A Simulation Authoring System for Cooperation and Conflict Situations

Abstract

In the social sciences simulations have historically been used to test mathematically oriented models statistically. At least since Richardson tested his theory of arms races, they have been a respected research technique. Since Tucker's invention of the prisoner dilemma game, experimental methods have been used to develop controlled testing of game-theoretic hypotheses of social behavior. Yet experimental tests and simulations are rarely an integral part of the curriculum for social science undergraduates. Most recently, computers have been used to generate increasing control over the experimental environment. We report on software we are writing that permits students to author experiments and simulations. It is designed to generate pedagogically useful and fully operational social science laboratory experiments with great ease and without substantial constraints. We report on its pedagogic and research applications as well as its general technical structure Keywords: authoring system, laboratory experiment, pedagogy, political science, research, simulation, simulation design, social behavior, social science.

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