Underestimated Ally: Ukraine during the Polish–Soviet War of 1920 in Polish Underground Publications (1976–1989)

The history of democratic opposition in the Polish People’s Republic (PPR) is in some sense a prologue to Polish politics after 1989. One of the basic forms of dissident activity across the socialist Eastern Bloc was publishing underground periodicals, or samizdat. Although the term “samizdat” originates in the USSR, it is used to denote underground publications in all countries of the socialist camp. The Polish situation, however, was unprecedented in the countries of the socialist camp due to its sheer size. In comparison, samizdat had relatively small circulation in the USSR, and its distribution was limited mainly to the opposition intelligentsia. In contrast, there were several thousand underground publications in Poland before 1989. Among the socialist countries, only the Polish opposition managed to reach wide social circles. ¹ The circulation of some samizdat periodicals reached tens of thousands. It is impossible to count the number of people engaged in underground publications (pol.—drugi obieg wydawniczy); however, it is safe to say that we are talking about tens of thousands. Its vast size means that the Polish samizdat is essential for understanding modern Poland’s political and intellectual history. It formed public opinion and laid the ideological foundations for future Polish policy, especially its Eastern policy. Many, if not most, members of the post-communist Polish political elite were personally associated with underground publications.

Another significant difference in the case of Poland was the institutionalization of underground publishing in the PPR. ² Organizationally, this often resembled official publishing practices. ³ Unlike the USSR where illegal texts were usually created on typewriters, in the PPR, journals and books were most often printed with the help of copiers and other typographic equipment. Despite its peculiarities, in the Polish case, the term “samizdat” fits into the Eastern European history of that phenomenon. ⁴ Therefore, I use the terms “underground publications” and “samizdat” as synonyms in this article.

The samizdat period is considered to have begun in 1976, when the Committee for the Defense of Workers (pol.—Komitet Obrony Robotników [KOR]) began to publish the Komunikat and Biuletyn Informacyjny newsletter after the June protests. The circulation of underground periodicals decreased after the imposition of martial law on 13 December 1981, but the scale of publishing was resumed after 1983.

Polish oppositionists presented their views in underground publications, discussed action programs, and explained the struggle’s goals, strategies, and tactics. Samizdat was a form of civic self-expression for the part of Polish society that disagreed with the communist authorities, and most importantly, Poland’s dependence on the USSR. Polish oppositionists set themselves to disseminate information that was absent in the official media, to analyze social problems, and to continue the tradition of Polish independent political thought. ⁵ As Jan Olaszek noted, “the independent publishing movement did not have the ambition to replace the official press and book circulation, but only to assure the readers’ access to those authors, titles and topics, which would not be available in another way.” ⁶ Historical topics were often discussed in books and journals published beyond the range of censorship. One of the most popular topics was the Polish–Bolshevik war. ⁷ J. Piłsudski’s Eastern policy was one of the most popular topics in historical publications. The reason for this was the significant difference between the Polish independent tradition of depicting the war of 1920 and the narrative created by the official communist historiography. ⁸ It is worth noting that official Polish authors writing about the Polish–Soviet war had to use Soviet clichés. ⁹ In the historiography of the PPR, Piłsudski’s policy toward the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR) was usually characterized as imperialistic and Soviet Russia was depicted as a victim of Polish aggression. The UPR was characterized as a marginal political organization. ¹⁰

Although emigrée journals and books, including illegal reprints, were also a significant factor in the political discourse of the time, the object of this study is primarily texts that initially appeared in Polish underground publications. Nevertheless, we consider the interaction of Polish samizdat and political exile an important factor, and that is also presented here. The subject of the study is the interpretation of Józef Piłsudski’s eastern policy and, especially, the Polish–Ukrainian Alliance of 1920, by Polish oppositionists, and its significance in shaping the ideological foundations of Polish opposition to Ukraine. This involves, first, interpretive models, understanding the role and significance of Ukraine in recent Polish history, and the use of historical experience in the reasoning of political concepts.

It is important to emphasize that the Polish opposition considered the Warsaw communist regime a puppet of Moscow and tried to encourage independent political thought. The ideological palette of the Polish opposition was not homogeneous. Some currents followed the traditions of National Democracy. There was a certain rehabilitation and modernization of Roman Dmowski’s legacy and the related concept of Polish foreign policy based on the alliance with Russia; however, the cult of J. Piłsudski, who was popular among Poles of different political views, was much more influential. ¹¹ Even among nationalist circles, however, there were changes in the way Ukraine was seen. They believed that Poland must take a neutral position on Ukrainian–Russian relations. This was something of a change, given that nationalists traditionally considered it desirable to resolve the Ukrainian issue in the Russian imperial way and transform Ukraine into a province of Russia/USSR. ¹² Nevertheless, the traditional division of opposition in the PPR into right and left can be somewhat artificial or misleading. As Paweł Wierzbicki rightly points out, the idea of independence, as the supreme value for every patriot, was neither right-wing nor left-wing. The opposition circles of that period were highly diverse, and the political thought of individual groups was often a hybrid of a peculiar worldview, combining many ideological currents. ¹³ The prominent oppositionist Jacek Kuroń emphasized that all political groups in Poland had similar programs, the main goal of which was Poland’s sovereignty. ¹⁴ The essential features of the majority of opposition groups included outright disapproval of Poland’s dependence on the USSR, anti-communism, the cult of national tradition and the struggle for independence, and a positive attitude toward Polish statehood in the interwar period.

The interest in Ukrainian issues was caused by a belief in the need to normalize relations with Poland’s neighbors. Polish dissidents had realized that the geopolitical situation was going to change in the mid-1980s, which prompted a crystallization of the concepts of Eastern policy. One of their main approaches was to turn to the interwar tradition of Polish foreign policy, analyzing its experience and actualizing the traditional question in Polish political thought: Was it more profitable for Poland to border Russia or independent Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania?

The methodology used in this study is based on the principles of the Cambridge School of the history of political thought. I consider context to be crucial in understanding texts. According to Quentin Skinner and John Pocock, the acts of “political language” should be combined with a wider range of political realities, the dominant ideology, and the ideological climate at the time the text was written. ¹⁵ In my research, I will attempt to present not only the views of individual figures but also narrative patterns, rhetorical mechanisms, key concepts, and terminological issues.

Some researchers had analyzed underground Polish publications even before 1989. ¹⁶ The attitude of the Polish opposition to Ukraine was of interest to the Ukrainian diaspora, and this was reflected in the publications of T. Kuzio, J. Pelensky, and T. Matskiv. ¹⁷ The views of Polish dissidents regarding Poland’s relations with its eastern neighbors are described in studies by contemporary Polish and Ukrainian authors. ¹⁸ Łukasz Jasiński and Marek Golińczak highlighted the issue of foreign policy in the political thought of the Polish opposition, stressing the great significance of Eastern issues in underground publications. ¹⁹ The image of Ukraine and Ukrainians in underground publishing in Poland was demonstrated by Bogumiła Berdychowska, who emphasized that the accomplishments of the Polish opposition greatly facilitated the establishment of good neighborly relations between later independent Poland and its eastern neighbors. ²⁰

The Polish–Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 and its conceptualization of the principles of the eastern policy of Polish opposition has not previously been the subject of a separate study, although it has been touched upon in some publications. For example, Polish researcher Paweł Kowal claimed that the Polish–Ukrainian Alliance was often “exploited” in Polish opposition publications. ²¹ Kh. Chushak noted the great symbolic significance of the Alliance of 1920 for Polish–Ukrainian dialogue in the second half of the twentieth century and found that “almost every periodical that published at least a few materials on Ukrainian issues considered it obligatory to mention this agreement.” ²² J. Pelensky paid some attention to the attitude of Polish dissidents regarding the alliance with the UPR during the Polish–Soviet war. He noted that Polish publicists acknowledged that the Warsaw Treaty’s terms were unfavorable for Ukraine. Poland had failed to fulfill its obligations and betrayed Ukrainians to Bolshevik Russia. At the same time, according to most Polish opposition publicists, Ukrainians also did not live up to Polish expectations. ²³ Although the remarks were apt, Pelensky’s research was devoted to a much broader issue and was not focused on perceptions of J. Piłsudski’s eastern policy.

The topic of this article seems particularly relevant because the interpretation of the events of 1920 in the Polish underground publications of the 1970s and 1980s marked a sharp change compared with Polish interwar political thought. Only a few decades earlier, Polish intellectuals had been reluctant to talk about an alliance with Ukrainians in 1920:

The public opinion was completely dominated by the National Democracy slogans, which questioned even the existence of the Ukrainian nation, and considered the Ukrainian movement an Austrian intrigue against Poland. The constantly growing Polish-Ukrainian enmity that characterized interwar Poland also left its mark. ²⁴

Depending on ideological preferences, the Alliance of 1920 was considered either wise or dangerous by Polish intellectualists. Authors who were close to Piłsudski’s camp wrote about it positively, and authors who sympathized with the National Democracy wrote about it critically. ²⁵

One of the oldest samizdat journals prominent in Eastern Europe was Obóz, founded in 1981. ²⁶ In the first issue, the Editorial declared that “the fate of Poland is closely related to the changes in the entire communist world.” ²⁷ However, Obóz concentrated on issues of current politics; therefore, the issue of J. Piłsudski’s Eastern policy was not raised in it. Ukrainian issues could be found on pages of periodicals related to the Liberal Democratic Party “Niepodległość,” such as ABC—Adriatyk, Bałtyk, Morze Czarne and Niepodległość—Miesięcznik polityczny Liberalno-Demokratycznej Partii “Niepodległość.” Another leading journal that regularly discussed Polish relations with Ukrainians was Spotkania, ²⁸ which was tied to Catholic circles. The topic of Piłsudski’s Eastern policy was also discussed on the pages of Międzymorze journal and Libertas, and even by Tygodnik Mazowsze. ²⁹

After Poland became a Soviet satellite, and in the conditions of the Cold War, relations with exile significantly affected Polish underground publications. In matters of Eastern policy, the Polish opposition generally embraced the Parisian Kultura’s ideas. Giedroyc–Mieroszewski’s concept that independent Ukraine and Belarus were necessary for Poland’s security was supported by the Polish opposition. Materials from Kultura or Zeszyty Historyczne were often reprinted on the pages of underground periodicals, especially in early samizdat publications, and many materials from abroad were illegally distributed. ³⁰ In 1986, Jerzy Giedroyc pointed out that about two thousand miniature copies of Kultura and about six hundred normally formatted copies (out of seven thousand) were sent to Poland. ³¹ However, Bogumiła Berdychowska believes that apart from the influence of Kultura, the activity of Radio Free Europe also had a significant influence on the thinking about Ukraine. Its head, Jan Nowak Jeziorański, bravely supported J. Giedroyc in his position on Eastern Europe. ³² In this context, it is also worth mentioning Paweł Zaremba, who collaborated with the Polish section of Radio Free Europe; his book on the history of the interwar period went through many reprints in the underground press. ³³

Samizdat disputed official communist propaganda, which portrayed the Kyiv campaign of 1920 as an act of Polish aggression against the USSR and the alliance with the UPR as a manifestation of imperialism. The Krakow magazine Zomorządność ³⁴ pointed out the bias and distortion of official historiography. It noted that the average Polish citizen brought up on the official history of the Polish–Soviet War had a stereotypical notion that Polish troops had gone to Ukraine in the interests of Polish magnates. Proper information, as noted, “can be found outside school, in émigré books and underground literature.” ³⁵ Both among the political émigrés and in the Polish underground publications, there was a belief in the need to establish good neighborly relations with Ukrainians. It was virtually impossible to avoid the Polish–Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 in any discussion of Polish Eastern policy, whether past or future. It served as an example of both the practical implementation of J. Piłsudski’s concepts and the fighting brotherhood of Ukrainians and Poles, which was a symbol of reconciliation and unification. It also often served as a kind of “public diplomacy” in Polish opposition. The phrase “There is no independent Poland without independent Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania” became the slogan of the Polish opposition activists’ Eastern policy. ³⁶ Marek Golińczak believes that the undoubted triumph of Polish underground publications was that they managed to convince society that it was better to have Ukraine as a friend rather than as an enemy. ³⁷

According to Mirosław A. Supruniuk, the Literary Institute was the most “reprinted” of the émigré publishing houses. Reprints from publications edited in Maisons-Lafitte accounted for more than 30 percent of all reprints from émigrés publications and for about 15 percent of samizdat books. ³⁸ The influence of Kultura was presented implicitly—in solidarity with its main postulates and entirely directly—by reprinting some program texts. For example, the Lublin journal Spotkania referred to Kultura and declared its support for the independence of all the peoples of the USSR, especially the Ukrainians, who should play the leading role in the process of Soviet collapse. One of the main topics discussed on the pages of Spotkania was Polish relations with national minorities and neighboring nations. Editors consciously referred to Kultura from the first issue, which opened the periodical for discussion about a complicated common past and the mutual relations of Poles and Jews, Ukrainians, Germans, and Czechs. The editors and authors of Spotkania repeatedly emphasized the united fate of Central and Eastern European nations. Reconciliation and cooperation were indicated as essential conditions for regaining freedom. In the programmatic text published in the first issue, Janusz Krupski wrote, “Without liberating the nations of the Soviet Union we will not regain nor maintain our independence.” ³⁹ Piotr Jegliński, one of the co-founders, established contacts with Polish political emigrants, mostly among the older generation of Piłsudski’s supporters, such as Wacław Jędrzejewicz, the first director of the Institute of Józef Piłsudski in New York. The high level of Spotkania’s publications was appreciated by Jerzy Giedroyc. ⁴⁰

Kultura, as we know, was not the only project by Jerzy Giedroyc. One of the most important periodicals to discuss history in exile before 1989 was Zeszyty Historyczne. History, as Sławomir Łukasiewicz notes, was an instrument in the battle for the soul of the Polish people and its eastern neighbors. ⁴¹ The publication of materials on the history of Poland’s relations with its eastern neighbors—Ukraine, Lithuania, and Belarus—was associated with promoting Kultura’s Eastern Program—one of the most important projects in the activities of J. Giedroyc. The main components of this idea were the recognition of Poland’s post-war eastern border, a critical reassessment of relations with its eastern neighbors, and support for the independence of Ukraine, Lithuania, and Belarus. The concept of Eastern policy developed by J. Giedroyc and J. Mieroszewski formed the basis for understanding Polish national interests and the formation of foreign policy directives. In an interview with Tygodnik Mazowsze, Jerzy Giedroyc stated that his greatest success was that he had managed to initiate the signing of a declaration by leading Russian émigré activists, in which they spoke out in favor of Ukraine’s independence. According to him, it was an achievement of “historical significance.” At the same time, he had strong reservations talking about federalism. In his opinion, it was understood by neighbors as a manifestation of Polish imperialism. ⁴²

Pro-government authors also noted the significant influence of the Parisian journal on public opinion in Poland. ⁴³ One publication emphasized Kultura’s direct influence on the political opposition in Poland, calling Kultura a “source of ideological and theoretical inspiration” for KSS-KOR. ⁴⁴ Some authors called Kultura “the conceptual basis of the anti-socialist opposition in Poland” ⁴⁵ and stressed its significant role in shaping the political agendas of opposition. Other authors emphasized that the leadership of the Literary Institute supported the formation of an independent Ukrainian state, which, in their view, posed a threat to Polish national security. ⁴⁶ As can be seen from these publications, the communist leadership of Poland was not only well aware of the intellectual and ideological influence of the Literary Institute’s publications on the Polish opposition but also made great efforts to reduce it and discredit Kultura and J. Giedroyc.

At the beginning of samizdat’s existence, an article by Jacek Kuroń, Antoni Macierewicz, and Adam Michnik laid the ideological foundations of the attitude toward Poland’s eastern neighbors. It resonated powerfully with Juliusz Mieroszewski’s article “The Russian ‘Polish Complex’ and the ULB Terrain.” ⁴⁷ The main idea of J. Mieroszewski’s text can be summarized in two theses: first, the situation in Ukraine, Lithuania, and Belarus has always determined Polish–Russian relations; second, the mentality of the Poles had not completely overcome imperialism. In Mieroszewski’s opinion, Poland should not fight with Russia over its influence in these territories but must unconditionally support Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Lithuanians in their struggle for independence. An article by J. Kuroń, A. Michnik, and A. Macierewicz largely repeated these views. The authors noted that Poland, along with Soviet Russia, participated in dividing Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania in the interwar period, and therefore pursued an imperialist policy toward these peoples. Such a strategy led to the catastrophe of 1939. Poland should not treat these territories as a sphere of influence as it could not compete with Russia. They considered the sovereignty of these nations to be a guarantee of Poland’s independence, and that a policy that threatened the sovereignty of these nations was therefore anti-Polish. “There is no Polish-Russian border,” the article said,

and everyone who creates it must realize that they are doing so at the cost of oppressing Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Lithuanians. For Poland, that is a program for the lack of sovereignty, a constant mortal danger, and for the Russian nation—a program of dictatorship that corrupts society. ⁴⁸

Based on the logic of the connection between the Ukrainian and Polish issues, the opposition tried to instill in the minds of Poles the assertion that they do not border Russia in the east, but the Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Lithuanian peoples. As Paweł Kowal points out, it was not as obvious in the 1970s as it may seem now. ⁴⁹ Hence, according to the authors, followed a program of action, which developed sympathy among Poles for the independent aspirations of Lithuanians, Belarusians, and, most importantly, Ukrainians. ⁵⁰ It is worth noting that all three authors made a career in independent Poland after 1989: Jacek Kuroń headed the parliamentary commission on national minorities, Antoni Macierewicz served as defense minister, and Adam Michnik became editor-in-chief of the most influential liberal newspaper Wyborcza. It is also important to note that the authors whose beliefs were so different on many issues spoke with one voice on Eastern Policy.

Another important text on relations with neighbors was Jan Józef Lipski’s article “Two Homelands—Two Patriotisms.” It was designed to rethink the Polish national identity and Poland’s place in Europe. J. J. Lipski condemned nationalism and “megalomania,” which, in his opinion, dulled the sense of empathy and allowed Poles to justify their unfair treatment of neighboring nations. In his opinion, a special place in Polish consciousness should be occupied by the Lithuanian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian peoples. ⁵¹ Jacek Kuroń ⁵² expressed similar views in his publications. The press body of the KSS KOR, Krytyka. Kwartalnik Polityczny, positively assessed Juliusz Mieroszewski’s ideas and criticized the ideology of nationalism. One of its publicists believed that if the concept of “neodmowskizm” (pol.—neodmowszczyzna) prevailed among Poles, it would be bad for Poland’s sovereignty. The reasoning that Russia, toward which the National Democrats have traditionally turned a favorable gaze, would recognize Polish independence at the price of Poland recognizing the perpetual slavery of its Eastern neighbors is wrong. ⁵³

The conviction that cooperation of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe was the main condition for Poland’s liberation from Soviet rule was common among Polish oppositionists. A particularly important place was given to Ukraine as a “key element” of weakening the USSR. ⁵⁴ The Liberal Democratic Party “Niepodleglość” and the organization Freedom-Justice-Independence (WSN) together with the Conference of Ukrainian parties and political organizations declared Polish–Ukrainian cooperation as “a necessity in life.” ⁵⁵ The press body of the Liberal Democratic Party “Independence” considered the cooperation of enslaved nations the strategy that would give the best chance for liberation. ⁵⁶

This strategy, as Polish intellectuals believed, required establishing normal relations with partners. Stanisław Rojek argued that regaining independence should be preceded by an absolute reconciliation between Poles and Ukrainians. This was totally necessary for the interests of both nations. ⁵⁷ Andrzej Drawicz argued that many things united Poles with Ukrainians and many also divided them. However, the deepest interests of both nations required reconciliation. ⁵⁸ Janusz Sobczak and Włodzimierz Mokry in Krytyka emphasized that even the most tragic moments in history “cannot and should not obscure the only alternative of tomorrow.” Therefore, in their opinion, in Polish–Ukrainian relations, it was needed to “boldly reach for the positives.” ⁵⁹ Therefore, “Piłsudski’s alliance with Petliura” must be presented more fully “to capture all the drama, all the lessons flowing from them.” ⁶⁰

Polish underground publications tried to bring more empathy to the interpretation of the history of Poland’s relations with its eastern neighbors, to present the Ukrainian point of view, and to point out Polish responsibility for some historical mistakes. ⁶¹ They also tried to remind people about positive moments in these relations. The Polish–Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 involved two opposing symbols. On the one hand, it was a symbol of the fighting brotherhood in a joint campaign against the Bolsheviks. On the other, it was a symbol of overusing the weakness of the UPR, which was shown in the unequal conditions of the Treaty of Warsaw and the de facto unilateral annulment of the Alliance by signing the Riga Treaty with Bolsheviks. ⁶² It was also a significant point in any reflection on Polish–Ukrainian relations.

In 1978, on the occasion of Symon Petliura’s birthday, Spotkania published an appeal to “Ukrainian brothers,” describing the Main Ataman as a “stubborn patriot” of Ukraine. The appeal stressed that he was one of the first to realize that “the only way for our peoples is the way of reconciliation and mutual compromise.” ⁶³ This was an apparent reference to the April agreement in 1920. In general, Polish society primarily associated Symon Petliura with the Kyiv campaign in 1920. The editorial board emphasized that “there can be no free Poland without a free Ukraine, and no free Ukraine without a free Poland.” ⁶⁴

In an interview with Spotkania, Jerzy Giedroyc explained that the ideological foundations of the concept of Eastern policy promoted by Kultura were connected with Piłsudski’s ideas, but somewhat modified. ⁶⁵ In his opinion, Poland’s role in the East was huge, but was different from the Jagiellonian concepts that had become obsolete due to the emergence of the newest Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Belarusian nationalisms so that repetition of the old policy would be perceived as a new form of Polish imperialism. ⁶⁶ J. Giedroyc believed that it was necessary to make sacrifices to base Polish policy on new foundations and to avoid challenging imperialism. If the Poles wanted to normalize their relations with Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus, they needed to accept the loss of the eastern territories and abandon the idea of these lands being returned, even if the geopolitical situation changed. He stressed that Polish intellectualists must state this clearly. ⁶⁷

In general, the intellectual atmosphere was dominated by a belief in the far-sightedness and prudence of J. Piłsudski’s concepts. The concept of Polish national democracy was often criticized. ⁶⁸ Jerzy Łojek was one of those who criticized R. Dmowski’s concept in the most complete and meaningful way. He strongly condemned the pro-Russian orientation of the nationalists as erroneous. Although the National Democrats called their approach realistic, in fact, the so-called “realism” consisted “in directing national public opinion toward fatal and harmful delusions.” ⁶⁹ Against this background, J. Piłsudski’s concept was considered far-sighted and wise. Even the Polish official historiography’s condemnation of J. Piłsudski’s policy was interpreted as proof of its effectiveness. One of the articles emphasized that the Polish authorities were trying to discredit J. Piłsudski’s policy, as it still posed a real threat to the existence of the USSR. ⁷⁰ The author stressed the importance of “realizing the obvious need for the cooperation of peoples in their struggle against the yoke of communism in the Russian edition.” ⁷¹ Many other dissidents expressed similar views. ⁷²

The history of 1920 in the vision of Polish oppositionists was in some sense an “applied science,” and it should be used in the future. Ryszard Zieliński believed that the catastrophe of war that befell Poland in 1939 was the result of the events of 1920. In his opinion, during the Second World War, Poland did not defend its independence as

the victory of 1920 was incomplete, because we lacked the strength to make the last blow. Neither we, nor the neighboring nations, even more threatened than us, were able to unite—which was and still is the basic condition, protecting us from both the Germans and the Russians. ⁷³

R. Zieliński positively assessed the changes in Poland’s relations with eastern neighbors, which allowed him to draw optimistic conclusions:

The trend in history, however, fills us with optimism. The Russians used their chance as early as 1920. At that time, it was too early for the societies of our area to understand the necessity of consolidation. Today we appreciate it to a greater extent. Our chance is still ahead of us. ⁷⁴

Andrzej Ostoja-Owsiany believed that the means to ensure Poland’s permanent independence was the implementation of Piłsudski’s concept by providing the nations between Poland and Russia with the possibility of freely deciding their fate. As observed by Ostoja-Owsiany, “Today, from the perspective of historical events and misfortunes that hit Poland we can clearly see how correct the idea of the Marshal was.” ⁷⁵

Some authors described J. Piłsudski as a supporter of the federation in the former Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and in the alliance with the Ukrainian People’s Republic to encourage these federalist intentions. Ryszard Zieliński argued that the Kyiv campaign was the most comprehensive attempt at implementing the federal program, which, moreover, provided for the abandonment of some Polish interests and complete restraint in imposing formal and legal ties with Ukraine. ⁷⁶ R. Zieliński was also convinced of J. Piłsudski’s intentions to compromise over the issue of Eastern Galicia. He suggested that if the federation of Warsaw with Kyiv had become a reality, J. Piłsudski would have joined Western Ukraine to Dnieper Ukraine (united with Poland). ⁷⁷ It was also typical of Polish samizdat, and particularly R. Zieliński, to emphasize the loyalty and combat value of Ukrainian troops. ⁷⁸ He proposed to draw conclusions from this experience and “when the time comes for historical justice” to use “the new meanings of the old program.” ⁷⁹

An important publication in this context is the book A Contemporary History of Poland by Wojciech Roszkowski. In his opinion, the goal of J. Piłsudski’s federal program was to prevent Russian expansion to the West by liberating Ukraine and Belarus from Russian rule, with both these countries subsequently becoming allies of Poland. According to W. Roszkowski, the obstacle to the implementation of these plans was the weakness of the state-building forces in this region and the distrust that Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Lithuanians had toward the Poles. ⁸⁰ He discussed this issue in more detail in another book devoted exclusively to the issues of the eastern border. ⁸¹ According to W. Roszkowski, J. Piłsudski and S. Petliura were able to perceive a common interest in the face of Bolshevik aggression. The price of the Alliance for the Ukrainians was their acceptance of the Polish–Ukrainian border on the line of the Zbruch River. ⁸² W. Roszkowski believed that due to the population and economic potential of Ukraine, the alliance would be equal, or it could not exist at all. The impact of J. Piłsudski and S. Petliura’s programs on Ukrainian society turned out to be small and did not evoke national enthusiasm because the Ukrainian masses, according to W. Roszkowski, did not believe in the sincerity of Polish intentions. In his opinion, the Polish were also to blame because “in the conditions of the traditional Ukrainian distrust of Poles, the matter was not presented by the Polish side too skillfully.” ⁸³ In addition, some Polish politicians treated their Eastern partners arrogantly. ⁸⁴ As a result, the federal plans turned out to be impossible to implement.

According to W. Roszkowski, the Treaty of Riga, signed as a result of the war, was a halfway solution for Poland. On the one hand, it meant the final abandonment of the federal concept, which was “the best defense against Russian possessiveness.” On the other hand, it resulted in the incorporation of territories inhabited by non-Polish people. The Riga solution turned out to be most disastrous for Belarusians and Ukrainians who were artificially divided between Poland and Soviet Russia. ⁸⁵ One of the conclusions that W. Roszkowski drew from these events was that only the independent and democratic existence of Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania could be a lasting guarantee of Poland’s independence. ⁸⁶ For this aim, W. Roszkowski opposed any possible claims of the recovery of the eastern territories, although the Polish eastern post-Yalta borders might seem unfair to some.

If at the beginning of samizdat in the 1970s opposition authors often emphasized the federal plans of J. Piłsudski, then over time the number of publications that denied these plans increased. For example, Jerzy Lojek believed that J. Piłsudski’s plans did not include a Polish–Ukrainian federation. Ukraine was to remain a completely independent state. ⁸⁷ J. Łojek placed responsibility for the final abandonment of the policy of support for Ukraine on the Polish National Democracy. Later events, according to Jerzy Łojek, confirmed the accuracy of J. Piłsudski’s concept: “There is no doubt that Józef Piłsudski’s federation program, had it been implemented, would have given the Republic of Poland in 1939–1945 an incomparably greater chance of gaining proper political conditions after the Second World War.” ⁸⁸

This view was common. The September 1939 campaign participant Marian Gołębiewski believed that “with the peace concluded in Riga, Poland lost its chances, Petliura and Ukraine lost as well.” ⁸⁹ The Nowa Koalicja periodical noted that the Polish–Soviet peace of Riga in 1921 had become the final sanctioning of the Soviet rule over most of the Ukrainian lands, so it was a breach of the Polish–Ukrainian agreement of April 1920. Therefore, accusing Poland of betrayal is fair to a certain extent. For the good of the future of Polish–Ukrainian relations, he concluded, one must confess one’s faults. ⁹⁰

Some oppositionists stressed that although Poland was reduced to the role of a satellite state controlled directly from Moscow, “the key to the real independence of Poland lies in the hands of our Polish neighbors incorporated into Soviet Russia. It does not lie in Moscow, because the invader will never give up his imperial status.” ⁹¹ The liberation of Poland, S. Rojek believed, was directly related to the liberation of Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine:

Over 70 years ago Piłsudski understood this well when he tried to create a front of buffer states friendly to Poland and separating our lands, in a natural way, from Soviet imperialism. This idea failed because of mutual prejudices, hostility and unleashed nationalisms. ⁹²

That is why prejudices and hostilities, according to him, must be overcome.

Also, probably best among Polish oppositionist authors, S. Rojek described why the issue of recognizing the Polish eastern border was so important for Poland. For Ukrainians not to fear independence from Russia, he argued, they must also be sure that after “the disintegration of the Soviet empire, Polish soldiers will not be in Lviv again, and all Western Ukraine will not be incorporated into Poland.” ⁹³ If, at the time of the political conjuncture, Poles do not have any vision, S. Rojek warned, then the situation in Poland will be the result of old habits. ⁹⁴ He warned that territorial claims made on the eastern neighbors would rebound on Poland. The most important thing, in his opinion, was not that Lviv should be Polish; the main thing was that it should not be Russian. ⁹⁵ That is why the Polish declaration of inviolability of borders is so important. J. Iranek-Osmecki added to the discussion by observing that if there were renewed Polish–Ukrainian antagonisms, the whole concept would collapse into ruins. ⁹⁶

Jerzy Łojek believed that one of the reasons for the failure of the Kyiv expedition was that “Ukraine’s uprising for independence did not turn out to be as strong as Piłsudski had hoped.” ⁹⁷ However, describing the results of the Treaty of Riga, J. Łojek believed that from the Polish side the responsibility lay on the National Democracy. ⁹⁸ He came to the conclusion that the loss of sovereignty by Poland could have been avoided if J. Piłsudski’s concept had been successfully implemented. Referring to Tadeusz Hołówko, J. Łojek stated that “if Poland is left alone, if other states raised on the ruins of Russia fail to survive, a sad future awaits her.” ⁹⁹

A typical example of the struggle against the official interpretation of Piłsudski’s Eastern policy is the article by Kazimierz Pluta-Czachowski, a Polish–Soviet war participant. He complained that due to the propaganda of the opponents of the Polish–Ukrainian brotherhood, there were more insults than positive moments in the history of our relations. In an attempt to balance these distortions, the author described the history of Polish–Ukrainian relations in which the Alliance of 1920 played a prominent role. He stressed that Poland was the first to recognize Ukraine’s independence. K. Pluta-Czachowski also emphasized the Polish–Ukrainian armed brotherhood and the selflessness of Warsaw. If Poland won the war, then the future of Europe, in his opinion, could go “more logical ways.” ¹⁰⁰

In an article marking the sixty-fifth anniversary of the Polish–Ukrainian Treaty, Krakow’s “Zomorządność” newspaper noted that school curricula ignored this “outstanding fact” and that communist propaganda picked up on all forms of conflict between Poles and Ukrainians, bypassing examples of mutual assistance. The editorial board therefore tried to publish materials that “more objectively represent the fate of Polish-Ukrainian relations.” ¹⁰¹ The article described the Polish–Ukrainian brotherhood of arms from the Battle of Khotyn to the September campaign of 1939. The Polish–Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 occupied a prominent place in this description. The purpose of the Treaty, as noted, “was taking back Ukrainian lands which Russia had captured during the eighteenth-century partitions and the formation on those lands an independent Ukrainian state, united by an alliance with Poland.” ¹⁰² To emphasize the importance of the treaty, the term “allied troops” was used instead of their traditional definition as Polish. Marko Bezruchko and the defense of Zamość were also mentioned. The Treaty of Riga was described in the article as an act forced on Poland, contrary to the intentions of J. Piłsudski. So, although this page of Polish–Ukrainian cooperation ended tragically, it was emphasized that nothing separated Poles and Ukrainians any more, and that an awareness of the need for “joint” [emphasized in the original—V.B.] actions was a prerequisite for independence. ¹⁰³

One of the most prominent spokesmen for Polish–Ukrainian reconciliation, Bohdan Skaradziński, ¹⁰⁴ stressed that under the Treaty of Warsaw, Polish troops could be withdrawn from Ukraine at the request of either party. He argued that J. Piłsudski had no intention of establishing a protectorate over Ukraine, and that Poland could not pose a threat to Ukraine even if it wanted to as it was weakened both militarily and economically. ¹⁰⁵ B. Skaradziᅄski believed that the defeat in 1920 was the responsibility of both sides. In his opinion, Dnieper Ukraine did not respond to S. Petliura’s call. The Ukrainian army, although “courageous in battles with the Bolsheviks and loyal to the Poles both in times of success and defeat,” still did not exceed the size of a few tens of thousands. ¹⁰⁶

The appeal to the history of the Polish–Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 as a symbol of brotherhood and reconciliation can be traced through texts for the Polish reader focused on changing thinking about Eastern policy and in many political texts addressed to Ukrainians. The “Resolution on the Right of Ukraine to Independent State Existence,” adopted by the Political Council of the Confederation of Independent Poland ¹⁰⁷ and timed with the anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty of Warsaw, mentioned the liberation of Kyiv from the Bolsheviks:

Poland cannot accept Ukraine’s dependence on any Russian state, nor does it claim any influence on Ukraine’s territory. Poland’s interests are the unconditional formation and strengthening of a completely independent Ukrainian state, which would occupy the entire territory inhabited by Ukrainians [. . .] Today, as 60 years ago, opportunities for both Poland and Ukraine to reach an independent existence are becoming more and more realistic. It depends on the actions of the Polish and Ukrainian peoples in their countries and abroad, on overcoming long-standing disputes and prejudices, on concerted efforts in the name of achieving a great common goal. ¹⁰⁸

Rzeczpospolita, an official newspaper of the Committee of the Agreement for the Self-determination of the Nation ¹⁰⁹ as a supplement to the joint declaration of the Polish and Ukrainian émigré governments on shared interests, ¹¹⁰ contained an article entitled “Ukraine and Poland—Free with Free—Equals with Equals.” ¹¹¹ Emphasizing the experience of 1920, the periodical stressed the need to “understand the past and draw conclusions from it, leading to further brotherhood, to the mutual benefit of our peoples.” ¹¹²

Jerzy Targalski polemicized with emigrant writer Józef Mackiewicz, who had a very critical attitude to J. Piłsudski. ¹¹³ He believed that if J. Piłsudski’s aspirations had been successful, communism would not have gone beyond ethnic Russia to threaten the world. Russia, enclosed by a ring of nation-states, would sooner or later decline, and the post-Bolshevik Russian state “would be formed only within Russia’s ethnic borders [emphasis added by J. Targalski—V.B.], and even if it did not break with nationalism and imperialism, it would not be a deadly threat to other nations.” ¹¹⁴ Describing the events of 1920 in numerous publications, J. Targalski tried to stress the importance of the alliance with Ukraine and emphasized the combat value of Ukrainian troops and their devotion to the common cause. ¹¹⁵ J. Targalski considered the conclusion of peace with the Bolsheviks in Riga a mistake, which became the main reason for the loss of independence in 1939, and later in 1944. ¹¹⁶

The Polish–Ukrainian Alliance emerged in a completely different context. In an interview with Kontakt, Zbigniew Brzezinski compared the consequences of the 1945 Yalta Conference for Poland with the decisions of the Riga Conference for Ukraine:

Convinced that we could not defeat Russia, we sold the Ukrainians without the slightest hesitation. We signed the Riga Pact and disarmed the Ukrainian soldiers who fought together, hand in hand with us, because that is what the state’s needs dictated to us. Moreover, we had no particular remorse. So let us be more objective in assessing the policies of other states towards us. ¹¹⁷

The peak of interest in Ukrainian issues came at the end of the 1980s. The 33/34 issue of Spotkania in 1987 was entirely devoted to Ukraine and was timed to the anniversary of the baptism of Kyivan Rus. The introductory speech emphasized the complexity of the history of Polish–Ukrainian relations and expressed a desire to improve them. The editorial board addressed Ukrainians with the words “Forgive us as we forgive you,” ¹¹⁸ which was a repetition of the formula from the famous letter of the Polish bishops to the German bishops in 1965. The whole issue was addressed primarily to Ukrainians and was full of friendly gestures. It contained a speech by John Paul II ¹¹⁹ and a text from the Mass of Reconciliation in the Podkowa Leśna, ¹²⁰ which took place on 3 June 1984. The latter stated,

We apologized to God and our Ukrainian brothers for the sin that weighs on us Poles, for the historical sin of the lack of understanding of the aspirations and situation of the Ukrainian people. [. . .] We also want to forgive the evildoings done to us, even though they were not small. ¹²¹

The appeal “To the Ukrainian brothers,” published in the same issue, also mentioned the Polish–Ukrainian Alliance of 1920:

This year marks the 100th anniversary of the birth of the Ataman of Ukraine Simon Petliura, who for many is a symbol of reconciliation. He, an ardent Ukrainian patriot, was one of the first who understood and saw that the only way for our peoples [Ukrainians and Poles—V.B.] is the way of reconciliation and mutual compromise. ¹²²

Of course, the words “reconciliation” and “mutual compromise” meant the Warsaw Treaty of 1920; however, it is difficult to describe its terms as compromise. Nevertheless, as stated in the appeal, the example of S. Petliura “is encouraging for the future, because there can be no free Poland without a free Ukraine, and no free Ukraine without a free Poland.” ¹²³ Several opposition organizations issued a statement entitled “To the Brother Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Lithuanians,” published in various periodicals. ¹²⁴ The document was approved on 16 December 1984, but due to the specifics of samizdat, it was distributed by various publications for several years. The appeal stated,

Territorial conflicts repeatedly divided, quarreled, and weakened both Poles and Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians. This is [clarification of the border issue—V.B.] the most vital geopolitical interest of our nations fighting for freedom. [. . .] We believe that what happened should remain, although we condemn the evil that stood in its cradle. [. . .] The current borders must remain because that is how we understand the interests of our peoples and that this is our common will. ¹²⁵

As the appeal stated, any revision of the Polish Eastern border was therefore contrary to Poland’s interests and the spirit of community and friendship. The document was signed by the organization “Wolność-Sprawiedliwość-Niepodległość,” ¹²⁶ the political movement “Wyzwolenie,” ¹²⁷ the Liberal Democratic Party “Niepodległość,” ¹²⁸ the “Wola” ¹²⁹ Political Group, and the publishing house “In Corpore.”

Well-known oppositionist Włodzimierz Mokry explained that although the Polish–Ukrainian border was established without the participation of Poles and Ukrainians, any revision to the existing borders was unreasonable. ¹³⁰ He believed that for Polish–Ukrainian reconciliation and cooperation to become possible, it was necessary to reestablish Ukrainians’ trust in Poles, “which had been frequently abused.” ¹³¹ Among the examples of such abuses, he mentioned the Polish–Ukrainian Alliance of 1920. In his opinion, Ukrainian distrust of Poles extended and deepened when Poland, signing an agreement with Soviet Russia in 1920 in Riga, broke the previously concluded alliance with the UPR. W. Mokry accused Poland of later accepting the ideology of R. Dmowski, which made the alliance that was now so necessary for both Ukraine and Poland impossible. ¹³²

The number and quality of publications on Ukrainian issues and about the Polish–Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 in particular increased from the second half of the 1980s. The significance of B. Skaradziński’s book Our Brothers. The Story of Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Lithuanians is difficult to overestimate when we speak about the image of Poland’s eastern neighbors in Polish samizdat. ¹³³ It was a generalization of B. Skaradziński’s previous works, which withstood several reprints during the PPR period and later, and was very noticeable in the Polish intellectual atmosphere. This book was also translated into Ukrainian and published in Munich. B. Skaradziński aptly remarked on the “complete absence of Ukrainians” when considering the Polish–Soviet war in the Polish interwar historiography. He noted that the fight against the Bolsheviks in a 1920 campaign looked like a matter exclusively for the Polish army, which was not really true. ¹³⁴ B. Skaradziński believed that for Ukraine, the Warsaw Treaty, unlike for Poland, was a great sacrifice. Ukrainians had to give up Galicia and go

together with the Poles, who, with deliberation or not, distorted the historical development of their [Ukrainian] nation, and recently humiliated them by defeat [meaning the Polish-Ukrainian war for Galicia in 1919]. The great burden of this compromise on the Ukrainian government should be appreciated. Who knows if it was not too much of a burden. ¹³⁵

These challenging conditions of the Treaty did not arouse enthusiasm among Ukrainians, in his opinion, especially in the most conscious of them—Galicians. Responsibility for the failure in 1920 lay on both sides, however. Polish guilt, in particular, was due to a lack of tact and trust in Ukrainians, the paternalistic attitude toward the UPR, and the separate peace with the Bolsheviks concluded in Riga:

What has been done with the tradition of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation, the first since the days of Sahaydaczny, Wyhowski, and Mazepa? What then happened to those people [soldiers of the Ukrainian People’s Republic] who recreated this tragedy [in the conditions of the war of 1920]? I do not know. As a Polish chauvinist—ironically lamented B. Skaradziński,—I find the most commendable explanation for us: the Poles then decided to forget the whole thing, not to touch any mention of it, because they, like Marshal Piłsudski, were indescribably ashamed. ¹³⁶

According to B. Skaradziński, the eastern policy of J. Piłsudski and the Polish–Ukrainian Alliance, as the peak of this policy, were thus far from an ideal experience of cooperation. This was mainly due not to the fallibility of the concept, but the half-heartedness and inconsistency of its implementation in practice. This does not mean that cooperation is impossible; however, on the contrary, it indicates the need to consider mistakes for the future. B. Skaradziński’s main conclusion from the events of 1920 was that Polish–Ukrainian cooperation should be built on an equal basis. Only then would it be effective and successful.

Conclusion

According to the anti-communist opposition in Poland, Ukraine was thus an essential potential ally in the struggle for independence. In solidarity with the ideological postulates of Kultura, the Polish dissidents considered the emergence of an independent Ukraine an important, if not a necessary, condition for the true independence and sovereignty of Poland. To this end, they tried to establish good neighborly relations with Ukrainians. This strategy involved declaring the absence of territorial claims, overcoming national stereotypes, and rethinking their shared history. On the one hand, Piłsudski’s eastern policy was often portrayed as idealistic. The Riga peace, in that case, was described as a forced step. It was partly explained by the attempt to rehabilitate J. Piłsudski, whose motives in official historiography were explained by aggressive considerations and the struggle for the interests of Polish landowners in Ukraine. Another reason was the somewhat uncritical attitude regarding Polish interwar political thought, characterized by a certain paternalism toward Ukraine. As a symbol of reconciliation and unification against Bolshevik Russia, the Polish–Ukrainian alliance was often referred to in various political declarations and appeals to Ukrainians. Often such political gestures were timed to the anniversaries of the signing of the Warsaw Pact or S. Petliura’s birthday. Polish dissidents frequently emphasized the brotherhood of arms in the campaign of 1920. They also often described the terms of the Warsaw Treaty as a compromise.

On the other hand, in overcoming the burden of a complicated history, the Polish opposition considered it equally important to eliminate paternalism toward Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Lithuanians and to look at mutual history from both sides. Polish samizdat is characterized by a rethinking and critical attitude toward Poland’s eastern neighbors. The most important issue was the Peace of Riga in recent history. According to many authors, Poland betrayed Ukraine with this Peace, recognizing the authority of the delegation of Soviet Ukraine and interning the Ukrainian People’s Republic soldiers. Admitting the asymmetry of the terms of the Warsaw Treaty and ultimately the abandonment of their ally, authors such as B. Skaradziński and J. Targalski did not consider the Polish–Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 the best example of cooperation. It was generally believed in the Polish samizdat, however, that all these mistakes need to be taken into account to build cooperation on an equal footing in the future. Concepts of Polish Eastern policy, developed in samizdat, eventually, along with the traditions of J. Giedriyć’s Kultura, became the ideological basis of Polish policy after 1989. Despite its contradictions and shortcomings, J. Piłsudski’s Eastern policy and the Polish–Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 were the cornerstones of the evolution of this political concept.