The Most Trusted Advisor and the Subtle Advice Process in Family Firms

Abstract

The literature on advising family firms has primarily focused on providing practical advice through offering explicit intervention phases and advising models to family firm advisors. Yet the underlying implicit processes behind advising are not well understood. This study examines nine most trusted advisors in six family firms to develop a grounded theory model of how advisors capture attention, how they become attuned to family firm members to influence attention, and how they aid family members to collaboratively interrelate and mindfully govern the firm in order to facilitate an environment of collective attention.

Keywords

family business advising most trusted advisors attention attunement

Introduction

Advisors have been important in institutions from the Roman Catholic Church to European royal families. In the family business world, advisors commonly engage in strategy formulation, planning, succession, and conflict resolution (Strike, 2012). Often they do so in ways that are overt and directly observable, such as by providing objective advice. Yet, as expressed by one advisor that “If nobody knows who I am, or what I do, then I know I’m doing my job,” their advice can also be quite subtle (Dutton, Ashford, O‘Neill, Hayes, & Wierba, 1997). Notwithstanding the recognized importance of the use of advisors and advice networks in family business (e.g., Astrachan & McMillan, 2006; LaChapelle & Barnes, 1998; Upton, Vinton, Seaman, & Moore, 1993), there has been limited attention toward developing an understanding of providing subtle advice and the implicit underlying processes through which advisors afford value to family firms. Yet, despite being not easily seen, subtle advice can be vital to the health of the family firm.

In contrast to family business research that focuses on observable advice in intervention processes (e.g., Gersick, Davis, Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997; Hilburt-Davis & Dyer, 2003) or advising models (e.g., Bork, Jaffe, Lane, Dashew, & Heilser, 1996), I show how family firm advisors engage in subtle processes to guide and direct attention. At one level, the advice role can be subtle, which occurs when “nobody knows who I am.” At another level, the advice process can be subtle, which occurs when “nobody knows . . . what I do.” In this article, I examine subtle advice at both levels. First, I document the subtle role of what my informants labeled as the Most Trusted Advisor (MTA). Second, I follow how the MTA engages in both subtle and overt advice processes to facilitate collective attention. Although the MTA’s engagement in these processes was implicit, it was traceable.

I define subtle advice as the tactics and practices used to discretely guide the attention of family firm members toward developing collective attention. If advisors use subtle advice to influence attention, it is important to understand how they do so because little is still known about advising dynamics in family firms (Strike, 2012). I demarcate the analysis by focusing on advisors that were identified by the family as being their MTA, as trusted advisors are cited as those being closest to family firm members, and are thereby most likely to have the strongest influence on family firm members (Grubman & Jaffe, 2010; Marcus, 1983).

To address the call to increase our understanding of the advising process (Strike, 2012), I propose a grounded model of facilitating collective attention of family firm members. I used an inductive grounded theory approach that allowed me to shed light on the MTA’s subtle role and practices, and develop a process model of how advisors capture and direct attention, offering both theoretical and practical insights into the process of advising in family firms. To develop the grounded model, I drew on the experiences of nine MTAs and the families they advise in six family firms. As is common with inductive studies, this project began with a broad research question exploring the process of advising in family firms: How do advisors add value to the family firm? As the data collection and analysis proceeded, the study became more defined, and an account of the role of guiding attention emerged. My research questions then were the following: (a) How do MTAs subtly capture and direct the attention of family firm members? (b) How do MTAs facilitate an environment of collective attention in the family firm?

The study makes three important contributions. First, it empirically identifies the MTA’s role. Second, it uncovers how subtle (and overt) advice practices and tactics allow the MTA to direct and guide attention in family firms. Third, it documents how MTAs work to benefit the collective of the family firm as opposed to their own self-interest, which is common in many advising relationships (Dutton et al., 1997; Lingo & O’Mahony, 2010; Obstfeld, 2005). I proceed by providing an overview of the literature on advising. I then describe the methods, the findings, a discussion of the grounded model that emerged from the data and its theoretical and practical implications, and the conclusion.

Theoretical Background

Previous research on advisors has revealed that external advisors, advisory boards, and internal advisors are important resources for family firms (Astrachan & McMillian, 2006; Kaye & Hamilton, 2004; LaChapelle & Barnes, 1998; Strike, 2012). The literature on the advising process itself provides a relatively structured approach with explicit steps on how advisors should assist family firm clients (Bork et al., 1996; Gersick et al., 1997; Hilburt-Davis & Dyer, 2003). These approaches generally agree that family firms require a unique advising approach and that family firm advisors require effective skills to manage the sensitivities that are distinctive to family firms. The advising process differs in family firms as advisors must navigate themselves through overlapping family and business systems that result in intersecting personal and business conflicts (Bork et al., 1996), increased cognitive challenges, long-term emotional needs, and complex interrelationships with conflicting stakeholder interests (Gersick et al., 1997; Jaffe & Lane, 2004). Authors have identified fundamental differences between family and nonfamily firms that have implications for the advising process, how advisors intervene, and the advising tools they utilize (see Table 1; Upton et al., 1993).

Table 1.

Differences in Family and Nonfamily Firms.

	Family firm	Nonfamily firm	Implications for family firm advisors
Nature	Emotional	Rational	Need to be concerned with and manage emotions of family members
Membership	Involuntary	Voluntary	Need to balance family dynamics and conflicts as members cannot simply walk away
Assessment	Based on norms of loyalty and reciprocity	Based on contribution to the firm	Need to approach issues in a nonjudgmental manner and recognize different means of assessment
Orientation	Inwardly oriented to protect, nurture, and develop members	Profit oriented	Advising context is more personal and is not simply about firm effectiveness and efficiency
Penchant to change	Views change as a threat to safety and security for family	Views change as an opportunity for growth and advancement	Need to balance immediate change needs of firm and long-term emotional needs of family

For example, the Hilburt-Davis and Dyer (2003) consulting model suggests that what differentiates family business advising from nonfamily firms is the need for advisors to work at the interface of family, business, and ownership; to be aware of both process and content; to deal with long-standing complex emotions; and the use of multidisciplinary teamwork. This model is based on nine sequential steps that begin with first contact and end with exit and potential reentry. The authors also suggest further approaches such as balancing between process and content and moving from technical issues to more private emotional issues using five separate levels of analysis. Other advising models provide similar intervention phases (e.g., Bork et al., 1996; Gersick et al., 1997) each with their own unique approach, depending on the authors’ theoretical background and training. As noted by Bork et al. (1996, p. 8) though, “there is neither a perfect solution nor a single route toward a solution to the complex circumstances presented,” as the complex circumstances of the family firm will influence the advising process.

What each of the models and intervention processes assumes is that advisors are brought in for a specific project or task where the beginning and ending of the advising role is somewhat defined, such as aiding the family firm with succession or a particular change process. However there often exist, either within or external to the firm, advisors who are not brought in as advisors or consultants per se but who act in an ongoing trusted advising capacity (Marcus, 1983). These trusted advisors may hold the role of family business accountant, lawyer, or tax advisor (Nicholson, Shepherd, & Woods, 2010) who have access to private financial information that overlaps both the family and the firm; they may oversee the family office, providing counsel on both business and family matters (Junge, 2006); or they may retain a seat on the family’s advisory board or board of directors (Lester & Cannella, 2006). These advisory relationships are long term in nature, often lasting beyond a single generation (Grubman & Jaffe, 2010). While the goal of many advisors is therefore to complete their project and end the engagement with the client, trusted advisors are often lifelong and are deeply embedded within the family. Furthermore, the family is often highly dependent on the trusted advisor. Although these roles remain relatively understudied, they have been identified by titles such as relationship managers (Grubman & Jaffe, 2010), fiduciaries (Marcus, 1983), and personne d’confiance (Hughes, 2007). Common across these positions is they are “the classic all-position players” who represent “that special trusted advisor to the family elders who traditionally could be called upon for almost anything” (Grubman & Jaffe, 2010, p. 18). Though these roles are seldom explicitly recognized within the family firm literature, they yield great influence within the firm and family.

Often the advising process that these trusted advisors follow is more subtle than that of advisors brought in for a specific consulting project, where the role of the trusted advisor is more to influence the flow of information between members of the family firm and to guide and direct attention to issues of relevance and away from issues of insignificance. The literature that has studied this more subtle advice process of influencing attention primarily exists outside the discipline of family business. It suggests that advisors are important to the attention structure of social systems because they can channel organizational members’ attention and influence the flow of information within organizations. For example, Arendt, Priem, and Ndofor (2005); Dutton et al. (1997); Eisenhardt (1989a); Maitlis and Lawrence (2007); and Sniezek and VanSwol (2001), among others, all suggest that organizational members are influenced by “issue-sellers,” “counselors,” “sense-givers,” “peer-advice networks,” and “judge-advisor systems” and have urged researchers to study the processes that take place behind the scenes.

Scholars who have studied the underlying processes have focused on how third parties provide advice that is for their own benefit as opposed to for the benefit of others (e.g., Dutton et al., 1997; Simmel, 1950). Advisors in such roles may use one of two orientations to address problems or opportunities in a social context. Those who use information strategically to maintain a division between individuals or groups in order to enhance their own social capital and reap individual benefits assume a tertius gaudens orientation (third who benefits; Simmel, 1950). In contrast, those who strategically connect individuals or groups to one another to facilitate collaboration and common goals adopt a tertius iungens orientation (or third who unites/connects; Obstfeld, 2005). Yet, the type of orientation that family firm MTAs adopt has not been empirically substantiated, and it remains unclear how these advisors subtly navigate their way through the complex circumstances found in family firms. To effectively facilitate and develop the infrastructures necessary to manage these complex interrelationships, MTAs must be able to capture and direct the attention of family firm members amidst the emotional context in which the family firm is embedded (Strike, 2012). While the current intervention descriptions and advising models provide practical guidance on the explicit processes and steps involved in advising family firms, particularly for those advisors who are focused on a specific consulting project or task, we have a relatively narrow understanding of this more ongoing subtle role of MTAs and why some MTAs have a greater ability to influence family firm members than others (Astrachan & Astrachan, 1996; Strike, 2012). Furthermore, little is known about how MTAs guide attention. The role of MTAs in family firms therefore remains understudied despite the effect that even minor influence processes can have on family firm members’ attention. Increasing our understanding of how MTAs influence family firms may highlight the unique role that they hold and begin to unveil conditions for their success.

Method

This study evolved out of an inductive multicase research project (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Yin, 1989) examining the role of MTAs in family firms that has continued to extend for almost 10 years. The nature of my research questions, and the limited extant research on MTAs and the advising process, calls for inductive qualitative methods to develop an initial understanding of the phenomenon. In particular, I used grounded theory, which allowed me to understand and explore phenomena where little is known (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) in order to generate conceptual frameworks (Miles & Huberman, 1994).

Research Context

I selected six family firms according to a deliberate theoretical sampling plan. My aim was to choose cases that would offer theoretical insights, extend the phenomenon of interest, and provide the greatest opportunity for discovery (Eisenhardt, 1989b). I chose MTAs because their close relationships to family firm members provide an opportunity to understand the more subtle processes of advising in an environment of complex emotional and cognitive relationships that arises due to the intersection of family, business, and ownership. The role of the MTA is very private. It is difficult to identify who the MTA is, let alone gain access to them or family firm members. MTAs are privy to very confidential information from both the family and the business. Staying out of the spotlight and away from the media allows them to protect the family’s interests by guarding the intimate details of the sacrosanct areas that overlap the family’s personal and business lives. I drew on my own personal network to identify the initial two firms. I gained access to the other cases through contacts made at a symposium for MTAs that I attended. My sample is not randomly chosen, but as the aim is to understand the phenomenon, the most important elements are theoretical relevance and access to rich data (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Yin, 1989).

The family firms in this study came from North America. The firms’ ages ranged from 30 years to over 120 years. In the six family firms, I interviewed 9 MTAs at different stages of their relationship with the family. Two of the firms self-identified two MTAs, one for the first generation and one for the second generation (Cases C and D), and one firm had one incoming and one outgoing MTA (Case E). Eight of the MTAs were male, and one was female. I examined MTAs who were internal and employed full-time by the firm, or who were external and held a seat on the firm’s advisory board, or were employed as an external advisor. In addition, I searched for MTAs with varying tenure with family firms, which ranged from 8 to 31 years, and for MTAs who had been with the founder since she/he began the business or who had joined the family later on. The choice of these variances maximized differences along two dimensions thought to be particularly relevant to the strength of the relationship between the MTA and family firm members: high to low levels of interactions and length of the relationship. I also searched for MTAs with different professional backgrounds, who were either a lawyer or an accountant by training, thought to be relevant to the competencies of the MTA. Family firm members also provided examples of advisors who had not developed into MTAs and who had been asked to leave their position as family firm advisors. Although I was not able to interview these advisors, I was able to search for and capture the informants’ meanings and understandings of why the relationship did not develop further. Table 2 provides a summary of the six firms.

Table 2.

Summary Information of Case Studies.

Case	Generation	Family involved in firm	Relationship with MTA (years)	MTA present since founding or current owner becoming involved	MTA internal or external	Formal role of MTA
A	Fourth	Husband Wife	11	Joined when husband and wife purchased the family firm	External	Advisory board member
B	First and second	Father Son	21	Involved since purchase of firm	Internal	VP Finance and CFO
C	First and second	Husband Wife	MTA1—24	MTA1—Joined shortly after founding	Internal	MTA1—President of holding company
		SonDaughters (2)	MTA2—12	MTA2—Joined more recently	Internal	MTA2—Family office manager
D	First and second	HusbandSon (2)	MTA1—31	MTA1—Involved since shortly after founding	External	MTA1—Advisory board member
		Wife and 2 daughters on the advisory board	MTA2—9	MTA2—Brought in by adult children	Internal	MTA2—President of holding company
E	Fourth	FatherMultiple family members	MTA1—19	MTA1—Joined with fourth generation	Internal	MTA1—Past president of family office
			MTA2—8	MTA2—Joined more recently	Internal	MTA2—Began as CFO; currently president of family office
F	Second	Son 1Son 2	20	Joined when sons took over the firm	External	External advisor

Note. MTA = most trusted advisor.

Data Collection

I used multiple data-gathering approaches to support and triangulate the findings: open-ended interviews, electronic and written documentation, and participant observation. Interviews were the primary source of data, while documentation and participant observation were important for understanding the context and backgrounds of the interviewees.

I conducted 40 open-ended interviews with 21 informants. I used open-ended questions to encourage flexible and informal dialogue. I modified the guiding questions after each interview, adding questions to address issues that emerged as important. For each case study I interviewed multiple informants to triangulate the data, add alternative perspectives, and mitigate biases and retrospective sensemaking. Each interview lasted 60 to 120 minutes. All interviews were digitally recorded and then transcribed verbatim for use in the data analysis, resulting in more than 700 pages of transcripts. I also kept a record of field notes to supplement the transcribed interviews, to understand emergent findings, and to modify questions for follow-up interviews.

I collected more than 600 pages of written documentation that helped me gain insights into the firm and the family. These data included website information on the firm, industry, family, and the interviewees; archival public data from electronic and written media coverage; and presentations and documentation from the symposiums I attended. I was also given access to internal documentation on the firms and families that provided a secondary data source.

In participant observation I gained access to three private family firm MTA symposiums through the MTAs whom I interviewed. The symposiums ranged in size from 40 to 150 participants. They were invitation-only and closed to outsiders. I had many opportunities to interact and conduct informal interviews with workshop participants: between seminars, over meals, and on taxi rides, thereby increasing my sample size. The symposiums exposed me to the issues MTAs face and they helped me generate potential case studies and interview questions.

Data Analysis and Coding

My effort to study the subtle part of the advising process follows recent scholars who aim to capture not only the observable (Eisenhardt, 1989b) but also more unobservable elements. Instead of looking for clearly observable phenomena, I used an inductive grounded theory approach that integrated two methods—multiple case studies (the “Eisenhardt method”) and in-depth inductive case research (the “Gioia method”; see Langley & Abdallah, 2011, for an overview). The multiple case design (Eisenhardt, 1989b) allowed me to compare relationships within and across cases, providing more varied empirical evidence. While the Eisenhardt method focuses on developing testable hypotheses regarding observable phenomena, the Gioia method allowed me to take an interpretive stance (Langley & Abdallah, 2011), and it addresses the limitations that prior scholars have identified as existing by exclusively following the Eisenhardt method (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991). In combining these methods, I was able to explore both the MTA’s subtle role and the implicit and explicit practices used in the advising process.

During the course of the research I overlapped data analysis and data collection. I coded the data with procedures for building grounded theory (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). I conducted a detailed first-order analysis to give the perspectives of the MTAs and of their families. I proceeded to conduct a second-order analysis where I considered the findings from the first-order analysis in comparison to prior research (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This analysis revealed little work on the more subtle processes underlying the advising process. As themes and relationships emerged, I compared them with other case data, and I looked for similarities and differences among the cases. To ensure that I had not adopted the informants’ views, I met at regular intervals with another colleague who acted as an outsider and assumed the role of devil’s advocate to improve theorizing. After the initial model was developed, I returned to the informants to conduct member checks where 12 of the informants were available. I invited them to be critical of the findings and model and to identify weak links. The overall result was a framework of relationships and a grounded process model describing how the MTA is able to capture and influence the attention of family firm members.

Findings

Figure 1 presents the final data structure. The first-order themes on the left side of the figure use the language of the informants that informed the theoretical labels used to represent the data. The second-order themes are shown in the middle. The aggregate theoretical dimensions that emerged from the analysis are on the right-hand side of the figure. The first aggregate dimension allowed the MTA to capture the attention of the family firm members. The next dimension describes the underlying processes that enabled the MTA to become attuned to family members’ abilities and desires to deal with affective issues. The third dimension, facilitating collective attention, refers to creating an environment that enables family members to collaboratively interrelate and mindfully govern the firm. Table 3 provides representative quotations from the data that illustrate each of the second order themes.

Figure 1.

Data structure.

Table 3.

Representative Data Supporting the Second-Order Themes.

Second-order themes	Representative first-order data
Voice	A. “They have to be really honest, and honest in every sense of the word. Not just honest in the sense that they are going to steal money or something like that but it’s sort of more kind of like integrity. It goes way beyond what most people would expect.” (O3)
Voice	B. “To him own self be true. (MTA) even if it hurts his brother or his family or his wife or his children, will tell them what he thinks. They know and they accept it from him, even if it hurts because he’s straight as the arrow flies. He’s true to his values.” (O4)
Weight	C. “I’ve been a lawyer for 25 years. I worked for a family for 5 years so I’ve seen a lot of different situations. You try to extrapolate. You try to bring a body of knowledge that you have invested over years to a situation and say ‘I’ve seen this happen before. I see this happening right here again, the same sort of thing. This is what I’d advise you to do.’ And that’s good advice because it’s actually based on something that you’ve seen in the past.” (MTA6)
Weight	D. “I have an MBA, law degree, arts degree. I worked in the fishing industry. You develop a sense about what you don’t know and when you need help. What you do know is you know the questions to ask. If there is one thing that I contribute, it’s knowing the questions to ask and knowing when I need help, whether it’s tax, legal, accounting or whatever.” (MTA3)
Self in relation to others	E. “He has to really understand the personalities of the family. I think that’s really important because you have to speak differently to each type of person. Everybody hears different things. I think the more he understands the psyche of each of us, the more successful he is going to be. I think understanding the needs of each family member and attending to the different needs will create more harmony amongst us.” (D)
Self in relation to others	F. “I listen carefully at lots of different levels and in different places. Listening to what the concerns are, the areas of discomfort and trying to understand. Not everybody comes to you and says ‘listen, here’s what I think is the problem and here’s what needs to happen.’ Sometimes you can sense discomfort or anxiety or excitement but they are not necessarily expressing what it is exactly. So you have to think and listen to understand because people often don’t communicate those things so clearly.” (MTA5)
Self in contribution to whole	G. “Very few people make it to the most trusted advisor because they are too much a slave to their own discipline, to making money. They say ‘if I bring other people in they’re going to take a piece of it and there’s going to be less of it for me.’ The economic reason prevents them from really becoming a most trusted advisor. They are good advisors and they have a role to play, but they are not the most trusted.” (O4)
Self in contribution to whole	H. “An advisor has to be willing to see other people there as well. You don’t have all the wisdom in the world. There are other people who can come to the table. When I was in my 40s, I thought I knew everything that had to be known about anything. I didn’t need anybody else around advising me or even when I was doing this job because I knew . . . that’s stupid. The more people that you can bring around to help you and formulate thinking, why do you think you have a monopoly on wisdom. Bring other folks into this thing.” (MTA6)
Decision bias to others	I. “If I have apprised him of all of my own feelings and all the negative consequences and he still wants to do it, that’s fine. My job is to bring up the consequences and make sure he is aware of them. If he still wants to do something with taking into account all the negatives, I’m more than happy because that’s my job. I just don’t want him to be surprised.” (MTA2)
Decision bias to others	J. “Once you have made your position clear, they understand it and they’ve heard it, and they make a decision that is contrary to what you’ve felt is right, if you are a really good advisor you have to be prepared to go with whatever they decide and make it work, even if it’s not what you believe. I work on a lot of stuff that I don’t believe is the right thing to do, but you have to be what I call a good soldier. Once they make their decision they now pay you to implement their decision. And I’ve been good at implementing stuff even though I didn’t think it was the right thing to do.”(MTA3)
Collaborative interrelating	K. “The day they don’t want to be together, they won’t be together. The advisors, if they cannot say ‘hey, you guys are stupid if you don’t stay together because if you stay together you have more strength, and if you don’t realize that, then too bad for you,’ there’s nothing you can do about it.” (O5)
Collaborative interrelating	L. “There’s no question. If we didn’t have MTA and a kind of a process to speak resolution, I don’t think we would be in the court but we would split up for sure.” (Son3)
Mindful governance	M. “O might have said to you ‘sometimes I decide things too quickly and I don’t get all the information.’ You try to slow it down to make sure that he’s got all the information, that he’s had time to process all the information and think about it in a timely and thoughtful kind of way. Sometime with business and family issues, people make knee-jerk reactions and give knee-jerk reactions and that’s not always the right answer.” (MTA3)
Mindful governance	N. “Oftentimes MTA has helped me because what he has recommended that I do or consider is so different from what I am doing. He’s helped me though I didn’t take his advice and I changed my mind about what I was going to do. I went slower, I changed direction. I talked to somebody else. So if I wanted to hire somebody because it met my profile and made a lot of sense, and MTA would say ‘I wouldn’t hire that person.’ I may decide not to proceed with the hiring of the person, not doing what MTA told me but because there’s a different opinion that makes sense, I realize there’s more to this than I thought.” (O4)

Note. To protect the confidentiality of the interviewees within cases, the interviewees are not identified by case, but are identified by their role, followed by a designated number (e.g., O1). O = family business owner; MTA = most trusted advisor; Sp = spouse; Son = son; D = daughter.

Attributes to Capture Attention

The first part of the process that emerged from the data concerned the attributes possessed by the MTAs to successfully capture attention and gain the right to be heard. Advisors in nonfamily firms usually focus on providing advice primarily to the CEO or to the top management team on issues regarding the business (Eisenhardt, 1989a). In contrast, in family firms many of the business difficulties arise from issues within the family (Bork et al., 1996). Family firm advisors are therefore required to gain the attention not only of the CEO but also of family members who may or may not be involved in the management of the firm, are at different life cycle stages, and who have multiple and often conflicting emotional interests and goals (Gersick et al., 1997). The characteristics and competencies of the MTA, which I label as voice and weight, influenced how well the MTA was able to gain the right to be heard.

Voice

Voice refers to the characteristics of the MTAs that allowed them to be successful in capturing attention of family firm members (see Table 3, A and B). As one informant noted, “Advisor is a very gratuitous title—trusted advisor is an earned one” (Son2). MTAs earned their titles through deep-seated relationships with family members that were rooted in characteristics inherent in the MTAs’ voice. These characteristics included self-awareness, being true to one’s values, absolute trustworthiness, and selflessness. The informants suggested that several of these characteristics were unique to trusted advisors in family firms. The strength of the MTAs’ voice varied largely as a function of their tenure with the family. The most entrenched relationships were between founders and the MTA that they had been with since the founding of the firm. The more deep-seated the relationship, the more the MTAs could capture the attention of family members. For example, in one of the family firms that had two MTAs, the older MTA was the most trusted advisor of the founder of the firm. The younger MTA was the most trusted advisor for the second generation. The founder-MTA had started working with the owner as a lawyer shortly after the inception of the business, 31 years earlier. While the owner had respect for the younger MTA, he revered the senior MTA: “He ain’t God, but nobody has a head like him” (O5).

Self-awareness was reflected in family members’ descriptions of their MTA—being confident without having an ego, not taking things personally, not always having to win, knowing you are not always right, and a willingness to retain a low profile. Family members’ descriptions in particular showed that while their MTAs needed to be comfortable with and have confidence in themselves, it was important not to have an ego. Having a strong self-awareness without an ego was described as important to establishing a good working relationship: “There isn’t an ego involved in it, like ‘I’m right, damn it all I’m right’; you can’t have that situation because that means there can’t be trust if egos start getting in the way” (O3). In contrast, previous research in nonfamily firms has found that advisees prefer overconfident advisors and are more likely to follow their recommendations than advice from less confident advisors (Sniezek & VanSwol, 2001). Overconfidence is often associated with ego, whereas self-confidence and self-awareness are not. One owner described how an advisor on their board had an ego as he continually exhibited an attitude of always wanting to be right. This arrogance hindered the development of the relationship with the advisor eventually being asked to leave his position.

He wanted to run the show. He certainly wasn’t anybody we would ever have gone to for advice outside the board meeting. He had no trust at all in terms of our ability to decision make. It was a very stilted relationship and I think because of his tenure in the industry, we were young in comparison to him, and there was that whole “I’ve been there and I know that.” (O1)

MTAs were also true to their values. Family firm members did not believe that their MTAs would withhold information or agree with family firm members even if their position was at risk. Sometimes the advice that the MTAs provided would be perceived by nonfamily advisors to be a “career limiting move” in nonfamily firms, but the MTAs did not believe that their role was to agree with the family. In contrast, past scholars have suggested that advisors within organizations may withhold information to ensure that they are perceived well, are competent, and/or to ensure that they are successful and achieve desired rewards, as opposed to risking their positions (Dutton et al., 1997). However, as suggested by one of the MTAs: “You can’t just be a cheerleader. If you are not bringing objectivity, it’s a waste” (MTA6).

As the term “Most Trusted Advisor” suggests, trust was essential for establishing and maintaining voice. Trust was critical to the family firm members to the extent that it differentiated family from nonfamily firms. In the experience of the MTAs who had worked in both family and nonfamily firms, families placed more emphasis on trust and confidence in a family firm environment than in a nonfamily firm environment. This was consistent with the sentiments of the owners, where trustworthiness was considered to be more important than the advice itself:

The key component of all of this is one word: trust. Trust. Trust. Trust. If that doesn’t exist, forget everything. MTA could make many mistakes and we would forgive because he’s got a big bank account of trust with us and he can do no wrong to destroy that. (O4)

The owners explained that a key characteristic distinguishing MTAs in family firms from nonfamily firm advisors was that MTAs placed the family’s needs above their own. One owner explained how his MTA had the family’s best interest at heart, which was in contrast to advisors from his senior management team in his previous firm:

If you know that they always have your best interest at heart and are not self-serving, it’s an extraordinary thing to have. In my old company when I had senior people as shareholders they were all self-interested so didn’t want me to do a particular thing because it was good for the company but not good for them. The trusted advisor will come to you and say “I don’t think you should do it” or “I think you should do it,” even though it’s not necessarily good for him. He can get himself beyond all the pettiness of “is it good for me, not good for me.” You know it’s not coming from a self-interested point of view when he is making decisions or giving advice. (O3)

Weight

Weight refers to the competencies that bestow credibility and legitimacy on the MTAs, or the right to be heard. Weight emphasizes the value that the information provides. The weight of the MTAs and the extent to which family members will listen to the advisors depend heavily on whether their advice and role is perceived to be of critical value to the performance of the firm and the well-being of the family. The MTAs’ weight was created through depth and breadth of competencies. While depth of competencies is evident in nonfamily advisors, the data also suggested certain competencies, such as prior family firm experience and breadth of knowledge, were distinctive to family firm MTAs (see Table 3, C and D).

MTAs with depth of competence had expertise in a particular area, previous experience working with family firms, a graduate education, and/or a professional designation. Having expertise provided the MTAs with credibility, knowledge, and insights to identify main areas of concern and to recognize issues before they arose. The MTAs in the study were either lawyers or professional accountants by training, and several had expertise in tax. As lawyers and accountants, the MTAs were privileged to confidential information about both the family and the business that provided them with the context that enabled the relationship to develop. Legal and tax issues in family firms affect the firm and the family together. This provides additional personal information to which advisors in nonfamily firms would not typically be privy. Furthermore, having a background in law or accountancy provided MTAs with the necessary training and knowledge to anticipate issues that the family may not have previously considered.

The MTAs in the study had previous experience with other family firms in a senior management role, in an advising capacity, as a family member in a family firm, or with new ventures, all contributing to their competencies in working with family firms. Having knowledge about both the family and business allowed the MTAs to be ambidextrous where they were able to see and balance both family and business concerns:

We were always having meetings with our children on different issues, and MTA was very helpful in that because he sat on the board too he could come with a different perspective on the business issues. He could come with perspectives from the ventures side, and he also understood some of the issues what it is to be in a family business so he was a perfect person to help coach the children in these things and to come to our meetings. (Sp1)

Advisors from nonfamily firms are often not familiar with the overlap of business and family and how family emotions and conflicts carry over into the business system (Gersick et al., 1997). Family firms share similar dynamics across one another, and MTAs provided value by bringing in the best practices from their previous experiences. If the MTAs saw a similar situation in another family firm, they had experience to draw from on how the scenario might unfold, as it would generally repeat itself unless it was managed otherwise. As illustrated in the following quote, owners were more likely to turn to trusted advisors who had this type of experience:

You know he was the right hand man to (vast family firm) for a while. He knows all these families in-fighting and all this stuff. He sees the big, big picture. And we’re talking about not small money but big, big money so his perception is completely different so I would go to him before I would go to somebody else because of his experience. (O5)

In addition to depth of competence, MTAs in family firms had breadth of competence that entailed broad experience and a diverse background from which they could draw. Having this breadth of competence allowed MTAs to take a strategic view. The informants noted that MTAs needed to understand the financial, tax, legal, and emotional concerns that affected both the firm and family. To accomplish this they required a broad expertise, broad knowledge, and broad access to other resources. Professionals who lacked such breadth would become too focused on a specific area:

Certainly the experience you have is important for someone who is a trusted advisor. I’ve got a very broad level of experience so that brings value to the table. You’ve got to be able to see the forest for the trees. (MTA1)

A diverse background and experience in fields further helped MTAs to know what they didn’t know, when and where to seek advice, and knowing what questions to ask when they didn’t have the answer themselves. Asking insightful questions was described as being extremely important. MTAs who could ask the right questions were able to diagnose, understand, and get to the root of issues quickly. As one spouse explained: “A person who can ask you good questions hold onto them, don’t let them go. They are the most valuable people in the whole world”. The MTAs further noted that having many different types of experiences taught them how to recognize what was a problem and what was not a problem. It allowed them to know which concerns they could deal directly with the owner and when they needed to go through someone else.

Attuning to Influence Attention

What differentiates family business advisors from their nonfamily firm counterparts is how they

factor emotions into working with family business clients. . . Proper attunement [italics added] to a business family’s ability to deal with challenging emotional issues, together with their willingness and desire to do so, constitute the unshakable foundation on which family business consulting engagements stand or fall. It takes a combination of empirical data, self-knowledge, psychological insight, intellectual rigor, empathy, daring, and discipline. (Vago, 2006, p. 35)

The subtle processes behind how advisors factor in family member emotions and how advisors become attuned to family firm issues to influence and guide attention is neither easily observable nor necessarily relevant in nonfamily firm contexts where family and business systems do not overlap. The findings from this study enable us to understand how the MTA is able to become attuned to family firm members in order to influence and guide their attention to issues of relevance. Three second-order themes emerged from the data: self in relation to others, self in contribution to the whole, and decision bias to others.

Self in Relation to Others

Self in relation to others refers to the MTAs’ understanding of how group members relate to one another and their roles within the group. The MTAs envisioned how the group connects and how the actions of one family member influenced the other. To have a strong sense of self in relation to others, the MTAs in the study had a deep understanding of the underlying issues and interpersonal dynamics and were meaningfully engaged (see Table 3, E and F).

The deep understanding of the family firm members and their own role went beyond what one would find in many nonfamily firm advisor-business relationships. The MTAs were able to recognize the subtle concerns and issues that were not explicitly communicated or obvious. As per Bereiter (2002),

Understanding is an attribute of the person’s relation to the thing that is understood. To behave with understanding is to act in ways attuned [italics added] to relevant properties of the thing. To have deep understanding means one is attuned [italics added] to non-obvious structural or causal properties of the thing and to that thing’s relations to other things. (p. 104)

Family members in the study noted that their MTA had a better understanding of themselves than they did: “He knows everything about me. If I want to tell somebody ‘do you want to know about (owner), go call MTA.’ He knows more about me than I do” (O5). Having this understanding of both individual family members and the group dynamics allowed the MTAs to predict individual behavior or motivation and to anticipate needs: “When you understand the narcissistic tendencies of the CEO (owner), you can begin to anticipate their needs” (MTA from symposium). Deep understanding allowed the MTAs to envision the future direction of the family and the competencies they needed to develop. When MTAs pictured the system of interrelationships, they visualized the strengths and weaknesses, emotional dynamics, capabilities, and interactions of family members within the family and business.

MTAs were able to develop this deep understanding because they were meaningfully engaged and had strong relationships with family members. MTAs exhibited meaningful engagement by showing a personal interest in the family, having a desire to help the family to succeed, having shared experiences, shared values, and caring both about the family and firm. Family members felt that meaningful engagement differentiated MTAs from other advisors:

MTA really cares about what happens to every member of our family. If something was to happen today to the wife of one of my sons, MTA would genuinely be affected. It would really hit him in the gut whereas our tax lawyer would say “is that right? Oh that’s too bad.” One of them cares, feels, the other one, I don’t know. Do you understand the difference? (O4)

MTAs cared about the outcome. The owners noted that many advisors would give advice, submit their bill, and then leave. The family would forget and the advisors would forget; the family didn’t believe that these advisors cared what happened. However, the MTAs lived with the results as much as the family did. They cared about the consequences, which the owners felt was very different. One of the MTAs explained how the other advisors he had worked with previously did not exhibit this deep level of engagement. Meaningful engagement led to wanting to spend time with the family and to put in the effort to ensure their success:

There’s no fire in the belly with the other advisors, and that’s what I truly am—I like being engaged. I like the fact that they like engaging me and so I am willing to do the research, I am willing to spend the time to help them make the right decisions. And so by being engaged you are inquisitive. That becomes a natural by-product of it. (MTA1)

Self in Contribution to the Whole

Self in contribution to the whole refers to the contributions MTAs make, while being attuned to how their actions affect the group. MTAs would tailor their independent contributions based on their understanding of the issues and dynamics of the group. MTAs’ contributions were aimed at challenging family members’ thinking, ensuring that family members understood the potential implications surrounding issues of concern and coordinating the appropriate expertise at the appropriate time. This theme was exhibited through providing independent objective advice, acting with suspicious trust, and quarterbacking (see Table 3, G and H).

Providing independent objective advice was considered to be a key contribution of the MTAs. MTAs provided an external perspective with alternate view points, whether the family advocated the MTAs’ views or not: “You have to be able to say ‘this is what I think. If you don’t agree with it that’s fine but this is what I think’” (MTA9). This is in contrast to studies that have shown that providing contradictory and conflicting advice within nonfamily firms is risky as it might jeopardize the advisor’s position or reputation within the firm (e.g., Dutton et al., 1997). Similarly, the MTAs noted that even top executives within the firm would hold back on expressing opinions that contradicted the owner. Yet this was a critical part of the MTA role:

What he wants is somebody outside of his business that he can call and say, “Okay, this is a problem I have been having, this is the advice I have been getting internally, what do you think of this advice? Give it to me on an unbiased basis—good, bad, or indifferent—but give it to me unbiased. Don’t gleam it, don’t varnish it. What do you think is going on.” (MTA6)

MTAs were able to provide such candid advice because they had a deep understanding of the family, knew the best way, time and place to approach the family, and the families believed that their MTAs had their best interest at heart. There was also a more subtle aspect of providing objective advice. When there was significant emotion involved and MTAs felt that they could not directly approach the family they would take a more subtle approach, where the MTAs would help the family see the larger implications and encourage them to consider decisions from an alternate perspective.

Self in contribution to the whole also took the form of acting with suspicious trust, which was a more subtle contribution of the MTAs. Suspicious trust refers to depending on another to see, interpret, and believe events, circumstances, and the environment differently. MTAs who acted with suspicious trust were preoccupied with potential issues and failure, questioned assumptions, and were critically aware. The MTAs thought critically about potential implications and consequences of issues and decisions, continually trying to anticipate the future and prevent the worst from happening—family break-up, business collapse, fraud, or succession problems. Suspicious trust is critical in groups such as family firms. Family members trusted the MTAs to see what they did not see, especially regarding issues that overlapped business and family concerns. They relied on the MTAs to be critically aware, to see things differently, and to not see or necessarily believe what they themselves saw, for, “when others see what they believe, both their seeing and believing miss a lot” (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999, p. 96).

MTAs also contributed to the whole through quarterbacking. They interfaced with other advisors, coordinated advice, and deferred to other advisors’ expertise when appropriate. Quarterbacking differentiated the MTAs from other advisors. The MTAs suggested that most advisors did not want to recommend to families that they turn to another advisor for expertise, because the advisors wanted to keep the family captive. The MTAs were able to coordinate the various advisors for the benefit of the family because they possessed a deep understanding of the group dynamics, how they interrelated, and their own role within the family. As the MTAs had a holistic view, where they understood the issues inside both the firm and the family, they were able to integrate the assorted fragments of advice for the best interest of the family as a whole. Integrating advice increased decision quality and accuracy because it decreased complexity:

MTA would act as a quarterback; he would coordinate between different disciplines. The families told us horror stories about how the lawyer told them you had to do it this way, the accountant said you have to do it a different way, so they were caught betwixt and between not knowing which way to turn. MTA for us was the quarterback who would bring everybody together and get the best advice from each of them, but he would be the only person that would know all of the issues and therefore could make sense out of it. (Sp1)

Where the MTAs did not have the necessary knowledge or skills they would defer to expertise. Having multiple advisors increased the confidence of decision makers, provided more information, and increased the accuracy of advice. The MTAs were willing to have other advisors interface with the family as they did not feel threatened by their presence but felt it was in the family’s best interest. When expertise is ignored and other advisors are excluded, the danger is that power concentrates in the hands of too few. To safeguard that the power was not concentrated in one person the MTAs ensured that there were checks and balances in place, such as requiring multiple signatures on documentation and having multiple advisors involved. This was especially the case when the MTA was employed full-time by the family in a capacity such as overseeing the family office. To illustrate, one MTA cautioned about concentrated power:

The MTA has to be a very trusted advisor. That person has to be open to having an advisory group around him. Where things fall apart is where one guy concentrates too much power in his hand. I’ve seen another MTA telling the family what they can do and what they cannot do. The family got so weak because they were not doing anything. The second or third generation was being bossed around by the office. The office wasn’t there to serve them; they were there to serve the office. So there was a growth and power in the office that was disproportionate to what it should have been vis-à-vis the actual family. The MTA, if he is an open-minded person, is going to have an advisory group around him where he will allow different advisors to interface with the family as opposed to him being the only interface. An insecure person is going to try to keep that interface as much as he can to himself as opposed to having other people around. (MTA7)

The attribute of voice enabled the MTAs to be confident enough to bring in other advisors. If MTA actions were not transparent or if they were averse to bringing in external advisors then power could become too concentrated to the detriment of the family. Having an in-house advisor with too much power in the family office was more likely to occur in families with significant wealth, in second and third generation firms when the founder was no longer involved, and when the family was not involved in the daily management of the business but only retained an ownership role.

Decision Bias to Others

Decision bias to others refers to accepting and supporting the decisions and goals of the family. This theme took the form of being attuned and recognizing that the decision belonged with the family and accepting and committing to the decision, even if the MTAs did not fully agree with the decision (see Table 3, I and J).

The MTAs acknowledged that the final decision belonged with the family. It was only when the concepts of self in relation to others and self in contribution to the whole were present that the MTAs could accept and commit to the decision for the best interest of the family. The MTAs could not assist and support the group by accepting and committing to a decision unless they understood the group, their role within the group, and how their individual contributions interrelated with others. This finding was critical to the continuing success of the MTAs. MTAs were able to recycle themselves by accepting, committing to, and supporting decisions. One son noted that when the family decided not to go with their MTA’s advice but the MTA would still back the decision this “recycled” the MTA, gave him more credibility, not less, and family members were more likely to pay attention to the MTA in the future:

He backed the decision. He said “I disagree with it” but the aspect of listening, making his opinion, keeping it, being true to himself, he didn’t change his mind but without getting too attached or too emotional to it. The point was very strong and made him recyclable for other decisions. (Son2)

This is in contrast to research in nonfamily firms that has shown that if internal advice is not accepted, those advisors lack “the political protection that comes from successful past selling attempts” (Dutton et al., 1997, p. 418). Similarly, MTAs noted that to be a good advisor you needed to get behind the decision and make it work, even if it wasn’t what the MTAs believed, while being vigilant for any concerns that might arise. The MTAs had implemented many decisions that they did not believe was the right thing to do; they referred to it as being a “good soldier.”

Facilitating Collective Attention

By possessing the attributes that enabled the MTAs to successfully capture family members’ attention and by being attuned to the family’s ability to deal with and address issues, the MTAs were able to facilitate an environment that encouraged collective attention. Collective attention refers to an increased awareness of the thoughts, actions, and motivations of family firm members in addressing issues and in connecting family members with one another, resulting in actions that focused on the whole, not just the individual. The MTAs accomplished this through facilitating an environment of collaborative interrelating and mindful governance.

Collaborative Interrelating

In collaborative interrelating, the MTAs helped family members understand their role in relation to one another and helped the family connect and relate with one another in order to be able to work together. In nonfamily firms, when colleagues are not able to collaborate they may leave the firm or be dismissed (Upton et al., 1993). In family firms, it is less likely that family members will leave the family. As such, a key role of the MTAs was to facilitate an environment where family members could develop the necessary skills to work with one another (see Table 3, K and L).

It was important for family members to appreciate their respective roles in order to set the stage for working with one another. Helping family members understand their role in relation to one another consisted, first, of the MTA helping family members develop their own competencies. Second, it was important for family members to focus on what was good for the group and not only for themselves individually. MTAs could only create an environment for collective integration as far as the members assumed responsibility for their own interrelations. Research on collectives has shown that when individuals in a group attend only to their personal situation as opposed to the group situation, they are less caring, attentive, and responsive to one another: “To act with care, people have to envision their contributions in the context of requirements for joint action” (Weick & Roberts, 1993, p. 372). Furthermore, if processes become highly concentrated in the hands of one individual, group members can lose the ability to respond to collective direction at the group level. For example, one owner highlighted the importance of the MTAs helping family members understand that they belonged to the larger group and that thinking only about themselves would result in the demise of the group:

The family itself, the siblings have to think of themselves, not what’s good for themselves individually. They have to think of the group, what’s good for the group, and once they start thinking just for themselves, everything is gone. (O5)

Collaborative interrelating also took the form of helping the family interrelate with one another to make decisions together. Family firms have intertwined, dense interrelations that are tightly coupled and interactively complex (Gersick et al., 1997). Family firms are often heavy with emotions and conflicts that have been carried over into the family firm from childhood. This differentiates them from nonfamily firms where there is a tendency to hide and decrease attention to emotions. The MTAs aided family members in easing tensions, providing emotional balance, refereeing between competing interests, giving credibility to others, and building consensus. As O5 explained, the MTAs aided family members in overcoming these tensions so they could work together:

They are carrying all this old baggage that they have grown up with; in most cases they can’t overcome it. You carry it. The advisor, if the siblings respect them enormously, their judgment, they play a critical role in overcoming all these tensions and say “okay, let’s go.” (O5)

In three separate interviews, a daughter, a spouse, and an owner each noted that the MTA would give others in the family credibility in the process of interrelating with one another. For example, one daughter explained how though she was a member of the board, she was not involved in the management of the firm, and her brothers would discredit her comments. Yet the MTA would tell the brothers to wait a minute and listen to what their sister had to say. Similarly, the owner of another firm noted that she would discount comments made by her sister, who was an owner and a board member yet did not have an executive position in the family firm; the MTA would remind the owner that her sister had a say and valid contributions to make.

In aiding the family’s interrelations, the MTAs facilitated the decision-making processes so family members could operate as a group. Unlike nonfamily firms, the family firms that I investigated had multiple family members involved either as an owner, manager, or board member. These family members, and especially the ones in the second and later generations, explained that having a process to express one’s thoughts, opinions, and potential resolutions was a priority. In nonfamily firms there is less of a focus on the collective, where the CEO makes the ultimate decisions, or decisions are put to vote. This collective focus was reflected in the goals of the firm. Family firms emphasized family unity as much as profits. This differentiated family from nonfamily firms where the goal was primarily business focused and profit oriented (Upton et al., 1993). The MTAs assisted family members in communicating with one another, expressing opinions without demoralizing or intimidating the other and continuing to focus on what was important:

The end goal is a unified family. We want people to feel that everyone has a voice; this is the overarching goal. If you have an individual that is a really good facilitator, they facilitate that environment and everyone gets there much faster on top of that. It’s amazing once people learn the skills about how to have different opinions with that end goal in mind we are going to get there much faster and make the best decision. That’s a very important point. Making more perceptually accurate higher quality decisions because of the fact MTA facilitates the environment which develops that unifying structure. (Sp1)

Mindful Governance

To be mindful is to be aware of one’s thoughts, actions, or motivations (Langer, 1989). Individuals who are mindful anticipate and attend to subtle cues (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006), resulting in more critical thinking. Governance is the process of making decisions, and the methods by which those decisions are implemented or not implemented. In mindful governance, the MTAs encouraged family members to slow down, stop, reflect, and think about the various consequences of decisions, thereby redirecting their attention. The MTAs would help the owners because what they had recommended the owner to do or consider was so different from the original focus that it encouraged the owner to think about the issues differently. They might not take the MTAs’ advice, but they went slower, they changed direction, they talked to someone else (see Table 3, M and N).

Founder-led family firms are known for their ability to make decisions quickly. Actions may be taken by the owner or other family members without taking into consideration the impact on the entire family, all of the necessary information, and without processing that information. When that occurs, there is the probability that the resulting consequences will take more time by causing more issues than if the time had originally been taken to involve family members in the decision process. MTA5 explained why it was important to slow down this process and encourage reflection about the issues and their implications:

Sometimes snap decisions are made and they may not be the right ones because they are made too quickly. People don’t think enough about the things that do matter. Because the owners are entrepreneurs they tend to be very quick and impulsive, particularly impulsive with things that involve family dynamic. Owner is a person who may get very impatient and want to make a decision because he’s used to making decisions. He may think “well, this is what we are going to do because I can’t wait. We are going to do it right now,” but the truth is that I know that there are family members who are going to have strong views and cause him grief. (MTA5)

MTAs in the study commented that ensuring the owner and other family members had taken the time to reflect on the issues could be difficult. Some of the tools that MTAs used included asking family members questions, asking them to feed back what the issues were, and asking other family members, advisors, or key employees who were close to the family whether the family members truly understood the issues. In turn, family members felt that by reflecting they were able to make better decisions: “He’s opened another door. So in that sense, it got me to do better. I did a better decision” (O4). One of the sons described that helping the family to more mindfully govern the firm was the number one priority for their MTA and was the only way that the family would be able to stay together in business:

Governance is the number one thing. Helping us make decisions without our father. That’s the only way that we are going to be able to keep (firm) together. (Son3)

Discussion

The focus of this study was to identify the role of MTAs and to develop a better understanding of how MTAs add value, specifically by identifying the implicit advising processes in family firms. The findings indicate that advising has not only overt practices but also constitutes more subtle and underlying processes that easily remain hidden. These processes illuminate how MTAs navigate their way through the complex circumstances ever present in family firms. The processes unveiled in this study focus on the attributes that advisors require to capture the attention of family firm members, how advisors become attuned to family members to influence that attention, and how advisors facilitate an environment that enables collective attention of family firm members. The successful outcome of each dimension is dependent on the existence of the previous dimension. In Figure 1, I presented the data structure for the static concepts and aggregate themes that emerged from the data analysis. In Figure 2, I present the dynamic relationships between these concepts, which are the basis for a grounded theory model of facilitating collective attention in family firms. Figure 2 positions the second-order themes and aggregate dimensions that reveal how advisors facilitate an environment of collective attention.

Figure 2.

Process model of facilitating collective attention.

Figure 2 highlights the characteristics (voice) and competencies (weights) of MTAs that are the antecedents for them to successfully capture the attention of family firm members in order to proceed with the advising process. Possessing these attributes were an important requisite for MTAs to become attuned to family members’ dynamics, roles, ability to deal with emotional issues, and their willingness to do so. As noted by Vago (2006), proper attunement to family members constitutes the unshakeable foundation on which family advisors succeed or fail. The subtle processes of sense of self in relation to other, self in contribution to the whole, and decision bias to others define how MTAs attune to family members.

As further illustrated in Figure 2, attuning to family members feeds back and strengthens the MTAs’ attributes to capture attention. MTAs make themselves recyclable for other decisions when they commit to and support family decisions. In attuning to family members, MTAs are able to guide attention by directing them to issues of relevance and away from issues that are not a priority but that would otherwise consume their attention. By being attuned to family firm members, MTAs are able to facilitate an environment of collective attention. This is achieved, first, by encouraging family members to pause and think in their course of action, and, second, by aiding family members to interrelate collaboratively with one another and more mindfully govern the firm.

Theoretical Implications

This study is the first to empirically identify two aspects of subtle advice: (a) the subtle role of the MTA and (b) the subtle advice processes consisting of tactics and practices that allowed the MTA to guide and direct attention in family firms while facilitating an environment of collective attention. It also provides evidence on how MTAs work to benefit the family firm collective. This study therefore makes three main contributions to the family business literature and the literature on advising.

First, this study identifies and provides empirical evidence on the subtle role of MTAs. MTAs are experienced individuals who advise wealthy families that own and operate a business. MTAs in family firms have remained largely unrecognized and understudied. Yet, the MTA is an age-old phenomenon. Known by diverse names, the role has been seen in prominent business families (Gianluigi Gabetti was the consigliore to late family patriarch Gianni Agnelli who was the head of Fiat and controlled 4.4% of Italy’s GDP), the Roman Catholic Church (François Leclerc de Tremblay was the éminence grise to Cardinal Richelieu), Asian dynasties (Kim Cheo-Seon was the wise eunuch who counseled successive kings during the Korean Joseon Dynasty), and European royal families (Sir Walsingham was the courtier to Queen Elizabeth I). The common underlying thread is they are all very powerful advisors who provide advice to, and influence, some of the world’s most powerful decision makers, making them an important phenomenon to understand and study.

Second, as outlined in Figure 2, I offer insights into the more subtle processes of how advisors capture and influence attention in family firms to stimulate collective group processes. Previous research has focused on offering guidance to advisors on the practice and phases of advising (e.g., Gersick et al., 1997). Understanding the more subtle processes behind advising has remained elusive as there have been few inductive studies on advising to date (Strike, 2012). In subtly providing advice the MTA influenced the family members’ assumptions, cause and effect relationships, beliefs about facts, and interpretation of issues, thereby expanding family members’ consciousness by directing attention to issues that affect both the firm and the family.

Third, literature on the broader role of advisors has recognized the importance of advisors in influencing the flow of information between organizational members (Arendt et al., 2005; Obstfeld, 2005). Yet the extant literature external to family businesses advisors focuses on a tertius gaudens orientation (third who benefits) where advisors reinforce their own position by employing a strategy of separation or by manipulating others for their own benefit (Dutton et al., 1997; Simmel, 1950). The MTAs in this study are at variance from other forms of advisors that have been studied by adapting a tertius iungens (third who unites/connects) orientation (Lingo & O’Mahony, 2010; Obstfeld, 2005). Research has shown that those who adopt a tertius iungens orientation link unconnected parties to further collective action (Lingo & O’Mahony, 2010). As such, this study is important because relatively few studies have empirically documented how advisors work to benefit a collective rather than benefit their own self-interest. This also highlights the importance of social knowledge as MTAs facilitate collective attention and action by emphasizing what individuals have in common. The MTAs’ primary role is to help the family balance business and family dynamics. The practices used by the MTAs were consistent with the factors identified by Obstfeld (2005, p. 111) and tested by Lingo & O’Mahoney, (2010), such as: “I see opportunities for collaboration between people,” “I point out common ground shared by people who have different perspectives on an issue”, and “I forge connections between different people dealing with a particular issue.” MTAs therefore facilitate an environment to unite the family, as a family characterized by separation can have toxic effects on the business.

Practical Implications

Although the focus was on MTAs in family firms, the MTAs’ role may be common across relationships of trust more generally. People close to us and whom we trust—family, friends, mentors, and advisors—often guide our attention and help us to think about issues differently. This finding, however, goes against anecdotal evidence that suggest that outsiders are able to provide advice because of their distance to the people they advise (Sauder, 2010). Advising is often thought of as a dispassionate activity that assesses the facts. Getting too closely involved with advisees may mean that objectivity, which is so crucial to the MTA role, is compromised and that they are no longer able to remain emotionally distant. Yet, the findings in this study suggest otherwise. The interview with O1 regarding the advisor who was asked to leave the board illustrates that when the relationship with the advisor and the family was distant, the advisor was unable to capture or influence family members’ attention, which was vital to facilitating an environment of collective attention. The findings from this study therefore suggest that in emotionally complex environments with multiple stakeholders, advisors can improve the advising process in a number of ways.

First, the findings indicate that having expertise in a particular area is not sufficient to earn the title of trusted advisor. Advisors need to consider focusing time and effort on developing characteristics inherent in voice and self-awareness such as having a clear perception of their personality, strengths, weaknesses, thoughts, beliefs, motivation, values, and emotions. Second, advisors should seek to obtain experience in advising capacities by working with other family firms and expanding their expertise beyond a single area. Having broad knowledge is deemed as important in knowing the right questions to ask and in having a comprehensive perspective. Third, behaving with understanding and being attuned to family members’ group dynamics, emotions, and abilities to deal with issues are the foundation of family firm advising (Vago, 2006). Advisors who can develop a deep level of sense of self will better understand others, how they themselves are perceived, and their own attitude and responses. For the MTAs to understand how their role should be situated within the group requires developing a profound understanding of the family members as individuals and how they interrelate with one another. In being attuned to family members, advisors should look beyond providing overt advice and be aware of the more subtle yet powerful influences that they can have on family members. They should also not hesitate to turn to other advisors in areas outside of their own expertise and to obtain alternate views and perspectives. Advisors who commit to and support decisions they may not agree with, while being alert to potential problems, will be better able to recycle themselves for future issues. Finally, in facilitating an environment of collective attention, advisors should encourage an environment of collaboration and mindful reflection, focusing on higher level goals of a unified family and developing the skills and competencies required to achieve that goal over the long term, as opposed to focusing solely on daily issues and conflicts that are more likely to be the emphasis of nonfamily firm advisors.

Limitations and Future Research

This study has a number of limitations that serve to provide opportunities for future research. First, I was unable to follow a specific action or trace process outcomes, such as succession, within a family firm. Yet, this follows other recent inductive studies (e.g., Dane, 2013) where the purpose is not to follow the course of an explicit problem or action for the intention of permitting causal inferences but instead to deepen the understanding regarding a phenomenon of interest in a particular setting. Here, the purpose was to develop a better understanding of the subtle role of MTAs in order to establish a foundation for future causal studies.

Second, to probe for more variance among the family firms I made many attempts to speak with families and MTAs who had experienced unsuccessful advisor relationships, but informants were hesitant to discuss adversarial associations. Four of the six family firms described negative MTA relationships that they had either experienced personally or heard about through other colleagues, but I was not able to speak with these MTAs directly. I tried to minimize any shortcomings by being cautious when interpreting my results and by going back and conducting member checks of my findings. Future scholars should continue to strive to develop research where advisors did not succeed in order to increase our understanding regarding the role of the advisor, the family, the context, and the issue involved in failure, as it is through failures that we can best learn how to succeed.

Third, while there were implicit outcomes of facilitating collective attention that were suggested by the informants, such as “a better decision,” it was not the focus of this research to study the outcomes but instead to increase our understanding of the underlying processes. Future researchers may extend these findings and study the effects that result from collective attention. Especially interesting would be to explore the more subtle and nontransparent outcomes that extend beyond standard explicit firm goals such as profit or growth.

Conclusion

The literature on family firm advising has tackled some of the more practical questions of how to advise family firms. Although less studied, the underlying theoretical questions are equally important. By relying on a multicase analysis of nine most trusted advisors and the family firms they advise, this study developed a grounded theory model that establishes a link between how advisors capture and direct attention and how they facilitate collective attention. I began the study by investigating the overt role of the MTA but revised my focus to examine the MTAs’ subtle, sophisticated advice process. This study therefore provides a window unto, and develops a deeper understanding of, a phenomenon—the MTA and the advising process—that has remained largely unknown even to scholars and business people within the inner circle of family firms.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I thank and am grateful for the insightful comments provided by Paul Beamish, Pursey Heugens, Eric Morse, Barbara Decker Pierce, Claus Rerup, Glenn Rowe, Stephen Sapp, Pramodita Sharma, Alex Stewart, Charlene Zietsma, the special issue Guest Editors, and two anonymous reviewers on earlier versions of this manuscript. I also appreciate the thoughtful suggestions provided by participants of the Family Enterprise Research Conference (2010), European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management Workshop on Family Firms Management Research (2010), Academy of Management Process Research Workshop (2010), Academy of Management Meeting (2010) and research seminars at the Rotterdam School of Management.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biography

Vanessa M. Strike, PhD, is an assistant professor in the Department of Strategic Management and Entrepreneurship and the founding and scientific director of the Erasmus Centre for Family Business, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, the Netherlands.

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