Abstract
Since the Euromaidan revolution, Ukrainian cinema has been experiencing a renaissance, associated with both the wave of civic and creative activity and the policy of the post-Maidan authorities supporting the film industry. The article analyzes the development of Ukrainian cinema from 2014 to 2019, focusing not only on organizational, institutional, and legal changes but also on the accompanying controversies. It addresses the main socio-political, economic, and cultural factors influencing progress in the number of films produced in Ukraine and their popularization on the domestic and foreign market. The article particularly emphasizes the context of Russian aggression toward Ukraine and the ongoing war in Donbas, as it influences not only the topics taken up by filmmakers but also the priorities of authorities in the field of cultural policy. Cinema has become one of the fronts of the conflict. Thus, the post-Maidan authorities’ concern was both to block Russian content deemed dangerous from the point of view of national security and to produce and promote “Ukrainian-centric” narratives. The last part of the article will discuss the new Ukrainian “patriotic cinema,” supported and subsidized by the state, with a focus on the role it plays in a society experiencing conflict.
When Ukraine gained the status of an independent state in 1991, there was a conviction among the state-building elite that national culture based on national language was crucial for the consolidation of the new political community. Equally important was the emancipation from the “malorosiistvo” (Little Russianness) complex, according to which Ukrainian culture and language were deemed immature and inferior. 1 It was believed that cinema could be one of the tools for the promotion of the Ukrainian language and “Ukrainianness.” 2 Cinema, especially films revealing “white spots” in Ukrainian history, was perceived as an effective tool for the formation of national identity and (re)building a sense of pride in being Ukrainian. 3 However, Larysa Briukhovets’ka bitterly summed up the first fifteen years of cinema in independent Ukraine by saying: “None of the Ukrainian films of the era of independence won our screens and hearts and became the basis of Ukrainian identity.” 4 Ukrainian filmmakers were unable to create films that attracted a mass audience to the movie theaters. The low level of film education and detachment from the currents of world cinema led to the preservation of Ukrainian film art in the circle of a narrow tradition that has ceased to be attractive in the new socio-political reality. 5
The crisis of Ukrainian cinema was only deepened by the indolence of the young Ukrainian state, which was not able to properly use the opportunity to create a domestic film industry. There was a lack of financial resources and appropriate legal regulations as well as a lack of understanding about how to use the well-developed infrastructure that remained after the Soviet period. Film studios and a well-functioning movie theater chain fell into disrepair without state support or a well-thought-out strategy for marketing. During Soviet times, the Ukrainian SSR had been a powerhouse in film production. However, all film production facilities were controlled by Moscow and centrally managed, and the employees, mostly non-Ukrainians, were not interested in developing Ukrainian culture. In the 1990s, film studios and movie theaters were largely transferred into private hands, with new managers having no idea how to manage them. There were no new legal measures regulating the film industry, and since Ukraine had no experience with the free market, private financing mechanisms for film productions were poorly developed. In addition, the problem of cinema’s dependence on state administration remained, which often meant that decisions about supporting films were made not on the basis of a substantive assessment of the value of the project, but rather on the basis of personal acquaintances and bribes. Despite the declaration of reform and development of Ukrainian cinema on the part of state activists and officials of the Ministry of Culture, in the first years of Ukrainian independence, neither a clear vision nor a constructive plan was proposed to do so. 6
Consequently, film production was consistently reduced from about fifty feature films in 1990–1992 to just a few annually in 1996–2000. In 2010, no films were made in Ukraine. Film consumption was limited almost exclusively to Russian and American productions, often watched via illegal pirated copies that flooded the Ukrainian market. The number of cinema viewers in 2000 was 6 million, which, compared with 552 million in 1990, shows the scale of decline. 7
The situation slowly began to change when a generation of filmmakers who had been brought up in independent Ukraine took the floor. They began to talk loudly about the problems of the Ukrainian film industry and the missed opportunities related to the development of national cinema. The real revival of the Ukrainian cinema, however, began only in 2014, with the Revolution of Dignity. 8 The desire for change and reform covered many spheres of state, society, and culture. Many grassroots actions and initiatives aimed at the development of cinema gained the support of the new, post-Maidan authorities. At the same time, in the conditions of growing conflict with Russia and pro-Russian separatists in Donbas, 9 the Ukrainian authorities recognized cultural policy as one of the strategic areas related to state security. Also, film policy, which defines the scope, direction, and shape of state intervention in the film industry, had become the subject of increased concern for the authorities.
This article aims to present the development of Ukrainian cinema in the context of Russian aggression toward Ukraine and the ongoing war in Donbas. The analysis will cover the years 2014–2019, from the first post-Maidan government until the end of the presidency of Petro Poroshenko and the government headed by the president’s close ally Volodymyr Groysman. 10 These authorities, operating in the difficult conditions caused by the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the war in Donbas, promised to pursue a policy of democratic reform bringing Ukraine closer to EU and NATO structures, and, at the same time, supporting the Ukrainization policy. 11 In the first part of the article, I will indicate the main socio-political, economic, and cultural factors influencing the development of Ukrainian cinema and the main actors involved in the changes. Next, I will analyze the shape of Ukrainian film policy in the context of the ongoing conflict with Russia. The war between Russia and Ukraine has never been officially declared, 12 but as early as January 2015 the Ukrainian authorities recognized Russia as an “aggressor country” waging a hybrid war against Ukraine. This part of the article is based on a textual analysis that will cover both legal acts introduced by the Yatseniuk governments (2014–2016) and the Groysman government (2016–2019) and the discursive field formed around them by various stakeholders, including those responsible for implementing this policy, and the cultural elite (e.g., directors, journalists, film experts). 13 Finally, I will focus on the state-subsidized “patriotic cinema,” which has become the apple of the eye of the new film policy creators. Analyzing the most famous Ukrainian blockbusters of recent years, I will look at how films participate in shaping the moral judgments and emotional perceptions of current events, and in a wider context—how they take part in internal cultural wars to define and imagine Ukraine. 14
This article sets out to partially fill the gap in current scholarship on post-Maidan Ukrainian cinema. This topic is only just becoming a subject of interest for researchers and has not yet been sufficiently researched. 15 At the same time, this case may be a valuable contribution to the general discussion of “national cinema.” 16 It is interesting that while researchers focused on the Western cultural context have wondered if the concept of national cinema is obsolete and useless in terms of globalized cultural economy, transnationality, and the global influence of Hollywood, 17 those analyzing other cultural contexts, including the post-Soviet, still see its explanatory value. 18 As can be seen from the example of contemporary Ukraine, even in the era of globalization state-supported cinema may remain closely related to the policies of top-down “nation-building.” Films can be used by governments to promote certain values and beliefs, shape the desired vision of national history, and foster a common sense of belonging among citizens. In addition, the case of Ukraine can provide interesting insights regarding not only national cinema as a tool of national self-differentiation but also film policy in the conditions of hybrid war.
The Revolution of Dignity in Ukrainian Cinema
The revival in Ukrainian cinema began in the second decade of the 21st century with a young generation of filmmakers that “had no or very little experience working within the Soviet system, and unlike their older colleagues, they were exposed to international filmmaking.” 19 In their opinion, Ukrainian national cinema, often narrowly equated with “poetic cinema,” which flourished in the 1960s, required updating in the completely new context of 21st-century Ukraine. Two independent projects, Mudaky. Arabesky [Fangs. Arabesques, 2011] and Ukraïno, Goodbye! [Goodbye Ukraine, 2012], met with interest from young audiences and showed that it was possible to create attractive, modern cinema in Ukrainian. However, the real renaissance of Ukrainian cinema was possible only under conditions in which the creativity of filmmakers met with organizational and financial support from the state and the film industry.
This happened after 2014 when a new government was formed in Ukraine as a result of mass protests in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. The Revolution of Dignity was also a revolution in Ukrainian culture. In the conditions of extraordinary social mobilization related to the revolution and the war that followed, Ukraine experienced an impressive cultural renaissance. As Pesenti noted, “The Euromaidan movement spurred a powerful wave of cultural activism, involving among other things the establishment of platforms for debates, the holding of pop-up exhibitions, urban regeneration projects, and initiatives by volunteer groups to protect crumbling national heritage sites around the country.” 20 The grassroots community, united by the slogan “viz’my ǐ zroby” (do it yourself) popularized during the Euromaidan, was the main driver of this dynamic development. The outbreak of film work devoted to the events of the winter of 2013/2014 was also the result of spontaneous actions. Already in November 2013, a cinema project, “Babylon-13,” was created, under which Ukrainian directors and cinematographers documented the birth and first steps of the new Ukrainian civil society. As declared by the filmmakers who created this association, “a film documentary is a tool capable of changing the way citizens perceive reality.” Hence cinema had a responsibility to participate in transformations and even shape them. 21 This task became even more serious in the following months. The filmmakers accompanied the participants of the “anti-terrorist operation” and the civilian population of Donbas as it was ravaged by the war. Also, many participants of military operations and refugees decided to convey their experiences through film, which resulted in the development of committed documentary cinema in Ukraine. 22
This spontaneous trend was reinforced by the actions of the new government, which initiated substantial support for the film industry for the first time in independent Ukraine. In 2014, Yevhen Nyshchuk, a Euromaidan activist and popular theater and film actor, became the minister of culture. 23 One of his first decisions was to restructure the Ukrainian State Film Agency (Derzhavne ahentstvo Ukraïny z pytan’ kino, known as Derzhkino). During the first few years of its operation this institution, which was established in 2011 as a central executive body of the government implementing the state policy on cinema, was deprived of financial and legal resources. In July 2014, Arseniy Yatsenyuk approved a document, 24 according to which Derzhkino was granted substantial powers, thanks to which it could financially and administratively support all stages of film production, from script competitions to national and international promotion.
At the same time, solutions were introduced aimed at increasing the transparency of state support procedures for cinema and breaking down old structures that did not support creators. For this purpose, in November 2015, new rules were introduced for selecting film projects to receive state funding. Until then, the competition procedure was not fully public, a result of obfuscation, and caused many controversies. According to the new rules, pitching—when filmmakers present their film ideas to get funding—has become open to the public. Everyone can see the assessments of the project evaluation committee. Additionally, these meetings are recorded and available online. The rules ensured that all competitions are announced in good time and detailed results are published on the Agency’s website. It was also established that the experts on evaluating committees would not be government officials but people with extensive professional experience, mainly directors, producers, distributors, film festival organizers, journalists, and critics. In addition, local film commissions were set up in the regions to give local filmmakers a better chance to emerge.
New rules related to the introduction of transparent and democratic procedures in cultural management are also visible in newly established institutions. One of them is the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation (Ukraïns’kyǐ kul’turnyǐ fond), created in March 2017. The mission of the Foundation is to introduce “new mechanisms for result-oriented and competition-based state funding for initiatives in the field of culture and creative industries,” 25 aiming to promote both national culture and art and the principles of democratic, fair management of public finances. Caring for national film heritage and awarding grants supporting the production of the “national audiovisual product” has become one of the main priorities of the new institution.
In addition, the Ukrainian state has significantly enhanced the budget for the development of domestic cinema. Between 2014 and 2019, the State Film Agency’s budget for the co-funding of film production increased by 700 percent, from UAH 63 million to UAH 505 million. 26 As a result, in the first three years following the Revolution of Dignity, Derzhkino was able to support the production of over a hundred new films. Since 2014, the number of Ukrainian films released has been steadily increasing. Moreover, the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine took care of the development of cooperation with European institutions willing to subsidize Ukrainian productions. Also, the creation of new legal and financial mechanisms started to enable the co-production of films with foreign partners. As a result, joint film projects were launched with countries such as Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Canada, and Australia.
In addition to supporting production, problems with the distribution and popularization of Ukrainian cinema, which had so far been one of the greatest difficulties of domestic cinema, 27 began to be solved. In 2014, the Dovzhenko Center, an institution whose aim is to preserve Ukrainian film heritage and popularize it at home and abroad, was restructured. 28 Moreover, both Derzhkino and the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation provide grants for promotional campaigns of Ukrainian films. Additional funds have been created for Ukrainian filmmakers participating in foreign festivals. Thanks to this, Ukrainian films could be seen at the world’s leading film festivals, including in Berlin, Venice, Cannes, and Karlovy Vary. One result is the increase in the number of films that have received prestigious international film awards. International popularization of Ukrainian cinema is also fostered by the growing distribution of Ukrainian films abroad and their availability on popular platforms such as Amazon and Netflix. Considerable state support was also given to Ukrainian based festivals, both for those already existing, such as the Odessa International Film Festival and the Kyiv International Film Festival “Molodist,” and for the creation of new ones. 29 For example, 2018 saw the first edition of the new international film festival, the Kyiv Critics’ Week. 30 The festival presents a newly created film prize, “Kinokolo,” awarded by Ukrainian film critics.
“Kinokolo” as well as other newly created film awards testify to the development and growing prestige of domestic cinema. In 2014, the National Filmmakers’ Union of Ukraine created a special prize “for contribution to the development of Ukrainian cinema” for the best feature and non-fiction film and the best animation. As noted by the head of this institution, film expert Serhiǐ Trymbach, “For the first time in the last 15–17 years, the number of Ukrainian film screenings exceeded the number of foreign film screenings. For many years there was no award for the best Ukrainian film. The reasons are clear because there were simply too few films.” 31 Another important initiative is the establishment of the Ukrainian Film Academy (Ukraïns’ka kinoakademiia), which began awarding the annual “Golden Dzyga Film Awards” (Zolota dzyga) in 2017. The award quickly became known as the “Ukrainian Oscar,” and its appearance—a spinning top—symbolizes the continuous and dynamic development of Ukrainian cinema. 32
An equally important factor in the development of Ukrainian cinema is the rapidly changing perception of native productions in Ukrainian society. The box office success of many Ukrainian films proves the great demand of the audience for “their own” cinema. Ukrainian films are no longer synonymous with “embarrassment,” and the interest in both classic productions of Ukrainian cinema and contemporary works is significantly increasing. In 2017, four times more tickets were sold for Ukrainian productions than in the previous year, which proves this trend. 33 The development of the local production and distribution market is beginning to be more and more profitable, and the attitudes of distributors and movie theater chains to the screening of Ukrainian films are changing. Movie theater chains are finally interested in the distribution and popularization of domestic productions. There are also initiatives that combine the creative energy of activists with the money of private sponsors, aimed at popularizing Ukrainian artists and creating opportunities for their further development. 34
New Film Policy: Make Cinema More Ukrainian
At the same time, it should be borne in mind that since 2014, Ukrainian cinema has been developing in the conditions of an armed conflict in the east of the country and a hybrid war with Russia. These situations affect the topics taken up by filmmakers but also the shape of the film policy pursued by the Ukrainian state. Unlike Ukraine, which for a long time did not support the domestic film industry, since the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s presidency Russia has been pursuing an active film policy, related to ideological goals. 35 The Russian government skillfully uses its film and media industries to shape public opinion, strengthen national identity, arouse patriotic feelings, and try to impose its narratives on the past and current events of the entire post-Soviet area. 36
In the midst of the growing conflict with Russia, the discussion of the omnipresence of Russian films, series, and TV programs in Ukraine began to percolate from the inner circles of experts and cultural critics into the public mainstream. Voices of activists calling for a boycott of Russian films and TV programs began to be louder, especially as they were supported by several commanders of volunteer battalions who were respected and popular during wartime. As early as October 2014, Derzhkino created the first list of films banned from screening, explaining that they glorify the armed forces of the “aggressor state.” Films with the participation of actors who openly supported Putin’s policy and the separatist republics in the Donbas were also blocked. 37
At the same time, work began on a legal solution to ban the display of Russian content in the Ukrainian information space. The law “On amendments to some legal acts of Ukraine concerning the protection of the information television and radio space of Ukraine” was signed in February 2015. 38 Under the new law, it is prohibited to use any audiovisual products that harm Ukraine’s national security, and in particular, contain propaganda of an aggressor state, glorify Russian and Soviet armed forces and the security services, create a positive image of their members, and justify the occupation of Ukrainian territory. The law also prohibits the broadcasting by TV and radio stations of all audiovisual works, the production of which includes people from the special list of persons posing a threat to the security of Ukraine. The list was prepared by the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, mainly at the request of the Security Service of Ukraine. 39 Another even more radical legal arrangement was introduced a year later. According to this, all Russian films made after January 1, 2014, were forbidden to be distributed in Ukraine. Due to this policy, in 2014–2019, Derzhkino banned the distribution of 778 films and series in Ukraine, most of them produced in Russia. 40
A large part of the film community has welcomed the law blocking Russian content, seeing it as an opportunity to strengthen the domestic film industry. Leonid Kanter, a director from the youngest generation of filmmakers and author of documentaries devoted to the war in Donbas, has expressed this opinion in an interview, stating that: “It is possible that such a radical decision will pave the way for Ukrainian films, and their producers will finally be noticed.” 41 At the same time, Ukrainian authorities realized that culture could be a powerful instrument of soft power and a tool to sustain the mobilization of society in difficult conflict conditions. Cinema was recognized as a cultural good that could be used for the ideological purposes of uniting the nation and constructing a national identity. Hence, one of the priorities in cultural policy has become (re)building a “national cinema” that promotes the Ukrainian language and culture and strengthens Ukrainian patriotism.
Pylyp Ilienko, a film director and producer, was appointed the person responsible for this task as head of Derzhkino from August 2014 to August 2019. Ilienko is the son of the outstanding Ukrainian director Yuriy Ilyenko, who is not only one of the most prominent creators of Ukrainian national cinema, but also dealt with the institutional development of Ukrainian cinema in the first years of Ukrainian independence. 42 Ilenko junior, an active participant in Euromaidan, politically associated with the nationalist party “Svoboda,” not only had experience in the film industry but also a clear vision of what “national cinema” should look like. Implementing reforms of state cinema and shaping film policy, he treated the reconstruction of the Ukrainian film industry as a patriotic mission. In the interviews he gave, he emphasized that his dream was to “revive Ukrainian cinema” and to make it more Ukrainian. 43
The legal document intended to make these dreams come true was a new Law of Ukraine “On the State Support for the Cinema in Ukraine” 44 introduced in March 2017. The document precisely defines the scope and mechanisms of implementing state support for the production, distribution, and promotion of films. Support is provided for up to 100 percent of film production costs in the case of commissioned, documentary, educational, and debut films, as well as films intended for children’s audiences and films of high artistic and cultural importance. The remaining budget can support up to 80 percent of the production costs for feature films and 50 percent for TV films and series. Favorable tax breaks for the film industry were also introduced, and the rules of co-production of films with foreign entities were regulated. Pursuant to the act, state support was provided for the development of film education, archives, and festivals, as well as distribution and screening networks, especially in cities with fewer than 250,000 inhabitants.
Since, according to the new law, one of the goals of state support for cinema is “promotion of Ukrainian values, Ukrainian language and culture as well as popularization of national films,” the new legislature precisely defines the criteria determining which films can be defined as national and receive state support. For this purpose, the legal definition of a “national film” was introduced into the Law of Ukraine “On Cinema.” A specially established Council for State Support for the Cinema is to award a “national film certificate” on the basis of an appropriate number of “points.” The basic requirements include the production of the film (entirely or partially) in Ukraine, the participation of Ukrainian filmmakers and actors, and the language issue: the Ukrainian or Crimean Tatar language must account for 90 percent of the total dialogue. During the screening of a national film in Ukraine, dialogues in any language other than Ukrainian must be dubbed or subtitled in Ukrainian.
In practice, therefore, films made in Russian were excluded from the category of “national cinema,” which caused much controversy among a film community. 45 It is noted that the new law excluded from state support those Ukrainian artists who would like to create Ukrainian culture but in Russian. Indeed, for some Ukrainian filmmakers, making films in Russian was a natural decision, as this was the language they were most comfortable speaking. In many cases, however, it was a decision motivated by economic factors and the requirements of the film industry, as it facilitated the distribution of films to Russian-speaking markets. 46 Moreover, the introduction of the requirement that only films in Ukrainian can count on state subsidies, and all foreign films must have a Ukrainian language version has exposed the weaknesses of domestic film studios, which have problems with both creating Ukrainian dubbing and producing Ukrainian soundtracks. 47 Nevertheless, the new policy is quickly yielding results. The protests from 2008, when the largest movie theater chains in Ukraine did not agree to dub foreign films in Ukrainian, did not happen again. 48 Also Ukrainian film studios and production companies have started to adapt to the new requirements in order to benefit from state subsidies. For example, Kvartal 95 Studio, which has so far only made films in Russian, made the first film with Ukrainian dubbing, Ia, ty, vin, vona (I, you, she, he), in 2018. 49
The requirement to dub films made in Russian, however, is perceived by some as too radical. For many Ukrainian citizens who use Russian on a daily basis, it may seem incomprehensible or even funny. The problem of creating a credible representation of that part of Ukrainian society for which Russian is the mother tongue also remains an important issue. 50 This dilemma was pointed out by director Sergei Loznica, who called the idea of dubbing his film Donbass (2018) in Ukrainian “strange.” First, he notes that in the area where the action takes place, people speak Russian, and dubbing in Ukrainian sounds unnatural. Second, in his opinion, it is unnecessary because “everyone understands Russian well (. . .), this language is absolutely clear and accessible to all who live here.” 51
Nevertheless, the discussions about the status of the Ukrainian language that has been going on in Ukraine for decades, in the conditions of the current armed conflict, have acquired a unique dimension. Language is perceived not only as a means of communication but also a factor of national security. 52 For many Ukrainians, including those involved in creating cultural policy, the argument that “everyone understands Russian” is no longer relevant. In their opinion, the significant presence of the Russian language in the information and cultural space perpetuates the belief that the Ukrainian language is inferior and unattractive. Therefore, strengthening the position of the Ukrainian language in these spheres is considered a priority. Cinema has become one of the tools of this policy, promoting “Ukrainianness” as something positive and attractive. 53
Another objection to the new film policy is the fear that the “highway” has been opened only to selected films that comply with the ideological line of the post-Maidan authorities. 54 In public debates on new legislation and ways of implementing the new film policy, attention is drawn to the problem of the limits of state intervention in art. 55 There is an argument that while fighting Russian influence, Ukraine is borrowing and adapting some solutions in the field of cultural policy from Putin’s Russia. In Russia, especially since 2001, patriotic filmmaking generously subsidized with public money is one of the key instruments in nation-building policy. Especially keenly commissioned by the state, and generously financed, are historical and war films, which build positive associations with the Russian nation and state and provide the opportunity to “plunge” into the national culture and history. 56 Similar thinking about the role of national cinema seems to guide the creators of the new Ukrainian film policy, and along with it, similar mechanisms of influencing the decisions of filmmakers and film studios are used.
Patriotic Filmmaking in the Times of War
Derzhkino, under the leadership of Ilyenko, devoted itself to a large extent to its “patriotic mission,” supporting the production and distribution of films that tie in with the desired vision of national history, mythology, and identity. Ilyenko did not hide that the films that are most generously financed by the state are those which can become a tool for shaping national self-identification and the foundation of the modern Ukrainian nation. 57 Among them, a special place is occupied by films devoted to Ukrainian history, including the history of ongoing conflict. The demand for this type of production was expressed through thematic competitions organized by Derzhkino at the request of the Ministry of Culture. In 2014–2019, these were historical topics, ‘On the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the announcement of the Ukrainian National Republic and the Battle of Kruty” (2015 and 2016) and “On the occasion of the 85th anniversary of the Holodomor 1932–1933” (2017). In five of the six competitions held between 2014 and 2019, there was also a thematic section “About heroic fighters who took part in the defense of Ukraine,” which supported the production of films dealing with the subject of both historical struggles for national liberation and the ongoing war. 58 Moreover, a special program of the Ministry of Culture, “Production and distribution of patriotic films,” was announced in 2018. 59 A gigantic sum of UAH 500 million has been allocated to it, which is as much as the entire budget of the State Film Agency. At the same time, in the debate on Ukrainian “national cinema,” a new term, “patriotic cinema,” has appeared. Its supporters see it as a tool to consolidate the national community and strengthen patriotic attachment. In turn, for opponents, patriotic cinema is equated with propaganda. 60
It should be added that historical cinema, dealing with the “white spots” of Ukrainian history, has struggled with the problems of under-financing for decades. This changed after 2014 when the Ukrainian state began to pursue a coherent policy of memory and identity based on the belief that the past is a powerful reservoir of national myths and heroes. 61 Films about the heroic struggles of Ukrainians for independence in the twentieth century as well as films introducing the characters of this struggle and reinterpreting them, in accordance with the Ukrainian-centric point of view, received generous support. This is in line with one of the so-called “decommunization laws,” “On the Legal Status and Honoring the Memory of Fighters for Ukraine’s Independence in the Twentieth Century” signed in 2015 by President Poroshenko. Among the most spectacular historic blockbusters, generously funded with state money, are Taiemnyǐ shchodennyk Symona Petliury (The Secret Diary of Symon Petriula, dir. Oles Yanchuk, 2018), Chervonyǐ (Red, dir. Zaza Buadze, 2017), and Kruty 1918 (dir. Oleksii Shapariev, 2019).
The first of these films take on the controversial figure of Symon Petriula, leading Ukraine’s struggle for independence as the Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian Army and the President of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1918–1921. The next tells about an ordinary man, a fighter of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, who after the war ended up in a Soviet labor camp and started an uprising there, uniting prisoners of different world views and experiences. The last of the movies describe the dramatic fate of nearly 400 young cadets, mainly poorly trained students, who faced the much stronger Bolshevik forces near the Kruty railway station in January 1918. The above-mentioned films are therefore linked by confronting these events and figures of Ukrainian history, which were presented in Soviet historiography as treacherous and shameful, and attempt to tell Ukrainian history anew. These films not only have the potential to shape judgments and perceptions of the past, but also—through the visual language of the film—create a cultural memory of the national heroes of the previous century, enabling contemporary Ukrainian generations to identify with them.
Moreover, the latest Ukrainian historical films contain numerous references to the current political situation. They show the need to stop quarrels and unite in the face of the constant threat to Ukraine from the east. The Russians are presented in them as representatives of a different, semi-barbaric civilization, trying to impose foreign values and ideas on the essentially European society of Ukraine. The most readable parallels between the past and the present can be found in the production Kruty 1918. The author of the idea for the film and its screenwriter, Konstantin Konovalov, emphasized that although the script itself was created long before the Euromaidan, “when the war in the East began, it was strange to watch how history repeated itself.” 62 The film begins and ends with an eloquent scene in which a contemporary Ukrainian soldier, a participant in the “anti-terrorist operation,” arrives at the site of a hundred-year-old battle, admires the Kruty Heroes Memorial, and finally takes a train to the east, to the next battlefront for a free Ukraine. The contemporary soldier has the face of the main character of the film, which emphasizes the relationship of two events that are separated by a hundred years. They are symbolically intertwined with each other, creating a mythical dimension in the struggle for the homeland and a common memory of the sacrifice of all those who gave their health and lives for it.
Thanks to cinema, it is also possible to shape perceptions and emotional assessments of current events in the east of the country. This is clearly seen in the blockbuster Kiborhy. Heroï ne vmyraiut’ (Cyborgs. Heroes Do Not Die, 2017), telling the story of one of the most famous episodes of the ongoing war—the fight of Ukrainian soldiers to defend the Donetsk airport. The characters of the six main protagonists, cyborgs, are based on real people involved in that struggle. On the other hand, they create almost archetypal patterns reflecting different attitudes of contemporary Ukrainians and different ideas about the future of Ukraine. As the director of the film, Akhtem Seitablayev, explained in one of the interviews, the main task of the film was to explain the current wartime situation and shape its assessment. Kiborhy is “an attempt to understand what kind of war it is, between who and what for.” 63
The film was warmly received by both viewers and critics, becoming a cinematic success and the sixth highest-grossing Ukrainian film. The film received a new Ukrainian “Zolota dzyga” award for the best film and the Ukrainian critics “Kinokolo” award for the best actor. At the same time, it changed the tone of the debate on Ukrainian “patriotic cinema.” Historical films, such as Taiemnyǐ shchodennyk, were accused of “patriotism on the border, and even going beyond the border of healthy pathos” 64 and artificial characters belonging to the “sterile world of propaganda.” 65 However, the pathos and heroism in Kiborhy are closer to American patriotic films in the style of Saving Private Ryan (dir. Steven Spielberg, 1998), and not the crude and pathetic Soviet cinema. As noted by Seitablayev, the border separating patriotism from propaganda is a question of taste and aesthetics, but in both, it is about arousing the feeling of pride in being a citizen of one’s country. 66 The combination of professional implementation and authentic dialogues, which were developed in consultation with the participants of the events in Donetsk, with a clear ideological message, allowed many Ukrainian viewers to enjoy patriotic Ukrainian cinema without feeling embarrassed and ashamed, which drew the attention of reviewers. 67
Furthermore, as the film director admitted, Kiborhy was also an attempt to create a “new epic” in which the main role is played by “new heroes of a new country.” 68 Similar attempts to create a modern myth and the heroization of the participants of the ongoing war in Donbas are also visible in other super productions generously supported by Derzhkino, including Pozyvnyǐ Banderas (Call Sign Banderas, dir. Zaza Buadze, 2018) and U311 Cherkasy (dir. Timur Yashchenko, 2019). Also films dealing with the topic of the current conflict, not from the perspective of a heroic narrative but from that of trauma, could count on generous state funding for their production, distribution and promotional campaign. These include art house films, such as Atlantyda (Atlantis, dir. Valentyn Vasyanovy, 2019), in which we see the ruined industrial landscapes of Donbas and people trying to settle down in post-war conditions, and Dodomu (Homeward, dir. Nariman Aliev, 2019) about a Crimean Tatar, who lost his son in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
Movies about the contemporary armed conflict not only create a cultural memory of recent events that shape Ukraine’s recent history, but can also help Ukrainians cope with the war experience. They try to make the experience more understandable and make sense of it. Moreover, such films are also used to inform foreign viewers about the situation in Ukraine and shape its assessment among them. The Ukrainian Institute, an institution created in 2017 to represent Ukrainian culture in the world and form a positive image, supported special screenings of Ukrainian films, including films related to the current political situation in Ukraine, in many European and American cities. Also, art films like Atlantyda and Dodomu, well received by the international festival public and awarded with prestigious awards, could play an important role in popularizing both Ukrainian cinema and knowledge about the difficult situation faced by Ukrainian society.
In addition to the generous support for historical and war productions, Derzhkino actively supports the production of entertainment cinema, realizing that this meets the expectations of a mass audience. The native Ukrainian-language product is intended to supersede and replace Russian films, series, and programs that flooded Ukrainian movie theaters and TV channels before 2014. As the authors of the new Ukrainian film policy emphasize, the division of films into “patriotic” and “unpatriotic” should be interpreted conventionally because patriotism is not a legal category but a moral category, marked on the cultural level. According to Ilyenko, all films that create a Ukrainian cultural context are patriotic, including comedies that allow Ukrainians to joke with “Ukrainian” jokes and not jokes from comedies by Leonid Gaidai and Eldar Ryazanov. 69 This is why, in his opinion, the state’s task is to support all those productions that create “a new Ukrainian myth, a new Ukrainian archetype, a symbol of culture, a meme, a trend that will unite us and shape our cultural identity. It is an extremely important patriotic mission.” 70 Minister of Culture Nyshchuk spoke in a similar vein, saying in interviews that the patriotic direction of changes in Ukrainian cinema should lead to the saturation of cultural space with Ukrainian content, and this applies not only to historical films but also popular cinema, fairy tales for children, and drama serials. 71
These words are followed by specific actions. State subsidies for production were granted to the three highest-grossing films in the history of Ukrainian cinema, watched by the largest number of cinema viewers—the successive parts of the romantic comedy Skazhene vesillia (Crazy Wedding) from 2018, 2019, and 2021. However, it is difficult to speak of a “national product” here, as the script of the film is an adaptation of the French hit Qu’est-ce qu’on a fait au Bon Dieu? (2014), directed by Philippe de Chauveron. Much greater potential in promoting “Ukrainianness” is found in the comedy-musical Hutsulka Ksenia (dir. Olena Dem’ianenko, 2019), which received almost the same size of grant for implementation from Derzhkino as Kiborhy. The action of Hutsulka, referring to the famous Ukrainian operetta from 1932, takes place in Western Ukraine a few weeks before its occupation by the Bolsheviks. The film was not a huge box-office success, although it received very positive reviews from Ukrainian critics.
Much more successful, and generously subsidized by the state, were the family comedies Pryhody S Mykolaia (Adventures of S Nicholas, dir. Semen Horov, 2018) and Til’ky dyvo (Just a miracle, dir. Olena Karetnyk, 2019), as well as the “film fairy tale” Pekel’na Khoruhva, abo Rizdvo Kozats’ke (Infernal Guidon, or Cossack Christmas, dir. Mykhaǐlo Kostrov, 2019). These films, released for distribution in December, were intended to be a “Ukrainian alternative” to Soviet comedies watched by vast numbers of people in the post-Soviet area, including Ukraine, during Christmas and New Year’s Eve. Moreover, adaptations of folktales and fairytales can play an important role in the construction of the nation. They refer to a semi-legendary past that can become a storehouse for contemporary nationalist myths and heroes. An example of this type of successful production is Storozhová zastáva (The Stronghold, dir. Yuriǐ Koval’ov, 2017) and Zakhar Berkut (The Rising Hawk, co-dir. Akhtem Seitablayev, 2019). Both films combine references to Slavic-Ruthenian folklore and memories of past battles with a powerful enemy from the east. Zachar Berkut is a film adaptation of the novel of Ivan Franko, who, along with Taras Shevchenko, is considered one of the most prominent representatives of modern Ukrainian literature. In turn, Storozhova zastava, the plot of which takes place in the semi-legendary space of Kievan Rus, was based on the book by Volodimir Rutkivsky, which was an attempt to “recover” the characters and history traditionally associated with Russian folklore for Ukrainian culture. The debates on the “Ukrainianness” of the characters accompanying the screening of the film 72 reflect the fact that in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, culture wars have taken on a sharper dimension, and cinema remains an important space in which they take place.
Conclusions
As shown in the article, in the period 2014–2019, Ukrainian cinema has been experiencing a real renaissance. The combination of the wave of civic and creative activity with the policy of state protectionism resulted in growth in the number and quality of films produced in Ukraine and their popularization on the domestic and foreign markets. At the same time, the shape of the film policy pursued by the post-Maidan authorities was largely related to the political situation in which Ukraine not only lost part of its territory to Russia and pro-Russian separatists but also was embroiled in a cultural struggle to define borders of the national community. Hence, the priorities of the film policy were, on the one hand, to protect their own information and cultural space from content produced in Russia, and on the other, to promote and disseminate film narratives promoting the Ukrainian language and culture as well as strengthening Ukrainian patriotism. The cinema became one of the battlefronts, explaining tragic events, uniting the community around common history and shared values, facilitating the mobilization of the war effort, and heroizing the warriors who fell in it.
However, it should be remembered that film policy alone cannot guarantee that appropriate values and attitudes are shaped in society through films. State incentives may not be used by creators who may wish to remain independent in pursuing their artistic visions, and viewers may not wish to watch state-sponsored films or may interpret them differently. Success requires a balance between the expectations and needs of authorities, filmmakers, and the public. Such a situation happened in Ukraine, as evidenced by the fact that state incentives were willingly taken up by authors, and the effects of the latter’s activities were accepted by the local public. After the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine wanted to be more Ukrainian, and cinema has become one of the spaces and, at the same time, a tool of these changes. At the same time, new Ukrainian cinema, appreciated by critics not only in Ukraine but also abroad, has become a cultural space that can facilitate an exit from the “postcolonial syndrome” and the “malorosiistvo” complex that weighs upon successive generations of Ukrainians. Films that associate “Ukrainianness” with something modern, attractive, and fashionable have the potential to change the perception of Ukrainian culture and depict it as more valuable than before.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that apart from “national cinema” with a state certificate, there are also films made in Ukraine without such a stamp. This applies to both Russian-language commercial productions, which are still in demand among parts of Ukrainian society, and “patriotic films” financed from private funds. The latter largely relate to productions devoted to the ongoing war, being the result of grassroots reactions, usually in the milieu of fighters, their relatives, and families. 73 This hybridism and the variety of Ukrainian productions require caution and attention when defining “national cinema,” as Bohdan Nebesio has pointed out. He looked at Ukrainian cinema of the 1990s from an inclusive perspective, taking into account the heterogeneity of Ukrainian society and culture. 74 Today, this breadth of vision is just as important, and when focusing on national, patriotic wartime productions, we should not lose sight of the whole picture.
