Climate Activism and the Destabilization of Business-as-Usual in Milan,Italy

Introduction

The first objective of this article is to describe how a coalition of activists in Milan has acted to reduce the use of fossil fuels in the city and thus intervene in the ongoing climate crisis; the second is to explore how political climate action is problematized by them, that is, how they think it is possible to “change the route that leads to the climate crisis” (F. 27), and what instruments are considered necessary and legitimate. These two objectives will be explored through their critique of fossil fuel consumption (in the form of goods, products, and fossil energy sources) and their actions to change the social environment in which it occurs (by mass demonstrations, direct action). By pushing the transformation of consumption habits these activists try’s to problematize issues of local and extra-local material ties, everyday practices of personal reproduction, dependence on energy infrastructure and services, critical aspects of the urban question, and the temporality of climate change and social change (Marres 2015; Knox 2020). Their aim was to reduce the impact that human actions have on ecosystems and the climate; the continued investigation of how these impacts occur led them to specify which practices have a preponderant weight in this crisis and to problematize local social life—associated with fossil fuels and sustained by them—in terms of the extraction of resources necessary to guarantee their reproduction.

By collectively engaging in research into the conditions that guarantee business-as-usual and how it can be changed—whether through study groups, seminars or environmental monitoring practices such as Citizen Science (Gabrys 2014) – these activists began to distinguish forms of behavior that reinforced ecological and climate impacts and to identify institutions, companies, groups, and political parties with close ties to the fossil sector as targets they should press and whose change could lead to positive changes in the current climate crisis. According to the point of view that will be developed here, the multiplication of targets that become the object of intervention by these activists can teach us something new about political action in the era of climate change. Translating the global problem of climate change into local conditions (Edwards 2013) has raised important questions about the path that should be traveled, the instruments that could be used to tackle it, and the generative dynamics of alternative forms of life not dependent on fossil fuels.

Defining the causes and agents of the crisis, they sought to disseminate information and moral values about the climate and ecological situation locally and, from this, to develop campaigns that could reach the “public” as well as the “allies of the fossil industry” with the hope of dissuading them from collaborating with the fossil fuel industry. In this article, I have selected four vignettes that allow us to discuss the objectives that the activists prioritized and how they sought to achieve them. They describe the negotiations within the Milan climate network on participation in public demonstrations, the organization of protests, the use of direct action and, finally, the pressure exerted on allies in the fossil fuel industry. The general problematic that runs through this work therefore refers to the ability of these activists to undo the different generative mechanisms that fossil fuels have in social life—mainly that of creating a social environment (Stengers 2011) that guarantees stable conditions for the reproduction of its operations and its longevity. This is the analytical reason for considering the political action of climate activists in a broader perspective.

Actions to counter business-as-usual as a problem emerged as a research topic through my participation in climate change events in the city during my doctoral research that began in 2018. Milan was chosen as a field of research in 2019 during the large-scale mass demonstrations that took place in the city during that period and continued until September 2022 with the Pre-COP 26 Summit held in the city. ¹

In March 2019, more than 100,000 people took to the streets to protest political inaction on the climate crisis in a demonstration called by the local chapter of Fridays for Future—the largest mass climate demonstration that had taken place in the country so far. At the demonstration that same day in the late afternoon—organized to “facilitate the participation of workers together with students”—it was announced that an assembly would soon be held to establish a coordination of Milanese groups that were active on the environmental and climate issue.

The city of Milan, being a place where fossil fuels are consumed (in the form of energy, goods, and services) rather than produced, helps us to empirically situate the dilemmas imposed on political action to control the climate crisis by reducing the use of these fuels and, secondly, how these activists seek to generate conditions of acceptability that facilitate the energy transition toward renewable sources. The relation between urbanization, the expansion of extractivist market economy and climate change is intrinsically (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2017; Malm 2021; Mitchell 2011). Is call the “Great Acceleration” (post-1945) the period that saw an unprecedented increase in energy consumption, water usage, changes in land use and deforestation. They are directly associated with the expansion of urban infrastructure, such as dams, transportation, telecommunication, use of fertilizers for agriculture (the “green revolution”), just to stay on few (Steffen et al. 2015). As put by Hodson and Marvin (2010, 300) “cities are the material representation of today’s energy-intensive economies where carbon-based energy systems—oil, electricity and mobility systems—have made the huge agglomerations of cities and modern industrial systems possible.” This shows how all these aspects are part of the assemblages through which have organized and expanded what can be called the anthropocene machine: cities must be considered, as Amin and Thrift (2017, 34) note, the “one of the main products and producers of anthropocene.” The “urban” becomes in this scenario a fundamental target to be changed. Currently 100 of the highest emitting urban areas account for approximately 18% ofthe global carbon footprint (IPCC 2022, 863).

Since 2009, the Municipality of Milan has been part of the international network C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, constituted by the mayors of the world’s major cities to promote the decarbonization process at urban level. The Municipality joined the C40 “Deadline 2020” program in 2017, committing to become a carbon neutral city in 2050 (with the elimination of fossil fuels), to help keep the planet’s temperature increase at 1.5°C (in line with the 2015 Paris Agreement objectives). The initiative provides for faster and more incisive actions to mitigate climate change, with a Plan that has a horizon of 2050 and an intermediate target of 2030. The plan identified different “Shock Stress” as flooding/floods, infrastructure system collapse, deprivation and poverty, phishing attacks, hazardous materials accidents, air and water pollution, heat waves and extreme heat, degradation of urban spaces, ship building management and temporary uses, social exclusion and inequalities, lack of decent and affordable housing, aging population, lack of security and possible terrorist attacks, waves of migration, riots or civil unrest. The plan was structured into six areas of intervention: Cool Milano: urban forestry, agriculture and climate change; Abitare Milano: social innovation, housing, youth and training; Milan City of Water: hydrogeological risk, governance, reopening of the Navigli; Circular Milan: urban metabolism, waste, urban and industrial economy; Safer Milano: emergencies, security and cyber security; Next Us: infrastructure, redevelopment and public space, underground services, immigration.

According to the analysis that will be developed here, we can interpret the political climate action of these activists based on the effects they are capable of generating: the first is that of destabilizing the consensus regarding the naturalness of using fossil fuels and takes a mainly communicative/informative form; the second can be defined as disruptive and seeks to interrupt—even if only temporarily—the extraction, circulation, and consumption of these fuels. As I will show in the next section of this article, this distinction is necessary to understand how these practices affect this social environment and how activists orientate themselves in the socio-material tangle where fossil fuels circulate. This aspect shows that the conflictual repertoire of these activists’ political climate action should not be reduced to that of social movements or mass collective actions. From an analytical point of view, the contribution of this article is to define the agents’ practices based on the effects they can have on fossil fuels entanglements/assemblages: that is, through the forms it passes through and is consumed by, and not as a quantifiable and “purified” entity independent of these forms.

Generating contrasting practices to business-as-usual based on local specificities, these activists have defined their political action as orientated toward communicating the climate crisis and the abandonment/reduction of fossil fuels in collective and personal life. Communication and consumption are axes that help us define the politics of these Milanese activists.

As noted above, the focus on consumption aspects is a consequence of how fossil fuels circulate in this territory: they can be specified as goods and products derived from fossil fuels, industrialized agri-food systems, and dependencies on large commercial chains—such as supermarkets—as well as international commercial conglomerates known for their repeated environmental and social violations, such as Amazon. The existence of these commercial and industrial chains is an important part of what activists define as “the system” responsible for the climate crisis, and to which they have a daily relationship. The system is confronted from the local, material, and subjective configurations of complex local and extra-local extractive chains (Tsing 2015; Hetherington 2019; Stengers 2020a, 2020b).

In this sense, the criticism leveled by these activists against the use of fossil fuels is not only directed at the industry and the state—which operates its extraction and distribution, in the case of the former, or which guarantees the political-legal conditions in the case of the latter—but also at the social environment that sustains this continuity—people and institutions whose ties sustain this continuity. Following these activists without imposing a normative differentiation on how they should act allows us to broaden the analytical field of political action that currently exists. The term social environment will be used here to emphasize the conditions necessary for fossil continuity. This means that what defines these agents, the limits, and potentials, depend on how this environment is constituted and inhabited. The experience of these activists is considered based on their interactions—with humans, objects, infrastructure, plants, animals, etc.—which allows us to investigate the plurality of modes of experience (Stengers 2020a) that they try to generate.

Activists make this environment problematic by making explicit the way in which objects, technologies, and relationships have been generated and maintained through the use of fossil fuels (Chakrabarty 2009, Mitchell 2011).

Through the case of Milan, however, I will introduce a differentiation regarding the effects that activist practices generate. In general terms, I will say that different agents intervene to reduce or block business-as-usual through actions that can subtract material and immaterial spaces for the circulation and consumption of fossil fuels—this means, for example, preventing the expansion of fossil fuel infrastructure, as well as preventing the advertising of fossil fuels and their products in newspapers and social media; it means participating critically as a minority shareholder in shareholder meetings of fossil fuel companies as well as creating marketing networks for low-carbon products.

The analytical distinction proposed here based on the diverse responses presented by the Milanese activists allows us to show that the space for action expands considerably; the activists point to the presence of fossil fuels in social life and the links that these fuels have with the everyday reproduction practices of their population in a given social environment. But this shows that there is a difference between criticizing and protesting the use of fossil fuels and blocking their continuation or expansion—through new infrastructure, for example. It seems useful to us to reprise Tilly’s notion of contentious repertoire to show that these activists exploit languages and practices elaborated in the past, while at the same time seeking to adapt them to the new situations they must face.

The novelty of the underlining, however, is that these activists don’t just demand that the state recognize a right that is denied or neglected in the present: they seek to dismantle the links through which fossil fuels enter the spheres of personal and collective reproduction—and how these links in turn guarantee the continued extraction, distribution, and consumption of fossil fuels. In this case, as other researchers have observed, it is a question of foreshadowing the possibility of a personal and collective life outside of fossil fuels. One of the responses of these activists would be not to collaborate with the reproduction of the extraction and consumption circuit—refusing, for example, the high consumption of products with a major climatic and ecological impact.

Below I will present some aspects of this social environment, the analytical differentiation of the agents, and the practices they carry out.

The Fossil Continuity

To understand the effects that the practices of these activists can have on reducing or stopping the use of fossil fuels, it is first necessary to specify how fossil continuity is possible. In this section, I try to summarize the interdisciplinary literature, looking mainly at how the limits and shape of this industry are delimited. The fossil fuel industry is usually defined in the field of transition studies as an economic and technological sector whose transformation—toward renewable sources—would take place through the activation of market mechanisms, technological development or the action of policy-makers (Kivimaa et al. 2021; Levy and Newell 2002; Paterson 2021; Turnheim and Geels 2012, 2013; Turnheim 2023). The agents and actions able to intervene in its operation are those who have expertise in the subject, have a relevant economic position to intervene in the possible development of alternatives and other sectoral niches or hold a political-administrative position that allows them to intervene in regulating its operation. In this article, this perspective is considered reductionist for two reasons: firstly, it does not consider the relational aspects necessary for the stable maintenance of the fossil machine; secondly—and because of the first—it does not allow it to investigate the multiple forms of resistance and diffuse actions that emerge in opposition to fossil continuity.

The extraction, distribution, and final consumption of fossil fuels requires what the philosopher of technology Simondon (2016) defined as the generation of an appropriate associated environment so that the installation and stable functioning of a technological device can continue without irreversible disturbances.

This means that the reproduction of its functional cycle depends on a coupling between technical and socio-environmental conditions in such a way as to allow the device to effectively operate satisfactorily and continuously. This space guarantees “affordance” to the fossil machine and includes heterogeneous components (material and immaterial) that are functional to perpetuating its continuity; these components include fossil fuel companies, governments, industry representatives, the financial system, formal institutions, managerial elites, epistemic communities, and the media and communication system capable of exercising different forms of power to combat the possible delegitimization and marginalization of fossil fuels (Grasso and Delatin Rodrigues 2022; Grasso and Delatin Rodrigues 2023).

The perspective developed here to analyse these processes is based first and foremost on a characterization of the fossil industry based on the notion of “extractivism” (e.g., Chagnon et al. 2022), and argues that the fossil sector should be understood as a heterogeneous reticular structure (Appel, Mason, and Watts 2015; Anand, Gupta, and Appel 2018; Appel 2019) that allows for the constant influx of resources to sustain economic growth (energy generation and production of goods) centered on fossil fuels. This definition therefore takes into account the various attempts made in the social sciences to characterize it: the notions of web (Marriott and Minio-Paluello 2013), assemblage (Stewart 2012, Watts 2012), networks (Bakke 2016; Barry 2006; Mitchell 2011), and oil complex (Watts 2008) are some of the concepts that allow us to expand the description of the fossil industry’s binding capacity and, at the same time, the experiments to block or break these links.

The Milanese activists, in this sense, are trying to dissolve the everyday socio-material ties that necessarily bind them to what Simpson (2020) called “fossil urbanism,” that is, territories transformed and maintained by the high consumption of fossil fuels.

Agents and Practices of Destabilization

In this sense, following how these agents define and activate the practices needed to confront this situation allows us to problematize the contentious repertoires (Tilly 2008) in terms of what they define as justifiable means of responding to a critical situation. However, the reticular nature that characterizes the fossil industry shows us that actions to stop it cannot be restricted to just one point in this network—such as indirect pressure against the industry through mass demonstrations and political lobbying.

The definition of climate activists used here stems from their self-identification during the research—and I do not intend to construct a typology: their practices constitute partial responses stemming from their respective positions in relation to the fossil tangle present in their own experience.

In general, we can say that they seek to destabilize the consensus that permeates business-as-usual by denaturalizing the use of fossil fuels as essential for personal and collective reproduction and, at the same time, blocking the production and consumption of these fuels.

From the very first meetings of the M4C coalition, these activists asked themselves the question of how to translate the global event of climate change from the situated conditions of their personal and collective daily lives (Tsing 2005). Translating the urgency of the climate scenario into the normal conditions of everyday life (Edwards 2013) required, according to them, “establishing a presence throughout the territory by taking part in all the events that mark the city’s calendar”; the aim would be to disseminate information about the crisis and to communicate alternatives regarding energy consumption, and mobility. Through this presence in the territory, it would be possible to make explicit the ties and conditions that keep social life “tied” to fossil fuels, and to disseminate other knowledge and techniques that would make it possible to escape this capture (this was mainly done in a demonstrative way through alternative markets for exchanging clothes, selling food, and even self-producing food in homes or in abandoned areas of the city).

Through these prefigurative gestures (Yates 2014), some of these activists personify, through low-carbon forms of behavior—such as deciding on the means of personal reproduction—the dissent regarding business-as-usual and, through this personification, disseminate, through every day public testimony, divergent norms and values regarding how to inhabit the local social environment; for example, they bear witness to and seek to demonstrate the harmfulness of fossil fuels through artistic performances and notices posted around the city, they discourage high-carbon lifestyles, but they also demand that the damage caused be rectified through moral condemnation and legal action.

The practices of these activists reveal a broadening of the possibilities for intervention and establish as legitimate targets for destabilization institutions/agents identified as generating complicity with the fossil industry and/or negligence in relation to the climate and ecological crisis.

The Milanese Case

A simple search in one of Italy’s most widely circulated newspapers (Corriere della Sera) shows a substantial increase in the topic of climate change in the public debate. The year 2019 alone has the same number of mentions as the years 2005–2017 combined. Climate change events in Milan were multiplying at such a rate that it was difficult to keep track of them all. “The year 2019 was the momentum” (S. personal communication, June, 2020) that would be seriously jeopardized by the outbreak of the Covid-19 health crisis in February 2020. The problem of climate change was discussed in different spaces and, in each of them, this was done by situating the global event in the practices, references, and languages that made up those experiences. It was based on these situated experiences that the various subjects sought to construct meanings for their own position in relation to this event and to modify their choices, desires, and life projects based on the current and future consequences—simulated in climate models—that this crisis generates. They defined themselves as climate activists and, in this way, sought to compose new entanglements—material and affective—that would allow them to “get out” of the social life generated by the use of fossil fuels, or at least part of it. And this process was not restricted to the younger generations, as one might think.

The “climate” of open discussion has given rise to interesting confrontations between generations: in this way, I was able to follow an event in December 2019, where members of the Gruppo di acquisto solidale - Lambrate (a group involved in the trade of agri-food products from local producers) invited members of the local Extinction Rebellion (XR) group to hear ideas on how to act to tackle the climate and ecological crisis. The self-defined “elders” were suspicious of the possibility of a major social transformation through acts of civil disobedience, as advocated by the group. But what was most striking was a question put by the “old men” to the young activists. One of the Gas members asked if the XR members took part in a Gas network, and “how they bought their food or which markets they prioritized.” Based on the negative answers (that at that moment they depended on large-scale distribution), the Gas member said that this was a point that should be seriously considered: “how was it possible to transform this system if we continued to reinforce these chains through non-critical consumption?”

But what was the goal of the activists? It would be difficult to summarize. In this article I have chosen to discuss the attempt at coordination between different climate groups, rather than that of following just one of them; for this reason, I have tried to highlight the points of collision, conflicts, and controversies in which disagreements over methods and modes of action can become explicitly characterized. The problematic situation (Stengers 2020b) of climate change is not enough to unify perspectives on what to do.

I have selected a few cases here to show how these activists are trying to confront the continuity of business-as-usual locally. But this confrontation is complex, because it does not just involve denouncing or attacking the fossil fuel industry head-on—in this case, the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi ENI—or the state agents that give it center stage in energy generation; it focuses on different points where, according to these activists, it would be possible to transform the relationship that people and institutions have with fossil fuels. ENI’s presence is widespread—through its infrastructure, foundations, arts and sports sponsorship, scientific funding, advertising, in the state’s administrative structure, etc.—and is not limited to guaranteeing economic predominance in the market; it guarantees its continuity by generating consensus on its beneficial role as a promoter of economic and social development; this is where the activists come in.

Against the rampant consumerism of products derived from fossil fuels, they will organize used clothing exchange events (Block Fridays - Make Friday’s Green Again), local food markets (Gruppo di acquisto solidale - GAS/Lambreta); faced with an increasingly cemented city, they will engage in the production of an agro-forest (Parco della Vettabbia), as well as the defense of green areas (Bassini Park, Goccia, Baiamonte); in defense of a new urban mobility policy, they have started using bicycles to get around and as a means of blocking traffic in protest (Bike Strike); occupying RAI (Italy’s public broadcasting company/Radiotelevisione italiana) to make public their opposition to news coverage of the ecological and climate crisis; occupying electricity distributors ENEL (National Electricity Board/Ente nazionale per l’energia elettrica) to demand an energy transition plan; or holding protests, demonstrations, and direct actions against ENI-ENEL during its annual shareholders’ meeting held every year in Milan.

Here are some examples that allow us to problematize the types of political action they considered necessary, as well as the disagreements within the coalition over the legitimacy of the demands and the legality of the actions. These actions took place in 2019.

Transversal Politics?

Two months after the largest climate demonstration in the city of Milan (March 15, 2019), the activists gathered in the Milano per il Clima network debated the pertinence of participating in an initiative that sought to contrast the rise of nationalism and racism in Italian public life. Called Gran Galà del Futuro, organized by Nemumadimeno and Milano antifascista antirazzista meticcia e solidale, it brought together a vast galaxy of associations and groups that at that moment were seeking to contrast the spread of conservative, racist, and exclusionary agendas.

The event was supposed to coincide with the closing of Matteo Salvini’s election campaign on 18 May 2019, which would be attended by the well-known French far-right leader Marine le Pen in Milan. According to the organizers’ statement,

All those who cultivate the dream of returning to fascism, strong national borders, the supremacy of the “white race,” the condemnation of homosexuality and transsexuality and the return of women to the home to look after the family or to brothels, reinforcing the image of the mother or the prostitute, will be present.

While an entire generation is on the streets denouncing that climate change is taking away their future, European right-wingers promote the unconditional exploitation of lands, bodies and territories, foment war between the poor to avoid class conflicts, promote the persecution of Roma and Sinti, deny universal rights by not saving lives at sea, finance countries like Turkey and Libya that exploit and torture migrants and open administrative detention centres.

To fight this reactionary wave, we want to organise a day on 18 May that will bring fabulous Milan onto the streets to say no to the return of nationalism and all forms of fascism in Europe and the world: we want to bring the GRAN GALA DEL FUTURO to life, because there’s no going back!

Despite the apparent support of most of the groups gathered there, some objections were raised. Many agreed that the event was important and that its demands were fair. But for some of its members, M4C’s participation seemed inappropriate. Some objections were raised about the way support for this event had been articulated and its relevance from a climate debate. Firstly, the method was questioned; insofar as the support was not unanimous, joining the campaign could not be done in the name of the M4C network; according to the account of one of the participants (a member of a student collective at the University of Milan - Statale):

Firstly, we are a network and joining as a network implies that all the member organisations (or at least the majority) have expressed their support. That hasn’t happened, as we well know; and since we haven’t yet set up the working groups, there hasn’t even been a decision by an internal M4C body that has been delegated by everyone to take such a decision. So if those who are taking part in the current discussion make that decision, the others won’t feel represented and won’t really feel part of Milan for the Climate.

Secondly, the anti-racist event’s commitment to climate and ecological issues was questioned: for some activists, it seemed that this demonstration sought to instrumentalize the climate and ecological crisis to attack the ruling group in the Lombardy region (Lega, far-right in the first place), with which some of the members of the M4C network had institutional relations. According to a message posted on the network’s messaging chat:

However, beyond the question of participation, M4C is a political network, but not a partisan one. This means that we take political positions on our issues, the environmental ones; but the event on the 18th seems to me to be more against specific political formations than in support of a specific issue. It’s true that in the description there is a reference to climate change and it’s also true that some (not all) sovereign realities are deniers; but frankly, it seems to me that the thematic centre of gravity of the event is not the environment. Therefore, taking part in the event implies, in my opinion, unconditionally taking sides against the League [the extreme right-wing party] and its allies (who also govern in the Region and with whom we have an open table) and this, in my opinion, goes against the non-partisan nature. A demonstration on environmental issues against the government would be different, because in that case there is a link with our activism, but it seems to me that this event doesn’t have many environmental issues.

Other associations added to this assessment by explicitly asking that the initiative not be published by M4C’s communication channels. The reason was always the political nature of the event: “I wouldn’t like the political aspect as an association” (E., Naturiamo). The division between the specifically climatic spheres and other political spheres was the main reason for the dissent, a dissent that would continue and return at various other moments in M4C’s collective activities. For some, this separation was a cause for surprise, since the correlation between climate change, exploitation, and migration, for example, could not be ignored and would tend to grow in the future. The distinction advocated by some, however, helps us to outline some of the impasses facing Milanese climate activism and the difficulty of building a common perspective on what (and how) to do. By distinguishing climate issues from political ones, some of these activists were reaffirming the motto of following science; this resource, according to its advocates, would allow them to move directly from current climate data and future scenarios simulated by climate models to government action.

While some of the student organizations—especially those close to the city’s left-wing social centers—defended the need for official participation in this demonstration, groups with a more traditional format (such as associations and NGOs) considered it necessary to maintain their separation.

Thus, a difference emerged regarding how to conduct the climate struggle that points to more general aspects regarding the prospects for social transformation and how a climate policy from below should be conducted. One part of the groups was pushing for an approach that kept the existing instruments of mediation intact; another was advocating the need to conduct actions outside of these instances in order to forge other spaces where political experimentation could be conducted—a striking demonstration of this occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic, when solidarity brigades were created throughout the city from groups of activists—including climate activists.

It is obviously not a question of inserting simplistic dichotomies; however, it is necessary to make explicit two more general critical aspects that can be verified in the field: responses to climate change can be considered in continuity with the historical political-institutional trajectory of a territory—this means considering that the condition of inertia of current responses can be modified through pressure from activists and the public; another perspective outlined considers that political immobilism is generated by the intrinsic relationship of interests between state agents and the fossil industry in order to guarantee the longevity of a socio-economic model sustained through fossil fuels; in this case it would be necessary to build spaces for participation and deliberation that would allow for intervention and deceleration of this crisis.

Between 2019 and 2021, several experiments were carried out in the city to demonstrate the effective capacity to generate solutions “from below” in relation to the climate crisis: the installation of solar panels in low-income housing by activists linked to social centers, sustainable self-building laboratories, gardens and self-production food systems. Obviously, it is not a question of judging whether these practices can “slow down” the crisis on a global scale; I think it is more interesting to point out that these experiences have engaged many activists who are trying to change their daily habits, which are based on high energy consumption and local and extra-local extractivism. According to some Italian activist collectives, this would be a way of creating “a life outside of fossils.”

By blocking collaboration in the anti-racist demonstration, some of these activists sought to keep the climate discussion strictly related to environmental and energy aspects. This allowed them to present themselves as objective, non-partisan interlocutors. This difference became explicit in the way the demonstrations were organized, and how the message had to be coherent with the form used. The large mass demonstrations occupied an important place as a privileged contentious repertoire for publicly expressing dissent over climate policy. The demonstration had to be arranged in such a way as to generate certain performances, and the way in which they were to be generated ultimately constituted a highly instructive terrain of confrontation regarding the internal differences within the coalition. It consisted of creating spaces “for people of all ages to publicly express their opinions” (D. 35)—mainly through signs with written messages. For some activists—mainly linked to social centers—this seemed necessary but not sufficient.

Mass Demonstration Performance

In the run-up to the demonstration on May 24, 2019, some information about the event began to circulate. It was about the organizational preparations where they discussed what and how the activists’ messages would be conveyed. The demonstration would start in Piazza Cairoli and run through the streets of the city center. The route, submitted in advance to the police commissioner, involved a long journey with the risk of dispersal of the participants. To avoid this risk, the organizers had planned to put up some messages at important points to guarantee thematic continuity. Technically, this posed a problem as these messages had to be displayed at a great height. According to one of the organizers, the difficulty “was how to get to a height of 8 metres without risking death or having to climb ladders.” To overcome these difficulties, at the organizational meeting it was decided that some balloons would be launched during the demonstration so that messages could be transmitted in them, which could hardly be done simply by climbing the buildings. Having been approved at the meeting on May 14, it was communicated to the other participants that the balloons had been ordered. This service announcement triggered a long exchange of accusations about the inconsistency of the choice and the contradiction between the message and the medium used. The first to speak out was a member of a large international NGO: “Excuse me, but when were the balloons decided? This really contradicts our fight. We’re all fighting against single-use plastic and we turn up with 200 plastic balloons? Sorry, but no. Let’s keep it coherent?”

How do you get the message across without using means that could contradict the message itself? How do you accept a decision made by the majority present at a meeting that seems to contradict minimal concerns about the impact on the environment and people’s judgement?

We were told that it would be biodegradable plastic and that we would do our best not to disperse it. I was sceptical too, but that’s what the majority decided on Tuesday.

I can say that disagreement is normal, but it’s also normal for decisions to be made at the meeting, with those who are present.

The representative of a well-known Italian environmental organization reports that “After a quick collection of opinions, we decided against balloons. It’s precisely the disposable concept that’s wrong.” Those who proposed the action justify it by saying that they are biodegradable balloons and that they will be collected in the end, but nothing that can placate the growing condemnation of the choice:

These small gestures make explicit the differences in which public action must be taken. An attention in which the message about the climate catastrophe must be carried forward without the use of fossil materials. The same dynamic took place during an artistic performance at the end of the September 19, 2019 demonstration in front of the Duomo di Milano, where a representation of the globe was set on fire. The action planned by the local section of FFF provoked the fury of some and further demonstrated the internal differences within the network. One of the main points of discussion within the network was the position of the FFF. As an autonomous organization and the undisputed organizer of the morning’s demonstrations, the M4C put itself in a position where, in trying to chart a course that would involve the greatest number of participants, it ended up following the actions of the FFF or feeling called to respond to it.

As J. (member of the FFF) explained, the action was decided at an FFF assembly: “The FFF has open assemblies and if these things are approved, these things will be done”. The relationship with the FFF was ambiguous. While many activists recognized FFF’s indispensable role in pushing new generations toward climate activism, at the same time some activists felt that M4C was subordinate to FFF’s agendas and style.

The idea of showing that the planet was on fire—giving shape to Greta’s speech made months earlier—had been met with harsh criticism from some organizations. Personal and political attacks began to become more serious, and fissures opened up that widened over time until the final rupture. Meanwhile, it became increasingly clear within the coalition that it was impossible to share certain ideas and practices.

As we will see in the next few vignettes, the major division came over the discussion of whether to take direct action and over the definition of what violent action would be. In the case of the objects used to realize the contentious performances, it seems clear to us that the question is about the consequence of the acts: on the one hand, the attempt to produce a strong message for the public, without considering, however, the climatic and ecological consequences produced by the choice—or considering that these impacts are small compared to those produced by business-as-usual; on the other hand, that of considering that these consequences should take precedence in defining how these messages would be transmitted. If both consider the recipients of these messages, they obviously consider them differently. In the first case, it is necessary to affect and even disturb the audience; in the second, to dialog with them.

If in the case of the balloons there was not necessarily a clear difference between the groups—since the decision to use them had been taken at the group meeting—in the case of the burning globe, it was clear that a difference could be seen between activist groups belonging to the new climate activist groups and collectives and those from NGOs and other “more traditional” collectives. For the latter, the urgency of the issue did not justify using “extravagant means” to attract public attention. It was necessary to “maintain coherence” and not convey messages that could be considered contradictory by the public and the media.

The paralysis of institutions and public agents was beginning to weigh on activists and the long-awaited participation of the public did not seem to be enough to change the balances that facilitated business-as-usual. The robustness and quantity of scientific data was not translated into sufficiently broad political-institutional actions to reduce environmental and climate impacts.

The problem encountered in the groups can be formulated as follows: there is a need to broaden the consensus on the need for action, but the construction of this consensus oscillates between two positions. For the first, the emphasis should be on coherent communication that is not dissociated, in public appearance, from a practice of numerical expansion: when more people know about the phenomenon, there will be a “tipping point” that will transform climate policy; the second opts for disruptive action (material and subjective) and direct action. The risk pointed out for the latter—and pointed out by both activists and various scholars—is that of alienating possible new participants, but it seems to us that this statement is far from consensual and that is hard to know a priori what can work or not.

Occupy or Not Occupy?

But how can we put pressure on the operational agents of fossil sociality? Those responsible not only for extracting fossil fuels, but also those who distribute them, sell them, and make them consumable? The apparently limited scope of these activists’ actions, however, touches on important dimensions of the political debate about what kind of action should be taken and, perhaps more importantly, what actions are considered legitimate. What is the limit of political action? Legality, legitimacy? Dialog, confrontation? On May 22, 2019, FFF activists, including members of the student collective Tempo Zero—one of the organizations that joined M4C—announced:

We have occupied Enel’s headquarters on Carducci Street, on the corner with Cadorna, and anyone who can will come and support us, even if it’s just to say hello. We’ll probably sleep inside, but pass the word on

What to take to Enel as soon as possible: banners, tarpaulins, used posters, spray cans, PowerBank, food, water, today’s press release and 24 leaflets, sleeping bags, whisky and string.

Immediately, various groups began to take a stand against the action, many of whom asked that it not be published on M4C’s communication channels, and others particularly disassociated themselves from the method, the choice of target and the date chosen for the action.

Guys, Mani Tese is not sponsoring this event. We do not agree with Enel’s occupation.

The Climate Reality Project has also pulled out of the event.

Msoi has withdrawn from sponsoring the event. The action was not discussed at the assembly.

Furthermore, for Resilient GAP, the action should not be sponsored by the website.

The rejection of the action surprises the prosecutor, who tries to justify himself by saying that it is an autonomous action and that there was no association with M4C:

It seems to me that we’re not worrying about anything. I understand the objections of those who are against it (I also have some, although I think the action is justified), but I don’t feel that anyone is associating M4C with the occupation of ENEL. And anyway, even dissociations, as long as they remain in that group, can serve to reaffirm a position, but they don’t reach the public.

The fear of some M4C members was that, with an action of this kind, “they would effectively scratch themselves”, something like a “second No-Expo”—the demonstrations against the universal exhibition held in Milan in 2015 where clashes with the police and attacks on spaces symbolizing capitalism were widespread. According to several members, the fear was to see an action considered violent associated with the whole climate movement in Milan. The way this gesture would be narrated by the media and received by the public was a constant cause for concern. They feared the misinterpretation associated with the whole movement. This kind of action was considered by some to be an unjustifiable attack that risked placing the entire movement in a lens of irresponsibility.

As noted above, presenting themselves as responsible meant practically accepting the mechanisms of political mediation that currently existed and submitting to the same procedures of public legitimization offered by liberal democracies. By placing themselves outside of this scheme, the activists ended up—according to their critics—delegitimizing the political gains they had made historically and making them unfit in the eyes of political leaders for the task of negotiation and dialog.

On May 26, 2019, the European Parliament was symbolically occupied by an international group of FFF activists and the activists responsible for M4C communication (members of Tempo Zero and FFF-MI) published the news on the group’s Facebook page. The dynamic is repeated; D. shows his disagreement and accuses the Tempo Zero members of monopolizing communication “for specific political ends”—that of giving visibility to the FFF and promoting tactics not shared by the other members of the group:

When asked why the occupation could not be considered a valid tactic of political struggle, D. argues that “firstly, it’s illegal” and, secondly, that “it was an end in itself”. But not everyone saw it as a violent attempt to impose their own will against the institutions:

Discussions about the organization of the next demonstration are confused about how to reconcile what has evidently become clear to everyone. At the same time as the Venice Film Festival in 2019, a group of climate activists decided to take advantage of the situation of high international public visibility to carry out actions calling for climate change to be challenged immediately: an M4C member who was present at this demonstration wrote a long report that we consider appropriate to leave in full:

It is precisely a total refusal to consider valid any act that could be considered disruptive by those who suffer it: blocking traffic, insofar as it denies car drivers passage, would be unacceptable because it impedes and creates difficulties and discomfort for those who need to get to work, home or simply move freely around the city; this intervention is followed by other comments about how change can only take place peacefully.

Non-violence (as opposed to verbal psychological physical violence against people or things), democracy and freedom of expression. If that’s missing, I don’t think there are any extenuating circumstances, interpretations, or different points of view.

The problem is that these are conceptually questionable forms of struggle. The great lesson that history has taught us is that non-violent struggle leads to much more significant results than violent struggle. If we want to have a future, we can’t ignore this factor. Most people, fortunately, still condemn violence in all its forms. (Chat—09/2019)

But not everyone was unshakeable. That was “the hallmark of M4C” and probably the reason for its break-up:

I think that’s the wrong approach to the problem. If “people” make these questionable equations, you need to work to educate them, not to attack those who follow antagonistic practices that, even if we don’t agree, have the same goal as us. If you like, it’s the same thing, in reverse, with dialogue with “green” parties/institutions/companies: you may find this path futile and/or even harmful, but it makes no sense to attack those who do it, regardless of who is right, and are fighting for the same reason. Arguing about who is better between x and y is old and sterile, and only plays into the hands of those who are against both. (Chat—09/2019)

Fossil Culture

ENI’s relationship with media outlets and cultural institutions is well-established. ENI’s Innovation Sector even has a regular column in the sustainability section of one of Italy’s largest newspapers, Corriere della Sera.

Activists demanded more attention from the media—especially the public concession to report more frequently on the causes and consequences of climate change. The aim was to stop labeling extreme events as “bad weather” and to situate them as a manifestation of ongoing climate change. To break this pattern of communicating the climate crisis, activists from social centers (Lambretta) and student collectives (Tempozero), FFF-Milano and XR-Milano occupied RAI’s headquarters on September 20, 2019 in Milan to protest the news coverage of climate change in Italy. The motto of the occupation was “Tell the truth—Act now—Change the system” (Dire la verità - Agire subito - Cambiare il sistema). In their public statement signed jointly by the FFF and XR, they declared:

Public television is already trying to deal with the problem, but it has a duty to tell everyone the truth, abandoning the current narrative based on the rhetoric of emergency and contingent history (. . .) Any news must be contextualised in this historical phase: the climate crisis. Everyone who uses the public service needs to know what we are facing and what they can do to change it.

Within the M4C network, the issue was once again strongly contested by those who considered it an act of violence. According to one of the network’s activists, whoever organized this act “was naive and put the whole movement in a very bad situation,” G. (M5S) wrote,

This had already happened with the demonstration at the Venice Film Festival. If they can’t stop doing one protest a month, at least choose the right targets: there are many oil companies besides Eni (. . .) there are car manufacturers who are marketing new electric models at unjustifiably high prices. Please, a little clarity!

In relation to this comment, another activist noted that,

Nowadays, nobody can question the great power that the media has, and so if we all agree that the climate crisis is something terrible and of extreme urgency, what’s wrong with asking (we hope!) for it to be dealt with properly? If you think it would be more useful to move the company’s internal channels and take a more interlocutory approach, requesting meetings and sitting at the table, you can do this with one of our associations, or even all of them if you wish. The movement is right to make the move! No more counter-interlocution and contestation, please. I also appeal to those in this group who repudiate any mediation. Different subjects exist precisely because we can take different paths. Confusing them and even opposing them means playing into the hands of those who oppose both.

The constant conflicts over how to conduct “the climate battle” becomes an opportunity to understand how those engaged in the struggle for substantial transformations in the conduct of this crisis define the field of action, their own identity as well as the contextual conditions in which they interact and which they try to transform. The onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 forced these activists to “stop everything” amid doubts about its severity and progress. The divergence between these activists, however, can be signaled in terms of whether they accept direct action or action not mediated by existing institutional mechanisms. This division has persisted in the environment of climate activism in Milan and continues to shape possible fields of action.

Conclusion

These four vignettes were selected with the aim of making explicit what communicates with the experience of those who become active and seek to respond to the intrusion of the climate and ecological crisis into their daily lives—whether personal or collective. Although empirically limited to one city, the four vignettes presented allow us to observe constitutive aspects of activist practices—and how the extra-local dimension invades this terrain and comes to be problematized by activists. The perspective adopted here is that they cannot be considered secondary, insofar as they inform the choices and forms of political action that will be adopted to confront the fossil industry and the consumption of fossil fuels. This is a point I would like to emphasize: the activists who build alternative food distribution markets are the same ones who organize demonstrations and direct actions against the big oil industry. There is no cut between the micro-local and the macro-global, between the personal and the structural: the question is how they are articulated. To the slogan “change the system, not the climate”, we can add, as an example of problematization, the statement by an activist at the first national assembly of the FFF held in Milan in April 2019, that “we are the system”, which, in that specific situation, could be translated not into the general definition of equal responsibility, but in the sense that “we” are linked to the material and subjective chain of reproduction of the socialities generated through fossil fuels; the rupture of the omnipresence of fossil fuels therefore includes the body and its sustaining materiality, and the rupture of its circulation is a fundamental aspect. The different vignettes we present are distributed over time; the activists transform situations—from domestic to institutional spaces—into occasions to show complicity with business-as-usual. Becoming active in a problematic situation is the result of a permanent explicitness of the conditions that sustain everyday life: one that transforms a previously passive environment into an active one and claims responsibility for its present and future consequences.

The creation of the coalition was an attempt to build an alternative to business-as-usual, bringing together the groups already active in the environmental sphere and the new ones that have emerged since 2018. The goal of acting through consensus was a source of constant tension between the groups proposing direct action and those against it. This divergence over time was the reason for the coalition’s break-up, but not for the end of their actions.