the situation. The Transnistrians immediately accused the new Moldovan leadership of being part of a Romanian and NATO plot. They also started to speak about a possible new war (see below). The settlement of the conflict suddenly became highly improbable.

The repeated failure of the negotiations was due mainly to the incompatibility of the Moldovan and Transnistrian positions with respect to the constitutional status of the secessionist region. Chişinău was ready to accept a degree of autonomy even more advanced than that of Gagauzia, which is frequently mentioned as an international model. Tiraspol, however, asked stubbornly for a confederation. This would have allowed its leaders to block any major change both at home and in Chişinău. Moreover, as a confederate republic Transnistria would have automatically acquired the right to quit the confederation. Many Moldovans believed that this was little more than a constitutional way to legitimize Tiraspol’s full independence. It is clear that the only possible compromise would be based on a more or less balanced federation. In more than one occasion, Chişinău seemed ready to accept such a solution and the nineteen-year odyssey included episodes of justified optimism. Still, Moldova’s occasional openness was not mirrored by a similar Transnistrian stance. And it is logical to think that this stalemate will persist as long as two interrelated factors do not change. One is regional and concerns Russia’s geopolitical interest. It will be addressed in a later section. The other is local and relates to Transnistria’s ruling elite.

A Working Political Fiction

Transnistria was created as a garrison state meant to protect local ethnic minorities from discrimination within Moldova and from annexation by irredentist Romania. Ironically, Moldova did not unite with Romania and the rights of its minorities—including the Russian one—are fully respected. Furthermore, after 2001 Moldova was ruled by the Communists who shared Transnistrians’ view on history, language issues, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the attitude toward Romania. ³⁸ Still, this did not prevent the continuing instrumentalization of ethnic fears by the Tiraspol leaders. Even today, they

are putting efforts into flooding the Internet with stories of “ex-combatants,” witnesses, “victims,” that “have seen with their own eyes” what has happened during the conflict. Funds and efforts are put into printing books and writing articles. An especially interesting example is the case with Wikipedia: Tiraspol authorities have hired personnel who write detailed descriptions of the Moldovan-Russian relations, Transnistrian conflict events; they manipulate the facts and generally attempt to promote a different version of the conflict, similar to how Soviet-time specialists were building virtual history.³⁹

Another, related means of ensuring public support for the regime is based on something that might be labeled the culture of the international plot. Official propaganda speaks constantly of the danger of a Moldovan/Romanian/NATO invasion. But it is not the only one to do that. An interesting example is provided by Novaya Gazeta, ⁴⁰ the journal of the Tighina/Bender-based political analyst Andrey Safonov. A former minister and, since 1999, rival of President Igor Smirnov, Safonov is one of the very few independent (or, at least, autonomous) voices tolerated by the regime. In May 2009, he published a geopolitical assessment of the region. It was after the April turmoil in Chişinău and one might have expected to find an analysis of that event’s consequences. The world Safonov describes, however, has little in common with what Westerners or even Moldovans know about Eastern Europe. That part of the world is in fact a savage, dangerous international environment haunted by ferocious predators. Fortunately, computer simulations allow the Russian military experts to predict future evolutions. In turn, these predictions help the Kremlin elaborate its strategic plans. Basically, the influence of the United States is diminishing while the European Union is increasing its presence. The main danger is the expansionism of Romania. This country is targeting Moldova as well as former Romanian territories now controlled by Ukraine. By getting Moldova and the Ukrainian gas-rich continental shelf of the Black Sea, Bucharest intends to become a regional super power posing a lethal threat to Transnistria. The only hope is an already planned Russian intervention that would lead to the dismantlement of Romania. This is a “politically incorrect but necessary scenario” similar to those used in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and USSR. Romanian Moldova (between the Prut and the East Carpathians) would merge with the Republic of Moldova. Transylvania would become Hungarian and South-Western Romania Serbian (nothing is said about Bucharest). This would solve all tensions in South-Eastern Europe as well as “many financial problems.” The only possible complication might be caused by Ukrainian ambitions. For Tiraspol, a Russian–Ukrainian or Russian–Polish war would be a “cataclysm.” In any case, Moscow represents Transnistria’s only protector. ⁴¹ Everywhere in Europe, this 1939-type scenario would seem grotesque. The fact that in Transnistria it is published and widely commented on is illustrative of the results of almost two decades of Stalinist-style propaganda. At least a part of the population sees the separatist region as a besieged fortress that has to struggle for its physical survival. Under these circumstances, contesting the patriotic leadership in Tiraspol can only be suicidal.

Such widespread convictions help perpetuate the rule of the Soviet elite already legitimized by the initial conflict. Under the pretext of resisting Moldovan “fascism,” President Igor Smirnov (a Russian citizen), Minister of State Security Vladimir Antyufeyev (a former OMON officer accused of political crimes in Soviet Latvia), and their group built a consolidated authoritarian regime whose Stalinist methods are not unlike those of Central Asian dictators. There are no free and fair elections. Any dissent is brutally suppressed. Politicians and journalists who display the slightest degree of disloyalty are harassed or banned. The Ministry of State Security has even sponsored the creation of the Proryv youth group whose mission is to prevent a Colored Revolution and to “protect Transnistria from the orange plague.” ⁴²

Smirnov and his associates also benefit from the very profitable economic activities that made Transnistria known worldwide. In 2000, in this region there were 42,000 tonnes of weapons and ammunitions belonging to the Russian Federation. About half of them were evacuated or destroyed during 2000-2004. ⁴³ The rest, as well as weapons manufactured illegally in Transnistria, are simply being sold on the international black market. Tiraspol’s lack of international recognition has the paradoxical effect of preventing any legal action against its companies. Russian arms exporters did not miss the opportunity and started to use Transnistria for their own illegal trade. Governments under international embargo, guerilla fighters, and terrorist groups are today regular customers of the region’s arms traffickers (Xavier Deleu, a French journalist who built close links with Transnistrian officials and businessmen, published a 2005 book on this subject ⁴⁴ ). Furthermore, all sorts of traffickers outside the weapons sector also discovered the advantages of Tiraspol’s special status. Consequently, Transnistria, already a “weapons laundry,” has become “a virtual free criminal zone” described by a report funded by the British Department for International Development as “a smuggling company masquerading as a state.” ⁴⁵ The main profiteers are the leaders in Tiraspol. They are fully aware that trafficking can go on only as long as Transnistria maintains its present unclear status. Hence their resolute opposition to any settlement that would bring the region under the control of the Moldovan police and judiciary.

The Transnistrian Wind of Change and Its Negative Consequences

Smirnov’s firm grip on power prevents any democratization move. However, in recent years the regime came to be contested by members of the Transnistrian oligarchy. Authoritarian excesses and human rights abuses led to the increasing international isolation of the region. When this took the form of serious obstacles to Transnistrian exports, some business groups realized that their interests diverge from those of the regime. Consequently, in the December 2005 parliamentary elections, twenty-three of the forty-three seats of the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet were won by the candidates of the Sheriff business group formally represented by the Obnovlenye (Renewal) party. ⁴⁶ Sheriff is an extremely influential group that dominates most of the region’s economy. Its very existence would not have been possible without a close relation with the Smirnov regime. In fact, Oleg Smirnov, one of the dictator’s sons, even worked for the group. But the latter’s export had seriously diminished in 2004 and it was clear that only a political change could have improved the situation. However, Obnovlenye’s political platform was similar to that of Smirnov on most major points and especially on the independence of Transnistria. Sheriff simply wanted to replace the top policy makers with its own men, not to overthrow the authoritarian regime. The Obnovlenye leader, the young, Moscow-educated Evgheni Shevchuk, became the speaker (chairman) of the Supreme Soviet. He was replacing the only ethnical Moldovan among the associates of Smirnov, Grigori Mărăcuță, who had held this position since 1991. Shevchuk mobilized a significant group of deputies and succeeded in imposing constitutional changes that weakened the position of the president and enhanced the independence of the judiciary. He also tried to turn the Transnistrian official TV into a public company and to reduce the control of local councils by the Tiraspol authorities. ⁴⁷ However, Shevchuk refrained from a full-fledged crusade. Most notably, in 2006 he did not run as a presidential candidate, allowing Smirnov to be reelected. He claimed that he did not want to endanger Transnistria’s unity at a moment of major external challenge. He might have added that, given Smirnov’s methods, he didn’t want to endanger his own security either. The dispute continued in the domain of constitutional reform. The project of a new Constitution, completed in April 2009, was limiting drastically the attributions of the president while reinforcing those of the Supreme Soviet. Smirnov threatened to “mobilize the Cossack troops” and to dissolve the legislative assembly and conceived a competing project reinforcing his own position. ⁴⁸ Finally, in July 2009 Shevchuk resigned from his position of speaker of the Supreme Soviet, accusing the president of “undemocratic and anticonstitutional actions.” ⁴⁹ The then Moldovan President Voronin, who had put great hopes in a political change in Tiraspol, bitterly accused Shevchuk of being “a weak man.” ⁵⁰ In any case, despite this victory the image of the Smirnov group was seriously affected. On 18 November 2009, thirty-six of the forty-three members of the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet rejected the president’s call for a referendum modifying the Constitution in his favor. ⁵¹ Both Shevchuk and Mărăcuță took the opportunity to ask Smirnov to step down. ⁵² In the December 2010 parliamentary elections, Obnovlenye won twenty-five of the forty-three seats of the Supreme Soviet. ⁵³ Perhaps more importantly, Evgheni Shevchuk announced his decision to enter the 2011 presidential race. ⁵⁴ It is more and more clear that the survival of the present leadership in Tiraspol depends on its capacity to relegitimate itself.

Exaggerating the gravity of the external threats provides the simplest and most convenient solution. In 2007, NATO’s opening of an information and documentation center in Chişinău was presented by the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet as a decisive Moldovan step toward joining the Atlantic Alliance. ⁵⁵ But it was the 2009 fall of Moldova’s communist regime that provided the much needed “proof” of a plot threatening the very existence of Transnistria. Smirnov warned that the new right-wing Moldovan government will start “a new wave of violations of the rights of the Russian speaking citizens” and paralleled the “nationalist policies of Georgia and Moldova.” To counter the efforts of the new government in Chişinău to “reduce to zero Russia’s influence in the region” and to put an end to the presence of Russian troops, he proposed the accession of his region to the Russian Federation. Short of that, the Transnistrians would be forced “to prepare to defend by themselves the borders of their state.” ⁵⁶ Some of his colleagues were even more aggressive. When the Moldovan acting President Mihai Ghimpu asked for the retreat of the Russian forces from Transnistria, he was accused by the president of the Security, Defense, and Peacekeeping Committee of the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet, Oleg Gudymo, of being

genetically unable to accept the fact that Transnistria is not a part of Moldova. . . . Mihai Ghimpu cannot sleep well as long as in Transnistria we sleep in peace. . . . Drastic actions such as the retreat of the Russian troops will not lead to anything good. The presence of the Russian pacificators could put an end to the war. We are against their retreat. President Ghimpu’s statement on the retreat of Russia from Transnistria was foolish. ⁵⁷ (emphasis added)

The departure of the Russian soldiers, concluded Gudymo, would lead to a new war. In 2006, when Chişinău was ruled by the Communists, he had already stated that “Moldova has sharp teeth and aggressive plans with regard to the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic.” ⁵⁸ Now, with a pro-Western government, Moldova can only prepare an overt aggression. Unsurprisingly, this point of view is shared by the entire Transnistrian leadership, which can emphasize once again its patriotic goals.

To show the seriousness of the “Moldovan threat,” the Transnistrian secret service entered the scene. In the spring of 2010 it arrested a Tiraspol journalist, Ernest Vardanean, and a Tighina/Bender civil servant, Ilie Cazac, on charges of treason and spying in favor of Chişinău. The alleged use of brutal interrogation methods led to “confessions” that were broadcast by Transnistria’s official television. In December 2010, Vardanean was sentenced to fifteen years in prison after a trial assessed by Moldovan and international human rights activists as “a flagrant violation of fundamental freedoms.” ⁵⁹ It is not illogical to think that Smirnov might even contemplate the ignition of some small-scale armed incidents on the Nistru. This would ensure large-scale mobilization within Transnistria, reinforcing greatly the legitimacy of the present regime. However, the Tiraspol leaders do not have the freedom of deciding such extreme actions by themselves. On serious matters, the final decision has always been taken by the Kremlin.

Player and Referee: Russia

Writing about Russia’s role of “patron state,” Nicu Popescu formulated the best brief description of the Tiraspol–Moscow relation: “Transnistria could not have emerged without Russia, nor could it have survived.” ⁶⁰ The picture is completed by Nicholas Dima’s equally short explanation of the 1992 war: “Russia wanted to keep Moldova under control, Romania at bay, and Ukraine under threat.” ⁶¹ Despite its 1999 Istanbul commitment, the Kremlin still maintains on the territory of Transnistria 1,500 soldiers and huge stocks of weaponry. This force is small, but not insignificant if added to Tiraspol’s own militia and compared with Moldova’s poorly trained and armed 7,000 soldiers. ⁶² More importantly, the Russian military presence is perceived by all parts as explicit support for the secessionists. The latter have always been pictured in Russia as victims of Chişinău’s aggression. Moscow responded to the Moldovan efforts to force the withdrawal of its troops with a media campaign claiming that this would lead to renewed violence. ⁶³

The 1992 Transnistrian and 2008 South Ossetin episodes indicate clearly that any Moldovan military action would trigger a Russian direct intervention. For Chişinău, this is a strong incentive for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. But the Transnistrians know they are well protected and see no reason to change the status quo. In this, they have been helped by Moscow’s attitude in the negotiation process. The Russians have undermined constantly the five-sided negotiations as they believe that third parties are favorable to Moldova. In fact, Russia “transformed the other participants in the 5+2 format, Ukraine, OSCE, EU and USA [into] onlookers.” ⁶⁴ It tried to impose direct Chişinău–Tiraspol negotiations, while assuming the role of a biased, pro-Transnistrian arbitrator.

This protecting attitude at the international level has been paralleled by direct Russian involvement inside Transnistria. A 2008 report of the Moldovan Institute for Public Policy assesses this involvement as including the following elements: (1) Massive offer of Russian passports to the inhabitants of Transnistria. Out of a total population of about 550,000, more than 100,000 are today Russian citizens. ⁶⁵ (2) Financial assistance and the promotion of expectations regarding the extension to Transnistria of social assistance programs from Russia. (3) Support for periodical referendums regarding independence and affiliation with Russia. (4) Illegal privatization of strategic economic entities by Russian public and private capital. (5) Imposition of a pro-Russian media space openly hostile to the “enemy” (Moldova). Russia is presented as the only defender and savior. (6) Holding elections for the state bodies of Russia in Transnistria exactly as on the territory of the Russian Federation. (7) Imposition of and support for Russian citizens who execute the Kremlin’s indications in the Tiraspol administration. (8) Transformation of the Transnistrian secret service into a branch of the Russian secret service. ⁶⁶

Ironically, while Russian propaganda in Transnistria presents Chişinău as the arch-enemy, Moscow has made also visible efforts to project its influence inside Moldova. ⁶⁷ Using Moldovan printed media, local editions of popular Russian newspapers, and Internet-based platforms, Moscow conducted an efficient propaganda campaign that discredited NATO, the United States, Western Europe, as well as pro-Western and pro-Romanian local politicians. ⁶⁸ This explains the preference of 50.4 percent of the Moldovans for Russia as their country’s most important strategic partner. The much less active European Union is supported by only 25 percent of the population; the United States, by about 1 percent. ⁶⁹

The propaganda is far from exhausting Moscow’s arsenal. When the Moldovan Communists came to adopt a rather pro-Western stance, the Russian National Security Council, the Russian government, and the State Duma decided to use a “complex pressure mechanism” against Moldova (and Georgia). ⁷⁰ The most visible measure was the 2006 banning of the Moldovan agricultural and wine imports. Chişinău’s dependence on Russian gas was also fully exploited. The first set of measures targeted the economic interests of the Moldovan elites. The second affected seriously the conditions of living of the common people. Voronin’s 2007 pro-Russian turn is therefore hardly surprising. ⁷¹

The Russian support for Transnistria is the result of a coalition of interest groups inside the Russian Federation. ⁷² First, important Russian business groups are involved in the secessionist region. Benefitting from corrupt links with the Smirnov regime, they took part in the privatization process and made Russia the largest foreign investor. Second, elements of Russia’s military-industrial complex cooperate with Transnistrian factories. In fact, Russian orders have been crucial in preventing them from going bankrupt. Third, the region is frequently used for illegal traffic by influent Russian business, military, and mafia groups. For obvious reasons, all these “interested actors” try to keep a low profile. But they are very influential in shaping Moscow’s policies. Finally, at the political level, the most vocal supporters of the regime in Tiraspol are the nationalist and communist deputies of the Russian State Duma. They have constantly put pressure on the executive to adopt tougher policies toward Moldova and succeeded in creating a pro-Transnistrian attitude within the Russian public opinion. ⁷³

However, economic, ideological, and cultural factors only represent the tip of the iceberg. They are important but cannot be compared with Moscow’s geopolitical interest. For the Kremlin, the present situation of Transnistria presents multiple advantages in keeping Moldova inside the Russian sphere of influence and projecting Moscow’s influence in the region. First, it prevents the normalization of the political and constitutional situation of Moldova. This perpetuates the image of an unstable, almost failed state that cannot be welcomed as a member by the European Union or any other Western structure as long as it does not solve its internal problems. Even the Romanian public believes that it is better to stay away from this crisis-ridden region. Second, it forces any leadership in Chişinău to maintain a relatively pro-Russian attitude. For the overwhelming majority of Moldovans, the reunion with Transnistria is a major policy objective. Any anti-Russian measure can only hamper this reunion and is therefore unpopular. In extreme cases, small-scale military action undertaken unilaterally by Transnistrian forces could be used to stress the need for Russian mediation and peace keeping. Moreover, an openly hostile attitude toward Moscow might lead to Russian recognition of Transnistria’s independence. Such a move would be a shock for most Moldovans and would seriously delegitimize the local government perceived as having caused it. Third, Russian political and military presence in Transnistria can be used to put pressure on Kiev. Many of Ukraine’s lines of communications with Moldova, Romania, and Central Europe cross the territory controlled by the separatists. Fourth, a fundamentally changed geopolitical context might require the projection of Russian military force in South-East Europe. In that case, Moscow might decide to use Transnistria as a military outpost. For a Westerner, such a perspective seems very unlikely. But one should not forget that things are seen from Russia through nineteenth-century lenses. Fifth, the eastern bank of the Nistru is used by Russian companies for large-scale illegal export of weapons. Besides its obvious utility for some Russian oligarchs, this represents a convenient way to arm disreputable overseas friends.

This is why the Kremlin has supported the Transnistrians and has made visible efforts to maintain the status quo. Russia might accept the reunion of the secessionist region with Moldova, but only under conditions mirroring the present situation. Transnistria should receive a constitutional status equal to that of the rest of the country and allowing it to maintain special relations with Russia as well as the latter’s troops. Russian influence should also be decisive in Chişinău. Moldova should abandon any plan of joining Western structures. ⁷⁴

During the April 2009 crisis, the Communists were supported by the Kremlin, but their subsequent electoral failure was not perceived by Moscow as its own defeat. At the September 2009 Chişinău CIS summit, Medvedev did not even meet Voronin. ⁷⁵ It seems that the Russians were deeply dissatisfied with the Communists’ pro-Western episode and did not trust the former Moldovan president. Furthermore, election rigging could have triggered a colored revolution with extremely negative consequences for Russia’s position in Moldova. Consequently, the Kremlin preferred to show a smiling face to the new government in Chişinău despite its pro-Western attitude. However, the chairman of the Commission for relations with CIS member states and co-nationals of the Russian State Duma, Aleksey Ostrovsky, made clear that the Russian Federation could recognize the independence of Transnistria if the new Moldovan leadership becomes too pro-Romanian. ⁷⁶

All this suggests that, despite the political change in Chişinău, Moscow intends to maintain its previous attitude toward Transnistria and Moldova. It will push for a settlement of the conflict only under conditions that are extremely favorable to its own geopolitical interests. Otherwise, it will continue to protect the secessionist region and will oppose any move to modify the status quo.

The Missing Link: Romania

At the fall of communism, Moldova was hardly one of the Romanians’ main priorities. To Vladimir Socor, “the Romanian public at large appeared almost wholly indifferent to the issue.” ⁷⁷ A rather vague preference for the union with the former Romanian province was due mainly to the activity of some intellectuals invoking what Charles King called the “Kosovo complex”: the idea that “a particular piece of territory within the historical homeland is mystically linked with the collective well-being of the ethnos.” ⁷⁸ All the political parties included irredentist elements in their programs, but the importance of these elements was modest. Even for the two parliamentary ultranationalist parties—the Transylvania-based Party of Romanian National Unity and the Greater Romania Party—Moldova was a matter of secondary importance as they targeted mainly the Hungarian minority. The superficially reformed former Romanian Communist Party led by Ion Iliescu adopted a pro-Moscow stance. Consequently, it did nothing to support effectively Moldova’s anti-Soviet moves and then became “the sole political actor in Romania willing to accept Moldovan statehood for the long term.” ⁷⁹ This was very important because Iliescu took power in December 1989 and built a semiconsolidated authoritarian regime that lasted until 1996. ⁸⁰ Hence, he was able to control fully Bucharest’s foreign policy and limited drastically Romanian support for the Moldovan Popular Front. At times, there were some concessions made to nationalist supporters and allies. In symbolical terms, the most important was the July 1991 Declaration of the Romanian Parliament condemning the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and urging a peaceful correction of this legacy of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. ⁸¹ Iliescu also offered the Moldovans a significant aid package to pay for outstanding fuel debts to the Russian Federation. A range of official connections was created between the governments in Chişinău and Bucharest, including high-level working groups on bilateral relations. Romania became Moldova’s largest trading partner outside the CIS. ⁸² Yet none of these elements was intended as the first step of a Romanian–Moldovan unification process. Furthermore, beginning with the mid-1990s—when the Moldovans’ lack of interest in reunion with Romania was generally acknowledged—the Romanian parties downscaled accordingly their already weak irredentist programs. The Transnistrian leaders, however, saw the situation in a very different light. From the very beginning, they used Romanian pro-union statements—even if they came from marginal political or cultural groups or individuals—to build an aggressive rhetoric against “irredentist” Romania. The “annexation” of Moldova was presented as imminent, which in turn justified the secession and the creation of the Smirnov-led garrison state.

For their part, most Romanians see Transnistria as a remote and obscure place with which they do not have anything in common. However, for the first time since perhaps 1944, in the mid-2000s there was a short-lived official Romanian initiative concerning the secessionist region. In December 2004, at the beginning of his presidential tenure, Traian Băsescu promoted an aggressively pro-American foreign policy illustrated by his project of a “Bucharest–London–Washington axis.” While supporting Romania’s military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, he advocated the presence of American military bases in Romania and asked for an active involvement of NATO and the United States in the Black Sea region. In a speech delivered in March 2005 at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, he asked for the “formulation of a common Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea region” in order to promote “freedom, democracy, prosperity, and stability,” leading to the creation of a “new identity for the Black Sea region.” A Romanian–American strategic partnership was proposed in order to

find lasting solutions for the “frozen conflicts” in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh [which] threaten the security of Europe by spilling over organized crime, human and arms trafficking, and transnational terrorism.

Coming to the point, he explicitly asked for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria and Georgia. ⁸³ He tried to win President Bush’s support for this plan during two visits to the White House, in March 2005 and July 2006. ⁸⁴ In September 2005, in a speech delivered at Stanford University, he even proposed the creation of a U.S.–European Union military task force in the region, as “the Russian Federation does not accept the internationalization of the Black Sea.” He insisted that “it is time for the Black Sea to cease being a Russian lake.” ⁸⁵ Romania’s National Security Strategy, adopted in April 2006, reflected the same ideas. ⁸⁶

However, despite the genuine interest of the Bush administration in this project, there were few visible consequences, none of which concerned Transnistria. Because of West European opposition, the April 2008 NATO Summit—held precisely in Bucharest—failed to mark the acceptance of Ukraine and Georgia in NATO’s Membership Action Plan. In September 2009, the decision of the Obama administration to abandon plans for the anti-missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic put an end to any hope for increased American interest in the region.

Furthermore, domestic evolutions also affected the coherence of Bucharest’s eastern policy. President Băsescu is in control of only one of the three major Romanian political groups. His Democrat Liberal Party, now in power, was part of coalition governments during 2005-2007 (with the Liberals) and from December 2008 to October 2009 (with the Social Democrats). These two parties try to build good relations with Russia. Since 2006, the Liberal National Party is under the total control of the controversial billionaire Dinu Patriciu, who advocates openly close economic ties with the CIS countries. Within the Social Democrat Party (the former Communists), Ion Iliescu, now honorary president, is supported by the party’s overwhelmingly pro-Russian old guard. Their view on Moldovan matters is well illustrated by an interview given in September 2009 to the Moldovan department of Radio Free Europe by Iliescu’s former defense minister, Ioan Mircea Pașcu. Asked to comment on the new anti-communist government coalition in Chişinău, Pașcu, now a Social Democrat member of the European Parliament, spoke exclusively and insistently of the Moldovans’ energy dependence on Russia, of their need to adopt an attitude favorable to Russian interests, and of the great danger of antagonizing Moscow. ⁸⁷ It seemed more of a statement of a Comecon representative than that of a European parliamentary. The 2005-2010 Social Democrat president, Mircea Geoană, belongs to the younger, pro-Western faction. However, in November 2009 it was disclosed that on 27 April 2009, when he was president of the Senate and vice president of Romania’s Supreme Defense Council, he made the first of a series of three secret visits to Moscow. There he allegedly met Arkady Dvorkovich, assistant to the president of the Russian Federation on economic matters, and Sergei Prikhodko, aide to the Russian president. Geoană first denied the events. When he was forced to recognize them, he claimed those were private visits designed to “normalize the Russia-Romania dialogue.” ⁸⁸ He did not disclose any further detail, but press reports claimed that he negotiated Russian financial and political support for his 2009 presidential campaign. In exchange, he allegedly promised that once elected, he would downscale the Romanian involvement in the Nabucco gas pipeline project while joining South Stream, the Russian rival project. ⁸⁹ While these allegations cannot be proved, the visits themselves demonstrate the interest of the younger Social Democrats in improving the Bucharest–Moscow relation. Any involvement in Transnistria might complicate this task and therefore the Social Democrats have joined the Liberals in discouraging it. They are helped by the fact that the Romanian public opinion is resolutely hostile to any involvement in post-Soviet crises. Consequently, despite his continuing support for an American military presence in the region, president Băsescu had to abandon his earlier plans. Romania’s brief presence on the Transnistrian stage came to an irreversible end.

Deus ex Machina: The European Union

The European Union–Moldova relationship began quite modestly. A bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1994 and entered into force in 1998. In June 2001, Chişinău became a member of the EU-initiated Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. Yet Moldova’s importance was perceived in Brussels as marginal. Between 1991 and 2006, the EU assistance amounted to only €300 million. ⁹⁰ However, an important change was determined by the launching of the European Union’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). ⁹¹ An ambitious joint ENP Action Plan was adopted in February 2005 by the EU–Moldova Cooperation Council. The European Union also increased its presence in Moldova. In October 2005, a full European Commission Delegation was opened in Chişinău and Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged was appointed EU Special Representative for Moldova. ⁹² In fact, the European démarche has two independent constituents. The first concerns the Europeanization of Moldova, in a way similar to that of the post-communist countries now members of the European Union. It probably contributed, in a limited measure, to the societal change that finally led to the 2009 electoral defeat of the Communists. The second has the objective of putting an end to the Transnistrian crisis. It seems that Brussels considered this an easier task and gave it priority. Consequently, the Transnistrian question was addressed by both the 2005 ENP Action Plan ⁹³ and the European Commission’s Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 for the Republic of Moldova. ⁹⁴ Progressively, a three-level Transnistrian strategy emerged. ⁹⁵ First, direct pressure was put on Tiraspol. Already in 2003, the European Union (and the United States) introduced a visa ban against leading members of the separatist regime. The ban has been renewed annually. ⁹⁶ Also in 2003, the European Commission convinced Ukraine to conclude with Moldova an agreement forcing Transnistrian exporters to acquire customs stamps only issued by Chişinău. ⁹⁷ A more ambitious (but short-lived) customs regime was introduced by Kiev in 2006 also under EU pressure. ⁹⁸ Moreover, an EU Border Assistance Mission was deployed to prevent illegal traffic at the Moldovan–Ukrainian border. The second level is incentive based. In recent years, Brussels has offered Moldova increased financial assistance, trade concessions, programs of student scholarships, etc. This trend became very visible after the 2009 regime change in Chişinău. The negotiations for a new Association Agreement started on 12 January 2010. ⁹⁹ Tiraspol is excluded from the Moldova–European Union cooperation and this becomes more and more frustrating. Transnistrian trade with the European Union has increased, with 59 percent during 2006-2008, and could benefit greatly from the preferential regime granted to Moldova. ¹⁰⁰ The third level is represented by the already mentioned direct European involvement in the negotiation process. This led to the creation of the 5+2 format that improved significantly the position of Chişinău. However, as shown earlier in this article, in 2008 Voronin abandoned this format in favor of secretive trilateral negotiations with Russia and Transnistria that ended without any result. An important development took place in June 2010, when German Chancellor Angela Merkel proposed to President Dmitri Medvedev of Russia to resolve the long-running conflict in Transnistria by reviving the 5+2 negotiations. In return, Mrs. Merkel offered the establishment of an EU–Russia Political and Security Committee where Brussels and Moscow would work closely together in civil and military crisis management operations. ¹⁰¹ The proposal was further developed at the October 2010 Merkel–Medvedev–Sarkozy reunion in Deauville and at the December 2010 OSCE Astana Summit. ¹⁰² Yet Russia cannot be asked to study seriously this German plan as long as it is not transformed into a full-fledged EU initiative. And for the time being, it is not clear if Chancellor Merkel’s views are supported by the other EU members.

On one hand, all these elements might lead to optimism. The European Union is forging increasingly efficient instruments that turn it into a major regional player. The secessionists in Tiraspol have to face a new set of sticks and carrots and, ideally, might be tempted to give up. On the other hand, however, the plot-obsessed Transnistrian leaders perceive the EU actions as hostile and illegitimate. They hardly appreciate Brussels’ pro-Chişinău attitude and assess it as the result of a dangerous Romanian–Western plan. Moscow has a similar stance. “Losing” Transnistria to a fully independent Moldova is inacceptable, as this would cancel the multiple advantages enumerated in the section on Russia. But “losing” Transnistria to Moldova and the European Union would be even worse. The Kremlin’s geopolitical vision allows only one interpretation of such an event: the Russian sphere of influence would diminish in favor of a rival, aggressive sphere of influence. This demands counteraction, not appeasement.

The Minor Actors: Ukraine, the OSCE, and the United States

Ukraine has been a mediator in the Transnistrian negotiations and stations military observers on the demarcation line. In principle, Kiev is interested in putting an end to a crisis that destabilizes the region and maintains Russian forces at its Western border. Still, as it was shown in the previous sections, it has taken little effective action. ¹⁰³ Moreover, it did so only under strong pressure from the European Union. The Orange revolution brought the Yushchenko Plan, but its results were disappointing. In part, this is due to the fact that Ukraine has important interests in the separatist region. There are major Ukrainian investments in Transnistrian companies. Corrupt officials in Ukraine benefit from smuggling through the region. And Transnistrian trade through the Ukrainian customs, territory, and seaports represent an important source of revenue for the budget of the Odessa region. ¹⁰⁴ More importantly, Ukraine’s Transnistrian policy is only an element of the complex and troubled Kiev–Moscow relation. This is a subject too vast to be presented here. But it is clear that Ukraine is not free to play a fully independent role on the Transnistrian arena. This can only change if and when Kiev breaks its eastern links and follows a genuinely European trajectory.

The role of the OSCE was mentioned in the section on the negotiation process. In the 1990s, its contribution was quite important and helped stabilize the region. ¹⁰⁵ Later, however, it became clear that the organization had exhausted its potential. Neutral brokerage is today insufficient and the OSCE lacks the instruments needed in order to break the deadlock. This is even more obvious when compared with the European Union’s actions in the region.

Finally, the United States have always avoided any serious engagement in Transnistria. When they did take some action—such as the 2003 adoption of the visa ban or the 2005 decision to become an observer within the 5+2 negotiation format—it was in conjunction with the European Union. This already cautious approach can only be reinforced by the September 2009 decision of the Obama administration to adopt a foreign policy less hostile to Russian interests. In this context, it would be unrealistic to expect any new major American involvement in the settlement of the Transnistrian crisis.

Conclusion

A cynical description of the Transnistrian situation would depict a nineteen-year old, three-sided game between Moldova, Transnistria, and its Russian protector. Somewhere close to the table but unable or unwilling to play are Romania, Ukraine, the OSCE, and the United States. However, a new player has entered the game. The European Union is bringing new sticks and carrots for the Transnistrian leadership. Besides this major change, three of the initial actors have undergone important transformations. Moldova has overthrown the authoritarian regime of the Communists and has adopted a pro-Western foreign policy. The weakened Transnistrian regime tries to take advantage of this new “threat” in order to relegitimize itself. And Moscow considers the EU support for Moldova as a threat to its own sphere of influence.

It is clear that the two local actors are weak and unable to win the game by themselves. Moldova remains a country with many problems that has only very recently reverted to democracy. The new regime is fragile and its future unclear. It is highly unlikely that such circumstances will allow a “victory” that could not be achieved by the stable and coherent regime of the Moldovan Communists. Transnistria is in a similar position. Domestically, the disputes within the authoritarian leadership illustrate a legitimacy crisis that endangers the very survival of the Smirnov regime. At the international level, the situation of Tiraspol is reminiscent of the Republika Srpska in the mid-1990s. The Bosnian Serbs were rejecting the reunion with their Muslim adversaries. They could not be defeated militarily. But the recently arrived Americans negotiated directly with the Belgrade leader and imposed the Dayton agreement that everybody else had to accept. Similarly, the regime in Tiraspol can survive only as long as Russia supports it. A deal with the Kremlin could bring the settlement of the Transnistrian question in a matter of weeks.

The crisis, then, has to be scrutinized at the regional and not local level. Moreover, unlike Bosnia, for the two global players—Moscow and Brussels—Transnistria is not an isolated case. The European Union started what seems to be a cautious but nevertheless revolutionary involvement in the CIS area. What is at stake on the Nistru River is not the settlement of a minor 1992 conflict. The European Union is testing its capacity to pacify, Europeanize, and eventually bring under its influence parts of what, until recently, used to be Moscow’s uncontested chasse gardée. On the opposite side, Russia is carefully watching the intrusion. To a geopolitics-obsessed Kremlin observer, there is little difference between the European involvement in Moldova and the American one in Georgia. Both are threatening the Russian sphere of influence. Unfreezing the South Ossetia conflict was the Russian response to Washington. The same radical option is unlikely on the Transnistrian theater only because Moscow has a wider range of instruments at its disposal and the magnitude of the “external threat” is more modest than in Georgia.

It is important to note that the frozen conflict itself as well as its possible unfreezing plays a purely instrumental role. It is difficult to find arguments showing that the overall geopolitical game is subordinated in any way to the internal logic of the Transnistrian crisis. On the contrary, the crisis itself has been and continues to be instrumentalized by the major regional players. The obvious conclusion is that a settlement can be secured only through a Dayton-style agreement between these players that would leave little space to maneuver to Tiraspol and Chişinău. Such an agreement, however, is unlikely because of the obvious regional imbalance between Russia and the European Union. First, the resources they can mobilize in Moldova/Transnistria differ greatly. Moscow has troops, an important economic presence, strategic energy resources, the control of major TV stations and newspapers, and the support of important local political forces. Brussels provides only limited assistance and trade concessions. The only factor that would certainly change the situation is a credible commitment to accept Moldova as an EU member. Yet for the time being, this is out of question. Second, a similar imbalance characterizes the Russian and European perceptions of the legitimacy of their involvement in the region. In Russia, both the political elite and the general public are familiar with the crisis and share the conviction that they have the right and the obligation to protect the Russian minority of a land defended heroically by Suvorov and Stalin. The average European citizen, on the other hand, is unable to point Moldova on the map. His or her interest in Transnistria is roughly equal to that in Western Sahara. Third, this huge difference leads to equally different political priorities. The Kremlin regards this part of the CIS as belonging clearly to its sphere of influence. Any intrusion has to be eliminated. The European Union could hardly adopt a similarly resolute attitude. The simple citizens don’t even know that a crisis exists. The governments of the EU member states are divided on the relation with Russia. The bureaucrats in Brussels adopt by definition cautious strategies. And the nomination of a low-profile EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy made any change improbable. Fourth, the local perception of the two major actors is very different. Because of its capabilities, commitment to the region, and aggressiveness, Moscow is feared by everybody, friend or foe. Acting against its interests is seldom perceived as a wise attitude. For its part, the European Union is seen as a friendly but remote and weak power. One should think twice before relying on such a partner when it comes to face the angry bear.

These differences prevent Brussels from forcing a new Dayton. Today, an EU–Russia agreement on Transnistria could only take the form of a slightly modified Kozak Memorandum. The European Union has no reason to support a settlement that would be so unfavorable to Moldova. It is more logical to wait until the constantly increasing European presence in the region improves significantly Brussels’ negotiation status. This means that in the short and, probably, medium term there will be no significant progress in the settlement of the crisis. Despite the encouraging EU discourse, the present stalemate will most likely be preserved for a long period of time with all its negative consequences for the regional security and for Moldova’s political and economic development. The Transnistrian question will most likely continue to be instrumentalized by both Russia and the Moldovan Communists in ways that can affect negatively Moldova’s democratic consolidation process.