Identity Politics or Economics? Explaining Voter Support for Hungary’s Illiberal FIDESZ

Abstract

This article tests cultural and economic explanations of why the longest surviving illiberal government in Central Europe, Hungary’s FIDESZ, has maintained popular support throughout two elections despite dismantling institutional checks and balances. Much of the literature on illiberalism in Central Europe attributes the appeal and successes of these governments to the brand of identity politics and rhetorical vilification of “others” practiced by their leaders. Yet the role of economic growth, a strong determinant of voter behaviour, has received little theoretical attention in accounting for illiberal party support. Using five rounds of European Social Survey data from 2010 to 2018, I show that economic satisfaction rather than a host of cultural factors, notably anti-migrant and anti-European Union attitudes, better predicts support for FIDESZ and satisfaction with government. I examine the implications of these results for understanding and conceptualising voter behaviour under backsliding. Voters may not understand what backsliding is and therefore are unable to penalise it or they may take information about backsliding into account and judge backsliding to be the price of prosperity. These findings and the discussion of voter behaviour raise important questions about the role of economic growth in sustaining illiberalism in Central Europe and other third wave democracies.

Keywords

illiberalism FIDESZ backsliding voter behaviour economic voting

Introduction

Backsliding, a process where executives dismantle institutional checks and balances on their power, present a serious challenge to third wave democracies.¹ The ascension of illiberal governments in Hungary (2010) and Poland (2015) illustrate that backsliding affects democracies that were lauded for their exemplary development of the separation of powers and oversight bodies.² Explaining the success of the illiberal turn in Central Europe (CE), as well as other backsliding democracies, involves not only an analysis of the structural factors that allowed the governments to impose their agendas but an explanation of why voters have supported and re-elected them. Despite overseeing declines in democratic quality, why do voters support and re-elect illiberal governments? As the case of Hungary shows, chosen because it is the longest surviving of Central Europe’s illiberal governments, voter support for illiberal parties rests more on their economic proficiency rather than their nationalist and populist rhetoric.

Voter behaviour in illiberal regimes has received little empirical analysis. The extensive case study literature explaining backsliding in Hungary and Poland, as well as the cases of Turkey and Venezuela, more often addresses structural factors that contributed to the illiberal turn than voter behaviour that can sustain it. Much of this work, assessing how and why governing parties have implemented their illiberal programmes, is descriptive. The success of illiberal parties in structural explanations is defined as the ability of illiberal governments to realise policies that chip away at institutional checks and balances—such as the judiciary and media. Structural factors that increase the probability of backsliding include the government possessing constitution-making majorities in the legislature³ and having leverage over judges when seeking to extend executive control over the judiciary.⁴ However, focusing on such factors alone is analytically insufficient.

What makes backsliding a worrisome issue, in endangering political and civil liberties, is the ability of the illiberal government to survive electoral challenges from political opposition. Backsliding would not necessarily be so troublesome if it were penalised every time at the next election. Therefore, while understanding what makes a country or a party predisposed to backsliding is certainly important, voter support for illiberal parties should form a large component of future backsliding research. If voters are broadly conceived as a guardrail in holding leaders accountable and thereby ultimately sustaining democracy,⁵ then their behaviour is key for any analysis of changes in regime quality.

Hungary’s FIDESZ achieved re-election in both 2014 and 2018 and Poland’s PiS was re-elected in 2019 even as judicial independence, media freedom, and an open civil society waned. Should voters not intuitively penalise such governments and throw them out of office? Using European Social Survey data for Hungary across five rounds from 2010 to 2018, I test competing explanations for why voters support illiberal parties and are satisfied with the government despite implementing illiberal policies. The extant literature on Central Europe shows that, on the one hand, voters in illiberal societies are moulded by exclusionary populist rhetoric directed against the European Union (EU) and migrants—a strategy that falls under what Fukuyama and Kaufmann call identity politics.⁶ On the other, the economic voting literature holds that voters support parties that deliver economic growth and preside over a strong economy.⁷

I show that, in line with the economic voting literature, economic rather than cultural factors are far stronger in predicting support for FIDESZ and satisfaction with government performance. However, it is unclear whether voters consider FIDESZ’s backsliding in evaluating whether to support them or not or understand the process at all. I consider the complexity of establishing a causal relationship between economic growth, tolerance or ignorance of backsliding, and government popularity in the results and discussion section below. The results have worrying implications for the study of democratic consolidation. Once elite preferences shift from liberal democratic loyalty to disloyalty, voters cannot be relied upon to defend liberal democracy.

Voters under Illiberalism

The Post-2010 Illiberal Period

Since its victory in the 2010 parliamentary election, FIDESZ has greatly reshaped Hungarian politics into an illiberal mould. This process is informed and perpetuated by its domineering leader Viktor Orbán for whom the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the policy blunders and scandals of his Socialist predecessors, as well as the onset of the European Migrant Crisis in 2015, form part of a broad “crisis narrative” that he deploys to delegitimate liberal democratic ideas.⁸ The main vehicle through which FIDESZ achieved its reforms has been through its two-thirds, constitution-making supermajority in parliament.⁹ An early example of the reform process took place on July 5, 2010, when the new FIDESZ parliament rescinded a 1995 law that required a four-fifths parliamentary majority to approve any rules for the drafting of a new constitution.¹⁰ Other laws and constitutional amendments to the highest court of review, the Constitutional Court, led to the alteration of the rules on judicial nominations, the selection of the Court’s President, and court stacking—all reforms were aimed at increasing FIDESZ’s control over the legal system.

In April of 2011, a new constitution was passed (coming into effect on January 1, 2012), titled the Fundamental Law of Hungary. The Fundamental Law and the amendments passed by FIDESZ’s supermajority altered Hungarian constitutionalism and served to limit executive constraints by eroding the independence of the judiciary (particularly the Constitutional Court), the willingness of judges to challenge government laws (being FIDESZ appointees), and limiting the scope of judicial review.¹¹ Although sections of the constitution introduced specific limitations on the executive, such as imbuing the Fiscal Council with veto powers on matters concerning the budget, FIDESZ’s supermajority practically insulated itself from those constraints.¹² In addition to the alteration of the constitutional framework of checks and balances, civil society freedoms have diminished throughout FIDESZ’s time in government.¹³ A prominent example was an April 2017 bill that amended the higher education law to restrict the Central European University’s operations in the country, which eventually led to the University moving to Vienna after the government refused to permit its continued operation.¹⁴

The rise of illiberal democracy and populist politics in Central Europe, particularly in Hungary, has elicited a cornucopia of academic work both describing and explaining the processes of backsliding—alternately termed deconsolidation and de-democratisation in this regional literature. Since the election of FIDESZ, Hungary has specifically been targeted as a “worst-case scenario”¹⁵ and having undergone a “democratic U-turn.”¹⁶ The conceptualisation of backsliding, that is, the indicators of negative change in the quality of Central European democracies, is diffuse. Some authors look to institutional changes and focus on, for example, declines in Hungarian judicial independence engendered by constitutional revisions¹⁷ or the gradual concentration of media ownership in allies of the governing party.¹⁸ Others address elites’ stylistic and rhetorical change, broadly defined as being populist, as evidence of their political preferences shifting away from a democracy defined by liberal inclusivity towards insular nationalism.¹⁹

Whether Hungary remains a procedural democracy or has transitioned to electoral autocracy, where voter choice is largely unfree in an environment of electoral manipulation and fraud, has also been the subject of academic debate. An often cited conceptualisation of backsliding holds that the distinction between an electoral democracy (or “defective” democracy as termed by Cassani and Tomini) and an electoral autocracy lies in the presence of political contestation.²⁰ There is certainly a strong case that FIDESZ’s illiberal institutional reforms (i.e., targeting the judiciary and civil society) have increasingly created an uneven electoral playing field that disadvantages the opposition and thereby jeopardises political contestation.²¹ However, electoral monitors like the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have concluded in their reports that the 2014 and 2018 elections were free if not wholly fair. In the aftermath of the 2014 election the OSCE noted that although the election was “efficiently administered” and voters faced a diverse set of candidates, FIDESZ “enjoyed an undue advantage because of restrictive campaign regulations, biased media coverage and campaign activities that blurred the separation between political party and State.”²² Again, following the 2018 election, the OSCE reported that while “fundamental rights and freedoms were respected overall” and the “electoral legal framework form[ed] an adequate basis for democratic elections,” the government used its powers to gain an electoral advantage by restricting information, used state resources and laws to restrict campaign advertising, and fostering media bias.²³ Nonetheless, given the absence of on-the-day electoral tampering, fraud, or threats of violence from the incumbent, the ability of voters to freely choose has persisted and they therefore remain analytically relevant actors.

Cultural and Rhetorical Explanations

A vague causal relationship between identity politics, through the use of exclusionary populist rhetoric, and popular support for these illiberal parties is frequently identified in the Central and Eastern European backsliding literature. That is, the deployment of exclusionary populist rhetoric by illiberal governments entrenches their support. These arguments are informed by the expansive theoretical and empirical literature on the causes of the populist wave in advanced democracies and rising support for populist parties. By populism, I refer to what Norris and Inglehart characterise as “a style of rhetoric . . . claiming legitimate power rests with ‘the people’ not the elites.”²⁴ This idea, particularly among European right-wing populists, is intertwined with nativism and identity politics, which define the “people” as those with common ethnic or cultural characteristics.²⁵ Among the objects of criticism are elite-devised concepts like globalisation, immigration, and European and global integration as well as the transnational bodies that propagate them, such as the EU and United Nations.²⁶

This rise in populist discourse and increasing popularity of populist parties is the product of a complex number of economic and cultural factors.²⁷ Globalisation, in fostering rising inequality and greater economic competition that disadvantages blue-collar workers, has created greater support for such populist narratives.²⁸ The role of economic crises as well as the economic anxieties generated by higher rates of immigration have also undergirded populism. However, they have not been perfect predictors of populist support given that countries greatly affected by the GFC and European debt crisis, such as Ireland and Iceland, have seen little to no populist electoral successes. Instead, as Norris and Inglehart argue, the populist wave is the product of a “cultural backlash” where older voters wish to preserve or restore conservative values (e.g., tradition, family, religion) eroded by postmaterialism (e.g., environmentalism, gender equality, multiculturalism) by electing strong leaders.²⁹ This cosmopolitan-nationalist cleavage is evident in Eastern Europe where ideas such as European integration are deemed a threat to national identity.³⁰

In studies of FIDESZ and Orbán’s rhetoric, the defining of enemies, ranging from refugees to supra-national institutions and individuals such as the European Union and George Soros, is key for cultivating and maintaining popular support.³¹ For example, Sata and Karolewski attributes the continuing process of backsliding in Central Europe to “Caesarean politics”—processes deleterious for the quality of democracy (identified as “patronalism” and “state capture”) are justified with “exclusionary identity politics.”³² According to this explanation, illiberal constitutional changes such as those described above were legitimated using populist discourse that labelled liberals and the liberal democratic project starting in the 1990s as enemies of the Hungarian people.

The antecedents to this illiberal shift and deployment of identity politics began after FIDESZ’s defeat in the 2002 parliamentary election. Alongside its main ally, the Civic Circles Movement, FIDESZ successfully created a civil society movement that mobilised educated, Christian, middle-class conservatives.³³ Greskovits, in his analysis of Civic Circles events during MSZP-SZDSZ incumbency, shows that Civic Circle activism primarily took the form of petitions, open letters, and public statements that invoked issues of identity—Hungarian identity, Christianity, and anti-communism and liberalism.³⁴ Rarely did grievances take socio-economic form. Instead, Christian ideas were frequently invoked by the Civic Circle owing in part to the involvement and patronage of the Church. FIDESZ also shifted its electoral strategy to reflect this new ideological programme by running on a joint list with KDNP (Christian Democratic People’s Party), as FIDESZ’s junior partner, in all subsequent elections.³⁵ Evidence of this close relationship with the Church can be seen when FIDESZ returned to power. In 2013, for instance, the government renewed an agreement with the Vatican made in 1997 (initially intended to provide compensation for Church losses during the communist period) that introduced Bible education into public schools and committed to greater financial support for church services.³⁶

Since 2010, government-aligned media platforms have propagated FIDESZ’s cultural and historical narratives. At the same time, civil society organisations with US–EU links are branded by the media as “foreign agents” and have had severe regulatory restrictions placed on their activities.³⁷ What Bustikova and Guasti term “uncivil society” has amplified the cultural grievances of the 2000s to vilify ethnic minorities, promote anti-abortion and anti-LGBT ideas, and EU secularism and multiculturalism.³⁸ While a concern for Hungarian identity certainly preoccupied the organisers and participants of the Civic Circles and the organisations that perpetuate FIDESZ’s political outlook, it is not clear whether these themes resonate with the broader public.

FIDESZ’s response to the 2015 refugee crisis is the pure distillation of how illiberals and populists use exclusionary politics to legitimate their own rule. The anti-migration discourse from Orbán, blaming migrants for anti-social behaviour such as crime and terrorism, either tapped into the public’s xenophobia or reinforced it.³⁹ Here, Sata and Karolewski point to polls indicating that anti-foreign attitudes rose sharply and that the public supported a plan to build a fence on the southern border where migrants were crossing into Hungary. Waterbanks, in her analysis of FIDESZ’s rhetoric, argues that migration has been constructed to be the opponent in which the government is protecting the Hungarian people.⁴⁰ The question is whether individuals who hold xenophobic or anti-establishment views are more likely to support FIDESZ over other parties. If the power of government rhetoric and its identification of “others” is crucial to its popularity, then this outcome is expected. However, given the regional literature on backsliding has focused on the political and rhetorical strategies of FIDESZ (or PiS in Poland), I explore whether popular support for FIDESZ across time reflects growth in the country’s economic outlook.

Economic Voting Explanations

While voter behaviour is affected by a number of socio-political, cultural, and economic factors, the literature points to the economy as a significant and consistent factor. Differences in the literature arise in two key areas. Firstly, whether voters, when assessing economic conditions, evaluate incumbents’ past or future (predicted) economic performance—termed retrospective versus prospective economic voting. Secondly, how voters evaluate the economic performance of an incumbent. Voters may judge an incumbent’s performance based on how well they themselves or their households are faring financially and will punish the incumbent when their financial conditions deteriorate. This theory of pocketbook voting is contrasted with sociotropic voting, which holds that voters are far more likely to consider the national economic situation when casting their ballots. In the vast majority of studies, voters are found to retrospectively assess the national economic situation.⁴¹ Furthermore, the economic vote is stronger with single-party governments—this is termed the clarity of responsibility hypothesis. Coalitions suffer from “coalition complexity,” which means that it is harder for voters to hold any single party responsible for the success or failure of the economic record.⁴² Economic voting models, regardless of national democratic setting (i.e., transitional or consolidated democracies), reliably predict voter behaviour.⁴³

Although a robust association is found on both the macro-level (between economic performance and vote share) and micro-level (individual perceptions and vote choice), the economic voting mechanism at play is always implied.⁴⁴ Economic voting is theorised to work according to the performance-based mechanism—voters are able to take in economic information, evaluate it, and make a judgement as to whether to support the incumbent or her opponent. However, objective economic performance could have no role in shaping subjective evaluations even though such evaluations affect vote choice; subjective evaluations could instead reflect partisanship.⁴⁵ Becher and Donnelly find evidence in support of the performance-based mechanism—a mediation effect, showing that economic evaluations are the causal link between the objective economy and incumbent vote share, is found.⁴⁶ While voters have biased perceptions, they are significantly responsive to changes in the real economy. In line with past research, while economic growth has a positive effect on both single-party and coalition government vote share—where policy-making power is concentrated versus dispersed—it is often stronger for single-party governments.

There are important antecedent events in Hungarian political history that point to the influence economic changes exert on voter behaviour. Prior to FIDESZ’s 2010 election, the Socialists (MSZP) has governed since assuming power in 2002. Its two terms in government saw a precarious rise in the deficit and national sovereign debt—come 2009, the debt was 75 percent of national GDP. In the 2006 election, the Socialist prime minister Gyurcsány obfuscated Hungary’s economic problems and concealed the need for comprehensive economic reforms from the public—rebuffing FIDESZ’s gloomy economic outlook. While proposed economic reforms were revealed by the Socialists after the election, riots occurred in September after a tape was leaked of Gyurcsány speaking to senior Socialist figures that he had intentionally lied to the public.⁴⁷ Reflecting disagreements about the Socialists’ inadequate economic reform, its coalition partner (Alliance of Free Democrats) left the coalition in 2008. With the onset of the GFC, the already weak Hungarian economy plunged into a deep recession. In October 2008, the IMF, World Bank, and European Union provided a substantial finance package (US$25 billion) to stabilise the economy.

Support for the Socialist government during its time in government was heavily influenced by economic oscillations and political shocks.⁴⁸ Despite the newness of their democracy, Hungarian voters during the Socialist government’s tenure (2002–2010) demonstrated that they were economic voters who were particularly sensitive to changes in unemployment.⁴⁹ Voters, at the beginning of Hungary’s democracy, supported the Socialists even when unemployment rose, because of voter knowledge that they stood for pro-employment policies. However, as more electoral contests occurred and voters observed the Socialists preside over worsening unemployment, voters voted them out of office.⁵⁰ Given the pattern of economic voting since Hungary’s democratisation, it would seem intuitive that voters would be greatly supportive of a party that implemented pro-growth policies and reduced unemployment.

Since FIDESZ assumed office, it has been a shrewd steward of the economy (see Figure 1). The focus on fiscal discipline and growth can be attributed to a desire to correct the financial problems and avoid the scandals of the Socialist period—a critique of the Socialist’s “liberal” economic management and the need for stronger government to avoid catastrophes such as the GFC are themes frequently drawn upon by Orbán is his speeches.⁵¹ Orbán cites the illiberal and undemocratic “star” of China as an example of how liberal democracy was not necessary for the creation of economic growth and prosperity.⁵²

Figure 1.

Hungary’s unemployment rate and GDP per capita, 2005–2019.

From 2010, economic growth has been driven by private consumption and investment growth.⁵³ In the labour market, the unemployment rate has steadily fallen since 2010. In March of 2010, a month before the election, unemployment stood at 11.2 percent. For each subsequent election year, it fell to 7.8 percent in March of 2014 and 3.7 percent in 2018.⁵⁴ Both business and consumer confidence have increased steadily and exceed the OECD average.⁵⁵

Given that the health of the economy, in varying degrees, is central to voter evaluations of the government, how do voters react during periods of economic crisis? Can economic shocks generate a change in voters’ political preferences that amount to a rejection of democratic ideas and facilitate backsliding? At the very least, failures on the part of mainstream parties to manage economic shocks creates high voter discontent that translates into greater populist support and vote share—as evidence from the Eurozone indicates.⁵⁶ Conventional wisdom would hold that in the immediate aftermath of an economic crisis, voters’ redistributive demands would rise and thereby translate into higher support for left parties. As Margalit notes, there remains significant disagreement in the literature about the effects of personal exposure to shocks on individual-level political preferences and voting behaviour.⁵⁷ Personally experiencing economic shocks does have an observable influence on voters’ political attitudes and behaviour. Negative shocks, like job loss, lead to an individual preferring greater wealth distribution and, in some cases, erodes her or his trust in the political system, while positive economic shocks, such as winning the lottery, have the opposite effect—preferring less wealth distribution and increasing political trust.⁵⁸ However, Margalit finds that many other works conclude that such effects are often transient (dissipating over time) and exert less impact on voting choice than on general attitudes and policy preferences.⁵⁹ Moreover, when shocks influence behaviour, there is no consistent attitudinal and electoral response. Voters may support the left, antiestablishment, or populist parties (mainly on the right) or withdraw from the political process entirely—it is not yet clear what explains this variation. The studies reviewed by Margalit are drawn principally from consolidated democracies. For countries experiencing backsliding, does the experience of economic shocks lead to voters privileging economic recovery and growth over the integrity of democratic institutions; would economic shocks shift voter preferences to disregard backsliding if the government presided over growth?

Considering Voter Competencies

In determining whether rhetorical or economic factors better predict support for FIDESZ, there remains the problem of estimating voter knowledge of backsliding and whether or how that affects perceptions of the party and government performance. Voters may or may not understand what backsliding means or, if they do, may not think it is a problem.

Repeated empirical investigation has formed a significant body of literature concluding that voters pay little attention to politics and are largely disinterested in ongoing policy debates. Instead, during elections voters are largely swayed by their feelings towards the economy and the political preferences inherited from their parents.⁶⁰ Converse found that voters “do not have meaningful beliefs, even on issues that have formed the basis for intense political controversy among elites for substantial periods of time.”⁶¹ This assertion was buttressed by the fact that the overwhelming majority of respondents could not express the principal concepts or policy positions espoused by the main political parties, respondents were not ideologically consistent in their responses to related policy questions, and that, across three two-year time periods, respondents were not consistent in their answers to the same questions. Given the flimsiness of public opinion, voters are susceptible to framing and reframing effects, that is, small changes in the presentation of an issue can sometimes lead to great changes in opinion.⁶² A negative implication is that elite rhetoric can manipulate voter preferences for their own ends. This concept lends theoretical credibility to the role elite rhetoric plays in Hungary and other illiberal democracies.

That voters lack basic political knowledge and ideological moorings is rebuffed by the retrospective arguments of V. O. Key.⁶³ Key argues that “voters are not fools” and that their beliefs are shaped by government performance. These ideas were developed in subsequent works concluding that poor political knowledge does not impede voters’ ability to hold elected figures to account since they focus on simple performance indicators and employ heuristics (e.g. “Am I better off now than I was in the past?”).⁶⁴

Testing Cultural and Economic Explanations

I test whether Hungarian voter behaviour is more consistent with cultural or economic explanations outlined above. That is, is voter support for FIDESZ and the government largely contingent on the delivery of positive economic outcomes or exclusionary political rhetoric? As outlined in the literature above, two main hypotheses emerge:

Hypothesis 1: Voters holding cultural attitudes aligned with FIDESZ’s rhetoric are more likely to support FIDESZ.

An observable implication of exclusionary rhetoric determining support for FIDESZ is seeing over time individuals with negative views towards migrants, for example, aligning more closely with FIDESZ. FIDESZ’s emphasis of its unique cultural heritage, evidenced in Viktor Orbán’s references to “Christian democracy,” should result in culturally conservative groups of voters supporting the government.

Hypothesis 2: Voters satisfied with economic performance are more likely to support FIDESZ.

Voters’ subjective economic evaluations are important in determining government support. They ingest economic information, evaluate it, and make a judgement as to whether to support the incumbent or not.⁶⁵ Furthermore, the economic vote will be stronger in the context of a single-party government—with voters attributing positive economic outcomes to FIDESZ and Prime Minister Orbán. According to the theory of economic voting, Hungarians who are happier with the economy will support FIDESZ.

Research Design

To test these two hypotheses, I use Hungarian survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) rounds five through nine, which captures the years between FIDESZ’s election in 2010 and the latest ESS round in 2018 (see Appendix Table 5). The choice of using the ESS data set, in short, was based on its large number of theoretically valid variables, ranging from political opinions to demographic information, in which to test the hypotheses. To predict the correlates of support for FIDESZ and satisfaction with government, I employ logistic and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for each round.

Dependent Variables

I operationalise voter support in two ways—(1) support for FIDESZ and (2) satisfaction with the government. The first dependent variable is measured dichotomously as feeling closer to FIDESZ than any other political party. The second is a continuous variable that gauges satisfaction with government performance on a scale of zero to ten. The two variables are theoretically distinct since voters can be aligned with a party but not satisfied with its performance and vice versa. To disentangle these two theoretical concepts and provide a clearer picture of public political attitudes, I gauge both voters’ relationship with the party, as a distinct political entity, and the government that it leads.

Independent Variables

I include four independent variables from the ESS data set. One independent variable, economic satisfaction, measures economic attitudes.⁶⁶ It is measured from zero (extremely dissatisfied) through ten (extremely satisfied). Three variables gauge cultural attitudes relevant to FIDESZ’s rhetorical strategy—anti-immigrant views, anti-European Union views, and religiosity.⁶⁷ I include the first two given they are highlighted as issues on which European populists mobilise and the regional literature’s identification of FIDESZ’s hostile campaign against migrants and supranational bodies such as the European Union. Religiosity is employed because it has been an issue on which FIDESZ has historically used to gain supporters (particularly through the Civic Circles). Since entering government, FIDESZ has used religious discourse to buttresses a broader rhetorical strategy, embodied in ideas such as “Christian democracy,” with which FIDESZ has sought to legitimate its illiberalism. The religious–secular cleavage—among others such as the political class or nomenklatura cleavage and the urban–rural cleavage—is identified by Körösényi as prominent in Hungarian society.⁶⁸

Anti-immigrant is coded dichotomously where zero is coded as believing that either many, some, or a few migrants can live in Hungary and one that none should enter. Attitudes towards immigration have shaped Hungarian politics since the 2010 election—when the far-right Jobbik party won seats in the parliament. During the European Migration Crisis in 2015, Orbán’s rhetoric took on a nationalist and anti-migrant tone to complement such policies as closing the border and building fences. Anti-European Union views are measured continuously in response to the question asking whether European integration has gone too far—where ten is holding the belief that unification has already gone too far and zero being that unification needs to go further. Religiosity is measured dichotomously—where one is coded as belonging to a religious denomination. Religious individuals have usually gravitated to FIDESZ and its satellite party, KDNP, for their long-term promotion of Hungarian Christian heritage and culture.

As a robustness check, an alternate set of cultural variables are tested—the importance of tradition (one to six), intolerance of LGBT individuals (one to five), and negative evaluations of immigration on the economy (one to ten).⁶⁹ Higher values for each variable denote stronger views. The latter variable gauges the extent to which FIDESZ rhetoric appeals to voters’ economic fears given Hungary has relatively few immigrants.

Control Variables

The following variables have been found in the literature to independently affect party support and satisfaction with government performance. For the logistic regression model, where the dependent variable is feeling closest with FIDESZ, I control for left–right self-placement—zero being on the right, five in the centre, and ten on the left. As in many democracies, long-run forces such as party or ideological identification affect voter behaviour. Anderson et al. argue that in the case of Hungary, voters place themselves along a left–right ideological continuum.⁷⁰

Other demographic factors included in both models are possessing a university degree, living in an urban area, age (and age squared), and gender. I include university, with zero coded as having a high school education and lower and one as having a university degree, as a blunt proxy for political sophistication—the expectation being that university-educated individuals are more likely to be aware of political events such as FIDESZ policies and backsliding than those with a high school diploma or lower. Similarly, the urban variable gauges the nationalist–cosmopolitan divide identified as playing a consistent role in Hungarian politics.⁷¹ In addition, party support may reflect differences in the attitudes held by the more cosmopolitan urbanites (living in a major city or its suburbs is coded as one) and the nationalists living in a small city, town, and country village (coded as zero). The next section details descriptive statistics from the ESS data and the empirical testing of the hypotheses.

Results and Discussion

The descriptive statistics provided by the ESS data show feeling closest to FIDESZ and government satisfaction fell from 2010 to 2014 but subsequently rose. In 2014, only 44 percent of respondents felt closest to FIDESZ and government satisfaction dropped to its lowest at 3.5. However, both would rise to approximately 61 percent and 4.5, respectively, in 2018, indicating both robust FIDESZ support and relative satisfaction with government.

In line with rising economic growth, voters’ economic satisfaction went from 3.1 to 4.7 in this eight-year period. Anti-migrant views remained stable from 2010 to 2014—between 28 and 32 percent expressing that they wanted no migrants to enter Hungary. However, this rose to 48 percent in 2016—coinciding with the European Migration Crisis and the influx of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa—but fell to 43 percent in 2018, indicating around a 10 percent rise in anti-migrant views in the period. Anti–European Union views have remained consistent throughout this period, with responses leaning slightly towards believing that European integration has gone too far (at 5.48 in 2018). The left–right scale is consistent throughout this period—a mean of 4 shows that the population leans right of centre. University attainment did not change much over this period, with around a fifth of the population having a degree. The percentage of those who were religious in 2010 was 59 percent and fell to around half the population in 2012, where it has roughly stayed for the subsequent three rounds. Throughout all rounds, approximately two-thirds of individuals live in urban areas.

Table 1 shows the coefficient estimates for feeling closest to FIDESZ for each of the five rounds of ESS data from 2010 to 2018.⁷² The results are shown as odds ratios, which represents the probability of Y given X, for ease of interpretation.

Table 1

Feeling Closest to FIDESZ Than All Other Parties, 2010–2018

Feel closest to FIDESZ	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Economic	1.091	1.389***	1.582***	2.356***	2.352***
satisfaction	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.22)	(0.19)
Anti-immigrant	0.655 (0.15)	0.999 (0.29)	0.979 (0.25)	1.294 (0.41)	1.176 (0.35)
Religious	1.357 (0.29)	1.526 (0.40)	2.160** (0.53)	1.846* (0.56)	2.230** (0.69)
Anti-EU		0.855** (0.05)	1.031(0.05)	1.094(0.06)	1.248*** (0.08)
Left	0.630*** (0.03)	0.594*** (0.04)	0.737*** (0.04)	0.747*** (0.04)	0.648*** (0.04)
University	0.767(0.19)	0.702(0.21)	0.875(0.24)	0.967(0.34)	0.807(0.33)
Urban	0.631* (0.14)	1.155(0.33)	0.289*** (0.08)	0.695(0.24)	0.513* (0.15)
Age	1.016(0.03)	1.068(0.04)	0.914* (0.04)	1.006(0.05)	1.087(0.05)
Age²	1.000(0.00)	0.999(0.00)	1.001* (0.00)	1.000(0.00)	0.999* (0.00)
Female	1.436(0.28)	1.603(0.40)	1.501(0.34)	1.334(0.39)	1.563(0.44)
N	670	484	565	537	587

Note: Values are odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses.

p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

The results for both models indicate that there is stronger evidence for the economic performance hypothesis (2) than the identity politics hypothesis (1). Fieldwork for ESS round 5 (2010) was undertaken in October to December 2010—six months after the election. The Hungarian economy was still experiencing the deleterious effects of the GFC, and unemployment hovered over 11 percent. As shown in 2010, the effect of a one-unit increase in economic satisfaction on feeling closest to FIDESZ was negligible. By 2014, the odds of supporting FIDESZ was 50 percent higher given an increase in economic satisfaction—in the following two rounds this increased to approximately 130 percent. The positive effect of economic satisfaction on being closest to FIDESZ in all rounds since 2012 is statistically significant.

The only factor between 2014 and 2018, other than economic satisfaction, that is a consistent statistically significant predictor of support for FIDESZ is religiosity. This indicates that FIDESZ has been successful at expanding its base of support to include religious individuals; being religious increased the probability of being closest to FIDESZ by 130 percent in 2018. This has not been matched by those with anti-migrant and EU views. While those with anti-migrant views went from being less likely to support FIDESZ in 2010 to being marginally more likely in 2016 and 2018, the results are statistically insignificant. Similarly, it was only in 2018 that showed a small and statistically significant relationship between anti-EU views and FIDESZ support (the odds increasing by 24 percent with a one-unit increase in anti-EU sentiment). This does indicate some success in FIDESZ appeal and rhetoric given that those with such views were less likely to support FIDESZ in 2012. Likewise, the OLS results in Table 2 show that aside from economic satisfaction, the only other statistically significant variable correlated with government satisfaction is anti-EU attitudes, which effect has been consistently small since 2014. Cumulatively, these results show economic satisfaction and being religious as the strongest drivers of FIDESZ support.

Table 2

Satisfaction with Government, 2010–2018

Government Satisfaction	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Economic satisfaction	0.449*** (0.03)	0.786*** (0.03)	0.822*** (0.02)	0.865*** (0.03)	0.872*** (0.02)
Anti-immigrant	−0.389** (0.14)	−0.135(0.11)	−0.109(0.11)	−0.139(0.11)	0.0534(0.09)
Religious	0.285* (0.13)	0.123(0.09)	0.212* (0.09)	0.260* (0.10)	−0.00313(0.09)
Anti-EU		−0.0159(0.02)	0.0402* (0.02)	0.0365(0.02)	0.0444* (0.02)
Left	−0.423*** (0.03)	−0.291*** (0.03)	−0.173*** (0.02)	−0.174*** (0.03)	−0.159*** (0.02)
University	−0.0605(0.15)	0.177(0.11)	−0.282* (0.12)	−0.173(0.13)	−0.229(0.12)
Urban	−0.430** (0.13)	−0.0796(0.10)	−0.0814(0.10)	−0.0674(0.11)	−0.131(0.09)
Age	0.0369* (0.02)	0.00346(0.02)	−0.0324* (0.02)	−0.0390** (0.01)	−0.00999(0.01)
Age²	−0.000249(0.00)	0.0000675(0.00)	0.000351* (0.00)	0.000401** (0.00)	0.0000830(0.00)
Female	0.0173(0.12)	0.117(0.09)	0.220* (0.09)	0.0737(0.10)	0.0271(0.09)
Constants	3.902*** (0.47)	2.045*** (0.41)	1.650*** (0.42)	1.818*** (0.42)	1.254** (0.44)
R-squared	0.352	0.652	0.649	0.664	0.688
N	1208	1337	1207	1134	1253

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

In Tables 3 and 4, where the alternate set of cultural variables are tested, the findings largely mirror those of Tables 1 and 2. Having more traditional attitudes and being more intolerant of LGBT individuals are not consistent statistically significant predictors of supporting FIDESZ over other parties. In the OLS model, contrary to expectations, these variables are statistically significant at the beginning of FIDESZ’s term but become insignificant in the following ESS rounds. Notably, respondents thinking immigration is detrimental to the economy were more likely to support FIDESZ in 2018—this result may be the product of respondents feeling that the higher growth enjoyed since 2010 may be endangered by immigrants.

Table 3

Feeling Closest to FIDESZ with Alternate Cultural Variables, 2010–2018

Feel closest to FIDESZ	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Economic satisfaction	1.095(0.07)	1.409*** (0.09)	1.561*** (0.11)	2.451*** (0.25)	2.428*** (0.21)
Traditional	1.001(0.09)	1.160(0.13)	1.248(0.15)	1.255(0.17)	0.946(0.12)
LGBTintolerance	1.067(0.09)	0.823(0.09)	0.867(0.09)	0.874(0.11)	0.957(0.12)
Economic immigration	0.919(0.04)	0.963(0.06)	1.051(0.07)	1.118(0.09)	1.215** (0.08)
Urban	0.666(0.15)	1.163(0.32)	0.313*** (0.09)	0.661(0.24)	0.595(0.17)
Left	0.608*** (0.03)	0.609*** (0.03)	0.775*** (0.04)	0.752*** (0.05)	0.668*** (0.03)
University	0.743(0.20)	0.599(0.20)	0.869(0.23)	1.078(0.39)	0.838(0.36)
Age	1.022(0.03)	1.059(0.04)	0.950(0.04)	1.008(0.05)	1.108* (0.05)
Age²	1.000(0.00)	1.000(0.00)	1.001(0.00)	1.000(0.00)	0.999* (0.00)
Female	1.722* (0.37)	1.313(0.32)	1.621* (0.38)	1.145(0.36)	1.536(0.43)
N	585	466	526	507	573

Note: Values are odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses.

p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Table 4

Satisfaction with Government with Alternate Cultural Variables, 2010–2018

Government satisfaction	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Economic satisfaction	0.457*** (0.04)	0.779*** (0.02)	0.815*** (0.03)	0.854*** (0.03)	0.877*** (0.02)
Traditional	0.142** (0.05)	0.0348(0.04)	0.0302(0.04)	0.0651(0.05)	−0.00352(0.04)
LGBT intolerance	0.162** (0.05)	0.00448(0.04)	−0.0282(0.04)	−0.0176(0.04)	−0.0502(0.04)
Economic immigration	−0.141*** (0.03)	−0.0389(0.02)	−0.0410(0.03)	−0.0319(0.03)	0.0334(0.02)
Urban	−0.455*** (0.14)	−0.113(0.10)	−0.0387(0.10)	−0.0668(0.12)	−0.106(0.10)
Left	−0.417*** (0.03)	−0.285*** (0.03)	−0.177*** (0.02)	−0.200*** (0.03)	−0.156*** (0.02)
University	−0.102(0.16)	0.0375(0.11)	−0.315* (0.12)	−0.170(0.14)	−0.240(0.13)
Age	0.0396* (0.02)	0.00338(0.01)	−0.0181(0.02)	−0.0441** (0.01)	−0.00423(0.02)
Age²	−0.000283(0.00)	0.0000785(0.00)	0.000226(0.00)	0.000481*** (0.00)	0.0000198(0.00)
Female	0.0354(0.13)	0.112(0.09)	0.197* (0.10)	0.0531(0.11)	0.0375(0.09)
Constant	3.631*** (0.57)	2.044*** (0.43)	1.780*** (0.53)	2.285*** (0.48)	1.295** (0.48)
R-squared	0.380	0.651	0.626	0.656	0.666
n	1068	1345	1132	1028	1237

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

The results are consistent with the numerous economic voting studies cited in the literature review predicting that voters reward governments—in these models by aligning more closely with FIDESZ and registering satisfaction with government performance—when they perform well economically. This is not to dismiss the sizable literature that shows culture to be a key determinant in populist support and electoral successes throughout Europe and other democracies. The findings merely provide provisional evidence that when populists or illiberal figures govern, voters appear to evaluate them like they would in any other democracy—principally on the economy.

What makes such findings noteworthy is the role economic perceptions play in evaluating political actors and their performance in government despite the presence of backsliding and the accumulation and centralisation of power by the executive. Furthermore, the results suggest that while, as V. O. Key states, voters are not fools, in that they can process economic information and identify political actors that deliver economic goods, it appears that they cannot be relied on to push back against democratic backsliding and defend liberal democracy.

What is not clear is the causal mechanism by which voters disregard or do not respond negatively to backsliding. Several possibilities emerge that merit further examination: (1) Is it that voters understand that backsliding is occurring and decide to accept it for the price of economic stability and growth? This is what I term the Faustian bargain hypothesis. If this is the case, then a decline in economic growth theoretically would lead to voters abandoning FIDESZ and shifting focus onto its illiberal reforms and governance. On the other hand, (2) Are voters’ conception of democracy amorphous, such that the systematic and incremental dismantling of checks and balances does not appear concerning or is not considered important for voters? That is, when exposed to information about liberal backsliding, do voters not see, for example, a decline in judicial independence as inimical to democracy as they understand it? This is the sophistication gap hypothesis. If this is the case, there is a theoretical limit to government backsliding before voters begin to see government activities as threatening democracy. Where intervening in judicial independence might not be understood by voters to be a direct assault on democracy, overt electoral manipulation and interference with and intimidation of the opposition may elicit popular outrage.

Voter opinions and preferences do not form in a vacuum and are subject to exogenous political forces. Why and how voters react to backsliding are often contingent on a range of structural factors. For example, in line with the Faustian bargain hypothesis, would the experience of an economic shock (e.g., GFC) make an individual more likely to accept backsliding in the context of a government delivering growth?⁷³

What has not been estimated in the course of this article, principally because of the lack of available data, is whether government rhetoric and the reframing of certain core ideas about what is legitimate government behaviour and the meaning of democracy makes voters more amenable to, or accepting of, backsliding?⁷⁴ The data provided by the ESS is not suited to testing such complex relationships. There are a number of other factors that certainly affect the dependent variables that cannot be measured here. This includes the repression of civil society activists and declining media freedom (FIDESZ allies have purchased key newspaper, TV, and radio stations over the years), which may influence (i.e., limit) voter exposure to descriptions of backsliding or serve to amplify government reframing narratives. Such strategic obfuscation could make voters less aware of information that would negatively affect their evaluation of FIDESZ and lead to voters’ relying on economic indicators. Other conditions, such as voter polarisation, can make switching to the opposition more difficult for voters even when they object to their preferred party’s activities.⁷⁵ In addition, even if citizens do wish to register their discontent with government activities, they encounter numerous collective action problems that inhibit mass protests from translating into substantive political change.

A dysfunctional and weak opposition, which for Hungary’s opposition parties is caused in part by the incremental strategic manipulation of electoral boundaries and practices by FIDESZ, can also limit voter exposure to information about incumbent backsliding. After FIDESZ’s landslide victory in the 2010 election, the Socialist party and smaller left-liberal parties have exhibited fragmented resistance to FIDESZ. Former prime ministers from the Socialist party, Ferenc Gyurcsány and Gordon Bajnai, splintered and became leaders of the Democratic Coalition and Together 2014, respectively, which caused tension and acrimony between them and the Socialists.⁷⁶ In the 2010–2014 period, inter-opposition squabbling on the left and the inability to reconcile the divergent policy positions among these parties hampered their joint list effort to pushback against FIDESZ at the 2014 election.⁷⁷ In addition, civil society activism was relatively ineffectual For example, while the Hungarian Solidarity Movement mounted a successful and well-attended demonstration event on January 2, 2012, their momentum slowed soon after and their subsequent protests were overshadowed by those supporting FIDESZ and Jobbik.⁷⁸ Again, in the 2019 election, the opposition failed to craft an effective message criticising FIDESZ. The various left-liberal parties competed for leadership of the opposition and resulted in their inability to replicate the 2014 joint list—this would place them at a disadvantage electorally as they would compete with one another in the single-member districts.⁷⁹ What success the opposition has achieved has been limited to spreading awareness of, and spurring efforts to rein in, Hungarian backsliding among members of the European Parliament.⁸⁰

Although the lack of unified leadership and infighting certainly contribute to the opposition’s organisational and electoral impotence, such problems are compounded by FIDESZ’s efforts to create an uneven electoral playfield. As described above, reforms made to the electoral system making it more majoritarian (i.e., increasing the number of single-member districts) and facilitating pro-FIDESZ gerrymandering injured an already fragile effort by the left-liberal opposition to field candidates in 2014.⁸¹ Increasing media capture and the use of state bodies to penalise the opposition, such as the State Audit Office fining Jobbik for violating a law banning billboard owners from offering discounts to political parties, have exacerbated the myriad problems facing the opposition’s ability to mobilise voters against FIDESZ.⁸² While the 2014 and 2018 elections were deemed by the OSCE/ODHIR monitors to be minimally competitive (free but not wholly fair), the further undermining of horizontal accountability and the fact that accountability institutions and the opposition cannot restrain incremental efforts by FIDESZ to manipulate elections on the margins may lead to a situation where voters, at some future election, may no longer be relevant because of the erosion of electoral contestation. Indeed, the COVID-19 virus and the subsequent public health crisis it has engendered has provided the justification for Orbán to exercise even greater control over government and policy through the use of decree powers (formally through “state of medical crisis” powers).⁸³

Conclusion

Illiberalism and government backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe have been explained by the extant literature in terms of identity politics. Hungary’s FIDESZ, Poland’s Law and Justice, as well as a number of other right-wing parties in the region have utilised populist, exclusionary rhetoric vilifying groups such as migrants to marshal support. In Hungary, where FIDESZ has governed for close to ten years, the government’s popularity and re-election despite dismantling and weakening democratic institutions has been attributed to this manipulation of identity politics.⁸⁴ However, FIDESZ’s tenure has occurred alongside an economic recovery that has led to a precipitous rise in economic growth and fall in unemployment.

As voters, in the comparative economic voting literature, are greatly responsive to changes in the economy, estimating the effect of voters’ economic evaluations on government approval fills a key gap in this literature. In analysing the predictors of both supporting FIDESZ over its party rivals and government satisfaction, satisfaction with the economy was strong and consistent. Aside from being religious, anti-migrant and European Union factors were not shown to be statistically significant predictors, which would not be expected if identity politics played a large role in moulding voter behaviour. This finding of course does not dismiss the role identity politics may play in the party’s popularity. What it does emphasise is that economic satisfaction is a principal component.

These findings have implications for future research on illiberalism in Central Europe and other third-wave democracies. Principally, widening the scope of scholarly inquiry to include how changes in the economy may affect how voters react to illiberal governments and backsliding is needed. The unprecedented economic revival of Hungary since FIDESZ assumed power and the concurrent decline in horizontal accountability raise questions about the different forms democracy can take—between a liberal or a procedural democracy—and the crucial role voters play in determining the outcome. The consolidation of democracy, the process where independent liberal institutions are gradually established to constrain executive power and check its abuse, appears in Hungary to be hampered by voters who are either ignorant of executive abuses or unwilling to penalise them because of their economic performance. Future empirical work should grapple with the complex task of carefully exploring how competent voters are in evaluating changes in the quality of democracy and how this can be influenced by government framing and competent stewardship of the economy.

Footnotes

Appendix

Table 5

Descriptive Statistics

Variables	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
2010—ESS 5
Government satisfaction	1,407	4.384	2.545	0	10
Economic satisfaction	1,495	3.161	1.995	0	10
Closest to FIDESZ	722	0.638	0.480	0	1
Left-right scale	1,338	4.017	2.395	0	10
University	1,534	0.168	0.374	0	1
Anti-immigrant views	1,478	0.323	0.467	0	1
Religious	1,526	0.590	0.491	0	1
Urban	1,535	0.318	0.466	0	1
Age	1,535	47.150	18.305	18	92
Female	1,535	0.535	0.498	0	1
Traditional	1,450	4.548	1.330	1	6
LGBT intolerance	1,420	2.687	1.218	1	5
Economic immigration	1,437	6.076	2.320	0	10
2012—ESS 6
Government satisfaction	1,859	3.619	2.651	0	10
Economic satisfaction	1,902	3.349	2.309	0	10
Closest to FIDESZ	553	0.540	0.498	0	1
Left-right scale	1,626	4.605	2.140	0	10
University	1,956	0.189	0.391	0	1
Anti-EU views	1,689	5.119	2.543	0	10
Anti-immigrant views	1,786	0.283	0.450	0	1
Religious	1,907	0.483	0.499	0	1
Urban	1,957	0.292	0.455	0	1
Age	1,959	47.742	17.963	18	91
Female	1,959	0.535	0.498	0	1
Traditional	1,914	4.568	1.210	1	6
LGBT intolerance	1,705	2.845	1.289	1	5
Economic immigration	1,815	5.854	2.387	0	10
2014—ESS 7
Government satisfaction	1,596	3.512	2.462	0	10
Economic satisfaction	1,618	3.789288	2.244	0	10
Closest to FIDESZ	615	0.441	0.496	0	1
Left-right scale	1,383	4.606	2.317	0	10
University	1,651	0.193	0.395	0	1
Anti-EU views	1,442	5.314	2.463	0	10
Anti-immigrant views	1,604	0.334	0.471	0	1
Religious	1,630	0.493	0.500	0	1
Urban	1,655	0.273	0.445	0	1
Age	1,656	48.762	18.330	18	92
Female	1,656	0.533	0.499	0	1
Traditional	1,480	4.546	1.187	1	6
LGBT intolerance	1,526	2.729	1.252	1	5
Economic immigration	1,549	6.392	2.270	0	10
2016—ESS 8
Government satisfaction	1,501	4.581	2.569	0	10
Economic satisfaction	1,509	4.829	2.210	0	10
Closest to FIDESZ	597	0.638	0.480	0	1
Left-right scale	1,294	4.108	2.497	0	10
University	1,573	0.197	0.398	0	1
Anti-EU views	1,415	5.843	2.720	0	10
Anti-immigrant views	1,518	0.482	0.499	0	1
Religious	1,549	0.499	0.500	0	1
Urban	1,578	0.316	0.465	0	1
Age	1,578	49.103	18.210	18	95
Female	1,578	0.528	0.499	0	1
Traditional	1,423	4.698	1.155	1	6
LGBT intolerance	1,449	3.170	1.328	1	5
Economic immigration	1,456	6.947	2.297	0	10
2018—ESS9
Government satisfaction	1,601	4.479	2.740	0	10
Economic satisfaction	1,623	4.715	2.360	0	10
Closest to FIDESZ	647	0.613	0.487	0	1
Left-right scale	1,426	4.632	2.589	0	10
University	1,656	0.149	0.356	0	1
Anti-EU views	1,480	5.488	2.607	0	10
Anti-immigrant views	1,567	0.430	0.495	0	1
Religious	1,624	0.512	0.499	0	1
Urban	1,662	0.268	0.443	0	1
Age	1,663	51.594	17.996	18	90
Female	1,663	0.577	0.494	0	1
Traditional	1,606	4.219	1.187	1	6
LGBT intolerance	1,556	3.155	1.233	1	5
Economic immigration	1,528	6.390	2.272	0	10

Note: ESS weights were used.

ORCID iD

Bermond Scoggins

Notes

Bermond Scoggins is a PhD candidate at the Australian National University. His research concerns the determinants of declines in horizontal accountability across third-wave democracies and voter attitudes to declines in the quality of democracy.