Abstract
The February 2011 Canterbury earthquake was a dramatic reminder of the need for schools to have emergency management plans in place. A number of other disaster and hazard events have historically caused New Zealand schools to close temporarily, and often within a short time frame. At such times principals must act decisively and communicate clearly with their communities in complex and difficult circumstances, carrying risk for student well-being. Here we present two hazard-specific New Zealand case studies, pandemic (H1N1) and adverse weather (snowstorm) − both precipitating instances of temporary school closure. Lessons taken from the case studies offer an opportunity for management staff to reflect on how to best plan for and manage environmental hazards precipitating temporary school closure in order to mitigate immediate and long-term risk to pupils and the wider school community.
Introduction
Many people are aware of the devastating impact of recent earthquakes in Christchurch, New Zealand and the on-going challenges the people of the Canterbury region face as the community rebuilds. Large-scale natural disasters may be infrequent, but such incidents remind educators of the important role they play in building community resilience during both large-scale, generalized and smaller-scale, localized hazard events. As Hayes (2011: 4) notes: ‘Above all the earthquake reminded me that leadership is not about budgets and buildings, it is about people’. When disasters occur, principals often find themselves in unfamiliar territory, making decisions in an environment of uncertainty. One way of preparing for such situations is to learn from the experiences of others. This article offers just such an opportunity. Reporting on original case study research (Stuart et al., 2010), we document the lessons learned from two New Zealand hazard case studies: the Auckland H1N1 influenza outbreak (2009) and the severe snowstorm in Canterbury (2006). We reflect on these exploratory case studies in relation to two key insights from the disaster studies literature – firstly, that hazard events generate social cohesion, and secondly, that hazard events exacerbate existing social vulnerabilities. The article concludes with a discussion of implications for those whose professional responsibilities include planning for hazard events.
Schools are required to manage potential health and safety risks to their students from different environmental hazards including, but not limited to, community exposure to pandemic, adverse weather events, volcano, and earthquake. In such circumstances, schools may need to close temporarily and within a short time frame. As in other jurisdictions (see Bramwell, 1993; Hunter-Jones and Hunter-Jones, 2007), New Zealand schools are required to actively manage health, safety, and hazard risks through effective planning. Boards of Trustees (locally elected boards of governors) have a legal obligation to ensure that their schools have Emergency Management Plans (EMPs) based on Ministry of Education guidelines and templates (see Ministry of Education, n.d. (a)). New Zealand school principals and members of senior management teams responsible for decision-making at the time of a hazard event are guided by the school’s EMP. This decision-making is theoretically directed by the plans but in practice principals’ responses reflect their assessment of the event and its particular circumstances. While principals follow broadly prescribed processes, they also exercise judgement with their community’s best interest in mind. Thus, EMPs are important for preparedness, but the local knowledge and communication skills of school principals are crucial for effective implementation.
Methods
The research project this article is based on was an exploratory project into the experience, social significance and consequences of temporary school closure due to a hazard event. Although the significance of permanent school closure has been explored previously (see Kearns et al., 2009; Witten et al., 2007), little is known about temporary school closure experiences. Purposive sampling was employed. Principals 1 with experience of temporary closure were invited to participate in a semi-structured interview. In all, 11 principals participated. 2 The schools they represented varied in size and type. 3 In addition to the different geographical regions in which they were located, the socio-economic profiles of their communities also varied. 4
The lead investigator (Stuart) interviewed participants for approximately 1 hour using a seven-item, semi-structured interview schedule to explore their experiences of managing temporary school closure. The interviews were conducted 6 months following the H1N1 outbreak and 36 months following the snowstorm. Interviews were analysed thematically and the emergent themes were grouped temporally as follows: the pre-closure environment; decision-making processes; community consequences of closure; and lessons learned from the closure experience. Managing thematic data temporally enabled contrasting experiences in terms of community preparedness and responsiveness to be identified within the data set.
Case study one: The H1N1 outbreak in Auckland
Following reports of an outbreak of the H1N1 virus in Mexico in 2009, health authorities worldwide went on alert. On 26 April 2009 New Zealand’s Ministry of Health issued its first media release on the outbreak. A group of recently returned travellers from Mexico to Auckland 5 were thought to be infected with the virus. Within days, members of the group returned positive test results for infection by the virus. The response of the New Zealand Ministry of Health, in conjunction with the Ministry of Education and individual schools, was temporary school closure in situations where students were found to be infected with the virus. Ultimately eight New Zealand schools were closed as a result of the outbreak, with the majority in the Auckland region. Schools were advised by Ministry of Education officials to close for a minimum of 4 days. 6
The four Auckland schools that comprise the H1N1 case study had an EMP (including a pandemic plan) in place, though none had previously employed this plan. Principals undertook closure in circumstances that added complexity to their decision-making process. First of all there was a high level of uncertainty surrounding the virus outbreak, both in terms of expectations of the progression of the virus as well as the necessary or best response to the outbreak. 7 Secondly, these schools were not accustomed to the need to close the school under such urgent conditions. Thirdly, the potential of exposure to H1N1, of individual infection, and of pandemic had been highly publicized by the media. These degrees of risk were issues of pertinence to the wider population in a way that is not always the case where schools need to close temporarily.
Processes, challenges and lessons in the H1N1 outbreak
The highly publicized nature of the H1N1 outbreak lent school principals an early opportunity to access the relevant EMP, and all reported this as the first action in their closure process. Closures were managed with external advice from the Ministry of Education and regional public health authorities. 8 The timing of the H1N1 event during the winter months meant that the first piece of pre-closure advice (to keep a close record of student absenteeism) was easily implemented. New Zealand schools traditionally have higher absence rates during the winter months, and in all four schools' attendance rates were already being closely monitored.
The decision to initiate a closure process was made as a result of two key factors: high absenteeism, and positive identification of the H1N1 virus in the medical testing results of a school student. Although principals were aware of the possibility of closure, the decision was nevertheless described as one that seemed ‘sudden’ and which proceeded with a high degree of urgency. Making the decision required principals to be decisive in the face of much that was unknown.
Implementing the closure took time, so that communication with the community could be carried out effectively. Closure involved first officially notifying parents and caregivers. Where possible, this was done at the close of the school day on the afternoon before closure. Communities were notified of closure primarily through a written notice, though families of absent students received telephone calls.
The speed at which the need to close progressed meant that it was not always possible to follow the recommended course of action or to follow other aspects of written procedures contained in EMPs. It took between 16.5 and 36 hours for closure decisions to be communicated and implemented by the four schools. Where the decision to close was made in the evening hours, notification of closure took place the following day through media announcements and whiteboard notices at the entrances to school grounds. The whiteboards carried information about closure expectations as well as contact details of school principals.
The primary challenge of closure was how to ensure that everyone who needed to know about closure had been informed in a way that kept children and the community safe and yet did not add unduly to anxiety and risk. The school closures necessitated by the H1N1 outbreak brought to light an on-going difficulty for schools in maintaining up-to-date contact details for parents and caregivers. Telephone numbers can change frequently without schools being kept up to date. In addition, students primarily arrived at school on foot. School staff had limited direct contact with some caregivers because students arrived at school unaccompanied. Effective alternative communication plans were thus essential.
While the widespread use of mobile telephones can be a helpful means of disseminating closure information, inaccurate information may also be easily and widely spread using this technology. In the case of the H1N1-related closures, inaccurate closure information was widely communicated by unofficial sources through SMS/text messaging. Principals commented on this quick spread of misinformation and the community anxiety and confusion that resulted. 9
Although principals were satisfied that their EMPs were useful as a guide to action, the closures had consequences that were nevertheless challenging. Auckland principals had no previous experience in implementing a temporary school closure under any circumstances, much less under threat of a pandemic. In addition to the need to react quickly, and to act in a way that did not increase risk for the school community, principals were challenged by the pressure put on their communication systems, the need to manage unwanted and at times unhelpful media interest, and the increased and on-going anxiety of their communities in the immediate aftermath of the event. 10 One interviewee commented, ‘It was kind of like we were lepers, you know. It really was. People were saying they didn’t want [our school’s] children going into their shops’.
Interviewees reported some confusion during the consultation process prior to closure. They said they were not entirely clear on the division of responsibility between themselves, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health officials. Although they were largely satisfied with how closure was carried out, disappointments included an unmet expectation of face-to-face support from government officials, (resulting in a sense of isolation), a concern about who would be financially liable for the costs of closure, and disruptions to social ties that the closure wrought.
Case study two: The Canterbury snowstorm
The Canterbury region 11 experienced a heavy snowstorm on the night of 11 June and the morning of 12 June 2006. The storm left a heavy blanket of snow over the region. Although this region is accustomed to adverse weather events, exacerbating factors increased the significance of this event. 12 The severity of the storm’s effects varied across the region, with Ashburton, Mackenzie, Timaru and Waimate districts being most severely affected (Wilson et al., 2009). The principals interviewed for this case study came from schools within these districts. Although they were experienced in this type of closure, the severity of the event was unheralded in their management careers. 13
The snowstorm case study comprises interviewees from eight affected primary, intermediate and secondary schools. The schools were largely situated in rural areas or small towns servicing such an area. One of the schools was located in a major provincial town. The length of closure ranged from one to five days and varied according to the different geographic locations of the schools. 14
Certain Canterbury schools, because of their geographic location, are familiar with the need to close urgently because of adverse weather conditions, and some individual schools have considerable experience of temporary school closure. The Canterbury region ranges from temperate coastal areas to high altitude mountain areas, and in the sparsely populated rural areas school students may reside far from one another. Large and variable geography within the Canterbury region make managing temporary school closures complex. In addition, in the rural areas there is heavy use of bus transport to bring students to schools. Familiarity with the temporary closure process meant that in commenting on the 2006 storm, principals also spoke of other closure events they had experienced.
Processes, challenges and lessons in the Canterbury snowstorm event
Expectations for a snowstorm and closure experience similar to previous storms were not borne out in the eventual course of events in 2006. The usual routine following a weather warning is for rural school principals to rise earlier than usual on the day of the possible closure. Some respondents reported waking during the night of the 2006 event and noting the particularly heavy nature of the snowstorm, while for others the first moment they realized the extent of the situation was when they arose early in the morning. In the case of this particular storm, the decision-making process was made easier by its extreme nature and the timing of the event. Other times, closures may involve just one or a small number of bus runs, or one or a small number of schools. This particular event spread snow over a large geographic area, attracted extensive media attention, and occurred prior to school opening times. There was blanket temporary school closure across the region. Announcements were broadcast advising people to stay at home. One interviewee recalled, ‘It quickly became an event that was bigger than you and bigger than your school, which is not always the case’.
The greatest challenges for Canterbury principals in closing schools usually arise when closure is required after students have arrived at school, and parents and caregivers are involved in their work day’s activities in a variety of different locations. The timing of the 2006 event and the wide area affected meant that the usual problems with closure were alleviated. Principals hence reported little practical difficulty with this particular closure. Their comments on earlier closure experiences, however, suggested that common challenges involved in carrying out temporary school closure due to the sudden onset of an adverse weather event were as follows:
The need to ensure that a changing parent/caregiver community has been advised adequately of what the closure process is
The conflicting need to implement EMPs flexibly in response to the uncertain nature of hazard events
The need to keep the EMP relevant and familiar in a constantly changing school community
The difficulties created by diffuse lines of responsibility between school management teams and parents, with parents sometimes acting without consultation with school staff.
Respondents said that it was often parents who created problems by following a different procedure than what was outlined in the EMP. A parent might give their child advice to go to the home of a friend or neighbour in the event of a closure without advising the school of the arrangement. Difficulty was also created when parental worry resulted in the child being uplifted from school without ensuring that proper procedures had been followed.
In relation to the 2006 snowstorm, the challenge was not making the decision to close, nor was it the evacuation of students from school, but it was deciding when to open. Staff reported being concerned to reopen as soon as was safely possible in order to resume teaching for senior secondary students who would be facing external examinations just a few months hence. For primary school staff, the concern was to reopen as soon as practical, at least in part to relieve farming families of the responsibility for the supervision of younger children when farm animals were requiring urgent care and important farm repairs needed to be undertaken. The effect of severe weather events such as this one also may mean that farming families require older children to remain at home either to help care for younger children or to help with the physical demands presented to their farming operations. One interviewee noted this as an area of potential staff−parent conflict. ‘Sometimes staff don’t see that there is a need for the students to be staying at home … because I’ve brought my children up in this area … [I] see there is a need … I’m not sure some staff see it that way’.
Canterbury principals suggested that in 2006 it was the post-closure environment that created difficulties and challenges for school management and leadership. Social and emotional strain were created as a result of the severity of the event, exacerbated by the length of time it took to get essential services up and running to all community members, and the on-going financial costs to families within the school communities sustained through damage to the environment and stock losses.
Comparing the case studies
Although the two communities focused on here are demographically different, there are general lessons that can be taken from their experiences when it comes to planning for and managing temporary school closure events. In both cases, preplanning for temporary closure was extremely important. Having processes in place meant that principals at least knew what was supposed to happen, even if implementation did not proceed exactly as expected. Responding effectively in a pressing situation required a willingness to employ the plan flexibly in response to the changeable nature of the specific hazard event. Past history with closure brought a greater awareness of what might conceivably go wrong in implementation of an EMP, while a school’s lack of history with closure created higher levels of uncertainty. Finally, the importance of knowing and understanding the composition and needs of a given school community was crucial in both cases in managing the stressful event.
The Auckland and Canterbury principals reported a largely favourable experience implementing their EMPs, although those from the Auckland schools accounted for the immediate experience as one fraught with a sense of community vulnerability and social isolation. Those from the Canterbury schools accounted for their immediate experience as one involving, initially at least, high levels of social cohesion as a consequence of shared adversity, the need for cooperation and the opportunity to help others. While this cohesion was seen to facilitate successful temporary school closure, as is often the case following a hazard event, principals from Canterbury also said that the time of greatest difficulty was some time after the event when media and public interest had been exhausted but challenges to their everyday life were still being faced by those affected. A related issue that warrants further investigation is how principals and their communities manage partnerships when the immediate interests of educators and families do not align. This study suggests that these conflicts are resolved over time, but can be stressful when they occur.
The Auckland and Canterbury temporary school closures resulted from two different kinds of hazard events, each with particular challenges. What they have in common is that both are best understood within their specific social and community contexts. Intentionally reframing ‘natural’ hazards as social phenomena offers principals responsible for emergency management another lens through which to reflect on their emergency plans and responses. By reframing we mean critiquing the idea that the severity and intensity of ‘natural’ events are closely tied to the severity or intensity of damage and destruction. On the contrary, the use of the term ‘natural’ can mask the relationship between the actual hazards (a ‘natural’ event in a specific time and space, for example, a spring snowstorm in a rural area) and their social antecedents and consequences (for example, patterns of land use, damage to livelihoods or access to local services). From this perspective, it is important to understand the social processes that might intensify hazards events, and their differential impact on the communities experiencing them (see Squires and Hartman, 2006).
Concluding comments
Two seemingly disparate insights in the disaster studies literature have relevance when reflecting on the case studies presented in this article. The first insight is that social cohesion intensifies in the face of ‘natural’ disasters, as a sense of community develops in response to the (actual or imagined) shared experience of an event and its aftermath (West and Smith, 1996). This is consistent with the reflections of the Canterbury principals in relation to their previous experiences closing schools during the school day because of adverse weather. The second is that social vulnerabilities are exacerbated by ‘natural’ disasters, and thus some groups and communities are more vulnerable to events and their aftermath than others (Fothergill and Peek, 2004; Phillips et al., 2009; Wisner et al., 2004). This is consistent with the experiences of Auckland principals closing schools during the H1N1 outbreak and with those of the Canterbury principals in the aftermath of snowstorms and once their schools had re-opened.
These two case studies offer those who plan for temporary school closure some insight into the practicalities of the process. Principals’ decision-making is contextualized by their legal requirements, their knowledge and understanding of their school community, and the nature of the event itself, as well as their preparedness in terms of EMP and previous experience of similar events. The case studies illustrate the importance of planning, the need for principals’ flexibility in making decisions in the context of that planning, and the importance of skilled communication with school communities about the timing and duration of temporary school closure. In addition, the case studies are illustrative of two (seemingly disparate) insights from the disaster studies literature: the increased social cohesion that arises as communities respond to hazard events, and the exacerbation of pre-existing social vulnerabilities within communities as a consequence of hazard events. Both illustrate that disasters are not ‘natural events detached from social systems’ (Wisner et al., 2004: 52).
Media reports often observe that social cohesion intensifies when communities experience a significant ‘natural’ event (see, for example, Hutching, 2011). Canterbury principals described their isolated, rural communities as resilient, phlegmatic, and accustomed to dealing with adversity in a matter-of-fact way. This is illustrative of strong and traditionally oriented social bonds, typical in homogenous communities with shared social values and high levels of familiarity and similarity in everyday practices (see Tonnies, 2002/1887). In contrast, the Auckland case studies of schools affected by temporary closure were located in communities already experiencing a degree of social exclusion through poverty, unemployment, and the non-standard and flexible employment of parents and care-givers, making it difficult for the schools to maintain up-to-date contact details.
Principals can enhance their management of hazard events by intentionally reflecting on how hazards are socially situated and incorporating local knowledge and understanding of their school communities into their EMPs. Interviewees for the research project on which this article is based suggest that well-thought-out, locally specific, EMPs are essential yet can only ever be viewed as guides to action. The plans need to be employed in a way that accounts for unanticipated and uncontrollable differences between events. School principals should view each event as an opportunity to refine plans as there will inevitably be gaps between the course of the hazard event and what was expected. Principals in communities where social vulnerabilities are already significant are encouraged to reflect on the way disasters can exacerbate social isolation. In the pandemic case study, communication with parents was mediated by pre-existing difficulties with regard to frequently altered contact details as mobile telephone providers were often changed. The H1N1 outbreak, like other hazard events, also offered opportunities for social cohesion but the type of event made such opportunities more challenging to practically realize than in the case of the Canterbury snowstorm.
It is important for principals to gain from the lessons learned by their colleagues, who are similarly charged with planning for and managing temporary school closures in the event of an environmental hazard. The infrequency of such events means that they may have only a small number of opportunities to learn from personal experience during their careers. This makes it particularly important to learn from the experiences of other school leaders. The general lessons provided by our research project (such as the necessity of preparedness and the need to manage community relationships) apply more generally to disaster management in other national contexts. Further research on experiences of temporary school closure during the Christchurch earthquakes of 2010−2012 could also increase understanding of the challenges of managing such events. As noted earlier in this article, schools have a central part to play in creating resilient, socially connected communities. Through reflecting on the particularities of their local community, principals can build resilience actively through their emergency planning processes, and they can draw upon their community’s strengths to mitigate vulnerabilities while managing their school response to hazard events.
Footnotes
Funding
Funded by GNS Science / Massey University Joint Centre for Disaster Research, through the Natural Hazards Platform.