Abstract
The political representation of ethnic minorities in the party systems of Central and Eastern European states remains understudied despite the consolidation of democracy in these countries following their accession to the EU. This paper asks what institutional factors influence the way ethnic minorities are represented in the party systems of Central and Eastern European states. It does so based on a comparison of ethnic minorities in two paired cases (Slovakia/Romania and Estonia/Latvia), each of which shows similarities in some regards but have different outcomes in terms of party representation. The paper specifically examines explanations for the diverse forms through which minorities are represented in these four countries with a focus on three distinct types: ethnic particularist minority parties, integrationist minority parties, and accommodative majority parties. We examine two institutional/political factors that influence specific minority party types: (1) electoral systems and (2) political strategies of the dominant ethnic elite. We argue that while electoral systems do play a role in explaining differences in the party representation of minorities, they become particularly important in the broader political institutional context that emerged in the first decade following the collapse of communism. The manner in which dominant ethnic political-elites approached minority representation in the early years of democratization is critical in explaining different types of party representation that ensued.
Introduction
As democracy has become consolidated in the EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), an important question relates to the modality of political party representation that ethnic minorities have achieved. Much of the existing literature on the topic applies the concept of the “ethnic-minority party” or “ethnonationalist party.” 1 The key idea seems to be twofold. First is the notion that such parties have as their primary objective the promotion of the interests of a particular ethnic minority. 2 Second, the political party turns constructed notions of shared identity and interest into an institutional mechanism for their promotion. 3 In this article, we develop a more nuanced conceptualization of the notion of party representation of minorities by developing a typology of party types. Based on an examination of four specific cases, drawn from the new EU member states in CEE, we explore differing explanations for divergent outcomes. This involves a small-n comparison that relies on a most-similar systems research design. Among the four cases (Estonia, Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia) are two pairs of cases that share even more similarities with one another than they do with the other two cases included in the study. The cases, however, differ in terms of the dependent variable, which is the form of party representation of the most important ethnic minority in each of the four countries. Accordingly, we seek to identify those variables that explain the differing outcomes in terms of party representation of minorities, despite the large number of similarities between the cases. In this way, we test hypotheses that can subsequently be examined more systematically on a larger size sample. We conclude that in addition to electoral systems, the manner in which the dominant ethnic elites approached minority representation in early years of restored independence/post-communist transition are pivotal factors in explaining different types of party representation that have persisted.
Cases Studies
The four countries we have selected—Estonia, Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia—share significant similarities with each other, as well as with party systems in other Central-East European post-communist countries. Among these commonalities are high levels of fluidity, fragmentation, and volatility of the party system, 4 along with generally low levels of popular participation, voter turnout, and party identification. Within these parameters there are, nonetheless, some differences between the cases under study that affect the larger environment within which political parties operate. For example, Sikk documents the extremely high volatility of parties in Latvia in the first decade of post-communist rule, whereas Slovakia experienced the lowest volatility. 5 The role and success of post-communist successor parties also differs, with the diverse range of such parties in Romania with strong popular appeal 6 to a moderate and institutional progression in Slovakia. 7 On the other hand, in Estonia, the centre-right has consistently dominated the political system and communist successor parties have had limited success. 8 In both Latvia and Estonia, the Russian-speaking minorities have tended to support left-leaning parties, whereas in other countries (including Romania and Slovakia) the parties minorities most often support are centre or centre-right. In most ways, however, in terms of the political position of ethnic minorities, the four countries share more commonalities than they do with any other country in Central and Eastern Europe. This includes size and geographic distribution of minority groups, historical dynamics between ethnic majorities and minorities, political culture, and political development since the post-communist transition. The four cases are among Central Europe’s most heterogeneous. However at the time of post-communist democratization, all were unitary states dominated by nationalist elites that pushed for nation-state models and ethnic-majority control over the institutions of government. For our purposes, most importantly, with respect to national minorities, in all four cases the issue of nationalism and identity, in addition to socio-economic reform, was an important element of the overall shape of party competition—at least in the first decade of post-communist transition. 9
These countries are similar in terms of the character of their ethnic-minority populations. All include sizable minorities with an ethnic homeland in a neighbouring state—Russia in the case of the first two countries and Hungary in the later two. Historically, these minorities also share a perceived image of “former masters” vis-à-vis the majority group. This is the case of the Russian-speaking 10 minority in Estonia and Latvia between 1940 and the breakup of the USSR as well as the case of the Hungarian or Magyar minority in Slovakia and Romania prior to World War I and during Horthyst Hungary in World War II. In addition, smaller ethnic minorities are present in these four states as well (see Table 2). Most significantly, the largest minority in each of the four states is large enough to pass existing electoral thresholds. Romania’s and Slovakia’s Hungarian minorities stand at 6.5 percent and 8.5 percent of the population, respectively. In Estonia, in 2011 ethnic Russians made up 25 percent of the population, 11 while in Latvia they formed just under 27 percent. 12 In addition, about 5.5 percent of the population is reported to be from closely related Slavic groups (Belarusian or Ukrainian) in Latvia, and 2.7 percent in Estonia. 13 As Sikk and Bochsler point out, in Estonia and Lativa, “Eastern Slavs (Russians, Belorusians, Ukrainians) cluster politically together. 14 These figures may be a bit misleading, however, in terms of electoral significance. Most of those belonging to the Russian-speaking minority were not granted citizenship immediately in the 1990s, and the naturalization of residents belonging to ethnic minorities was a topic of significant controversy after independence in both countries. 15 Today, the proportion of Estonian citizens of non-Estonian ethnicity stands at around 18 percent. 16 Muižnieks 17 estimated that in 2004 about 18 percent of citizens in Latvia were Russian, but survey data from 2011. suggest a somewhat lower proportion, between 15 and 16 percent. 18 Nonetheless, the current Russophone voting potential in both Baltic states exceeds that of Romania’s and Slovakia’s Hungarians.
Similarly, the major minorities in all four states are, to varying degrees, geographically concentrated. 19 Most of Slovakia’s 458,500 Hungarians live in the south near the Hungarian border, forming a majority in Komarno and Dunajska Streda districts. 20 The bulk of Romania’s 1,227,600 Magyars reside in the country’s centre—in Covasna and Harghita and parts of Mures counties. 21 According to the 2011 census, of Latvia’s 557,119 ethnic Russians, 47.5 percent lived in Riga, making up about 40 percent of the city’s population. 22 Also in the southeastern region of Latgale, about 39 percent of the population is of Russian ethnicity, and 54.5 percent indicated Russian as the language mostly spoken at home. 23 In Estonia, in 2011 those whose mother tongue was Russian constituted about 44 percent of the population in Tallinn, but were more concentrated, at 81.5 percent, in the northeastern Ida-Viru County near the Russian border. 24
In comparing the paired cases of Estonia/Latvia with those of Slovakia/Romania, some important differences should also be noted. While the Hungarian population groups in Romania and Slovakia have resided there for centuries, most of the Russian-speaking minority population immigrated to the two Baltic states during the Soviet period. However, by now a large proportion of Russian speakers in these countries were born in Estonia or Latvia, respectively. 25 Consequently, they are no longer recent immigrants; rather, increasingly they are second or third generation. They thus form a unique case, standing between the position of recent immigrant minorities in Western Europe and historic minorities in the Romanian and Slovak cases.
In terms of political culture, there are some differences between the ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia compared to the Hungarian minority populations in Slovakia and Romania, but similarities predominate within each of the paired cases. In both Estonia and Latvia, the communities were initially fragmented, indigenous leadership was weak, and the population over-represented urban, industrial workers who faced a significant decline in socio-economic status following the Soviet collapse. 26 At the outset of independence, there was minimal social integration with the dominant ethnic group, and links to the homeland were viewed by the dominant population group with suspicion. Laws relating to citizenship and education elicited a similar sense of grievance. Agarin notes that civil society organizations in all three of the Baltic states have been dependent on state funding and have taken on a weak advocacy role, 27 although the latter is somewhat more pronounced in Latvia. 28 Some observers have also noted differences between the Russian-speaking communities in Estonia and Latvia, but compared to their similarities, these are relatively minor. Pettai and Kreuzer argue that the Russian community has been somewhat more homogeneous in Estonia, 29 and Kolstø and Tsilevich note that they were more active in the early 1990s than in Latvia. 30 In addition, more ethnic Russians had resided in Latvia for a longer time period, which led to higher rates of intermarriage and bilingualism, and a boundary less sharp “between the Russians and the ‘natives.’” 31 At the same time, Berg notes that in Estonia a cleavage did emerge among Russians between citizens and non-citizens, even though the latter are entitled to vote in local elections (unlike in Latvia). 32
Important similarities also characterize the political cultures of the Hungarian/Magyar minorities in Slovakia and Romania. Both communities experienced a radical change in status under communism. Under the Dual Monarchy and in the brief period between the Nazi-sponsored Vienna Awards and 1945, ethnic Hungarians enjoyed a position of domination while other nationalities were subjected to harsh Magyarization and discriminatory policies. However, in post–World War I and post–World War II Czechoslovakia and Romania, the Hungarian communities were themselves turned into disenfranchised minorities, subjected to discriminatory and assimilationist policies. These policies included closing down Magyar-language schools and the targeting of Hungarian-owned large estates for land-redistribution in favour of members of the ethnic majority. The experience of the community in the two states did differ somewhat in the period right after World War II. The Magyars in Romania experienced territorial autonomy between 1951 and 1968. Those in Slovakia did not and they were regarded as a minority within Czechoslovakia’s main minority, the Slovaks; furthermore, ethnic Hungarians in Czechoslovakia were deprived of their citizenship for the first three years after the end of World War II. 33 Throughout the communist period as well as afterwards, Hungarians in post-communist Romania and Slovakia continued to be viewed with suspicion when it came to their loyalty to the state. In particular, discussions of territorial autonomy are specifically regarded by ethnic majorities and mainstream parties as a first step towards breaking away and joining their ethnic kin in neighbouring Hungary. 34
While not denying the existence of socio-cultural distinctions within the paired cases and between the Russian and Hungarian minorities, these differences are a matter of degree rather than of kind; they take on significance mainly in interaction with political-institutional features.
Lastly, the choice of case studies tries to control as much as possible for external factors such as the effects of EU conditionality (which involved external pressure on national governments to promote ethnic minority rights). All four cases were part of the EU fifth enlargement (2004, 2007) and thus underwent a more or less similar path towards EU accession. Accordingly, EU conditionality likely worked in a similar manner in all four cases. 35 Likewise, the influence of the kin state was more or less similar across the four cases. Hungary did not challenge the territorial sovereignty of its neighbours. Nonetheless, it did try to promote ties with the Hungarian diaspora while top Hungarian government officials did occasionally make public statements in favour of Hungarian territorial autonomy in Romania and Slovakia (particularly under right-wing governments). In relation to Estonia and Latvia, Russia tried to promote the rights of Russophones in the Baltic States, however without actively promoting territorial secession as it did, in some cases, in Moldova, Georgia, and the Crimean region of Ukraine. 36
Party Representation and Ethnic Minorities
The question of how multiethnic societies manage to remain stable has been extensively studied in academic literature. Undoubtedly, Arend Lijphart’s model of consociationalism has been most influential in describing how stable democracies transcend societal cleavages by effectively accommodating different interests of their rival subcultures. 37 Similarly, according to Horowitz, societies that have successfully dealt with the ethnically differentiated opposition without imploding are those that have embraced the democratic representation of ethnic minorities. 38
Most studies of ethnic-minority representation, however, distinguish between those minorities that succeed in achieving representation (by having an ethnic party in parliament) and those that do not. Such conceptualizations usually see the “ethnic particularistic” party as a reaction on the part of the losers of the post-communist transition. 39 The ethnic-based party is often caricatured as a party without a transformative program, involving a narrow strategy to promote solely ethnic group interests by drawing clear boundaries between “us” and “them.” Rather than opting for outright separation, these parties are considered to be using state structures to channel benefits towards their own clientele. By virtue of their limited electoral appeal, such parties are incapable of pursuing mainstream party status. Finally, because they often appeal to emotional symbols, they are frequently depicted as dominated by a charismatic leader. 40
Although undeniably descriptive of some cases, this characterization lacks nuance. For example, our cases offer a range of modes of party representation of minorities. Accordingly, we have developed a more differentiated typology (represented in Table 1), which focuses on the way in which the party representing the minority relates to other population groups or political forces. Along similar lines, Ishiyama and Breuning argue that the exclusivity of a minority party may be signaled by the inclusion of the group’s name in the party title, concluding that “what differentiates different kinds of ethnic parties is how they portray themselves to an electorate they seek to exclude.” 41 Other authors, such as Chandra, also include the notion of exclusiveness in their understanding of minority ethnic parties. 42
Types of Parties, in Relation to Ethnic-Minority Populations
The typology is based on two axes. The vertical axis distinguishes between parties that articulate ethnic-minority interests and those that do not. The horizontal axis distinguishes exclusivity or inclusiveness in terms of the party’s broader electoral appeal.
The typology identifies three types of minority representation: ethnic particularistic minority parties, integrationist minority parties, and finally, accommodative majority parties (the fourth type, the national majority party, does not purport to represent the minority). The “ethnic particularistic” minority party has been given the most attention and is discussed above. 44 The “integrationist” minority party, although having the minority ethnic group at its base, promotes cooperation between minority and majority groups, and uses this feature to appeal to voters outside that group. Third, the accommodative majority party, although dominated by the ethnic majority, projects itself as the voice of the ethnic minority as well.
Our four case studies represent these three party types (see Table 2). While Romania saw the consolidation of a strong ethnically particularistic party (Democratic Party of Hungarians in Romania), in Slovakia an integrationist minority party has been strongest. This was first the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) before radicalization in 2008 and afterwards Most-Hid since 2009. In the Latvian case, an integrationist minority party coalition (Harmony Centre, now the Social Democratic Party “Harmony”) has gained the strongest Russian minority support; in Estonia, the same is true of Centre Party, of the accommodative majority type. In short, in spite of the evident similarities in the nature and status of the minority populations, the type of party representation differs across cases. What factors influence these distinct trajectories? In seeking an answer, we look specifically at two institutional/political factors: (1) electoral systems and (2) political strategies of the dominant ethnic leadership, and their institutional expression.
Ethnicity, Citizenship, and Ethnic-Minority Party Representation
Statistics Estonia, 2011.
Estimated by the authors on the basis of data from the 2011 census.
Statistics Estonia, 2011.
Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, 2011.
For Latvia, Matulionis et al. (2011) 43 report survey data indicating that 57.6% of Russian respondents have Russian citizenship According to the 2011 census, there are 556,422 residents of Russian ethnicity in 2011 and 2,067,887 citizens. Muznieks indicates that in 2004 330,201 of Latvia’s 1,805,156 citizens were Russian, citing the Citizenship and Migration Affairs Board.
Romanian National Institute of Statistics, 2011.
Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovakia, 2011.
The Role of the Electoral System
One explanation would suggest that the electoral system, combined with the territorial concentration of ethnic minorities, is an important variable in explaining how such minorities are represented through the party system. 45 In the cases under study, however, there is a clear discrepancy between what one would expect ethnic representation to look like as a result of the electoral system and the actual form that representation has taken. In this section, we briefly discuss the differences between electoral systems and the expected types of parties they would promote. Then we provide a detailed description of the electoral system in the four states and finally discuss whether expectations are confirmed by reality.
Among all electoral systems, proportional representation (PR) is considered to favour smaller parties more than single-member districts (SMDs, plurality). Within PR, however, a plethora of additional electoral mechanisms may hinder or promote ethnic-minority parties. First, if the size of the ethnic minority is less than or close to the electoral threshold, then a particularistic ethnic party may have difficulty gaining representation without assuring a higher than average level of electoral mobilization and reaching out to other parts of the population. Second, if the entire country is treated as one large electoral district, minorities cannot capitalize on their geographic concentration in a specific region, 46 whereas multiple PR districts may allow this. In general, the more PR districts are available, the more likely it is that an ethnic party would be successful. This system is especially favourable to parties catering to regional interests and should provide fertile ground for a particularistic ethnic party to gain a foothold in some regions. Some variants of the PR system allow voter choice among individual candidates on the party lists, which could encourage selection of candidates that are visibly of the ethnic minority. Mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems similarly may allow particularistic ethnic parties to launch candidates successfully in districts where the ethnic minority dominates.
Both Estonia and Latvia have district PR systems with multiple seats allocated per electoral district (see Table 3). Estonia has twelve multi-member constituencies while Latvia has five; given the smaller population of Estonia, the electoral districts are considerably smaller in population and more ethnically differentiated from one another than in Latvia, also due to the somewhat higher regional concentration of Russian speakers in Estonia. Therefore the system is even more permissive for a particularistic ethnic party to gain a foothold in Estonia than in Latvia.
Electoral Systems and Ethnic-Minority Populations in Estonia, Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia
Source: Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament), 2014; Saeima (Latvian parliament), 2014; Camera Deputatilor (Romanian Chamber of Deputies), 2014; Národná rada (Slovak National Council), 2014.
National elections only.
Apart from district size, there is another important distinction between the operation of Estonia’s and Latvia’s PR systems. While both systems allow the voter to express candidate preferences, in the Latvian case selection of the party list is done first and determines the final outcome. In the Estonian case, selection of the individual candidate is done first, and this determines the proportional distribution between parties. 47 Khrychikov and Miall contend that particular features of Estonia’s application of the PR electoral system have helped to “[channel] the activities of Russian-speaking groups into Estonian parties.” 48 The system “encourages parties to compete for votes across different constituencies and it also favours cross-party alliances and voting for individuals.” 49 Specifically, parties may run prominent Russian candidates or candidates with Slavic names in majority-Russian districts. Including candidates with Slavic names in the regional party list in districts with a large Russian-speaking population would presumably increase the party’s attractiveness. Beginning in the 2003 parliamentary election, the Centre Party has run three to four identifiably Russian candidates in the (Russian-dominated) Ida-Viru district, of the ten permitted on the ballot. Since 2003, Mihhail Stanuhhin, the leading Centre Party candidate there, has won enough votes to guarantee himself a seat in the first distribution phase and by 2011 ranked a surprising third in the country in his personal mandate votes compared to the quota needed to win a personal seat in his district, falling only behind Centre Party leader Edgar Savisaar and Reform Party leader Andrus Ansip. Another Centre Party Russian candidate, Deniss Borodits, also made his way into the parliament through the personal mandate, in this case elected from one of the Tallinn districts. 50 Over time, other parties have also included Russian candidates in their lists in Ida-Viru, with some success, indicating a more assertive effort to court the Russian vote. For example, most of the other parties ran candidates with Russian or Slavic names in the district between 2003 and 2011; however, only two were successful.
Khrychikov and Miall argue that at least until 2002 there was “a clear preference for non-Estonians to cast their votes for candidates with Slavic names” 51 whereas Berg suggests that ethnicity is not a primary determinant of vote. 52 Apparently the Centre Party affiliation was important as well as the Slavic cast, evidenced by the fact that in local elections in Ida-Viru County, that party draws strong majority support. It should be noted that, unlike in Latvia, in Estonia non-citizen residents are entitled to vote in local elections, so these local vote outcomes do not translate directly into national electoral results. While the electoral system created an opportunity for the Centre Party, the party used the opening to establish a reputation for itself as “the” party for Russians to support.
The electoral system in Latvia places more emphasis on the attraction of the party as opposed to the individual candidates. While creating the opportunity for an ethnic-minority party to gain support, the PR system does not provide the parties there with the same flexibility to present themselves with distinct profiles in districts with differing electoral makeups. Even though there may be more Russian candidates included on the district electoral lists in areas with a more strongly Russian electorate, the voter first picks the favoured party list, then evaluates the candidates. The only electoral grouping that gained parliamentary seats in Latvia with a significant representation of Russian candidates on its list in 2011 was the Harmony Centre Party. Biographical data provided on the Latvian Electoral Commission website revealed that of the deputies elected on the Harmony Centre list in 2011, twelve indicated Russian ethnicity and only five indicated Latvian ethnicity. 53 Of the remainder, two indicated another ethnicity (German and Karelian), while a majority of the twelve indicating no ethnicity had Slavic names. Compared to Estonia’s Centre Party, Latvia’s Harmony Centre has been more clearly a Russian party but with some Latvian presence. In other words, it does project itself as a Russian party but not an exclusivist one. For other parties in Latvia, the vast majority of deputies elected in 2011 indicate their ethnicity as Latvian with three exceptions (only one of these being Russian). 54 Latvia’s open list system allows for voters to indicate positive preferences with a “+” and negative preferences by crossing out names of candidates. Therefore, neither the electoral system nor the identity of the other parties encourages them to include Russian candidates on the party list, thus reinforcing the existing ethnic cleavage in the party system.
The electoral systems of Romania and Slovakia have changed over time, but in contrast to the more nuanced electoral systems in Latvia and Estonia, both had a single countrywide PR district with a 5 percent threshold during most of the 2000s. After 2008, Romania changed from PR to a mixed system. The Slovak system had four electoral districts in 1992 and 1994. Afterwards, the Slovak system bore some resemblance to the Latvian system but with one national list as opposed to district ones. In the Slovak case, electors are given a ballot for each party. On the ballots, the parties list all their candidates running. In addition to voting for a party, voters may circle up to four preferred candidates from the party’s list. 55 However, preferential voting changed over time. While in 1990, a candidate had to win 50% of all the votes of his or her political party in order to be able to influence the order of candidates, the threshold was lowered to 10% in 1992 and 3% in 2004. As a result, preference votes became progressively more commonplace. 56 Ultimately, both the Slovak and the Romanian variations of the proportional representation system are not favourable for smaller ethnic groups. Nonetheless, PR would not impede concentrated or dispersed minorities from entering parliament, provided their proportion is larger than the threshold.
An additional aspect worth mentioning is the presence of special reserved seats for national minorities in Romania. While in the other three cases no special seats are set aside for minority groups, the Romanian Constitution tries to offset the hindrance of ethnic minorities (other than Magyars) to enter parliament by creating reserved seats for those minorities that cannot win representation otherwise. Each minority may possess only one reserved seat. Romania’s electoral system further spells out that organizations of national minorities that fail to pass the threshold automatically receive a seat in the lower chamber 57 if they win 5 percent (10 percent after 2004) of the average number of valid votes cast for the lower house representatives in single-seat constituencies. This came down to just 1,300 votes prior to the 2004 changes and circa 2,100 votes after. 58 This threshold is so low that practically all official minorities are able to send representatives to parliament; because ethnic Magyars have ethnic representation through the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (DUHR), they do not receive an additional reserved seat. 59
Based on the electoral system, one would most likely expect emergence of an ethnic particularist party in Estonia and Latvia, due to the nature of the PR system and the larger share of the ethnic minority groups in the voting population. On the other hand, such parties should be less likely to emerge in Slovakia, and in Romania. While the shift to a mixed system in Romania after 2008 would offer ethnic minorities a better chance in some districts to succeed on the national list as an ethnic particularist party, the ethnic minority group would need to vote strategically for one single party and show up with high turnout. 60 Likewise in Slovakia, with a single national list and the Hungarian minority standing only somewhat higher than the 5 percent threshold (at 8.5 percent), an ethnic particularist party would face greater obstacles than in Estonia or Latvia.
Despite these expectations, Hungarian ethnic particularist parties have constantly entered national parliaments in Romania, but have not in Estonia or Latvia. Furthermore, Estonia would have been the best candidate for an ethnic political party to form successfully (because of the smaller number of PR districts relative to population). However, Russians in this country have voted for the least radical party type, an accommodative majority party—the Centre Party. This may also be partly due to another aspect of Estonia’s electoral system (the primacy of personalized choice). Nonetheless, this feature of the electoral system operates in a particular political context that established the Centre Party as the party of choice for Russian-speakers. It is still somewhat surprising that the Centre Party holds such sway among Russian-speaking voters, given the fact that the party’s top leadership is made up of ethnic Estonians, that ethnic Estonians dominate in most electoral districts, and that positions on issues that concern the Russian minority are moderate and only form one component of the party’s identity. Likewise, in Latvia, despite relatively propitious conditions, a successful particularist ethnic party has not emerged, but Russians generally opt for an integrationist minority party.
On the other hand, contrary to expectations, an ethnic particularist party, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (DUHR), has been very successful at gaining parliamentary seats in every election since 1990. After 2008, Romania switched to a mixed system with 315 single-member electoral districts. Candidates must now obtain 50 percent +1 of the total number of votes in order to win a district seat. Votes in those districts where no candidate obtains a majority are tallied nationally and seats are allocated proportionally to parties that pass the 5 percent threshold or win three single-seat districts in the senate or six single-seat districts in the lower house. 61 Despite the impeding effect for smaller parties (including minority parties) of this particular system of allocating single seats, the Magyar minority is nonetheless highly concentrated in 13 of the 315 new ridings and thus still manages to achieve parliamentary representation under the new system.
In Slovakia, as in Latvia, an integrationist minority party has drawn the most ethnic minority support. Between 1998 and 2010 this was the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK), and during the first eight years in this period, the party was also part of the governing centre-right coalition. 62 Since the radicalization of SMK in 2007, Most-Hid, an integrationist party that split from the Coalition, has been particularly successful at gaining Magyar votes at the expense of SMK.
Based on electoral system and demographic features, particularistic parties have not emerged where we might normally have expected them. As electoral system and territorial concentration on their own do not seem to adequately explain which type emerges in particular cases, we now turn to examine another explanation based on historical patterns of development within particular countries and strategies of majority elites vis-à-vis ethnic minorities. These strategies, in turn, also, in some cases, may have been important reasons that the various electoral systems developed as they did.
Majority Elite Strategies and Party Representation of Ethnic Minorities
As we demonstrated above, electoral systems alone do not explain specific patterns of ethnic representation. An important feature of ethnic-minority representation is the way that states and majority political parties treat those minorities and the way in which this shapes the kind of ethnic minority representation that ensues. In other words, majority elite strategies vis-à-vis the minority include electoral systems but they are not restricted to them. A broader range of strategies adopted by ethnic-majority parties affect types of ethnic representation of minorities. Ishiyama, for instance, points out that the policies of the state towards ethnic minorities (rather than features of the minorities themselves) are critical in shaping the minority parties’ strategies to foment protest and communal conflict. 63 A more nuanced view of this is provided by Birnir, who argues that ethnic parties—which she calls “ethnic attractors”—are inherently peaceful when seeking access to political power. This is because these parties seek to act and gain leverage for their ethnic group. When violence does occur, it is not because of the ethnic group’s political representation but because it is being denied that representation by the state. 64 Often state policies and associated institutional structures are generated by motivations of key political actors at some key stage in the political development process. In the case of the post-communist countries examined here, the pivotal period was likely the first few years or decade after independent statehood was restored because in this time period new political institutions, including political parties, were established.
Three types of state strategies can be identified: (1) instances where the state and its policies discriminate between different minority groups; (2) cases where the state seeks to asymmetrically co-opt portions of a particular minority ethnic group; and (3) situations in which the state pursues an even-handed approach to different ethnic groups and subgroups within particular ethnic minorities. In the latter case, this is not to say that the latter group is necessarily accommodative towards minorities but rather that it does not differentiate between them (at least in legislation concerning political representation). Romania seems to represent the clearest example of the first case (where the state has discriminated between different minority groups) and Estonia the second, while Slovakia and Latvia fit into in the third category (involving non-discriminatory policies). We hypothesize that these institutional choices, at least in these instances, are significantly responsible for the different types of ethnic representation that ensued.
Romania and Estonia: Cases of Asymmetric State Policy
The Romanian electoral law is in and of itself a case of asymmetric state policy, as it gives preferential reserved seats to some minorities (i.e., small minority groups). The motives attributed to Romanian political elites for codifying this practice immediately after the anti-communist 1989 Revolution vary. One purpose may have been to increase legitimacy of the new post-1989 National Salvation Front (NSF) government. Similarly, it may have been intended to appease international concern about the deteriorating situation of minorities in the Balkans. 65 Most importantly, however, some analysts see it as directed at counterbalancing the presence and influence of the anti-NSF Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania. 66 In short, the intent of Romanian political elites after 1989 may have been to appear pro-minority, while limiting the ability of the Hungarian minority to effectively build a broader political base. The result has been that the minority representatives who enter parliament via reserved seats are the most loyal allies of any government (left or right). Such representatives are aware the preferential rules could easily be removed by a simple amendment to the electoral law. 67 Therefore, unlike the DUHR, minority MPs often unconditionally vote for the party in power.
This asymmetric electoral law has other implications as well. For instance, it automatically encourages ethnic particularistic parties among minorities other than the Hungarians, as competition for the reserved minority seats occurs solely between ethnic organizations. Alionescu illustrates that since the minority seat is guaranteed and since the threshold is so low, the electoral system encourages a proliferation of ethnic organizations. 68 Additionally, mainstream parties are neither encouraged to recruit members of ethnic minorities, nor do they attempt to appeal to them. 69 Positively discriminating in favour of all other minorities has had an effect on the DUHR as well. The party has been prevented from successfully taking on the issues of other minority groups to expand its voter base. Accordingly, this system encourages the DUHR to adopt an ethnic particularist position instead of an integrationist one. The DUHR platform is focused exclusively on Magyar issues and places important emphasis on Magyar culture, Magyar representation as well as Magyar territorial autonomy. 70 The party membership as well as the voter base for the party is overwhelmingly Magyar, as Hungarians vote almost exclusively for this party. 71 The mix of policies towards Hungarians and the other national minorities has resulted in the particularistic nature of the DUHR.
A different kind of asymmetric policy towards minorities was practiced in Estonia in the period immediately following the restoration of independence. This involved cooptation of important figures within the Russian minority. Like Latvia, Estonia was an independent state before 1940 and saw its independence after 1990 as a restoration rather than establishment of a new state. Because Estonia’s incorporation into the USSR in 1940 was regarded as illegitimate, citizenship was granted only to those who, irrespective of ethnicity, were citizens of the country before 1940. This included some Russian-speaking Old Believer communities. According to O’Connor, approximately eighty thousand Russian-speakers (ca. 25 percent of Estonia’s Russophones) were eligible for citizenship. 72 Nonetheless, the largest portion of Russian-speakers who entered Estonia (as industrial workers or as military personnel), under Soviet rule, were not.
However, in addition to pre-war residents, citizenship was granted to a select group of Russian-speaking pro-independence political activists. 73 This group, estimated at about five hundred individuals, included media personnel, political leaders, community activists, trade union leaders, and cultural figures. Under the leadership of Edgar Savisaar of the moderately leftist Centre Party, the government also encouraged the formation of Russian civic organizations, particularly the Russian Parliamentary Assembly. 74 Berg argues that “this helped promote political factionalism among Russian “ethnic entrepreneurs,” between so-called integrationists (or “loyalists”), who had chosen institutional politics as an arena to champion citizens’ rights, and “hard-liners” (or “extremists”), who demanded both unconditional citizenship and the installation of Russian as the second official language.” 75 According to Park, the Estonian government treated these organizations like other public formations, and there emerged Russian-dominated trade unions, city councils, and media. 76 The website of the government of Estonia indicates that a much larger number, 24,201 individuals, were granted citizenship by naturalization in the period between 1992 and 1995 because of their support “for the independence of Estonia.” 77
One result may have been a division within the Russian-speaking population between the “Soviet-Russians,” who supported the continuation of the USSR, and those “Baltic-Russians,” who supported independence. 78 Thus, the ethnic Russian party (Our Home is Estonia) that did gain about 6 percent of the vote and six seats in the Estonian parliament in 1992 splintered shortly after that electoral success, with votes dispersing among various Estonian parties. 79 In addition, that part of the Russian-speaking population that was oriented negatively towards the new Estonian state was also less likely to make the effort to attain Estonian citizenship. These individuals could not vote in national elections and could not be members of political parties; they therefore could not contribute to supporting a national ethnic party.
Ever since 1991, the Centre Party of Edgar Savisaar has been particularly successful at projecting an image of the mainstream party that represented Russians, alongside its social-liberal economic program; 80 furthermore, it has periodically been part of the national governing coalition (briefly in 1995, 2002–2003, and 2005–2007), as well as succeeding at the local level in Tallinn and in localities in Ida-Viru county, thus reducing the political marginalization of the Russian-speaking population there. The fact that Estonia had a party system dominated by the centre-right throughout its post-communist experience 81 also helped make the Centre Party the most viable centre-left option and arguably a natural appealing choice for the Russian-speaking minority. The size of the ethnic minority may be one factor that has motivated the mainstream Centre Party to reach out to the Russian community, but this factor might also have been expected to play a similar role in Latvia, where, in fact, a different pattern emerged.
Slovakia and Latvia: Cases of Symmetric State Policy
In Slovakia, no attempt was made to positively or negatively discriminate between various minority groups. In general, however, centre-left governments have been less accommodating than centre-right governments on issues of ethnic minorities and ethnic representation. Arguably, the 1998 law against coalitions by the Meciar government affected the Hungarian ethnic parties, which up until that time ran as a coalition rather than a party. However, the main target of the 1998 electoral law was more likely the main opposition—a league of five political parties from all poles of the ideological spectrum forming the Slovak Democratic Coalition. The law had a small impact on the Hungarian parties that already ran together in previous elections and that merged into one party, the SMK, after the 1998 anti-coalition law. Electoral rules hindering the ethnic representation of Hungarians were therefore not targeting ethnic Hungarians exclusively but voters of the Slovak majority as well. At the same time, the Slovak state has made no effort to offer enhanced representations for minorities other than the Hungarians. The absence of either positive or negative discrimination in Slovakia has deprived Roma, Czechs, Ruthenians, and Ukrainians from receiving the type of representation they would have in Romania. However, this has also allowed the major Hungarian parties to adopt a moderate integrationist stance while simultaneously taking on the responsibility to represent Roma or Ruthenian minority interests. SMK (between 1998 and 2007) and especially the new Most-Hid Party, formed in 2009, adopted an integrationist message vis-à-vis the ethnic Slovak majority.
While Most-Hid is presently the party most likely to be associated with integrationism, SMK was very much in the same situation prior to 2007 when the party began to radicalize. The party was part of the governing coalition between 1998 and 2006 and made occasional attempts at appealing to a multi-ethnic rather than solely ethnic-Hungarian constituency. According to Haughton and Rybar, during the 2006 elections for instance, SMK pushed for a strong regional strategy, aiming to broaden its appeal beyond the ethnic-Hungarian vote. 82 A second way to court the Slovak vote was to promote popular party leader Bela Bugar, playing on his reputation as generally likeable and trustworthy among both ethnic groups. 83 When Bela Bugar was ousted as the party turned towards a more radical platform in 2007, Bugar and former SMK moderates formed a new party that also included a number of ethnic Slovaks in an attempt to project a moderate counter-image. 84 In the 2010 as well as the 2012 parliamentary elections, it was the new Most-Hid party that made it to parliament while SMK failed to pass the 5 percent threshold. Most-Hid—even more so than SMK before its radicalization—appeals to both Magyar and Slovak voters. It has renounced separatism and opted for a multi-national bi-cultural Slovak state. 85 In its program, it mentions the Roma and other minorities more often than it mentions Magyars, and it promotes itself as a multi-ethnic party. 86
Finally, the Latvian case resembles Slovakia. Like Estonia, Latvia granted limited automatic citizenship upon independence to those that were citizens in 1940 and their descendants. Those who took up residence after that year had to pass the same sort of language and history tests as in Estonia. As in Estonia there was also an attempt to court loyal Russians, but no special legal accommodation was offered. The reasons for this are subject to speculation, but it seems possible that the Latvian population felt more threatened than in neighbouring Estonia, in part because the portion of the population of Latvian ethnicity had fallen more dramatically, to 52 percent compared to 61.4 percent in Estonia in 1989. 87 Higher rates of inter-marriage and residential inter-mixing 88 in Latvia may have also raised greater concerns about ethnic dilution; in addition, Russians formed the majority in virtually all Latvian cities, with Latvians dominant only in the countryside. 89 This situation may have contributed to higher levels of tension and a greater sense of threat to ethnic integrity both among Latvians and Russians. According to Melvin, Latvian elites also did not “[develop] a strategy to facilitate the creation of civil institutions within the non-Latvian community,” 90 although Brands Kehris notes several efforts to do so. 91 Non-citizens were not given the right to vote in local elections, as in Estonia. All of these factors led to fragmentation and an exit of Russian-speakers to seek advancement in the private rather than the political sphere, as well as developing close ties to Russian business. 92
Reasons why a particularistic party did not develop in Latvia may be similar to those affecting Estonia: fragmentation and infighting among Russian groups, 93 lack of leadership, and the low proportion of Russian-speaking voters among the Russian-speaking resident population. By 2011 about two thirds of Latvia’s non-Latvian population received citizenship; 94 as the number of Russian-speaking voters increased and the possibilities to gain political representation accordingly also became more realistic, it made sense not just to appeal to ethnic Russians but to Russian-speakers of various ethnicities (Ukrainians, Belorussians, and others), since citizenship and language concerns would unite these groups. Furthermore, given the importance of the citizenship issue, a particularistic message might be counterproductive to the party’s efforts to push for more Russians to be “let in” or enfranchised. While these factors gravitated against a particularistic party outcome, on the other hand no Latvian majority party matched the effort of the Centre Party in Estonia to court Russian votes.
The result was the articulation of a strong Russophone integrationist political movement that took the form of the Russian minority party, National Harmony and between 1998 and 2003 the Alliance for Human Rights in a United Latvia (of which National Harmony was part of). 95 In addition, a number of minor more radical parties claiming to represent Russophones were formed, but they did not gain significant support. In most elections, it was the moderate National Harmony—and later on the Harmony Centre party—that became the main political advocate representing Russian interests. The path towards suffrage taken in the Latvian case has created a particular emphasis on citizenship and languages - illustrated even by the most recent language referendum of 2012. This has ultimately polarized Latvian-speakers versus Russian-speakers and has prevented a mainstream Latvian party from becoming a credible Russian-minority advocate as in the Estonian case. On the other hand, it has also promoted the creation of an integrationist political movement which, although aiming to represent Russian interests, is by no means exclusivist. The disadvantage is, however, that Harmony Centre, its predecessors and its recent successor (the Social Democratic Party Harmony) have never been accepted into the national governing coalition (despite the fact that the party won the largest number of votes in the 2011 and 2014 parliamentary elections), presumably due to reluctance on the part of the other important parties, namely, Zatler’s Reform Party and the Unity Party in 2011, to form a coalition with such strong Russian connections.
Conclusion
This article has identified three types of parties in Central and Eastern Europe that cater to ethnic issues: ethnic particularistic minority parties, integrationist minority parties, and accommodative majority parties. We have explored political and institutional factors that affect the success of each party type. The study is based on a comparison of two pairs of largely comparable cases (Estonia and Latvia, on the one hand, and Slovakia and Romania, on the other).
We conclude that while electoral laws and patterns of territorial concentration may be a factor in explaining differences in party representation of minorities, they become particularly important in the broader political institutional context that emerged in the first decade following the collapse of Soviet power. Across the four cases, the nature of the electoral system would have been differentially conducive to formation of a particularistic ethnic party, but particularly so in Estonia and Latvia. However, this only occurred successfully in one case, and not the most likely one, namely Romania. In Romania, state policies towards various minorities were asymmetrical; here, the “ethnic particularistic” minority parties was successful. In another case—Estonia—state policy and at least one major party pursued a cooptative and integrationist approach; here an accommodative majority party has been the most successful. Finally, in cases where institutional rules did not discriminate between their minorities (Latvia and Slovakia), “integrationist” minority parties emerged as the most attractive.
These conclusions will require confirmation in further cases in future studies. In addition, the particular features of the Baltic cases also deserve attention, given that the gradual acquisition of the franchise created particular problems for both ethnic-minority and ethnic-majority actors in attracting political support from Russian-speakers. The role of historic contingency (e.g., of particular leaders and political forces such as Savisaar in Estonia) in the transition period may also be important. What is clear is that neither a mechanistic examination of the impact of electoral systems nor a socio-cultural explanation that focuses exclusively on the nature of the ethnic-minority group are adequate to explain the outcomes; political factors that originate in the actions and strategies of the majority-ethnic leadership must also be examined. This conclusion places upon ethnic-majority and ethnic-minority groups a certain key collective responsibility for fostering political outcomes that encourage greater political integration and more effective representation of the minority.