The Visegrad Countries and Visa Liberalisation in the Eastern Neighbourhood

Introduction

The often-quoted opening of Adam Mickiewicz’s Pan Tadeusz is perhaps the most passionate declaration of nostalgia in Central and Eastern European literature. Of course, it is important not to confuse the contemporary reader. The Lithuania of Mickiewicz was not limited to the borders of the modern state. The epic poem sought to romanticise the disappearing world of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that once stretched across the lands of today’s Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Russia. Polish language, in which Mickiewicz wrote, was the dominant force, with Belarus and Lithuania equally claiming the poet as their national bard.

These complex multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-religious lands of the former Commonwealth, partitioned between Prussia, Russia, and Austria, devastated by two world wars, and traumatised by pogroms, the Holocaust and Stalinism, bear witness to the turbulent history of Central and Eastern Europe. Alas after 1945, it seemed, the burden of history was too great; people once sharing a common past (however turbulent) were left permanently separated by physical and psychological boundaries.

Yet, on 1st May 2004, among others, the four Central European states—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia (the Visegrad 4/V4)—joined the European Union. Driven by their common desire to leave behind forty years of Sovietism, the states have sought political transition and return to what they perceived was their rightful place at the heart of “core” Europe, symbolised in the membership of the EU. To this extent, the four states provide a fascinating case study into post–Cold War regional politics. At the same time as re-connecting with the peoples on the other side of the Iron Curtain (what Václav Havel termed the “return to Europe”), the V4 have also sought to re-engage with the people of the newly independent states in post-Soviet Eastern Europe, and have been particularly active in the formulation of policy priorities in the EU’s relations with its eastern neighbourhood, with a particular focus on cross-border mobility of people. As Martin Dangerfield notes, “the 2004 enlargement itself introduced additional dynamic into the EU’s policy . . . a set of new member states with keen stakes in the EU’s Eastern policies were now in position to become players in its future development.” ¹ In Paris, Berlin, or Brussels, Minsk or Chișinău were no longer as distant places as before.

In this context, the respective V4 states’ EU Presidencies to the date prioritised the EaP in EU foreign relations ² whilst, as early as May 2004, they have declared their intention “to use their unique regional and historical experience and to contribute to shaping and implementing the European Union’s policies towards the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe.” ³

The V4 countries have had, albeit in different contexts, relatively long histories of interaction with the peoples of Eastern Europe, albeit largely limited to those in close geographical proximity. In the case of Poland, the history of connection is overwhelmingly deeper and more complex than in the other three cases. Yet, despite more than a decade-long primary pursuit of the “return to Europe,” an eastern policy had always been an important aspect of their respective foreign policies. Even the Czech Republic, which shares no common boundary, has also traditionally put an emphasis towards the east and, in all four cases, cross-border mobility proved to be an important aspect of bilateral relations and people-to-people contact. ⁴ The four states are, it can be argued, a bridge between the east and west of the continent. However, their accession into the EU and, in particular, the impact of the Schengen acquis made visa liberalisation with the Eastern European and South Caucasus countries one of their main but vaguely defined priorities, ⁵ as the four countries failed to agree on a wider vision of the EU’s relations with its new eastern neighbourhood, highlighting mistrust and diverging policy goals between the V4. ⁶

Therefore, put into the wider context of the countries’ relations with the EaP states, this article aims to answer the research question “if and how the way of approaching the post-Soviet space differs among the Central and Eastern European states?” by exploring why and, to what extent, the V4 countries support the facilitation of greater cross-border mobility and, in particular, the process of visa liberalisation vis-à-vis the eastern neighbours. This article will unpack this research question by arguing that, despite unspecified claims in previous academic research, ⁷ historical discourse ⁸ plays a limited role in understanding the V4’s post-EU accession policy preferences towards the eastern neighbourhood.

By highlighting the limitations to the institutionalist approach of March and Olsen and their differentiation between “logics of consequences” and the “logics of appropriateness,” ⁹ this article contends that, while the V4 may be applying a normative agenda linked to EU visa liberalisation conditionality (such as the promotion of minority rights) to their relationship vis-à-vis the EU’s eastern neighbourhood (“logics of appropriateness”), this does not make it mutually exclusive from an interest-driven approach by the individual countries (“logics of consequences”); a normative agenda, in this sense, should rather be understood as a tool rather than a rationality (or a paradigm) and, in contrast to March and Olsen’s argument, is argued to be compatible with interest-driven rationalities ¹⁰ that can, for example, be related to wider regional geopolitics. Therefore, it will be shown that while the V4 states may individually have different interests (ends) in employing a normative agenda (means) in the eastern neighbourhood, the regional framework along with EU conditionality are used as an opportunity to maximise their national preferences in areas, such as visa liberalisation, where or when they may lead to shared goals. As a result, the Visegrad Group/V4 is used here as a level of analysis in loose terms. This is because the V4 is not a singular actor with a common policy but, as will be argued below, a loose regional framework with diverging interests (e.g., the well-being of Hungarian minority in Ukraine or the strengthening of civil society in Belarus), but shared understanding of the means (local border traffic agreements, visa facilitation agreements, and visa liberalisation conditionality).

Further, as will be shown, visa liberalisation is employed as a technical instrument in the V4’s and, indeed, the EU’s engagement with the EaP countries, externalising EU internal (in)security by way of promoting good governance and stimulating reform under EU-set conceptual parameters. ¹¹ Visa policy alone is “a safeguard against unlimited and unwanted migration as well as trans-national organised crime” into the Schengen zone. ¹² As a tool of foreign policy, however, visa seeks to have a wider impact because it aims to influence third countries’ actions ¹³ and, as Marta Jaroszewicz argues, visa liberalisation is the “EU’s most tangible incentive” in the eastern neighbourhood. ¹⁴ In this context, it is also worth noting the V4 states’ response to the ongoing illegal migration in the EU’s southern neighbourhood, in contrast to facilitating legal flows across the EU’s eastern border. However, it should be understood that the eastern neighbourhood provides a completely different scenario (and, hence, approaches) for the V4 and the EU as a whole, including the presence of ethnic minorities, the ongoing regional contestation with Russia, and most importantly, a different migration profile.

The article is divided into four sections. The first part will attempt to provide a conceptualisation of the V4 cooperation, and the states’ rationale for a joint pursuit of visa liberalisation in the eastern neighbourhood. This will be done by exploring the limits to March and Olsen’s approach, and by highlighting how the V4’s shared goals of promoting greater cross-border mobility can be understood from its constitution as a loose regional framework for the maximisation of national interests.

The subsequent sections will explore why the Visegrad countries are interested in visa liberalisation for the countries of Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. The article will do this by (1) analysing the limited role of the historical narrative, while the pursuit of interests through a normative agenda will be shown as not being mutually exclusive. For the purpose of coherence, the bulk of the article will be divided to show (2) diverging national interests (“logics of consequences”) and (3) shared normative agenda (“logics of appropriateness”), which includes (a) a shift from the “exclusive” impact of Fortress Europe towards “politics of inclusion” ¹⁵ and (b) recognition of the transformational impact of cross-border mobility in areas as diverse as minority rights, promotion of democratic governance, and economic cooperation.

The article will conclude that while the V4 has been criticised by scholars for not taking a greater leadership role in the Eastern Partnership, this is a rather unrealistic expectation that stems from existing misconceptions of the regional cooperation. On the other hand, however, the Visegrad states have been relatively successful in undertaking localised technical steps to minimise the impact of the external Schengen borders on people-to-people contact, while providing important support on reforms to the countries of the eastern neighbourhood.

Understanding the V4 Cooperation and the Rationale for Pursuing Visa Liberalisation: Logics of Appropriateness as Logics of Consequences?

The neo-institutionalist approach of March and Olsen sets logics of consequences against the logics of appropriateness. As Goldman notes, “the logics form perspectives from which politics may be seen.” ¹⁶ On one hand, Consequentialism points to personal or collective objectives, the fulfilment of ends. ¹⁷ In comparison to the logics of appropriateness, this is an interest-driven approach that, according to March and Olsen, ignores the norms-driven role of “identity, rules and institutions” (logics of appropriateness).

The Visegrad states and their regional framework of cooperation, as will be demonstrated below, highlight the limits to this approach. Despite high (and, often, unrealistic) expectations, ¹⁸ the V4 is not a framework for a common foreign policy but rather a platform for the maximisation of individual states’ interests. In this case, norm and interest-driven approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

For example, while the following sections will explore the V4 states’ own experience and the normative agenda employed, it does not mean that, whether individually, or as a regional grouping, their initiatives are not interest-driven. As Barkin explains, “political actions in the international domain, even when motivated by best intentions, have ramifications on the distribution of power that can affect both the ultimate effectiveness of the actions and the way those actions are viewed by others.” ¹⁹

Thus, even in the case of the influential post-war Polish exile-commentator Juliusz Mieroszewski, his normative-driven arguments to building a ring of friends in Eastern Europe was as much influenced by security concerns of the Polish state as Piłsudski’s federalist concept of Międzymorze. In more recent times, Slovakia favours good relations with the eastern neighbours (long-term interest) at the same time as “conflict-free” relations with Russia (short-term “domestic” interest), ²⁰ thus opting for engagement on de-politicised technical issues such as trade and liberalisation, and without compromising one set of relations over another.

Whether driven by a “soft” security agenda via democracy promotion and trade, or “hard” security based on military power, the approaches to Polish or Slovak eastern policy are interest-driven; the instruments, just as the view of Russia may wary, but the core intention remains the same—building a stable ring of friends on the EU’s eastern border through greater engagement under EU-set conceptual parameters, of which cross-border mobility remains a key goal. Therefore, while Tulmets argues that the logics are not mutually exclusive because they can be used “alternatively to highlight different modes of behavior,” ²¹ highlighting the limits to March and Olsen’s approach is important, not least in showing the misconceptions about the type of cooperation that has emerged between the V4, but that conceptualising “logics of appropriateness” (normative-driven tools) as a type of logics of consequences (interest-driven decisions) helps our understanding of the rationale and policy formulation in the individual and regional framework.

As noted above, it is argued that analysts and scholars often tend to over-state the V4’s agency, creating over-expectations of its capability or, indeed, shared interest in joint action in the eastern neighbourhood. ²² Indeed, one reason for this is that the V4 has lacked serious scholarship on policy formations and preferences. ²³ As a result, the discourse has become dominated by those who predict the doom of the cooperation or those, perhaps best exemplified by the former Czech dissident Petr Pithart, who resort more to romantic literature than the study of modern political processes. For example, assigning a mythico-historical significance to the choice of Visegrad as a place for the 1991 founding meeting between the Presidents of Czechoslovakia, ²⁴ Hungary and Poland, and that between the three kings of Bohemia, Hungary, and Poland in the same place, Pithart writes that “those three kings back in 1335 knew very well why they chose that place [Visegrad Castle] to meet, on a solid outcrop high above the Danube. They did so because they wanted the majesty of the silent and powerful river to remind them that there are values that stand above the daily conflicts and squabbles of neighbours.” ²⁵

Despite their prominent role on individual policy issues (such as civil society support), the V4 states have assumed neither joint nor individual leadership of the EaP, which can be explained through structural, financial, and political constraints within the regional constellation. While it is not in this article’s aim to comment on the positives and the negatives of individual states’ priorities and interests, it does nevertheless seek to develop an understanding of the V4 states’ ability to reconcile, in policy-specific cases, diverging national interests with shared goals.

Firstly, even before the V4 countries’ accession into the European Union, the grouping has largely functioned as a platform for the coordination of shared policy goals, rather than a framework for developing common foreign policy interests. Its declarations function as guiding principles to align the four states’ policies, rather than streamline them into one. In the 1990s, the former Czech President Václav Klaus, for example, initially pushed the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) as a more viable option for the pursuit of national interests than the Visegrad framework with its political, social, or cultural initiatives. Despite his preference for pursuing economic interests, Klaus eventually changed his mind, recognising the V4 as an important vehicle for the countries’ individual Euro-Atlantic integration and economic reforms, rather than an unnecessary distraction from national goals. ²⁶ In other words, the four states only use the regional platform when a joint approach is recognised as benefiting or, indeed, complementing national priorities.

Secondly, the V4’s permanent institution is the International Visegrad Fund (IVF), while being one of multiple regional synergies. Although it might be the oldest and most important of the different platforms it is, at best, a loose framework based on “changing coalitions” that often also includes Sweden, the Baltic States, Romania, as well as Austria and Slovenia. ²⁷ The Polish proposal for an eastern dimension of the ENP in 2007 serves as the best example. Copsey and Pomorska argue that it is doubtful that Poland would have benefitted from presenting its proposal as a V4 initiative because a partnership with an “older” and more experienced Member State(s) such as Sweden provided better benefits, not least because of its upcoming Council Presidency and the experience of Swedish representatives to stir the document through the Council working groups. As they note, “Poland therefore appeared to have the opportunity to advance its position as an independent actor within the EU outside the confines of the Visegrad subregional partnership.” ²⁸

Thirdly, in comparison to the Western Member States, the resources of the four states do not allow them to engage in ambitious foreign policy projects. As an example, in 2013, the total expenditure of the Slovak Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs was just under 133 million euros. In the significantly larger Poland, a year previously, it was 423.9 million euros. In comparison, Germany’s total Foreign Ministry budget was 3.4 billion euros the same year. In other words, the Visegrad countries are limited as shapers on the international stage by sheer economic scale. The countries might be at times (to their own credit) punching above their weight but, as the exclusion of Poland from the Minsk talks on Ukraine showed, the countries are still very much foreign policy pygmies when compared to some of the larger and richer western European states. ²⁹

Fourthly, the three smaller V4 states tend to be suspicious of Poland, whom they tend to see as the bigger partner up-loading its policy priorities on to the V4 level, failing to take into account the other three state’s views, ³⁰ while Poland often lacks awareness of its own limitations. The case of Poland is particularly worth noting because Polish analysts are often frustrated with Visegrad cooperation and predict its demise, perhaps sub-consciously, as they equate common initiative with the other countries largely following Polish leadership. Therefore, when Polish analysts lament a missed opportunity for the Visegrad Group in 2013 during the Polish presidency, ³¹ they all too often complain about the other Czech, Hungarian, or Slovak failure to follow Poland. The image created here falsely suggests that Poland is the good member, willing to cooperate and engage, pitted against three states hampering the possibilities for common initiatives, whereas scholars ought to take into account diverging perceptions of (among other things) Russia, which in Poland is generally portrayed as a geopolitical issue, and the other three states see Russia more from an economic prism.

Finally, as highlighted above, the governments of the four states have never jointly expressed the wish to take a lead in the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative. They are, however, building a leading position on particular technical issues, especially in the case of visa liberalisation in the eastern neighbourhood. The V4 states possess large networks of consulates across the neighbourhood and a 2010 survey of Schengen consulates in Ukraine, in terms of citizens’ satisfaction, put Hungary in the first place overall, Slovakia in fourth, Poland in sixth place, and the Czech Republic in sixteenth. ³² More importantly, out of the 2.1 multiple entry “C” Schengen visas issued in the EaP in 2012, more than a million was issued by the V4 states’ consulates. Of the seven hundred thousand “C” visas issues by the V4 in Ukraine, more than two hundred thousand were issued by the Polish consulate in L’viv alone. ³³

The Historical Discourse: Sensitivities and Nationalist Nostalgia?

Rather than being limited to mere cross-border contact, the shifting boundaries of the past millennium have meant that the people within the borders of today’s V4 states have all too often lived in common polities with its immediate eastern neighbours.

For example, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth stretched across most of today’s Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania, and even Russia; from Poznan to Smolensk. After the First Partition of Poland, the Austrians created the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, stretching from southern Poland (Krakow) to western Ukraine. As a result, the “Galicians” were incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian Empire, shared by Hungarians, Czechs, Poles, Ukrainians, and multiple other ethnicities alike.

At the same time, eastern Poland, Belarus, and eastern Ukraine were gradually incorporated into the Russian Empire. After the First World War, the reconstituted Poland had more than 1.9 million Belarusians living on its territory that included today’s western Belarus and Ukraine. Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, had possession of Subcarpathia between 1919 and 1938, when it was invaded by Hungary. After 1945, Poland was pushed westwards, and the eastern borderlands (“kresy”), along with Subcarpathia, were incorporated into the Soviet Union.

Ethnic groups often lived side by side in tension. For example, despite the portrayal of harmonious and shared history within the former Commonwealth, ³⁴ the Polonisation of the late nineteenth century was particularly resented by the Ukrainians, whilst the Second World War shattered any illusions of multi-ethnic co-existence within these communities.

In the case of post-war Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the western Soviet Republics, ethnic minorities became divided, as nationalism and geopolitics changed the regional landscape. Yet, given the Czech Republic’s lack of boundary with any of the EaP countries, historical cross-border relations can only be assessed either through its existence in the Austro-Hungarian Empire or the Czechoslovak state and, in both cases, it was largely limited in comparison to Poland. One can perhaps dig deep as the Bohemian or the Greater Moravian Kingdoms; however, that would rather lead towards historical romanticism.

In the case of Slovakia and Hungary, any significant interaction is largely limited to a small area of Ukrainian western borderland and their minorities in the region. Historically speaking, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic are no less interested in the Balkans than in the eastern neighbourhood, and the well-being of Hungarian, Slovak, or Rusyn minorities in Ukraine or Serbia tends to be equally important to their successive governments. ³⁵ With regards to the Caucasian countries, there is no history of shared statehood or of strong interaction between the people.

Nevertheless, despite these limitations, the post-war period offers some limited insight into the formulation of modern day state interests and, indeed, strategic thinking. During the Cold War, in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, an eastern policy generally meant its fraternal relationship with the Soviet Union, which set the general tone on foreign policy for the whole Warsaw Pact. Nevertheless, while in Hungary the 1920 Treaty of Trianon was still a sensitive issue (and continues to be so) some in the Polish émigré community in Western Europe sought to develop a new eastern policy towards the “kresy,” one that can take into account existing political realities rather than historical sensitivities and nationalist nostalgia.

In this context, for example, Jerzy Giedroyć, editor of the Paris-based Kultura magazine, together with the political commentator Juliusz Mieroszewski, had a profound effect on the eastern policy of the post-1989 Poland and, to some extent, symbolised a form of Polish self-reconciliation with its own past. In general, the émigré community believed that a post-Soviet-dominated Poland (however distant that seemed throughout the 1950s–1980s) should reclaim the lands of Mickiewicz’s Pan Tadeusz lost after 1945, namely, western parts of Belarus, Ukraine, and the district of Wilno (Vilnius) from Lithuania.

Mieroszewski, however, was critical of such a programme, believing that it was not only impossible in the light of existing Soviet power (most of his writing came from the 1950s to early 1970s), but it might ignite the possibility of renewed German claims for the return of Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia. In Mieroszewski’s view, Polish imperialism was no better than the Russian or German, and argued that the inter-war eastern policy provided neither an alternative to balance Russian imperialism nor bring security to the Polish state. ³⁶

Instead, Mieroszewski believed, Poland should leave behind Piłsudski’s irredentist tendencies (Międzymorze) and the belief in its special mission as the bulwark of Christianity (disguising its imperialist aims), and rather concentrate on fostering friendly relations with the western Soviet republics once they achieve independence. Therefore, Poland’s place in Europe could only be made secure by abandoning all territorial claims on the “kresy,” recognising the national aspiration of Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians, and by offering Poland as a “bridge for the Europeanisation of Russia.” ³⁷ In such an approach, Russia would be “europeanised” (pacified), whilst the newly independent states of former western Soviet Union would be likewise transformed through the adoption of European norms, chiefly in terms of democratic governance and human rights, creating a belt of free and secure states on Poland’s eastern border.

Despite the argument of Snyder and others, ³⁸ Milenković contends that the “main causes for treating these three republics like this, was not because of the historical connections with them, but in the context of security of Polish state”—containing Russia not through the building of regional alliances with the borderland states but by establishing a democratic and stable ring of friendly states. ³⁹ The fundamental difference, therefore, laid in Mieroszewski’s belief that cooperation on an equal basis should take place where once Polish imperialism failed. In this sense, interaction, renewed cross-border contact, and good neighbourly relations based on European norms should replace the redundant irredentist policies of Polish Romanticists and inter-war leaders.

Thus, the historical discourse is largely limited to Poland but, to some extent, also Budapest’s support for ethnic Hungarians (see below), highlighting the dominant position of the former in the historical interaction with the Eastern Partnership countries in the closest vicinity, while failing to take into account the limitations (not just possibilities) history may put on inter-state relations. Nevertheless, even in the Polish case, scholars take the role of history in policy making at face value without a thorough analysis of state interest (in this case, the security of its eastern border) or its limits. Further, Polish former imperialist ambitions lay in the east, but its long eastern border has also made interaction with its eastern neighbours a simple political necessity in the post–Cold War period.

Overall, we should rather be speaking of largely limited and, often, complicated historical discourse. It fails to explain the Visegrad countries’ cooperation in specific policy areas such as mobility. Therefore, to some extent, long-term historical relations may help to explain the case of continuous interest in an eastern foreign policy, but they explain the reasons for increasing dynamism in cross-border mobility as far as the presence of ethnic minorities.

The past may help to set the long-term context, but neither is it representative nor does it guide current policy preferences, which are subject to short-term political developments. As Norman Davies concedes on the role of the past in the present: “No contemporary problem can ever be an exact reconstruction of similar problems in the past. New factors must always come into play, and the outcome must always differ in certain respects from earlier precedents.” ⁴⁰

Logics of Consequences: Diverging Interests and the Return to Europe

Overall, therefore, cross-border mobility initiatives of all four Visegrad countries can be largely attributed to postwar local arrangements but, in particular, to new political developments since. In terms of engagement, enhanced cross-border mobility is recognised as beneficial not merely for minority groups but also for regional development, including security, governance, and trade. As long as tariffs and visas continue to mark their trading relations, argues Kobzová, “Polish, Slovak and Hungarian provinces bordering Belarus and Ukraine will continue to be economically deprived.” ⁴¹

Logics of Appropriateness: The V4’s Shared Normative Agenda

With a focus on integration into the Western institutions during the 1990s, the V4 generally lacked any bold initiatives to strengthen relations with the east neighbours, whilst the Balkan wars pre-occupied the western countries and the V4 alike. At the same time, however, it should be reminded that the V4 possessed neither the resources nor the institutional capacities to maintain dynamic relations with both the western and eastern parts of Europe simultaneously. ⁵⁷ Even whilst Ukraine still saw the V4 as its window into Western Europe, actual assistance in political and economic transition on the ground was severely limited. Crucially, the European Union and its Member States also failed to provide Eastern Europe with the kind of economic incentives given to the Visegrad and the Baltic states, and more ambitious initiatives from the V4 and the EU as a whole only came in the post-enlargement period.

Therefore, cooperation became increasingly channelled into areas of relatively low intensity, such as visa facilitation and cross-border crime, with the increasingly dictatorial regime of President Lukashenka in Belarus creating new challenges, setting early limits to democratisation and transition possibilities without adequate support and incentives. Nevertheless, with small steps, technical cooperation did slowly help to (re-)intensify cross-border contact.

Conclusion

This article sought to assess how and why the Visegrad Group supports greater cross-border mobility and, in particular, visa liberalisation with the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. To answer the respective question, the article first sought to conceptualise the type of cooperation that has emerged between the four states as well their joint ability (or, indeed, lack of it) to pursue common goals, especially as a result of often diverging interests. Nevertheless, as it has been shown, while the V4 states might pursue visa liberalisation with the eastern neighbours for diverse reasons (ends), the four states employ a shared normative agenda (means), which includes (1) a shift from the “exclusive” impact of Fortress Europe towards “politics of inclusion” and a (2) recognition of the transformative impact of cross-border mobility in areas as diverse as minority issues, promotion of democratic governance, and human rights.

The Visegrad countries have had some historical connections with the peoples of Eastern Europe; this was not uniform, and while Poland may have the most dominant record of historical interaction, the historical discourse does not take into account the widening of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood into Southern Caucasus, or help explain modern policy preferences that stem from more recent (short-term) developments.

As the article showed, despite all the rhetoric, the V4 states have been largely limited in the post-1989 period in their ability to fully engage in eastern policies. This was largely as a result of their pre-occupation with their political and economic transitions, and the eventual membership of the European Union that came in 2004. Their accession, however, not only re-focused their external policies eastwards, but also had a significant effect on the foreign relations of the Union as a whole, now with new neighbours to the east. The V4 have made visa liberalisation one of the top priorities for the Eastern Partnership, recognising that travel and interaction “will remain underdeveloped as long as visa barriers persist in keeping citizens of EaP countries from travelling to the EU.” ⁷⁹

Despite the constraints of the Schengen Fortress, the article argued that the V4 have been instrumental in increasing cross-border contact with Eastern Europe, reducing visa fees, simplifying application procedures, and arranging local border traffic regimes where possible. This, according to the Stefan Batory Foundation, has largely resulted in the V4’s preparedness to share know-how on transition with the EaP countries, but also increase people-to-people contact, learning from their own experience that “the possibility of travel to Western Europe brought about the chance to acquaint oneself with the rules of democracy and free market economy and the way of functioning of these countries.” ⁸⁰

The article sought to highlight that in contrast to many perceptions, the V4 is rather a loose regional framework for alignment of policies, rather than an institution for the creation of common policies. Whether suspicious of their much larger Polish partner, or diverging interests, the V4 as a singular body has neither been able nor made the attempt to gain leadership in policies towards the EaP, whilst “changing coalitions” with Sweden, the Baltic states, Romania or other EU partners have become a permanent feature of policy-specific regional synergies. Thus, we have shown that despite March and Olsen’s approach to separate the interest-driven “logics of consequences” and the normative agenda of “logics of appropriateness” are not mutually exclusive, highlighted by the Visegrad states’ pursuit of national interests through common normative means within the EaP.

With the continuous increase in legal cross-border mobility between the EU and the eastern neighbourhood, the V4 should persist in further emphasising the facilitation or complete removal of visa requirements for particular groups, in particular, students and business. Despite the recent commendable effort by Moldova to gain a visa-free regime, EU conditionality all too often sets goals that, in the short-term, are beyond the capacity of the EaP states, thwarting further possibilities for engagement and reforms within.

Nevertheless, in the case of visa liberalisation, the article tried to show that the V4 increasingly speaks with a single voice, recognising the political significance of cross-border mobility as an important instrument in the pursuit of their often different interests. Thus, rather than the nostalgia of Pan Tadeusz, the national interests of the V4 are driving the states’ desire for enhancing contact with the peoples of Eastern Partnership countries. Historical ties exist, but the present is not a reconstruction of the past; Europe, not the Old Commonwealth, is the guiding principle. “Whose past and whose future? One wonders.” ⁸¹