A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?

Parameters and Limitations

Many aspects of Serbian politics in Croatia in 1990 are worthy of analysis, from the SDS’s sidelining of the SKH to the eruption of armed rebellion and relations between different SDS factions and Zagreb and Belgrade respectively. This article is concerned with just one, critical part of this story, however: how the SDS viewed solving the “Serbian question” in Croatia.

Of course, the SDS was a broad movement that contained individuals with deep political differences. Jovan Opačić and Dušan Zelenbaba, SDS deputies in the Sabor (Croatian assembly) from Knin, favoured more hardline rhetoric and actions. Babić was closer to Rašković, but became more distinct from him as the year progressed. SDS leaders in Slavonia, where Serbs did not have an absolute majority in any municipality, and large Croatian cities, tended to take a more moderate approach. Rašković was by far the dominant personality and ideologue of the movement in 1990, however, and it is on Rašković that this article focuses. Views of other SDS leaders are referenced when relevant, and, as we shall see, there was actually a great deal of unanimity on key issues.

As well as to links between Babić and Milošević, authors have connected the perceived radicalisation of the SDS in 1990 to discussions in Belgrade on 27–28 June involving Yugoslav President Borisav Jović, and then Milošević, about partitioning Croatia; the gradual militarisation of the crisis and the “Balvan (Log) Revolution,” which erupted in the Knin Krajina on 17 August; controversial constitutional amendments the HDZ had adopted on 25 July; and the publication on 31 July of an apparently compromising transcript of a meeting between Rašković and Tuđman. ¹⁹ The fundamental argument of this article, however, is that there was no significant radicalisation in the SDS’s programme in 1990. The core programme was always there and, as we shall see, its key elements were all publicly espoused prior to these other developments. The extent to which these developments influenced the minor shifts in the SDS’s programme that did take place is a question that requires a wider investigation of all of these individual developments, which is beyond the scope of this article.

Evolutions in how the SDS presented its ideas were more noteworthy, and there is a simple explanation for these: as the Serbian population became more receptive to the party’s more radical ideas, and such ideas became more politically relevant, so the SDS became more open about them. However, as this issue is deeply connected with broader analyses of the political situation in Croatia and Yugoslavia, it is set to one side, the focus being on examining whether it was indeed merely the presentation, rather than the content, that changed.

One important question, does, however, first need to be addressed: is it possible that—as a few authors suggest—Rašković was himself working with Milošević or following his lead? ²⁰

Rašković and Milošević

The available evidence indicates that Rašković was indeed connected with Belgrade—not, primarily, with Milošević or his Socialist Party of Serbia (Socijalistička partija Srbije [SPS]), but with parts of Belgrade’s nationalist and dissident intelligentsia. Most of these gathered around the opposition Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka)—of which, in fact, Rašković initially wanted the SDS to be the Croatian branch. ²¹ A significant personality was Serbian novelist and nationalist ideologue Dobrica Ćosić, an old friend of Rašković’s and his “spiritual father,” who was involved in the formation of the SDS and helped draft its programme. Ćosić later began occasionally meeting with Milošević, but their first meeting was only in March 1990, and their political stances were then opposed: Ćosić wanted to allow all nations the right to self-determination, but Milošević rejected any separation, arguing that “Yugoslav nations are together, they have the same language, they are inter-mixed, those nations are the same.” ²² (Milošević also opposed the formation of Serb national parties at the time, and was contemplating a new Yugoslav-wide socialist party.) ²³

Rašković himself did have some contact with Milošević. Ćosić introduced the two around June, and they met three or four times thereafter, in meetings of various sizes. ²⁴ However, they never had a good relationship. Ćosić later recalled that Milošević “did not like” Rašković because of his “anti-communist” stance and only agreed to meet him on Ćosić’s “persistent insistence.” ²⁵ Indeed, Rašković was publicly critical of Milošević throughout 1990–1991. He recognised Milošević’s contribution to unifying Serbia but saw him as a communist relic and “Bolshevik,” and openly opposed the formation of the SPS and the suppression of opposition protests in June 1990—for which “the Serbian government has to apologise to the Serbian nation.” ²⁶

There is evidence of Rašković and Milošević discussing several issues in 1990: the merits of different political systems and ideologies, such as socialism; the participation of the SDS in Serbia’s elections; Rašković’s idea of a “Gandhi march” on Zagreb; and his proposal for an independent Krajina state. They disagreed on all of them. But, nevertheless, Rašković remained opposed to socialism; he insisted on the SDS running in Serbia’s elections; he continued to advocate pacifist stances at key moments in the descent into conflict in Croatia, including the “Gandhi march”; and for months the Krajina state was his main proposal. ²⁷ It therefore seems highly unlikely that Rašković was co-ordinating with Milošević or following his instructions.

What about other SDS leaders? Opačić and Zelenbaba never seem to have met Milošević. They shared Rašković’s anti-communist stance and in September 1990 left the SDS for Serbia’s main opposition party, the Serbian Renewal Movement (Srpski pokret obnove [SPO]). ²⁸ Babić, meanwhile—testifying against Milošević at the ICTY—explained that they first met in October 1990 (which comments from Rašković support). ²⁹ As we shall see, however, by that point the key elements of the SDS’s programme were already very clear (and their subsequent relationship is thus not of immediate relevance to this investigation).

Reading Rašković

Rašković could expound at great length on every aspect of Serb–Croat relations but was not inclined to draw up concrete proposals, and indeed never issued a comprehensive programmatic document. The SDS’s founding programme mostly spoke generally about democracy, and contained nothing on how the party would respond to Croatian independence, or a confederation. ³⁰ Luda zemlja, an eclectic collection of extracts from speeches, interviews, and articles, published in November 1990, also contains relatively little on such key issues. ³¹

The main challenge in analysing SDS proposals, however, is their apparent ambiguity and inconsistency. Rašković could seemingly contradict himself in the space of sentences. ³² “He says one thing today, but another tomorrow”—one Croatian negotiator complained—one moment seeking “cultural autonomy,” the next opposing it and demanding “territorial autonomy” or to “annex Knin Krajina to Serbia.” ³³ Babić’s former deputy Lazar Macura recalls that Rašković in fact “didn’t have [a] real viewpoint,” it was “just changing depending on the situation”: “One day he said we want . . . cultural autonomy . . . the other day he says we will separate from the Croats, and then he says we will build golden bridges to Zagreb!” ³⁴

There is some truth to these interpretations. Rašković rarely wrote speeches in advance, and reportedly “often” said what would be popular with the crowd, even if he disagreed with it—something of which we can certainly find examples. ³⁵ However, Rašković must be understood as a rhetorician, someone for whom, as he himself said, “metaphors, phrases” were “more important . . . than a real relationship with the truth.” ³⁶ Rašković’s overriding theme was that the demands of the SDS (the Serbs) were entirely legitimate, natural, and justified. Maintaining this required the employment of ambiguous and often confusing terminology, and some quite tortured “verbal acrobatics.” ³⁷ Upon deciphering Rašković’s rhetoric, however, it becomes clear that he did have a coherent programme and, importantly, that this was quite different from that usually attributed to him.

The SDS Programme: Key Elements

Three key elements of the SDS’s programme completely united the party and are fundamental to understanding it: the party insisted that the Serbs in Croatia were a “political nation” with the right to self-determination; it supported the preservation of federal Yugoslavia; and it argued that the existing status of Serbs in Croatia was inadequate.

The first of these was critical. The Serbs in Croatia were not a “national minority” but a “sovereign nation” equal to the Croats, living on “their historic territories” where they had “lived for centuries and before the creation of the state of Croatia.” ³⁸ Countries like France and Italy were “national states of one nation,” but Croatia was bi-national, a “state of Croats and Serbs,” or “Croatian and Serbian territories.” ³⁹ And, as “nations separate, and not states,” then the Serbian nation had the right to self-determination, to independently “determine with whom it will live, in what regime it will live and how it will connect with other nations in Yugoslavia.” ⁴⁰

In the first half of 1990, self-determination was not typically foregrounded, as SDS leaders focused on the party’s more immediate and concrete concerns. (So did the media, which sometimes failed to report Rašković’s more radical ideas.) ⁴¹ As early as February 1990, however, Rašković suggested that Tuđman recognise the Serbs’ right to self-determination up to secession, and he mentioned it several times in May and June, too. ⁴² Opačić and Zelenbaba also talked openly about self-determination in this period. ⁴³ That the Serbs had this right was a view shared by all the leading figures in the SDS, including the prominent Slavonian moderate Vojislav Vukčević, who was forced from the party in spring 1991. ⁴⁴ It underpinned all of the SDS’s actions in 1990.

The second key stance of the SDS was its commitment to federal Yugoslavia, as “the fate of the Serbian people in Croatia depends on democratic federalism.” ⁴⁵ Moderate SDS officials were no less adamant on this point: the “Serbian nation in Croatia will not and cannot renounce . . . federal Yugoslavia” ⁴⁶ —“the only guarantee that we will have all rights in this state.” ⁴⁷ Moreover, the SDS did not support the “loose” Yugoslavia created by its 1974 constitution, ⁴⁸ but a strengthened federation with, for example, the first chamber of the federal parliament being elected directly by citizens on the basis of “one man, one vote.” ⁴⁹ Unsurprisingly, a confederation was, from the start, rejected: ⁵⁰ the SDS, Rašković explained, supported only “a federal Yugoslavia . . . not a Yugoslavia of a confederation and small statelets.” ⁵¹

Finally, the SDS argued that Serbs in Croatia were in an unequal position, subject to cultural assimilation and economic neglect, with equal rights only on paper. ⁵² It was therefore necessary to introduce Serbian rights and Serbian autonomy in Croatia.

Serbian Rights

A key demand of Rašković throughout 1990 was for constitutional recognition of the “sovereignty of the Serbian national being in Croatia.” This was usually couched as simply seeking, in the “Croatian people’s… sovereign state,” “an equal position for the Serbian and other peoples,” ⁵³ or merely recognition of the Serbs’ existence or “national identity.” ⁵⁴ Rašković even suggested that if this was granted, they would “not have any kind of problems” in achieving a “historic compromise of the Croatian and Serbian nations.” ⁵⁵ Indeed, on 10 May Rašković met Tuđman, and this was his only concrete request. ⁵⁶ Babić, Opačić, and Zelenbaba spoke similarly. ⁵⁷ What, however, did this proposal really entail?

Under its then constitution, adopted in 1974, Croatia was defined as the “the national state of the Croatian nation, the state of the Serbian nation in Croatia, and the state of the nationalities which live within her.” ⁵⁸ Rašković’s proposal was slightly different: Croatia should be defined as “the state of the Croatian nation, the Serbian nation in Croatia, and other nations.” ⁵⁹ The subtle but significant change was that Croatia would no longer be the “national state” of the Croatian nation, but the state of each nation equally, reflecting the SDS’s view of Croatia as a fully bi-national state. At the same time, Rašković repeatedly declared his opposition to any “group,” “ethnic,” or “national” sovereignty, arguing instead for “civil sovereignty” and Croatia defined as a state of its citizens, and also claimed to “have nothing against the Croatian nation creating its state and its sovereignty.” ⁶⁰ When he clarified what he meant, Rašković explained that national sovereignty should follow from civic sovereignty, and Croatia could be a sovereign state of the Croatian nation, but of the Serbian nation, too. ⁶¹ He fleshed out this idea in proposals for Croatia’s constitution in December 1990, drafted together with Vukčević, where he suggested that, after the preamble on Croats’ historic right to their state, a section be added talking about the Serbs’ historic rights, including “all rights of a political nation, which belong to them in their entirety.” ⁶²

As Tuđman’s then chief advisor Slaven Letica recalls, this implied the right to self-determination, too. ⁶³ This reveals an essential point: the SDS was not simply seeking symbolic recognition of Serbian equality, but constitutional acknowledgement that Croatia included a Serbian “political nation” ⁶⁴ with the right to self-determination. According to Rašković, he had explicitly formulated this to Tuđman as recognising Croatia as a state of both “Croatian and Serbian territories.” ⁶⁵ He tried to make this more palatable by speaking of the “Serbian national being” rather than the “Serbian nation,” claiming that this was neither “state sovereignty” nor any “duality of sovereignty,” but the essence was the same. ⁶⁶

Rašković, moreover, expected this “sovereignty” to be “[institutionalised] with all the rights which [the] Serbian national being in Croatia has”—“not only through declarations, but through institutions.” ⁶⁷ This meant “the establishment of institutions which would limit any majority or arbitrary will towards minority groups,” ⁶⁸ such as a dual-chamber Sabor, the second chamber being a “Council of Nations” where Serbs could veto decisions affecting them. ⁶⁹ In addition, as Rašković constantly repeated, Serbs throughout Croatia must have their own cultural societies, museums, newspapers, radio, and television; the full right to officially use the Serbian language and Cyrillic script; and Serbian schools with different curricula. ⁷⁰ And, finally, it was also necessary to introduce Serbian autonomy in Croatia—the subject of a great deal of misunderstandings about Rašković’s proposals.

Serbian Autonomy

In the first half of 1990 Rašković regularly disclaimed autonomy of the type of Serbia’s provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina—which Serbian nationalists, including Rašković, had long critiqued—or the creation of a “Serbian state” in Croatia. ⁷¹ This contributed to the impression that he was opposed to more radical ideas. ⁷² However, Rašković and Babić defined their own autonomy proposals as a “modern” autonomy “such as today there is everywhere in the world,” and therefore unlike Serbia’s provinces. ⁷³ Moreover, what Rašković really meant with such statements—and would sometimes add—was that he was opposed to such proposals at that moment in time, in that particular circumstance. ⁷⁴ For example, Rašković told the Croatian weekly Danas in December 1990 that he was “against the formation of a Serbian state in Croatia,” arguing that the autonomy he proposed fell below that level, but simultaneously advocated the formation of such a state in some eventualities. ⁷⁵ These statements were thus principally examples of the “verbal acrobatics” Rašković performed to legitimise SDS demands.

Building Serbian autonomy through the formation of a Serbian region in Croatia was, in fact, a key aim of the SDS from the start. Rašković argued that such a region—the “Krajina”—existed and had its “natural, traditional and ethnic bonds,” and was “only broken up thanks to the leading Croat-centric politics.” ⁷⁶ Under socialism, every municipality belonged to a Community of Municipalities (Zajednica općina), voluntary associations for cooperation on areas of mutual interest. ⁷⁷ The Serb-majority municipalities were all included in Communities based around Croat-majority regional centres, and the SDS programme argued that this regional organisation, and the existing municipal boundaries, divided historic “Krajinas” and did “not correspond with the historic interests of the Serbian people.” The party therefore promised to “strive for an administrative division of Croatia into regions and municipalities which would reflect more appropriately the ethnic structure of the area in which we live.” ⁷⁸

In the spring Rašković repeatedly described how “Serb” territories should be linked into an “integral region,” and the SDS’s electoral goal was to win power in some Serb-majority municipalities and then use them as a base for creating a Serbian region. ⁷⁹ Immediately after the elections, on 21 May, the SDS then decided to form its own Community of Municipalities. ⁸⁰ Initially, this was titled the “Community of Municipalities of North Dalmatia and Lika,” but this limitation was brief and purely tactical. The SDS wanted to form its Community as quickly as possible, by the start of July, ⁸¹ anticipating that the HDZ would soon “change the article [in the constitution] which allows this to happen” and it would be harder to “tear down” the Community if it was already formed. ⁸² By limiting the Community to the areas where the SDS had most influence, it was able to proclaim its formation on 1 July; others were then immediately invited to join. ⁸³ It was always intended, however, and repeatedly publicly stated by Rašković and others, that the Community would unite all “Serb” territories. And as Babić outlined on 23 June, for example, this meant not only the Serb-majority municipalities of the Krajina but also mixed Petrinja and a further five or six municipalities in Slavonia, as well as Serb-inhabited territories in neighbouring Croat-majority municipalities, such as Plaški and Okučani (where initiatives to separate were already under way). ⁸⁴

When first asked to comment on the Community proposal, some local SDS officials initially told journalists that they had not received any official information on it, ⁸⁵ and Gagnon points to this as evidencing “a plan that had come about suddenly and was being imposed from outside.” ⁸⁶ Evidently, not everybody was informed prior to announcements on the implementation of this idea. But this was a reflection of the SDS’s haste, and also typical of the disorganised and top–down way that the party functioned. ⁸⁷ The Community itself was not a source of controversy within the SDS, and was even supported by Milan Đukić, a local official who later led a party of “Tuđman’s Serbs.” ⁸⁸ It was, after all, “one of the most important points” of the party’s programme. ⁸⁹

The SDS envisaged “something similar to a Community of Municipalities,” ⁹⁰ a Community that would have its own regional assembly, ⁹¹ independently decide about questions of economic development, ⁹² and organise the Serbs’ cultural autonomy, such as their schools. ⁹³ A regional bank was also mentioned, ⁹⁴ and “full municipal self-government,” which then included some competencies concerning police and defence. ⁹⁵ From July onwards the SDS also sought a police Secretariat for the Community, a regional unit with authority over other police stations. ⁹⁶ Knin’s warning that it might have to “form an independent organ of internal affairs on the region of the Community” brought into question whether this Secretariat would really remain subordinate to Zagreb, however. ⁹⁷

Rašković argued that a Community was a “condition for modern autonomy” of which there were “hundreds” of cases in Europe. ⁹⁸ He gave the programme a variety of names but usually, rather misleadingly, considered it part of “cultural autonomy,” reasoning that cultural autonomy and this version of territorial autonomy were inseparable: “There cannot be any cultural autonomy without territoriality.” ⁹⁹ Defining “territorial” autonomy as something wider than this, Rašković would then explicitly deny that the SDS was seeking such autonomy and insist that “all that we seek is in the cultural sphere.” ¹⁰⁰ At times Rašković would even claim that this catalogue of rights naturally belonged to people as individuals, and was thus simply a question of “civil rights.” ¹⁰¹ This made for persuasive rhetoric but, understandably, contributed to people’s confusion about the SDS’s actual proposals.

“Territorial Autonomy”

On 20 October, the SDS formally changed its programme: instead of “cultural autonomy” it now sought “territorial autonomy” within Croatia (and Yugoslavia). ¹⁰² Rašković was then fund-raising in North America, and some suggest that Babić radicalised the party in his absence. ¹⁰³ However, not only was Rašković fully on board for this shift, but in many respects it was simply a change in terminology.

As well as advocating the redrawing of municipal and regional boundaries, the SDS’s founding programme had itself argued that “it is necessary to ensure constitutional possibilities to create territorial autonomies within individual federal units should the population . . . so decide in a referendum.” ¹⁰⁴ Rašković took the same position publicly. ¹⁰⁵ The Community was actually in many respects an attempt to build Serbian autonomy by, as Rašković put it, “[taking] advantage of the present Constitution of Croatia, in which the possibility of creating an association of communes has remained as a Communist mistake.” ¹⁰⁶ Constitutional amendments in July 1990 abolishing Communities and downgrading municipal self-management probably partly explain the shift away from this idea, and the SDS’s first detailed outline of Serbian autonomy, authored by Vukčević and issued by the SNV on 24 September, itself envisaged “territorial autonomy.” ¹⁰⁷

Vukčević proposed “autonomous provinces” with their own budgets, statutes, elected assemblies, administrations, and governments, with competencies including local development, education, official languages and scripts, health and social protection, and urbanism. This was similar to the SDS’s idea of the Community, and the proposal also referred to its provinces “as forms of territorial autonomy or as forms of cultural autonomy.” ¹⁰⁸ Like the earlier Community proposal, however, Vukčević’s document does not seem to have been a definitive outline of SDS views. An almost verbatim copy of the status Serbia’s new 1990 constitution gave to Kosovo and Vojvodina, it was evidently shaped by a desire to make a political point: the Serbs in Croatia were seeking no more rights than non-Serbs had in Serbia. ¹⁰⁹ It made no mention of, for example, the police Secretariat that Vukčević himself had previously sought. ¹¹⁰

The Babić-led SNV repeated Vukčević’s proposal in November. ¹¹¹ When Babić proposed a statute for a Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina (Srpska autonomna oblast Krajina [SAOK]) in December, however, he added “the autonomy of judicial and police organs” and revenues directly from the region’s “own taxes and a certain percentage of state taxes”—a more significant escalation. ¹¹² Rašković had recently re-issued Vukčević’s proposals, but he publicly supported SAOK’s statute, including Krajina’s independent police, ¹¹³ and even made some statements suggesting greater autonomy than Babić claimed. ¹¹⁴ He had, after all, consistently noted as an open question whether SDS’s demands would escalate, warning that this would happen if Croatia failed to grant them. ¹¹⁵ In November, Rašković explained the shift in proposals in precisely that manner: he “mentioned cultural autonomy in the phase when he thought that the Croatian state [would] have understanding for the Serbian national being,” that is, would recognise Serbian sovereignty, and advocated “territorial autonomy” when it was clear that such recognition would not be forthcoming. ¹¹⁶

Also, beyond denying comparisons with Kosovo and Vojvodina, Rašković had rarely specified limits to his “autonomy” proposals, which were at least partly tactical. As early as March, Rašković had hinted at some of the competencies sought in December, ¹¹⁷ and on 6 July he described the Community as the basis for “territorial-political” autonomy. ¹¹⁸ On 7 October Rašković then explained that autonomy was never intended as “a final solution,” but only “a transitional form”: “proof that the Serbian nation exists in Croatia and that the Serbian nation has the right to [self-determination].” ¹¹⁹

Precisely how Rašković, Babić, and others really envisaged Serbian autonomy in Croatia is difficult to establish. Contrary to the view that Babić espoused more radical proposals than Rašković, Babić generally kept within the limits of the official programme, which until October meant “cultural autonomy.” He may, of course, have privately influenced the evolution to fuller “territorial autonomy.” ¹²⁰ However, Rašković was always clear that the Serbian nation had the right “to organise itself how it thinks is best for it,” and I suspect that, for him, the precise competencies of autonomy were always up to locals to determine. ¹²¹

Confronting “Reality”

As we have seen, the SDS advocated a wide range of rights for Serbs in Croatia, including forms of territorial autonomy—but also Croatia remaining in a strengthened federal Yugoslavia. From May, however, Croatia was ruled by a party committed to Croatian independence, either fully separate from the rest of Yugoslavia or associated only in a loose “confederation.” The SDS programme adopted on 20 October outlined a clear response to such eventualities: the Serbs had the “inalienable right” to secede from Croatia and “remain . . . in a single state with the majority of the Serbian people.” ¹²² Previously, there had been some ambiguous rhetoric from SDS leaders on these issues. Upon analysis, however, it becomes clear that this was essentially the policy all along.

Rašković’s initial reaction to the election of the HDZ surprised many: he labelled the elections a “plebiscite of the Croat nation” in favour of “Croatia as an independent state in a loose or almost no kind of Yugoslavia,” and “a reality which must be respected.” ¹²³ Taken in isolation, some of Rašković’s statements in May–July 1990—which earned him some favour in Croatia—even seemed to suggest that he accepted this “plebiscitary decision of the Croatian nation,” focusing on his “cultural autonomy” programme regardless. ¹²⁴ However, in this same period—and sometimes in the same speeches and interviews—Rašković also insisted that “regardless of [the HDZ victory], our orientation is still Yugoslavia”—“We will support Yugoslavia, we do not renounce it,” and, on the contrary, he continued to advocate its strengthening. ¹²⁵ The apparent contradiction is explained by the fact that, for Rašković, recognising the “right” of the “Croatian nation . . . to organise the country however it finds appropriate,” and its “right to separate from Yugoslavia,” did not imply any renunciation of his programme, because he simultaneously sought that the Croats recognise “the sovereignty of the Serbian national being,” which included the Serbs’ “plebiscitary right to determine where and with whom they will live.” ¹²⁶ As he said on 1 July, for example,

The Croatian people have voted overwhelmingly for their own sovereign state. We only ask them to recognise our own national identity. But if a confederation is imposed on us . . . the Serbian people in Croatia must have the right to make their own decision as to what state they will live in. ¹²⁷

Moreover, although Rašković emphasised that “we will build Croatia as our homeland together with the Croatian nation,” ¹²⁸ he also maintained that Serbs also had “one wider homeland—Yugoslavia,” and the SDS supported a “united . . . federal Yugoslavia”: ¹²⁹

It is in interest of all of us, and for the fortune of our children that we continue a common life in this our common homeland. But . . . we do not consider only Croatia as our homeland. Serbs also have Yugoslavia as their homeland. If Croatia secedes from Yugoslavia, which the new government in Croatia is wholeheartedly working on, we Serbs in Croatia will not go from Yugoslavia. ¹³⁰

Rašković and other SDS leaders would also sometimes insist they had nothing against a “democratic” Croatia. But this meant a bi-national Croatia that would acknowledge all the Serbs’ rights, from autonomy to self-determination. It was also conflated with Croatia remaining in federal Yugoslavia, apparently on the grounds that a “democratic and free Croatia . . . [could] more decisively, flexibly and practically determine [itself] towards Yugoslavia.” ¹³¹ Thus, as Rašković explained on 29 July, it was “important that [the Croatian state] be democratic and free. The Serbian nation in Croatia will accept and receive such a state as its own”—but if the Croats opted “to live in an independent state, Serbs in Croatia will go to a referendum and decide with whom and how they will live.” ¹³²

This response to a confederation or independence was also mentioned by Rašković in May and June. ¹³³ The most likely outcome was secession from Croatia to “remain” in a reduced Yugoslav state. As Rašković said on 23 June, for example, “if you want your independent state of Croatia, make it—but we Serbs with our ethnic territories will not allow that and will remain further in Yugoslavia.” ¹³⁴ An alternative raised by Opačić and Zelenbaba was the formation of a united Serbian state, that is, a Greater Serbia. ¹³⁵ A possible connection with the Bosnian Serbs was also mentioned, and on 5 September Rašković suggested the formation of an independent Krajina state, which would also include neighbouring Bosnian Krajina. ¹³⁶ By the end of the year, he and Babić were mentioning all three options. ¹³⁷

“Independent Autonomy”

From mid-September onwards Rašković consistently maintained that if it “comes to a confederation,” or independence, the Serbs would form their “new independent state of Krajina,” his main proposal from then on. ¹³⁸ Previously, however, he had been inconsistent on this point, occasionally mentioning proclaiming “territorial” or “political” autonomy. ¹³⁹ Babić made similar statements as late as October—“if Yugoslavia is a confederation, or there is no Yugoslavia, our autonomy is also territorial.” ¹⁴⁰ The “Declaration on the Sovereignty and Autonomy of the Serbian Nation in Croatia” adopted by the SNV on 25 July also said that “political-territorial autonomy” would apply in a confederation (and “cultural autonomy” in a federation). ¹⁴¹

What, however, was meant by this “political” or “territorial” autonomy? Most evidence suggests that this actually meant what Rašković later called “autonomy as an independent agglomerate,” which I term “independent autonomy.” ¹⁴² This meant the formation of an “independent national territory” which would itself determine its connections with Croatia and other republics, and it was thus essentially a byword for self-determination (which was usually referred to in the same breath). ¹⁴³ The main point of the SNV’s “Declaration,” for example, was actually the Serbs’ right to self-determination, ¹⁴⁴ and Opačić explained that it meant that if Croatia went for a “separate state, independent or in a confederal relationship . . . the Serbian nation will be forced to proclaim its political autonomy, with all constitutional rights”—which would then create an “integral Serbian state.” ¹⁴⁵ Babić also mentioned “self-determination to secession” in the event of a confederation, ¹⁴⁶ and clearly believed that “our autonomy is our right to self-determination” and “territorial” autonomy merely a byword for this. ¹⁴⁷

This “independent autonomy” option—a “form of province which will have not only cultural and historical elements but also some territorial dimensions with elements of statehood”—thus seems to have meant secession from Croatia. ¹⁴⁸ As, for example, SDS Sabor deputy and Rašković ally Rade Tanjga said, “We will . . . create our autonomous territory, since we do not want to live in [Croatia].” ¹⁴⁹

The only clear reference I have found to an “independent autonomy” retaining any links with Croatia comes from Rašković’s talks with Tuđman on 23 July, when he asked Tuđman what he thought of the possibility that, if Yugoslavia broke up, Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia unite into one entity and “be independent but somehow part of the Croatian state.” Rašković, however, was clearly attempting to soften Zagreb’s attitude towards his programme, sometimes disingenuously, and even suggested that through an autonomous Krajina Croatia could annex the whole of Bosnia. As it seems unlikely that Rašković supported the creation of a Greater Croatia in the borders of the fascist Independent State of Croatia (1941–1945), it is difficult to take this as a firm indication of his intentions. ¹⁵⁰

A few comments from Rašković in the autumn could suggest that he distinguished between a confederation and independence, or that “territorial” autonomy did not mean full secession, as he repeated the SNV stance of “territorial” autonomy in a confederation but added self-determination in the event of independence. ¹⁵¹ Usually, however, Rašković, Babić, and Opačić equated a confederation and independence (as, in fact, did the authors of the confederal proposal), ¹⁵² treating them as the same option requiring the same response. ¹⁵³ Most of the leaders of the SDS in Slavonia also supported secession in the event of a confederation, ¹⁵⁴ and so did Rašković’s main political associates outside Croatia: Radovan Karadžić and the Bosnian SDS; ¹⁵⁵ the SDS branch that Rašković founded in Serbia; ¹⁵⁶ the SDS’s sister party in Montenegro, the People’s Party (Narodna Stranka) of Novak Kilibarda; ¹⁵⁷ Dobrica Ćosić; ¹⁵⁸ and Serbia’s Democratic Party. ¹⁵⁹

Rašković’s proposal of an independent “Krajina state” also seems genuine. He not only advocated this in considerable detail and with evident passion throughout Yugoslavia and North America but also to Croatian representatives, Milošević, Karadžić, and Ćosić—and this despite the fact that Milošević and Karadžić strongly opposed the idea (and Rašković’s main critics in Knin, Babić’s faction, then favoured “remaining in Yugoslavia”). ¹⁶⁰

Ultimately, we can never know exactly what Rašković thought, and whether an “independent autonomy” retaining links with Croatia was originally one option. Most evidence suggests, however, that, as Rašković said on 10 August, the SDS never had any intention of allowing a confederation to set “borders through the living tissue of the Serbian nation”—the SDS was for a federation, and “whoever wants to secede from it, let them do it without harming us.” ¹⁶¹ The terminology changed, not the content.

Conclusions

Once we cut through the confusing terminology, rhetorical flourishes, and befuddling “verbal acrobatics” that Rašković employed, we can see that his programme was always considerably more radical than that usually attributed to him. Every proposal the SDS made in 1990 was based on the principle that the Serbs in Croatia were a “political nation” with the right to self-determination. If Croatia remained in federal Yugoslavia, this meant that the Serbs could demand a catalogue of different rights, including recognised Serbian “sovereignty,” veto power and cultural autonomy across the republic, and some form of territorial autonomy for “Serbian” regions. In the event of a confederation or Croatian independence, the Serbs could secede from Croatia. Rašković and other SDS officials gradually became more open and explicit about these ideas, but there was no fundamental change in them. Rašković was, moreover, an independent personality, and this core programme appears to have been formed independently of official Belgrade. The interpretation that there was a great distinction between the proposals of Rašković and Babić, or that the actions of Belgrade or the HDZ caused a major shift in SDS proposals, eliminating a “missed opportunity” for peace, is therefore mistaken. It was Jovan Rašković, not Milan Babić or Slobodan Milošević, who founded the territorial and separatist politics of the Serbian Democratic Party in Croatia.