The Effect of Value Congruence Between Founder and Successor on Successor’s Willingness: The Mediating Role of the Founder

Abstract

Drawing from social exchange theory, this article explores the founder–successor relationship quality as a mediated pathway in examining the effects of founder–successor value congruence on successor’s willingness to take over the business. Based on survey data from 102 founder–successor dyads, polynomial regression analysis shows that when both a founder and a successor have high value congruence in family prosperity, the relationship quality will be enhanced, which leads to higher successor’s willingness. When there is value incongruence between a founder and a successor, the successor’s family prosperity value has a more important impact on the founder–successor relationship and successor’s willingness.

Keywords

value congruence successor willingness family prosperity founder–successor relationship social-exchange theory

Introduction

In 2006, over 70% of family firms that had been established in the previous 10 years permanently closed their businesses (Daspit, Holt, Chrisman, & Long, 2016), highlighting succession as one of the greatest challenges faced by family firms (Handler, 1994; Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Steier, 2004; Yan & Sorenson, 2006). Scholars have dedicated significant attention to this critical issue (De Massis, Sharma, Chua, Chrisman, & Kotlar, 2012). Succession is a multiphase process of transferring leadership from one family member to another in the family firm context (Sharma, Chrisman, Pablo, & Chua, 2001). Of the many factors that affect the outcome of the succession process, the most commonly cited is the successor’s willingness to take over leadership roles and his or her commitment to the long-term development of the family business (Cabrera-Suárez, 2005; Parker, 2016; Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 2003; Sharma & Irving, 2005; Venter, Boshoff, & Maas, 2005). Many founders face a dilemma when their children are unwilling to continue the family business.

The extant literature provides insights into the factors affecting a successor’s willingness to take over responsibility for and leadership of the family business. Some previous studies have framed successor willingness as a response to individual factors, such as the successor’s low ability (Barach & Ganitsky, 1995), a lack of incentives or misalignment between personal and family needs (Venter et al., 2005), a lack of motivation or dissatisfaction (Sharma & Rao, 2000), and the founder’s strong emotional attachment to the business and/or reluctance to retire (Sharma et al., 2001). Other studies have focused on relational factors, such as a lack of acceptance and legitimacy by long-term employees or the continuous presence of other, older-generation family members (Sharma et al., 2001), as well as conflicts and rivalries among family members (Bruce & Picard, 2006; Churchill & Hatten, 1987). Overall, the relationship between the founder and the successor is regarded as one of the most important determinants of the succession process (De Massis, Chua, & Chrisman, 2008; Venter et al., 2005). A high-quality relationship is characterized by a high level of trust, mutual support, open and earnest communication, and willingness to acknowledge one another’s achievements (Harvey & Evans, 1995). Unfortunately, most previous studies have considered founders’ and successors’ perspectives and characteristics in isolation. Without considering both sides of the founder–successor dyad simultaneously, we may have an incomplete understanding of how the relationship between them shapes the succession process and its success (Erdogan, Kraimer, & Liden, 2004; Krasikova & LeBreton, 2012).

The current study adopts a social exchange perspective with the purpose of examining how value (in)congruence in founder–successor dyads affects the quality of the founder–successor relationship (FSR) and consequently influence the willingness of a successor to take over the business. Value, in this context, refers to the moral compass that guides an individual’s decisions and interactions in social relationships (Van Quaquebeke, Graf, Kerschreiter, Schuh, & van Dick, 2014). Value congruence characterizes the state of similarity or match between an individual’s values and those of his or her supervisor (Jung & Avolio, 2000). While some family business scholars have noted that values, such as Confucian values (Yan & Sorenson, 2006), family values, and kinship (Santiago, 2000), have significant impacts on succession, the issue of value (in)congruence in founder–successor dyads remains unexamined. This omission is unfortunate because succession involves two central stakeholders: the founder and the successor. Specifically, this study aims to examine a founder’s and a successor’s value (in)congruence in family prosperity (FP) value and the joint effects on the FSR and succession willingness. Because most family firms are perceived to have a strong desire to sustain long-term family wealth and reputation (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia & Larraza-Kintana, 2010; Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999; Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012), the FP value, referring to a person’s willingness to shoulder the responsibility of bringing honor and prosperity to the family (Yang, 1995, 1998; Yeh & Yang, 1997), should influence the behaviors and decisions of both the founders and successors during the succession process.

This research makes several important contributions to the literature. First, it is among the first to adopt the central insights of social exchange theory as the underlying theoretical explanatory mechanism and to empirically examine the role of value (in)congruence in the family business setting. The social exchange approach has recently been used to understand succession in family businesses (Daspit et al., 2016; Long & Chrisman, 2014). Theoretically, value congruence is embedded in social exchange (Edwards & Cable, 2009; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005; Matta, Scott, Koopman, & Conlon, 2015; Z. Zhang, Wang, & Shi, 2012) and thus can be extended to explain the interpersonal dynamics between a founder and a successor. We argue that value (in)congruence exerts different effects such that congruence between the founder’s and successor’s FP values enhances positive social exchange in the dyad by facilitating a mutual understanding of each other’s life goals and personal preferences with respect to the family business. In contrast, incongruence leads to difficulties and barriers in the social exchange process because it triggers friction and conflicts in communication and misaligned role expectations. (In)congruence of founder–successor FP values should therefore have different effects on the FSR and the successor’s succession willingness.

Second, the social exchange approach provides an opportunity to better understand the mediating role of FSR in the effects of value (in)congruence on a successor’s succession willingness, as the positive reciprocity derived from value congruence can enhance the relationship. In contrast, value incongruence makes the two parties psychologically distant. A successor’s willingness to take over the business, in turn, should be an outcome of the quality of FSR. Studying relationship quality as the mediating link between value (in)congruence and successor willingness is novel in the succession literature. It is crucial to understand this mediation, including not only that it occurs but also how certain effects occur.

Third, this study contributes to the literature on family business succession by using a polynomial regression method to explore the interplay of the values held by both the founder and successor simultaneously. Previous studies examined only the antecedents of successor willingness from a single perspective and neglected the joint effect between them. The single-perspective approach is problematic because succession is fundamentally a two-person process occurring between a founder and a successor that involves mutual exchange of material/emotional resources (De Massis et al., 2008); thus, it is necessary to consider the dyad as the level of analysis (Gooty & Yammarino, 2011). Polynomial regression, which allows us to combine both sides at the same time, moves our understanding of the succession process from a single perspective to a dyadic perspective and thus provides a more holistic picture of family business succession, thereby supporting the development of a more nuanced understanding of the relationship.

Social Exchange Theory and Value Congruence

Social exchange theory has long been developed to explain the exchange of social and material resources in human interaction and how the social relations created by repeated exchanges constrain or enable actors to exercise power and influence (Blau, 1964). Such interactions are shaped by a reciprocal exchange of both tangible and intangible rewards as a means of achieving short-term and/or long-term goals. The norm of reciprocity is conceptually elaborated in two distinct forms, restricted and generalized exchanges, which lie at two ends of a continuum (Daspit et al., 2016; Long & Mathews, 2011). In restricted exchanges, individuals are motivated by direct reciprocity, from which short-term, quid pro quo returns are expected. Restricted exchanges may facilitate formal processes, reduce uncertainty via contractual arrangements, offer role clarity, and simplify interactions to those involved; however, due to its inherent instrumental nature, restricted exchange tends to reduce or eliminate cohesion among actors (Daspit et al., 2016). Conversely, a generalized exchange system is based on indirect reciprocity wherein individuals do not expect immediate or equal return (Daspit et al., 2016). In fact, generalized exchanges are grounded in the notion of long-term obligations or covenants in which the relationship between actors and the maintenance of the group is valued more than the reciprocity itself, making immediate or direct reciprocity less consequential (Long & Mathews, 2011). In the context of family business, both types of exchanges may exist between a founder and a successor and may shape the unique attributes of their relationship (Long & Chrisman, 2014; Long & Mathews, 2011; Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005). We argue that to the degree the founder’s and successor’s behaviors revolve around different reciprocity expectations, their exchange patterns and level of quality in the relationship will vary.

In this study, we draw on social exchange theory to examine how founder and successor value (in)congruence in FP affects exchanges in the FSR and consequently influences the successor’s willingness to take over the business. Family-oriented values are highly emphasized and embraced in family businesses (Losada et al., 2010) for long-term sustainability. In particular, the FP value highlights the importance of family honor, which is a source of credit and respect won over time, and family fortune, which is a flourishing and thriving condition for long-term financial success. It encourages family members’ determination to extend and enhance the family’s good fortune (Yang, 1995). Thus, the FP value should have strong indication for of intrafamily business succession (De Massis et al., 2008; J. Zhang & Ma, 2009).

Adopting a dyadic approach, we propose a two-by-two matrix of FP value (in)congruence between founders and successors (see Figure 1). There are two scenarios of founder–successor FP value congruence: Both the founder and successor can have a high FP value and be congruent (Quadrant 1 [Q1]), or they can have a low FP value and be congruent (Q2). There are also two scenarios of founder–successor FP value incongruence: The successor possesses a higher FP value than the founder (Q3), or the successor has a lower FP value than the founder (Q4). Note that we use founder and successor FP values empirically as continuous variables in the Method section but use this matrix for theoretical categorization and data interpretation (Matta et al., 2015).

Figure 1.

2 × 2 matrix of founder–successor family prosperity value (in)congruence.

FP Value Congruence and Quality of FSR

An individual’s values first guide his or her social expectations and transsituational goals (Rokeach, 1968; Schwartz, 1996). Clearly reflected in the nature of FP value are family members’ life goals toward the family business and the preference for enduring family legacies and economic value (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2003; J. Lee & Li, 2009). When a founder and a successor are congruent in their FP value, they tend to have common ground for mutual understanding of the other’s goals and preferences with respect to the family business. We expect that this common ground can facilitate a successor’s smooth social exchange process with the founder (Lubatkin et al., 2005) and thereby help develop a better FSR and stronger succession willingness.

Specifically, for a successor, the founder’s FP value provides an important frame of reference for the founder’s goals for the family business against which the successor can compare his or her own goals. Such a comparison should help the successor establish a basic idea of whether his or her goals are congruent with those of the founder. A successor whose goals are congruent with those of the founder is more likely to have a mutual understanding with the founder about the future of the family business, the route through which they can reach that future, and the level of effort he or she should exert to achieve that future (Edwards & Cable, 2009), as the two parties tend to have similar preferences about family honor and glory (whether those shared preferences are favorable or unfavorable toward each). In contrast, a successor who has goals that diverge from those of the founder may disagree with the founder about the future of the family business and his or her own role and responsibility in the future. Therefore, FP value congruence with the founder facilitates a successor’s smooth social exchange process with the founder, because similarity of the founder’s and successor’s goals reduces the effort needed to negotiate the successor’s role in the family business, which could require a large amount of cognitive and/or emotional energy (Bauer & Green, 1996; Lubatkin et al., 2005). We therefore expect that smooth social exchange in the congruence scenarios (compared with the incongruence scenarios) will result in relatively harmonious FSR and help to enhance a successor’s succession willingness.

A person’s values also provide guidance for his or her cognition and behavior (Meglino, Ravlin, & Adkins, 1989; Rokeach, 1968). When a successor shares a congruent level of FP value with a founder, he or she tends to think and behave in similar ways as the founder with respect to the future of the family business. Hence, this value congruence allows the two parties to have relatively accurate mutual expectations and predictability when they communicate with one another. The successor is likely to think and behave in such a way that is conforming and acceptable to the founder. Such interactions and exchanges will help foster a harmonious relationship. In contrast, when a successor’s FP value is not congruent with that of a founder, his or her cognition and behavior may go in opposite directions or even lead to friction and conflict that will subsequently reduce the relationship quality. FP value incongruence makes the exchange difficult and uncertain, which would likely to lower FSR quality. Based on the above reasoning, we predict that greater value congruence should lead to better FSR.

Therefore, we propose the following:

Hypothesis 1a: The greater the congruence between a successor’s and a founder’s FP value is, the better the quality of FSR.

While we argue that greater congruence will lead to a more positive FSR, which is an important first step, we further argue that the nature of the exchanges in the dyads may vary, as people reciprocate to different degrees and in different forms (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). Values can be congruent when both individuals share a high level of FP value (Q1) or when they have a low level of FP value (Q2). Overlooking the important nuances within value congruence scenarios could lead to inaccurate interpretations of their effects (Edwards, 2008).

When founder–successor dyads share a high FP value (Q1), they are more likely to have a generalized social exchange relationship (Daspit et al., 2016; Long & Mathews, 2011). They tend to have common ground regarding the needs and goals of the family, and they often seek out ways to build a positive family relationship to offer emotional support and to improve family members’ well-being (Sayegh & Knight, 2010). In addition, they identify long-term vision as an important dimension of the family business culture (Zahra, Hayton, & Salvato, 2004). The common ground of a founder’s and a successor’s life goals, that is, achieving and continuing family wealth and perpetuating the family name, may encourage the two parties to engage in more joint efforts and to provide mutual support; these activities involve a great amount of social-emotional exchange within the dyad, which tends to develop into a long-term relationship with continuous positive reciprocity (Sayegh & Knight, 2010; Zahra et al., 2004). Thus, we predict that a founder’s and successor’s congruence at a high level of FP value can create a higher quality socioemotional relationship through frequent and effective communication, similar family goals, collective decision making and information sharing, mutual trust, and the emotional support of the family.

In Q2, when both the founder and successor have a low FP value, restricted social exchange tends to develop (Daspit et al., 2016; Long & Mathews, 2011). In this congruence scenario, the two parties may not have a strong desire for long-term family wealth and prosperity, but they are likely to understand each other’s personal preferences and/or goals, have role agreement, and have similar cognition. For example, they may build consensus and understanding surrounding transactional roles, expectations, behaviors, and the exchange of resources. This exchange is likely to be motivated by self-interest and as a means to specific ends, and a direct and short-term instrumental return may be expected (Long & Mathews, 2011). Because a restricted social exchange is not as enriched as a generalized exchange (Long & Chrisman, 2014; Long & Mathews, 2011), we predict that the quality of FSR is lower in this low-low FP value congruence scenario than in a high-high FP value congruence scenario. Thus, we hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 1b: The quality of FSR is higher when a successor is congruent with a founder at a high level of FP value than when a successor is congruent with a founder at a low level of FP value.

FP Value Incongruence and Quality of FSR

We hypothesize that FP value congruence at different levels is not equal because the nature of social exchanges can vary. Likewise, the effects of incongruence may not be equal because human interaction is not always symmetrical. Value incongruence between a founder and a successor is likely to lead to expectation discrepancies because the influence process between the founder and successor entails mismatched roles and unequal status. Yang (1995) contends that in an unequal power relationship, the two parties’ expectations are “asymmetric” insofar as those with greater power are likely to impose more role prescriptions on those with less power than the latter actually prefer. Disagreement and conflict can occur between mismatched transmitted and received role expectations (Katz & Kahn, 1978), which may cause more disappointment and anger for the party with more power and higher status (Graen, 1976) and thereby have a detrimental effect on the quality of the exchange relationship. Conversely, expectation discrepancies can also occur when the lower status party reciprocates more than expected, and the relationship quality may be mitigated through such proactive reciprocity. Thus, we suspect that the consequences of incongruence are asymmetrical in the sense that when the FP value of the founder is higher than that of the successor, it will be more detrimental to the relationship than when the FP value of the successor is higher than that of the founder. That is, the quality of the FSR should be different between the two incongruence scenarios.

Specifically, when the successor has higher FP value than the founder (Q3), the founder may have low expectations for the successor to share the roles and responsibilities of the family firm; however, the successor may be keen to share the responsibility and contribute to the family by demonstrating care and hard work that exceed the founder’s expectations. While value incongruence is still costly in a social exchange, such proactive filial piety behaviors will partially smooth the process and may provide a counterforce that can, to a certain extent, mitigate the negative effect (Pan, Jones, & Winslow, 2017). In addition, the likelihood of the successor’s commitment to creating family wealth and a long-term future is greater, which may lead the founder to evaluate the successor’s performance more positively and thus mitigate the detrimental effects of incongruence on FSR.

Conversely, when the founder has high FP value but the successor has low FP value (Q4), the founder is more likely to insist on a long-term vision of family business management and hope to transfer the family firm to the next generation. Thus, the founder may have high role expectations for the successor and assign him or her more important roles and tasks in the management of the family business. However, a successor with low FP value may have his or her personal interests, plans, and lifestyle. The founder will therefore be disappointed and feel that the business is threatened because the successor does not show the required effort and commitment and does not live up to these expectations. In this situation, the successor will also be unhappy with the roles and responsibilities imposed on him or her by the founder. As a result, he or she may feel frustrated, resentful, and unwilling to accept the assigned roles. Communication and social exchange between the two parties will become extremely difficult, and the FSR will suffer as a result. Based on the above argument, we hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 2: The quality of FSR is higher when FP value of a successor is higher than that of a founder, rather than when FP value of a founder is higher than that of a successor.

FSR Quality and Successor Willingness

Research has conceptually and empirically demonstrated the mediating effects of the leader–member relationship between value congruence and various outcome variables (e.g., Chen, Wen, Peng, & Liu, 2016; Z. Zhang et al., 2012). Similarly, based on the relationship mechanism, we predict that FSR plays a mediating role in shaping the relationship between FP value congruence and the successor’s willingness to take over the business. Family business founders play dual roles as a supervisor of their offspring in both family life and the workplace; therefore, FSR is critical for successors’ standings in family firms and their intention to continue their role as family business successors. As we argued above, FP value congruence in a founder–successor dyad should lead to a higher quality FSR, and substantial empirical evidence has demonstrated the positive relationship between FSR quality and succession. For example, Lansberg (1988) indicated that the quality of the relationship between founders and successors is essential for effective succession. When the quality of FSR is high, successors will gain more support and trust, have more positive interactions and information sharing with the founder, and be more willing to cooperate and share responsibilities, thereby increasing their willingness to take over the business. In contrast, if the relationship quality is low, the successors will have negative interactions and difficulties working with the founder, and their willingness to take over the business will decrease accordingly (Kepner, 1983).

Therefore, given that we have hypothesized the effect of dyadic FP value congruence on FSR and the well-established positive relationship between FSR and successor’s willingness, together with our argument for a positive association between dyadic FP value congruence and successor’s willingness, we expect that FSR quality can transfer these value congruence effects to the successor’s willingness to take over the baton. Figure 2 demonstrates our overall theoretical model. Thus, the mediating role of FSR quality is hypothesized as follows:

Hypothesis 3: The quality of FSR mediates the relationship between founder–successor (in)congruence in FP value and the successor’s willingness to take over the family business.

Figure 2.

Hypothesized model of founder–successor relationship (FSR) quality linking family prosperity (FP) value congruence to successor willingness.

Method

Data and Sampling

The study was part of a larger research project investigating dynamics in family firms in China. We used Chinese family firms to examine our hypothesized model for two reasons. First, after a period of high-speed economic development, Chinese family businesses are gradually entering a stage of stable development and succession. Of all private enterprises in China, 85.4% are family-owned (Ren & Zhu, 2016), and approximately three fourths will undergo the process of succession in the next 5 to 10 years (Gilding, Gregory, & Cosson, 2015). Second, FP value has been identified as the most future-oriented value in the Chinese culture toward succession (Yang, 1995). These two reasons indicate that the Chinese context is suitable for a timely investigation of family value congruence and its effect on family business succession.

The participants were recruited from members of the Next Generation Societies in Shanghai and Zhejiang. These societies are voluntary organizations formed and run by second-generation family firms with an estimated 200 members each. An invitation letter specifying the purpose and requirements of the study was sent to the presidents of these organizations, who then distributed the letters during their member events. A total of 141 companies agreed to have both the founder and successor participate in the survey. Two sets of questionnaires were included: one for founders and one for successors. The HR heads helped us distribute the questionnaires, which were returned in sealed envelopes. The final sample consisted of 102 founder–successor dyads, corresponding to a response rate of 72%. Among the successors, 73 were male, with an average age of 26 years (SD = 6 years). Most were college graduates and had worked in their family firms for 2 years on average. Among the founders, 84 were male, with an average age of 51 years (SD = 9 years), and most had a high school degree.

To determine whether the difference between our final sample (102 observations) and the original sample (141 observations) reflected nonrandom sampling, we tested for significant differences in the founders’ gender, age, and education between the final sample and the original sample. We created a binary outcome model, the results of which indicated that none of the founders’ demographic variables differed significantly between the initial sample and the final sample. We could not compare nonrandom sampling for successors because we did not have demographic information for the successors who were not working in the family business (141 − 102 = 39 observations). In the current study, we included only founder–successor dyads.

Measures

All question items were measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). All surveys were administered in Chinese; they were translated from English and then back-translated (Brislin, 1980).

Independent Variable

Family Prosperity Value: We used the four-item FP scale developed by Yeh and Yang (1997) for both founders and successors. One example item was “I am willing to work hard to bring honor to my family.” The α coefficients were .89 for the founders and .90 for the successors.

Mediator and Dependent Variable

Founder-Successor Relationship Quality: FSR quality was measured by three items derived from Venter et al. (2005). Successors were asked to rate their relationship with their founder. One example item was “During the succession process, the founder and I have a mutually supportive relationship.” Cronbach’s α was .78.

Successor Willingness: Willingness to take over the family business was measured with eight items from Venter et al. (2005). The successors were asked to rate the extent to which they were willing to take over the firm. One example item was “I have a strong desire to take over the family business.” Cronbach’s α was .90.

Control Variables

Given that demographic differences in age, gender, and education may affect attitudes in a founder–successor dyad (Schaubroeck & Lam, 2002; Tsui & O’Reilly, 1989) and thus provide plausible alternative explanations for the relationships of interest, we controlled for the differences in these three variables. Both founder and successor age were measured as ordinal variables (20-29 years old was labeled 1, 30-39 labeled 2, 40-49 labeled 3, 50-59 labeled 4, and above 60 labeled 5). Founder and successor education levels were also measured as ordinal variables (middle school education was labeled 1, high school labeled 2, undergraduate labeled 3, and graduate labeled 4). Dissimilarities in age and education were computed as the absolute value of the difference between the founder and successor (Green, Anderson, & Shivers, 1996): For example, if a founder was aged 50 to 59 and a successor was aged 20 to 29, their age difference was treated as 4 − 1 = 3). Dissimilarity in gender was coded such that zero indicated the same gender and one the opposite.

Data Analysis

Polynomial Regression and Response Surface Methodology

To empirically investigate the proposed theoretical model and test the stated hypotheses, we adopted polynomial regression and response surface methodology (Edwards, 2002; Edwards & Parry, 1993); these analytical approaches can be used to examine founder and successor FP values simultaneously. Polynomial regression is appropriate for the present study because it allows us to examine the complicated mutual dynamics of value (in)congruence in a founder–successor dyad, as proposed in our hypotheses.

Methodologically, polynomial regression has many advantages over other statistical methods to test (in)congruence effects. Specifically, other approaches, such as dichotomization and difference scores, impose unrealistic and untested constraints on the two independent variables and force them into one dimension, which leads to low reliability, loss of information, ambiguous interpretation, and confusing results (Edwards, 2002; Edwards & Parry, 1993). On the contrary, polynomial regression does not have these constraints and thus allows the two independent variables to represent their own respective psychological construct dimensions; therefore, polynomial regression is capable of examining the match or mismatch of two independent variables at either high or low levels (Edwards, 1994, 2001; MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002) and of enabling the testing of three-dimensional relationships (i.e., founder FP value, successor FP value, and successor outcomes; Lambert, Edwards, & Cable, 2003). This approach facilitates our understanding of the complex patterns of the outcome variables that might emerge from FP value (in)congruence and allows us to make more theoretically relevant contrasts, as proposed in our hypotheses.

Based on the procedures recommended for polynomial regression (Edwards, 1994; Edwards & Parry, 1993), we regressed the mediator and the dependent variable, respectively, on the control variables and the five polynomial terms: (1) successor FP value, (2) founder FP value, (3) successor value squared, (4) successor value times founder value, and (5) founder value squared. To reduce multicollinearity, the successor FP value and founder FP value were both centered on the pooled grand mean in the polynomial regressions and in the response surfaces (Z. Zhang et al., 2012).

To test our hypotheses, we examined three key features of the three-dimensional response surfaces as specified by Edwards and Cable (2009). The first feature involves the curvature of the incongruence line on which successor FP value is the opposite of founder FP value. This curvature characterizes whether there is FP value congruence for the mediator and the dependent variable, which would be necessary for supporting Hypothesis 1a. Specifically, the curvature of a response surface along the incongruence line should be negative (i.e., an inverted U shape) and significant such that the outcome variable increases when the successor and founder FP value move from either end point of the incongruence line toward the middle, approaching the congruence line on which successor FP value equals founder FP value, that is, a successor and a founder reach more congruence in their FP value. The second feature of the response surface is the slope along the congruence line, which is key to testing whether an outcome variable is higher when the successor FP value and founder FP value are congruently high than when they are congruently low and thus whether Hypothesis 1b is supported. Specifically, the slope of the response surface along the congruence line should be positive and significant (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Edwards & Parry, 1993).

To test Hypothesis 2, we examined the third feature of the response surface graph, which involves the slope of the response surface along the incongruence line. This feature requires that the slope along the incongruence line be positive and significant (Z. Zhang et al., 2012). Specifically, it indicates that the outcome variable should be higher when the FP value of a successor is higher than that of a founder than when the FP value of a successor is lower than that of a founder. Note that the congruence line and the incongruence line are perpendicular, and we label these two lines in both response surface graphs (see Figures 3 and 4).

Figure 3.

Three-dimensional response surface for founder–successor relationship.

Figure 4.

Three-dimensional response surface for successor succession willingness.

Additionally, we used the delta method and the Wald test to facilitate easy interpretation of Hypotheses 1b and 2. Following Y. T. Lee and Antonakis’s (2014) approach, we examined the predicted values of the four corner points on the response surfaces. As shown in the response surface figures (Figures 3 and 4), Point A is the predicted value of an outcome variable for founder–successor congruence on high FP. Point B is the predicted value for founder–successor congruence on low FP. Point C is the predicted value for low successor but high founder FP. Point D is the predicted value for high successor but low founder FP. We label these four points in both response surface figures.

The delta method can evaluate the approximate standard error for a nonlinear function of polynomial regression coefficients (Oehlert, 1992). We used this method to compute the standard error of the predicted value differences (i.e., the difference between Point A and Point B for Hypothesis 1b and the difference between Point D and Point C for Hypothesis 2) by using a robust version of the Wald test. If the Wald test shows that Point A is significantly higher than Point B, it implies that the slope of the response surface along the congruence line is significantly positive, thus providing additional evidence to support Hypothesis 1b. If Point D is significantly higher than Point C, it implies that the slope of the response surface along the incongruence line is significantly positive, providing additional evidence to support Hypothesis 2 (Y. T. Lee & Antonakis, 2014).

Mediation Test Using the Block Variable Approach

Finally, to test the mediation effect in Hypothesis 3, we used the “block variable” approach (Edwards & Cable, 2009). This approach can greatly facilitate the assessment of the direct and indirect effects of (in)congruence in mediation models (Heise, 1972). In Step 1, the joint effects of the five polynomial terms were combined into a block variable as the linear combination weighted by their regression coefficients (Z. Zhang et al., 2012). A higher value of the block variable corresponds to FP congruence, and a lower value of the block variable corresponds to incongruence. In Step 2, we regressed the mediator, that is, FSR, on the block variable with the same control variables from the original model. The regression coefficient obtained for the block variable in this step is commonly referred to as the “a” path in mediation models. In Step 3, we regressed the dependent variable, that is, succession willingness, on the mediator, the block variable, and the control variables. The regression coefficient for the mediator in this step is generally referred to as the “b” path. The “a” and “b” paths were multiplied (a × b) to estimate the indirect effect; the significance of the indirect effect was then tested by 10,000 bootstrapped samples (Efron & Tibshirani, 1994).

Results

The descriptive statistics and correlations are reported in Table 1. The reliabilities of the independent variables, mediator, and dependent variable are provided on the diagonal. We used confirmatory factor analysis to test the discriminant validity of the four variables (founder FP value, successor FP value, FSR, and succession willingness). Following previous research conducted by Sass and Smith (2006), we randomly combined the scale items of these variables into parcels for a series of six alternative models. The hypothesized four-factor model was compared with these alternative models. Our results showed that the hypothesized four-factor model fit the data well, χ²/degrees of freedom (df) = 1.37; comparative fit index = .96; Tucker–Lewis index = .95; root mean square error of approximation = .06; standardized root mean square residual = .07) and was significantly better than alternative models (all Δχ² were significant, p < .001). These results provided evidence that the four key variables we investigated can be distinguished from one another. We further conducted the common latent factor test (Bentler & Bonnet, 1980; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003; Widaman, 1985) to examine whether there was potential common method bias for the three variables rated by successors (i.e., successor FP value, FSR, and successor’s willingness). The test disclosed that the common latent factor model, which includes a common latent factor and the three successor-rated variables, was not significantly different from the trait model, which includes the three successor-rated variables (ΔTucker–Lewis index = .01, Δχ²(1) = 1.63, n.s.). Hence, we concluded that common method bias was not a concern. The detailed confirmatory factor analysis and common method bias tests are available on request from the authors.

Table 1.

Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, and Reliabilities.

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Gender difference	0.40	0.49	—
2. Age difference	2.51	0.73	.06	—
3. Education difference	0.90	0.72	−.03	.06	—
4. Founder FP value	4.21	0.60	.10	−.06	.07	(.89)
5. Successor FP value	4.27	0.62	.15	−.03	−.09	.41***	(.90)
6. FSR	4.09	0.60	.00	.04	.06	.12	.44***	(.78)
7. Successor willingness	3.96	0.66	.03	−.04	.06	.19^†	.49***	.54***	(.90)

Note. FP = family prosperity; FSR = founder–successor relationship. No. of observations = 102 founders and 102 successors. Reliabilities are reported along the diagonal.

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 2 shows the polynomial regression results. We also drew response surface plots for both the FSR and succession willingness. Hypothesis 1a predicted that founder–successor FP value congruence leads to significantly higher FSR. As shown in the “Model 1” column of Table 2, the three quadratic terms were jointly significant in predicting the FSR (F value = 4.52, p < .01) and explained 17% more of its variation, indicating a nonlinear relationship between the independent variables and the mediator; thus, polynomial regression is an appropriate approach. For the first response surface feature mentioned above, the curvature along the incongruence line was negative and significant (b₃ − b₄ + b₅ = −.69, p < .05), indicating that the requirement for the first feature was met (Cole, Carter, & Zhang, 2013). Figure 3 shows the response surface of FSR, which appears to be an inverted U shape along the incongruence line as we described above. Hence, Hypothesis 1a was supported.

Table 2.

Polynomial Regression Results for Congruence Between Successor FP Value and Founder FP Value,^a,b FSR, and Successor Willingness.

Variable	Model 1: FSR	Model 2: Successor willingness	Model 3: Successor willingness
Constant	3.71*** (0.35)	3.90*** (0.42)	3.73*** (0.34)
Control variable^c
Founder–successor gender difference	−.12 (.11)	−.03 (.12)	−.07 (.11)
Founder–successor age difference: Level 1	−.39 (.42)	−.21 (.48)	−.16 (.41)
Founder–successor age difference: Level 2	.42 (.33)	.07 (.41)	.30 (.32)
Founder–successor age difference: Level 3	.36 (.33)	−.06 (.41)	.10 (.32)
Founder–successor age difference: level 4	.58 (.42)	−.18 (.55)	−.11 (.41)
Founder–successor education difference: Level 1	−.04 (.12)	.01 (.13)	.11 (.12)
Founder–successor education difference: Level 2	.18 (.16)	.19 (.17)	.23 (.15)
Founder–successor education difference: Level 3	.62 (.50)	.25 (.58)	−.05 (.49)
Mediator
FSR	—	—	.37*** (.10)
Polynomial terms^d
b₁: Successor FP (S)	.45** (.13)	.60*** (.12)	.39** (.14)
b₂: Founder FP (F)	−.05 (.13)	−.12 (.12)	−.11 (.13)
b₃: S²	−.08 (.11)	.08 (.13)	.04 (.10)
b₄: S × F	.54** (.18)	.59** (.21)	.35^† (.18)
b₅: F²	−.07 (.09)	−.19^† (.10)	−.19* (.09)
R ²	31%	30%	47%
Congruence line (S = F)
Slope (b₁ + b₂)	.40** (.13)	.48*** (.12)	.28* (.13)
Curvature (b₃ + b₄ + b₅)	.39** (.14)	.48** (.18)	.20 (.13)
Incongruence line (S = −F)
Slope (b₁ − b₂)	.50* (.23)	.72*** (.20)	.50* (.23)
Curvature (b₃ − b₄ + b₅)	−.69* (.27)	.70* (.34)	−.50^† (.27)
F value for the 3 quadratic terms	4.52**	4.99**	3.49*
ΔR² for the 3 quadratic terms	17%	10%	14%

Note. FP = family prosperity; FSR = found–successor relationship.

Observations = 102 pairs of founders and successors. ^bUnstandardized regression coefficients (standard error in parentheses) are reported. ^cDifferences in gender, age and education were used as control variables. All control variables were ordinal variables. ^db1 to b5 represents regression coefficients for their respective polynomial terms.

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Hypothesis 1b predicted a significant positive effect such that a founder–successor dyad that is congruent in high FP value has a higher quality FSR than a dyad that is congruent in low FP value. The second feature of the response surface illustrated above requires a significant positive slope along the congruence line. Model 1 in Table 2 indicates that the slope of the response surface along the congruence line is significantly positive (b₁ + b₂ = .40, p < .01), which suggests that a congruently high FP value was associated with a higher quality FSR than a congruently low FP value. As additional support, in Figure 3, we calculated the difference in the predicted FSR on the response surface graph at Point A (i.e., where both founder and successor are congruently high in FP) against Point B (where both are congruently low in FP) by using the delta method and the Wald test (Y. T. Lee & Antonakis, 2014; Oehlert, 1992). The results showed that Point A was significantly higher than Point B (Point A − Point B = 1.18, SE = 0.39, χ² = 9.23, df = 1, p < .01). This finding confirmed that FSR was higher when FP value was congruently high (Point A) than when the value was congruently low (Point B). Hence, Hypothesis 1b was supported.

Hypothesis 2 predicted a significant effect such that FSR is higher when a successor has higher FP value than a founder than when a successor has a lower FP value. This prediction is related to the third feature of the response surface described above and should produce a significant positive slope along the incongruence line. As shown in Model 1, Table 2, the slope along the incongruence line was positive and significant (b₁ − b₂ = .50, p < .05) that indicated that FSR was greater when the FP value of the successor was higher than that of the founder than when the FP value of the successor was lower. We further used the delta method and the Wald test to calculate the difference in the predicted values for the FSR between Point D (where the successor has high FP and the founder has low FP) and Point C (where the successor has low FP and the founder has high FP) on the response surface graph in Figure 3. The results showed that Point D was significantly higher than Point C (Point D − Point C = 1.51, SE = .69, χ² = 4.72, df = 1, p < .05). Thus, Hypothesis 2 was also supported.

We further explored the dynamics of founder–successor FP (in)congruence on the successor’s willingness to take over the business, and we expected that the corresponding polynomial regression patterns would be similar to those of FSR. Model 2, Table 2, shows the polynomial regression results for succession willingness. The three quadratic terms were jointly significant in predicting succession willingness (F value = 4.99, p < .01) and explained 10% more of its variation, and the curvature along the incongruence line was negative and significant (b₃ − b₄ + b₅ = −.70, p < .05). The slope of the response surface along the congruence line was significantly positive (b₁ + b₂ = .48, p < .001), suggesting that congruently high FP was associated with higher successor willingness than congruently low FP. In Figure 4, the delta method confirmed that Point A in the response surface graph was significantly higher than Point B (Point A − Point B = 1.25, SE = 0.36, χ² = 13.54, df = 1, p < .001). Model 2, Table 2, further shows that the slope along the incongruence line was positive and significant (b₁ − b₂ = .72, p < .001), which indicates that successor willingness was greater when the FP value of the successor was higher than that of the founder compared with when it was lower. In Figure 4, the delta method showed that Point D was significantly higher than Point C (Point D − Point C = 1.62, SE = 0.49, χ² = 12.52, df = 1, p < .001).

To test the mediating effect of FSR on the relationship between founder–successor (in)congruence in FP value and successor willingness, we added FSR to Model 3 in Table 2 after controlling for congruence effects. The FSR showed a significant positive impact on successor willingness (b = .37, p < .001); the three quadratic terms remained jointly significant (F value = 3.49, p < .05). Regarding the “a-path” linking FP value congruence and FSR, on the basis of the polynomial regression predicting FSR, we used the block variable approach to achieve a single standardized coefficient to present the combined effects of FP value congruence on FSR. This coefficient had a value of .79 (p < .001; the β column in Model 1, Table 3). The coefficient for the “b-path” linking FSR to successor willingness in the block variable approach equaled .34 (p < .001; the β column in Model 3, Table 3). Table 3 shows that mediation had a significant indirect effect of .27 (= .79 × .34, SE = .08, p < .001, bootstrapping repeated 10,000 times). The direct effect remained significant, with a standardized coefficient of .42 (p < .001; the β column in Model 3, Table 3), a decrease from .89 (the β column in Model 2, Table 3). The drop in the direct effect coefficient from .89 to .42 indicates that the indirect path through FSR explained a large amount of the variation in the overall effect of FP value congruence on successor willingness. We used a bootstrap technique (repeated 10,000 times) to check whether this drop was significantly different from zero. Our results showed that the estimated difference was .47, and the bias-corrected 95% confidence interval of this difference was in the range of [.28, .67]. These results confirmed that there was a significant difference in the relationship between founder–successor FP value congruence and successor willingness before adding the mediator versus after adding it. Thus, taking both the significant direct and indirect effects into consideration, these results show that FSR partially mediated the effects of founder–successor FP value congruence on successor willingness to take over the family business. Hence, Hypothesis 3 was supported.

Table 3.

FSR Mediation of the Successor Willingness.

	Model 1: FSR			Model 2: Successor willingness			Model 3: Successor willingness
	BB	SE	β	b	SE	β	B	SE	β
Constant	4.01***	0.39	—	4.01***	0.40	—	4.03***	0.38	—
Mediator
FSR	—	—	—	—	—	—	.37	.10	.34***
Controls
Founder–successor gender difference	−.05	.11	−.04	−.03	.11	−.02	−.01	.11	−.01
Founder–successor age difference—Level 1	.06	.45	.07	−.23	.47	−.25	−.25	.44	−.27
Founder–successor age difference: Level 2	.05	.39	.07	.01	.40	.01	−.01	.38	−.01
Founder–successor age difference: Level 3	.07	.39	.04	−.10	.40	–.05	−.12	.38	−.11
Founder–successor age difference: Level 4	.44	.51	.36	−.09	.52	−.07	−.26	.49	−.13
Founder–successor education difference: Level 1	−.02	.12	−.03	−.04	.13	.04	−.03	.12	−.02
Founder–successor education difference: Level 2	.13	.16	.16	.23	.16	.25	.18	.15	.20
Founder–successor education difference: Level 3	.71	.56	.39	.24	.57	.12	−.02	.54	−.02
IV:
Block variable (congruence of family prosperity value)	.97	.17	.79***	1.19	.18	.89***	.84	.19	.42***
Indirect effect^a: (.79 × .34)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	.08	.27***
95% bootstrap bias-corrected confidence interval for the indirect effect^b	—	—	—	—	—	—	[.13, .44]

Note. FSR = founder–successor relationship.

Standardized coefficients are multiplied and reported. ^bBootstrap repeated 10,000 times.

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Discussion

This study extends the literature on family business succession by focusing on the role of value (in)congruence between the founder and successor in shaping the FSR, which, in turn, influences the successor’s succession willingness. Drawing on social exchange theory, we argue that congruent FP values in founder–successor dyads foster positive social exchange and promote higher-quality relationships, in turn enhancing the successor’s willingness to take over the family business. We found a significant effect of founder–successor FP value congruence on the quality of FSR. Moreover, in the congruence scenarios, founder–successor dyads that are congruent at high level of FP value have a higher quality FSR than dyads that are congruent at low level of FP value. Regarding the incongruent scenarios, dyads in which the FP value of the successor is higher than that of the founder enjoy a higher quality FSR than dyads in which the FP value of the successor is lower than that of the founder. We also found that the effect of value congruence on successor willingness is mediated by the quality of FSR.

Theoretical Implications

Based on a social exchange approach to family business research, our first contribution is to offer a relational perspective on the effects of FP value congruence on FSR and successor willingness. Theoretical models that examine the single perspective of either the founder or successor alone may not reveal the overall picture and, at best, tell half of the story. By offering a dyadic perspective on FP value congruence, the present study extends our knowledge of family business succession and allows a more comprehensive view of how value (in)congruence shapes the exchange between two generations (i.e., founders and successors) in the family business context. Furthermore, the congruence effect and the nuanced differential effects that we found indicate that a founder–successor dyad can adopt either a generalized exchange or a restricted exchange (Long & Mathews, 2011) in their interactions based on their dyadic FP value, which makes family business succession an outcome of mutual fit between the two parties.

The generalized exchange derived from congruence of a founder’s and successor’s high FP values guarantees, to a large degree, that the founder’s legacy can be carried on by the second generation, which relieves the founder’s concern about the sustainability and continuity of the family business. We believe that the joint effects of high FP value congruence facilitate the “mutual role adjustment” (Handler, 1994) between a founder and successor as well as the necessary role changes on the founder’s side by allowing the founder to overcome his or her fear of losing control over the family business, make necessary family leadership transitions, and engage in mentoring activities and knowledge sharing that helps the successor eventually take over the business (Long & Chrisman, 2014). On the other hand, the restricted exchange derived from congruence of a founder’s and successor’s low FP values is motivated by primarily self-interest, and the exchange is formed as means to specific ends. Based on the notion of contractual arrangement and short-term returns, the expectations can be made clear to both sides, and thus, a harmonious relationship can be maintained.

FP value congruence with the founder guarantees that the reciprocity between the two parties is either benevolent (generalized exchange in the high-high FP value congruence scenario) or clearly defined (restricted exchange in the low-low FP value congruence scenario), which should enhance family cohesion (Long & Chrisman, 2014; Long & Mathews, 2011) and/or reduce conflicts. Therefore, the two generations can communicate candidly about the expected role the successor will play in the future of the family business and the degree to which he or she has the willingness to take over the family business. This will allow the successor to be more prepared for succession and/or pursue his or her personal agenda without objection from the founder.

Second, we extended the concept of value congruence to family business research. Prior research on value congruence has given little attention to the influence of family values on individual attitudes and behaviors. This study explored the significant effects of founder–successor FP value (in)congruence on successor willingness, as family values play an important role in family businesses. Perhaps more important, this study found that value (in)congruence works differently in different conditions, exerting both joint effects and differential effects. These findings are important because they provide evidence that value congruence is not all equally positive and beneficial and that value incongruence is not all equally negative and detrimental. Thus, our study demonstrates that FP value congruence versus incongruence has different effects on succession willingness depending on the types of social exchange in these (in)congruence scenarios.

Third, conceptualizing the mediating role of FSR in the relationship between founder–successor value congruence and successor willingness is another contribution of our study. Family business succession is an outcome of multiple factors, and a successor’s willingness to take over the business depends on a variety of remote and/or proximal antecedents. We believe that value congruence is more likely to be a remote antecedent of succession willingness because value congruence between a parent and a child tends to evolve over a long period of time before the dyad begins to consider family succession. Therefore, value congruence is more likely to first influence other proximal antecedents of succession willingness, such as FSR, before it eventually influences successor willingness. Our study showed that FSR mediates the effects of FP value congruence on successor willingness, which indicates that we need to consider both remote and proximal antecedents of successor willingness to gain a complete understanding of family business succession.

Last but not least, we contribute to the family business literature by responding to a recent call for more studies in underrepresented areas, such as Asia (Sharma & Chua, 2013). Family firms in China are relatively new. Many founders of Chinese family firms struggle to transfer their business to a second-generation successor (Cao, Cumming, & Wang, 2015); thus, China provides a unique setting for our study. Since between-generation social exchange in the succession process, especially from the first to second generations, tends to be a universal issue for family firms, our research paradigm of mediated value congruence guided by social exchange theory in the Chinese context should make an important contribution to knowledge of family business succession and thus provide a useful reference for family businesses in other countries.

Practical Implications

Our findings also have practical implications. Based on our results, we believe that founders may find it useful to consider the values of their children before making a succession plan and selecting a potential successor. This practice may be important not only for selecting an appropriate successor but also in terms of saving companies training costs. Moreover, family business owners who have poor relationships with their children should note that early education in FP value and frequent communication may be helpful. Consultants in the field of succession planning could use various value instruments to uncover and discuss differences in family values. Examination and discussion of such differences may be a first step toward awareness and mutual understanding and may, over time, enhance the quality of the relationship.

Limitations and Future Research

This study has limitations that should be noted. First, although we believe that the influence of value congruence in founder–successor dyads should exist in all family businesses worldwide, we collected data only in China, which may cause external validity concerns. In addition, we focused only on succession from the founding generation to the second generation, G1 to G2. The congruence effect may vary from G2 to G3. Future research could address these limitations by comparing findings based on samples from different generations and from both Western and Eastern countries.

Second, our research interest was the mediating role of FSR on successor’s willingness to take over the business, which also limited the scope of other relational mechanism for family business succession. For example, meso-level analyses have addressed the importance of trust, cohesion, and a shared vision for the effective building and transfer of leadership to a successor (Bruce & Picard, 2006; De Massis et al., 2008; Lansberg, 1988; Long & Chrisman, 2014). Although we argue above that, theoretically, shared goals for a family business embedded in FP value congruence is one route through which social exchange can facilitate FSR, empirical research is needed to demonstrate that FP value congruence will lead to higher trust or shared vision between a founder and a successor. In doing so, we can obtain a better understanding of how value congruence contributes to more comprehensive social relations in family businesses.

In addition to successor willingness to take over the business, future research could explore the direct or indirect relationships between FSR and nonfamily managers’ attitudes toward succession. For nonfamily managers, a healthy and positive FSR implies that mutual trust and respect exist between the founder and successor and that both have the willingness to work together seamlessly in the family leadership transition process. Similarly, a positive FSR may also positively influence the perceptions and attitudes of outside business partners/stakeholders toward the family business succession. It would be interesting to examine whether value congruence between two family generations has a ripple effect on outside stakeholders who may be affected by the succession process.

Finally, our study examined only founder–successor value congruence, and the (dis)similarities in family values among other key stakeholders were not tested. For example, value congruence between a successor and his or her siblings may influence the relational dynamics in the family and whether siblings either support or oppose the successor. The parent will, sooner or later, become aware of the relationship quality among his or her children and realize how the succession will affect family cohesion, business sustainability, and/or even the survival of the family business. Thus, successor–sibling value (in)congruence should be integrated into research on sibling rivalry and family business succession (Grote, 2003), as such studies will enrich our understanding of how relationships in younger generations affect a successor’s willingness to take over the business and the incumbent’s decision regarding succession.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we developed a mediation model that explains how founder–successor dyadic FP value congruence enhances the quality of FSR, which in turn leads to increased successor willingness to take over the family business. Our empirical results support the proposed model. Given the importance of succession in family businesses, we hope our research will encourage researchers to further investigate the intriguing dynamics through which value (in)congruence between and among various stakeholders affects interactions and decisions in family firms.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: National natural science foundation of China, No. 71702195.

Author Biographies

Jean S. K. Lee is the Michelin chair professor in Leadership and Human Resources Management and director for Family Heritage at China Europe International Business School, Shanghai. Her research interests include leadership, corporate culture, women in leadership, and family business.

Guozhen Zhao is an associate professor at College of Business and Aviation, Delta State University, United States. His research interests include person–environment fit, organizational identification, and work–family enrichment.

Feifei Lu is an assistant professor in the area of entrepreneurship and family business at SHU-UTS SILC Business School, Shanghai University. Her research interests include family business research, leadership, entrepreneurship, and corporate social responsibilities.

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The Effect of Value Congruence Between Founder and Successor on Successor’s Willingness: The Mediating Role of the Founder–Successor Relationship

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

Social Exchange Theory and Value Congruence

FP Value Congruence and Quality of FSR

FP Value Incongruence and Quality of FSR

FSR Quality and Successor Willingness

Method

Data and Sampling

Measures

Independent Variable

Mediator and Dependent Variable

Control Variables

Data Analysis

Polynomial Regression and Response Surface Methodology

Mediation Test Using the Block Variable Approach

Results

Discussion

Theoretical Implications

Practical Implications

Limitations and Future Research

Conclusion

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

Author Biographies

References