How Bosnia Changed Paddy

Bosnian War: History, Consequences, Causes, and Actors

A powerful case can be made that the aggression in Bosnia . . . was started by the Muslims as much as by the Serbs. ⁸ (Paddy Ashdown, House of Commons, April 1993)

Paddy Ashdown did not enter the realm of the Bosnian war with a “blank canvas.” In fact, in consonance with any commentator on a war; he entered the arena with a number of preconceptions and misjudgements. It is important to analyse these and comprehend where they emanated from before it is possible to fully understand his suggestions to solve the conflict. This discourse can be broadly divided into Ashdown’s understanding of the history of the region, his view on the potential consequences of the war, the more immediate causes of the war, and the actors and groups who prosecuted the conflict. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to look at Ashdown’s first interaction with the area.

Before Yugoslavia started to “collapse” in 1991, Ashdown knew very little about the history of the area. In fact, the first record of Ashdown commenting on the region (in June 1991, during the incursion of the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army [JNA] into Slovenia) is an entry in his diary where he stated that he would be unable to even find Yugoslavia on the map. ⁹ In the summer of 1992 Ashdown compared Bosnia to his native country depicting it as a kind of three-dimensional Northern Ireland. ¹⁰ Henceforth, as he had no independent understanding of the situation, for the first couple of years, Ashdown’s broad historical discourse matched that of the British Government’s. Both advanced the myth of “ancient hatreds” between the peoples of Bosnia. In fact, this view was asserted by Ashdown even before the start of the war in Bosnia, where he stated in Parliament in November 1991 that the war in Croatia was rooted in a religious and cultural conflict and that the blood and turmoil swirling around the split in 1992 was a continuation of more than two millennia of conflict. ¹¹ However, Ashdown’s understanding of history was not only coloured by a lack of knowledge.

His view of the past was also characterised by a series of more specific falsehoods which were often propagated by opponents of intervention in the war. He surmised that a major feature of Bosnian history was a disposition towards guerrilla warfare. ¹² Similarly, at a state banquet Ashdown wrongly assumed that Franjo Tudjman (the Croatian President) had fought for the Axis. However, it is concerning the Serbs where Ashdown’s view of history is particularly confused. Upon seeing units of the Bosnian Serb Army, he believed that they were “Russian trained.” ¹³ Furthermore, Ashdown appears to buy into a Serb-nationalist narrative of history by alleging that the whole of Serbian history can be epitomised as Serbia against the world. ¹⁴ Henceforth, in the first two years of the war, Ashdown’s view of history was shaped by the overruling governmental discourse as well as by factual inaccuracies.

Ashdown’s understanding of history remained broadly unaltered throughout the years 1992–1993. After this period, there are less articles and debates from Parliament to shed light on his views. However, there is one notable exception. Ashdown wrote a book review for Noel Malcolm’s Bosnia: A Short History, which appeared in The Times in March 1994. ¹⁵ Seemingly, Malcolm’s interpretation of Bosnian history as being more shaped by economics than ethnicity ¹⁶ appeared to clash with Ashdown’s viewpoint. However, the book review appears to represent something of a sea change in Ashdown’s understanding. Throughout the article, Ashdown agrees with Malcolm that history is not actually the cause of the war. In fact, he goes on to argue that the conflict was caused primarily by external aggression and ignorance from the West. ¹⁷ The following month, he went on to argue that NATO should commit to guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the former Soviet states ¹⁸ from Russia, whereas no similar contention was made in the case of Bosnia.

In contrast to many commentators who saw the wars in Yugoslavia as having little overall consequence for the wider world, Ashdown foresaw early on the geopolitical significance which the conflict posed, especially to Europe. ¹⁹ This was, to a large extent due to Ashdown’s strong belief in European federalism, ²⁰ which was in marked contrast to the majority of his parliamentary colleagues. Henceforth, it is unsurprising that Ashdown’s first “call to action” (during the JNA’s action against Croatia) was used to exhibit the potential benefits of a common European foreign policy. ²¹ Furthermore, the irony of the endless debates on the intricacies of the Maastricht Treaty (within the context of continued intransigence over Bosnia) was not lost on Ashdown. ²² Ashdown was also equally worried about the signal the continued inflexibility would send out to other regimes and the potential damage the war could do to the standing of the UN. Henceforth, Ashdown’s initial preoccupation with the consequences of the war lead him to become more concerned with the potential implications than actually with the breakdown of Yugoslavia itself. Ashdown at least initially saw Bosnia principally as a “dress rehearsal” for how world order would be increasingly threatened in the future. ²³

Ashdown also foresaw the impending disintegration of Yugoslavia as a continuance of the danger that had beleaguered the continent during the collapse of the Soviet Union. For Ashdown, the analogy between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was pertinent as he viewed both entities as “empires.” In his line of thinking, empires inevitably collapsed and fragmented as the Austro-Hungarian Empire had seemingly devoid of human agency. Consequently, the belief that Yugoslavia was largely pre-doomed to fail due to a combination of historical determinism and the inescapability of empires to collapse, only a “spark” would be needed to initiate its disintegration. Henceforth, Ashdown blames the European Community’s (EC’s) so-called early recognition of Croatia and its failure to secure the rights of the Croatian Serbs as being largely responsible for triggering the war. ²⁴

The situation was not helped by Ashdown’s consistent failure to identify (for the first couple of years of the conflict especially) who the parties actually prosecuting the war were. To Ashdown, the Bosnian side was particularly perplexing. His concern about “minorities” being expelled without retribution ²⁵ seems to suggest he believed that the Bosnian Muslims were a minority in north and east of Bosnia before the process of “ethnic cleansing” started in April 1992. ²⁶ Furthermore, he consistently referred to Alija Izetbegovic as the “President of the Bosnian Muslims” ²⁷ and equates the Bosnians with “the Muslims.” ²⁸ Consequently, Bosnian Army officers are often categorised as “Muslim commanders.” ²⁹ However perhaps most surprisingly, for someone who became so associated with the Bosnian side, Ashdown contested in Parliament that a powerful case can be made that the Bosnian Muslims started the war, as much as the Serbs.

It will be seen that Ashdown’s interpretation of Balkan history, the predominance of the Government’s view, and specific falsehoods which became a part of his discourse would impact upon his proposals to end the conflict. It appears his understanding of history was altered to a certain extent through reading Noel Malcolm’s Bosnia: A Short History in 1994. However, it did not fundamentally alter Ashdown’s belief that Yugoslavia was essentially “fragmenting” naturally. In attempting to decode Ashdown’s understanding of what was driving the war, this is perhaps the most important element. Although this belief did not impede Ashdown from identifying the burden of aggression as lying with the Serbs, ³⁰ his reading of history essentially removed any element of agency. Henceforth, Ashdown would define the conflict as a war of minorities ³¹ between three warring parties. ³² Nevertheless, by his own admission, he found the war a bewildering conflict, ³³ and one in which nobody (presumably least of all himself) actually understands. ³⁴

Bosnian War: Discourse during the War

The winter is likely to kill more people than the war. ³⁵ (Paddy Ashdown, quoting a United Nations High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR] worker, summer 1992)

Looking back, we should have seen that we were doomed the moment . . . it [was called] a “humanitarian nightmare.” How stupid of us not to realise: not a political nightmare or a military nightmare, but a humanitarian nightmare. And even that they cured with the wrong medicine. ³⁶ (Senada Kreso, Sarajevo resident, summer 1993)

In contrast to colleagues in Parliament who came out in favour of defending a multinational Bosnia, those against any action, or many who were indifferent to either, ³⁷ the course of action which Ashdown advocated oscillated throughout the war. Ashdown himself called this taking the right action at the right time. ³⁸ Broadly speaking, there are three stages within Ashdown’s discourse. The first, at the start of the war in the summer of 1992 where he advocated limited military action and started to “humanitarianise” ³⁹ the war. The second and longest stage between the autumn of 1992 and the spring of 1995, where he further “humanitarianised” the conflict, supported the proposed “peace” plans and effectively accepted the partition of Bosnia by giving up on military action. During the third and final stage of his discourse, he finally argued that it was right to take action against the Bosnian Serbs, something that he suggested he had been arguing for all along.

Ashdown’s first position on the breakdown of Yugoslavia (as opposed to its implications for a common European foreign policy) occurred in November 1991 shortly before the fall of Vukovar to the JNA. ⁴⁰ At Prime Minister’s Question Time on 12 November, he asked John Major whether Britain had done enough to stop the brutality of the bombardment of Dubrovnik. At this stage, Ashdown’s question came from a position of sympathy and goodwill towards the Government and was consequently met with a genial reply. ⁴¹ However, this eventuality was not set to last much longer.

Ashdown’s first reference to Bosnia occurred as late as 7 July 1992, more than three months after Bosnia’s independence and the first round of Serb ethnic cleansing in the north and east parts of the country. Although Ashdown realised that his Party had dodged the issue, ⁴² he criticised the Prime Minister for exercising excessive caution in the use of air power in Croatia and Bosnia. ⁴³ Although only mild criticism at this point, this period would set the stage for three years of often bitter exchanges between Ashdown and members of the Government. This would reach new heights after the first of seven trips Ashdown made to Bosnia during the conflict.

In fact, Ashdown’s first trip to Bosnia would perhaps influence his discourse on the war more than any other event. This is because the majority of Ashdown’s time was spent in Sarajevo where he witnessed the start of the Siege and the conditions which the civilian population lived through. As a staunch advocate of European integration, Ashdown’s discourse reflects his moral outrage that Europe could allow such scenes to occur in its own backyard. He was truly “shocked by the faces of his fellow Europeans,” ⁴⁴ and the way “people would walk calmly down the street like citizens of any other European city.” However, Ashdown did not criticise the source of Sarajevo’s problems, the Serbs who were besieging the city. Instead, (coining a phrase of a UNHCR worker) “the winter is likely to kill more people than the war,” Ashdown’s discourse came near to classifying Sarajevo’s situation as a natural phenomenon, such as an earthquake or a drought. To Ashdown, it was as if the winter was responsible for Sarajevo’s plight. Henceforth, as Ashdown saw Sarajevo as principally a humanitarian crisis, his criticism was reserved for parties whom he blamed for not contributing enough towards the humanitarian effort. Ashdown was particularly reproachful of the role the British Government had played, who as head of the rotating European Presidency at the start of the conflict he argued had sand-boarded any effective response to the crisis. In fact, Ashdown went as far as characterising Britain’s response to the predicament as nothing short of shameful.

Ashdown’s early discourse on the course of action which the Government should take was not limited to humanitarian aid. Although against deploying British troops on the ground, ⁴⁵ in the summer of 1992, he suggested three other significant proposals. The first was to create a series of defensible “safe havens” for the people Ashdown categorised as “refugees.” ⁴⁶ The second measure would mandate the UN to essentially impose a cease fire from the air, ⁴⁷ through the imposition of a “no fly zone.” Thirdly, once in place, any offensive operations after an imposed deadline had passed would be liable to air attacks. These proposals would form the basis of Ashdown’s strategy for the first couple of years of the war. However, in essence these proposals had a lot in common with Ashdown’s criticisms of the lack of aid to Sarajevo. This is because, as in Sarajevo, these suggestions dealt with the symptoms of the war and not the causes.

As discussed previously, the positions Ashdown took were likely related to his interpretation of the causes of the war, which did not identify a clear victim or aggressor. Ashdown believed his proposals would reduce the intensity of the conflict creating a “defensive stalemate,” which would enable the negotiators a chance. ⁴⁸ This is clearly demonstrated in August 1992, where Ashdown argued that the scale of the fighting could be reduced if only the EC and the US would initiate a limited air campaign to destroy the larger weapons. ⁴⁹ However, Ashdown was not suggesting this course of action in order to break the Siege of Sarajevo or any other Bosnian town or city. He was proposing this course of action in order so that the two sides would be able to carry on “defending” themselves with smaller arms as opposed to with heavier weapons. ⁵⁰ Ashdown was essentially presenting a scenario where the war would continue, albeit with the intensity of fighting reduced. Importantly, Ashdown did not call for an end to the Siege.

Ashdown’s interpretation of the war led him to misjudge the Serb’s war aims. This became particularly clear during Ashdown’s second visit to Bosnia in August 1992, which transpired through an invite by Radovan Karadzic to see the “Serb side.” Initially, Ashdown judged Karadzic to be a charismatic, honest, and plausible politician, ⁵¹ that is, someone with whom business could be done. It was during this visit (due to “permission” from Karadzic) that Ashdown was able to visit several Bosnian Serb-run “prisoner camps” which he noted contained many non-combatants. ⁵² Instead of arguing that the installations should be closed down and their prisoners released, he suggested the most pragmatic solution would be a prisoner exchange alongside Red Cross action to ensure conditions improved. ⁵³ Ashdown appeared to consider that these “refugees” were not there by design but were an unfortunate outcome of the war. Moreover, if violence was being committed against these people, Ashdown believed it was being perpetrated by local extremist Serb groups ⁵⁴ as opposed to being a direct policy of “ethnic cleansing” undertaken by Karadzic and his supporters.

By the early autumn of 1992, Ashdown’s position on the conflict started to gradually alter, entering the second stage of its discourse. Although he continued to advocate a “no fly zone,” as the Siege of Sarajevo became even more entrenched, his demand for effective action to end it reduced. Instead, Ashdown appeared to accept that the Government would never take the necessary action to “diminish the destructive nature of the war.” Henceforth, in an open letter to the Prime Minister he urged the Government to “reduce the suffering” instead, ⁵⁵ that is, to further “humanitarianise” the war. Consequently, during this period, Ashdown’s discourse would define itself more than ever within the context of the Government’s own policy. He continued to chide the Government on its approach to humanitarian aid, which he argued had been “too little, too late.” ⁵⁶ At the same time, he trumpeted his proposal for “safe areas” as being perfectly in keeping with the Government’s own policy of maintaining “refugees” as near to their place of origin as possible, ⁵⁷ which essentially meant keeping refugees out of Britain. It was during this stage that the Government and Ashdown’s positions started to converge.

The clearest example of this convergence is Ashdown and the Government’s joint support for the arms embargo. ⁵⁸ Ashdown’s approval of this policy is somewhat surprising as he had attacked the Government for failing to protect the Bosnian people, although his own policy did not encompass providing the Bosnian Muslims with the means to defend themselves. In fact, even as late as August 1993, Ashdown appears to be confused over the difference in arms between the two sides. He “suspected” that the Bosnians were not as well armed as the Serbs, but thought this was of little consequence because of a lack of close engagement between the sides. Ashdown’s support of such a policy alongside his desire to prevent both sides using excessive force ⁵⁹ in essence meant he favoured the current situation over any attempt by the Bosnian Government or Army to reassert its control over the country. This assertion would have clear implications for Ashdown’s opinions on the “peace” negotiations which came to the fore in January 1993.

As Ashdown did not propagate a policy where the Serb’s gains would be reversed, or defend a multinational Bosnia, he accepted the VOPP as the best proposal from limited options; however, he did note that it would reward the aggressors. ⁶⁰ Ashdown believed that it was the British troops’ stabilisation of the situation which had actually facilitated the possibility for peace negotiations to succeed. ⁶¹ This was even though the British Army were based in Vitez (between the Bosnian Army and the Croatian Defence Council [HVO]), where they had no contact with the Serbs. ⁶² Furthermore, Ashdown’s interpretation of the Bosnian Serbs’ war aims led him to consider that they were desperately suing for peace ⁶³ at a time when they were in control of more than 70 percent of the country. Ashdown believed that Vance and Owens’s skilful approach had made Karadzic realise the penalties of failure. ⁶⁴ Although Ashdown had been positive about the VOPP during the point of its inception, by the time of its impending failure in May 1993, ⁶⁵ he came to the realisation that negotiations had failed because of the Serbs and Croats’ being able to achieve more through the gun than through negotiations.

By the time of the first parliamentary debate on Bosnia in April 1993, Ashdown began to advocate a more robust plan for defending Bosnia’s Muslims, which he dubbed “protective intervention.” The UN would take responsibility for negotiating on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims and the “safe areas” would be transformed into mini-UN protectorates defended by 30,000 troops. Ashdown’s plan can essentially be seen as legitimising the ethnic division of Bosnia. However, Ashdown was asserting such a position in the name of creating the conditions in which he believed a meaningful peace could be created. ⁶⁶

He was advocating such a line as he did not believe that Serb control over Bosnia could be reversed. This is largely due to confusion over the extent of the Serb’s military might. In December 1992, he had stated that the Serbs were nothing more than cowards and local town thugs, ⁶⁷ whereas during the parliamentary debate of April 1993 he suggested it would take over 250,000 troops to push them back from their positions. Furthermore, although he had previously been a keen proponent of (albeit limited) air strikes, he contended that air intervention against military targets would have no effect on the situation on the ground. ⁶⁸ Henceforth, by the summer of 1993, Ashdown was arguing that the chances of restoring the country to its pre-war borders as a multinational state were minimal. Instead, Ashdown suggested that negotiations based on the Geneva talks would provide the best conclusion to the conflict. ⁶⁹ So essentially, Ashdown (a politician who styled himself as a friend of Bosnia) was (albeit regretfully) arguing for the de facto partition of Bosnia. At the same time, he blamed “Europe” for letting one of the few operating models of a multi-ethnic society be strangled by fascism. ⁷⁰

Nevertheless, much to the surprise of his fellow parliamentarians, in December 1993 Ashdown briefly touted the idea of a full withdrawal of international troops in the spring. This caused much consternation in the House of Commons, with one Member calling it one of the most unprincipled U-turns in parliamentary history. ⁷¹ Ashdown’s defence was that such action was necessary because of past failings in Government policy. ⁷² However, this approach was not set to last, as only a matter of months later in February 1994, Ashdown was asking the Prime Minister whether he agreed with General Rose’s plan for more troops to be sent to Sarajevo. ⁷³

The troop debate was not the only one of Ashdown’s oscillating policies during this period. In April 1993, Ashdown had asserted that politicians have to sometimes disagree with commanders on the ground, ⁷⁴ whereas in February 1994 he castigated John Major for having the gall to turn down the request of a British general. ⁷⁵ In fact, Ashdown’s own position on one such general (General Rose) appeared to have two different angles as on one hand he showered him with praise for improving the credibility of the operation, ⁷⁶ while at the same time inferring privately that he wasn’t the right man to lead the mission. However, Ashdown’s position on the “peace” negotiations was more straightforward.

On the political front, Ashdown supported the Contact Group’s work (as essentially Geneva’s successor) although he did not hold much faith in its mission because of its failure to advocate the use of force as an ultimatum. However, Ashdown held no such reservations about the “threat” which the Bosnian Army posed to the area. He criticised the Bosnian Government for acting aggressively and worried that it might launch a counter-offensive to gain territory. ⁷⁷ Instead, Ashdown lauded the measures taken such as restoring the gas supply and the creation of an exclusion zone around Sarajevo in the summer of 1994, which he argued could add to the temptation for peace. ⁷⁸ These measures had certainly given Sarajevo a few peaceful weeks, but Ashdown once again failed to realise that the city was still at the mercy of the Serb guns, where it was unlikely that any amount of momentum could be built up to create a situation where Karadzic would be tempted to sue for peace. Consequently, in rejecting any Bosnian counter-offensives, alongside his defence of the arms embargo, ⁷⁹ Ashdown endorsed a situation which (with a few modifications) was essentially a continuation of the present state of affairs.

It is consequently unsurprising that Ashdown was dismissive of the American position throughout the conflict, which broadly represented a critique of the European standpoint. During the time of the Geneva talks, Ashdown categorised American threats of military intervention against the Serbs as “stupid.” ⁸⁰ Instead, he called for the United States to follow General Rose’s lead to extend the improving situation in Sarajevo to the rest of the country. ⁸¹ Later, in the autumn of 1994 Ashdown went further, lambasting the Americans for behaving “awfully” with the idea that concrete action was to be taken against the Serbs. ⁸² However, it is with reference to the United States’ decision to stop policing the arms embargo that afflicts Ashdown the most, ⁸³ which he alleges would be tantamount to the abandonment of Bosnia. ⁸⁴ Moreover, by contesting that such a policy would put the troops on the ground in danger ⁸⁵ (i.e., British ones) Ashdown is essentially concluding that the mission has become a hostage to its own operation.

Even though in the spring and early summer of 1995, the whole nature of the war was to radically change, Ashdown’s remedy to end the conflict stayed true to course. At this point, his biggest worry appeared to concern the possibility of the withdrawal of international troops, which he argued would give the Serbs a green light to take the remaining enclaves. ⁸⁶ Instead, Ashdown argued the troops should be “consolidated” into more defensible locations throughout the enclaves. ⁸⁷ However, as the new American-led strategy for solving the conflict came closer to fruition, Ashdown’s terminology started to shift. With the wind blowing towards greater intervention, Ashdown made it clear that he had no objection to taking sides against aggression, as in fact he had previously argued for it. ⁸⁸ However, by the spring of 1995, Ashdown’s position had not markedly shifted. He was against the Croatian Army stepping over the border into Bosnia (it would be intolerable). ⁸⁹ However in an about turn in June 1995, Ashdown suggested that it was actually in the interests of the Bosnians to gain territory. ⁹⁰

Although Ashdown was awarded the title of The Guardian Campaigner of the Year in 1995 ⁹¹ for his critique of the Government’s approach, what he actually articulated in practice was very similar. It seems that many outlets confused Ashdown’s moral outrage for the possession of a coherent, alternative plan. Ironically, in the summer of 1992 Ashdown actually did advocate (albeit limited) air strikes against the Serbs, but then spent virtually the rest of the war opposing them. Ashdown “humanitarianised” the war by dealing with the symptoms as opposed to the cause of the conflict. He aimed to turn the “safe havens” into mini-UN protectorates, whereas his support for the VOPP and Geneva legitimised the partitioning of the country. Although Ashdown was happy to “defend” the Bosnian Muslims from further attacks, for the vast majority of the war he didn’t advocate military action on their behalf. He also supported the Government’s arms embargo and was against any attempt by the Bosnian Government to retake military ground. Furthermore, he also disagreed with the American policy of rehabilitating Croatia as a military counterweight to Serbia. By only arguing for the use of force in specific circumstances and never in order to restore Bosnia as a multinational state, Ashdown’s interventions did not seriously aim at altering the status quo ante. ⁹²

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

I was a completely lone voice calling for greater action in Bosnia. ⁹³ (Paddy Ashdown, the Trial of Radoslav Brdjanin, 4 December 2002)

Ashdown was to testify at three different trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY): once in 1998 against Tihomir Blaskic and twice in 2002 against Radoslav Brdjanin and Slobodan Milosevic. Blaskic, a member of the HVO, was accused of committing war crimes against Bosnian Muslims in the Lasva Valley, in central Bosnia in 1993. ⁹⁴ Radoslav Brdjanin was accused of planning genocide and extermination as a political leader of the Bosnian Serb authorities. ⁹⁵ Slobodan Milosevic, as the President of Serbia (and later the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), was indicted for genocide in Bosnia. ⁹⁶ Whereas Ashdown had never heard of the first two indictees, he had had a well-publicised meeting with Milosevic in September 1998.

Evidence at the Blaskic Trial is centred on a conversation that Ashdown had with the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman during a dinner marking Victory in Europe Day, in London in May 1995. Ashdown alleges that Tudjman illustrated for him (on the back of a menu) a map showing how Bosnia would be partitioned between Serbia and Croatia (implicitly) as a result of an agreement between himself and Milosevic. ⁹⁷ Blaskic’s defence called Ashdown as a witness in order to disprove allegations that the document demonstrated Croatia’s formal involvement in the Bosnian war, which would amount to the existence of an international armed conflict. The majority of the exchange between Ashdown and Blaskic’s Defence consists of the Counsel trying to discredit the map and Ashdown’s subsequent interpretation of it.

However, the final parts of the cross examination demonstrate in further detail Ashdown’s interpretation of how the Bosnian war was brought to an end. Far from representing an operation to re-establish its rule over the Krajina region, Ashdown believed Croatia’s “Operation Storm” denoted the first step in a Serbian/Croatian partition of Bosnia. ⁹⁸ Yet, by this time the United States had already started to arm Croatia and Bosnia and had concluded the Washington Agreement between the parties, ending the state of war and bringing them together in an alliance against the Serbs. In this capacity, the Croatian Army fought against the Serbs in Bosnia. ⁹⁹ However as outlined above, Ashdown was against this development as he believed peace was becoming possible just before the operation.

Whereas evidence at the Blaskic Trial concentrates on events at the end of the war, the Radoslav Brdjanin Trial focuses upon the conditions that Ashdown witnessed at the beginning of the war during a visit to northern Bosnia in August 1992. The cross examination (by the Defence and the Prosecution) demonstrates that eight years after the end of the war, Ashdown’s views on the causes of the conflict were unchanged as were his understanding of the identity of the actors that were prosecuting it. For instance, at the beginning of his cross examination, Ashdown states that Karadzic would categorise the defenders of Sarajevo as Muslims whereas he himself believes that the “proper name” would be Bosniaks. However, in this context there is little but an arbitrary difference between the two terms.

Furthermore, Ashdown attests once again that after his visit in August 1992, he was not calling for the camps to be closed but merely encouraging an improvement in their conditions. Because of this, he suggests that his calls were “objective” as opposed to emotive in manner. Furthermore, he holds that he made the right judgement on these “political comments.” However, they seem to suggest that Ashdown continued to underestimate Karadzic’s programme to ethnically cleanse these parts of Bosnia. He still defends the letter which he wrote to him, asking Karadzic to relieve the suffering of “innocent people stuck in the middle.” Ashdown realises that to a certain extent he was drawn in by Karadzic, as he lied to him about an embargo on medicines in the region. However, he continues to equate blame between the three nationalities. He mentions that although the weight of atrocities are with the Serb side, it’s important to point out that the burning of villages and crimes were committed by all, and that there were no clean hands in this war. ¹⁰⁰

The most well-known case concerning Ashdown at the ICTY is the Milosevic Trial, where Ashdown was cross-examined by Milosevic for an hour. During this exchange, Ashdown reminded Milosevic that, prior to the Kosovo conflict, he had warned him (in person, in September 1998) that his actions would lead to an indictment and that he would one day see him in court. ¹⁰¹ Although the event received a lot of media attention at the time, the cross examination tells us little about Ashdown’s evolution with reference to Bosnia, as the majority of the testimony concerns the conflict in Kosovo. However, there are several references to Bosnia, including the ill-founded accusations of a false film made about the Trnopolje camp and the Tudjman map, but the Judge interrupted these questions because of their lack of relevance to Ashdown’s evidence. Nonetheless, Ashdown was still critical of Milosevic’s policy on Bosnia and suggested to him that if his recommendations had been followed through many Serb lives would have been saved. ¹⁰²

Throughout the three trials in 1998 and 2002, it appears that Ashdown’s position concerning Bosnia had altered very little from the time of the war. Although he acknowledged that the Serbs committed the majority of the atrocities, he still apportioned blame more evenly between the three nationalities and his understanding of Serb war aims were unchanged. Additionally, by trying to negotiate with Karadzic he inadvertently gave him strength and legitimacy. Ultimately, he believed that peace could have been initiated without the United States arming Croatia and Bosnia.

High Representative

It is testimony to the extraordinary nature of this bridge that so many have gathered here today, from so many countries, to celebrate what its reconstruction says about Bosnia and Herzegovina, about coexistence, and about the triumph of hope over adversity. ¹⁰³ (Paddy Ashdown, on the reopening of Mostar’s Old Bridge, 23 July 2004)

After being frustrated observing the Government’s policy throughout the Bosnian war, and a mere witness at Milosevic’s Trial, Ashdown finally received the chance to shape policy on Bosnia in the role of the OHR & EU’s High Representative. Whereas his predecessors’ approach in this role had been largely bureaucratic in nature, ¹⁰⁴ Ashdown’s style was distinctive and more akin to the Royal Marines drillmaster, which he had once been. ¹⁰⁵ There are four broad themes relevant to Ashdown’s mandate that will be looked at in detail. The first is Ashdown’s changing use of history, the second are his views on the Dayton Accords, the third are issues relating to Europe, and the fourth is his discourse on the nationalist parties. Broadly speaking, there are three distinct stages of Ashdown’s mandate. The first covers the period 2002–2003, the second 2004 to autumn 2005, and the third late 2005 to 2006.

Throughout the Bosnian war, Ashdown had shown an acute lack of understanding for the history of Bosnia and the wider region. Seven years after the end of the conflict, as responsibility for the war was still highly contested by Bosnia’s constituent peoples, Ashdown understandably abstained from commenting on Bosnia’s immediate history. Furthermore, as he had been largely associated with the Bosnian Muslims during the war, he had to work hard to convince the Serbs that he was not against them. ¹⁰⁶ However, as the role of HR was born out of the war itself, it would be naive to suppose that the two could be totally divorced. Perhaps recognising this, Ashdown quickly stated his personal determination to initiate a process to erect a permanent memorial to the victims of Srebrenica. ¹⁰⁷ This is significant as Ashdown chose to initiate this specific project instead of creating a memorial to another massacre, or a monument to represent all deaths during the war. It perhaps demonstrates Ashdown’s belated recognition that the Bosnian Muslims had been the greatest victims during the war, with Srebrenica being the unfortunate “stand out” atrocity.

However, Ashdown did make one assertion on the history of the war which conflicted with some of the statements he had previously made. By the end of the war, Ashdown was in the peculiar position of being equally critical of both the European and American approaches to the conflict. Whereas he accused Europe of creating the continents’ Palestinians, ¹⁰⁸ he berated the Americans for behaving awfully. ¹⁰⁹ Most significantly, Ashdown had been against the American action which had ultimately ended the war in 1995. However, in a newspaper interview in 2003, Ashdown stated that it was scandalous that Europe had had to wait for Uncle Sam to solve the problems in Europe’s backyard. ¹¹⁰ Apart from this interview, Ashdown barely touched upon recent Bosnian history during his term in office. However at the same time, it cannot be said that Ashdown totally ignored Bosnian history either.

In fact, his speeches and interviews are peppered with references to history; although they are not concerned with recent events such as the war but references to earlier periods of Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rule of Bosnia. Many of these references are quotations from the work of Ivo Andric. Unlike most Bosnian/Yugoslav literature, Andric’s stories are translated into English and are therefore often read by people who have an interest in the region. It appears that Ashdown read several of his books prior to taking office in 2002, as he frequently quotes his work in order to illustrate a wider point. There is one such occasion with reference to the Bosnian elections in October 2002. Addressing the Republika Srpska (RS) National Assembly, he stated that the choice facing the Bosnian people (between a European future and failure) had been posed fifty years earlier in Ivo Andric’s book Travnicka Hronika. ¹¹¹ However, it can be said that Andric’s books are in fact not very political and are hardly amenable to drawing conclusions about contemporary Bosnia. Therefore, it seems clear that anyone who bases their analysis of Bosnia on these books is likely to be someone who has a relatively poor grasp of contemporary Bosnia.

Often this type of superficial analysis from policy makers is without consequence, but sometimes it can have a detrimental impact upon the subject in question. Despite the numerous wars, disasters, and occupations afflicting Visegrad, the bridge in Ivo Andric’s most renowned book The Bridge over the Drina ¹¹² can arguably be seen as a metaphor that unites its peoples. The view may seem appealing, but it does not necessarily follow that a literary analogy can be transplanted into contemporary Bosnia. However, this is something that was frequently carried out by Ashdown, with particular reference to Mostar’s reconstructed Old Bridge which was completed in 2004.

In fact, the importance which Ashdown attached to the rebuilding of the Bridge cannot be overstated. In a newspaper article written only four months into his tenure as HR, he stated that the reconstruction of the Bridge was his second priority, only behind that of capturing Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic (his third priority being the return of refugees). ¹¹³ Henceforth, for Ashdown the “rebirth” of the Bridge is an immensely powerful symbol of reconciliation. ¹¹⁴ He authored an article in the Yorkshire Post titled “The Bridge That Leads to a Better World” ¹¹⁵ supposing it symbolises the knitting of communities back together again. ¹¹⁶ He even went as far as to suggest that Bosnia itself represented a bridge between Europe, America, and the wider Islamic world. ¹¹⁷ In reality, just before the Bridge reopened, Mostar’s politicians couldn’t agree to reunite the divided administration, leaving it to be completed via a decree from Ashdown. ¹¹⁸ Henceforth, it is clear that Ashdown’s superficial understanding of Bosnian history meant he took the bridge analogy too far, which was divergent from the real situation on the ground. Therefore, throughout his mandate Ashdown was both constrained by history and his own understanding of it. However, how far the Dayton Accords, the Agreement which brought the war to an end, curtailed his role is more open to interpretation.

Like many matters relating to Bosnia, Ashdown’s view on whether the Dayton Accords were a help or a hindrance to his mission shifted according to circumstance. In academia, there is a clear divide between two opposing schools of thought. Whereas David Chandler has suggested that Dayton is a flexible framework for the HR to operate within, ¹¹⁹ Derek Chollet contends that subsequent HRs have in fact been stifled by Dayton and its ensuing paradigms. ¹²⁰ During the first stage in his mandate, Ashdown seemed to be firmly within the Chandler school of thought. Of course, with any statement there is a degree of realpolitik involved; when Ashdown arrived in Bosnia, there was a widely held belief that he would pursue substantive constitutional change aimed at abolishing the RS. ¹²¹ Clearly, Ashdown wanted to allay such fears in order to get the Serbs “onside.” Therefore, he was more than happy to be a “servant of the Dayton Agreement.” ¹²² Anyhow, he went on to argue that any constitutional change would have to be “organic” and not imposed by any international organisation. ¹²³ However, at this stage it appears he genuinely did not believe that Dayton would be much of a hindrance to his project. He described the Agreement as “the floor and not the ceiling” and as a framework and a process which could be built upon. ¹²⁴ However, this position was not set to last.

As the Ashdown-driven process of reform started to slow during the second stage of his mandate, he began to become more critical of Dayton and to suggest that the Agreement could actually be an impediment to moving Bosnia forwards. He concluded that Dayton was a good system to finish the war but not an Agreement which made state-building easy. ¹²⁵ Ultimately, he argued that the reliance upon group rights and the dysfunctional structure of the governance could hold Bosnia back from European accession. ¹²⁶ With the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Dayton Accords in December 2005, the momentum for change increased, with Ashdown arguing that constitutional change was in fact needed to replace the “push” of Dayton (i.e., the role of the HR) with the “pull” of Brussels (i.e., getting nearer to EU accession). ¹²⁷ However, he continued to argue that it was not the job of the HR to construct a new system as this was primarily the responsibility of the Bosnian people. ¹²⁸

Nevertheless, during the third part of his mandate, Ashdown’s discourse shifted back towards praising the successes, which the Dayton system had delivered. He stated that “Dayton had been used to change Dayton,” ¹²⁹ and contrary to earlier discourse, argued that the Agreement was “strong enough to maintain peace and flexible enough to maintain change.” ¹³⁰ Presumably, this was because a process of “organic” constitutional change between Bosnia’s constituent peoples did not emerge. Henceforth, he is happy in effect to see the glass half full as opposed to half empty. However, in the two books written by Ashdown after the end of his mandate, the pendulum swung back once again. In his book on state-building, Swords and Ploughshares, Ashdown stated Dayton had been a “monster” which he had had to work with. ¹³¹ Whereas in his autobiography, A Fortunate Life, he asserted that his mission had been to “slowly dismantle the structures of Dayton.” ¹³² Henceforth, Ashdown’s pronouncements on the Dayton Accords can be seen as contradictory and being greatly related to each specific point during his mandate. However, whereas Ashdown’s opinions on Dayton frequently oscillated, his views on the benefits of European accession were unchangeable.

Upon taking office as HR in 2002, Ashdown made it clear that his primary goal was to gain the country’s accession to the EU as quickly as possible, ¹³³ as it was the embodiment of prosperity and security. ¹³⁴ Although Europe had let Bosnia down in the past, Ashdown believed that accession was the only measure that could prevent the horrors of the 1990s from re-emerging and ultimately safeguard its long-term future. ¹³⁵ Through a plethora of speeches, press releases, interviews, and newspaper articles, Ashdown aimed to convince the Bosnian people of this belief. It would be achieved by depicting Europe as model of normality for Bosnia to follow.

For instance, in a television interview he proudly stated that Bosnia had “established a proper central government . . . just like any European democracy.” ¹³⁶ But to Ashdown Europe did not merely represent a goal for the country to aspire to; it embodied a vision of a new Bosnia, having put its former divisions behind it, arriving at an idealistic, promised land. Echoing Martin Luther King’s “I have a dream” speech, ¹³⁷ he stated that progress in Bosnia had been made by the “power of a dream. A dream that one day this country can become a member of the European Union . . . capable of providing a better and safer life for its citizens.” ¹³⁸ Ashdown perhaps saw himself as a kind of preacher, the individual who will put Bosnia inextricably on the road to salvation.

However, Ashdown did not believe that Europe’s staying power with Bosnia would continue indefinitely. Using what Danijela Majstorovic has called “spatio-temporal metaphors of closed doors/closed windows,” ¹³⁹ Ashdown explicated to the Bosnian people that this “window” of opportunity would be limited. Failure would lead to Bosnia (and the Balkans in general) becoming Europe’s black hole and an unwanted enclave. ¹⁴⁰ In fact, Ashdown was as stark to suggest that “if this country has no future in Europe, then it has no future whatsoever.” ¹⁴¹ Nevertheless, as the HR himself cannot physically deliver Bosnia to the gates of Europe, a degree of consensus has to be achieved between Bosnia’s politicians. In order to attain this, Ashdown adopted an element of coercion in order to bring about this goal. This included using the Bonn powers (the ability to impose legislation, overrule elected institutions and dismiss officials seen to be contravening Dayton) ¹⁴² 153 times during his first year of office, which more than tripled their usage from the previous year. ¹⁴³ If politicians were acting in contravention to Dayton, Ashdown was far more willing than his predecessors were to remove them from public office. Predominately, many of these politicians were from the nationalist parties.

Ashdown’s relationship with such parties proved a controversial theme throughout his mandate. Only five months after Ashdown had taken office, the October 2002 election returned to power the nationalist parties who had prosecuted the war. ¹⁴⁴ This was after a two-year hiatus, during which a coalition of non-nationalist parties had run the country. ¹⁴⁵ As someone who said he had fought against nationalism his whole life ¹⁴⁶ and was blind to ethnicity, ¹⁴⁷ this clearly came as a blow. However, as illustrated above, Ashdown’s default position during the Bosnian war was to accept the de facto partition of Bosnia, which effectively meant he accepted the legitimacy of the three nationalisms. He later stated that he had feared that this development would effectively spell the end of his mandate. ¹⁴⁸ However, Ashdown’s discourse in public was very different. He sought to downplay the significance of the results by arguing that they represented more of a protest vote against the previous administration rather than a widespread revival of nationalism. ¹⁴⁹ But there was a more important point at play here. Prior to the election, all the parties had agreed to implement Ashdown’s reform programme if elected. ¹⁵⁰ Henceforth, Ashdown argued it did not make a great deal of difference who was in power, because if reforms were not implemented everyone would ultimately fail together. ¹⁵¹ Whereas critics called it naive to believe that former enemies could work together to promote a programme of reform, ¹⁵² allies suggested it was the only realistic move available. ¹⁵³ In hindsight, however, it appears that neither critics nor allies were totally vindicated as Ashdown’s approach ultimately rested upon a very specific premise.

Ashdown’s strategy rested upon the hope that his “Jobs and Justice” plan would revitalise the Bosnian economy, provide employment, and deliver an improved standard of living, which would in turn imbue a sense of loyalty to the State from all its citizens. If the State could provide adequately for its people, a “tipping point” would be reached, which would fatally undermine the lifeblood of the nationalist parties leading to an inevitable schism between reformists and hardliners. ¹⁵⁴ The conclusion of this process would be accession to the EU. To illustrate the point, Ashdown used the example of the ruling party in Croatia, the HDZ. ¹⁵⁵ He did not believe that a Bosnian nation would be created, ¹⁵⁶ but that the landscape of Bosnian politics could be “normalised,” with the politics of consociationalism being replaced with everyday bread-and-butter issues. ¹⁵⁷

For the first three years of his mandate, this strategy worked reasonably well. Significant reform did occur; over a million refugees returned home and the economy grew at 4 or 5 percent per annum. ¹⁵⁸ However, by 2005 progress on the key police reform had come to a halt ¹⁵⁹ and the RS was still refusing to extradite a single indicted war criminal to the ICTY. ¹⁶⁰ It was at this point that Ashdown made a volte face concerning the nationalist parties. Far from being happy to work with “anyone,” he stated that it was a tragedy that Bosnia had a nationalist government. It couldn’t take Bosnia through the gates of the EU; in fact the country would only be able to enter if it rid itself of nationalism. ¹⁶¹ At this point, it appeared that Ashdown’s critics had finally been confounded. However, during the third stage of Ashdown’s mandate, reform was to restart. The RS took its first tentative step towards accepting a degree of responsibility for Srebrenica ¹⁶² and Bosnia passed a significant stage on the path to EU accession by entering into the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. Admittedly, reform was not as swift as during the first stage and Ashdown ended his mandate without finding a solution to police reform, something he later regretted. ¹⁶³ However, most significantly, for several reasons, Ashdown did not reach the “tipping point” which the ultimate success of the whole process relied upon.

Importantly, the reforms didn’t improve living conditions for the average Bosnian. As someone who had opposed the Thatcherite programme in Britain, the irony of having to impose a similar agenda on Bosnia was not lost on him. In fact, conditions would have to get worse before they were to get better. However, even if conditions had significantly improved, it is not clear that they would have broken the nationalists’ hold on power. This is because Ashdown’s aim to initiate a process of “Sanadarisation” of Bosnia’s political parties was unlikely to happen, as the comparison with the HDZ was not a “like for like” example. Unlike Bosnia, Croatia is dominated by one nationality, which means that the Croat vote is inevitably shared among a variety of parties. After Croatia recognised Bosnia’s sovereignty as an independent state, the HDZ had no choice but to give up its claims to much of Herzegovina and transform itself into a modern-day conservative party. However, in Bosnia bread-and-butter issues were no more likely to come to the forefront than they have been in an infinitely more prosperous country such as Belgium. Therefore, in reality, the “tipping point” ¹⁶⁴ of Bosnian politics was difficult to reach. This is demonstrated by the fact that since the war ended in 1995, nationality persists as the overriding sociodemographic cleavage at the expense of all others, ¹⁶⁵ and identification with the State by Serbs and Croats remains low. ¹⁶⁶ Ironically, Ashdown’s term as HR might have been more successful if he had followed more closely his approach during the war, to create an accommodation with nationalism as opposed to trying to destroy it from within.

After four years in office, it is clear that Ashdown left Bosnia in a better shape than the one in which he found it in. However, his mandate was hampered by several factors. The first were his constantly oscillating views on two key debates during the period, the nature of the Dayton Accords and the viability of a nationalist-led government. In both instances, they altered several times during the three broad stages of his mandate. Of course, it can be argued that Ashdown had to act more as a politician with “flexible” views ¹⁶⁷ than an ideologue; however, it can equally be said that his mandate might have been more successful if he had more effectively set the agenda, as opposed to merely following the currents. Secondly, Ashdown’s simplistic understanding of Bosnian history led him to place far too much importance on metaphors and symbols, such as the rebuilding of the Mostar Bridge. Although the rebirth of the Bridge was certainly an architectural advancement, it had little influence on Bosnian society more generally. Thirdly and finally, in hindsight, Ashdown’s unalterable programme to put Bosnia inextricably on the road to European accession was beyond reach. This is because his mandate would never ultimately produce the “tipping point” needed to create lasting change in Bosnia.

Conclusion

Throughout the three stages of Ashdown’s interaction with Bosnia, as a parliamentarian, a witness at the ICTY, and essentially a politician as HR, it is conspicuous how little the substance of his views on Bosnia really changed. Moreover, far from evolving between the three stages, as might be expected, it seems more accurate to suggest that they actually oscillated through the subsequent stages. In essence, once Ashdown had adopted a view or a misconception, it rarely altered. An example of this would be how Ashdown understood the geopolitics of Bosnia. Historically, Bosnia had been at the crossroads between Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and Islam. However, it would be overstretching the analogy and historical symbolism to suggest that Bosnia could act as a bridge between Europe, America, and the Islamic world. Ashdown had also made a similar faux pas during the war. Although unlike many British politicians who saw the war as little more than a local fratricide, ¹⁶⁸ Ashdown clearly understood that the conflict had potential geopolitical ramifications for Europe. However, ironically he arrived at this conclusion from a false thought process. This is because Ashdown essentially categorised Yugoslavia as an “empire” which, like the Austro-Hungarian Empire, would inevitably fragment.

Part of this is borne out of a lack of understanding for the history of the region. During the JNA’s incursion into Slovenia in June 1991, he stated in his diary that he would be unable to even find Yugoslavia on a map. ¹⁶⁹ As Ashdown had had no previous experience in the area, this is perhaps understandable. However, even at the ICTY in 2002 he confidently stated that the JNA was the best equipped force in the Warsaw Pact. ¹⁷⁰ Furthermore, as Ashdown failed to understand that the country was a multinational state as opposed to an empire, and did not understand the history of the region, his failure to comprehend why Yugoslavia collapsed and the war in Bosnia begun is unsurprising. As Ashdown did not believe Yugoslavia was a viable state, in this line of thinking, only a single event would be needed to initiate the fragmentation of the country and the commencement of a war. For Ashdown this occurrence was the EC’s so-called early recognition of Croatia and its failure to secure the rights of the Croatian Serbs. ¹⁷¹ He described this “theory” to the House of Commons in April 1993. One might have thought that with the benefit of hindsight Ashdown would have modified this view. However, in his memoirs written sixteen years later in 2009 he was still propagating exactly the same explanation. ¹⁷²

As Ashdown failed to understand that the war had been brought about by Milosevic’s Greater Serbia project, he didn’t appreciate that the very same issue underpinned the continuation of the conflict. In fact, Ashdown never really comprehended the Serbs’ war aims. Although he acknowledged that to a certain extent he had been taken in by Karadzic during his visit to Bosnia in the summer of 1992, he still argued at the ICTY in 2002 that he was right to try and negotiate with him in order to improve conditions for camp prisoners. Even more than seven years after the end of the war, Ashdown still did not appreciate that Karadzic was hardly amenable to rational compromises. Perhaps it is understandable that Ashdown was deceived in 1992, but the defence of such beliefs more than a decade later is harder to justify.

Although such people as Tony Blair have suggested that Ashdown was “right” on Bosnia before many of them were, ¹⁷³ his strategy towards Bosnia during the war does not stand up well to scrutiny. However, as Ashdown did not understand the geopolitical consequences of the Bosnian war, nor its history, nor the reasons for the conflict, it is unsurprising that he failed to articulate a coherent strategy to end the war. On one hand, it can be argued that throughout the conflict Ashdown advocated a whole range of often contradictory policies. This included advocating limited military action against the Serbs at the beginning, to accepting the de facto partition of the country in the middle, to suggesting that UNPROFOR should be withdrawn, and finally in the summer of 1995 to a belated acceptance that it was in the West’s interests to help the Bosnian Government gain territory. ¹⁷⁴ However, it can also be argued that these policies had more than a common thread between them. This is because it is perhaps easier to point out what Ashdown did not advocate during the war. He never argued for military action to defeat Serb (and Croat) irredentism, nor to restore Bosnia to its pre-war borders as a home for its three constituent peoples. ¹⁷⁵ Henceforth, it can be argued that Ashdown’s views on the war were actually fairly consistent.

Paradoxically, the longest period in Ashdown’s interaction with the country at the helm of the OHR cannot be easily compared with his discourse during the war or his testimonies at the ICTY. This is because two of the key subjects which the period covers; Ashdown’s seesawing take on the Dayton Accords and his view on the nationalist parties are synonymous with the period. However it is perhaps his views on Europe which had evolved the most. During the war Ashdown clearly identified Europe as one of the “villains” who had contributed towards Bosnia’s destruction. Conversely, during his time as HR he used Europe as an instrument to draw the three peoples together towards the mutual benefits of EU accession. Furthermore, his artificial understanding of Bosnian history meant he attached far too much importance to the rebuilding of the Mostar Bridge. However, he used the issues of the nationalist parties and the Dayton Accords much like a politician would and constantly shifted his views on them according to circumstance. Ultimately, however, he could not take Bosnia to its “tipping point,” which would have led to EU accession and removed the legacy of the war as an issue in Bosnian politics.

Throughout his interaction with Bosnia, it would certainly be difficult to suggest that Ashdown did not care passionately about the country and have its best interests at heart. During his discourse, he talked about his love for the country and its people ¹⁷⁶ and his speeches as HR often contained the word “our” ¹⁷⁷ as if he were a Bosnian himself. Although clearly well intentioned, Ashdown’s political evolution with regard to Bosnia was not as complete as it could have been.