Abstract
This article belongs to a forthcoming special cluster, “Contention Politics and International Statebuilding in Southeast Europe” guest-edited by Nemanja Džuverovic, Julia Rone and Tom Junes.
This article looks at the impact of one of the recent waves of mobilization in the Republic of Macedonia, the “Citizens for Macedonia” platform, over policy outcomes that originally derived from the movement actors. Furthermore, the text highlights the crucial role of the international community in shaping and implementing the policy outcomes, playing the role of international statebuilders in the process of reintroducing democracy in the captured Macedonian state. The theoretical framework and the literature review present an attempt to bridge contemporary works on social movement studies with those on democratization and international state building. A lot of emphasis is also put on the peculiar political opportunity structure, and the difficult and movement-unfriendly conditions in which the citizens’ platform operated. On the other hand, the article tries to show the gains and losses of a coalition between an established political party, and a loose horizontal network of citizens and citizens’ organizations that advocate for rule of law and protection of human rights. The central conclusions that can be extrapolated from this work are the strong and committed claims by the movement, articulated through various repertoires of action, but also the active role of the international community, which presented a conditio sine qua non, bringing down the regime led by former PM Nikola Gruevski and freeing the state institutions previously occupied by the political parties in power.
Recent happenings in the Republic of Macedonia, especially the revelations of the wiretapped conversations by Zoran Zaev, current Macedonian prime minister (PM), clearly showed that the country has not completed the democratization process and that the central state institutions were usurped by a small clique within the former largest ruling party. This disclosure triggered a fierce citizen reaction that culminated with the creation of the “Citizens for Macedonia” (CfM) platform, a social movement uniting numerous social movement organizations (SMOs) and individuals with different ethnic, confessional, and political backgrounds who put forward a long list of credible claims. Brokered by a joint effort by the EU and the USA, the main political parties agreed upon several issues designed to re-introduce democracy in the deteriorated political and legal system. In the wake of the accusations of widespread corruption, undemocratic governing practices, and a large-scale wire-tapping scandal, 1 a coalition of more than seventy nongovernmental organizations, over fifteen political parties and thousands of unaffiliated citizens formed the movement “Citizens for Macedonia,” 2 asking for the resignation of the Macedonian government led by former PM Nikola Gruevski. As highlighted in the headline of the declaration compiled by the activists, the movement represents a “citizen and non-partisan coalition for reintroducing human dignity and protection of the Macedonian Constitution.” 3 After one of the largest citizens’ protests in recent Macedonian history that took place on 17 May 2015 (the alleged number of protestors in news reports varies from forty thousand to one hundred thousand participants), approximately 2,500 people set up tents in front of the government building, a shantytown lasting almost two months. The camp was dismantled after a political agreement referred to as “The Przhino Agreement” was reached between the four major political parties in Macedonia. The negotiations were brokered by the European Union (EU) and the United States of America. The citizens’ coalition articulated many claims, putting forward a long list of very accurate conditions. Some of the addressed claims were taken into consideration during the negotiation process, while others were completely ignored, even by the political parties that were directly participating in the large citizens’ coalition. The central claims that were deemed as crucial by the coalition members were the following: immediate formation of a caretaking government to ensure the accuracy of the voters’ register, assurances for independence of the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) and neutralizing the strong government influence and control, appointment of an independent public prosecutor, and organization of fully free and democratic elections to reflect the objective political will of the Macedonian citizens. 4
Regarding the policy outputs that resulted from the movement, this work focuses on the adoption and implementation of the new Law on the Special Prosecutor of the Republic of Macedonia (Law on the SPO) as one of the most significant. From the claim put forward by the movement agents until the publication of the final text in the official gazette, all the phases of the process are analyzed. As defined in the central research question, the main focus of the research is directed toward the role of the main social movement actors in the legislative process, but also towards the role of the external actors as far as the moment is concerned. The article delves deeper into institutional and extra-institutional phases of the law-making process, shedding light particularly on the SMOs and other relevant movement and nonmovement actors, aiming to measure their role and influence in the policy-making process. Furthermore, the text looks at the decisive roles of the international actors, especially those of the USA and the EU, in shaping the central policy outcomes initiated by the movement actors.
Theoretical Perspectives Regarding Social Movement Outcomes and International State-Building in the Region
Recent research on social movement outcomes has emphasized the positive sides of reconstructive approaches when one wants to examine the influence of movements that go beyond a quick response. 5 When making a convincing claim regarding the influence of social movements, the researcher has to demonstrate that social movement actors modified the plans and agendas of decision makers; influenced the content of proposals agreed by legislators, members of the executive or administrators; advocated for substantial votes that led to the passage of key policy documents; or affected the speed and the nature of the policy implementation. 6 Amenta suggests analysis of primary documents, contemporary testimonies, news accounts, and memoirs as most reliable data collection tools. 7
In the case studies of social movement research, especially those regarding the political outcomes of movements, one of the most difficult tasks is to measure the impact of the movement while considering all other actors in the political system that are partially involved in the policy cycle itself, or are influencing these processes directly and indirectly from the outside. In brief, measuring the impact of a movement calls for prior detection and impact measurement of all other actors in the system. In the end, what is “left” (“the leftovers”) is assigned to the movements. 8 These scholars have emphasized a positive assessment of challengers on governments, primarily dividing the process of creation of new rules (constitutional amendments, laws, bylaws, etc.) into several phases: agenda setting, legislative content, passage, and implementation. 9 By “putting themselves on the map,” that is, reaching the political agenda, movement actors significantly increase their chances of fulfilling the ultimate goals, 10 which can subsequently lead to an alleviation of the grievances set forward by governmental challengers. Once a certain proposal reaches the policy arena, social movement agents can exert sufficient pressure on legislators or other policy makers to formally support their ideas, which are usually oriented toward gaining collective benefits. 11 When concrete policy outputs are acquired, the process of implementation follows subsequently. 12 This is also where the distinction between “policy outputs” and “policy outcomes” is made. Policy outputs can be defined as the first formal materialization of a political process that later enables policies to be further developed. David Easton defines policy outputs as political decisions formulated by the political institutions and the actors. 13 Alternately, referring to the literature on policy outcomes in social movement studies, I define policy outcomes as the direct effects deriving from previously defined policy outputs that alleviate the grievances put forward by social movement actors. 14
Building on the social movements theory developed in the political science tradition of the West, predominantly in the United States and Western Europe, I highlight different causal factors in the political systems of Southeast Europe that are not present in the West. Apart from approaching the resource mobilization theory (RMT) and the political opportunity structure (POS) as pillars and milestones of social movement research, I focus on the particularities coming from the “other side” of Europe. I argue that the dominant differences relate to the POS, and especially to external factors (e.g., the heavy influence of the US and the EU), and the high political polarization that further complicates the terrain of success for social movements. Ultimately, while bridging social movement studies literature with that of international state-building, this work aims to overthrow an argument by Michael Ignatieff, who openly argues that international state-builders cannot make the state work “in non-liberal societies that are poor, divided on religious or ethnic lines, or lack a substantial state tradition in the first place.” 15 Evidence from this research shows that even in these types of societies, international state-builders can push and succeed for substantial democratization changes, contrary to the wishes and goals of the elites in power.
The central research question addressed here is the extent to which the particular movement contributed toward the adoption of the policy outputs specified in the “Przhino Agreement.” My main argument is that the manner in which social movements in partly free democratic societies reach the policy arena vastly differs from the one found in fully established democracies, having as they do to rely mostly on established political parties in the country, as well as on suggestions provided by international partners such as the United States and the EU. Furthermore, this work shows that although highly visible and influential on the streets, governmental challengers in the region cannot make a strong influence on the political and legal decision-making process, which are dominantly shaped by the international state-builders.
Data Collection and Methodology
In order to analyze the adoption of the policy outputs, I have conducted in-depth interviews, as well as analysis of the documents themselves, together with the minutes from the sessions at which they were formally adopted. The first category of interviewees is the movement activists who took direct part in the protests that channeled the main claims of the governmental challengers. Regarding the sampling, I tended to recruit each interviewee in this category from a different subgroup of the movement: NGO members, political party members, individuals, etc. The participants shared their views regarding the central claims, and to what extent these claims were covered by the final documents. In doing so, they assess the discrepancy between their “wishful thinking” and reality. The second category of interviewees is the SMO representatives, whose organizations participated not only in the protest but also in the framing of the political agreement between the parties. The role of these interviewees was one of the most crucial. They highlighted their role in shaping the political agreement (the “Przhino Agreement”) which was later translated into several laws enacted by Parliament. The SMO representatives covered just one perspective of the narrative. Insights on the policy process from within the institutions were presented by the policy makers, who were in this case members of the Macedonian Parliament. I contacted the biggest four political parties: two in government and two in the opposition (VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, DUI, and DPA). Two of the parties come from the Macedonian ethnic community, while two represent the Albanian minority in the country. Unfortunately, only representatives from the SDSM (the largest party in opposition at the time of protest) were willing to share their views on the process, commenting on the procedures in Parliament, the participation and involvement of the citizens, as well as any obstacles and shortcomings which occurred during the policy process. The last category of interviewees is the key informants. This category is composed of people which have thorough knowledge of the Macedonian context, not only regarding the “Citizens for Macedonia” movement, but also regarding the history of the democratization process in the country, and likewise other factors that contributed toward the initiation of the movement. These people are mainly university professors, journalists, analysts, etc. I would once again like to underpin that among the eleven interviews that provide a substantial part of the basis for this article, none are with members of the VMRO-DPMNE or the former government led by PM Gruevski. They would have been very helpful in addressing the question of why the VMRO-DPMNE ultimately acquiesced to signing of the “Przino Agreement” and paved the way for the creation of the SPO.
For this study, I interviewed three activists, three SMO representatives, four key informants, and only one policy maker. To analyze the interviews, I apply Process Tracing Methodology (PTM) as an overarching method that aims to reconstruct the policy-making process. The main ambition of PTM is to trace causal mechanisms. 16 Glennan defines a causal mechanism as “a complex system, which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts.” 17 On the question of causal mechanisms, Beach and Pedersen attempt to build on the argument by George and Bennett, framing PTM as “attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.” 18
Analyzing the Political and the Legal Process
The demands for justice coming from the CfM movement resonated in the ears of the negotiators, but also in the heads of policymakers in Parliament. Departing solely from the facts, this work turns firstly to the political agreement that aimed to resolve the year-and-a-half-long political crisis, the so-called Przhino Agreement. This document is of utmost importance, mainly because all prospectively enacted laws, including the Law on the SPO, derived directly from its text and further amendments.
Following the series of wiretapped conversations leaked by the opposition in early February 2015, referred to as the “political bombs,” incriminating former Macedonian PM Nikola Gruevski and a plethora of his closest party and state aides, 19 the four main political parties VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity), SDSM (Social Democratic Union of Macedonia), DUI (Democratic Union for Integration), and DPA (Democratic Party of the Albanians) began a process of press conferences, accusations, and legal actions implicating their most renowned political leaders and representatives. Although formally independent from the CfM movement officially launched on 17 May with a grand rally in front of the Macedonian government building, 20 the SDSM, in parallel, took part in the political negotiations fostered by the USA and the EU. 21 The first round of the political negotiations was completed on 2 June 2015 when the parties agreed, formally, at least, to the following: commitment to the Euro-Atlantic processes and democratic principles; overcoming the political crisis; respect for the principle of political accountability; consolidation of economic and democratic developments strengthening inter-ethnic relations, implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), strengthening good neighborly relationships; and establishing a “transitional period” intended to ensure early free and fair elections fully compliant with European standards by the end of April 2016. 22 The transition period foresaw a grand coalition government; the creation of a parliamentary committee for inquiry into the wiretapped conversations; immediate oversight of the functioning of the state intelligence services (UBK); handing of the sensitive material from the wiretapped conversation from SDSM to the public prosecutor; substantial political party negotiations regarding the enabling of structural reforms encompassed by chapters 23 and 24 of the European acquis; the implementation of future recommendations issued by the European Commission (EC) toward bringing forward the High Level Accession Dialogue (HLAD); and a newly composed State Election Commission (SEC) with extended competencies. 23 In this phase, one could not yet envisage clearly the creation of the SPO, since the international community still had faith in the established state prosecution office. The members of the CfM movement platform at that time did not even consider demobilization and removal of the “shantytown encampment” in front of the government building, mainly because previous experiences had taught them they could not have full faith in the political parties—not even in the SDSM, which represented to a certain extent their interests on the green table. 24
In the meantime, a group of senior rule of law experts, led by retired European Commission director Reinhard Priebe, released its Recommendations. The team was previously contracted by the EU to scan and report on the key rule of law issues in Macedonia, primarily taking into consideration the findings deriving from the released wiretapped conversations. The Recommendations highlighted numerous systemic pitfalls, but also presented concrete proposals for rule of law enhancement in the following areas: interception of communications; judiciary and prosecution services; external oversight by independent bodies; elections; and the media. 25 This was seen by many relevant stakeholders as further pressure exerted by the EU over the Macedonian political leadership. In light of the Recommendations released by the Priebe-led group, the EC also released a document underlining the urgent reform priorities for the country related to: Rule of Law and Judiciary; De-politicization of Public Administration; Electoral Reform; Implementation of the Recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry into the events of 24 December 2012 (the so-called Black Monday); and Media: Freedom of Expression. 26 What can be easily noticed is that the international community continuously highlighted the importance of rapid enhancement of rule of law. The political negotiations continued with an Annex to the Agreement signed on 19 June 2015 envisaging urgent negotiations regarding the exact organization of the government responsible for the forthcoming elections. 27 Lastly, after almost two months of extensive negotiations, the party leaders reached a final political agreement on 15 July 2015. The most important agreement provision directly connected to this work is the one noting that “by 15 September 2015, there shall be a new Special Prosecutor with full autonomy to lead the investigations surrounding and arising from the interception of communications. This Special Prosecutor shall be appointed by agreement of the undersigned parties.” 28
The Impact of CfM—Visible in the Streets, Absent in Negotiations and Policy Making
Unpacking the policy process required collecting insights from SMO representatives, policy makers, and key informants in order to shed further light on the mechanisms which contributed to the adoption of the Law on the SPO. Dissonance can be noticed among the SMO representatives regarding the extent of the impact that the activists had on this particular legal act.
29
One of the SMO representatives, who was among the strongest liaisons between the non-party and party challengers, reflected on the limitations within the scope of the parliamentary procedure: [There was a] very small influence [over the enaction of the Law, I.S.]. . . . But this should not surprise us, taking into consideration that the decisions regarding what will be included in the laws were brought in Przhino. Every discussion saying that the SMOs could influence the texts of the laws is pointless. Enaction of laws is a technical issue which enshrines the will coming out of political negotiations between crucial political actors. Whether we like it or not, the largest four political parties in Macedonia represent the vast majority of Macedonian citizens. CfM did not have any channel of communication with these actors, apart from the communication with the SDSM.
30
The interviewee stressed the pivotal role of the political parties, but also recognized their legitimacy deriving from the citizens. This testimony is very much in line with what Burstein and Linton discover regarding the difference in impact of political parties on policy in comparison to SMOs and interest groups, the one of the political parties being incomparably greater. 31 Another point which should also be stressed is the “two-faced, Janus-ian” role of the SDSM, which to a certain extent triggers both the mechanisms of boundary activation 32 and identity shift. 33 SDSM has been an established political party since the beginning of Macedonian political pluralism—a pillar of the CfM movement, but also one of the key negotiating parties during the Przhino negotiations. The very limited and indirect influence that the movement challengers had over the enacted Law on SPO can be to a certain extent explained by the role of broker which the SDSM played during the process. The same interviewee insisted that although the party had been a constitutive part of the CfM platform, it did not formally represent the movement, but only its party base and voters: “We influenced the standpoints of SDSM, but they did not represent us. They did not negotiate on our behalf.” 34 This shows the slightly remote position that the SDSM had in regard to other movement actors during the negotiations and the formalization of the Przhino Agreement in parliament.
In this vein, it is very interesting to glance at the role of the Albanian opposition. As the SDSM was very active in advocating for dramatic legal changes and the introduction of the SPO, similar vibes could not be felt from the DPA campus, although they had been the largest Albanian party in opposition. Existing evidence show that the DPA leader, Menduh Tachi, was instead loyal to the VMRO-DPMNE leadership, thus, remaining deliberately passive durng the “Przhino Agreement.” The DPA remained reserved and silent during the protest, while tacitly supporting the two ruling parties during the Przhino negotiations. One of the indicators, which, to a certain extent, unraveled the unconditioned loyalty of DPA and its leader, was the released wiretapped conversation between Menduh Thaci and the former chief of the secret service and first cousin of former PM Gruevski, Sasho Mijalkov. In the phone conversation released by SDSM, the wider public could hear Thaci saying to Mijalkov that he would be “loyal until his death.” 35 Once again, the narrow business and political interests prevailed over the democratization of Macedonia and protection of human rights of its citizens.
The parliamentary documents, preceding and accompanying the Law, confirm the previously elaborated view by the SMO representative. Throwing a glance at the parliamentary materials, it becomes evident that during the committee sessions, where draft versions of the Law were discussed, no citizens, and neither NGOs nor SMOs, were present. The reports from the legislative committee, as well as those from the committee on the political system and interethnic relations, show that it was only MPs who discussed, voted, and were present for the draft Law on the SPO. 36 Although the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia (RPARM) enables citizens’ participation in the working bodies, 37 the two respective committee sessions, held on 15 September 2015, did not make use of this democratic tool. Furthermore, it must be noted that, according to the parliamentary documents, there is likewise no indication that the participating SMOs in the CfM platform raised any initiative that would result from any citizens’ participation during the work of the two committees. Similar conclusions can be drawn regarding the conduct of the plenary session, which was held on the same day as the committee sessions. 38
One of the policy makers, a former MP from the SDSM who was actively involved in the parliamentary activities connected to the adoption of the Law on the SPO, and other laws deriving from the Przhino Agreement, shared similar views with the ones of the SMO representatives Her responses also confirmed the information gathered from the parliamentary documentation, highlighting strongly the lack of citizen involvement: No, no . . . as far as I know not. There were no representatives neither from the SMOs, nor individuals. Even for us [the MPs, I.S.] there was no sufficient time to discuss. There was a political agreement that there is a crisis in the state which does not do anyone good. There was no larger and broader debate. What was agreed by the leaders in Przhino was later transcribed into the laws.
39
Another important factor that the MP highlights is the dominant role of the political agreement vis-à-vis the role of parliament, transforming the legislator into a “voting/confirmation machine” which failed to fully exert its substantial competences. This once again points to the crucial role of the political leaders and the international community in the process of the creation and fine-tuning of the Law on the SPO.
Nevertheless, there is no clear consensus on the effect and impact of the challengers on the policy outputs, with dissonance coming mainly from the side of the movement’s activists. Apart from the limited influence discussed above, certain SMO representatives value their influence over the legislation as relatively high, while others completely disregard any concrete involvement by the governmental challengers.
One of the interviewed SMO representatives, who also performed the duty of an executive director at an NGO that was highly involved in the movement activities, likes to point to a greater impetus coming from the side of the citizens. Still, he stresses mainly the consultative role that the citizens played in the relationship with the SDSM, when the party shifted both identities and arenas, moving from the streets to the “green table”: During the political negotiations, there were regular consultations between representatives of the SMOs and the political parties. We continuously advised the opposition what they can do, but also, what they shouldn’t do under any means. As SMOs, we played an extremely large part in encouraging the opposition not to break under pressure, that a political agreement must be reached.
40
Furthermore, a point of convergence between the two SMO representatives, who actively participated in the organizational activities of the CfM, is the strong role of the political parties in the political negotiations as well as in the policy process: “I must admit that the crucial role and the powers during the negotiation process were mainly within the political parties. After the political agreement was reached, and after the texts entered parliament, the meetings and consultations were less frequent.” 41
A very distinctive characteristic that must be noted in reference to the lack of citizens’ participation is the velocity by which the Law on SPO was enacted. As mentioned previously, both committee sessions and the plenary session were held on the same day. Additionally, the Law was enacted through an urgent procedure, narrowing the possibilities for any substantial citizens’ involvement. Taking into consideration the RPARM provisions which regulate the modalities of the urgent procedure, it is evident that the Parliament violated the legislative procedure.
42
In the text of the law proposal, the initiators failed to explain and provide any reason why this law should be adopted using an urgent legal procedure.
43
Looking carefully at the provisions of the RPARM, we see that when a certain law is enacted through an urgent procedure, the possibilities for discussion and other types of participation are largely narrowed.
44
These points were highlighted by an interviewee who played a multifaceted role in this project: an SMO representative and a key informant.
45
She was not hiding her disappointment regarding the policy outputs emerging from the Przhino Agreement: Regarding the laws you mentioned, the citizens didn’t influence them at all. Firstly, they were enacted instantly. I can accept that because of the crisis, but when I take a look at the substance of the laws, they are terrible, especially when I look at them as a lawyer. They are extremely restrictive.
46
Failing to see any success in the citizens’ influence over the policy output, she represents the most pessimistic strand of the movement. Furthermore, the judge also contests the legal quality of the Law on the SPO, as well as the other laws that derived from the Przhino agreement, noting her skepticism regarding the fulfillment of its crucial role: restoring basic democratic values and rule of law in Macedonia. These reflections also delve deeper in nuancing the policy outcomes elaborated further in the text.
The Role of the International State Builders—Structuring the Power Order?
Following the adoption of the Law on the SPO in the Macedonian Assembly, the challengers looked forward to its implementation, mainly through the establishment of the new extra-judicial institution and its prospective work. Just in its first six months, the SPO opened 120 criminal cases investigating illegal wiretapping, electoral violations, illegal media financing, embezzlement, tax evasion, money laundering, different forms of corruption, and various forms of malfeasance. 47 On 12 April 2016, at the beginning of its second semester and after two publically launched investigations, 48 Macedonian president Gjorge Ivanov decided to use his constitutional powers to pardon all high political officials and their collaborators who had been indicted by the SPO. 49 The pardon initiated a fierce and immediate reaction from the citizens, who flooded the streets of Skopje—but it also had the effect of diffusing protests throughout the country. What began as bottom-up support for the SPO transformed into a massive multifaceted movement called the “Colorful Revolution.” The name refers not only to the innovative tactic of throwing paint at the state institutions but also to the monuments arising from the controversial “Skopje 2014” construction project, deemed by the governmental challengers as the biggest symbol of “Gruevism.” After more than sixty days of protest and continuous pressure from below, President Ivanov revoked the pardoning acts and the SPO continued launching investigations and indictments. Before further elaborating on the work and results of the SPO, a temporal excursis is needed in order to depict the demise of former PM Gruevski.
Following the signing of the Przhino Agreement and its addendums, the political parties and international mediators agreed that former PM Gruevski should step down one hundred days before the early parliamentary elections.
50
This part of the agreement was fulfilled on 15 January 2016,
51
and it was joyfully received by the governmental challengers, highlighting it as one of the most important gains: When speaking about many issues agreed in Przhino, the citizens really felt like they have won. Here I mainly refer to the agreement regarding the technical (provisional) government, the resignation of former Prime Minister Gruevski and the creation of the Special Prosecution Office.
52
The SPO continued with its intensive work of investigations and indictments. At the moment of this writing, nineteen investigations and several indictments have been opened. 53 Continuous pressure coming from the newly established institution, aimed at deconstructing corruption and re-establishing rule of law and amplified by the strong citizens’ support—as well as internationally imposed pressure over the VMRO-DPMNE—resulted in unfavorable election results for the former ruling party. Although Gruevski’s party managed to secure a narrow victory, 54 it failed to create a ruling coalition and subsequently moved into opposition. 55
The mechanism of international influence was undoubtedly one of the key parts of the puzzle constituting the re-democratization of Macedonian society. In regard to the movement’s participants, the international community was one of the stronger allies, in the sense that a primary goal of both parties was to re-establish rule of law and protection of human rights. The international partners saw credible elections as the best tool to enhance the de-legitimation of the former regime. Equalization of the “field of play” in the wake of the elections was a target they managed to achieve. “The international community interfered and will always intervene in the sense of trying to ‘level the field of play’ regarding the electoral conditions in the country” 56 were the words of one Department of State employee, stressing this important issue.
In regard to the foreign influence over the creation of the SPO, many interlocutors underpinned its utmost importance. Former Macedonian President Branko Crvenkovski stated that the protests raised the alarm for the international community, and it reacted promptly and accordingly.
57
One of the protest organizers also commented that the creation of an independent prosecutor was the ultimate goal of the international community: Irrespectively of the form, whether you call it an SPO, or a newly elected public prosecutor, whoever deals with these issues needs the support of the international community. For the time being, this goal has been fulfilled and today we have public prosecutors dealing with the crimes of politicians. This project has been signed off by all major political actors and strongly supported by the international community. We can see active cases.
58
One of the SDSM’s lawmakers in parliament claims that it is not a secret that this process had been conducted by the four political leaders, but channeled and streamlined by the international community, primarily by the USA and the EU. 59
One of the CSO representatives that leads an organization heavily involved in supporting other CSO initiatives recognized the crucial role of the international community. According to her, the SPO was founded directly on behalf of the international community. It was their envoys who inserted the article that regulates the creation of the SPO, and this is the most important part of the Przhino Agreement. 60
For those closely following the political developments in Macedonia, this active role of the international community is not a novelty. Since the early days of Macedonia’s independence, the international factor has been heavily involved in the key decision-making processes: the facilitation of the Kosovar humanitarian crisis in 1999, the conclusion of the armed conflict and the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) in 2001, the adoption of the constitutional amendments during the same year. All these examples point to the direction that both the USA and the EU have been continuously visible and present in the recent contemporary Macedonian political history.
Concluding Remarks
Reflecting on the previous discussion, we can see that the crucial role in fine-tuning the Prhino Agreement was played by the international community, specifically the representatives from the US and the EU. Although movement actors channeled their claims through a variety of repertoires of actions, materialized on the political opportunity structure and used its opening to reach the policy arena, the final form of the enacted acts was not substantially influenced by the citizens and the SMOs which formed part of the “Citizens for Macedonia” movement. On the other hand, both the international community and the four major political parties in Macedonia were the crucial actors that shaped the political agreement later enshrined in the legal acts. The current political crisis in Macedonia shows that the representatives of the international community in the Balkans, especially the envoys of the United States and the EU, remain extremely influential in tailoring political epilogues on the Balkan Peninsula.
Looking at the adoption of the Law on the SPO, the most credit has to be given to the political parties—especially the largest one coming from the opposition—as well as to the international community, which exerted strong political pressure on the political leaders and state institutions in order to complete the process of legalization. Although the movement’s actors were excluded from the adoption process, their continuous pressure from below on both the political parties and the international community contributed toward the establishment of the SPO. One must also highlight the role of parliament and the numerous procedural breaches of its internal acts, resulting in a lower level of legality for the enacted documents. Furthermore, the largest influence coming from the side of the challengers is evidenced in the effectuation process, where the strong pressure from below managed to create a new wave of protest, pushing for the previously agreed implementation of the Przhino Agreement. The citizens’ energy, combined with the strong diplomatic intervention by the EU and the United States, managed to put the mechanisms of rule of law and protection of human rights back on track in Macedonia.
