Revisiting Autopoiesis

The Notion of Autopoiesis Within Social Systems

For Maturana and Varela (1974/1994), the core of both autopoiesis and theory of knowledge finds an explanation in the organization of living beings. One of the greatest contributions of this theory to our understanding of social systems is recognizing that some systems have the quality of producing themselves resorting to their own operations and elements, regardless of actions from the environment or an external observer. For example, common understanding of the nervous system conceives it as an instrument that gains information from the environment. Along this logic, an organism would only be able to respond to environmental stimuli. However, the concept of autopoiesis suggests that “the nervous system does not capture environmental information . . . it brings forth a world by specifying which environmental configurations are disturbances and which changes trigger them in the organism” (Maturana & Varela, 1984, p. 113, our translation).

This circular and self-referential concept of systems cannot be explained without taking into consideration the interpretative capacity of living beings and, therefore, the emergence of a new level of phenomena: the constitution of meanings. To some extent, we can say that autopoietic systems unveil, within nature, the interpretative phenomenon, as the operations of distinction between the system and its environment rely on it. Considering that the interpretative phenomenon strongly alters the idea of the system, autopoiesis theory proposes that changes originate in the internal dynamics of a system’s self-production rather than the environment. Applied to social systems, this idea highlights that what was designed as a socialization process between the system and its environment is only made possible by the emergence of a communication network. In the words of Luhmann (1997), a social system emerges as a closed communication network in which society is maintained and self-produced through internal dynamics of meaning creation. Social systems are operationally closed, because at the level of their own operations, communication is part of them (rather than “external” information originating in the environment).

As a result of this operational closure, a system depends on its own organization, and its structures constitute and transform themselves solely through its own operations. The mere act of a communication system coupling through language has a relevant effect on its own evolution. However, autopoiesis theory reaches beyond this, postulating that interpretation of living beings occurs in the praxis of living in language, a daily practice in which we are necessarily and permanently submerged (Maturana & Varela, 1984). As beings, we are within the language and not outside of it (Echeverría, 1995). In line with the circular logic of autopoiesis, we tell our stories about reality within language; as Maturana (1992) puts it: reality exists because we word it.

Organization as a System of Narratives

The concept of language as a generative instrument is the key to understanding organizations as systems of narratives. According to this concept, organizational life is made up of cooperation—a realm of coordinated consensual actions (Maturana, 1992)—and, therefore, of communication. Both phenomena are inseparable: Organization cannot be understood without communication and vice versa. Hence, the reality of organizations is a complex sum of symbolic spaces that are common to the organizational environment, where new meaning is created among and for the members of that environment. Organization encompasses a network of conversations (Flores, 1994). Furthermore, following on the premise that language constitutes reality, conversation becomes a key phenomenon in organizations (see also Cooren, 2012). In this view, organizations emerge from a network of conversations, with concrete output in the realms of business, education, leisure, finance, or politics.

To understand organization as an autopoietic system that operates within language, one last step still remains to be achieved. This is where the concept of organization as a system of narratives comes into play. Narratives mark the boundaries and positions within which conversations and their subsequent actions take place. They are at once a framework to the conversations and a nucleus through which these are interwoven. Organizational members’ background is populated by pre-existing narratives. These constitute a history that follows its course “moment to moment, contingent upon its recurring interactions, with its own internal structural dynamics and interactions with the environment” (Maturana, 1992, p. 53, our translation). Conversations enter that history, generating the act of distinction whereby an organization’s identity and unity are created (i.e., the “self”). Organizational unity and cooperation are achieved when individuals, enacting it through the conversational network, have adopted the narratives by appropriating the actions derived from them.

Predictably, this organic system of narratives is neither primitive nor does it generate spontaneously. It originates from the wide spectrum of pre-existing narratives that we have inherited as social beings and that we continuously and necessarily maintain, transform, and/or question in our conversations. Some organizational narratives exemplify the impact of those stories that are associated to the idea of commitment. Within information technology, the cases of Steve Jobs with Apple or Bill Gates with Microsoft are quite illustrative examples of personal effort and leadership; these narratives have served as sources of inspiration for new forms of management. It is usual, then, for organizations to uphold their elevated productivity standards and performance levels, relating their accounts to heroic founders with the purpose of safeguarding their members’ cooperation. Overtime, these narratives become principles or organizational practices that go unchallenged and turn into powerful means of control. In general, they are linguistic operations that support themselves upon wide realms of consensus. Among the functions fulfilled by those accounts are coordination of present and future actions, control of wishes and expectations, definition of mandates and instances of obedience, justification of assessment and sanctions, and orientation of organizational change.

Opening the Dialogue: Implications for the Study and Practice of Organizational Communication

The concepts of communication and organization proposed by autopoiesis theory are not without consequences. In presenting itself as a theory of knowledge based on the phenomenology of living beings, it carries what could be referred to as an epistemic responsibility for the observer wishing to study organizational reality and/or intervene in organizational processes. At this stage, three perspectives should be taken into consideration to open up the dialogue with other constitutive approaches developed by North American and European researchers (e.g., Brummans, Cooren, Robichaud, & Taylor, 2014; Schoeneborn et al., 2014).

First, let us mention what Maturana and Varela (1984) call “cognitive tautology,” which consists in acknowledging that the universe of human knowledge and experiences cannot be explained from a perspective that is independent from that same universe: “We can only learn human knowledge from knowledge itself” (p. XI, our translation). What may be understood as an apparent paradox becomes the cornerstone of the theory of autopoiesis. Objectivity and rationality take on a new meaning, if we accept that, on the path of knowledge, observers give form to existence through their operations of distinction, in their practice of living within language. So, what are the operations that allow us to account for this reflexive and circular knowledge process and for our role as integrated observers in a system we wish to understand or take part in? How can one develop a “constitutive objectivity” (Maturana, 1992) that acknowledges this integrated/integral position in approaches to organizational phenomena? What changes should be implemented in organizational practices and processes when following this position?

A second consideration, resulting from the previous one, consists in taking seriously the act of distinction in the constitution of the object and subject of knowledge. Neither the observer nor the organization is a priori ontological assumption. Both appear in the distinguishing act of observing. As mentioned earlier, there is no constitution without distinction, both operate within language. This is the starting point: Languaging as a fundamental constitutive process and narration as a linguistic operation whereby distinction emerges from a search for cooperation, coherence, and unity. So, how can we account for simultaneity in the processes of distinction and constitution, or in the processes of differentiation and unity in organizing? What are the properties of language that generate at once these apparently opposite processes? How does narration precisely contribute to the search for unity?

Finally, let us mention the ethical attitude presented by the praxis of living within language. For Maturana and Varela (1984), every human act holds an ethical meaning because it is inevitably an act within language; it therefore “brings forth the world that is created with others in the act of coexistence that generates human nature” (p. 163, our translation). Following these authors, communicating with others is the foundation to reflecting on the legitimacy of the existence of another: “Acceptance of the other alongside oneself, in coexistence” (p. 163, our translation). If, as Maturana says, knowledge is binding, there are greater arguments to think in new organizational forms that operate on the basis of coexistence and communion, rather than indifference or negation.