Abstract
Thirty years after communism’s demise, Polish civil society is, decidedly, self-sustaining, and wide-ranging, with activism focused on various issues, from the natural environment to education reform to reproductive rights. This paper uses data from interviews and a nationally representative survey to explore the evolution of activism in Poland and specifically the claim that Polish citizens are more likely to engage in civic action when these efforts concern everyday social problems, rather than abstract political ideals. We argue that since 2015, the Polish government is, indeed, attempting to direct civil society’s growth and development, thereby shrinking the space for activism, especially for liberal, progressive organizations. Yet, this is only a part of a more complex and interesting picture of activism that is also shifting, with individuals focusing on new issues and mobilization tactics, and strengthening through the creation of networks, and groups that work on different sectors but join forces. Thus, although some citizens are mobilizing around local, social concerns, intangible, political issues remain important, with Poles participating in activities online and in person to defend the rule of law and judicial freedom. Polish citizens are also regularly protesting limitations on reproductive rights and in support of gay rights. Thirty years of change and democracy in Poland have produced a dynamic and diverse civil society that is, simultaneously, shrinking, shifting, and strengthening.
Keywords
Introduction
Thirty years after communism’s demise, Polish civil society is, decidedly, self-sustaining, and wide-ranging, with activism focused on various issues, from the natural environment to education reform to reproductive rights. The intensity and regularity of activism in Poland underscore the troubles facing its fragile democracy. In the last decade alone, thousands of new social groups emerged; tens of thousands of citizens took to the streets, and an even larger number of people are participating in civil society broadly defined. However, this does not mean that Polish citizens are mainly engaged in “traditional” civil society by creating or joining formal organizations like nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or civil society organizations (CSOs). 1 The nationally representative survey we commissioned confirms that although most Polish people (about 80%) are not members of any NGO or CSO, many do volunteer in schools, donate to charities, or are engaged in some form of informal activism either in person or online. Importantly, an increasing number of citizens are standing up for woman’s reproductive rights, protesting the government’s encroachment on courts’ independence, and fostering awareness of ecological problems and community development. In rural areas of the country, farmers are voicing their concerns over food sovereignty, while educators are establishing “folk high schools” for adult learning. 2
Polish civil society is often characterized as inactive or ineffective, in part because of the democratic backsliding taking place in this Central European country. 3 The government’s behavior has, as Barbara Smith explains, “seriously undermined” the independence of the judiciary, and many of its policies have put democratic freedoms at risk. 4 Yet, we contend and demonstrate that civil society in Poland continues to evolve and mature in response to the government’s actions, as well as its failure to deliver important social services. The robust informal and grassroots activism thirty years after communism’s demise, we argue, should push us to rethink how we map civic activism and how we define civil society, or the sphere of voluntary social self-organization and engagement. Like Tsveta Petrova and Sidney Tarrow and the other authors in this special section, we define civil society quite broadly as the arena outside the family, the state, and the market that includes individual and collective actions to advance shared interests. 5 Moreover, we include both in-person and online activism. Various online platforms give younger activists in particular novel ways to post information, share content, and participate in social initiatives. For some activists, it is important to include online activities because the divisions between online and off-line activism are neither clear-cut nor that important and leveraging technology to engage citizens has a significant and growing impact on Polish society. 6
To be sure, Polish activism is not limited to the virtual world, and street protests are regular occurrences, especially in large cities. At the beginning of 2020, Poles were in the streets because of concerns over judicial independence. By the end of the year, even larger numbers were protesting the government’s effort to pass restrictive abortion legislation. 7 Even during COVID and at the time of this writing, there were regular protests in more than fifty Polish cities over government efforts to create some of Europe’s most restrictive abortion legislation. 8 Street protests were commonplace in communist Poland, and the country’s citizens distinguished themselves by their regular acts of defiance against the communist government. In the thirty years since, scholars have debated the legacy, importance, and future of the country’s protest culture. 9
Like the other articles in this special issue, this research investigates the proposition that Polish citizens are more likely to engage in civic action when these efforts concern everyday social problems, rather than abstract political ideals. Through interviews and survey research, we demonstrate that Polish civil society has no shortage of organizations, in-person, and virtual activities. In fact, civil society activism in Poland reflects a broad spectrum of orientations and interests, and although certain forms of activism are shrinking and disappearing (as in Russia), the country’s social landscape is also shifting in new and innovative ways. Given the government’s interest in “overseeing civil society development,” activism in some areas, like women’s reproductive and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer(LGBTQ)+ rights, is, in fact, expanding and relationships are strengthening. 10 To make our argument, that Polish citizens are interested in both abstract political issues and everyday concerns, we draw on interviews that were conducted in person or through zoom calls, as well as survey data and primary and secondary sources. 11 Our semi-structured, open-ended interviews, which started in the summer of 2019, continued in person in December 2019 and then online during the summer of 2020. In a few cases, we interviewed more than one person at the same time to create a focus group environment. Although we intended to bring together more people who held diverse perspectives into focus group environments to better understand their motivations and strategies, our Polish interlocutors maintained that this would discourage open conversation. 12
In total, we conducted thirty-eight interviews with experts, activists, academics, and government officials largely through a snowball sampling technique. Poland’s National Freedom Institute—Centre for Civil Society Development (Narodowy Instytut Wolności—Centrum Rozwoju Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego, NIW)—also provided the authors with a list of “active civil society organizations” that it supported, many of which are based in small towns or rural areas. These organizations complemented our interviews with individuals who were located largely in two of Poland’s most active cities: Warsaw and Poznań. The average length was sixty minutes, conducted in Polish or in English. In addition, this article reflects data incorporated from our team’s survey conducted in November 2019 by Kantar, as well as interviews that were conducted by other scholars from our research group. 13 Based on this material, we argue that Polish citizens are not passive and are likely to be engaged with both concrete, everyday problems as well as intangible, political concerns. 14 This article analyzes why, where, and how civic activism in Poland is, simultaneously, shrinking, shifting, and strengthening, with special attention to women’s reproductive rights and gay rights.
From Solidarity to Something Else
During the communist period, the word Solidarność was synonymous with civil society activism in Poland. As Jane Curry reminds, at its apex, Poland’s independent trade union, Solidarność, included most of the country’s workers, while the Solidarity movement enjoyed almost universal support among the population. 15 Solidarity’s authority was so thorough and its reach so extensive in the late 1980s that leaders of the independent trade union were instrumental to getting communist party leaders to begin discussions on systemic change in the spring of 1989. Solidarity’s strength meant that Poland was “the only communist country where mass protest became a frequent way of exerting political pressure and defending collective interests,” ultimately ending the communist government’s reign. 16
As the country embraced democratic principles in the 1990s, activism became more diverse and dispersed, and it was impossible to depict this broad arena of independent action using a single word. 17 Solidarity’s legacy and large doses of international assistance from Western sources contributed to the hope that Polish society would be vibrant, liberal, and take specific organizational forms (NGOs or CSOs). Polish society was different from other formerly communist countries because even during the communist period it was pluralistic, less controlled by the communist party, and even somewhat independent. 18 By the last decade of the 20th century, two main mechanisms contributed to the reshaping of Polish civil society. The first was rebuilt groups like labor unions and professional associations that existed during the communist period. These organizations were joined by new NGOs or CSOs that were financed mainly by donors from the West that maintained that civil society development was a key component to democratic consolidation. 19 From 1990 until 2004, for example, U.S. public and private funding provided most of the international assistance to Poland, and almost 80 percent of it went to “society-oriented assistance” interested in civil society development. 20 In fact, Western assistance to Central and Eastern Europe fueled an “associational revolution” in the region that later proved to be problematic because many of the organizations were driven by donor, rather than local, interests. 21 Nonetheless, during the 2001–2015 period, between 3,000 and 5,000 new associations were registered every year in Poland. 22
Despite the obvious growth of NGOs and CSOs supported by Western donors, the overall effect on Polish civil society was less clear because numbers alone cannot measure citizens’ involvement; they do not reveal a group’s activities, and numbers cannot calculate the embeddedness or connectedness of civil organizations. Several important studies in the 2000s documented low levels of trust in political institutions and the paltry membership in voluntary associations throughout post-communist Europe despite Western investments, with many concluding that civil society was weak throughout the region. 23 Various scholars criticized these interpretations, maintaining that Polish civil society, in fact, played an important role in democratic consolidation. 24 Others also argued that although civil society in post-communist Europe looked different from other countries in Western Europe or North America, this did not mean it was necessarily weak; instead, the region’s development required broader definitions of activism. 25 Although “contentious activism” and strikes declined in the mid-1990s, more “civil forms of activism,” including participation in and support for informal organizations, rose in the 2000s. 26 Moreover, many of the existing CSOs, while fewer in number, continued to enjoy significant public support. 27 Quantity, thus, is less important than quality and the embeddedness of these organizations in Polish society.
Since 2004, when Poland became a member of the European Union, activism has been marked by both polarization and pillarization along political, ideological, and cultural lines. 28 Membership in the European Union links Polish society to regional and international actors, and Europeanization has changed numerous organizations’ “structure and institutional culture,” making more funds available, especially for liberal, progressive causes. 29 This led some politicians to criticize the Europeanization process, and contributed to a backlash against Western involvement in Polish society. 30 Not surprisingly, Europeanization and the transnationalization of Polish society has had both supporters and critics, and the expansion of progressive initiatives is matched by a growth in groups that are fearful of globalization and critical of Western influences.
Many of the contemporary patriotic and nationalist organizations in Poland that are opposed to Western involvement are tied to the Catholic Church or have allied with conservative political parties that seek to preserve Polish values. These traditional “value guardians” tend to support Poland’s United Right (Zjednoczona Prawica), a coalition of parties led by Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość [PiS]). 31 Since coming to power in 2015, PiS promised to make what it calls “significant reforms” in Polish society, and this includes enhancing civil society’s traditional, patriotic, and conservative character. Toward this end, in September 2017, the Polish parliament created the National Freedom Institute to support “civil society, public benefit activities, and volunteering.” 32 Following populist trends in the region and around the world, the Polish government uses financial support to ensure that “authentic” Polish interests and organizations take root. 33 The PiS government has also changed legislation and limited activities for progressive organizations, which others refer to as Poland’s shrinking civic space. However, as the next sections demonstrate, polarization and pillarization have produced other outcomes, with some activists choosing to focus on concrete, everyday problems (such as tenant rights and women’s reproductive rights), mobilizing in new ways, shifting activism online, and strengthening relationships, connections, and motivations among activists.
What Is Shrinking?
Scholars and activists regularly observe the country’s democratic backsliding, arguing that the current government’s efforts to disrupt international funding, change legislation, and limit social activities are “shrinking” the space for civil society activism. 34 Because of government reforms, “Poland has experienced a retreat from tolerance, inclusion, transparency, and government accountability,” making activism in some areas more difficult. 35 For the Polish Helsinki Committee, the situation is decidedly not good because “the space for public dialogue and social consultations” has been closing with the PiS government. 36 The shrinking space for dialogue and activities has been particularly difficult for “claims-making” or advocacy NGOs that pursue a rights-based agenda. Many groups have been impacted negatively, but individuals and organizations focusing on sexual orientation, women’s reproductive rights, and immigrant/refugee rights have been most affected, at least in the short term.
The closing or shrinking of space for civil society refers to multifaceted efforts by the government and government-sponsored organizations to disrupt international funding to local CSOs; limit the public space for activities; and reduce organizations’ political voice through legal restrictions, or other forms of repression. 37 Key pieces of legislation adopted by PiS, directly and indirectly, seek to shrink the political space for activism, including but not limited to changes associated with the rule of law, parliamentary processes, access to information, and restrictions on freedom of assembly and speech. The government not only limits public discussions of laws and practices related to civil society but also centralized the funding for the third sector, making it more difficult for international donors to work directly with Polish organizations. With government agencies in charge of both international and domestic funding, liberal NGOs like legal aid organizations for immigrants receive less money to support their activities. According to Freedom House, the centralization of financing means that the Polish “government is exerting more influence over CSO’s funding and thus CSO’s themselves” by allowing certain Polish NGOs to distribute funding to local groups. 38 For the Centre for European Policy Studies, the PiS government’s policies are problematic for other reasons; not only is there a lack of clear guidelines for which organizations receive public funding but also there are consistent irregularities in the government’s decision-making processes. 39
In addition to legislation and practices that restrict activities and funding for certain NGOs, the government has fostered an environment that allows, enables, and even encourages discrimination against certain groups of people and specific kinds of activism. The result of these laws, reforms, and practices means the narrowing of “civic and political space,” especially for those who oppose the government’s nationalistic-conservative agenda or advocate for liberal, progressive causes. 40 Although many organizations, individuals, and initiatives have felt the brunt of these actions, the following highlights the impact on organizations involved in women’s reproductive rights, gay rights, and refugees and migrants. To be clear, some of these organizations do not see themselves as claims-making, advocacy NGOs, or anti-governmental organizations. As in Russia, these NGOs often describe themselves as organizations that provide essential public, social, health, or educational services for vulnerable members of society. However, the Polish government sometimes chooses to politicize their activities, claiming that if organizations specialize “only in one group of victims” like women or refugees, they are, by definition, discriminatory and cannot receive government funding. 41
Activists involved in these issue areas not only worry about how democratic backsliding might affect legislation and their access to public information and debates but also they feel the financial pinch. For organizations that support women’s reproductive rights like the Federation for Women and Family Planning (Federacja na Rzecz Kobiet i Planowania Rodziny), one of Poland’s oldest NGOs, the government’s behavior makes it challenging to provide much needed services to women. Established in 1991, this coalition fights for equal opportunities for men and women and protects the right to “conscious parenthood,” which includes access to contraception, comprehensive and evidence-based education about human sexuality, and the right to a legal and safe abortion. 42 For the Center for Women’s Rights (Centrum Praw Kobiet) in Warsaw, the government’s efforts make it difficult to receive funds from the national government to support ongoing activities. The Center, which started in 1994 and had a good working relationship with previous governments, now receives most of its funding from private donations and businesses. The defunding of organizations working on reproductive rights is debilitating, but the government’s use of intimidation and harassment are more threatening. In 2017 and following a series of protests for women’s reproductive rights, the government authorized a police raid on the Center for Women’s Rights offices, taking computers and other materials. 43
Human rights and gay rights activists are also the target of regular attacks by government officials, state television, and prominent Catholic Church members. They, thus, worry about more than finances; they are concerned for their personal safety. For example, a well-known attack against the Campaign Against Homophobia (Kampania Przeciw Homofobii, KPH) was orchestrated in 2019 by the public media. The campaign hurt LGBTQ+ groups and specific individuals, and it effectively prevented them from accessing public schools. 44 The leader of the Law and Justice Party, Jarosław Kaczyński, has regularly said that “homosexuality represents a threat to Polish identity, to our nation, to its existence and thus to the Polish state.” 45 The Polish President, Andrzej Duda, has also stated, “We are being told that [LGBTQ+] people are people. And that’s just ideology.” 46
Human Rights Watch argues that the ruling Law and Justice Party has scapegoated “[LGBTQ+] people and sexual and reproductive rights activists for political ends, under the banner of what is calls gender ideology.” 47 For example, in the October 2019 elections, the party made countering “[LGBTQ+] ideology” part of its platform, accusing human rights activists of undermining traditional Polish family values by advocating for equal rights. A 2020 survey by the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association concludes that threats to LGBTQ+ activists make Poland the most homophobic country in the European Union. 48 According to a human rights activist from Poznań, “Poland’s situation is not completely dire but depends on the city or town and its leadership.” 49 Cities like Poznań and Warsaw have open-minded mayors and more progressive leadership in the Catholic Church, such as Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki (Poznań) and Cardinal Kazimierz Nycz (Warsaw), but in many places, people are afraid of the government and are unwilling to stand up for their rights.
For organizations like the Never Again Association (Stowarzyszenie Nigdy Więcej), which has existed informally since 1992 (formally since 1996), and documents hate crimes, racism, and discrimination in Poland, the country has experienced many detrimental changes in just the last five years. 50 Although Never Again once helped shape government legislation on human rights and minority policies, it no longer is granted access to government officials or has a presence in the public media because the government assures that the environment for human rights organizations is “not pleasant.” 51 Nonetheless, according to one of its members (Interviewee 1929), the organization is still able to work with independent media in Poland, indicating that there is plenty of interest, especially among young people and regional and international partners in fighting discrimination and advocating for human rights, and provide ongoing support.
According to a leader of the Association for Legal Intervention (Stowarzyszenie Interwencji Prawnej, SIP), which provides legal assistance and counseling for asylum seekers and migrants, the current government’s efforts have directly and negatively impacted several organizations focused on human and minority rights. While its “anti-NGO discourse has targeted only a few activists, it has left others with the distinct feeling that we could be the next in line.”
52
There are reasons for concern; at the same time, there have been positive moments and developments. The Association’s financial support is currently from individuals and private funds, and this has been matched by a growing number of organizations that cooperate with SIP, creating a consortium of organizations that meets monthly to support refugees and migrants. Thus, although some NGOs face more “difficulties to work,” and there is plenty to do . . . and space to work . . . Many fantastic initiatives are operating on the local level . . . the question is how we can re-evaluate (civil society) and assess how it acts in reality, through in-person and on-line activities.
53
For a former member of Lambda’s management board (Poland’s oldest running gay rights NGO), the government’s behavior has shaped domestic activism in surprising ways. 54 Although Lambda has not directly influenced current government laws and practices, it uses “boomerang advocacy” to steer actions by getting the EU and other international allies’ attention. These powerful international allies, in turn, pressure the Polish government to keep human rights and gay rights on the agenda. Relations with the current government make the situation for LGBTQ+ individuals precarious, and it limits certain groups’ capacity to act. At the same time, the current environment pushes like-minded groups together, and claims-making groups are increasingly well networked and collaborative. 55 As others have confirmed, there can be benefits to having a conservative government intent on closing the space for gay rights activism: it forces domestic activists to build solidarity in different ways. 56
What Is Shifting?
Because of the government’s behavior, activism in Poland is also shifting, with some individuals focusing more on everyday local concerns, or using different strategies to be effective, including engaging in activism online and in more informal ways. As in other countries experiencing democratic backsliding, contemporary Polish civil society is transforming, and there is a noticeable and important shift in where activism happens and how activists engage. Not only are activists using various online platforms to meet, share information, and be involved in collective action but activism is shifting in terms of what motivates individuals to action, with a growing recognition of the problems associated with liberal capitalism. Polish scholars highlight these important shifts, particularly the growth of Internet engagement and grassroots, local activism. Called “new social movements” by Polish scholars, these social initiatives are intentionally creating alternatives to existing civil and socioeconomic models of activism and traditional NGOs or CSOs. 57
Especially for young people, civic activism is moving online, and the space for growing e-activism in Poland is tremendous. Our survey indicates that a large majority (74%) of respondents declare that they use the Internet and 59 percent every day. Although critics of online activism dismiss this form of civic participation, referring to it as “slacktivism,” because it requires little physical engagement, it is increasingly popular and, some claim, effective in Poland. According to one of the founders of Action Democracy (Akcja Demokracja), e-activism is better at assessing the needs of “regular people” and it can be more effective in outreach, mobilization, and fundraising. Younger activists, moreover, often prefer e-activism because they are critical of NGOs, their hierarchy, and their need for donors. 58 Virtual initiatives such as Action Democracy was fashioned as a “virtual protest movement” to reflect social activism changes and to foster new forms of 21st-century citizen participation. Action Democracy was established in 2015 by a handful of people who believed that Polish NGOs were distant, outdated, and generally ineffective. This initiative wants to cultivate an “open style environment” in Poland that fosters a community to advance progressive causes, not just create another NGO that requires donors, funding, and office space, and “concentrates on its own survival.” 59
Another initiative, operating both off-line and online, is the Committee for the Defense of Democracy (Komitet Obrony Demokracji [KOD]), which intentionally references the former Workers Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników), because of its influence and authority during the communist period. KOD leaders did not want to create an NGO, but they wanted to support “a few forms of protest and political participation.” 60 KOD was created in response to the 2015 election and the PiS government’s controversial legislation that KOD leaders argued was dangerous to democracy and political pluralism. KOD is meant to echo Poland’s past and its struggle with communism, representing as Václav Havel once put it, “the power of the people” and a unique form of nonpartisan political participation. 61 KOD’s activities shift constantly and strategically between civil and political society, aiming to be a platform for an extraparliamentary power struggle and using the traditions of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. to engage in peaceful, nonviolent protests. “Our movement arose as a reaction to the abuses of power that began to attack democratic institutions.” 62 Since 2016, it is registered as an association (stowarzyszenie), but instead of creating a single organization that engages in one activity, it facilitates discussions and organizes different educational and social activities, encouraging its supporters to demonstrate in the streets, distribute leaflets, and keep others informed. 63
According to the Klon/Jawor Association, an independent nonprofit organization created in 2000 to research and disseminate information on the country’s third sector, Polish society is active in many ways. However, as an official of Klon/Jawor Association explained, activism in 2020 is hard to track, and it looks different from the past. 64 As many activists proudly admit, they seek to leverage technology, using new strategies to engage individuals from all over the country, if not the world. A characteristic feature of these activities is the emphasis put on self-realization and developing a new identity, especially around creating a different kind of economy, which will fuel the revitalization of neighborhood cooperation. 65 As one activist involved in Akcja Demokracja explained, “We are used to people devaluing what we are doing online, but using technology can have a real impact on democracy and life in Poland.” 66 With respect to activists from the 1970s and 1980s, who think civic action means “sitting in a room and smoking cigarettes, young people today are mobilizing and participating, but just in different ways?” 67
Akcja is a movement, rather than an organization, and it uses technology to allow its supporters to take coordinated action for what it calls a better, fairer society. Its supporters believe that political change will not occur because of behind-the-scenes actions, but only if people demand it together, loudly, and clearly. Similarly, the origins of Poznań’s branch of “The Chain of Light” (Łańcuch Światła), a grassroots movement against the dismantling of the rule of law in Poland, can be traced to an online event inspired by Akcja Demokracja that was started in Poznań by a current member of the Polish parliament, Franciszek “Franek” Sterczewski. From a social media post to the mobilization of 20,000 citizens through The Chain of Light, e-activism in Poland echoes the spirit of the Arab Spring, demonstrating the potential new technologies and social media can bring to 21st-century activism.
It is important to stress that Polish activism is not only shifting in terms of where activism happens and how engagement looks but also what is motivating people to action, with a growing number of initiatives focused on concrete, everyday problems. As Laura Henry explains, “everyday activism” focuses on immediate, practical concerns, or social or economic issues that are tangible, rooted in the material realities of daily life, and located close to home. 68 Everyday activism focuses on problems that regular citizens encounter in their daily lives and thus attracts participation by citizens as well as full-time activists. Even more so than other former socialist countries, Poland’s privatization process occurred quickly and dramatically, creating new social problems and urban dilemmas that the government is ill equipped to handle. According to our team’s survey, less than 20 percent of respondents are members of NGOs/CSOs, and about the same percentage indicated that they participated in some type of civic activity in the last twelve months. In other words, about 40 percent of the population admits to being engaged in some civic activity, though over 80 percent of respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement, “citizens should be actively engaged in social or public life,” with 89 percent indicating that they believe that “citizens should watch over the actions of the government.” When it comes to the problems that need to be addressed by citizens, 44 percent of respondents considered health and social care Poland’s most pressing issues.
Some of the activism that focuses on health and social care, like the Barka Foundation for Mutual Help (Fundacja Pomocy Wzajemnej “Barka”), tries to address everyday problems by providing financial support, psychological counseling, and education to socially marginalized groups. Created in 1989, Barka has built homes in sixteen locations and created numerous shelters and communal living arrangements for homeless people and addicts around the country. According to two of Barka’s leaders, its citizen-based strategy was developed because of the problems associated with the country’s transition and the need to empower individuals to build relationships and address local concerns. 69 Like Barka, Home for Autistic Children (Dom Autysty) grew out of societal need and the country’s inadequate social welfare system. Instead of waiting for the government, parents of autistic children in Poznań came together and raised funds. With the goal of creating a home and encouraging activism, this organization hopes to provide both a place and space for people with disabilities to live independently. Over ten years, they collected individual contributions that were required by the European Union to grant further funding to build Dom Autysty. 70
Poland is now also the site of grassroots urban activism, which focuses explicitly on the problems produced by the government’s neoliberal economic policies that fundamentally altered Polish cities. Rapid privatization and increasing urbanization have produced a strong leftist critique and an emerging movement around tenants’ rights and urban problems. Poland has more than forty associations that are working informally in large- and middle-size cities to defend the rights of tenants and advocate for social justice. In 2004, some of these associations created a campaign focusing on housing as a human right, not a commodity. 71 Depending on the city, informal initiatives and “new social movements” have emerged that focus on environmental problems. 72 Some of these informal initiatives emphasize the importance of cultivating a collective identity to bring about changes in the perception of everyday concerns and, thus, broader social changes. 73 For these individuals, activism in Poland is about demonstrating that civil society has gone “beyond NGO-ization” and is returning to its roots by engaging people and communities in noninstitutionalized, informal activism that defies organizations’ establishment.
According to Jacobsson and Korolczuk, Poland’s grassroots urban activism looks different from similar movements in the West. 74 Post-communist countries have not only experienced rapid, far-reaching liberalization of housing and urban policy more recently but also these changes occurred alongside a weakening of state institutions. Protests and activities that are locally driven tend to oppose the professionalization and bureaucratization characteristic of externally funded CSOs and NGOs. 75 Although urban activism is strong in cities like Warsaw and Poznań, research on civil society often overlooks their activities, focusing instead on the number of specific NGOs and CSOs, the size of protests, and actions that attract media attention. However, Poland’s urban activists are generally not associated with formal organizations or anything political, focusing on problems that Polish people experience in urban areas, which might not warrant much media attention. 76 The overarching goal of urban activists, which is hard to measure, is “creating local communities and practicing solidarity.” 77
Importantly, some individuals and organizations in Poland have also started to shift their focus to problems and issues outside the country’s borders. As Poland develops economically and transitions away from being an aid recipient to a country that is providing aid to other countries, a small number of groups have emerged to provide humanitarian and technical assistance to countries in transition and impacted by war and natural disasters. 78 Most international NGOs are still located in North America or Western Europe, but Polish citizens (sometimes with the government’s support) are increasingly interested in humanitarian issues. According to a representative of Polish Humanitarian Action (Polska Akcja Humanitarna [PAH]), this organization is somewhat unique in Poland because it has been providing international aid since the early 1990s. 79
Since Poland has received significant amounts of assistance from Western Europe and the United States, some Polish citizens believe that it is time for them to help others. 80 Giving back and doing something for other countries is still not popular in Poland, according to a leader of the Polish branch of the Humanity in Action (HIA), because of the country’s history as bystander, or a country that chooses not to get involved in the affairs of other countries. Moreover, many Polish citizens still cannot afford to use their time for voluntary work because they must earn money to sustain themselves. 81 Yet, HIA-Poland, an NGO started in the United States, is working with young Polish humanitarians in particular to change this narrative, focusing on educating and training Polish youth on human rights issues. For HIA activists, only by educating and empowering young people will the country be able to address injustices and promote human rights—both at home and abroad.
What Is Strengthening?
According to an official from the National Freedom Institute, the government’s interest in civil society development is both logical and necessary because of what it calls the unbalanced development of Polish civil society after 1989. 82 Since a lot of funding for civil society in the 1990s and early 2000s came from donors from the West and went to liberal, progressive causes from urban areas, the government now seeks to provide what it calls strategic, long-term thinking for this sector’s development. As previously indicated, however, the government is clearly motivated to marginalize and decrease the number of liberal, progressive groups and grow conservative-patriotic organizations or “value guardians” that support the government’s traditional, conservative values. 83
In PiS’s 2019 platform, one of the government’s priorities for civil society development, is to build institutions that support local civic activity, especially if it is “motivated by patriotism, traditional pro-social attitudes and deeply rooted in the history of the Polish intellectual, worker and peasant.” 84 This is because PiS sees civil society as a common space that allows individuals “to exercise civic virtues, such as responsibility for the nation and local communities, solidarity and engagement in building grassroots civic institutions.” 85 Thus, it supports and funds “traditional” or “conservative groups” that are in line with its view of the Polish nation. 86 Moreover, it cites a government report that indicates that some 85 percent of all civil society funding before 2015 went to just 4 percent of the organizations in urban areas as evidence for the need for this “balancing” in government funding. 87
PiS statements further indicate that the government is determined to strengthen the “libertarian and Christian ideals of citizens” to protect the country’s rich heritage. 88 To this end, it has invested in, among other initiatives, the revival of “folk universities” and the Circles of Female Farmers (Koła Gospodyń Wiejskich) in rural parts of the country. Folk universities, like the West Pomerania Folk University and the Kaszubski Folk University, have been around for many years, and similar to the folk universities in Scandinavian countries, these organizations provide informal education, training for unemployed individuals, and cultural events to ignite and sustain activism in rural areas. 89 The government’s support of these grassroots educational organizations is important because of the rural–urban split in Poland, making it hard for CSOs from urban areas to work effectively in rural locations. 90 The government has also supported ultranationalistic organizations by establishing the Institute for Legacy of Polish National Thought (Instytut Dziedzictwa Myśli Narodowej), for example, providing funding for the so-called “Independence March” (Marsz Niepodległości). 91 These marches have grown since 2010 and demonstrate the disenchantment of some Poles with the post-eighty-nine Polish socioeconomic policies, Europeanization, and globalization. Moreover, during the mass protests after the controversial judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal on the access to legal abortions in October 2020, the leader of the PiS called on citizens to defend churches and Polish values. 92
PiS’s involvement in civil society has increased the number of self-proclaimed “traditional organizations.” Its heavy-handed strategy has also had unintended consequences, solidifying alliances among individuals and organizations that feel particularly threatened by the current government and its ambitions. This solidification of relationships is, thus, expanding and strengthening some liberal, progressive networks, especially those focused on women’s rights and LGTQ+ activism. As Petrova and Tarrow suggest, counting the number of organizations in post-communist countries is only one way of measuring civil society’s strength; the other way is relational and considers the degree to which and how groups coalesce around shared concerns. 93 Not only is there a broad spectrum of NGOs/CSOs, groups, associations, and online movements in Poland focused on the rights of women and LGBTQ+ individuals but also the ties between these groups are growing stronger, allowing even a small number of people to engage in meaningful and impactful collective action. We contend that although the magnitude of participation in Poland is low for the general population, this is different from the density of the relationships among actors that are increasingly engaged in “coalition formation around issues, network formation, and negotiation with elites.” 94 As other scholars observe, the government’s policies have, unintentionally, strengthened transactional capacity around children’s rights, the rights of people with disabilities, urban movements, and environmental protection. 95 The following highlights the coalitions and the networks that have strengthened, and, in some cases, surged around women’s reproductive rights.
Women’s groups and women’s rights activists were among the first to form associations in post-communist Poland. Although feminist groups took many forms in the post-1989 environment, they were typically linked to NGOs and academia, and they were criticized for being elitist, reflecting the concerns of “middle-class women from urban areas.” 96 This has changed profoundly in the post-2015 period, as the PiS government has worked to restrict women’s reproductive rights and support traditional gender narratives. These efforts occurred alongside other government measures and policies that targeted the independence of the judiciary, media freedom, and freedom of association. These government actions culminated in the Polish Women’s Strike (Ogólnopolski Strajk Kobiet) that started in the fall of 2016 and led to a series of nationwide, large-scale protests and the creation of numerous online organizations and off-line activities. Not only did thousands of women from around the country participate in street protests but also a nationwide network of organizations emerged which called on all Polish women to protest the government’s restrictive measures.
Black Monday (Czarny Poniedziałek) protests, which took place in October 2016, included tens of thousands of people, connected through social media networks and informal alliances. These protests occurred in over 150 locations throughout Poland and abroad. In addition to about 200,000 people participating in street protests, about the same number of women did not go to work. According to the Polish Women’s Strike network, half a million people wore black on that day. The Black Protests illustrate the dense networks of like-minded individuals and the critical role of informal activism, working alongside formal groups and the new spaces of activism that are both online and off-line—existing “in a continuum [that] cannot always be neatly separated.” 97
Poland’s current anti-gender regime is not entirely new, nor are grassroots efforts and organizations that advocate for women’s rights and gender equality. Various post-1989 governments tried and successfully limited women’s rights, but the topic of reproductive rights was rather unpopular and pro-choice activists who attempted to rally the country and liberalize abortion laws failed to accomplish much. In the post-2015 era, Polish civil society and particularly women’s rights activists and supporters of reproductive rights have changed dramatically. The collaborative efforts of like-minded individuals emphasize inclusivity; their strategies are intentional; and their tactics are multifaceted, ensuring that ordinary women can participate in these activities. Moreover, these coalitions provide women (and men) from all places around Poland with a range of choices for how they can be active and supportive: they can stay home from work; they can march; they can simply wear black; or they can just post or share content online. All these options allow women and allies to speak and act. 98
Some women’s advocacy organizations have demonstrated an ability to adapt to the new environment, which provides less funding and support by diversifying funding streams and broadening their support. Some groups have opted to create professional training programs for gender inclusivity that generate income or use membership fees. For some organizations, the “Lump Sum Income Tax Act,” or the 1 percent designated by taxpayers from individual income tax that goes to public benefit organizations (NGOs/CSOs), has allowed organizations to find a level of self-sufficiency. 99 The facilitating and complementary role of social media and online platforms is an integral part of contemporary feminist activism. Groups like Dziewuchy Dziewuchom (Gals for Gals) and Dziewuszki Dziewuszkom (Girls for Girls) started as Facebook groups but morphed into off-line groups and initiatives that sprung up around the country. These more informal initiatives filled a significant void by providing ordinary women and girls with space to discuss their experiences, share their grievances, and to organize. In particular, Gals for Gals is an impressive grassroots organization that had, at least at one point in time, as many as 100,000 supporters. 100
For some, contemporary feminist activism has broken with the past and the organizations that dominated the post-1989 landscape; earlier, activists’ work was channeled through NGOs that relied on external funding and support, and it often became depoliticized, detached, and driven by the logic of funders, rather than the needs and interests of locals. 101 This is no longer the case. This diversity of feminisms in Poland has been visible in the recent mobilizations, where young and old marched together and where various visions of feminism and justice are articulated.” 102 Civic activism in this area is not so much about the number of organizations; it is about different kinds of organizations and new forms of actions, and the “connective action” that relies on frames that are shared through social media networks. According to one City Councilwoman, “funding challenges for civil society organizations are real, and people are burned out,” and while Polish citizens are weary of street protests and fundraising, this does not mean that they are passive and uninterested. This is particularly the case for women’s reproductive rights. When this Councilwoman thinks about women’s activism, she admits that things are changing a lot, and while organizations look different and some have disappeared, younger activists are doing things differently. Activism in Poland today “just looks different,” but it certainly exists. 103
The Polish Women’s Strike and the numerous online and in-person initiatives have coalesced into what can only be described as a sustained women’s movement. The government has recently used the COVID-19 pandemic to try again to push through restrictive abortion laws. Despite a national lockdown and the health risks involved, Polish women again showed up and organizations came together to resist the government’s plan. Even if they were not ultimately able to prevent the government from further restricting abortion, these protests are some of the largest in the country’s history. Thirty years after communism’s demise, organizations committed to women’s rights and reproductive freedom are connected to each other and to other like-minded progressive organizations that fear the current government’s conservative, homophobic, anti-democratic behavior. Today’s trajectory of feminist activism is a good illustration of how the government’s efforts to direct civil society have created its own backlash against the government, strengthening feminist voices and pushing individuals and organizations to cooperate and innovate, leveraging online technology. As activists in Poznań explained, civil society in Poland, like in other countries, is increasingly divided, which means that although people live in their own “bubbles,” but when it comes to protesting and advocating, “we all know each other” and can be active in many areas. 104
A final important indication of the surprising strengthening of segments of Polish civil society is the multiorganizational response to the PiS government’s interference in the country’s judicial system, which has helped develop Poland’s legal profession. In part, because of the government’s efforts to limit judicial independence, Poland now has a broad array of legal organizations and coalitions that provide individuals and organizations with guidance and support. Among the groups in these diverse legal networks are the Committee for the Defense of Justice (Komitet Obrony Sprawiedliwości, KOS), which is a coalition of more than a dozen organizations of lawyers, judges, and legal experts 105 ; the Polish Judges Association Iustitia (Stowarzyszenie Sędziów Polskich Iustitia); the Polish Society for Anti-Discrimination Law (Polskie Towarzystwo Prawa Antydyskryminacyjnego); and the Themis Association of Judges (Stowarzyszenie Sędziów Themis). While some of these are long-standing groups, some were created recently in response to citizen protests over discrimination, human rights abuses, and judicial independence.
To be sure, Poland’s national government is not the only actor involved in shaping and sustaining activism, and what emerged from our interviews is that the nature and intensity of civic activism is also influenced by an array of public and private actors (including lawyers and judges), but also local governments, city officials, and private businesses. This new, dense landscape does not mean that these coalitions and public–private networks are not fragile; they certainly are. However, as an official from Poznań’s Human Rights Center (Poznańskie Centrum Praw Człowieka) put it, Poland now has more professionalized organizations . . . and while some have less ability to act and less access to politicians and the media, there is also (a sense) that organizations are starting to come together, supporting each other . . . and cooperating with bigger and more powerful organizations.
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Conclusion
For decades, Polish citizens longed to “return to Europe” to become “European rather than Eastern European” and be, again, “a normal country.” In normal countries, presumably, citizens can speak out against their government, associate, and advocate without fear, or they can choose to remain silent and do nothing. The dynamics and diversity of contemporary activism in Poland confirm that Poland has, indeed, accomplished this ambitious goal. Activism in this country has unique characteristics, but its trends and tendencies are not that dissimilar to other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. As elsewhere in the region, most Poles are not members of any formal NGO or CSO, but, we maintain, that this tells us little about what is really happening in Polish society. Primary and secondary sources, as well as interview data provide a more nuanced look at what is happening in contemporary Poland as well as why, how, and where activism is occurring. This information demonstrates that the government’s role in civil society development is crucial, and that in the post-2015 period, the PiS government’s actions have limited the space for activities and activism, particularly for advocacy NGOs. Yet, such efforts are not that unique and since 2012, more than ninety laws in at least fifty countries seek to restrict the freedom of association or assembly for CSOs. 107 Even in many democratic countries, the space for activism is shrinking or closing.
Despite the government’s actions, civic activism has not disappeared in Poland; instead, it has transformed and shifted, exploiting new technology and opportunity structures, as is the case in both Bosnia and Russia. New generations of e-activists are creating effective ways of engaging average citizens, participating in activities that create new identities and strengthen relationships across sectors. Because of the government’s interest in supporting traditional and conservative organizations, Poland’s civil society is also diverse in terms of ideology and geographical representation. The government’s autocratic behavior has strengthened the ties among individuals concerned about the future of democracy, upset with everyday problems, and fearful that the government will deny women basic rights. This strengthening of civil society and backlash against the government is demonstrated by the networks of organizations and individuals that regularly call upon each other to protest proposed laws and government actions and to demonstrate in the streets.
As in other democratic countries, where the government is trying to direct and restrict civil society, the Polish government is forcing some activists to mobilize in new and different ways. It is, simultaneously, pushing discontent and engagement into new venues and issue areas, strengthening relationships and intensifying collaboration. As the activist and Congress of Women participant, Bogna Czałczyńska, puts it, Every time I think of it, I am so, so grateful to Law and Justice and Chairman Kaczyński. If it had not been for all they had done . . . there would have never been such an acceleration, such a rapid joining among women’s movements, civic movements, which we are witnessing now. I’ve been noticing a new wave of different women.
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Polish activism thirty years after communism’s demise has unique aspects and distinct organizations, but its fragmentation and diversity are not that different from its neighbors—in the east, south, or west—and, in fact, Poland now resembles other “normal” democratic countries.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
We thank the following for their feedback: David Forsythe, Weronika Paszewska, Paula Pickering, Sabrina Petra Ramet, Dorota Pietrzyk-Reeves, Paulina Pospieszna, Valerie Sperling, Lisa Sundstrom, participants of the panel “Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe Thirty Years After,” at the 52nd Annual Convention of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES), as well as two anonymous reviewers.
Notes
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