Phobic Discourses of the Far Right: The Case of Volen Siderov

Introduction

An extensive body of literature about far-right leaders ¹ focuses on their discourse and its impact on electoral appeal. The interest in the role, functions, and consequences of far-right discourses also has been prominent in post-communist countries, where several examples of such leaders have populated political arenas. Previous studies ² have explained how the consistency and content of discourse helped these leaders and their parties to gain political representation and achieve a substantial presence in the political arena of their countries. However, much less attention has been paid to the creation of such discourses and the tools employed by political leaders to articulate a discourse with a broad appeal to the electorate. Thus, it is unclear what are the sources that inspire the far right and which are the predominant themes approached by these discoures.

This article seeks to address this gap in the literature and investigates how a far-right political leader builds his discourse. More precisely, it looks at how public anxieties, social prejudices, and fears deeply entrenched in the Bulgarian society were used to gain popularity and make electoral inroads. It scrutinizes specific tropes of phobic discourses this leader has systematically deployed to transform sensible fears into phobias and to pursue tangible political gains by misdirection, systematic fear-mongering, and the presentation of rare incidents as epidemic. It explores the content of these phobic discourses that legitimated his political presence and goals. Indeed, phobic discourses constituted a very dynamic and decisive part of the far-right leader’s political agenda, helping him emerge from political obscurity and win public acclaim.

The case selected for analysis is that of Volen Siderov, the leader of the far-right ATAKA in Bulgaria. This case makes an appropriate subject for our analysis for at least two reasons. First, the Bulgarian political environment is one of the most volatile in Eastern Europe, with a large number of entries and exits in the parliamentary arena that make it difficult for political parties to survive. Formed quite late in the second post-communist decade, ATAKA revolved around its leader, who not only kept it alive but also ensured success for the party in European and national parliamentary elections. Second, Siderov is the founding father of the party and has had an uninterrupted leadership role, with limited contestation within his party. This continuity allows for a straightforward analysis over time of his discourses.

The analysis relies on the qualitative technique of discourse analysis and explores the articulation of Siderov’s phobic discourses in his books as well as in his texts published in the newspaper ATAKA. ATAKA’s manifestos have also been taken into account, since we are dealing with a personality party. The study covers the period between the early 2000s, when Siderov disseminated phobic discourses prior to the formation of ATAKA in 2005, until the decline of ATAKA’s popularity in 2013. My methodological approach is critical discourse analysis, ideal for the investigation of discursive and rhetorical strategies that cultivate and spread phobias. I focus on particular topoi of broader strategies of phobias; a topos is understood as a discursive scheme or formula of argumentation. As will be pointed out, topoi dealing with phobias are implicated in schemes of perceived threats and putative imminent disasters. More specifically, firstly, I will examine the articulation of what we might call “ethnophobia” or, in the context of Bulgaria, “Bulgarophobia” which is characteristic of nativist views that people should live among and be ruled by their own ethnic kind. Within this framework, the topoi of “national treachery and disaster” and of “threatened national identity” will be unfolded. Then, I will discuss “xenophobia,” that is, the flip side of ethnophobia, which I will divide into Islamophobia and Romaphobia—a xenophobic reaction to the ethnic or cultural other, or in the case of Bulgaria, indigenous minorities. With regard to Islamophobia, I will deploy the topoi of the “perpetual cultural confrontation between Christian Bulgaria and Islam” and of “religious terrorism,” while in case of Romaphobia, the topoi of the “demographic explosion of Roma” and of the “bad human capital” will be analysed.

Siderov was not exceptional among European far-right leaders in systematically articulating phobic discourses and availing themselves of entrenched social fears and prejudices. He was a latecomer, who saw the political vacuum at the far-right end of Bulgaria’s political spectrum as a unique opportunity for a political career. He had already witnessed and eventually adopted, for instance, an exclusivist and xenophobic nationalism (e.g., the deprivation of citizenship of the Roma in the Czech Republic) or the perception of minorities as a threat to the nation (e.g., in the Baltic states or in former Yugoslavia) that emerged after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. Discourses investing in phobias similar to those articulated by Siderov had already been disseminated across Europe. To mention just two examples, in Poland, the short-lived League of Polish Families articulated topoi such as the threat to Polish and Roman Catholic identity, the “criminal and conspirator Jew,” and the “privileged and burdensome minorities.” ³ Jobbik in Hungary availed itself of ethno-nationalism and social prejudices against the Jews and the Roma. ⁴ Not only in Eastern Europe but also in Western Europe, the far right has taken advantage of the fear of the other to mobilize electoral support: Rydgren has pointed out topoi such as “immigration is responsible for social unrest and criminality,” monoculturalism, and the “threat of the national identity” ⁵ ; Betz and Meret have highlighted the topos of the “Muslim invasion.” ⁶ Taras has analyzed the discursive usage of Islamophobia in Europe as a threat of Islamification based on the increasing presence of visible symbols of Islam; as an identification of Muslims with an antagonistic, dangerous, or terrorist “other”; as an expression of the unbridgeable civilizational divide reflecting the so-called clash of civilizations thesis; and as a phenomenon of racialization of politics. ⁷

Common far-right themes such as nativism, xenophobia, the preservation of national identity against globalization, anti-Semitism, and the articulation of a romanticized past ⁸ were played upon by Siderov, who adapted them to Bulgarian politics in order to feed a political agenda and occupy the far-right side of the Bulgarian political spectrum. The present research on discourses articulated by the leader of ATAKA supplements earlier studies on the party of ATAKA, such as my own, focusing on its nationalist and anti-European discourses, ⁹ and work by Ghodsee, who has discussed its xenophobic and populist aspects. ¹⁰

Siderov availed himself of the vacuum at the extreme right side of the Bulgarian political spectrum and the fertile ground for the dissemination and proliferation of phobic discourses. Indeed, a series of public opinion surveys show that phobic discourses could find a receptive audience. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Surveys, 83 percent of Bulgarians mistrusted Bulgarian elites, while only 42 percent of Bulgarians (the lowest in former communist countries) agreed that “people are better off in free markets,” a trend manifesting distrust towards economic liberalization, multinational corporations, and globalization. In addition, 63 percent of Bulgarians expressed concerns that “their way of life is being lost” and 69 percent that it “must be protected against foreign influence.” The issue of homosexuality divided Bulgarian society. Such attitudes upheld ethnophobic discourses that the Bulgarian nation is in peril. Pew Global Attitudes Surveys also showed that 56 and 28 percent of Bulgarians were unfavourable towards Roma and ethnic Turks respectively, while a Eurobarometer 2009 survey indicated that 38 percent felt insecure because of the presence of minorities. IMIR/Alpha Research survey of 2005 indicated that 86 percent of Bulgarians believe that “the Roma are irresponsible and lazy”; 87 percent felt that “the Roma are inclined to criminal acts”; and 82 percent that “all Roma are alike.” ¹¹ Also, in a survey held in 2005, 60 percent of Bulgarians believed that “the Turks are religious fanatics.” ¹² A survey conducted by the Agentsiia Mediiana showed that two of three Bulgarians were opposed to the right of minorities to political participation. Therefore, xenophobic discourses had ground to flourish.

The Figure of Volen Siderov

Far-right leaders can be classified into ideologues, who find multi-culturalism abortive and unimaginable, and opportunists, who are seeking political credentials and electoral profits. Siderov clearly belongs to the latter category, as he went through a radical shift in his deeds and views in the space of a decade. At the beginning of the 1990s, he was an atheist; he defended Dogan [the chairman of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS), and was of Turkish origin himself] and Turks and Jews, in general; he praised the USA, NATO, the “New World Order,” and Euro-Atlantic values; he advocated privatization and other neo-liberal positions; and, most importantly, he was sceptical of nationalism. ¹³ By the end of the 1990s, however, he had made a volte-face: he had become an ardent Christian Orthodox; he developed provocative rhetoric against Dogan and the Turks; he incited anti-Semitism; he vehemently criticized global US hegemony and the so-called world conspiracy; he demanded the withdrawal of US military bases and nationalization; and most importantly, he became an advocate of virulent nationalism. ¹⁴

Siderov’s controversial and opportunistic personality is also evident from his partisan itinerary. In 1990, he was a candidate of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) in the first elections after the fall of communism and became editor-in-chief of its official newspaper, Demokratsiia. In 2001, Siderov got involved in Sakskoburggotski’s National Movement of Simeon II (NDSV); he praised the monarchy and Sakskoburggotski himself. However, he was dismissed from the candidate lists of the NDSV after allegations implicated him in the intelligence services of the communist era, the Dŭrzhavna Sigurnost. ¹⁵ Later on, he ran as a candidate mayor of Sofia with pitiful results.

Since the late 1990s, Siderov has begun spreading phobic discourses as an author-publicist, journalist, and TV broadcaster. He became the deputy editor-in-chief of the nationalistic and xenophobic newspaper Monitor, which systematically targeted Roma, Turks, and Jews, while articulating anti-EU, anti-NATO, and anti-US rhetoric as well as narrating world-conspiracy plots. ¹⁶ In the early 2000s, Siderov wrote and published the “Boomerang of Evil” (2002), “Bulgarophobia” (2003), and the “Power of Mammon” (2004), in which he advocated nationalism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and conspiratorial theories. His popularity was catapulted, however, by his SKAT TV programme called “ATAKA” fraught with nationalistic, anti-Turkish, anti-Roma, anti-establishment, and conspiracy rhetoric. Hence, Siderov named the coalition he led in the national elections of 2005 after ATAKA; ironically nevertheless, he opted for the Latin word “attack,” instead of its Bulgarian equivalent, “napadenie.”

The reliance of Siderov on phobic discourses can be explained by demand–supply dialectic ¹⁷ and ethnicization models. Prior to the emergence of ATAKA, even though extremist racism was marginalized and ultra-nationalist organizations were fringe and not represented in Parliament by virtue of the so-called “Bulgarian ethnic model,” there were incidents of hate speech, discrimination and mistreatment, racially motivated violence, campaign expulsions, communal ostracism and mob harassment against Roma, and anti-Semitism. ¹⁸ The press, for example, the newspaper Monitor; TV channels, for example, SKAT; publishing houses, for example, Zharava; and several websites and blogs fiercely advocated ultra-nationalism, xenophobia, and conspiratorial stories. In general, several studies have shown that the media, wittingly or unwittingly, have contributed to essentialization and ethnicization of crime, if committed by Roma. ¹⁹ There was increasing anti-Muslim prejudice occasionally, for example, after the 9/11 events, and allegations of fundamentalist indoctrination of local Muslims. What is more, the Bulgarian society proved to be indifferent or even tolerant of racist extremism, while state authorities showed signs of institutionalized racism. ²⁰ Modernization through globalization as well as the economic and social crisis that marked the transition period made concerns about social status loss, unemployment, and impoverishment thrive. ²¹ The relatively high Roma criminality rates legitimized law-and-order demands and justified fears of falling victim to crimes committed by Roma. ²² The ethnic Turkish party, DPS, joined the coalition governments of Sakskoburggotski and Stanishev (2001–2009) with two and three ministries, respectively, which fostered concerns of infiltration of Turks into power and putative Turkification. All these characteristics of the transition period on the “demand side” were expressed by phobic discourses on the “supply side”; as only a part of it, Siderov’s books, speeches, and articles, are fraught with perceived threats against the ordinary Bulgarian from conspiracies, national apostates, Islam, and Roma.

Ethnicization of politics and identity politics favour phobic discourses. The transition period was marked by a quest for identity and, within this framework, nationalism and Orthodox Christian religion offered tangible solutions. Sentiments of pride and belonging to a collective, sentiments of security in an ever-changing globalized world, a perceived need of defence against threatening imported innovations, adherence to traditional values, nativist views, and ethnic nationalism all may substantiate an acute discursive divide of the universe between “us” and “them” based on ethnic or racial characteristics. Then, in order to keep “us” safe, a thesis of impossible accommodation with “them” within the same social and political environment and, moreover, the rivalry with “them” may resonate fairly well.

Ethnophobia

Ethnophobia, or Bulgarophobia, that is, an irrational fear that the nation is withering away, rests on the individual’s need for belonging, for narcissistically investing in a collective, ²³ and for feeling strong enough to cope with life’s adversities. It underlies an essentializing approach to national identity and it has been developed as a response to critics of far-right parties for being xenophobic. Within the framework of Bulgarian society, ethnophobia implicitly but heavily draws on an indeterminate sentiment of a “parallel loss and displacement”: on the one side, the loss of a mythical homeland, the “Bulgarian way of life,” Bulgarian traditions, Bulgarian identity and the Christian-Orthodox faith, and on the other side, the loss of social status, employment, social security, and welfare provisions. Ethnophobia could be seen as a by-product of the ethnic and tribal nationalism that Siderov espouses, which puts an emphasis on “genuine traditions” and “true, pure identity.” ²⁴ It rests upon a long-standing tradition of national discourses deeply embedded in Bulgarian society, from Marxist nationalism during the communist era to Sakskoburggotski’s “playing of the patriotic card” for legitimacy purposes, ²⁵ and the persistent failure of the Bulgarian state and its institutions to interrogate legacies of ethnic cleansing and abuse in the public domain, ²⁶ which consigned these events to oblivion and gave room for far-right speculation.

Siderov underscored that Bulgarophobia serves the “colonization of Bulgaria” that has been growing since 1997, as Bulgarians since then have been working for multinational corporations and foreign states. As a result, “everything that our fathers and mothers had built with hard work, foreign firms took hold of.” ²⁷ It was claimed that multinational corporations had seized all profitable sectors of the Bulgarian economy and over-speculated at the expense of the Bulgarian people, whose labour and money allegedly subsidized foreign monopolies, as well as the budget and the pension funds of foreign countries. ²⁸ In others words, Bulgarophobia, it was argued, has been invented and unleashed to make Bulgarians servants of the West and of global capital and Bulgaria a mere colony of cheap labour. Hence the core slogan of ATAKA “to take our Bulgaria back” and the derivative reclaiming-the-country metaphor. ²⁹

To achieve these colonizing goals, Bulgarophobic elites were blamed for purposefully denigrating the alleged glory of the Bulgarian nation. This was encapsulated in three theses. Firstly, the Bulgarians were recast as an autochthonous people who had created the most ancient culture and founded the oldest nation-state in Europe, which had not changed its name since the medieval times. ³⁰ Siderov unfolded an idealistic national narrative that Bulgarians have timeless qualities and glory, as they survived against the most adverse conditions under the Ottoman yoke. ³¹ Second, Bulgaria was portrayed as having assumed a civilizing mission to enlighten the Slavs and disseminate Christianity and literature all over Eastern Europe. Siderov stated that “Christian, European Bulgaria delivered the Orthodox lights and literature,” ³² “faith and script to over half of Europe,” ³³ and that “not accidentally, we [Bulgarians] gave both literature and faith to Russia.” ³⁴ Siderov even argued that civilization as we know it was born in the lands of Bulgaria. ³⁵ Third, Bulgaria was understood as the defender of Europe against Islam. Bulgaria was depicted as a timeless bulwark capable of containing the Islamization of Europe and inhibiting the “Turkish invasion of Europe,” that is, blockading the Turkish membership of the EU inter alia, as it did in the past when Bulgaria “stopped the Turkish hordes.” ³⁶ All in all, to keep Bulgaria under the colonial yoke, Bulgarophobic elites, it was argued, falsify Bulgarian history, disregard the Bulgarian people, and most importantly, dismantle Bulgarian identity. In that way, the Bulgarians incrementally lose their loyalty to their country, defy their history and traditions, and have their national identity destroyed.

Islamophobia

Islamophobia, an irrational fear of Islam, captures the cultural and religious other or the “perceived enemy within.” Siderov followed the path already paved by other far-right parties and leaders in Europe and, most importantly, Jörg Haider and the Freedom Party of Austria. ⁶⁰ They embarked on extensive and systematic attacks on multi-culturalism via Islam, and identified Muslims and Islam with terrorism. Others like Haider include Strache, Fortuyn, Wilders, the Swiss People’s Party, the Sweden Democrats, and the Lega Nord. ⁶¹

Islamophobia represents an age-old prejudice toward Islam; it is understood as a “trans-historical clash between Islam and Christianity” and “a modern and secular anti-Islamic discourse and practice . . . intensifying after 9/11.” ⁶² Regardless of whether Islamophobia is at first sight a racism-like ideology that gives specific meaning to Muslims and Islam or a set of modes of operation that sustain this meaning or a set of exclusionary practices that marginalize, prejudice, and discriminate against Muslims and Islam, as a discursive strategy Islamophobia reductively essentializes Muslims and Islam in a way that alleges that all Muslims are identical and Islam is a monolithic and static religious doctrine. ⁶³ Islamophobia is based on the conviction that Europe is in peril because of rising Islamic fundamentalism. It is associated with visible identifiers of Islam (mosques, minarets, burqas, and headscarves) as well as acts of terrorism. ⁶⁴ It is heavily influenced by the neoconservative thesis of the “clash of civilizations” ⁶⁵ which sees Western and Islamic civilizations as totally incompatible and unbridgeable, and in perpetual conflict.

Islam is represented by the ethnic Turks who comprise nearly 9 percent of the total population of Bulgaria and by the Ottoman Empire. The historical narrative of the Bulgarian nation had already constructed overwhelmingly negative images of the Ottomans and Islam. The Ottoman rule was called the Turkish yoke; Bulgarians were depicted as victims of forceful Islamization and ineffable suppression; a “sleeping beauty thesis” and a national awakening myth were systematically developed; uprisings and resistance against the Ottoman rule were ethnicized, highlighted, and overstated; invention of traditions, heroic moments, suffering and sacrifices, such as the haiduks, cell schools and Cape Kaliakra, were engineered; the so-called national liberation movement and national apostles were prioritized; moments of glory and injustice, such as the April Uprising and the San Stefano Treaty, were meticulously narrated; and the national yearning for the liberation of unredeemed lands and brethren projected Turkey as villain and enemy. ⁶⁶ In short, national myth-making and identity-building narratives that presented Turks as ruthless rulers and Islam as a hostile and inhuman religion were deeply entrenched in Bulgarian society. It is needless to say that the events of 9/11 gave further grounds for representations of Islam as militant and fundamentalist.

Romaphobia

Under a set of essentialist reductions and building a specific “regime of truth” in Foucauldian terms, the Roma, almost five percent of the total population, were portrayed as parasitic and as worthless, uncivilized human capital or, to quote Siderov, an “anonymous but privileged” community prone to crime, ⁷⁸ and hence a perceived threat and danger for “ordinary hard-working and civilized Bulgarians.” In tandem with this regime of truth, a systematic argumentation has been articulated that the Bulgarian nation is threatened with being obliterated because of the rapidly procreating Roma population. Siderov, once again, took advantage of discrimination against the Roma in various fields, persistent prejudices against Roma existing in everyday life, and negative images of Roma projected by the media. ⁷⁹ All in all, the Roma were presented as having a low sense of morals, as an extrinsic part of and a burden on Bulgarian society, and as having a “propensity” for crime.

Conclusion

This paper has shown how a far-right leader, Volen Siderov, reproduced and cultivated phobias that the Bulgarian society had already been exposed to and was susceptible to. Not accidentally, the mainstream populist Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), the winner of the last four general elections (between 2009 and 2017), has also adopted an anti-Turkish and anti-Roma stand and developed a nationalist agenda. In addition, after the last general elections, GERB formed a coalition government with the United Patriots alliance, to which ATAKA and Siderov now belong. This is striking evidence that mainstream parties are tempted to adopt popular phobic discourses in order to reclaim voters who have been attracted by far-right parties, or to forge their own electorate. However, by adopting far-right phobic discourses, mainstream parties contribute to the establishment of such phobias as “regimes of truth” that subsequently become difficult to deconstruct or dismantle.

As we have seen, however, it is striking that most often it is not the object of specific phobias or the presence of the unknown and the unfamiliar that make people feel unprotected and displaced, but in fact the discourse of phobia; as research on emotions has demonstrated, individuals who feel threatened are prone to intolerance of difference, stereotyping, and animosity towards outsiders, ⁹² which then render nationalist leaders more acceptable. A diffuse existential anxiety leads to an increased conformity to cultural norms and group identification, ⁹³ that is, ideal far-right fields. Hence, far-right parties in essence capitalize on the gains of a vicious circle entrenched in societies by popular phobic discourses. Phobic discourses fuel already existing sentiments of fear and insecurity, which in turn vindicate far-right concerns, whenever an incident seems to verify fears and anxieties (e.g., a crime committed by a Roma), and all this increases the far-right electorate.

To conclude, the far-right leader, Volen Siderov, owed a lot to the deployment of phobic discourses for his electoral success. He was not unique in capitalizing upon the phobias that have been described in this paper. Not only have far-right parties all over Europe articulated, reproduced, cultivated, overstated, and disseminated phobic discourses comparable or identical to those of Siderov but also media, mainstream parties, mainstream politicians, and academics have proven susceptible to the attraction of phobic discourses and amenable to adopting and adapting them for their own political, electoral, and professional advantage. As a result, as the case of Siderov demonstrates, far-right leaders can develop and take advantage of phobic discourses which are attractive to the mainstream of the political spectrum and, at the same time, are popular in European societies. And this makes phobic discourses a determinant factor in the rise and rise of the far right in Europe.

This article is a contribution to an in-depth investigation and comprehension of phobic discourses conducive to far-right political and electoral success, discussions that are necessary in order to stem the tide of far-right popularity. It sheds light on the discursive themes and tools employed by the far right to gain electoral success and popularity. Nonetheless, these themes and tools are not peculiar to the far right; they can contaminate other sides of the political spectrum and create a grey zone or even a bridge between the far right and mainstream parties. Therefore, systematic research needs to be conducted in two fields: on the one hand, the investigation of far-right phobic discourses in their own political context and, on the other, the exploration of all the social, political, and psychological reasons that make these discourses socially attractive and politically mainstream. A deconstruction of phobic discourses would make European societies more tolerant of diversity and more rationalist in mind.