The Ethnopolitical Motivation behind the Formation of New Municipalities in Montenegro

Introduction

The main purpose of this article is to address the question of how the formation of new municipalities in Montenegro is motivated by ethnopolitical considerations. Is the only model of formation of new municipalities along ethnic lines? Is the formation of municipalities closely linked to the stability of the ruling coalition at the state level? Did ethnic decentralization replace national patriotism with ethnic and regional loyalties, and strengthen the ethnic, cultural, and religious identity of Bosniaks and Albanians, thereby undermining efforts to build national unity and identity? Has this process actually increased the internal ethnic distance in Montenegro? These are the fundamental questions that we set out to answer.

As regards methodology, we use a case-study approach, which is the intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units, where the unit connotes a spatially bounded phenomenon observed at a single point in time or over some delimited period of time. ¹ Our research framework primarily involves the parliamentary system of the unitary state of Montenegro, and the three new municipalities formed during this decade, namely, Petnjica, Gusinje, and Tuzi. We choose Montenegro as a postconflict country where ethnic decentralization was meant to reduce ethnic tensions. Being part of the former Yugoslavia, Montenegro was naturally affected by the ethnic conflicts of the period 1991–1995, as Montenegrin soldiers were on active duty in the Yugoslav army fighting in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although there was no war on the territory of Montenegro itself, there were a number of incidents, such as the violent deportations of the Bosniak population from the Bukovica region in Montenegro, ² the persecution of Muslim political leaders, the extradition of Muslims to Bosnian Serb forces, and the opening of the Morinj camp for Croatian prisoners among others. Bosniaks legitimized their aspirations towards the formation of new municipalities along ethnic lines on the narrative of the victim, both in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Montenegro as part of Yugoslavia. The de facto (later also de jure) leader of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was Slobodan Milošević, who is seen as the main actor of the politics of ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs, and whose support was at the same time instrumental to the rise to power in 1989 of the Montenegrin long-time ruling party (until 2020), the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS).

Studying the political dynamics of Montenegro in regard to the development of its organization of local administration is also related to studies of wider ethnic relations in the region, particularly relations between minorities and majorities, whose dividing lines sometimes become blurred (a minority on the local level can be a majority on the state level, while a minority in one entity can be a majority in a neighboring entity, and so on). Montenegro being the smallest post-Yugoslav country (population-wise), it may also serve in many ways as a microcosm for comparison with other countries in the region. Indeed, as only three new municipalities were created, it is easier to study each one in great detail.

This article is divided into five sections. In the first section, we set the theoretical framework regarding decentralization and ethnopolitics. In the second part, we provide a historical overview of the development of the municipal organization in Montenegro. We then proceed to analyze the regional context and the creation of municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), North Macedonia, and Kosovo. Western Balkan countries are closely related and interlinked, and their experiences influence each other in various ways. Hence, developments in Montenegro are more easily understood if put into their regional context. Furthermore, most of the ethnic groups that are major players in the neighboring countries are also influential in Montenegro itself. After focusing on the post-communist experience of the creation of new municipalities in Montenegro in the main, fourth section, and then dealing with Serbian–Montenegrin relations, we offer some concluding remarks.

Theoretical framework

Even though ethnicity is an elusive concept with different connotations across countries and in different regions of the world, it is important to understand that ethnic fractionalization leads to ethnic favoritism, ³ which is the main reason for ethnic decentralization. Ethnically motivated decentralization could produce different effects. Some scholars argue that it could reduce potential ethnic conflicts ⁴ and secessionism, ⁵ by bringing government closer to people and giving groups control over their political, social, and economic affairs, ⁶ while others argue that this process could represent a potential threat to national unity. ⁷

According to Brancati, decentralized systems of government are less likely to experience intercommunal conflict and antiregime rebellion than centralized systems of government. ⁸ Tranchant claims that ethnic decentralization is supposed to increase the well-being of minority groups and dampen strife by giving groups control over their own affairs and by insulating minorities from predatory politics from the center. ⁹ Lapidoth argues that institutional arrangements through various techniques and approaches including affirmative action, multicultural liberalism, autonomy, federalism, and power sharing could satisfy demands by whatever regional, ethnic, religious, or other groups with secession potential. ¹⁰ Further, Sambanis claims that if ethnic groups divide into ethnic homogeneous territorial units, the risk of ethnic conflict declines. ¹¹

By contrast, scholars such as Roeder argue that decentralization supports an inherent incompatibility through the maintenance of a sovereign central state together with the autonomous claims of ethnic groups—creating a vulnerable equilibrium which has implications for potential disintegration of a nation-state. ¹² Following the same line of thought, Cornell claims that decentralization establishes the capacity for ethnic groups to challenge the central state’s authority through subnational political institutions. ¹³ Treisman also argues that decentralization can satisfy limited demands for autonomy, but the problem is that the demands of ethnic minorities may not be limited, so they secretly commit to secession, while on the other hand ethnic decentralization replaces national patriotism with ethnic and regional loyalties. ¹⁴ Cheema and Rondinelli notice that governments were pressured to decentralize by political, ethnic, religious, and cultural groups seeking greater autonomy in decision making and stronger control over national resources. ¹⁵ The explicit goals of local territorial reform or organization and the number of municipalities are contained in official regulations or laws, but the implicit goals represent the aspirations of political parties or population groups toward gaining a political advantage from the territorial configuration. ¹⁶ The creation of municipalities can allow a group that is a minority at the state level but constitute a majority locally to exercise governmental power in ways that would otherwise be foreclosed if the whole country was one undifferentiated territory. ¹⁷

It seems that in post-communist democracies, it is not possible to underestimate negative arguments on ethnic decentralization such as (1) encouraging the promotion of ethnic, regional, and communal identities that lead to separatist mobilization; (2) generating conflict by working against the entrenchment of democratic values; and (3) providing a sphere for domination of minority groups by majority groups at the local level. ¹⁸ Decentralization could build a federalist mentality, undermining efforts to build national unity and identity. It may even deepen divides between groups and intensify conflict by reinforcing cultural or ethnic identities, ¹⁹ by giving them a sense of legitimacy ²⁰ and may lead fractious groups to want ever more autonomy. ²¹ After the fall of communism, ethnicity became the emerging political category in the countries that were part of the former Yugoslavia. At the top of the national minorities’ political agenda was the struggle for the adoption of minority rights, for political autonomy, and for the economic development of regions with a dominant minority population. ²² Snyder claims that ethnic decentralization has a terrible record, referring precisely to the violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. ²³ In that sense, there is a space for a contribution to the literature about local decentralization in Montenegro, as this is a newly established trend in this country. Contrary to other parts of former Yugoslavia, decentralization in Montenegro is not a direct product of civil war or ethnic cleansing, but a consequence of the war in Yugoslavia, of which Montenegro was a part, as well as of ethnic tensions and violent deportations on Montenegrin territory, as a reflection of the war in Yugoslavia. We argue that the less developed Montenegrin (state) identity is, the more likely it is that creating ethnic municipalities could produce ethnic distance and conflict, especially in such a post-communist state with a lack of democratic tradition.

Historical Overview

The historical development of the organization of the local government in Montenegro has been complex. The first form of decentralization is found in the kapetanijas (numbering forty) during the reign of Prince-Bishop Petar II Petrović Njegoš (1830–1851). They were headed by “captains” who carried out judicial, military, and administrative functions. ²⁴ In order to strengthen the military-administrative division of the country, Prince Danilo (1852–1860) divided the kapetanijas, which coincided with the territory of Montenegrin tribes, ²⁵ into small administrative units—hundreds, and further into dozens. The territorial expansion after the Berlin Congress in 1878, when Montenegro received international recognition, led to a new administrative-territorial division of the country. Montenegro was divided into ten nahijas, as the highest administrative units, and nahijas were divided into kapetanijas. Further on, in 1903, the country was divided into five regions that consisted of fifty-six kapetanijas and six borough municipalities. ²⁶ In 1918, Montenegro was forcefully and illegally annexed to the Kingdom of Serbia, losing its international subjectivity. ²⁷

The constitution of the newly founded Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes of 1921 envisaged a territorial division of the country into counties, districts, and municipalities, ²⁸ and in 1922 the government divided the country into thirty-three regions. The whole territory of Montenegro (without Pljevlja and Bijelo Polje) was one of them. In 1929, the territory of the country was divided into new administrative areas, namely, nine banovinas (provinces), including Zeta Banovina with headquarters in Cetinje, covering the territory of Montenegro with parts of Dalmatia, Metohija, Herzegovina, Bosnia, and Sandžak. After World War II, the territory of Montenegro (as a federal unit of Yugoslavia) was divided by the new communist authorities into three cities (Podgorica, Nikšić, and Cetinje), seventeen districts, and 294 local national committees that were part of the counties/cities. ²⁹

As can be seen, the territorial organization of local units in Montenegro started fairly late (in the mid-nineteenth century) because of the permanent struggle for independence, combined with the overall underdevelopment of the country. However, whichever system of government existed, and regardless of the changing size of the Montenegrin territory, there was no territorial organization that followed ethnic lines between the mid-nineteenth and the late twentieth century. In the early stages, there were no minorities, and later, although the population grew more heterogeneous with the acquirement of new territories, the tendency was to recognize those minorities only as religious, not ethno-national, ones—our brothers of the Mohammedan/Catholic faith. ³⁰ Under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the same trend of recognition of only religious, not national, differences continued, and in the early stages of communist rule the emphasis was put on class, not national, divisions. Thus, following the official ideology at the time, on the first postwar census in 1948, a huge majority of the population declared themselves as Montenegrins (90.7 percent). ³¹ Only gradually did the national dimension in Yugoslav politics resurge in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Maspok/Croatian spring, Cestna afera in Slovenia, Serbian liberals, recognition of Muslims as a nation, etc ³² ). However, while the resurgence of the national dimension in politics had consequences in Montenegro—clearly pointing to the need for further autonomy vis-à-vis central government with the foundation of some national institutions (such as a university, the Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts, and a television station)—it did not affect in any way the organization of local administrative units, which remained unchanged between the late 1950s and the end of the communist regime.

The supporters of the establishment of new municipalities extract from the law adopted in 1952 ³³ the right for their areas to gain municipality status. According to this law, the territory of Montenegro was divided into ten districts and the district level City of Titograd (former name of Podgorica), eighty-four municipalities, and nine city municipalities. Among these eighty-four municipalities were also the three youngest municipalities today: Petnjica, Gusinje, and Tuzi. Municipalities as a form of territorial organization in Montenegro are for the first time mentioned in this law in the post–World War II period, which however does not mean that municipalities then were similar to today’s municipalities. Those former municipalities had many more similarities with the local committees (numbering 137 just one year earlier) that were discontinued by this law. Supporters of the idea of restoring municipality status to Petnjica, Gusinje, and Tuzi declared that the right to a municipality is an acquired right (by the Law of 1952) which was unfairly taken from them. If this principle was followed through, and municipality status was returned to all those that had it in 1952, there would be more municipalities in Montenegro than in some considerably larger and more populous countries. Thus, the loss of municipality status (which affected not only Petnjica, Gusinje, and Tuzi but also a large number of other towns and villages) was just a result of further reform of the territorial organization of the country in 1957, which reduced the number of municipalities to twenty. ³⁴ This number would remain unchanged until 1991, when Andrijevica became the twenty-first municipality in Montenegro, by the separation of part of the territory of the Ivangrad municipality.

For the next twenty-two years, the number of municipalities did not change, although there was no lack of initiatives in that direction. Particularly persistent were initiatives in Petnjica, organized in 1991, 1998, 2002, and 2005. ³⁵ In Gusinje, a new political party, the Party for Gusinje, was formed in 2007 and a diaspora organization in New York, the Gusinje Foundation, in 2006. There were no discussions about the integration of municipalities, which would be a more rational process; instead, new municipalities were created by separation from existing ones. In contrast to developments in Montenegro, in neighboring Croatia, for example, proposals to rationalize the number of municipalities have become more frequent nowadays, and they even go as far as to reducing four-fifths of existing municipalities. ³⁶ Koprić claims that the existing territorial organization of the Republic of Croatia is a limiting factor for changing the management model. It is, he argues, expensive and inefficient, so the number of municipalities should be reduced to 100. ³⁷ Public opinion in Croatia shares the same views, so 81.9 percent of citizens believe that the number of municipalities should be reduced. ³⁸ It remains to be seen whether Croatia will reform its local administration, which in turn may influence Montenegrin lawmakers.

The flexible interpretation of the law about the results (economic, demographic, physical) that can be achieved by forming new municipalities, as well as the fiscal capacities of areas that require territorial changes, opened a countertrend, namely, the creation of new municipalities with questionable economic viability and dependent on the state government. Besides, those new municipalities do not even provide certain crucial institutions (health centers, hospitals, schools, universities, etc.), which in fact each local unit is under an obligation to provide. ³⁹ The motive for the creation of new municipalities is what we deal with in this article: the creation of municipalities along ethnic lines. This process, followed by political trading, generates a model for the future, which may have wider consequences for the state and for society that go far beyond administrative matters.

Regional Context: Creation of New Municipalities in Neighboring Countries

Like all other countries from the former Yugoslavia, Montenegro has maintained the municipality as the basic administrative unit. However, among these new states Montenegro is the only one where the number of municipalities did not change drastically during the last quarter of the twentieth century. Thus, unlike Slovenia, where the number rose from 60 in 1990 to 212 in 2017, or Croatia, where the number rose from 100 (plus the City of Zagreb) in 1991 to 555 basic units (municipalities and towns) in 2010, ⁴⁰ or North Macedonia, where from 32 the number of municipalities almost quadrupled to 123 (before falling slightly to 80 after the 2013 reforms), in Montenegro the number only rose from 20 to 21. This does not mean that there were no movements calling for new municipalities, like in Zeta/Golubovci, Tuzi, Petnjica, Gusinje, Nikšićka Župa, Grbalj, Petrovac, Sutomore, etc. The very complex situation in Montenegro in the years following the collapse of Yugoslavia and preceding the independence referendum in 2006 may be the most important reason why none of these initiatives was accepted or even seriously discussed on higher levels of decision making. In most cases, the formation of new municipalities in other countries was not motivated by ethnic or political considerations, but by functional or technical ones. While there are municipalities in Serbia, Slovenia, or Croatia where certain minority rights are implemented (first of all, the use of a minority language, an issue that caused particular tensions in Croatia ⁴¹ ), there was no “gerrymandering” of municipality borders in order to form ethnically homogeneous local units. In these three countries, however (and all three witnessed, and to some extent still witness, ethnic tensions), the situation in regard to ethnopolitical divisions is different. We should say here that there are good reasons for emphasizing the regional context. First of all, as a small country, Montenegro has always had a need to learn from the experience of others. Thus, political, and particularly legislative, solutions in Slovenia (as the most developed and most “European” South Slavic nation, EU member since 2004), Serbia (as its closest, largest, and most influential neighbor), and Croatia (the second largest of ex-Yugoslav countries, also seen as more Western and more developed) are usually given close attention, if not altogether incorporated almost ad litteram into the Montenegrin political and legal system. Secondly, there is a large presence of Serbs, Bosniaks, and Albanians in Montenegro, thus making Serbia, BiH, and Kosovo (and Albania) naturally involved in issues regarding the status of these ethnic groups in Montenegro. Finally, owing to the linguistic similarities and to many relations that survived the Yugoslav era, Montenegro is seen as part of “a system of communicating vessels,” that is, certain major changes or innovations in legislation (or events in politics or society, for that matter) in Croatia or North Macedonia, for example, would usually have some bearing on Montenegro in one way or another.

In North Macedonia, the ethnic and political dimension of the creation of new municipalities and border changes came to the forefront of its politics with the first postindependence reform of 1996 and has remained there ever since. ⁴² When the Law on the Territorial Organization of the Republic of Macedonia was adopted in 1996, ⁴³ the first cases of ethnopolitical influences became apparent. For example, new municipalities such as Plasnica and Centar Župa were carved out of villages from former, larger municipalities in order to form municipalities with a large Turkish majority. Redistricting municipal boundaries in 1996 was seen, in the eyes of the Albanians, as a way to break up local Albanian majorities within municipalities, with a view to opposing possible demands for autonomy. ⁴⁴ A new law, adopted in 2004, ⁴⁵ aroused even more controversy. This time, new municipalities were not formed, but there were significant changes regarding the boundaries of the existing ones, and some municipalities were incorporated into larger ones, thereby in some cases significantly changing their ethnic, religious, and linguistic structure. In thirteen cases where ethnicity seemed to be the sole factor influencing the decision on municipal boundaries, there was a failure to meet the criteria of municipal unit set by the Law on Decentralization itself, namely, that a municipality should have more than five thousand inhabitants in order to secure sufficient economic, financial, and human resources to fulfil its new competencies. ⁴⁶ This reform resulted in protests mostly by the Macedonian population, which was concerned about being marginalized in Albanian-dominated municipalities, ⁴⁷ and eventually led to the failed referendum of 7 November 2004 when a majority supported overruling the new law; the turnout, however, was not sufficient. As decentralization in North Macedonia is based precisely on ethnicity, it is clear that its effect is weak and does not contribute to stability. ⁴⁸ The ethnification of the territorial reorganization in 2004 meant that for many, decentralization had become more about accommodating local group cleavages than promoting integration within the unitary state. ⁴⁹

Kosovo, a former province of Serbia, unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008; its independence is now recognized by just over half of all UN member states. In Kosovo, unlike in North Macedonia, one nation (namely Albanians) is largely in the majority (92.9 percent, although most Serbs boycotted the census in 2011 ⁵⁰ ), there are (at least) seven other nations mentioned in the constitution, five of which are represented on the national flag and coat of arms. The number of municipalities did not change significantly after 1990, but major changes were made after Kosovo stopped being under Serbian rule. Like in North Macedonia, some of the municipalities were formed on ethnic lines, and some of the boundary changes were also made in this way. In 2008, Mamusha became a new municipality, by far the smallest in Kosovo, and the only municipality in the country with a Turkish majority. On the other hand, the Dragaš municipality was formed, incorporating the Gora municipality and part of the Prizren municipality, thus including the only municipality with a Gorani majority (Gora) into a new municipality with an Albanian majority. ⁵¹ Also, after the proclamation of independence of Kosovo (not recognized by Serbia), new municipalities were formed out of Serbian villages in some Albanian-majority municipalities—Parteš, Ranilug, Klokot, and Gračanica, and the Serb-populated northern part of the city of Mitrovica was separated from the Mitrovica municipality to form North Mitrovica. ⁵² Even though the Serbian state does not yet recognize Kosovo as an independent state, the “arm twisting” is actually for more territorial autonomy in areas where the Serb community constitutes the majority. ⁵³ Unlike North Macedonia, there are plans to connect municipalities with a Serbian majority into a Community of Serb Municipalities, but despite this being agreed by the Brussels Agreement of 2013, ⁵⁴ it still has to be implemented.

In BiH, the situation regarding the ethnically motivated creation of municipalities is more specific. Unlike Kosovo or North Macedonia, the whole country was divided on more or less ethnic lines by the Dayton–Paris Agreement that ended the war in 1995. ⁵⁵ Since the borders between the two newly recognized entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Bosniak and Croat entity) and Republika Srpska (the Serbian entity), did not follow the boundaries of prewar municipalities, many of those municipalities were divided. Thus, many new municipalities were formed to reflect this new political division. To emphasize their affiliation, Serbs named municipalities and towns using the prefix “Srpski” (Serbian). Later, they were renamed following decisions by the Constitutional Court (e.g., Srpski Mostar became Istočni [East] Mostar, Srpsko Sarajevo—Istočno Sarajevo, etc.). Many new municipalities actually had neither an urban center nor any functional logic but were formed only to assert that part of a former municipality had become part of one or the other entity. Thus, municipalities like Krupa na Uni, Oštra Luka, Ribnik, Istočni Mostar, Jezero, Istočni Drvar, Kupres (RS), Trnovo (RS), Pelagićevo, Petrovac, Berkovići, Novo Goražde, Osmaci, Donji Žabar, and Vukosavlje are, with a few exceptions, dominated by an ethnic Serbian population, and their population usually numbers just a few hundred inhabitants. ⁵⁶ Meanwhile, in the Federation of BiH, new municipalities with a large Bosniak majority were also formed, for example, Doboj-Jug, Doboj-Istok, Čelić, Teočak (that was actually formed after the referendum in 1992), Sapna, Foča-Ustikolina, and Pale-Prača; other municipalities, such as Dobretići and Ravno, had a Croatian majority. These municipalities represented parts of larger municipalities whose centers remained part of Republika Srpska. Of the thirty-three newly created municipalities, only 6 percent are efficient, so this decentralization model has resulted in stronger ethnic cleavages and has become one of the major obstacles to economic development, not only at the municipal level, but also for the whole country. ⁵⁷

Overall, it is clearly evident that there are cases where the creation of municipalities in countries neighboring Montenegro was ethnically motivated. These cases, while their evolution and numbers differ, are characteristic of countries that went through (or are still going through) ethnic conflicts—not only political but also military ones. All three countries—North Macedonia, BiH, and Kosovo—where those municipalities were formed, were scenes of armed conflicts in the past. Croatia too experienced similar conflicts, with the notable difference that in its case there was a clear winner. Thus, while it remains ethnically diverse in certain parts, Croatia did not need to make that kind of concessions to minorities (effectively, Serbs). The ethnically motivated municipalities were formed only in countries whose functioning is leaning on fragile compromise treaties (Dayton and Ohrid in the case of BiH and North Macedonia, respectively), or is made difficult by unsolved legal status (Kosovo). Montenegro shares the complex ethnic (and religious) structure of its neighbors, and is also plagued by (arguably less serious) political crises, but it is hard to expect that this type of creation of municipalities would become widespread, although certain cases do exist. Still, unlike in the above-mentioned countries, each newly formed municipality in Montenegro was formed following an individual procedure, one at a time—not on the basis of one general treaty or law. Overall, as of 2020, only three new municipalities were formed, none of which was formed completely as a result of ethnic gerrymandering (as all of them existed on a map, although, as explained above, municipalities in the 1950s were different entities from today’s). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and North Macedonia, by contrast, local borders were sometimes drawn to mirror military gains in ethnic conflicts or the results of ethnic cleansing. These new maps helped the formation of various municipalities that did not have an urban-type center and had only a rural population, which was not the case with municipal centers such as Gusinje and Tuzi (two ancient small towns) and Petnjica (in the process of urbanization) in Montenegro. ⁵⁸

Specific Cases of Creation of New Municipalities in Montenegro

Montenegro, according to its Constitution, ⁵⁹ is a civic state with a highly heterogeneous population and no clear ethnic majority. According to the 2011 population census, 44.98 percent of the population declare themselves as Montenegrins. Among the others, most numerous are Serbs (28.73), Bosniaks (8.65), Albanians (4.91), Muslims by nationality (3.31), Roma (1.01), and Croats (0.97 percent). ⁶⁰ The Bosniak and Muslim minorities will be considered in this article as a unique ethnic group as they were until the penultimate census in 2003, when a number of citizens of the Islamic faith began to declare themselves as Bosniaks. ⁶¹

Therefore, Montenegro is an ethnically heterogeneous country, and people belonging to ethnic minorities are represented in Parliament by civic parties, although their interests are represented by representatives of ethnic minority parties as well. In addition to the Albanian minority, which has had national representatives in all but one parliamentary terms since the establishment of the multiparty system in 1990, other minorities organized themselves politically. As a result, national minorities in Montenegro today have their own national party and their representatives in Parliament, ⁶² except the Roma minority, which, as one of the smallest, is at the same time in the most unfavorable socioeconomic and political position. ⁶³ Just like in neighboring Serbia, except the Roma, other national minorities are territorially concentrated in particular regions or municipalities. ⁶⁴ However, the influence of minorities or of their parties on political life has fluctuated considerably.

After the fall of communism, Montenegro chose parliamentarism over other types of organization of powers, “because every country leaving any kind of dictatorship had no practical choice other than parliamentarism.” ⁶⁵ One of the main features of the political system is the existence of a multiparty system with a dominant party (DPS) that had been in power for thirty years, until the formation of current government as a result of the parliamentary elections of August 2020. Since the introduction of the multiparty system in 1990, until 1998, minorities and their national parties have not had an impact on the formation of government, nor have they participated in it. The League of Communists, and from 1991, its successor DPS, won an absolute majority in the elections in 1990, 1992, and 1996, gaining an insignificant number of minority votes. ⁶⁶ In the first years of the multiparty system, the only opposition-run municipalities were those in which the minority people either dominated (Ulcinj, Rožaje, Plav) or where their number was significantly higher than on the national level (Bar). However, after the DPS split (in 1997) regarding the prospects of union with Serbia, ⁶⁷ minorities and their parties gained importance. The weakened DPS, on the eve of the presidential elections and with the aim of creating an alliance against President Bulatović (its former leader), concluded an agreement with the former opposition, including the parties of national minorities. ⁶⁸ The outcome of this agreement was the adoption of the law which established the principle of so-called affirmative action, ⁶⁹ through which it became easier for minority parties to acquire representatives in Parliament. ⁷⁰ According to Lapidoth, ⁷¹ such an approach simultaneously had to partly satisfy their demands and reduce their secession potential.

Starting with the 1997 presidential election when Prime Minister Đukanović ⁷² defeated his former ally President Bulatović by a margin of five thousand votes, all victories of the long-time ruling coalition led by DPS were achieved thanks to the huge support within the corpus of minority votes. After the parliamentary elections of 1998, minority parties entered into a strategic partnership with the DPS, and had since then, until December 2020, participated in the government. But as a counterfavor for this support, along with supporting DPS in making a clear departure from the politics of alienation of minorities, minority national parties were making requests that had an ethnic character (e.g., adopting ethnic criteria in employment). One of them was the ethnically motivated demand for the creation of municipalities. As Montenegrin society became more divided and as election victories became tighter, these demands have been more frequent.

A strong ethnic moment in political life causes its ethnicization ⁷³ and leads to the destabilization of interethnic harmony. Belonging to a particular ethnic group as a guide for specific political solutions has resulted in the creation of municipalities based on ethnic lines. Different factors contributed to this trend. Namely, national party minority groups (specifically Bosniak-Muslims and Albanians) set as an aim in their manifestos the formation of certain municipalities in which members of the minorities would represent the dominant ethnic group. Then, they imposed this question in political life, making it the object of political agreements, negotiations, and coalition agreements. In some cases, local parties were formed that were not operating at the national level, but the sole purpose of which was to form a separate municipality on the territory in which they operated. Also, civic parties contributed selflessly to the establishment of a separate municipality along ethnic lines, with the aim of achieving political gains. Advocating the creation of a municipality provided great support from minorities to civic parties in certain areas, but later became an obligation toward a strong electoral basis. Often this process was managed by an informal faction within a party.

The clearest example of a newly founded municipality in recent years is Petnjica, considering that this is a municipality with a dominant Bosniak-Muslim ethnic majority. The genesis of the drive for an independent Petnjica municipality is closely linked with the political processes in Montenegro. After the establishment of a multiparty system, representatives and citizens from the Petnjica area started several initiatives to “restore” the status of the municipality—for the first time in 1991 (just when Andrijevica gained municipal status), then in 1998, which coincided with political changes in Montenegro and also was linked to the support that the ruling coalition from 1998 had among minorities, specifically in that area. Only on the third attempt, in 2002, was the draft law put on the agenda of the national Parliament; however, it did not obtain the requisite majority. Finally, in 2010, the last unsuccessful proposal was withdrawn just before the voting.

In an extremely politically divided society, where the dividing line was primarily the attitude toward the question of independence of the country, the status of Petnjica was largely dependent on the political projections of the ruling DPS–Social Democratic Party (SDP) coalition. Namely, the rise to power and the subsequent hold on power of that coalition in the Berane municipality (the second largest in the northern region in terms of population) depended on the vote margin the coalition would achieve in Petnjica as an integral part of the Berane municipality. The population of Petnjica expected, owing to its support for the ruling coalition in several election cycles, that the ruling coalition would meet their demands for an independent municipality. By contrast, the opposition at state level, which did not have any obligation toward the local voters, whose support had been negligible, had a positive attitude regarding the creation of the Petnjica municipality. Owing to its political interests (namely, to achieve a majority in the Berane municipality), the opposition used to support the will of the citizens of Petnjica and to criticize the government for delaying the process of granting it independent status. These political projections were confirmed in reality as, after the formation of the Petnjica municipality in 2013 with the amendments to the Law on the Territorial Organization of Montenegro, ⁷⁴ the ruling parties at the state level lost the local elections in the Berane municipality. Eventually, a municipality of 6,686 inhabitants was created, larger (by territory) than the municipalities of Budva and Tivat, and with more inhabitants than the municipalities of Andrijevica, Plužine, Šavnik, and Žabljak. However, the created municipality was ethnically homogeneous with a predominant, almost 100 percent, Bosniak-Muslim population, providing a striking example of a municipality created along ethnic lines.

Two common features of Petnjica and Gusinje are that they were strong constituencies of the ruling coalition and that both regarded the Law of 1952 as the legal and political basis for the reestablishment of municipalities. Although the process of restoration of municipality status is predominantly influenced by the ruling majority at the state level, it should not be perceived only within that frame. What makes the case of Gusinje different from the case of Petnjica is the existence of a local party that had been formed with the aim of establishing an independent municipality. Namely, separating from the ruling DPS, its local committee (in 2007) led to the formation of the Party for Gusinje. The essence and basically the only reason for its establishment was campaigning for the creation of the Gusinje municipality, which was confirmed by the initiative for joining the DPS (in 2014), right after the municipality had been formed. The ethnic character of the newly created municipality is additionally reflected in the membership and functionaries of the Party for Gusinje, who almost without exception belong to the Bosniak-Muslim ethnic group.

Unlike in Petnjica, the creation of an independent Gusinje municipality had no impact on the recomposition of the government in other municipalities, and thus the process of its formation was not unduly burdened by daily politics. In 2014, the national Parliament adopted the amendments to the Law on the Territorial Organization of Montenegro, stating that following the separation of a territory that had belonged to the Plav municipality, Gusinje had become the twenty-third municipality in Montenegro. The newly established municipality had only 4,027 inhabitants, with a Bosniak-Muslim ethnic majority. ⁷⁵ As the representatives of the Albanian national parties did not support the creation of the Gusinje municipality, while the Bosniaks did, one therefore has the impression that the approach adopted to address the issue of the creation of this municipality was excessively ethnically led. Finally, although one may say that Gusinje is not a typical example of an ethnically homogeneous municipality, it is however an example of municipality in whose emergence an ethnic political motivation was highly present. In terms of ethnical composition, the population represented an ethnic majority at the local level, but only a minority at the national level.

More complex than previous cases is the case of Tuzi. Since the foundation of the Democratic Alliance in Montenegro, the first national party consisting of Albanians in Montenegro, all the Albanian national parties have argued for the formation of a separate Tuzi municipality, which would emerge as a result of the secession of part of the territory of the capital—Podgorica. However, although Albanians in Montenegro make up less than 5 percent of the population, what characterizes them is disunity and division into many (around ten) smaller parties. ⁷⁶

The issue began to take form with the Treaty of 1998 between the DPS and the opposition (also comprising parties of Albanian minorities), which committed the DPS, among other things, to the creation of the Tuzi municipality. Political projections of the ruling DPS–SDP coalition that, in case Tuzi separated from Podgorica, could lose the majority in the capital repeatedly postponed the search for a solution to this issue and resulted in the creation of transitional, compromise solutions. A compromise solution, which (only partially) accommodated the requirements of the Albanian parties in this regard, was the establishment of the city municipality of Tuzi as an integral part of the Capital Podgorica, by the Law on the Capital City of 2005. ⁷⁷ Albanian parties that were part of the ruling coalition on the state level (the Democratic Union of Albanians, DUA) accepted this gradual approach bearing in mind the broader political context (maintaining the ruling majority in Podgorica). Thus, the Minister of Human and Minority Rights Ferhat Dinosha, former DUA leader, expressed doubts regarding the financial viability of a separate municipality of Tuzi in 2009, suggesting that the issue of separation of Tuzi from Podgorica should wait for better times. ⁷⁸ However, the Albanian opposition parties (Albanian Alternative, Forza, Perspective), which wanted to fast-track the process, more strongly supported the formation of a Tuzi municipality and often criticized the policies of DUA and DPS. ⁷⁹

After Petnjica and Gusinje gained municipal status, the question of Tuzi reemerged. Prior to the last parliamentary elections, the ruling DPS took another step toward the formation of an independent municipality of Tuzi, in order to retain support among the Albanian population. The Amendment of the Law on the Capital City granted Tuzi municipality status within the capital with the right to its own territory and with expanded responsibilities, particularly in the area of financing, as it has the right to its own budget. Despite inter-Albanian competition between soft and more radical options, the Albanian national parties, as well as a part of the population, experienced this as a step toward the ultimate goal of creating a fully fledged municipality, which made everyone seemingly satisfied. In the process of forming the forty-first government of Montenegro in 2016, upon the insistence of the Albanian parties, the coalition agreement with the ruling parties included the obligation to create an independent Tuzi municipality. On the other hand, the ruling DPS was satisfied, as the solution to this issue was postponed until 2018, after one more local election in the Capital, which it won easily. Finally, after twenty years, Tuzi became the twenty-fourth municipality.

Tuzi, the youngest municipality, has an Albanian majority (making it only the second such municipality in Montenegro), and therefore is yet another municipality established along ethnic lines. However, the Albanian majority in Tuzi decreased between the last two censuses, ⁸⁰ while ethnic distance and tension between ethnic groups in Tuzi increased during the last decade. ⁸¹ It is noteworthy that the growing Bosniak-Muslim minority in Tuzi and the Bosniak Party did not advocate for an independent Tuzi municipality (just like the Albanians had not supported the creation of an independent Gusinje municipality). Bosniak and Albanian parties were competing to expand their influence in the ruling coalition—so, while they share some of the proclaimed goals, such as pushing for minority rights, adopting a more conservative agenda regarding some other civil rights and freedoms (like LGBTQ rights) and a cautious policy toward Serbs and the Orthodox Christian aspects of Montenegrin tradition (e.g., their stance toward Njegoš, the most venerated nineteenth-century Montenegrin Orthodox Prince-Bishop and poet, who celebrated the struggle against Ottoman domination ⁸² ), etc., they are, more than anything else, fighting for a better power position and thus are in competition with each other. The relative passivity and apparent lack of interest of the Bosniak Party in the case of Tuzi and the minor role of Albanian parties in the case of Gusinje should be interpreted in that sense. In 2013, most Albanian parties actually called for the boycott of a consultative referendum on the return of municipality status to Gusinje, citing economic unviability and the strong interdependence between Plav and Gusinje. ⁸³ After the Gusinje Municipality was formed, the Albanian parties leveled accusations, primarily at the DPS, that Albanians in Plav and Gusinje municipalities were discriminated against, since only thirty-five of the seven hundred employees in these two municipalities were Albanian. However, since the vast majority of the employees were Bosniaks/Muslims, this could be seen as a criticism of the Bosniak politicians as well. ⁸⁴ With the advancement of Albanian nationalism after the partial recognition of Kosovo, and the Albanians then taking on a more prominent role in North Macedonia (after forming a government in 2017 which significantly modified the course of the country’s foreign policy), there is a possibility that the Albanian minority of Montenegro may push more strongly for some kind of autonomy ⁸⁵ or for the establishment of some kind of Association of Albanian Municipalities. ⁸⁶ On the other hand, in the case of Bosniaks, further claims regarding regionalization are possible—the so-called cross-border region of Sandžak being an example. ⁸⁷

Overall, through the establishment of new municipalities, both Bosniaks and Albanians have strengthened their ethnic, cultural, and religious identity, ⁸⁸ thereby undermining efforts to build national unity and identity following Hechter’s pattern. ⁸⁹ Thus, Treisman’s worries that ethnic decentralization replaces national patriotism with ethnic and regional loyalties ⁹⁰ seem justified in the case of Montenegro.

The Issue of Serbian-Montenegrin Relations

While Montenegrins can be easily distinguished from the other nationalities living in Montenegro (Bosniaks are Muslims and Croats are Catholics, unlike most Montenegrins, who are Orthodox Christians; and Albanians have a different language), the division between Montenegrins and Serbs is nowadays mostly a political division among people who share the same language, religion, traditions, and history. Montenegrins share for the most part the same ethnoreligious background with the Serbs, but separate Montenegrinness is backed up by political history and a specific lifestyle. ⁹¹ Serbs in Montenegro present a particularly complex case. While they sometimes do use instruments whose aim is to promote minority rights (e.g., they formed their own minority council—The Serbian National Council in Montenegro), they are usually not seen as a national minority, ⁹² but rather as a special case. The fluctuating number of Serbs in Montenegro (from roughly 3 percent in 1981 to more than 9 percent in 1991, then 32 percent in 2003, and about 29 percent in 2011) ⁹³ points to the core of the Serbian issue in Montenegro. The numbers did not change because of a high or low birth rate or immigration/emigration of the Serbian population, but because of the unfinished identity-building process among Montenegrins themselves. Thus, while the majority of Montenegrins now do consider themselves as a separate nation from the Serbs, still many more declare that they speak Serbian rather than Montenegrin, and a huge majority of them prefer the Serbian Orthodox Church to the Montenegrin Orthodox Church. ⁹⁴ This is all a result of a centuries-long Montenegrin wandering in search of its identity, either as a separate South Slavic nation, or as a mere variety of a wider Serbian nation, through periods of instability and fighting for survival. Only in the communist era did the idea of Montenegrins as a separate nation seem to prevail, when leading Montenegrin communist Milovan Đilas explained that “although the Montenegrins were Serbs, they had experienced a different historical and political state evolution,” ⁹⁵ which justified the formation of Montenegro as a separate republic. However, since the 1990s the issue has been back on the table. Thus, regarding the local level, it becomes obvious that Serbs in Montenegro and pro-Serbian parties do not have the same goals as the parties representing Bosniaks, Albanians and Croats. Indeed, for Serbs, it is the whole of Montenegro—its identity, its own essence—that is at stake, and therefore their goals cannot be fulfilled with certain concessions at local level. While some Serb-dominated areas do indeed push for local reorganization, ⁹⁶ this is more of a byproduct or distraction aimed toward central government, or the result of a wish not to be ruled by a (state-level) minority (like in Murino), rather than goals whose fulfillment would satisfy Serbs and their political representatives.

This is backed by research on interethnic distance in Montenegro—the ethnic distance between Montenegrins and Serbs (and vice versa) is almost nonexistent. ⁹⁷ On the other hand, there is a significant ethnic distance between both groups and Albanians. Thus, when the political and ideological gap between Montenegrins and Serbs is narrowed, it will most probably lead to major changes on the Montenegrin political landscape. Calls for Serbian parties to join the Montenegrin Government, even before the last elections, have been made and supported, although arguably half-heartedly, by the Serbian Government. Finally, the pro-Serbian parties became part of the parliamentary majority after the 2020 parliamentary elections, and Bosniak, Albanian, and Croat parties lost their blackmail capacity. That may pave the way toward more rational management of local formation and (re)organization, and also curb down Serbian initiatives.

After the 2020 parliamentary elections, the minority parties representing Bosniaks and Albanians after many years lost their position of kingmakers while Croatian parties did not even pass the threshold. Seemingly unprepared for such a big change in the political landscape, minority parties send mixed and sometimes contradictory messages regarding their relations with the new parliamentary majority before finally choosing not to enter the government. ⁹⁸ However, the fact that the new government is supported by a wafer-thin majority of forty-one against forty, and that it consists of three coalitions (including more than a dozen political subjects), and that its very formation had lasted for almost one hundred days of interparty quarrels certainly helped the minority parties to refrain, for the time being, from entering it. ⁹⁹ While the new government is supported by the pro-Serbian parties, they only provide it outside support, making it in fact a minority government, which is not expected to last a full term, ¹⁰⁰ but to implement certain reforms in order to prepare the next elections. Thus, it appears that the issues of local administration reform will not make an important part of the new government’s agenda. As the relations among the Orthodox majority (Montenegrins and Serbs) look less strained, as the pro-Serbian parties make up a significant part of the new parliamentary majority along with the pro-Montenegrin ones, the position of minority parties is set to be weaker in the immediate future. On the other hand, the pro-Serbian parties also have not made the issue of making new local units their priority, preferring instead to emphasize on the upcoming population census, where they hope to see a rise in the number of Serbs in Montenegro at the national level. ¹⁰¹

Conclusion

Montenegro proved to be resistant to the formation of new municipalities between 1991 and 2013, and this for various reasons. One important reason has nothing to do with politics or with ethnic structure, but rather with the fact that Montenegro is a small country, one-third the size of North Macedonia, Slovenia, or Kosovo in terms of the population. The internal migrations of population, present in all countries in transition, helped a few urban centers become much larger, while in smaller towns, particularly in the north, and in most villages throughout the country, the population decreased. Thus, there was no growing pressure to create new municipalities since in the existing ones, most of all in the capital city of Podgorica and in some coastal towns, there was a significant rise in population, while in others, including those that were demanding municipality status, the population decreased. The exception may be the capital city’s division into municipalities (like in other ex-Yugoslav capitals), since there, according to the census, the population of the metro area increased to close to two hundred thousand.

However, the reasons for the stalemate in municipality creation were fundamentally political. On the one hand, political parties representing minorities were not seen as important factors in Montenegrin politics, since they were not represented in government before 1998, and did not even have parliamentary status between 1992 and 1996. Thus, since some of the main demands for new municipalities were related to areas with a large minority presence, there was no strong political pressure on the ruling DPS to make concessions. As the presence of parties representing minorities became stronger both in the parliament and the government, the ruling party gradually changed its attitude, before finally creating the municipalities of Petnjica, Gusinje, and Tuzi, in a decade marked by the strong rise of the influence of Bosniak and Albanian parties in Montenegro. While the ruling party was not as hostile to minorities as was the case in most of the neighboring countries, it followed, albeit in a milder fashion, the matrix of Milošević’s xenophobic and authoritarian policies before the transition of 1997–1998. However, even if the DPS’s policy toward national minorities through the 1990s did not by far meet international standards, its rejection of new municipality creation, particularly in ethnically motivated cases, may be seen as a wise move considering the situation in the region. The events in other ex-Yugoslav countries, with the formation of, or attempts at creating, different entities for political or ethnic reasons (like the so-called Serbian Autonomous Regions/Districts [SAO], Herceg Bosna, Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, Republic of Illirida, etc.) served as a warning not to raise such issues in a turbulent period.

So, various reasons, including an authoritarian system (and then a very sensitive transition in an almost evenly divided society), tense interethnic relations and a political and security crisis in the region prevented the formation of new municipalities in Montenegro before the independence referendum of 2006. Since then, things have changed. We can single out some of the factors that contributed to the final creation of the Petnjica, Gusinje, and Tuzi municipalities:

The formation of Petnjica, Gusinje, and Tuzi acted as an incentive to other similar movements, some of them ethnically and politically motivated. Serbian majority areas such as Grbalj (in Kotor), or Murino (in Plav, a municipality with a Bosniak/Muslim majority), may continue to push for a separate municipality.

Overall, bearing in mind what Snyder calls ¹⁰² the “terrible track record” of ethnic decentralization in former Yugoslavia, and the complexity of Montenegro’s own ethnic structure, it is not unreasonable to fear that the process of creating ethnically based municipalities might have a negative impact on the country’s stability. Not only has Montenegro a very diverse ethnic and religious structure on a very small territory, but it is also historically a very specific tribal society, unlike any other country in the region except for Albania.

Further cases of such claims are possible regarding the Serbian population in Montenegro (not seen as a minority) and, potentially, claims motivated by (former) clan or tribal dividing lines. The new Montenegrin government will probably not encourage these claims and will try to postpone settling them. Further proliferation of municipalities, making a country of 600,000 people a mosaic of dozens of municipalities, and its possible regionalization, might put its functioning and stability in jeopardy. Thus, new local units will probably be founded only rarely and cautiously, although the political dynamics in Montenegro, together with further developments in neighboring countries, may result in a different unfolding of events.