Like a puppet on a string … exploring Headteachers’ perceived demise of Local Governing Bodies within an English Multi-Academy Trust

Abstract

Multi-Academy Trusts (MAT) have developed organically in England since 2010. As a result, there appears to be a lack of consistency in the interpretation of delegated responsibilities of Local Governing Bodies (LGB). In a small-scale study of Headteacher (HT) accountability within one English MAT, governance was revealed as a major cause for concern. Accountability links between HT performance management, LGBs, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Trust Board were unclear. There was a perception of a lack of upward communication and an increase in local ‘rubber-stamping’ of MAT strategy. It is argued that, whilst LGBs are used as a form of ‘chain of command’ to monitor individual schools, their actual purpose may be operational; governed and limited by the Trust Board. LGBs appear to have lost their strategic influence in the conversion from maintained school to academy. I suggest that the term ‘Local Governing Body’ is potentially erroneous in its nomenclature, as some LGBs merely provide a middle level of ‘educational responsibility’ – puppets on a string.

Keywords

Governance multi-Academy Trusts system Leadership local Governing Bodies accountability

Introduction

In 2010, Coalition Education Secretary, Michael Gove, published a White Paper (DfE, 2010) proposing the adoption of a system of Swedish-inspired free-schools (Rönnberg, 2015) and opportunities for schools to apply for academy status in England. Gove's policy appeared to return freedom to schools to make contextually-appropriate choices regarding curriculum, finance and governance. Since the publication of the accompanying Academies Act (2010), the English education system has experienced a rapid increase in academy conversions (Eyles et al., 2017; Hillary et al., 2016; ILM, 2015). The subsequent paradigm shift from government to governance (Cribb and Gewirtz, 2007) and from Local Authority (LA) regulation to ‘self-managing’ (Fidler et al., 1997) represented a seemingly rapid rejection of the meso-level in which Local Governing Bodies (LGBs) are situated (Coldron et al., 2014).

The speed at which the academy programme expanded, led to a fragmentation of LA control (Greany, 2015; Wilkins, 2017) especially in Governing Bodies (GBs) where LA representation formed part of the statutory membership of maintained schools. Where single academy autonomy was sought, there emerged increasing numbers of schools collaborating in Multi-Academy Trusts (MATs) with a Board of Trustees taking the role of the responsible body and leading governance across a group of schools. Technically and legally, local governors ceased to exist in MAT arrangements. However, the rapid increase in academy conversions and subsequent rise of medium and larger-sized MATs resulted in ‘haphazard’ development of governance arrangements and a variety of approaches to schemes of delegation at local level, producing a ‘patchwork’ of provision (Ball, 2012b, 89). This ‘emergent approach’ (Burnes, 2005, 74) to internal and external accountability structures, akin to complexity theory models of organisational change (Burns and Köster, 2016; Mason, 2016; Morrison, 2002) meant that there was a danger that LGBs might misunderstand the changes to the responsibilities and accountabilities of a MAT LGB within a MAT structure, post-conversion - not least in the retained nomenclature of the word ‘governor’.

However, despite the role of MAT Trustees as the legal responsible body within this ‘emerging landscape’ (Burns and Köster, 2016; Earley and Greany, 2017), the unit of external accountability still remains the single school. League tables remain school, and not MAT-based. Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted) inspections, grading and associated reputational ‘damage’ (MacBeath et al., 2018, 7) are for single schools, not MATs. This suggests potential juxtapositions in internal versus external accountability structures above the level of Headteacher (HT) and hence potential complications of MAT strategy and governance across multiple schools, versus school-level operational implementation, local governance and compliance.

In a former role as a departmental head and member of the Senior Leadership Team in a school within a MAT, I observed some of the leadership tensions within the MAT structures, which were situated beneath Trust governance level. Although I was not directly involved, it became clear to me that a salient and under-researched area of educational leadership was the role of single establishment HTs within MATs. After a sharp drop in single school performance, I observed the removal of a new HT from their post and felt strongly that accountability should not have rested solely with that MAT HT after such a short amount of time. I developed a keen interest in the juxtaposition of increasingly evident neo-liberal ideology in education, with the altruistic and holistic aims of schooling (Fullan, 2003; Heilbronn, 2016; Keddie, 2016; MacBeath, 2006; MacBeath and Dempster, 2009), particularly with regard to accountability and reporting structures in MATs.

Hence my small-scale Master's research aimed to investigate the ‘locus of accountability’ within a MAT, exploring the possibility of an ‘accountability void’, as perceived by those MAT HTs. I was interested in the extent a HT of a single school could exercise autonomy (Male and Palaiologou, 2015) across policy and vision when situated within a MAT. Research questions centred on investigating HT perceptions of the accountability structures within the MAT, support within the MAT, changing role of the HT and the role of the Trust Board / CEO.

It is important to explain at this juncture that the empirical evidence upon which I shall draw in this article was not generated via a focussed study of governance structures in the MAT per se, hence why the participants were HTs and not Governors. However, the HTs experienced huge changes to local governance and felt that the LGB no longer formed an integral part of post-conversion accountability structures in the MAT. HT perceptions of the demise of LGBs in a MAT and suggestion of their puppet-like status, elicited such detailed and rich evidence, that this aspect then became worthy of separate analysis and discussion.

Accountability, autonomy and system leadership

Major themes from the literature include accountability structures within MATs, how academy autonomy manifests itself in groups of schools, and system leadership within the academy system. These contextual factors will be discussed briefly here, setting the context and revealing a clear research gap in the realm of single school leadership and local governance within a MAT.

Simkins links accountability intrinsically to ‘power relationships’ and asserts that in ‘every area of increased power, there seems to be a corresponding area in which additional external controls and constraints have been imposed’ (Fidler et al., 1997: Chapter 2 p.22). This notion of accountability as ‘constraint’ is supported by Higham and Earley (2013) and Hammersley-Fletcher (2015), who consider the juxtaposition of values-led decision-making against external accountability measures, leading to Heinrich's notion of ‘grey-area autonomy’ (cited in Wermke and Salokangas, 2015, 3). Nevertheless, the range of stakeholders across networks of schools (Hooge, 2016), explains Ehren and Perryman's question, ‘Who is accountable to whom and for what?’ (2017).

The positive effects of school autonomy upon student outcomes, contrast with the notion of accountability as ‘constraint’, yet paradoxically form the basis of external accountability measures (Elton and Male, 2015; Parameshwaran and Thomson, 2015). Discussions emerged before ‘academisation’, that school autonomy being beneficial to students was a red herring as a normative concept (Gorard, 2005, 2009; Helgøy et al., 2007). However, Cribb and Gewirtz (2007) suggest that the numerous arguments why autonomy should be limited, matched the corresponding counter-arguments declaring benefits to student outcomes. The Department for Education (DfE) seemed heavily influenced by international models of autonomy, given the references to ‘Asian Tigers’ and Scandinavian models of education in the White Paper (DfE, 2010). You and Morris (2016) analyse Asian autonomy models as possible inspiration for English ‘policy borrowing’ and moves to a more ‘self-managing’ system (Fidler et al., 1997) whilst West (2014) makes interesting parallels between the Swedish ‘fristående skolor’ and the English move towards academies and free-schools.

Cranston argues that academisation has led to school leaders becoming the “ ‘doers’ of the bidding of others” (2013, 131) in a reduction of ‘professional imperatives’ (2013, 135), which are potentially mirrored in MAT local governance structures. This contrasts with the purposes of, and what is considered as critical to, successful school leadership (Bush, 2016; Fullan, 2003; Leithwood et al., 2008). Cousin (2018) argues that issues of leadership and management now lie within new boundaries of ‘system’, ‘trust’ or ‘executive’ leadership – a view shared by Barnett and McCormick (2012) and Buck et al. (2017). These changes impact upon strategic and operational leadership roles and governance within a MAT, shifting the locus of accountability upwards.

The rules and structures of local governance in individual MATs seem to be at the mercy of the ‘surveillant’ (Foucault, 2008) or the individual Trust Board. New accountability structures have been created via LGB schemes of delegation, tipping the delicate balance of ‘input- and output-oriented dimensions of legitimacy’ (Woods and Simkins, 2014, 334) at both school unit and MAT level. However, where do LGBs fit into these new and emerging, but organic systems of trust governance?

Boylan (2016) defines boundaries of a system as ‘fluid, relative and situated’ and suggests that system leadership can be defined in terms of the level at which the leadership is being enacted. In a MAT, it is the prevalence of ‘webs of influence’ across ‘the school group as unit of analysis’ (Woods and Simkins, 2014, 336) intersecting with traditional ‘chains of command’, which makes trilateral ‘pure’ or ‘hard form’ accountability (Simkins in Fidler et al., 1997: Ch. 2) more difficult to locate within this new type of educational structure at meso-level.

Over time and with the new government's commitment to dismantling the previous ‘centralising compliance system’ (DfE, 2010: p.66), the growth of academies and MATs necessitated a way of governance and system leadership, which empowered a Board of Trustees to oversee a group of schools strategically. As Woods and Simkins (2014) outline, a plethora of academy structures ensued, comprising national chains, school-led chains, local federations, collaborative groups of schools and free-standing academies, notwithstanding existing collaborative structures within Local Authorities. However, the impact of this lack of centralised strategic planning with regard to this newly-forming meso-system at local level, was a series of diverse and seemingly disconnected groupings with a lack of clarity in their role. Wilkins defines this as rescaling the local (2017), the middle-tier (Greany, 2015), the ‘mediating layer’ (Mourshed et al., 2010, 22) or the new local (Simkins and Woods, 2014). Mourshed et al., emphasise the strategic importance of a meso-layer, which is intended to provide ‘targeted hands-on support to schools, a buffer between the school and the center, and a channel to share and integrate improvements across schools’ (2010, 22).

The locus of internal accountability within the framework of a MAT has changed, yet the unit of external accountability remains predominantly at single-school-level. The consistency of internal MAT accountability structures and their regulation at Government level also remains unclear and disputed (Gov.uk, 2017). Ehren and Godfrey (2017, 360) conclude that the focus of ‘internal quality control in the MAT’ seems to be upon individual school performance, ‘with little development of network-level outcomes’. This is supported by Sedgwick (2016) who suggests that a lack of network focus leads to what Ehren and Godfrey describe as ‘few incentives to participate in comprehensive joint planning and sharing of risks or to give up autonomy to a network-level authority’ (2017, 360).

This paradox of embedded hierarchical systems within autonomous, yet networked, institutions is further highlighted by Ehren and Godfrey (2017, 360) when they suggest that chain of command approaches to MAT accountability, ‘are not supportive of the creation of inter-organizational networks that are agile and flexible enough to effect change’. It is with this paradox in mind that I sought to research accountability gaps in MATs.

Methodology

My full research project followed a pragmatic mixed methods approach. I planned a concurrent time order (parallel), equal status paradigmatic study as outlined by Johnson and Christensen (2012) which Creswell and Plano Clark (2018, 66) categorise as ‘convergent design’. My chosen methods were survey and case study and I planned to compare results from both sources of data, thus giving equal weight to the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the study. However, it is the data and findings from the case study interviews only, which form the basis for this article.

Yin defines case study as an inquiry that, ‘investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-world context’ (2014, 16) and other researchers have described a case study as a particular (Stake, 1995) or as a single instance of a bounded system. A blend of these definitions described my research context exactly – a particular phenomenon within a bounded system in its real-world context. Hence I felt that case study was therefore most appropriate methodology for this research.

The HTs in the MAT constituted a convenience sample, chosen for ease of access to participants. Patton (2015) is forceful in his arguments against convenience sampling. Citing Morse (2010), Patton claims that convenience samples are ‘information poor, dangerous, of limited utility and lazy, not opportunistic’. As a novice researcher conducting a small scale project, or ‘dipping-your-toe-in-the-inquiry-water’ (Patton, 2015, 310), I was unsure about contradicting such strong claims. Hence I describe my research very clearly as an example of an ‘exploratory sample’ or ‘entry-into-the-field’ (Patton, 2015, 310). However, Patton's arguments made me challenge my positionality within the case study and proceed carefully.

My dual role as a researcher and employee of the case study MAT also presented interesting ethical challenges, as it crossed a clear insider-outsider boundary (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009). As an insider employee of the MAT, I had insight into the organisation as a contextual whole. As I was not a HT within the organisation, and hence an outsider to the HT participant role, it was vital for me to ensure clarity of HT perceptions, as opposed to my own internal observations, to address unintentional bias.

Kanuha asserts from the perspective of social work research,

‘being an insider researcher enhances the depth and breadth of understanding…questions about objectivity, reflexivity, and authenticity of a research project are raised because perhaps one knows too much or is too close to the project and may be too similar to those being studied…’

(cited in Dwyer and Buckle, 2009, 57)

Hence, before commencing any data collection from participants, I considered the threats posed to the validity and reflexivity of the research, due to the fact that the case study was, in fact, a convenience sample. Having ascertained the suitability of my position as an insider researcher with an outsider perspective on the ‘case’, I commenced a single-case, embedded case study model, using semi-structured interviews.

Data collection and analysis

Focused, in-depth semi-structured interviews (Bell and Waters, 2014) were conducted with the CEO and four secondary HTs from one MAT. The interviews were audio recorded using a TASCAM DR-100 portable digital recorder in each participant's office and arranged with each participant at mutually convenient times.

I perceived semi-structured interviews to be the most useful type of data collection, given the fact that I was not seeking to illicit a narrative, or life history from the participant (Goodson, 2008). My aim was to gain interview knowledge (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009) from each ‘interviewee having direct experience of the topic under review’ (Morris, 2015, 4) via open-ended questions. Participants were ‘allowed the freedom to talk about the topic and give their views’ and I was able to respond and ‘probe at the right time’ (Bell and Waters, 2014, 182) maintaining appropriate interviewer conduct (Arksey and Knight, 1999). The organisation and structure of the interview was revealed to participants before recording began (Fowler, 2009).

Despite the perceived limitations of in-depth interviews (Brenner et al., 1985; Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009; Morris, 2015), each interview lasted between 45–60 min and yielded rich qualitative data. I transcribed each interview as a preliminary form of data analysis, in order to identify overarching common themes within the discussions, coded these themes and then re-coded the interviews again according to sub-themes.

Ethics

I reflected upon Hammersley and Traianou's five commonly recognised principles (2012). I interpreted ‘protecting privacy’ as my ability, as researcher, to maintain anonymity of known participants within both public and insider domains, given the problematic nature of insider-outsider research (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009; Sikes, 2006; Tolich, 2004). Participants were sent detailed research information and consent forms before the interviews, which included consent for interview data to be used for the thesis and any linked publications. Gender-neutral pseudonyms and pronouns were used for all participants. The MAT is not mentioned by name, nor is its geographical location revealed. No direct quotes have been used from the CEO's interview and any identifying quotes from the HTs have been removed or re-worded. One HT removed consent and so their data were deleted and not used in any analysis.

Findings – changes and gaps in governance

Systems and structures of governance facilitate quality assurance of accountability measures at all levels in a MAT. From the case study interviews with HTs and a CEO, local governance lacks clarity or purpose at single-school level, but still remains as part of governance structures. Major themes from the case study interviews included HT performance management (PM), the role of LGBs, the Trust Board and upwards accountability, support offered by the Trust Board and perceived loss of ‘professional imperatives’ (Cranston, 2013, 135) with no apparent decrease in accountability.

HT performance management

All participants explained that PM procedures were about to change and that there was potentially a lack of clarity as to formal line management and performance management arrangements moving forward (Table 1). The LGB was not mentioned at all as a stakeholder in these new accountability measures. HTs felt a sense of confusion about changes to the role of the LGB in their PM. HTs expressed concern that the LGB had now been shut out of HTs’ PM revealing a sense of frustration in the futility of having an LGB at all if they were not part of their PM. Participants felt that excluding the LGB from PM would result in a reduction of objective and non-judgmental support, given that PM panels were now being made up of members of the central team, who were employed by the Trust Board. Comments made by participants also questioned future validity of LGB involvement in PM, given the perception that they were already merely agreeing ‘to targets that they (the MAT) have already decided’ (Alex). HTs were concerned that the employed CEO and central team were directing PM across the Trust and that this left no scope for local variation or discussion of the narrative of the school.

Table 1.

Perceptions of governance – performance management.

ALEX	‘area of considerable greyness’ ‘get wheeled back in’ ‘we agree to the targets that they have already decided’ ‘it hasn’t been very difficult or ever controversial setting my targets’
CHRIS	‘line management, accountability, performance management…is a bit odd’ ‘I’m not line managed by the director of secondary education’ ‘I don’t have line management meetings’ ‘I’m getting no feedback good or bad at the moment from the exec layer’
PAT	‘that's a real issue I have with our Trust…governance’ ‘from being accountable to the Local Governing Body to being accountable to the (Trust) Board.’ ‘nobody is quite sure what the lines of…line management are’ ‘curious role as to where that post sits, because that post is not my boss (Director of Secondary)'

The CEO suggested that there was no requirement for an LGB to be involved in PM processes and suggested that some senior leaders were coping less well with the transition away from direct monitoring by the LGB. The CEO also implied that HTs had not yet acknowledged this formal shift of accountability from the LGB to the Trust Board. However, one HT stated that their line management meetings were not with the CEO or Trust Board, they did not receive feedback on progress towards PM targets, which had previously been embedded into the LGB annual schedule. The CEO's responses made it clear that the LGB no longer had any part to play in holding the HT to account via PM.

LGB & executive roles and accountability upwards

The role of the LGB with a MAT seemed unclear to participants, particularly regarding standardisation of MAT systems e.g. policies. Alex suggested that many LGB agenda items were now ‘rubber-stamping’ of Trust policy. ‘Are they (the LGB) holding me to account for those policies or is the Trust holding me to account for those policies?’ (Alex). All participants suggested that LGBs had not worked out their strategic role, if any, within this MAT structure (Table 2); neither were HTs in a position to clarify exactly what they believed the LGB strategic role should be, given other MAT structures and processes in place.

Table 2.

Perceptions of governance – role of the LGB and Trust Board.

ALEX	‘a lack of clarity about what their role is’ ‘the local governing body is an area, which I think is there considerable greyness in this Trust’ ‘their job is to ensure that I deliver on the academy action plan and on the budget that I set, but actually the budget is set and agreed by the Trust’
CHRIS	‘I still don’t quite understand…the interface between the Board and the Local Governing Body, and nor does the Local Governing Body’ ‘I don’t submit my headteacher's reports to anyone else’
PAT	‘there is no direct correlation between the local governing body and the (Trust) Board'

The CEO stated that the role of LGBs was to hold the HT to account across a range of measures (crucially not in PM, as stated above). However, they also suggested that LGBs had not fully appreciated the shift in locus of power and accountability towards the Trust Board when the school academised. All HT participants were unclear as to the purpose of their LGB within new MAT governance structures. Similarly, there appeared to be a lack of ‘any correlation between the LGB and the Trust board’ (Pat). Participants suggested that LGBs were unclear about their strategic role in the MAT system and how they could, would or should be reporting to or be held accountable by the Trust Board.

HT participants seemed to lack knowledge about the specific accountabilities and powers of the Trust Board or how a scheme of delegation may work in local governance structures. Criticism was levelled at the Board's professional distance from each school, perceived lack of knowledge of each school's context and the infrequency of meetings. This was in direct contrast to their perceptions of their own LGBs.

HTs expressed concern about a lack of transparency regarding presentation of each school's unique narrative at Trust Board level. There was a lack of trust in formal data sets and colour-coded ratings being presented to the Board as accurate representations of school outcomes or current situations (Table 3). LGBs were not mentioned at all as a direct link to the Trust Board for HTs as a chain of command. In fact, in the interview, one HT began to question if their LGB reports were ever sent to the Trust Board and if the Trust Board was capable of understanding challenges in their school without an underlying local narrative. (Table 2 – Chris).

Table 3.

Perceptions of governance – impact of the Trust Board / accountability upwards.

ALEX	‘it's not the way teaching works is it?’ ‘If I thought the Trust was doing a terrible job I would leave’ ‘I’m really worried…you’re going to…snitch on me, so I don’t do it.’ ‘what will the Trust do, they’ll say to the DfE "we’ll sort it" "we’ll get it sorted" and what will happen? (indicates will be sacked)'
CHRIS	‘I don’t think anybody in the Trust would be feeling that, unless they do, magnified x times’ ‘We don’t have a huge amount of access to the board members’ ‘our data is given to the Trust, but our context, I don’t know’ ‘Have the Trust Board got any concerns or questions for us?’
PAT	‘I would challenge the Board to name three members of staff in this school’ ‘Limited confidence’ ‘I don’t know that they meet often enough (for the number of schools)' ‘it's pure master-servant’ ‘Where is the accountability up as well as down?’ ‘At what point do four or five of you dig your heels in and say no?’ ‘when there is four or five of you who feel that their position is rather untouchable’ ‘you have to have the credibility to say no’ ‘I’m not sure that that necessarily that level of accountability still sits in the hands of the CEO’

All participants questioned the effectiveness of the Trust Board in holding the Executive to account, when communication with LGBs was limited. They also questioned if the CEO's educational responsibility was really ‘magnified x times’ the number of schools in the MAT (Table 3 - Chris).

When asked if their school could instigate a vote of no confidence in the executive layer, responses varied widely from: concern that expressing an opinion would result in their professional demise; yes, but with union advice and evidence; to scepticism that it would ever be possible, as it would require four or five HTs whose schools were strong, secure and ‘untouchable’ (Pat). None of the HTs mentioned formal accountability chains via an LGB or the authority, influence or support of an LGB in this situation.

Discussion

Structures of governance set the standard for disciplinary power (Woods and Simkins, 2014) within an organisation. The way in which this power is enacted can provide evidence for accountability voids in MATs. This, coupled with a MAT's capacity to match exponential growth with effective systems and structures of governance, form crucial elements in their strategic success.

Research has been conducted into structures of governance within academies and ‘groups of schools’ (Wilkins, 2015; Woods and Simkins, 2014) however little research appears to exist into the relationship between LGB and Trust Boards, despite significant levels of commentary surrounding system-level governance (Ball, 2015; Ball and Junemann, 2012; Wilkins, 2015). This case study confirms Eddy-Spicer et al.'s concerns, ‘the emergence of MATs…is altering the processes of HT accountability’ (2017, 17), as well as the role and status of the LGB within those processes. Concerns were raised in this study about an apparent lack of communication between layers and levels of governance, as well as a lack of upward accountability.

Discussions about PM revealed clear expectations of regular ‘hierarchical observation’ (Niesche, 2011) or formal CEO contact at executive level, rather than from the LGB. The relationship between HT and line manager is not a new research topic (Radnor et al., 1997) however, the influence of LGBs within emerging MAT structures appears to have shifted dramatically, to the point of obsolescence.

Agency theory suggests that the role of Trust Board, as principal, is to ‘empower an agent’, ‘while at the same time constraining the agent from shirking on their responsibilities’ (Kivistö et al., 2015, 132). Applying this logic to MATs in a chain of accountability, the agent is a HT, so what is the purpose of both HTs and LGBs? Are LGB's indeed now, “’doers’ of the bidding of others” (Cranston, 2013, 131) with no strategic input? The issues raised here of accountability and communication structures within MATs, perceived disempowerment of LGB and lack of LGB agency to hold an executive to account, requires further research in other MATs to formulate any generalisations.

Conclusion

What is the role of a Local Governing Body in a MAT given that local governance is not a statutory requirement in a MAT? How is a Trust Board held to account? Is Pat justified in saying, ‘Where is the accountability up as well as down?’ (Table 3). There is clear scope for further research in this area, given that this is study of a single MAT with no claim to representation of all MATs. Whilst the claims made in this article hold true for this one example, generalisations across LGBs in England cannot be made and remain open to confirmation or contradiction. Documentary analysis of MATs’ scheme(s) of delegation could support evaluation of ‘demarcation of roles and responsibilities of the Trust Board and local governing bodies’ (Gov.uk, 2015). An analysis of accountability streams between meso and macro levels might explain the tension between Trust Board / executive and single school leadership / governance structures. Effective local governance should provide support and challenge for HTs in single schools, whilst feeding back into the MAT Trust Board's strategic aims. Recognising the meso-layer's strategic importance should enable MATs to structure their accountability systems more effectively, channelling direct communication from LGBs to Trust Boards to inform strategic system leadership. However, as exemplified in this case study, the perceived demise of LGBs creates the potential for internal accountability voids in governance between the strategic leadership and management of single schools and the whole MAT. This is seen most clearly in responses to external inspection and in internal PM structures. Accountability voids of governance, where single school leaders in a MAT are held internally and externally accountable for Trust-led strategy and decisions, must be addressed through external review and reform of accountability structures in the English education system.

Further research could be conducted to assess the nature of upward communication flow from LGB to MAT Board. The concept of single school agency and voice within a MAT structure could also be explored (Buchanan, 2015), to identify how the narrative of each school is presented to the Trust Board. Finances can be verified with documentary evidence (Wilkins, 2017); school improvement is less easy to present. Detailed research could study new MAT structures and show who is regulating and mitigating against historical mistakes of HT / LGB relationships at single-school level (Mason, 2016; Ozga, 2009) and how. Are there governance models in MATs where local governance is an integral part of system governance?

‘Freedoms’ of state-funded ‘independent’ schools (Ball et al., 2012) and the promises of autonomy from the White Paper (DfE, 2010) in purchasing, HR and staffing, curriculum and governance are now exactly the measures of performativity (Ball, 2003, 2012a) which are ‘constraining’ (Higham and Earley, 2013) single schools when in a MAT.

If MATs are truly ‘school-led’, what role does a Trust Board play? If MATs are ‘executive-led’, what role the Local Governing Body if not just a puppet on a string?

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

My heartfelt thanks to the group of Headteachers and CEO who consented to take part in this small-scale study about their MAT. Their trust in me, their honesty and their openness has been much appreciated.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Caroline Vinall

Author Biography

Caroline Vinall achieved triple honours from the University of St Andrew's, then worked in Germany, returning to England to complete her PGCE in MFL at St Martin's, Lancaster. She has held a variety of departmental, whole-school and SLT roles in secondary and middle schools in the North-West and East of England. Supervised by Dr. Bethan Morgan, this research was conducted for her part-time MEd thesis in Educational Leadership and School Improvement at the University of Cambridge, which was awarded a Distinction and the Simms Prize. Caroline is a peer-reviewer for MiE and has presented her research at Jamaica’s ICELM 2021 and the BELMAS Conference.

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